ETHIOPIA:

Government recognition of conflict IDPs crucial to addressing their plight

A profile of the internal displacement situation

26 April, 2006
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Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

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Government recognition of conflict IDPs crucial to addressing their plight

Internal displacement due to conflict occurs in different parts of Ethiopia. It is caused mainly by ethnic tensions exacerbated by the government’s regionalisation policy along ethnic lines, tight political control from the centre, and widespread resource shortages in a chronically food-insecure country. In the absence of a coherent approach to internally displaced persons (IDPs), estimates of displacement vary from 100,000 to 280,000, including some 60,000 drought IDPs. This report considers the displacement situations in the four regions of Tigray, Somali, Oromiya and Gambella. Drought displacement and the national resettlement scheme are mentioned as well.

There is no official line on who is an IDP and official recognition of IDPs is politically sensitive. While the displaced in some regions, such as Tigray and parts of Gambella, are said to be integrated in the government’s food-for-work programme or receive food aid, many displaced are currently not recognised as such, which puts them in danger of being excluded from national food distribution schemes and the required protection. The current drought affecting the south and east of Ethiopia is again diverting attention from the plight of IDPs. Political volatility as occurred after the May 2005 parliamentary elections and tensions along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border could easily cause additional displacement.

The UN hopes to engage the Ethiopian government in a national IDP assessment exercise in 2006. This would be an important first step towards recognising the problem and scope of internal displacement in Ethiopia and identifying IDP-specific protection needs in a situation of great overall humanitarian need. It is hoped that the assessment will lead to improvements in the provision of national and international assistance, which is currently ad hoc and treats IDPs as merely part of vulnerable groups. However, effective protection, as well as sustainable and safe reintegration of IDPs, will depend on the progress made in addressing the causes of conflicts in Gambella and Somali/Oromiya regions, the physical demarcation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, the protection of minority interests and the availability of basic public services.

Background and main causes of displacement

Ethiopia has a long history of centralised state power, culminating in almost 20 years of military rule under the Dergue. After toppling the Dergue regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) quickly turned itself into the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and monopolised power, marginalising other regional groups or pushing them into opposition.

In an attempt to decentralise the rigid system it had inherited, the EPRDF engaged in a major reform process. Nine regions were created, to a large extent following ethnic lines. Within the regions, power was vested in wereda (district councils) and kebele (local councils). These, however, are governed by political parties either directly affiliated, or allied, to the EPRDF. Thus in practice democratisation and decentralisation remain superficial, despite official declarations to the contrary. Central government holds a firm grip on regional, district, and local entities, without shying away from using force against political opponents (UNHCR, January 2004; HRW, May 2005). Existing tensions among Ethiopia’s 80 ethnic groups are in effect exacerbated by the government’s regionalisation policy which effectively increases people’s awareness of ethnic differences, while at the same time not ensuring the protection of ethnic minorities’ interests.
The May 2005 parliamentary elections led to the violent suppression in June and November 2005 of widespread protests against vote-rigging by the EPRDF, and allegedly to the displacement of thousands of people (HRW, 13 January 2006; ENC, 24 July 2005). In reaction to the repression, several donors have diverted their support for Ethiopia away from the government, instead funding NGOs directly; they have warned the government that non-partisan aid distribution has become difficult in an increasingly politicised environment (IRIN, 14 November 2005).

**Tigray: war displacement**

Despite a history of common struggle to overthrow the 1974-1991 Dergue dictatorship, tensions between the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea – which had gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after having been part of the latter since 1962 – rose quickly during the 1990s, escalating into an all-out war between May 1998 and June 2000. The cause was a dispute over small sections of their common border. About 100,000 people were killed in the conflict and over 360,000 internally displaced, of whom 90 per cent in the Tigray Region and about 30,000 in Afar (GoE, 17 November 2000). Ethiopia deported tens of thousands of persons identified as Eritreans, while Eritrea did the same with persons identified as Ethiopians living on its territory.

Most IDPs – but not these Eritrean deportees – returned home after a June 2000 ceasefire, followed by the December 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement. Today, an estimated 62,000 people remain displaced in the Tigray region, living mostly in host communities, with minimal external support.

The rejection by Ethiopia of a supposedly legally binding Boundary Commission border demarcation ruling, issued in April 2002, caused renewed tensions between the two states, leading up to a stand-off at the end of 2005 along the border, and raising fears of renewed internal displacement in both countries. The monitoring activities of the 3,000-strong United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in the demilitarised 25-km-wide Temporary Security Zone along the border were seriously hampered (UNNS, 11 November 2005). The Boundary Commission agreed in early 2006 to negotiate with Ethiopia and Eritrea the resumption of its demarcation activity, interrupted in 2003 (UN SC, 3 January and 6 March 2006). In the hope that such diplomatic activity would lead to more stability, the UN Security Council extended UNMEE’s mandate, due to expire by 15 April 2006, for one month (UN SC, 13 April 2006).

**Gambella**

In the remote south-western Gambella region, multiple ethnic conflicts between two main groups, the Anuak and the Nuer, displaced tens of thousand of people (OCHA Ethiopia, May 2004). A parallel conflict involved the Anuak and “Highlanders” (mostly resettled forcefully in the 1980s under the Dergue regime). Along with immigrating Nuer from Sudan, they reduced the Anuak to a minority group (HRW, 24 March 2005).

The long-standing conflict escalated in late 2003 and increasingly involved the Ethiopian army. At least 15,000 people, mostly Anuak, were forced to flee their homes in December 2003 (HRW, 24 March 2005; IRIN, 12 February 2004). Since then, and particularly after counter-attacks by Anuak on Highlanders, the army is reported to have committed widespread human rights violations against the Anuak throughout the region, in a climate of almost total impunity and adding to the general insecurity (UN CTE, 20 April 2005; HRW, 24 March 2005; Amnesty International, 17 December 2004). The central government assumed de facto regional control after a change in the regional government.

Incursions of Anuak and Nuer rebel groups from neighbouring Sudan have also caused displacement along the border. Occasional incidents of violence are still occurring in the region, displacing over 3,000 people in Nuer zone in early 2006 (UNCT, February 2006). With the continuously fragile security situation and inaccessibility of parts of Gambella to humanitarian...
actors, consistent displacement monitoring is virtually impossible and the UN maintains a working figure of 50,000 IDPs, pending assessment (OCHA, email correspondence, 7 February 2006; UN CTE, 20 April 2005).

**Borena (Oromiya region)**
The central government’s suppression of political dissent is particularly harsh in Oromiya region but is often difficult to monitor, especially in rural areas. Because of the government’s history of repression, reports from political opponents and human rights organisations that thousands of people, particularly in Borena, had to leave their homes in the wake of widespread repression after the May 2005 parliamentary elections seem plausible (HRW, 13 January 2006; ENC, July 2005).

Ethnic conflict between the Gabra and the Guji, and between the Gabra and the Borena displaced over 40,000 people in 2005. Many remain displaced, and local authorities do not consider them eligible for emergency food distribution and other basic services and protection. This makes their situation very precarious, particularly in the context of the current drought (Daily Monitor, 19 July 2005; UN OCHA, 3 January 2006).

**Tensions along regional border between Somali and Oromiya**
In December 2003 in Somali region, fighting between Oromos and Somalis – claiming land ownership and rights – led to the displacement of 19,000 people (almost 3,000 families), whereas 70,000 others were displaced by drought (OCHA Ethiopia, May 2004).

A border referendum carried out in October 2004 along parts of the regional border between Oromiya and Somali to determine the preference for administrative status of border kebeles created animosities between the two ethnic groups and forced tens of thousands of people belonging to minorities to leave their homes.

OCHA estimates that up to 80,000 people were displaced by the regional border conflict. It is not clear how many have returned during 2005. While the Ethiopian government claims that all displaced have returned, there may be as many as 50,000 remaining, of which around 15,000 are in need of emergency food assistance in camps in Afder zone. In July 2005, new conflicts between the Oromos and Somalis in Miesso areas of West Hararghe were reported, causing displacement in addition to the estimated 2,500 IDPs living in Miesso since December 2004. If their displacement goes unrecognised, they risk being excluded from the food allocation scheme. Assistance to those groups from NGOs was expected to stop by the end of 2005 (UNCT, July 2005).

**Drought: scarce resources as cause of ethnic tensions**
Somali and South Oromiya regions, and increasingly Afar region, are chronically food-insecure and are currently affected by one of the most severe droughts in years. In the whole country, consecutive years of drought, floods and scarcity of water and pastureland are testing the culture of sharing scarce resources to its limits, increasingly triggering conflicts (IRIN, 12 January 2005; Oxfam, February 2005). Somali region faces the additional challenge of hosting and re-integrating 75,000 IDPs displaced by drought since 2000 (OCHA email, February 2006). New drought-displacement is likely to occur. Since severe flooding in the Somali region in 2004, many displaced have received practically no assistance due to the irregular and erratic general ration distribution and lack of other coping mechanisms in the region’s camps and districts.

Within the framework of the UNDP-sponsored Regional Recovery Programme and in collaboration with the Somali regional government, the UN Country Team assessed in 2005 the possibilities for the return and reintegration of some 5,600 drought-IDPs from Hartisheik and Fafen camps to their place of origin in Deyghabur zone. That goal had been reached by February 2006 (UNCT, February 2006).
Controversial Resettlement Scheme

In early 2003, as part of its Food Security Programme, the Ethiopian government launched a new Resettlement Programme, intending to resettle, within three years, 2.2 million people from the chronically food-insecure highlands to more fertile agricultural areas. The government suggests that the scheme is successful and mostly leads to self-sufficiency (FAO/WHO, 26 February 2006). But according to other reports, resettlement was often experienced as a heavy burden, not respecting the four core principles of voluntariness, allocation of under-utilised land, host community consultation and proper preparation, and in certain cases leading to critical malnutrition. A considerable number of resettled people eventually are forced to move on (OCHA, 15 August 2005; Forum for Social Studies, 2005; Ethiopian Reporter, 24 December 2005, UNCT, February 2006; Herald, 19 March 2006). Past experiences of resettlement programmes, particularly large-scale resettlement under the Dergue regime in the 1980s, were fraught with problems and caused widespread suffering.

Population figures: who is an IDP?

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the total number of IDPs (due to drought and conflict) is between 100,000 and 280,000 out of a population of 73 million. The vagueness of the estimate stems in large part from the lack of possibilities for monitoring return movements, and from the fact that local authorities may be inflating the numbers of IDPs reported.

There is general disagreement between the Ethiopian government and the international community, and occasionally also among national agencies, on whom to consider an IDP and at what point in time someone ceases to be an IDP. Displacement for more than five years, and receiving emergency food assistance seem indicators to the government that a person is either integrated or that his or her needs are taken care of. According to the government disasters agency, there are currently no conflict-induced displacement situations in Ethiopia (OCHA, telephone interview, February 2006). In particular, new displacement is not being recognised by the government. Its early-warning system meant to respond to drought-induced displacement does not cover conflict-induced displacement (Interview with ICRC, April 2006; OCHA, 1 July 2004, p.13).

OCHA Ethiopia’s February 2006 estimates of internally displaced people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somali/Oromiya</td>
<td>border conflict</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>conflict</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigray</td>
<td>following Ethiopian-Eritrean border war</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>drought 80%, conflict 20%:</td>
<td>75,000 (15,000 conflict)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borena (Oromiya)</td>
<td>conflict between Gabra and Guji:</td>
<td>43,000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>conflict displacement of Bure:</td>
<td>1,000**</td>
</tr>
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* According to regional authorities
** According to local authorities

Acute humanitarian situation, lacking focus on IDP protection

Ethiopia is an extremely food-insecure country with up to six million people considered chronically food-insecure and another 10 million facing transitory food insecurity (FAO/WFP, 24 February 2006). While sufficient rain in 2005 assured a relatively good harvest in the west and north, the
regions of Somali, Oromiya (Borena, Bale and Hararghe), and potentially Afar and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region are seriously affected by the drought extending across the Horn of Africa. In a context where two-thirds of the population already lives in absolute poverty, the drought has devastating long-term effects on livelihoods. Malnutrition rates are high in many parts of the country, reaching alarming dimensions in Somali region, particularly in Liben (UNSSCN, February 2006; IRIN, 23 March 2006).

With much of the current national and international efforts directed at alleviating immediate drought-related needs, IDP-specific protection needs are easily overlooked, particularly in the context of resource allocation through kebele officials, and in the context of inclusion in food allocation schemes.

Kebele officials generally have great power and influence over the population and over the distribution of goods and services. Good relations with the local officials are crucial for obtaining land, farming aid, access to health care and education, and identity cards. Internally displaced persons often do not have the right connections. Ensuing possible discrimination comes in addition to the lack of traditional coping mechanisms such as family ties.

As is the case in several displacement situations in Ethiopia, IDPs will suffer from direct lack of food and water if they are not recognised by the government and included in emergency food service schemes. This has been a reported problem in Borena and in the Somali/Oromiya post-referendum displacement situation (Afder, Liben and Shinile zones). Many post-referendum IDPs have not received any assistance and their livelihood conditions and nutritional situation are deteriorating (WFP, 1 April 2005, p.5; OCHA, 11 April 2005; Relief Bulletin, 3 January 2005). While the government disasters agency does provide food assistance to some IDPs upon written request by regional authorities, the approach remains largely ad hoc (UN OCHA 2005 national assessment note). In addition, the government decided to consider IDPs locally integrated after five years and has taken many Somali IDPs with little option to return home off the assistance beneficiary lists (OCHA, 18 April 2005; 3 May 2005).

In Tigray, the government claims to have included everyone in the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), a food-for-work programme started by the Ethiopian government in February 2005 and extended to Tigray in 2006, but the inclusion of IDPs in the PSNP could so far not be verified on the ground. The government also says it provides food to Gambella’s IDPs (OCHA, telephone interview, February 2006, UNCT, February 2006).

In Gambella region, many displaced have moved to abandoned refugee camps along the Sudanese border, where they receive no assistance at all and are in urgent need of shelter and health services (UN CTE, 20 April 2005, OCHA, telephone interview, February 2006).

**Obstacles to return**

In the Tigray region, landmines and insecurity are the main protection concerns still preventing many of the remaining IDPs from returning home and becoming self-sufficient. In Ethiopia as a whole there are still some two million mines; they killed almost 600 people and wounded over 700 between 2001 and 2004, most of them in Tigray and Afar regions (IRIN, 6 April 2006). The field teams of the Mine Action Coordination Centre of the UNMEE are carrying out mine risk education and assistance for people living in areas suspected to be dangerous (SG Report, 6 March 2006).

In regions like Gambella, Somali and Oromiya, general insecurity and the lack of prospects for rebuilding livelihoods are believed to be the main reasons for people not returning. Figures relating to return are not available.
National and international response

At the national level, the Federal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) is the main government institution responsible for the emergency needs of conflict and war IDPs, in collaboration with relevant ministries such as Health, Agriculture and Water Resources. In the absence of a coherent national IDP policy, the government's response to IDPs' needs is ad hoc and inconsistent, unless it seems politically expedient to acknowledge them officially, as was the case in Tigray.

Where there are response plans for IDPs, the DPPA works in close cooperation with regional governments, local NGOs and IDP committees, UN agencies such as UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP), and international NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to provide protection and assistance to IDPs in Ethiopia (OCHA, 24 May 2004, p.5). The DPPA, in collaboration with the WFP and with the Relief Society of Tigray as its main implementing partner, has been assisting people internally displaced by the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict in the Tigray region since 1999. In Gambella, food has been delivered to the 3,000 newly-displaced (UNCT, February 2006). Despite such activities, many new displacement situations, particularly in Oromiya and Somali regions, are not consistently being recognised nor addressed.

In 2003, Ethiopia signed the Khartoum Declaration on Internal Displacement in the IGAD Sub-Region, thereby recognising that it is affected by the problems of internal displacement and that it has primary responsibility for protecting and assisting IDPs, and committing itself to developing and adopting a national IDP policy. As an important step towards national awareness-raising on the issue of internal displacement, OCHA and the Ethiopian government agreed in 2005 to carry out a national IDP assessment (OCHA, 2005 national assessment note).

This assessment would not only help the Ethiopian government focus on developing an IDP policy, it would also enable the international response, which currently focuses mainly on emergency food distribution, to address IDP-specific protection needs.

The 2006 Joint Humanitarian Appeal is presented jointly by the Ethiopian government and humanitarian agencies and led by the DPPA. While it mentions IDPs as one of the most vulnerable groups, the programmes do not specifically target conflict-IDPs. The Joint Humanitarian Appeal is meant to complement the Productive Safety Net Programme.

Effective protection, as well as sustainable and safe reintegration of IDPs, will depend on the progress made in addressing the root causes of conflicts in Gambella and Somali/Oromiya regions, the physical demarcation of the boundary, the protection of minority interests and the availability of basic public services. Official recognition of IDPs and their particular protection needs is a crucial first step in that direction.
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background to the 1998 border dispute

- Both Ethiopia and Eritrea share a joint history of armed opposition and overthrow of the Ethiopian Derg dictatorship
- In 1991 the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and took Addis Ababa and Asmara
- Eritrea nationhood was proclaimed in 1993 by 99 percent votes in favour of independence and with Ethiopian approval
- Given the excellent relations between Eritrean-Ethiopian government in early 90s, contentious issues of border-delimitation, citizenship and commerce were left unsettled and became source of conflict
- Public resentment grew against people of Eritrean and Tigrean origin for their prominence in business and politics and the under-representation of ethnic Oromo, Amhara and Somali
- After Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia became landlocked and economic relations between the two countries were further strained by the adoption of Eritrea’s own currency
- Ethiopia annexation of Eritrea in 1962 and the establishment of administrative boundaries blurred the 1902 colonial boundary notably around Badme, Tisorona-Zalambessa and Bure

“The political parties now in government in Ethiopia and Eritrea share a joint history of armed opposition to the former regime in Ethiopia: a brutal military dictatorship known as the Derg, led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.3 The Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an alliance of ethnically-based liberation fronts, which fought the Derg to obtain more autonomy for their respective regions. […] The TPLF started in 1975 as a national liberation front, with the political goal of establishing a “Democratic Republic of Tigray.” It naturally turned to Eritrean liberation fronts for assistance, and ultimately formed a close alliance with the EPLF. The relationship between the two fronts was marked from the outset by significant differences over ideology and military strategy, but pragmatism prevailed as both fronts confronted a ruthless common enemy in the Derg. As the TPLF gained increasing control over territory, it also forged the broader Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an alliance with other Ethiopian liberation fronts based on Ethiopia’s various “nationalities.”

In May 1991, the anti-Derg alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF finally gained control; first the ERPDF took Addis Ababa, then, a few days later, the EPLF won control of Asmara. Following the fall of the Derg, the EPRDF in July put in place a transitional government that was to have led Ethiopia towards democracy. […] The EPLF in late May named a provisional Eritrean government to guide the newly liberated Eritrea to formal independence two years later.

The Ethiopian Transitional Government pledged to uphold the right of self-determination for all of Ethiopia’s peoples. [...] In early July 1991, the new government approved the plan put forward by the Eritrean provisional government to hold a referendum to determine Eritrea’s status.

[...] Around the world, over one million people in more than forty countries took part in the referendum. [...] More than 99 percent of voters opted for Eritrea to separate from Ethiopia and become an independent state. [...] The vote was certified as free and fair by U.N. observers as well as by the Ethiopian government. [...] When Eritrea declared its independence, Ethiopia was among the first countries to recognize the new state.

[...]

The Short-lived Partnership

The newly-established Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and newly-independent Eritrea initially became close partners. A 1993 agreement between the ministries of internal affairs of the two countries confirmed an earlier agreement to exempt citizens of the other country from entry visa requirements. [...] This provision was intended "to promote and further consolidate the historical and cultural relationships long cherished by the peoples of the two countries, further strengthen the affinity and bonds of friendship between them."

[...]

So close were relations between the two countries that in June 1996 President Issayas Afwerki of Eritrea told an Addis Ababa newspaper that the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia was becoming "meaningless." [...]


Perhaps because the new governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea came to power as allies against a common enemy and therefore felt a great deal of trust for each other, certain aspects of their bilateral relationship— including how to define the citizenship of people of Eritrean origin living in Ethiopia after Eritrea’s independence, and the delineation of their common border—were never resolved in formal agreements. These unresolved issues as well as economic issues gradually led to tensions and hostility between the two countries.

[...]

For many, the establishment of an Eritrean provisional government and the promulgation of new laws by both this de facto authority and the new Ethiopian government raised immediate questions over the status of people of Eritrean origin in Ethiopia. Public resentment over the role of people of Eritrean origin in business and government after 1991 coincided with protests at the dominant role of Tigrean leaders in the new government. This criticism was fueled by protests that even as the new Ethiopian leaders restructured the state based on what it defined as its constituent nations and nationalities, the Oromo, Amhara, Somali, and others were underrepresented and marginalized, while the Tigrean nationality dominated. Indignation over the standing of those of Eritrean origin, however, was from Eritrea’s independence in 1993 readily transformed into a questioning of the loyalties—and ultimately the right to remain as citizens—of members of the Eritrean minority within the new Ethiopia.

[...]

Even as tentative steps were made to sort out the nationality issues in the two states, with due regard for the wishes of the people involved, a vocal minority in Ethiopia was voicing growing mistrust of people of Eritrean origin in Ethiopia. This group complained that people of Eritrean origin in the country controlled important segments of the Ethiopian economy and were working against Ethiopia’s interests and on behalf of the Eritrean government. These critics did not deny that these people still had standing as Ethiopian citizens, but opposed this on strictly chauvinistic grounds. They complained that those of Eritrean origin had yet to be obliged to choose between the one or the other country, and they pressed for the Ethiopian government to declare people of Eritrean origin in Ethiopia to be aliens under the law. [...] As the tensions grew in 1997, the rhetoric grew increasingly shrill. [...]
Controversy over the delineation of the 620-mile common border further exacerbated tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Upon becoming an independent nation in 1993, Eritrea succeeded to 1902 colonization treaty between Italy and Ethiopia, which defined the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia. However, Eritrea’s annexation by Ethiopia in 1962 had muddied the demarcation of the border since the colonial boundaries between the two formerly separate states were replaced by administrative boundaries within Ethiopia, some of which had shifted slightly over time. After 1993, both Eritrea and Ethiopia claimed sovereignty over three areas where administrative borders had changed: Badme, in the west of the border region, Tsonora-Zalambessa in the central border region, and Bure in the eastern border region.

In May 1998 the simmering border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia exploded in a military confrontation in the Badme area when Eritrea sent its army to expel Ethiopian troops stationed there and claimed the area as Eritrean. Weeks of skirmishes followed, and by early June the two former allies were at war.” (HRW, 30 January 2003, pp.11-17)

“Eritrea’s *de facto* border in 1991 was that of the Italian colony of Eritrea established in 1890. In line with the OAU principles on the integrity of colonial borders, this border was agreed to be a starting point, but both sides agreed that it was inconclusive and that some details needed to be clarified. The border had never been clearly demarcated and Italy had made several claims on Ethiopian territory prior to its full-scale invasion of Ethiopia in 1936 and five year occupation. There was no border demarcation throughout the subsequent British military administration in Eritrea, the 1952 federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, or after the removal of Eritrea's federal status in 1962, which set off the Eritrean liberation struggle. In 1991 both Ethiopia and Eritrea accepted that there were inconsistencies in the border but full demarcation was not regarded as a high priority. After an incident in July 1997, in which Eritrea claims that Ethiopian troops occupied Adi Murang, in Bada, eastern Eritrea, a bilateral border commission was set up to address problems as they arose.

Generally, relations between the two countries were good. There were large numbers of each other's citizens working in each country, who were treated the same as nationals and there was almost free movement of people across the borders. Special arrangements were in place for the use of Assab port, now on Eritrean soil, by Ethiopia (now land-locked) through which most of Ethiopia's imports and exports came. Both countries used the Ethiopian *birr* as a common currency, until 1997 when Eritrea introduced the *nakfa*. The introduction of the *nakfa* and subsequent switch to hard currency transactions between the two countries brought other economic policy differences to the fore and strained relations.

Ethiopia has a sizeable minority of people of Eritrean origin who, while voting for the independence of Eritrea in the referendum, retained their Ethiopian citizenship and considered themselves Ethiopian […] Many people of Eritrean origin worked in the Ethiopian civil service, in sensitive jobs in the telecommunications and aviation sectors, and were also prominent in business, particularly in Addis Ababa.” (AI 21 May 1999, sect.1.2)

**Chronology of the military confrontations in border areas between Eritrea and Ethiopia, May 1998 – June 2000**

- In May 1998 a military confrontation over the border town of Badme exploded between Eritrea and Ethiopia
- The first battle took place between May and June 1998 over the three disputed fronts of Badme, Tsonora-Zalambessa and Bure
- The second battle took place between February 1999 and June 1999 and Ethiopia recaptured Badme from Eritrean troops
In February 1999 waves of people were driven from their homes because of renewed aerial and artillery attacks in the border areas.

Significant clashes on the Zelambessa frontline area in early September 1999, and armed skirmish between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces took place on the border near Bure on 23 February 2000.

The heaviest Ethiopian offensive reaching deep into Eritrea took place in May 2000.

In May 1998 the simmering border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia exploded in a military confrontation in the Badme area when Eritrea sent its army to expel Ethiopian troops stationed there and claimed the area as Eritrean. Weeks of skirmishes followed, and by early June the two former allies were at war.

The two countries battled on three fronts over the three disputed areas of Badme, Tsonora-Zalambessa, and Bure. Fighting took place in cycles: short periods of pitched battle alternated with longer periods of relative lull in which only occasional skirmishes took place. The first period of major battle took place from May through June 1998—followed by seven months of relative quiet during which both belligerents rushed to train hastily-assembled recruits and conscripts. During this period both countries also engaged in a flurry of new arms purchases. Eager international weapons suppliers supplied arms and military instruction, in often cases to both countries simultaneously." (HRW, 30 January 2003, p.17)

"In May 1998 a border dispute in the Badame area escalated into a major military confrontation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. By early June 1998, the conflict had grown worse and spread into the Zalambessa and Alitena areas in the Debub Region and into the Bure area, west of Assab, in the Southern Red Sea Region. The international airport in Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, was bombed, causing the international community to evacuate the government to briefly close the airport. This conflict caused the first wave of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to flee their homes in search of safety." (UN January 2000, p.1)

"When the fighting resumed in late February 1999, Ethiopia overran Eritrea’s defensive lines and recaptured the Badme area, the original flashpoint of the conflict. The Eritreans then repelled an Ethiopian offensive against the southern border town of Tsonora, in the central front, a battle that cost both armies thousands of casualties. This second cycle of fighting came to an end with the approach of the rainy season in late June 1999.

After repeated attempts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to negotiate a truce failed, the fighting rekindled with even greater intensity in mid-May 2000 when Ethiopia launched an attack that reached deep into Eritrean territory. Eritrea, apparently hoping to secure a quick cease-fire, withdrew its forces from all contested border territories and redeployed them within uncontested Eritrean territory. After another round of OAU-sponsored negotiations in Algiers, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a “cessation of hostilities” accord on June 18, 2000. Finally, the two parties signed a comprehensive peace agreement on December 12, 2000." (HRW, 30 January 2003, p.17-18).

"Intense fighting started up again in February 1999 along the Mereb-Setit front (Badame area) and quickly expanded to the Tsonora area, then spread again to the Zalambessa and Alitena border areas. Aerial and artillery attacks upon civilians living nearby drove additional waves of people from their homes, to both rural and urban centers of the country, including the capital, Asmara, in greater numbers. The displaced people continue to stretch the capacity of existing public services, facilities, and infrastructure.

Adding to the humanitarian crisis, Ethiopia started, and is continuing, to deport people of Eritrean heritage. Over 67,000 deportees have been registered since the eruption of the conflict in May 1998 of whom over 28,000 are Rural Deportees." (UN January 2000, p.1)
"In the aftermath of the heavy fighting that took place in the Badme area during February, the month of March [1999] began relatively quietly amid calls for a ceasefire and an end to the hostilities. Hopes for a quick settlement were raised for a while following the announcement by Eritrea at the end of February that it had accepted the OAU Framework Agreement. Ethiopia later made clear it would not agree to any ceasefire nor engage in negotiations regarding the implementation of the OAU framework until Eritrea agreed to withdraw its troops from border areas around Egal and Zelambessa-Aiga, on the so-called central front, and Bada-Bure along the eastern border.

The relative lull ended on March 14 with reports that new fighting had erupted on the front line a little to the south of the strategically important town of Tsonora. According to international media reports, following an initial period of shelling using heavy artillery, fighting escalated quickly over a two-day period with the deployment of ground troops, armoured vehicles and warplanes. Given the apparent intensity and limited geographical focus of the fighting, there are concerns that heavy causalities were suffered. The focus later switched back to the western front close to the Mereb river where a series of skirmishes or clashes were reported by the media in the vicinity of the Eritrean town of Shembeko. This latest period of fighting appeared to come to a close with the Ethiopian government saying that it had successfully countered an Eritrean attempt to recapture territory it had lost around Badme during the earlier fighting in February. There have been no reports regarding the situation in the Bure border area, which is adjacent to the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab." (UN CTE 14 April 1999, p.1)

"On February 23 [2000] an armed skirmish between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces took place on the border near Bure, some 70 kms from the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab. The fighting was first reported by the Eritrean official media and later confirmed by the Office of the Ethiopian Spokesperson. The Ethiopian statement said that by attacking first and then blaming Ethiopia for initiating the engagement, the Eritrean government was attempting to deceive the international community. Eritrea claimed that Ethiopia was continuing a pattern of attacking whenever a peace envoy comes to the region.

The reports of fighting came after several months of quiet along the common border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The last significant clashes came on the Zelambessa frontline area in early September last year, and, according to Ethiopian radio reports, near the Jerbet river on the left flank of the Badme front in October. Even though there has been relative quiet along the border, the war of words between the two countries has continued unabated with Ethiopia pressing for the redeployment of Eritrean troops away from the remaining contested border areas and Eritrea accusing Ethiopia of preparing for yet another round of fighting. The enmity between the two governments became very evident during the UN General Assembly in October when the Foreign Ministers of the two countries made impassioned speeches condemning the other side and accusing the UN and international community of not doing enough to end the conflict." (UN CTE 10 March 2000)

"After two years of sporadic fighting followed by months of stalemate, Ethiopia launched a major assault against Eritrea on 12 May 2000. During this offensive, Ethiopia entered through the western flank and moved deep into Eritrea capturing Barentu, the strategic regional capital of Gash-Barka. A number of other towns in south and west of the country, including Shambiko and Tokombiya were also captured. Fighting then shifted to the central border town of Zalem Bessa. Although Eritrea has announced the withdrawal of its troops from this contested city as part of its acceptance of the OAU Peace Accord, fighting continues in areas around Senafe, another city to the north of Zalem Bessa." (UNICEF 20 June 2000)
Both Ethiopia and Eritrea used mass deportations as a weapon of war, 1998-2002

- Ethiopia deported an estimated 75,000 people of Eritrean origin to Eritrea from June 1998
- Eritrea deported an estimated 70,000 people of Ethiopian origin back to Ethiopia during from August 2000
- People deported from Ethiopia on ethnic discriminatory grounds were denied return and often separated from their own children
- Deportees had their identity documents confiscated and became stateless
- Deportees were detained and dispossessed with no recourse to due process of law prior to deportation
- Many people from Eritrean origin were forced to leave Tigray rural areas
- Many were told by Ethiopian authorities they were being deported for having voted in the referendum for Eritrean independence
- Before 2000 Eritrea supported voluntary repatriation of people of Ethiopian origins assisted by ICRC, afterwards it did not inform ICRC prior to deportation
- Many deportees from Ethiopia of Eritrean origin were registered as refugees and attended by the ERREC
- Peace deal signed in December 2000 failed to solve the plight of the deportees
- Some 60,000 expelled Ethiopians who returned from Eritrea live in difficult conditions in northern Ethiopia

“Denied return to Ethiopia, families like that of B.H. were separated on the discriminatory grounds of ethnic or national origin. Children were either left behind with relatives without Eritrean heritage, or more commonly, even though Ethiopian-born, expelled with their parents and denied the Ethiopian nationality that was their birthright under Ethiopian law. Although the authorities of independent Eritrea extended the option of Eritrean nationality to those with ties to that country, most of the uprooted retained the hope that they could return to their homes and families in Ethiopia. Reduced to the status of refugees, they confronted the specter of statelessness.

[...]

In Eritrea, a campaign of roundups, detention, and ultimately expulsion of civilians based on ethnicity and nationality paralleled the concerted nation-wide campaign that began in June 1998 in Ethiopia, but began considerably later. Even before authorities began a program of arrest, detention, and expulsion, ordinary Ethiopians living and working in Eritrea’s towns and cities were attacked by mobs, sometimes with police participation, in apparent retaliation for Ethiopia’s air attacks and battlefield advances. Thousands were subsequently interned in harsh conditions prior to expulsion.

[...]

Hundreds of thousands were internally displaced and over one million became refugees in the course of the war. Many fled or were deported to other countries in the region as both countries used mass population transfers as a weapon of war. The negotiated end of the war, agreed on December 12, 2000, stopped the fighting—but it failed to resolve the plight of those uprooted from their homes and cut off from their livelihood in both countries, in particular those deported from their own country and stripped of their nationality.

While Ethiopia and Eritrea both now appear to be conforming with the requirements of the peace agreement, the settlement deals primarily with the formal separation of the belligerents’ forces, the demarcation of the border, and competing claims for compensation. The issue of the wartime expulsion of tens of thousands of people on grounds of their purported nationality or national origin garnered surprisingly little attention from the international community during the war and remains largely overlooked in the war’s aftermath.
The Deportations
The Ethiopian government is known to have forcibly expelled an estimated 75,000 people of Eritrean origin during the war. The Eritrean government forcibly expelled or took part in the voluntary repatriation of an estimated 70,000 Ethiopians, notwithstanding persistent Eritrean government claims that it had no expulsion policy comparable to Ethiopia’s.

Ethiopia’s Campaign of Deportations
Ethiopian authorities launched a vast campaign to round up and expel people of Eritrean origin from Ethiopia in June 1998. Most had been born in Ethiopia when Eritrea was still held to be a part of that country—and had no other recognized citizenship other than Ethiopian. Most adults had spent all or most of their working lives in Ethiopia, outside of Eritrea. Ethiopian authorities in June 1998 announced the planned expulsion of residents who posed a security risk to the state, to include members of Eritrean political and community organizations, and former or current members of the Eritrean liberation front.

The Ethiopian authorities moved almost immediately to carry out arrests and to expel Eritreans and those of Eritrean origin in a manner that became increasingly indiscriminate over time. No meaningful steps were made to determine “risk” on a case-by-case basis—or to distinguish between those who had formally assumed Eritrean nationality and Ethiopian nationals distinguished only by their Eritrean origin.

The first wave of arrests and deportations began on June 12, 1998, targeting people of Eritrean origin in Ethiopia who were prominent in business, politics, or community organizations. In conjunction with this campaign, the Ethiopian government revoked business licenses and ordered the freezing of assets of thousands of individuals of Eritrean origin. Those with bank accounts were informed that their accounts had been frozen and were inaccessible. The government provided no avenue for affected individuals to challenge these actions. The main targets of the deportation campaign after June 1998 were tens of thousands of ordinary people who were deported and dispossessed on the sole basis of their national origin.

The expulsion of people from Ethiopia’s urban areas generally conformed to a common pattern, with almost all detained and interned prior to being deported—often under very harsh conditions. The majority of the deportees were held for days or weeks, although some were held for as long as several months. A “processing committee” of policemen, security agents, and political officials from the ruling party normally interrogated detainees on their identity, suspected links to Eritrean institutions—and their ownership of property. During the interrogation, the detainees were not given a meaningful opportunity to refute the allegation that they were Eritrean nationals (or security risks), and were denied access to the courts to challenge the legality of their detention or denationalization.

While the detainees were in custody at police stations, officials searched for and confiscated their Ethiopian identification documents, including identity cards, passports, work papers, and driving licenses.

Individuals of Eritrean origin who lived in rural areas of Ethiopia were also subject to summary deportation or expulsion. Individuals from those rural villages inhabited predominantly by people of Eritrean origins, mostly in the northern Tigray region, typically had to travel on foot from their villages into Eritrea. They were generally not allowed to take personal possessions with them and some were forced to abandon thousands of livestock.

The Ethiopian government arrested, detained, and deported approximately 75,000 people of Eritrean origin without due process of law. Most were told they being detained because they had voted in the referendum regarding Eritrea’s independence—with this cited as evidence they were “Eritreans.” Self-identity with others of the same national origin within Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic,
multi-national state, the essential criterion for voting in the referendum, was reinterpreted as having been an affirmation of citizenship. Membership in Eritrean cultural, social, or political community organizations was also cited as evidence that people of Eritrean ethnicity had lost their Ethiopian nationality. Classification as “Eritrean” and decisions to deport appeared to have been determined by the processing committees even before most individuals were called in for questioning—with a space on forms identifying nationality routinely filled in as “Eritrean” in advance. The Ethiopian government also forced deportees to sign away their property rights—by demanding deportees sign powers of attorney under threat.

**Eritrea’s Policy of Internment and Deportation**

Eritrea pledged at the outbreak of war that Ethiopian residents would not be penalized for the war, and that they were welcome to stay in the country and to keep their jobs, while offering the option of voluntary repatriation to those wishing to depart. There was no evidence during the first phase of the conflict that Eritrea had a policy to expel Ethiopian residents, although Ethiopian residents suffered considerable abuse. As the conflict dragged on, Eritrea’s policy toward Ethiopian residents became increasingly harsh. Thousands had left the country early in the conflict due to economic hardships related to the war and out of concern for their own safety. Increasingly, large numbers of residents were interned and expelled by the Eritrean authorities.

From August 1998 to January 1999, a period of relative calm on the war front, some 21,000 Ethiopian residents of Eritrea left for Ethiopia with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While Eritrean authorities insisted that these departures were voluntary, a measure of coercion was involved in a number of cases. Indeed, many individuals in this first wave complained upon arrival to Ethiopia of beatings, rape, and the confiscation of their property. […]

Eritrean authorities started expelling larger numbers of Ethiopian residents in earnest in July and August 2000, in several instances without prior information to the ICRC to ensure the safety of deportees as they crossed front lines. […]

Overlooking these issues will have grave consequences for thousands of war refugees and displaced persons, many of whom are still living in makeshift settlements and relying for their survival on relief handouts. The peace process has ended the bitter conflict between the two nations. However, the issue of the resettlement or return and the compensation of deportees must be addressed squarely. In particular, the nationality status of those whose citizenship was revoked during the expulsion process must be resolved if lasting peace and reconciliation is to return to the Horn of Africa so that the international peacekeepers can return home.” (HRW, 30 January 2003, pp. 3-7)

“Eritrean government registered the deportees from Ethiopia with the ERREC Educated deportees from urban background were easily integrated while the fate of those of rural origin was less fortunate Deportations from Ethiopia were reported as recently as March 2002 mainly from Tigray and Addis Ababa “The Eritrean government mobilized quickly to assist the deportees. The government-run Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (ERREC) was put in charge of assisting the deportees and facilitating their resettlement in Eritrea. A month after the arrival of the first deportees, the ERREC had set up reception centers for them near the main border crossings with Ethiopia. In addition to offering the deportees emergency aid and counseling, the ERREC registered them as refugees. […]

The first waves of expellees from Ethiopia, largely made up of urban professionals and business people, resettled in Eritrea relatively quickly and easily. Jobs and government services were much harder to come by for those expelled from Ethiopia in later stages of the expulsion campaign because of the strain on Eritrea’s economy of both the war and the influx of newcomers.
Rural deportees, many of whom are poor and uneducated and have little employment experience beyond farming, have generally fared less well once in Eritrea. Their stay in the temporary resettlement camp was meant to be brief: refugees were required to relocate to areas of Eritrea they had ties, however distant.

[...]

Expulsions from Ethiopia After the December 2000 Peace Agreement

Expulsions from Ethiopia continued after its devastating May 2000 incursion in Eritrea, but gradually decreased over time. During 2000, 911 Eritrean nationals were returned to Eritrea under the auspices of the ICRC delegation in Eritrea. [...] The U.N. secretary-general and the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea strongly protested the forced expulsion in June 2001 of 704 longtime residents of Eritrean origin from Tigray region to Eritrea. Both expressed concerns about the circumstances in which the expulsions took place, and reminded the Ethiopian government that such actions should be carried out only in accordance with international humanitarian law.

[...]

Ethiopia deported another 312 people of Eritrean origin in November 2001. The group consisted of residents of Addis Ababa who sought “voluntary” deportation to join relatives deported in earlier groups. [...] A group of one hundred people of Eritrean origin were later deported on March 16, 2002, ninety-two of them from the region of Tigray, and eight from Addis Ababa and the surrounding area. [...] Members of the groups deported told human rights investigators of the U.N. peacekeeping mission that they were fleeing discrimination in access to employment and services or seeking to join relatives who had been deported before them. [...] (HRW, 30 January 2003, pp.28-9;35-6).

“In addition, as a result of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, an estimated 60,000 people deported from Eritrea to drought-affected Tigray still live in difficult circumstances.” (UNICEF, 14 March 2003)

“During 2001, an estimated 25,000 persons of Ethiopian descent voluntarily returned to Ethiopia from Eritrea. Most had lived for many years in and around Asmara, the Eritrean capital. Several thousand of the returnees received transportation and border-crossing assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Ethiopian government accepted “full responsibility for their transport and relocation within Ethiopia,” a UN report declared.

An estimated 20,000 new Ethiopian returnees, however, remained internally displaced in northern Ethiopia at year’s end. Nearly all of the displaced returnees struggled to survive on monthly WFP food rations.” (USCR, 1 June 2002)

To access full ‘Report on the Joint UNICEF/Women’s Association of Tigray Study of Ethiopian Deportees/Returnees from Eritrea Living in Tigray by Buffoni Laura and Tadesse Ehetemariam’, 31 December 2001, click here [External Link]

Regular human rights violations, particularly after the May 2005 parliamentary elections (January 2006)

- In zones of conflicts as well as in urban areas, civilians, killed, tortured and detained without trial
- The crackdown by the Ethiopian government of political dissent after the May 2005 elections has been particularly violent
- The violence is said to have led to the displacement of thousands of people, particularly in Oromiya and Amhara regions

In the wake of the May 2005 parliamentary elections, the repression of opposition groups contesting the election results has been very severe and has caused widespread international concern.
"Reports filtering out of the Ethiopian countryside confirm that, following what appears to have been its electoral defeat, the EPRDF government has unleashed on the people its special troops, supported by its paramilitary forces and armed local government officials. In what increasingly bears genocidal characteristics, numerous ordinary people are being indiscriminately killed and wounded. Many are being tortured and intimidated.

First hand witnesses confirm that the repression includes the burning of houses and property, and the confiscation of land and farm animals. Terrified by such tactics, hundreds and possibly thousands of individuals and families have been forced to abandon their farms to save their lives – in the middle of the main period for cultivation.

The brute use of force by EPRDF government on innocent farmers is blatant retaliation for rejecting EPRDF’s candidates. It also aims to intimidate them so that they will be too afraid to bear witness against the orchestration of the investigation of vote counting currently underway under the auspices of the partisan National Election Board (NEB).

Although the repression has been all across the nation, farmers in certain parts of the country have been singled out for particularly brutal treatments. For instance, in Borena Zone in Wollo, especially in Kelala Lemi and Debre Sina districts, mass killings have been reported, not to mention loss of property and internal displacements. There are similar reports from parts of Gonder, eastern Gojjam, Shoa, parts of Wollega and Southern Ethiopia.

Residents of the Ethiopian countryside are particularly vulnerable to targeted atrocities due to their remote geography, lack of quick transport and communication infrastructure for rapid exchange of information, absence of human rights monitoring groups and lack of independent media coverage. Knowing this, EPRDF is acting with impunity." (ENC, 24 July 2005)

"In the wake of the May 15 parliamentary elections, in which opposition parties won an unprecedented number of seats amidst massive controversy over the election results, federal police in the Oromia and Amhara regions have threatened, beaten and detained opposition supporters, students and people with no political affiliation, often in nighttime raids. Alongside local government officials and members of local government-backed militias, the federal police have taken the lead in intimidating and coercing opposition supporters. [...] In Oromia, individuals detained by the federal police are often accused of being supporters of the Oromo Liberation Front, an illegal insurgency group that called for Oromia-wide protests against the government on November 8. Detained individuals were also accused by police of being members of the Oromo National Congress, although it is a registered political party that won seats in the May 15 elections as part of an opposition coalition group.

'The government is deepening its crackdown in Ethiopia’s rural areas, far from the eyes and ears of international observers in Addis Ababa,' Takirambude said. 'People are being terrorized by federal police working hand-in-glove with local officials and militias.' " (HRW, 13 January 2006)

For more information on human rights abuses in Gambella since 2003, see “Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region”

For more information on human rights violations in Ethiopia, see "Human rights defenders under pressure - International fact-finding mission"
Border standoff in November 2005 threatening border stability (March 2006)

- Hostilities along the Ethio-Eritrean border flared up at the end of 2005, with relation to the border demarcation process
- The Boundary Commission agreed to resume negotiations around border demarcation, in an attempt to solve the tensions politically
- UNMEE's mandate, meant to end on 15 April 2006, will be extended until May 2006 in support of the ongoing diplomatic efforts

"Increasing restrictions on the freedom of movement of United Nations peacekeepers following an Eritrean ban on helicopter flights has made it harder to warn the international community of any new outbreak of hostilities on the tense frontier with Ethiopia, where the two countries fought a two-year border war. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) reported today that it had already vacated 17 of 18 outlying posts it has been forced to leave because of the ban. Restrictions on freedom of movement had increased throughout the area which the peacekeepers are still patrolling, about 40 per cent of what it used to be, making it difficult to monitor the tense 1,000 kilometre border, it said.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned that the situation could lead to another round of "devastating hostilities," which ended following the Algiers peace accords of 2000. Apart from forcing UNMEE to evacuate posts in the so-called Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), the ban has endangered peacekeepers who need to be evacuated for medical treatment, forcing them to take the long land route.

[...]

Last week, the Security Council threatened actions that could include sanctions if, in the case of Eritrea, it does not immediately rescind its ban, and against both parties if they do not reverse their military build up.

It also demanded that Ethiopia accept the agreed-upon Boundary Commission's final and binding decisions concerning the demarcation of the border between the two countries, and that both parties return to their December 2004 levels of troop deployment within 30 days, refraining from threats or the use of force." (UNNS, 29 November 2005)

"The fragile peace maintained by Ethiopia and Eritrea since they signed a comprehensive agreement at Algiers in December 2000 is fraying dangerously. With a costly two-year war now followed by nearly five years of stalemate, patience on both sides of the border has worn thin, and there are worrying signs that the countdown to renewed conflict may have begun. Neither side appears eager for war, but to dismiss the tensions as mere sabre-rattling could mean missing the last chance to preserve peace in the Horn of Africa. The two parties need help urgently from the Algiers Group – the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), UN and U.S. – who witnessed the original accords. Its members need to work together urgently to forge a “3-Ds” parallel process of de-escalation, border demarcation and bilateral dialogue, using both intensive diplomacy and the credible threat (and employment as necessary) of punitive measures. The stakes could hardly be higher. The last war cost scores of thousands of lives, severed the economic lifeline between the two countries and ended in a way that confronted both governments with unprecedented domestic challenges. Resumption would destabilise the entire Horn, fuelling flows of weapons to armed groups throughout the region, rekindling a proxy war in Somalia and undermining the fragile peace process in southern and eastern Sudan.

At the heart of the problem is the ruling of the independent Boundary Commission established to delimit and demarcate the contested border. Both sides agreed in advance that its decision would be final and binding, but the ruling produced a stalemate that has brought them back to the brink of war. The primary bone of contention is the small, dusty border settlement of Badme, where the
1998-2000 war started. Having initially welcomed the boundary decision, Ethiopia reversed itself upon learning (after closer examination of the less than clear documentation) that this town – against the expectations of both sides – had been awarded to Eritrea. " (ICG, 22 December 2005)

"The Security Council this morning extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) for a period of one month, until 15 May, demanding, among other things, that Eritrea reverse its decision to ban the Mission's helicopter flights, and that Ethiopia accept the final and binding decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Unanimously adopting resolution 1670 (2006), the Council affirmed its intention, in the event that the parties had not demonstrated full compliance with the Council's demands, as expressed in resolution 1640 (2005) (see Press Release SC/8561 of 23 November 2005), to review the mandate and troop levels of UNMEE, with a view to possible adjustments of the Mission, including a transformation into an observer mission.

The current mandate had been established by resolution 1661 (2006) of 14 March. (See Press Release SC/8659 of that date, which also contains a summary of the underlying Secretary-General's report, document S/2006/140.)" (UNSC, 13 April 2006)

Causes of displacement

Armed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia displaced civilians living along the border, 1998-2000

- Areas up to 50 kilometers along the length of the border became closed military zones after outbreak of war in May 1998
- Populations at risk within a corridor of about 40 kilometres from the respective frontlines encouraged to evacuate because of renewed fighting in October 1998
- In May 2000, 15,000 persons fled their homes in northwest Ethiopia to escape retaliatory artillery bombardments by the Eritrean army

"Up to 600,000 people, mainly small farmers and nomads have been displaced on both sides of the border as a result of the fighting and areas up to 50 kilometres along the length of the border becoming closed military zones. Ethiopia has alleged that civilians have been tortured and forced to flee from their homes in the Badme area since Eritrea took control of the area in May 1998 and that Eritrea systematically destroyed property and looted churches in the disputed areas[...]. UN agencies estimate that over 300,000 people have been displaced in Tigray province as a result of the conflict and 245,000 people have been displaced inside Eritrea." (AI 21 May 1999, sect. 2.2)

"In late October [1998], the situation changed significantly following the Eritrean shelling of Shiraro [in Tigray]. Subsequently, the populations of several border towns began to evacuate as a precautionary measure, moving beyond the reach of artillery fire. Encouraged by the regional government, the people of Shiraro, Humera and Rama and to a certain extent also people from rural areas north of Enticho and Adigrat, started to move south of their respective home areas. With the hosting capacity of local communities having reached its limits by September, the new movements led unavoidably to the establishment of makeshift camps at various locations along Tigray's northern belt (the official displacement figure was 315,000 by mid-December). [...]

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In conclusion it is perhaps interesting to note that the zonal authorities told the mission that the need for precautionary evacuation was only given to the populations at risk (within a corridor of about 40 kilometers from the respective frontlines) as a recommendation. Whoever wanted to stay, was (at least initially up to December) permitted to do so at his or her own risk. This explains why by the time of the mission’s visit towns like Humera and Shiraro were not totally evacuated. Furthermore, the zonal authorities told the mission that in West Tigray, but also in areas of Central and East Tigray considered to be exposed to the potential danger of air raids, civil defense measures were being implemented. More and more people have constructed bomb shelters by digging cavities into the ground which are then covered with heavy wooden poles and topped with soil. The mission visited such facilities in Shire and Adigrat and was told the same measures were being undertaken in Axum, Adua and Mekele." (UNDP EUE 8 January 1999, pp. 1, 8)

"[In May/June 2000] An additional 15,000 persons in northwest Ethiopia fled their homes in May to escape retaliatory artillery bombardments by the Eritrean army in response to Ethiopia’s military offensive. No further new displacement of Ethiopian residents occurred after the two governments agreed to a cease-fire in June." (USCR June 2001)

**Thousands displaced due to ethnic clashes in the southern region, 2002-2003**

- In Yeki District in the Southern Region ethnic clashes over the move of the Shekicho zone to the Gambella Region, killed about 800 people, displaced 5,800 and over 2000 homes were destroyed in 2002
- Government refused to allow independent investigation
- The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) criticized the EPRDF government’s ethnic policy for fuelling conflict in SNNP and displaced over 1,000 Dizzi people

“Ethnic clashes during the year resulted in a number of deaths, injuries, and the displacement of thousands of persons [...]. For example, in January 92 ethnic Somalis were killed during regional clashes over grazing and water rights. Banditry and lawlessness continued to prevail in the region at year's end.

In March between 600 and 800 persons were killed during clashes between the Sheko-Mejjangar and Manja and the Sheka and Bench-Majjii in and around the town of Tepi, capital of the Yeki District, in the Southern Region. Government officials reported 128 deaths; however, the SEPDO reported more than 1,700 deaths. More than 2,000 homes were destroyed and 5,800 persons were displaced as a result of the violence. The clashes involved local officials and members of each of these communities, and resulted from the dissatisfaction of many Sheko-Mejjangar who had wanted autonomy following an unsuccessful attempt in 1993 to move the Shekicho zone from the Southern Region to the Gambella Region. The Government claimed to have arrested 41 policemen, 39 militia members, and 11 administrative officials for their involvement in the clashes. However, the Government refused to allow an independent investigation of the incident and put the Federal Police in charge of the government's internal investigation.” (USDOS, 31 March 2003 Sect.4)

**The Southern Nations and Nationalities People’s Region:**

“Ethnic conflict is "spreading like wildfire" in Ethiopia because the government is failing to tackle the problem, according to a national human rights organisation.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) urged the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to crack down on tribal clashes.
In its latest report, the organisation laid the blame for recent troubles between the Surma and Dizzi tribes who live in southwest Ethiopia at the door of the government.

The latest clashes in the Bench and Maji zone occurred after a member of the Dizzi tribe was killed. In a revenge attack, two Surma were killed. The nomadic Surma then carried out another attack on Dizzi groups living in at least four local districts.

More than 1,000 Dizzi tribe members fled their homes and some 31 people were killed in the clashes which broke out last July [2002], according to the report.

"The ethnic policy pursued by the EPRDF government badly undermined the culture and tradition of mutual respect and concern that held the two tribes together for years on end," the report said.

EHRCO said that groups carrying guns in areas where ethnic clashes occur should be disarmed and that elders should be used to calm down tensions.

It also said that talks between the Dizzi and Surma tribes could ensure "an environment of mutual respect, peace and tranquility". (IRIN, 12 March 2003)

Causes of ethnic clashes which repeatedly displaced people in Gambella, 2003-2004

- The fact that the two main groups in Gambella pursue different subsistence economies, pastoralism and agriculture has been both source of complementarity and conflict
- Traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms were undermined when the Ethiopian State placed this responsibility with local administrations and away from clan elders
- Conflicts been exacerbated by population growth and declining availability of lands and particularly since 2002 due to drought
- War in Sudan has increased the number of Nuers crossing the border and staying in Ethiopia
- Anyuak reject the 1994 census arguing Nuer infiltrated across Sudan to over-represent themselves and due to rains Anyuak villages were inaccessible during the census
- Although the Nuer represent 40% of the Gambella population and Anyuak 27%, Nuer language is no longer taught in schools
- Anyuak perceive the Nuer majority as usurpers of power and government posts
- Availability of guns from Sudan and from the Derg regime and difficulty to demobilize the pastoral Nuer has been conducive to conflicts

"Control over natural resources"

Though insignificant in its nature and causality, inter-group conflict between the Anyuaka and Nuer can be traced as far back as the early 20th century. Livelihoods pursued by these two groups are one of the major causes for conflict. As mentioned above, while Anyuaka are primarily cultivators, the Nuers are mainly pastoralists. Traditionally, the two groups have reciprocal arrangements whereby the Nuers have access to grazing land and the Anyuaka benefit from milk and some cattle provisions. Whenever small conflicts arise, elders from both groups gather to arrange for blood payments made in the form of a certain number of cattle as compensation lost human lives. Elders break weapons such as spears symbolizing that no more fighting and revenge will take place […]. Gradually, however, these traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have started to erode for various reasons. According to some elders, Ethiopian State administration took conflict management responsibilities from clan and group leaders and placed it in the hands of the local 'Kebele' administrations. As populations increased, access to grazing land and water became scarce […]. Large numbers of Nuer with their cattle encroached on Anyuaka territory and remained
there for a longer period than the traditionally limited grazing season permits. With time, some started to settle and even inter-married with Anyuua. While this tradition helps in resolving conflicts between the two groups, it is also said that the Nuers in particular benefit from these arrangements because the dowries that are required usually come in form of large numbers of cattle as gifts for the bride. The Anyuua, on the other hand, cannot afford to pay large numbers of cattle as bride wealth because they do not possess large numbers of livestock, they being primarily agriculturalists.

The push factors from Southern Sudan including the war between the government of Sudan and Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) has caused large numbers of Nuers to cross borders and settle in Gambella region of Ethiopia” (UN CT Ethiopia, 3 January 2003, pp.3-5).

“Competition over land between the Anyuak […] and the Nuer […] is fierce. The Anyuak see themselves as losing land to the nomadic Nuer, whose numbers are steadily rising.” (IRIN, 12 January 2004)

“What tribe or ethnic group constitutes the majority in Gambella region?
This question is the second most important factor that has contributed to a constant struggle between the two groups. It is well known that being a majority group means more seats in the government parliamentary system and other political privileges such as, for example, higher budget allocations. According to the 1994 population census, the Anyuua represent 27% while the Nuers represent 40% of the total population in Gambella region. However, the Anyuua do not acknowledge the legitimacy of the census claiming that the number of the Nuers is high because the Ethio-Sudanese border is difficult to control and therefore Sudanese Nuers keep infiltrating into Gambella region. An example is cited for Jikawo woreda where Nuers from Sudan crossed to be counted during the population census in 1994. Many Anyuua also believe that the 1994 […] census was conducted during the rainy season when most of the Anyuua villages were inaccessible and resulted in many Anyuua being uncounted” (UN CT Ethiopia, 3 January 2003, pp.3-5).

“Gambella, a swampy, malaria-infested lowland area, is inhabited by about 228,000 people, of whom 90,000 are Nuer, with 62,000 Anyuak constituting the second-largest ethnic group.” (IRIN, 12 February 2004)

*The Ethiopian federal system of dividing country’s regions along ethnic lines*

“The country's regions […] were divided along ethnic lines, with the largest ethnic groups gaining the most seats in local administrations. People had therefore become more conscious and sensitive of their ethnicity.” (IRIN, 15 January 2004)

“Under Ethiopia's federal system, the largest ethnic group in each state -- the Anuak in Gambella's case -- are meant to control local government affairs and dictate the official language.

But recently the Anuak have felt their authority has been undermined by outsiders, the so-called "highlanders" from the capital and other areas, who are accused of lording it over the indigenous population.” (AFP, 10 Feb 2004)

“What language should be taught
Until recently, this has also caused solemn conflicts between the two groups. Both groups claim that their own language should be taught in schools in Gambella region. Since 1995, both languages have been taught. Eventually, however, Nuer teachers are said to have left the teaching profession to join other government posts. Due to this, books in Nuer language are no longer produced. Currently, only the Anyuua language is taught up to grade 10. The Nuers, on the other hand, argue --- quoting the 1994 population census showing their majority representation in the total population --- that their language should be taught in schools.
Access to arms
As a border area, people in Gambella region have easy access to arms. This is considered to be one of the major reasons why the conflict has escalated with heavier causalities compared to conflicts fought with traditional arms such as spears. Arms are easily accessible owing to the SPLA presence on the other side of the border adjacent to Gambella region and due to frequent movement of people from Southern Sudan into Ethiopia” (UN CT Ethiopia, 3 January 2003, pp.3-5).

"[It is] recognised that without peace in war-torn southern Sudan, the conflict in Gambella was likely to continue." (IRIN, 24 January 2003)

Latest round of violence which caused displacement in Gambella, 2003-2006

- Sporadic incidence of violence between different Nuer tribes in the west of the region continue to cause displacements
- In December 2003 as they were blamed for the death of eight people, 5,000 Anyuak sough refuge in a church and between 60 and 424 others were killed
- The government blamed as inter alia soldiers blocked the roads out of the town
- Renewed ethnic clashes in January 2004 which killed more than 250 persons in and around the town of Dima led to the displacement of 10,000 people
- In early 2006, up to 3,000 persons were displaced in Nuer zone

"The 50,000 persons reported by regional authorities to have been displaced by ethnic conflict in December 2003 urgently require more shelter and health services. Occasional sporadic incidents of violence are still occurring, resulting in further displacements. There are also reported clashes in the west between different Nuer tribes. The security situation is worsening in the region. Humanitarian presence for effective monitoring of activities in the refugee camps in the region was re-established in October 2004 when UNHCR and WFP returned to Gambella after 10 months’ relocation of their staff. In spite of the relocation, UNHCR and WFP continued providing assistance throughout 2004 through the Government partner, ARRA. However many areas where persons affected by the violence and displacement of December 2003 need assistance, remain inaccessible." (UN CT, 21 April 2005)

"[In the Gambelly region] since December 2003, there have been numerous reports of attacks leading to massacres of civilians, mass rapes, forced disappearances, torture, illegal arrests and detentions, burning of homes and crops, and the forced displacement of thousands of persons" (OMCT, 13 April 2004).

December 2003

"[...] the more recent clashes had first erupted in December with an attack on a UN-plated vehicle in which eight government refugee workers were killed. The Anyuaks were held responsible and then subjected to reprisals, in which 60 of them were reportedly killed; but British officials say as many as 150 could have died.” (IRIN, 12 February 2004)

“According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 93 people were killed then. [...]"
The latest statement spoke of the December unrest as "a tragic riot in Gambella where innocent Anuak civilians were cold-bloodedly killed in their houses burnt down by a mob of hooligans and their supporters, all of whom were non-indigenous." (AFP, 11 February 2004)

"Mesfin went on to say that in the run-up to the attack, 5,000 Anyuaks had sought refuge in one of the town's churches, because soldiers had blocked the roads leading out of the town: "The mob, in collaboration with members of the [government] defence forces, continued to attack those who could not find anywhere to hide. Many were killed or sustained severe and light injuries," added Mesfin, who has been the president of ERCHO for eight years." (IRIN, 15 January 2004)

"Reports indicate that during the period between the 13th and 15th of December, 2003, 424 Anuak were killed by Ethiopian Government troops in uniform along with local people from highland areas, in Abobo, Itang, Gog and Gambella town in the Gambella region. The pretext for these massacres is reported to have been an attack on a van carrying eight UN and Ethiopian Government refugee officials on December 13th, 2003, which was blamed, without conclusive evidence, on members of the Anuak ethnic group.

It is alleged that the troops used this incident to incite the highlanders to commit violence. They also led attacks on Anuak civilians in Gambella and the surrounding areas. The killings were reportedly ordered by the commander of the Ethiopian Army in Gambella, Nagu Beyene, with the authorization of Government official Dr. Gebrehab Barnabas. Mr. Omot Obang Olom, an Anuak Government official is reported to have drawn up lists of individuals within the community to be targeted. Soldiers, using automatic weapons and hand grenades, reportedly targeted the Anuak population, summarily executing civilians, burning houses and looting property. During this three-day period, 424 people were reported to have been killed, with over 200 wounded and approximately 85 people remain unaccounted for." (OMCT, 13 April 2004)

January 2004

"...after a month of relative calm in Gambella, violence re-erupted in the form of a bloody attack on the gold mine, which is near Dima. According to humanitarian sources, highlanders and Anyuaks clashed again a day later, this time in Dima town. Yet more clashes subsequently broke out in Dima refugee camp on 6 February." (IRIN, 12 February 2004)

"Ten thousand people have fled ethnic fighting in western Ethiopia that has claimed more than 250 lives, according to government officials. Clashes had erupted at a gold mine, in which 196 people were killed in a single day; the killings being one of the worst instances of ethnic violence seen in Ethiopia in recent years, the government said on Wednesday.

[...]

The government blamed the renewed fighting on armed elements among the Anyuak – an ethnic group in Gambella which fears it is losing political power there. "These atrocities were conducted by an armed group of over 200 men who claim to be the leaders of the Anyuak," the ministry said in reference to the attack on the gold mine, which Anyuak claim as being on their territory.

Most of the victims originated from the neighbouring Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State. (IRIN, 12 February 2004)

"Almost 200 people were killed on a single day late last month (January) when simmering ethnic tensions in Ethiopia's western Gambella state exploded into an orgy of violence, the federal government said Wednesday.

The ministry of federal affairs said in a statement that 196 people, most of them traditional miners, were killed on January 30 in and around the town of Dimma, about 1,000 kilometres (600 miles) southwest of Addis Ababa, by members of the Anuak ethnic group." (AFP, 11 February 2004)
February 2006

"...Security is still a concern, with continued conflict reported. In Nuer zone, more than 3,000 people were displaced to Nyeneneyag due to inter-clan conflict. The DPP&FS office has transported and distributed food items to the displaced people." (UNCT, February 2006)

Human rights violations

“Since late 2003, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has committed numerous human rights violations against Anuak communities in the Gambella region of southwestern Ethiopia that may amount to crimes against humanity. These abuses have taken place in a region plagued by longstanding ethnic tensions to which the Ethiopian military has become a party.” (HRW, March 2005, p.1)

“Between 13 and 15 December 2003, mobs of civilian “highlanders” (people originating from the Amhara and Tigray regions of Ethiopia) and federal soldiers reportedly killed hundreds of members of the Anuak (also known as Anywaa) ethnic group in Gambella town. A subsequent government inquiry described how these events were sparked off by the killing of eight people, allegedly by an Anuak armed group, on 13 December. The eight included three staff of the federal government refugee organization and a police officer. Regional police reportedly put the mutilated bodies of the eight people on public display, leading to three days of ethnically-targeted violence. The inquiry reported that 65 people were killed and 75 wounded by civilians and soldiers, and 500 houses burnt down and looted.

Eyewitnesses and survivors have, however, claimed that several hundred Anuak people, including civil servants, teachers and students, were shot and hacked to death with knives and machetes. Many women were raped. Tens of thousands of Anuak people were displaced, many fleeing to Sudan, before the army restored order some days later. Hundreds were also detained and tortured, and are still in prison without charge or trial. ...

The situation in the region remains tense, with many more people reportedly killed by soldiers in the past year. Twenty-eight leaders of the GPDC, including former regional governor Okello Nyigelo Olam, remain detained without trial in Addis Ababa, and may be prisoners of conscience.” (AI, 17 December 2004)

Conflicts in the Somali/Oromiya Regions cause displacements, 2002-2005

- Conflicts have been going on between regional states of The Somali National Regional State (SNRS) and Oromiya state over the definition of their respective boundaries
- The October 2004 referendum which was supposed to put an end to a decade-old land row between the two regions caused tensions between communities
- Since November 2004, in East and West Hararghe there is increasing pressures on the minorities to flee
- There is fear of new displacements in areas where no referendum was conducted
- Conflicts between factions of the Somali Degodia and the Borana have been caused by competition over land and water resources

“The referendum which was held in October last year, was conducted in about 420 kebeles in 12 districts spilled across five zones of the zones of the Somali Region. According to the official results of the referendum, about 80% of the disputed areas have fallen under Oromia administration though irregularities in voting were heavily complained in many of them. This
subsequently triggered mass migrations of the Somali communities in the said areas, particularly in parts of Goro-baqaqsa and Gurodamole districts of Afder zone and in parts of Liban, Shinile and Fik zones. As per the latest updates of the situation, these displacements are the result of increased harassment and subjugation from the Oromo side in the post-referendum period rather than by direct confrontations. Many of the displacements are in areas that either already transpired to the Oromos or pro-Oromo activities increased to scare out their competitors. A similar situation is potentially looming in areas that have not yet been transferred into the hands of the Oromos. The referendum strained relations and raised frictions and uneasiness in areas where no referendum was conducted. A recent example in this latter case could be the case of western Hudet of Liban where heightened uneasiness prevented pastoral mobility and inter-tribal sharing of resources in the western parts of the district.” (Email to NRC from the DPPB of the Somali region, 7 April 2005)

“As a result of the referendum last year between Oromiya and Somali Regions there has been an increase in ethnic clashes in disputed woredas in East and West Hararghe. In November 2004, IDPs began arriving in Miesso town and there are now more than 2,100 people living in temporary shelter. There are now new reports of ethnic clashes in West and East Hararghe. The Doba woreda authorities have requested immediate relief support from NGOs for 12,000 newly displaced people. Reports from the region indicate that five people were killed, 12 others wounded and 447 houses burnt during an outbreak of violence in the last fortnight. Another NGO, Catholic Relief Service has received an urgent request for assistance from the Goro Gutu woreda administration for immediate humanitarian needs such as food, shelter and clothing for 324 displaced persons. The IDPs originally from Erer woreda have fled to Karamille town as result of the violence.” (UN OCHA-EUE, 28 January 2004)

“Southeast Ethiopia has been a region racked by conflict and has experienced large inflows and outflows of refugees. In 1977/78, the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia led to huge outflows of Ethiopian Somalis into Somalia. Then in the late 1980's and early 1990's, the civil war in Somalia led to a reverse refugee flow of Somalis, including those who had previously fled from Ethiopia, crossing into southeast Ethiopia to escape fighting in Somalia.

Apart from international factors that destabilise the region, the population of the SNRS also has to sustain the negative impact of conflicts between regional states, primarily Oromia and SNRS, and between fractions of concerned ethnic groups such as the Somali Degodia and the Borana of the Oromo. The change of government in 1991 and the subsequent introduction of the “ethnic federalism” concept brought about the creation of regional states and governments. However, the exact definition of the boundary between the SNRS and Oromia, two entities that have evolved from this process, remains disputed. At the same time, ethnic groups from both sides compete over the ownership and access, particularly to rich grazing land and pasture as well as strategically and historically vital water points along the regional border. Adding to this, there are local conflicts within SNRS that are related to particular issues or commodities such as cattle raiding. Parties to these conflicts frequently define themselves along the lines of clan identities. Furthermore, the semi-arid Somali Region is extremely drought prone. Drought is a recurrent and frequent phenomenon. Pastoralists experience a “mini-drought” each dry season stretching their livelihood to the limits. Both the international, and internal conflicts, and the recurrent droughts lead to population displacement.” (UNDP EUE, 31 March 2002, pp.1-2)

Drought-induced displacements fuel conflicts, 2002-2005 (February 2005)

- Poor rains in Afar region risk exacerbate tensions among neighbouring ethnic groups
- Some 460,000 people will need food aid in Afar region
• Scarcity of pasture lands and water led to bloody fighting between Afar and Kereyou tribesmen at the border of the two tribes’ territories in December 2002
• Issa pastoralists in conflict over scarce resources with Afar and Oromo people in Somali region
• Drought eroded cultural resource-sharing traditions and fuelled conflicts

Afar region:
“Concern is mounting over the likely long-term impact of poor rains in Ethiopia's remote Afar region …About 1.2 million people live in Afar, a lowland region bordering Djibouti and Eritrea, covering 270,000 sq km. The region, whose pastoral population are mainly nomadic herders living off their livestock, receives less than 200 mm of rain a year, according to government statistics. … Other humanitarian sources said there were fears that migration could also fuel tensions among neighbouring ethnic groups. Serious fighting between the Afar and neighbouring Issa clans of Somali Region broke out in 2002 as both searched for pasture and water for their animals. … Tensions were already preventing the Afar from crossing into traditional dry land pasture areas they once used in times of shortages. … The region was also hard hit in 2002/2003 when more than 12.6 million people in Ethiopia had to depend on food aid for survival. According to the government Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission, more than half of the cattle in Afar died, undermining its fragile local economy. Some 460,000 people are expected to receive food aid in the region, WFP said. A total of 8,500 mt is needed to assist the beneficiaries per month.” (IRIN, 12 January 2005)

“Tribal fighting is believed to have left as many as 40 people dead in recent clashes sparked by the severe drought in Ethiopia, humanitarian sources said on Wednesday.

The clashes, which occurred near Fentale in eastern Ethiopia, broke out after Afar pastoralists moved into Kereyou territory to graze their animals.

According to one local source, dozens of Kereyou tribesmen were killed in the fighting with armed Afar men. The clash, which took place in December, is the latest in a series of violent outbreaks over the past few months.

"Kereyou men were killed in the incident," a humanitarian source in the area told IRIN. "It was a fight over pasture on the border of Kereyou and Afar. The pressure of the drought has pushed the Afar into the Kereyou area. The Afar were much better armed and so the consequences were inevitable."

Clashes between rival groups have been erupting with increasing regularity in Afar and neighbouring areas.

In late November, some 16 people were shot dead in Gewane in Afar region. The killing has been blamed on ethnic violence between rival clans. Some 20 Afar women were also shot dead as they returned from a daily market near the town of Shewarobit, about 280 km north of the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. The killing was blamed on a rival ethnic group. Days later 11 Ittus in Kereyou were killed by Afar.

Aid organisations and the UN have warned that the drought has only exacerbated the conflict between groups competing for scarce water resources.

The Ethiopian military is understood to have moved into some areas to try and keep a lid on tensions. Regional government officials have also been involved in talks to try and defuse the situation.
The area has also seen an increase in guns with AK47’s being smuggled in from neighbouring Djibouti.” (IRIN, 8 January 2003)

“Where wells dried up and pasture never regenerated, pastoralists moved, often across traditional boundaries and other nations’ borders. In some cases, movements resulted in the spread of disease, and in others, the cultural tradition of sharing meagre resources in difficult times was tested to its limits and led to conflict.” (UN, 19 November 2002, p.2)

**Somali Region:**

“A drought-induced exodus of Issa pastoralists and their herds from Shinille zone, Somali region, to the south and east has resulted in confrontations, some violent, over unusually scarce grazing resources with both Afar and Oromo groups. There were unconfirmed reports of 32 Afar women being murdered in North Shewa zone in November. […]

The expected intensification of famine conditions during 2003 is likely to boost levels of dissatisfaction and, thus, dissent against the EPRDF, while increased population movements, especially among pastoralists, may fuel further ethnic clashes.” (SADC, 28 February 2003, p.3)

**Peace efforts**

**Organization of African Unity mediation efforts resulted in 2000 cease-fire**

- The US, European Union and U.N. provided substantial support to OAU’s mediation efforts
- Already in 1998 the OAU proposed an eleven-point framework agreement to settle Eritrean-Ethiopian war
- While Ethiopia accepted the agreement, Eritrea refused to withdraw troops from Badme and requested that the modalities of the framework agreement included compensation for the expellees
- The August 1999 modalities accepted by Eritrea and rejected by Ethiopia required parties to stop displacing and deporting people, to facilitate human rights monitoring and peace keeping mission to include grievance resolution mechanisms
- June 2000 parties signed the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities which required Ethiopia to withdraw to its pre-war position of control
- UN peace-keepers would be deployed under the auspices of the OAU
- 12 December 2000 both parties signed a Peace Agreement based on three issues: border demarcation, compensation and investigation on causes of the conflict
- The Agreement established a boundary commission and a claims commission

“Despite the mediators’ increasing frustration, intense truce efforts continued unabated led by the OAU, the U.N., the United States and the E.U., as well as by several other bilateral mediators.” (HRW, 30 January 2003, p.37)

**The OAU’s Framework Agreement - November 1998**

A high level delegation of African heads of state and government took over from the Rwandan-U.S. facilitators. […] On November 8, 1998, the delegation proposed an eleven point framework agreement to Eritrea and Ethiopia for a peaceful settlement of their conflict. The OAU’s framework agreement provided for the redeployment of “forces presently in Badme town and its environ” to be supervised by an OAU military observation mission supported by the U.N. It also
offered general provisions to address the socioeconomic impact of the crisis on the civilian population.

Ethiopia accepted the OAU framework agreement shortly after it was tabled. Eritrea expressed a number of reservations and ultimately refused to withdraw its troops from Badme as called for under the agreement, saying that its withdrawal would be an acknowledgment of Ethiopia’s sovereignty over Badme and other disputed territories. One of the main elements of the OAU document that Eritrea found contentious, according to Haile Woldensae, then Eritrea’s foreign minister, was its position on the issue of human rights. The official said that the proposal must include a reference to the expulsion of citizens and specifically provide for the compensation of “illegally-expelled” Eritrean nationals.

Eritrea unexpectedly declared its acceptance of the OAU’s framework agreement on February 27, 1999 after Ethiopia overran its defenses and recaptured the disputed Badme plains. However, differences of interpretation of the document kept the two countries at odds. Hostilities soon escalated, leading to a renewed escalation of the fighting in May and June 1999.

**Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU’s Framework Agreement - July 1999**

While both countries declared their acceptance of the modalities, each continued to question the other’s commitment to peace. The Eritrean insistence that people of Eritrean heritage expelled from Ethiopia be compensated appeared to add a precondition to acceptance since the modalities didn’t address the issue.

**Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the OAU’s Framework Agreement and its Modalities - August 1999**

The OAU presented the two countries with detailed “technical arrangements” for the implementation of the OAU’s framework agreement and its modalities in August 1999. Worked out by experts from OAU, the U.N., and the governments of Algeria and the U.S., the technical arrangements were presented as an integral and final part of the OAU settlement plan. The document mandated a peacekeeping mission, established under the authority of the U.N. Security Council, to monitor and assist with the implementation of the OAU’s peace package. Paragraph 9 required the parties inter alia to commit themselves to the prohibition of displacement and deportation of civilian populations and to facilitate human rights monitoring. It also addressed the security needs of local populations in and returning to areas where the civilian administration was restored, and empowered the peacekeeping mission to establish as necessary, and in consultation with the parties, local liaison and grievance resolution mechanisms accessible to the population.

Eritrea immediately accepted the technical arrangements. Ethiopia first signaled its dissatisfaction with some of the document’s provisions, and ultimately rejected it altogether, citing its failure to ensure Ethiopia’s sovereignty as main reason.

**Agreement of Cessation of Hostilities - June 2000**

Ethiopia’s major offensive of May 2000 was clearly meant to consolidate its negotiating position. Not only did the offensive lead to Eritrea’s withdrawal from all disputed border territories, but it placed Ethiopian troops in undisputed Eritrean territories well inside Eritrea. Ethiopia gained considerable leverage as a result of this military advantage and the pressures resulting from the flight of at least a million Eritrean civilians ahead of the fighting.

Following these shifts, the OAU negotiators presented in early June a “revised, consolidated” peace proposal to representatives of the two parties. In the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities they finally signed on June 18, 2000, the two parties reaffirm their “acceptance of the OAU Framework Agreement and the Modalities for its Implementation,” signaling by omission that the technical arrangements were moot. The agreement required Ethiopia to withdraw to positions it
controlled before the start of the war in 1998, but only after the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in a 25 km wide buffer zone running along the border from which Eritrean troops would be withdrawn. The U.N. peacekeeping force would operate under the auspices of the OAU to monitor the parties’ compliance with the agreement and allow the neutral demarcation of the border.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement - December 12, 2000

On December 12, 2000, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Algiers in which they committed themselves to the full implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, and to permanently terminate military hostilities between themselves. The agreement addressed the same three key issues as the OAU’s Framework Agreement on which it was based: delimitation and demarcation of the border, compensation, and investigation of the origins of the conflict. The agreement provided for the establishment of a neutral boundary commission to “delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border”; established a neutral claims commission mandated to decide on all claims of loss, damage, or injury from either side; and set the ground for an independent and impartial investigation into the origin of the conflict. Article 2 of the December 12 agreement also provided for confidence building measures, such as the early release of prisoners of war and all other persons detained in connection to the conflict.

The claims commission

Immediately after signing the December agreement, Ethiopia invited any of its citizens and foreign residents who had suffered material loss or whose human rights have been violated as a result of the war to present their claims to a National Committee for Collecting Compensation Claims. [...] On January 26, 2001, Ethiopia and Eritrea met the first deadline established by the December 12 agreement by announcing their respective appointments to the neutral Boundary Commission and neutral Claims Commission. [...] One month later, the four arbitrators appointed by the parties to the Claims Commission selected a chairman for the commission. [...] The Claims Commission was to commence its work in The Hague within fifteen days of this formation. This brisk pace hit a snag when by mid May each side had rejected arbitrators nominated by the other. A May 14-15 informal meeting of the commission broke the impasse by agreeing to replace the contested nominees. [...] The commission later provided general information on the progress of its work for inclusion in the secretary-general’s June 2001 report to the Security Council. [...] However, the three subsequent quarterly reports of the secretary-general did not annex updates from the Claims Commission.

The international bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which serves as the registry for the claims commission, announced that claims were submitted to the commission by the deadline of December 12, 2001. [...] Under the peace agreement, the commission is to endeavor to complete its work within three years of the deadline for filing claims.” (HRW, 30 January 2003, pp.39-43)

“The 15-point plan, brokered by the OAU in Algiers, provides for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in a buffer zone extending 26 km into Eritrea, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from areas occupied inside Eritrea since 6 February 1999. Demarcation of the border will follow later.” (IRIN-CEA 19 June 2000)

Provisions of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities:

“2. Under the Agreement, which was circulated on 19 June 2000 as a document of the Security Council (S/2000/601), the parties have committed themselves to:
(a) Resolving the present crisis and any other dispute between them through peaceful and legal means in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Charters of OAU and the United Nations; (b) Rejecting the use of force as a means of (c) Respecting the borders existing at independence, as stated in OAU resolution AHG/Res 16 (1), adopted in Cairo in 1964, and in this regard determining them on the basis of pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law, making use, to that end, of technical means to demarcate the borders and, in case of controversy, to resort to the appropriate means of arbitration.

3. The Agreement commits the parties to an immediate cessation of hostilities and stipulates that, starting from the signature of the Agreement, all air and land attacks are to cease. The parties have also reaffirmed their acceptance of the OAU Framework Agreement and the modalities for its implementation.

4. Under the Agreement, the parties called upon the United Nations, in cooperation with OAU, to establish a peacekeeping operation to assist in the implementation of the Agreement and guaranteed to ensure free movement and access for the peacekeeping mission and its supplies, as required, through their territories and to respect its members, installations and equipment.

5. Under the Agreement, Ethiopia shall submit to the peacekeeping mission redeployment plans for its troops from positions taken after 6 February 1999 which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998. This redeployment is to take place within two weeks after the deployment of the peacekeeping mission and is to be verified by it. For its part, Eritrea is to maintain its forces at a distance of 25 kilometres (artillery range) from positions to which the Ethiopian forces are to redeploy. This zone of separation is to be referred to as the 'temporary security zone'.” (SC 30 June 2000, paras. 2-5)

The Boundary Commission, 2000-2005

- The Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) was established at the Algiers peace agreement of December 2002
- The Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission drew an internationally recognized and legally binding border between the two countries on 13 April 2002
- Ethiopia accept in principle the April 2002 ruling of the Boundary Commission and both countries claim Badme belongs with their countries but refuse demarcation to continue
- Boundary Commission decides to close down its field offices due to lack of progress in the physical demarcation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border

The Boundary Commission:
"In April 2002, an independent border commission issued its decision on boundary delimitation between the two countries following their destructive border war from 1998-2000. According to the Algiers peace accord of December 2000, which officially ended the war, the sides agreed that any border ruling would be "final and binding". Both countries claim to have been awarded the now-symbolic village of Badme, where the conflict erupted in May 1998. (IRIN, 14 March 2003)

"Demarcation Process
On November 11 2002, the EEBC told Ethiopia to comply with its July 17th 2002 ruling that Ethiopia removes its settlers from Eritrean territory who had encroached 400 metres into Dembe MenGul near Badme. The Commission reiterated that its April 13th 2002 decision is final and binding. The EEBC voiced concern in March 2003 that Ethiopia had constantly sought variations to the delimited borderline. The Commission submitted to the parties the completed map of the border map for technical comments in December 2002. Both parties continue to insist that the
disputed town of Badme belong with their countries. In its eighth report, the EEBC cautioned that it appeared that Ethiopia was moving to reject the Commission’s April 2002 decision if variations sought would not be granted, and indicated that any such variations can only be done with the mutual consent of both parties and not by the Commission. A March 4 2003 Ethiopian Ministry of Information statement expressed grave concerns about the EEBC’s ruling on the government’s comments on the map and the April 2002 border ruling … ” (OCHA, 31 March 2003, p.28-9)

“The Boundary Commission has been unable to resume the demarcation process, despite continued efforts to do so. As described in the sixteenth report on the work of the Commission (see annex I), Eritrea insists on adherence to the April 2002 delimitation decision. The Commission also states that Eritrea is not prepared to accept the proposal made by Ethiopia some time ago for the completion of demarcation in the Eastern Sector unless there is at the same time a clear assurance from Ethiopia that the rest of the boundary will also be demarcated.

According to the Boundary Commission, Ethiopia is not prepared to allow demarcation to continue in the manner laid down in the demarcation directions and in accordance with the timeline set by the Commission. It now insists on prior dialogue, but has rejected the opportunity for such dialogue within the framework of the demarcation process. In the assessment of the Commission, this is the latest in a series of obstructive actions taken since the summer of 2002, which belies the frequently professed acceptance by Ethiopia of the delimitation decision.

In view of this situation, the Commission has indicated that it is taking immediate steps to close down its field offices for the time being. These can be reactivated (though subject to some months of lead time) when circumstances permit the resumption of demarcation work. As for the Commission, it remains ready to proceed with and complete the process of demarcation.

The Commission concludes its report by stating that the line of the boundary was legally and finally determined by its delimitation decision of 13 April 2002. Though undemarcated, the Commission reports this line is binding upon both parties, subject only, unless the parties agree otherwise, to the minor qualifications expressed in the delimitation decision.” (SG Report, 7 March 2005, para.13-16)

“JRS Ethiopia has accompanied many of the war displaced and is also concerned about the Commission's proposals. "Although the parties agreed to abide by the ruling, if it is seen as very unjust by the local people, there will not be peace. And this is the case at present", reports JRS. "The Ethiopian Prime Minister has said he will not go to war but local 'incidents' can escalate to take people to where they would rather not go. Another war like the previous would be a huge disaster", JRS Ethiopia reported." (JRS, 31 October 2003)

“The Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process remains deadlocked despite a recent announcement by Ethiopia that it would, "in principle", accept the April 2002 Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission ruling. Ethiopia’s proposal for re-opening of dialogue between the two countries, with the view to normalizing relations, has been rebuffed by Eritrea. As a precondition, Eritrea demands Ethiopia’s withdrawal from territory along the 1000km border awarded to it by the ruling. Although the international community has welcomed this move forward, it remains to be seen whether they will apply sufficient pressure on either side to further implement the border agreement.” (OCHA, December 2004)

The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and the Temporary Security Zone, 2000-2005

The Mission monitors the redeployment of troops from both sides and monitor the temporary security zone (TSZ)

The core operations are observation, reporting, analysis, identification of potential flash points and preventive action

Established within the UNMEE, the Mine Action Coordination Centre monitors threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance and gives mine action support

As of March 2005 the Mission force reduced from 3 to 2 battalions of some 3,344 military personnel

Until the second quarter of 2001 the UNMEE did not have a human rights component in its mandate

UNMEE’s mandate was extended until 14 September 2005

“The Security Council today [15 September 2000] authorized the deployment of 4,200 troops for the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), with an initial six-month mandate to carry out a range of verification tasks, including monitoring the ceasefire between the two countries. Unanimously adopting resolution 1320 (2000), the Council expanded not only the size but also the mandate of UNMEE, which was originally established at the end of July with a strength of 100 military observers. The newly authorized troops will be responsible for helping to ensure that the parties adhere to their security commitments. In a simultaneous effort, the Mission will monitor the redeployment of troops from both sides. Ethiopian troops will be redeployed from positions taken after 6 February 1999 which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998, while Eritrean forces will redeploy in order to remain a distance of 25 kilometres from the position of the redeployed Ethiopian troops. Also as part of its mandate, the Mission will monitor the temporary security zone, and provide technical assistance to mine action activities there and in adjacent areas. In addition, it will coordinate with the humanitarian and human rights work of others in the zone and adjacent areas.” (UN DPI 15 September 2000)

“As at 18 February 2005, the total strength of the UNMEE military component stood at 3,344, comprising 3,049 troops, 87 headquarters staff officers and 208 military observers. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1560 (2004) of 14 September 2004, the adjustment of the Mission and streamlining of its operations commenced in December 2004 and was completed at the end of January 2005. As planned, the force has been reduced from three to two battalions. The former Sector East has now been reorganized into a subsector under the operational command of Sector Centre. Some 250 troops from the Indian battalion, with a standby reserve of 30 to 40 troops, are now deployed in the new Sub-Sector East.

The core operations under the revised concept, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1320 (2000), remain observation, reporting, analysis, identification of potential flash points and preventive action. The concept also includes selective aerial reconnaissance of particular areas.” (UN SG, 7 March 2005, para. 9-11)

“Besides closely monitoring the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance in all Sectors, the UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre also continued to provide the necessary mine action support to the Mission in the Temporary Security Zone, ensuring that a consistent and well-coordinated UNMEE mine action response was maintained. During the period under review, the Force’s small demining assets, together with the commercial contractors for route clearance and integrated demining operations, destroyed 81 mines and 79 items of unexploded ordnance, and cleared 148,291 square metres of land and 222 kilometres of road.” (UN SG Report, 7 March 2005, para.18)

“UNMEE’s Human Rights Component

In a remarkable omission, the advance team dispatched by the U.N. in July 2000 to prepare for UNMEE did not include a representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Furthermore, UNMEE’s mandate as set forth in resolution 1320 (2000) also omitted the monitoring of ongoing human rights conditions. The persistence of reports of wide-scale human rights abuses by both parties, even after the cessation of hostilities, appeared to have led the U.N. secretary-general to announce, on September 18, 2000, that he intended to establish a “small” component within UNMEE to follow human rights issues. […] UNMEE’s human rights component became operational during the second quarter of 2001. The mission’s human rights officers were by then visiting the various sectors of the Temporary Security Zone and conducting investigations on the treatment of vulnerable groups of Ethiopians in Eritrea and of Eritreans in Ethiopia. The officers’ assignment also included the monitoring of the return of displaced persons. […] In particular, UNMEE’s human rights workers interviewed persons repatriated or deported to both countries and documented their treatment. Their reporting as of June 2001 was included in the human rights section of the secretary-general’s quarterly reports to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of the peace agreement, providing the Security Council with an effective tool for pressing the two parties to afford humane treatment to each other’s nationals. One factor contributing to the scaling down of deportations from both countries would thus appear to have been the combination of UNMEE’s field monitoring and the periodic opportunity for the secretary-general to publicly disclose reported abuses of these vulnerable groups. […] (HRW, 30 January 2003, pp.42-3)

“The UN Security Council extended UNMEE’s mandate on March 14 2003 for a further six months to September 15th 2003. UNMEE continues to assist the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) with preparations in readiness for the physical demarcation of the two countries common borders […] and with the clearance of mines through its Mine Action Coordination Centre.” (OCHA; 31 March 2003, p.28

**2006: Prolonged UNMEE mandate hoped to support diplomatic efforts**

“Although there has been little change in the situation since the Commission’s report of 5 December 2005 (S/2006/1, annex I), the Commission considers that a further attempt should now be made to secure the consent of both parties to the resumption of the demarcation process that was interrupted in 2003. It is, therefore, seeking to arrange a meeting with the parties to that end in early March 2006.” (UNSC, 6 March 2006, Annex II)

“UNMEE’s mandate is due to expire on April 15, and some members of the UN Security Council have called for the force to be scaled back if the peace process remains deadlocked. But diplomats here say the council is likely to extend the mandate for another month to let diplomatic efforts continue. ” (Xinhua, 7 April 2006)

**The Temporary Security Zone, 2000-2005**

- The TSZ is the controversial demilitarised area established in April 2001 between armed forces of both countries
- Concern raised over Ethiopian build up of troops south of the TSZ
- Eritrea considers the Ethiopian redeployment provocative.
- Threat to military stability due to political stalemate

“The parties agreed in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of 18 June 2000 (S/2000/601) to create a Temporary Security Zone, which would be a demilitarized area between the armed forces of both countries. The redeployment of Ethiopian forces from the future Temporary Security Zone was verified by UNMEE on 7 March 2001, and was followed by the rearrangement of the Eritrean forces, which was concluded on 16 April. This allowed my Special Representative,
Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, to declare the formal establishment of the Temporary Security Zone on 18 April, which marked a milestone in the peace process. The declaration of the Zone gave an additional momentum to the peace process and has made possible the return of civilians seeking to resume their lives in their places of origin. (UN SC 19 June 2001, paras.2)

"On 21 and 22 June 2001, UNMEE presented its final map of the Temporary Security Zone to the Eritrean and Ethiopian authorities, respectively. My Special Representative, Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, urged the parties to accept the map despite their objections to some parts of the boundary of the Zone as established by UNMEE.

Following the establishment of the final map of the Temporary Security Zone, Ethiopia stated that the map was unacceptable because of two "errors". It asserted that an 8-kilometre-wide pocket at the eastern end of Sector East should be returned to Ethiopia; and that the Zone should be uniformly 25 kilometres wide, which is not the case in Sector Centre, north of the Irob area. For its part, Eritrea has indicated that it could not accept the map as it was a departure from the proposals originally presented to the parties on 30 January 2001. In particular, the Eritrean authorities have indicated that the Zone could not be considered as "fully established" until their concerns regarding the southern boundary of the Zone had been addressed. However, while neither party has formally accepted the map, so far they have in fact based their operations on it, and have cooperated with UNMEE on the ground in the management of the Zone, in accordance with the parameters established in the map." (UN SC 5 September 2001, paras.1-2)

"The situation in the Temporary Security Zone and in the adjacent areas remains generally calm and stable. Following the announcement of the five-point proposal by Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, on 25 November 2004 (see S/2004/973/Add.1), there has been a steady increase of troops of the Ethiopian armed forces south of the Temporary Security Zone. This development, which began on 16 December 2004, after advance notice by the Ethiopian Government, appears to be continuing. Ethiopia describes the build-up of troops as part of the reorganization of its armed forces intended to improve its defence capability. So far, UNMEE has confirmed that Ethiopia has redeployed six to seven additional divisions at points ranging from 25 to 45 kilometres from the southern boundary of the Zone. This move has been characterized by Ethiopia as purely defensive. Eritrea considers the deployment provocative. At the same time and to the extent that UNMEE is able to monitor the situation, there has been no significant movement or redeployment of troops of the Eritrean Defence Forces, except for some adjustments in areas adjacent to the Zone to cover the main roads linking Eritrea with Ethiopia.

I am concerned about a possible rise in tensions along the border in view of the build-up described above, as well as the training of Ethiopian troops in the adjacent areas south of the Temporary Security Zone and Ethiopian troop movements in Sector West. I appeal to the Government of Ethiopia to redeploy its troops away from the vicinity of the southern boundary of the Zone, in order to reinstate the situation that pertained before 16 December 2004.

During the reporting period, both parties generally cooperated with UNMEE. However, as indicated in my previous report to the Security Council, the threat to military stability due to the lack of progress on the political front remains. This threat has increased with the recent military "reorganization" as well as the hostile rhetoric from both capitals. It should also be noted that the success of monitoring and verification of the military situation on the Eritrean side is somewhat qualified because of the serious measures described in paragraph 5 below. The present political stalemate notwithstanding, I am pleased to note that UNMEE has been able to maintain the integrity of the Temporary Security Zone. (SG Report, 7 March 2005, para. 2-4)

"In December [2004], more than 40,000 extra Ethiopian troops began to move up towards the border area for reasons that are still not altogether clear. Ethiopia described the move as "defensive"; Eritrea called it provocative." (IRIN, 5 April 2005)

The UNMEE Internet Site provides updated information about the operation.
POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global figures

Between 100,000 and 280,000 IDPs (February 2006)

Estimates of total number of conflict IDPs by UN OCHA in Addis Ababa, as of February 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Estimated number of IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tigray</td>
<td>62,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>15,000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromiya/Somali border displ.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromiya (Borena)</td>
<td>43,000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar (Bure conflict)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The government claims that all people in Tigray are currently covered under the PSNP starting in 2006. There was no verification of this on the ground.

** IDPs in Somali region are estimated by regional authorities to be around 75,000, of which 20 per cent are believed to be conflict IDPs.

*** Numbers reported from local officials, displacement due to conflict between Gabra's and Guji’s

OCHA cautions that some of the figures may be exaggerated as local authorities may expect some gain in reporting high IDP figures. Also, it is very difficult to monitor return movements and it is not clear how many of the people originally displaced have returned. Any IDP figure remains an estimate until the planned IDP survey has been carried out. Thus, according to OCHA, the total number of conflict IDPs could be anywhere between 100,000 and 280,000. (UN OCHA, email 7 February 2006)

The government currently estimates that there are no internally displaced people in Ethiopia, since they have either returned, are receiving food aid or are locally integrated. (OCHA, telephone conversation, February 2006)

132,000 people remain displaced by conflict in Ethiopia (May 2004)

- IDPs are located in Tigray, Gambella and Somali regions

*Today, there are estimated to be some 201,100 IDPs in Ethiopia. These are located in Tigray, Gambella and Somali regional states. The causes of their displacement are drought and conflict. It is estimated that 66% of the IDPs are conflict induced while the remaining 34% are drought...
affected as a result of the 1999/2000 severe drought that hit many parts of the Somali region. The figure on conflict induced IDPs includes the residual caseload of 62,091 persons in Tigray affected by the Ethio-Eritrean war and about 51,000 others in Gambella who were displaced because of the recent events in the region. Summary of IDP figure in Ethiopia by region is shown in table 1 below and the map on regional distribution of IDPs in Ethiopia.

Table 1 Summary on Conflict/War induced Internally Displaced Persons in Ethiopia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tigray</td>
<td>62,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>18,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>131,991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN OCHA-EUE, May 2004

Estimated people displaced in 2002 and 2001 (June 2003)

- About 90,000 people remain displaced by end 2002, according to USCR
- 15,000 people were newly displaced by ethnic violence in 2002 and had returned by end 2002 according to USCR
- 75,000 people remained displaced by the border war along the frontier in Tigray and Afar regions at end 2002
- 90,000 people displaced by conflict and drought in the Somali region end 2002
- About 60,000 people deported during the war from Eritrea still live in difficult conditions in Tigray
- While 2001 started with about 300,000 Ethiopian IDPs, by end of year only 100,000 remained displaced according to USCR
- Humanitarian agencies estimated in July 2001 that approximately 80% of the displaced populations have returned to their areas of origin

Estimated people displaced in 2002:

"An estimated 90,000 Ethiopians were internally displaced at year’s end [2002]. [...] Ethnic violence drove an estimated 15,000 Ethiopians from their homes during 2002. Nearly all newly uprooted populations remained in the country, and most returned home by the end the year.

Approximately 90,000 Ethiopians remained internally displaced at year’s end, including about 75,000 still uprooted as a result of Ethiopia’s 1998–2000 border war with Eritrea. Increased tensions over lack of food and disputes over scarce water resources erupted into violent clashes between rival ethnic groups that left dozens of people dead in Afar and Oromiya States during the year. [...] About 75,000 of the approximately 300,000 persons who had been uprooted during the border war with Eritrea remained internally displaced in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray and Afar regions at the end of 2002.” (USCR, 1 June 2003)

“As a result of the conflict with Eritrea, numerous persons were displaced internally. The Government presented relief and rehabilitation proposals for these IDPs to bilateral donors and
NGOs. The World Food Program reported that approximately 75,000 IDPs remained in the country along the border with Eritrea. There originally were approximately 300,000 IDPs following the border war; however, approximately 225,000 IDPs were resettled.” (USDOS, 31 March 2003, Sect. 2d)

“17 In recognition of the need to continue to provide assistance to former displaced populations who have begun to rebuild their livelihoods, many humanitarian agencies are exploring ways of including these groups into relief and recovery initiatives, be they food based or cash based e.g. WFP’s emergency operation for small-scale farmers and drought-affected pastoralists, and development activities; the World Bank supported Emergency Recovery Project (ERP); and NGO interventions.” […]. In February 2002, the DPPC led a joint assessment of food aid requirements for residual IDPs in Tigray Region. This assessment included participation from WFP, USAID, the regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST, an indigenous NGO responsible for food distributions to IDPs). Terms of reference were prepared jointly, with the methodology consisting of interviews with district and sub district officials and visits to areas where former IDPs had returned, as well as to areas where IDPs remained displaced. The findings of this assessment revealed the need to provide continued assistance to a residual caseload of approximately 76,500 people:

- 63,000 have returned to their places of origin, but have no access to cropping or pasture land;
- 12,500 have been unable to return to their home areas due to landmine or security concerns; and
- 1,000 ethnic Kunamas5 living in Northern Tigray (who were subsequently assessed by a WFP nutritionist).” (WFP, 1 May 2002, p5)

“There are 90,000 IDPs in the Somali region, as a consequence of conflicts or the 1999/2000 drought. They are particularly affected. They need basic services such as food and water but also longer-term initiatives to improve their situation (FS/EW, 07/02). The IDPs in the Afar region will be at great risk, already being one of the most vulnerable groups.” (RNIS No 39, October 2002, p.8)

**Estimated people displaced in 2001:**

“An estimated 100,000 Ethiopians were internally displaced at year’s end [2001]. […] The year began with approximately 300,000 Ethiopians internally displaced. Most were displaced in the northern regions of Afar and Tigray as a result of the 1998-2000 border war with Eritrea.” (USCR, 1 June 2002)

“Pending the collection of data from local authorities, humanitarian agencies estimate that approximately 80% of the displaced populations have returned to their areas of origin. The UNMEE peacekeeping operation continues, now in its seventh month, with the overall situation quiet along the TSZ and border areas. However, the humanitarian situation remains fragile, especially in areas where infrastructure has been destroyed or where people are unable to return because of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).” (UNICEF 24 July 2001)

**Geographical Distribution**

**Tigray: 62,000 still displaced since the Ethio-Eritrean war (January 2006)**
• IDPs are located in the North, North West, Central and Eastern Zones of the region, with highest concentration in Eastern Zone.

• They are not considered IDPs by the Ethiopian government, as they are supposed to be included in the national Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) as of early 2006.

1. The 62,000 conflict induced IDPs in Tigray are presently located in four zones, namely North, North West, Central and Eastern Zones of the region. The Eastern Zone hosts the highest IDP population, as it is the border with the Afar region where serious fighting took place during the Ethio-Eritrean war. The IDP caseload in Tigray could not be returned to their villages of origin because of fluid security situation and the presence of landmines in their villages of origin including their farmlands and communal grazing areas.

2. [...] The locations of the residual caseload of IDPs in Tigray region are shown in table 2 below and Map 1 attached.

**Table 2 Residual IDP Caseload in Tigray Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP Shelter</th>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Wereda</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adebai</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Kafta Humera</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiraro</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>T. Adiyabo</td>
<td>6,187</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adihagerom</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>T. Adiyabo</td>
<td>3,991</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adi Nibhit</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>L. Adiyabo</td>
<td>3,222</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badme</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>T. Adiyabo</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rama</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Mereb Lehe</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chila</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>T. Maychew</td>
<td>2,468</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerhu S.</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Ahiferom</td>
<td>7,362</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaga R.</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Ahiferom</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatsi</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Gulumahda</td>
<td>7,095</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebeya</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Gulumahda</td>
<td>4,985</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohan</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Erob</td>
<td>9,781</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zalambesa</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Gulumahda</td>
<td>7,427</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>62,091</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Link to the map
(UN OCHA Ethiopia, 24 May 2004)

Borena (Oromiya): Ethnic conflict between Gabra, Guji and Borena displace over 40,000 since April 2005 (January 2006)

• Ethnic tensions between the Gabra and Guji, and between Gabra and Borena in Borena zone (Oromiya) cause the displacement of up to 43,000 in 2005.

• Thousands of people are still displaced without the necessary food assistance by the government.

Ethnic conflict between Gabras and Gujis which erupted early in April 2005 in the Oromia region of Borena zone continues in the area, UN agency said on Monday. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) however says that intensity of the conflict has decreased in the last week. So far, according to the agency, over 43,000 people from both ethnic
groups have been displaced since April due to the conflict. The agency believes that the number is expected to rise unless calm is restored.

"The on-going conflict between Gabras and Gujis in Borena zone, Oromiya region that displaced 43,700 people has not been resolved. It is becoming a humanitarian problem in the area," UNOCHA said. The report indicated that in April, thousands of people in Hagere Mariam, Yabello and Arrero were displaced, and several thousand huts were burnt. The agency also expressed its concern that the number of beneficiaries requiring urgent food and non-food assistance will increase when the belg assessment results are released this week.

After an assessment last May, the DPPC provided some food and non-food assistance for 2,000 IDP the majority of which were Gabras in Yabello. The number of people who died due to the conflict is yet to be confirmed, but there were causalities in the area. OCHA also added that although the same ethnic group maybe involved--the Gabras-- the two incidents are completely unrelated. Attempts made by The Daily Monitor to get comments from the concerned federal government office were not successful." (Daily Monitor, July 19, 2005)

"Due to the occurrence of drought in northern parts of Kenya and tribal conflicts between the Gabra and Borena many people are migrating to the zone with their livestock putting pressure on the scarce pasture and water resources. Conflict between the Borena, Hamer and Erbore tribes is feared as the Borena have migrated to the Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples Region in search of pasture and water for their livestock. Several thousand people that are displaced due to the tribal conflicts between Gabra and Guji and Borena and Gabra are still in the area waiting for assistance. However, the allocation made by the FDPPA does not include these beneficiaries that are in a serious condition. In addition, non-food interventions are also equally important in this zone." (OCHA, 3 January 2006)

Three main areas of displacement along the Eritrea/Ethiopia border (April 2003)

- In Tigray Region’s Eastern Zone the displaced are now located in Adigrat town and the surrounding rural areas
- IDPs from the disputed Yirga triangle (in the Western zone) are located in areas south of the triangle up to and including the town of Shire (Endaselassie)
- IDPs from the Central zone are presently residing in Adwa town and its environs
- Most IDPs in the Afar region are living near Bure and Elidaar
- An estimated 20,000 out of the 25,000 expelled Ethiopians who returned from Eritrea became IDPs in northern Ethiopia by end 2001
- In 2003 the government registered 60,806 families as war-affected IDPs in Tigray
- WFP assists 1,000 ethnic Kunamas displaced from a military strategic area

"More than 90% of the IDPs are to be found in a belt of land due south of the border that runs from Bereket on the Sudanese border in the west to Adigrat in the east. They lead a precarious existence on food handouts distributed by the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), a local NGO. The remainder of the IDPs are to be found along Ethiopia's southeastern border in Afar Region." (RI 22 June 1999)

"Currently, there are three main areas of tension along the 1,000 km border between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Badme and Sheraro, in the western border area known as the “Yirga Triangle” between the Tekezze and Mereb rivers (Western Zone of Tigray Region); Tsonra - Zalambessa - Alitena, in the central border section (Eastern Zone of Tigray Region) near the main road leading from
Ethiopia to the Eritrean capital Asmara, and Bure in the eastern border section (Zone 1 of Afar Region) on the main road to the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab.

In the Tigray Region’s Eastern Zone, the displaced originate from the conflict areas in Irob and Gulomeheda woredas and are now located in Adigrat town and the surrounding rural areas. In the Central zone, most people have been displaced from the town of Rama and the surrounding areas and are presently residing in Adwa town and its environs. In the Western zone, most of the displaced originate from the disputed Yirga triangle and are presently in areas south of the triangle up to and including the town of Shire (Endasellasie); the balance have been displaced from Humera town and its environs and have moved further south to the villages of Bereket and Ba’eker.

In Afar, most of the displaced are living near Bure and Elidaar. They are being served by the government, Médecins du Monde, and the Afar Pastoralist Development Association (a local NGO), and also indirectly supported by UNICEF, WHO and other UN agencies.

In Tigray, there has been some shifting in displaced populations during 1999. Following the fighting in the Badme area in February 1999, many of those who had been displaced to Zeben Gedena from Sheraro town returned. The town is now bustling with activity, and has in fact become a host community for other IDPs who remain displaced from Badme and other areas close to the border. A new settlement, known as Wahla Ni’hibi, has been opened, and is a priority for providing shelter, water, health and sanitation services.” (UNCTE 28 January 2000, pp. 30-31)

“During 2001, an estimated 25,000 persons of Ethiopian descent voluntarily returned to Ethiopia from Eritrea. Most had lived for many years in and around Asmara, the Eritrean capital. Several thousand of the returnees received transportation and border-crossing assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Ethiopian government accepted “full responsibility for their transport and relocation within Ethiopia,” a UN report declared.

An estimated 20,000 new Ethiopian returnees, however, remained internally displaced in northern Ethiopia at year’s end. Nearly all of the displaced returnees struggled to survive on monthly WFP food rations.” (USCR, 1 June 2002)

“To date, the ERP has registered a total of 60,806 families as war-affected IDPs in Tigray Region. The figure includes all people from Zalambassa area. The IDPs are dispersed in four zones bordering Eritrea (Central, East, West and North West Tigray).” (UNDP EUE, 2 April 2003, p.4)

“The findings of this assessment revealed the need to provide continued assistance to a residual caseload of approximately 76,500 people.

[...]

1,000 ethnic kunamas living in Northern Tigray [...]

**Ethiopian Kunamas:**
As recommended in the February 2002 DPPC-led assessment, a WFP nutritionist undertook a rapid assessment in of ethnic Kunamas living in Northern Tigray in March 2002. This revealed some cases of obvious marasmus and found that, in general, the nutritional status of this group did not appear to be as good as that of other IDPs. While Ethiopian Kunamas settled in Kafa Humera (see par 32) some years ago, they are regarded as a marginalized group, with no tradition of seeking out labour opportunities in time of stress and are regarded as being less effective in working on large farms than others inhabitants of the area. Having been displaced from a militarily strategic area, they will not be able to return to their land for the foreseeable future.” (WFP, 1 May 2002, pp.9)

**IDPs in Afar:**
"Though a good main rainy season was reported last year, according to a recent article in the official *Ethiopian Herald* newspaper (April 17, 1999) the DPPB has distributed 2,180 metric tonnes of relief food to a total of 130,000 drought affected people in Zone 2 and Zone 4. While the latest update on needs issued by the Federal DPPC does not record any beneficiaries due to natural causes, the total number of people displaced by the conflict with Eritrea is given as 29,275. According to the regional DPPB in Asayita, the increase over the figure of 27,720 given in the February Afar Regional Contingency Plan was due to an additional episode of displacement which took place in March. Reportedly, the new caseload consists entirely of non-Afar urban dwellers from Bure ('now completely evacuated') and Manda ('mostly evacuated'), joining 16,290 earlier displaced persons of Afar ethnicity in Su'u'ula, a locality on the main highway some 15 kilometers south of Manda and some 50 kilometers north of Eli Dar. The DPPB told the mission that the other groups of displaced people, 'originating from both sides of the border' were to be found in Zone 2: Berhale (2,720), Afdera (3,710) and Dalol (5,000). Reportedly, some 290 people from Su'u'ula and 710 people from Afdera had moved in March to areas around Logia where possibly some of these 1,000 people might have used the so called 'Soger-Camp', which served in earlier times as part of the transit facilities for returnees and expellees coming from Eritrea (Assab).

[...]

In a recent 'urgent joint statement' issued both by the DPPB and APDA, it is stated that the Afar Region 'continues to hold some 24,000 displaced Afar in total'. This figure differs somewhat from the current official figure of 29,000. The statement went on to formulate a request for immediate assistance covering the sectors of shelter (2,500 palm mats and 300 blankets), food (supplementary food for 6,000 women and children), household goods (water containers and cooking utensils for 300 families) and medicines (for 20,000 people). (UNDP EUE 12 April 1999, pp. 4, 5)

**Gambella: Internal displacement (February 2006)**

- Important human rights violations coupled with forced displacement occurred in late 2003 and early 2004
- The Ethiopian armed forces allegedly carried out numerous human rights violations
- A Commission of Inquiry installed by the Ethiopian government in 2004 came to the conclusion that the armed forces had done no wrong
- IDPs moved to temporary shelters in Anyuak and Nuire Zones and in the outskirts of Gambella town
- Some IDPs have moved to the refugee camps along the border with Sudan
- Parts of Gambella are still inaccessible and it is currently unclear how many of the 50,000 displaced have still not returned home
- Ethnic clashes have been causing displacement since at least early 2002, when clashes between Anyuak and Nuer occurred over power sharing

*According to OCHA Ethiopia, some 50,000 displaced will be receiving emergency food assistance in 2006. Given that assistance, the government appears not to consider them IDPs anymore.*

"Security is still a concern, with continued conflict reported. In Nuer zone, more than 3,000 people were displaced to Nyinenyg due to inter-clan conflict. The DPP&FS office has transported and distributed food items to the displaced people." (UN OCHA, Focus on Ethiopia, Monthly Update, February 2006)
Since late 2003, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has committed numerous human rights violations against Anuak communities in the Gambella region of southwestern Ethiopia that may amount to crimes against humanity. These abuses have taken place in a region plagued by longstanding ethnic tensions to which the Ethiopian military has become a party.

On December 13, 2003, a brutal ambush allegedly committed by armed Anuak sparked a bloody three-day rampage in the regional capital in which ENDF soldiers joined “highlander” mobs in the destruction of the town’s Anuak neighborhoods. As many as 424 people were killed, almost all of them Anuak. The mobs burned over four hundred houses to the ground and ransacked and looted many of those left standing. The December 2003 massacre was not the first time ENDF soldiers had committed human rights abuses against civilians in Gambella, but it was a turning point in Gambella’s long history of conflict and insecurity.

In the fourteen years since the overthrow of the brutal Derg dictatorship in 1991, the new age of prosperity and peace promised by the government has eluded the people of Gambella. Long-simmering ethnic tensions have repeatedly boiled over into violence that has left hundreds dead and thousands homeless, while federal and regional authorities have taken almost no effective action to protect victims or punish their attackers. The prevailing state of insecurity throughout the region and the instability of areas along Gambella’s long border with Sudan have led to an ever-increasing Ethiopian military presence in the region.

Until December 2003, the garrison of ENDF soldiers stationed in Gambella had not become involved in the region’s increasingly frequent ethnic clashes. It became more difficult for the army to remain uninvolved, however, as longstanding tensions between Gambella’s Anuak population and its large community of onetime migrants from other parts of Ethiopia, known locally as “highlanders,” began to escalate. A series of attacks attributed to Anuak gunmen left more than twenty highlander civilians dead in the second half of 2003, and Gambella’s mainly Anuak regional authorities proved unable or unwilling to bring the situation under control. The vast majority of the military personnel in Gambella are drawn from the same ethnic groups that make up the region’s highlander community and December 13 marked the moment the Ethiopian military entered into the conflict against the Anuak. What had been a situation marked by long-simmering tensions that erupted sporadically into violence was transformed into a broad-based assault by the Ethiopian army against Gambella’s Anuak population.

Since December 2003, the military has set about finding and destroying the disparate groups of armed Anuak collectively referred to as shifta—organized Sudan-based rebels, farmers carrying out isolated revenge attacks in retaliation for past military abuses, and a small number of radicalized gunmen—it believes to be responsible for attacks on the highlander population. This has become a pretext for numerous bloody and destructive raids on Anuak villages and neighborhoods; more than 100 Anuak men, women and children were killed since the December 2003 massacre in the nineteen communities surveyed by Human Rights Watch alone, entire villages were burned to the ground and thousands of families were driven from their homes.

The prevailing climate of impunity that now exists in Gambella has allowed ENDF soldiers to prey upon and terrorize the Anuak communities they patrol. In dozens of communities, soldiers have raped Anuak women, beaten and tortured young men to the point of serious injury or death and looted homes and public buildings. Ordinary people now flee upon spotting approaching ENDF soldiers, and thousands of Anuak have been displaced or driven out of the country as refugees.

The Ethiopian government’s efforts to halt these abuses or punish those responsible have been grossly inadequate. A commission of inquiry set up to investigate the December 2003 massacre absolved the military of any wrongdoing, and federal authorities have taken no apparent action to investigate ongoing human rights violations in the region. When community leaders complain about these abuses to ENDF officers they are sent away with empty promises or even threats of further violence. Only a handful of soldiers have been held to account for any of the crimes
ENDF forces have committed since December 2003. To date, higher-ranking ENDF officers have been effectively beyond the reach of justice because of the federal government’s refusal to investigate persistent complaints of ENDF abuse.

The motivations behind the military’s assault on the Anuak population—and the government’s failure to address it—remain unclear. Many victims’ testimonies seem to indicate that ENDF officers and soldiers, frustrated by their inability to find and destroy the armed Anuak groups they are looking for, have come to believe that the entire Anuak population is colluding with their elusive enemies. Other abuses, including many of the reported rapes and incidents of looting, seem to be crimes of opportunity fueled by the near-total lack of accountability. Federal authorities, meanwhile, eager to see the troublesome region pacified, have at the very least shown themselves willing to turn a blind eye to what is happening. Whether or not federal officials are actively complicit in ongoing abuses or aware of precisely how widespread and serious they have been, they have certainly given the military a green light to employ tactics that could only be expected to result in a human rights disaster. The government should know what its military is doing to the Anuak and take steps to prevent it.” (HRW, March 2005)

1. There are about 51,000 IDPs in Gambella region. These are affected by the recent conflict in the region. The IDPs are located in the outskirts of Gambella town and temporary shelters in Anyuak and Nuire Zones. The IDPs are being assisted by the federal DPPC, the regional government and the ICRC. In order to ensure improved emergency response, the regional DPPB of Gambella regional state has recently prepared draft emergency plan of action for the federal government. […]

2. The main challenges to the delivery of coordinated humanitarian assistance to the IDPs in Gambella are security for aid workers and regaining access to the IDPs. […]

The distribution of IDP shelters in Gambella region is shown in table 3 below and Map 2 attached.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP Shelter</th>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Wereda</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dima</td>
<td>Anywaa</td>
<td>Dima</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abobo</td>
<td>Anywaa</td>
<td>Abobo</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gog</td>
<td>Anywaa</td>
<td>Gog</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akobo</td>
<td>Nuire</td>
<td>Akobo</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jikawo</td>
<td>Nuire</td>
<td>Jikawo</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>51,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Link to the map
(UN OCHA Ethiopia, May 2004)
“In Gambella region, an estimated 2,000 IDP families/10,000 persons from Annuaq tribe that were displaced since early 2002 because of conflicts with Nuuers have been residing in Ilaa Village in Itang Wereda. However, it is now confirmed with the regional DPPB of Gambella region that some of the IDPs have returned home. The residual caseload of 1,000 families/4,811 persons are currently being assisted by the federal DPPC as conflict induced IDPs in Gambella region.” (UN OCHA-EUE, 1 August 2003)

“Engagements between government forces and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) continued across Oromia region, and in January the OLF claimed to have put 1,639 government troops out of action across the region during 2002. In Gambella region, following clashes in July between Anyuak and Nuer ethnic groups which prompted Federal intervention, the death of a Nuer student sparked off new confrontations killing a further five and resulting in 80 arrests. The unrest has generated 10,000 Anyuak IDPs; some of them clashed in the Fugnido camp in November with Nuer and other refugees from fighting between SPLA and Sudan Government across the Sudan border. Forty people were killed according to a December UN-EUE report.” (SADC, 28 February 2003, p.3)

“During the year, there were numerous clashes between the Anuak and Nuer clans. For example, on July 7, 60 persons were killed and 41 were injured during ethnic conflict between Nuer and Anuak tribesmen in the Gambella region over political power sharing. EHRCO reported that all houses in eight kebeles were burned to the ground, and 8,760 persons were displaced from their homes. The situation remained unstable at year's end. There were no reports that the Government investigated the conflict.” (USDOS, 31 March 2003 Sect.4)

**Root causes of, and background to displacement in the Somali Region (August 2003)**

- 14,200 people remained displaced as a result of conflict in the Somali Region as of August 2003
- In the Afder and Liben zones of the Somali Region about 15,000 people were displaced
- The return of IDPs in the Somali region depends both on the settlement of conflicts and the re-stocking of lost livestock
- In Haya Suftu there are about 2370 IDP households, in Filtu over 800 who ‘claim’ to have been displaced by conflict
- Conflict between Oromo and Somali groups are over the definition of their common border, access to water and grazing lands
- Other IDPs fled conflict in Bale since early 90s

“It is well known that the root causes of inter clan conflicts in Ethiopia are claims on ownership rights over scarce resources such as communal grazing lands and watering points. Such clashes have resulted in human lives, destruction of property and human displacements. The two most recent conflicts that have resulted in massive displacement are located in the Somali and Gambella regions. Updates on these events need to be considered.

Regarding conflict in the Somali region, the working group on IDPs in the region reported that some 4,000 Shekash tribesmen from Jeno Gaben area of the Somali region were forced to move to Rasso area in North West part of the Somali region because of conflict with the Ogadenis. Following subsequent clashes in Shekash villages, other families were also displaced. Today, the regional DPPB of the Somali region and the federal DPPC have accepted the figure of 2,800 IDP families/14,200 persons as the current conflict induced IDPs in Rasso area. Hence the previous figure of 4,000 persons in the IDP working group report should be revised upwards to
14,200 persons as far as conflict induced IDP population in the Somali region is concerned.” (UN OCHA-EUE, 1 August 2003)

“Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) […] in these zones are pastoralists or agro-pastoralists either displaced by drought or conflict. […] People displaced by conflict face even greater difficulties because their return depends on the conflict settlement and on a successful reconciliation process […]. In addition, many of these people also lost their livestock and other assets.

IDPs settled around permanent settlements or in makeshift camps to benefit more easily from food aid, and to better position themselves to benefit from their meagre income generating schemes or the marketability of their remaining coping mechanisms. Many would not return to their places of origin since they would loose these opportunities offered by population concentrations, and would find it harder to access food aid. Needless to say that these conditions have also attracted other destitute individuals from surrounding areas who now live with the IDPs.

In Liben zone, with approximately 462,000 inhabitants (DPPC, 2001), the mission had the opportunity to visit Haya Suftu with 2,370 IDP households, and Filtu with over 800 IDP households (NCA/Ethiopia, 2001). In Dolo Odo, no camp-like settlements have been set up but IDPs have also established themselves around the town.

In total there are seven IDP camps in Liben zone: three in Filtu and four in Haya Suftu. Two camps in Filtu and one in Haya Suftu include people from Bale. The people in the other four camps all claim to come from Liben Woreda in Borana zone. In all seven camps people claim to belong to various Somali clans and sub-clans. However, the “ethnic origin” of some of the groups from Bale is uncertain. There are reports that for example the Gurra call themselves Oromos in Mada Wolabo, one of their places of origin, while they claim to be Somalis in Filtu and Haya-Suftu. The same applies for other groups from Bale area that are discussed and mentioned further below in this section.

Nearly all IDPs in Filtu and Haya Suftu claim to have left their places of origin due to conflict, with drought and food shortage being additional causes. However, the mission received conflicting information about the relevance of each of these reasons and was not able to substantiate the exactitude of those claims.

The original population of Haya Suftu used to be approximately 600 households. The IDP influx started in 1998. Presently there are 2,370 households registered that settled in 8 kebeles around the Haya Suftu administrative centre. People in Haya Suftu have mainly been living from food assistance provided through Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) and the DPPD food deliveries. In addition, each day two tanker truckloads of water are dispatched by the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY).

Conflict-related displacement originates from a variety of places and local contexts that nevertheless are mostly linked to the inter-relationship between certain Oromo and Somali groups […]. The most common cause of the conflicts is the dispute over the delimitation of the boundary between the two regions that seems not yet settled in certain limited areas. The discussions and conflicts mainly entail access to natural resources such as water and grazing land.

It was reported that about 1,400 Degodia households living now in Haya Suftu, and another 220 Degodia families that are now in Filtu, fled from an area south of the Negelle-Filtu road and north of the Dawa river […]. This area holds the so-called northern wayama grazing area and includes the particularly rich walenso, a dry season grazing ground which has traditionally served as a sanctuary for both Somali and Oromo groups in times of drought. The conflict here is primarily over land ownership, affecting the rights of access for grazing and watering. However, the
question as to how and whether conflict indeed triggered these population movements, and how many of these people are actually non-IDPs, requires further on-the-spot investigations.

[...]

The 510 *Marehan* IDP households in Haya Suftu appear to have an extraordinary history. They voluntarily repatriated themselves from Negelle even though their bitter relationship with the predominant *Degodia* in Haya Suftu did not make the option particularly promising. However, having lost most of their livelihood assets following their conflict with the *Boranas* in 1992, they saw no means of sustaining themselves as IDPs in Negelle and moved on to Haya Suftu in hope for better assistance.

Furthermore, 420 *Gurra, Ajuran* and *Karale* households in Haya Suftu and 243 *Wara Dubie* and 289 *Gurra* families in Filtu reportedly fled from conflict areas in Bale. The three groups in Haya Suftu came from Mada Walabu, about 50 km north of Negele near the Genale River. The IDPs in Filtu originate from Dallo Mana, about 100 km north of Negele, along the Welmel River, a tributary of the Genale River. Since early 2000, conflict has occurred there (NCA/Ethiopia, 2001). Overall, these conflicts are part of the wider context along the regional boundary between Oromia and Somali Regions. There definitely is a need to further investigate the role that drought might have played in the displacement of these people. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is currently re-registering the IDPs from Bale and has approved plans to assist them to move back to their former areas.

[...]

Nevertheless, conflict displacement remains important. An area starting north of Harodibe and stretching about 50 km eastwards into Afder zone is contested between respective *Borana* and *Gurra* groups. Again, this conflict is linked to the regional boundary demarcation. According to IDPs in Cheretti, the main part of this armed conflict took place between approximately 1994 and 1997. However, it flared up again before the last federal elections in 2000. Displacement from this conflict inter alia accounts for about 140 families of the IDPs in Cheretti.” (UNDP EUE, 31 March 2002, pp.7-9)

**Somali region: Over 15,000 conflict-induced IDPs (February 2006)**

- In Raso area, IDPs have been in temporary shelters for the last 3 to 4 years
- Some 2,835 displaced families are mainly located in Bordone and Mieso areas of the Shinille zone
- IDPs in Bordode and Mieso areas fled fighting between Oromos and Somalis in December 2003 over land ownership
- 14,900 people displaced mainly by conflict over land ownership between Oromo and Somali tribesmen in the Rift valley
- IDPs are from four peasant associations in Kato Obensale, Hardim, Goljenno and Kora areas
- IDPs are sheltered temporarily in areas on Somali side of the border with Oromia

*In February 2006, OCHA Ethiopia assessed the number of conflict-related displaced people at around 15,000 (20 per cent of a total of 75,000 displaced due to conflict and drought)*

"8. The Somali region is impacted with some 87,995 drought and conflict induced IDPs. These are scattered throughout the region. The drought affected IDPs constitute 79 % of the current IDP population in the Somali region while 21 % are conflict induced. The drought affected IDPs have been in temporary shelters for the last 3-4 years including the conflict induced IDPs in Rasso area."
9. The majority of conflict induced IDPs in the Somali region are located in Bordode and Mieso areas of the Shinille Zone. The IDPs in Bordode and Mieso areas are displaced because fighting between Oromos and Somalis in December 2003. Although the figure on IDPs in the above two localities have not yet been registered by the regional DPPB and the federal DPPC, two independent missions from WFP, OCHA, SC – USA, Hararge Catholic Secretariat and Shinille Zonal Administration to conflict areas have confirmed the presence of some 2,835 IDP families. The cause of conflict is reported to be claims on land ownership right. Reconciliation efforts are in progress with the involvement of community elders from both sides.

11. [...] The locations of the IDP shelters in the Somali region are shown in table 4 below and Map 3 attached.

Table 4 Current Locations of conflict induced IDPs in the Somali Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP Shelter</th>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Wereda</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bordode</td>
<td>Shinille</td>
<td>Mieso</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gennod</td>
<td>Shinille</td>
<td>Mieso</td>
<td>3,075</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebiley</td>
<td>Shinille</td>
<td>Mieso</td>
<td>7,715</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mieso</td>
<td>Shinille</td>
<td>Mieso</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasso</td>
<td>Ader</td>
<td>West Imi</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>18,900</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Link to the map
(UN OCHA Ethiopia, May 2004)

"12. The IDPs in Bordode and Mieso areas are Somali tribesmen from Hawiye, Gurgura and Ogadeni tribes whose livelihood depended on irrigated farming before the conflict. The groups are displaced from four-peasant associations in Kato, Obensale, Hardim, Goljerno and Kora areas. The cause of the conflict is reported to be dispute on land ownership. In terms of composition, the IDPs in Bordode are Hawiye; Gurgura and Ogadenis while those in Mieso are exclusively Hawiye. The Gurgura speak both Somali and Oromo languages. The IDPs are temporarily sheltered in safe areas on the Somali side of the border with Oromia.

13. The situation of IDPs in Bordode/Mieso was first assessed in February 2004 by a joint rapid assessment team mentioned in paragraph (4) above. The mission reported that some 2,300 families have been displaced. [...]"

14. According to Bordode and Mieso Wereda administration, 41 people were killed from both sides and 198 houses were burned and an unknown number of livestock was looted during the conflict. Regarding figure on displaced persons, Wereda officials in Bordode/Mieso informed OCHA Field Officer that there are some 2,835 families/14,900 persons. The breakdown by IDP shelter is shown in table 1 below:

Table 1 IDP Population in Bordode/Mieso Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP Camp</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mieso (Somali part)</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebiley</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>7,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gennod</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>3,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordode</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>1,810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Grand Total           2,835     14,900

(Note: Please note that the total number of persons in the above table except for Mieso is estimated by OCHA Field Officer by assuming an average of 5 persons per family. The figures on Mieso were provided by the Wereda Administrator and community elders). (UN OCHA Ethiopia, 24 March 2004)

**Displacement due to 2004 Somali/Oromia border referendum continues to be of concern (February 2006)**

- In Oromiya estimates suggest that 21,520 people have been displaced but federal authorities say that the number is overstated by as much as 11,000
- In Doba in Oromiya region, the district administration reports 17,641 IDPs, but OCHA and CARE put in doubt such number and the federal authorities put the number at 6,000 IDPs
- Probably between 25,000-35,000 people newly displaced in the Somali region according to the regional DPPB
- MSF-Belgique found between 10,000-15,000 living in six camps in the southern area of the Somali region
- CARE registered 2,557 IDPs in Miesso town
- In February 2005 a joint DPPC/USAID/UN agencies mission found more than 4,400 IDPs in Miesso town

"The region (of Oromiya) reports that displacement is a persistent problem in West Hararghe zone and to date there are 39,371 and 14,564 IDPs in Mieso and Doba woredas respectively in relation to the Somali/Oromiya referendum related conflict." (UN OCHA, February 2006)

"The referendum conducted in October 2004, to determine the preference for administrative status of kebeles bordering Oromiya and Somali Regions resulted in pressures on the minorities to move. As a consequence, many people have been displaced from the two regional states since November 2004. In Oromiya, estimates compiled from figures given by local woreda and kebele authorities, suggest that a total of 21,520 people have been displaced in different border woredas, namely Mieso, Doba, and Erer in West and East Hararghe zones. Federal authorities have indicated that this number may be overstated by as much as 11,000. In Doba woreda, the Ministry of Federal Affairs put the number of IDPs at 6,000. There are also more than 2,500 displaced persons in Miesso town, of which 452 are not registered and another 444 from Erer woreda now living in Kara-Mille town of neighbouring Goro Gutu woreda in East Hararghe zone. CARE and other NGOs are in the area providing food and non-food assistance up to May 2005." (UN CTE, 20 April 2005)

"MSF-Belgium which conducted a rapid nutritional assessment in the last week of March estimate that there are between 10,000-15,000 IDPs living in six camps in this southern area." (UN CTE, 20 April 2005)

"Confusion continues over the number of IDPs in Doba in west Haraghe. The district administration has reported 17,641 IDPs but an OCHA mission that was accompanied by field staff from CARE found no evidence of this level of displacement. 6,000 most affected IDPs have received food and non food assistance from the government." (UN OCHA, 14 March 2005, p.2)
“The recent land referendum held in areas disputed by the Somali and Oromia Regions have produced large numbers of new IDPs on the Somali side. The specific number of people displaced in connection with the referendum remains still undetermined but preliminary views on the situation are stating the number could be in tens of thousands. Probably between 25000 - 35000 people.” (Email from the DPPB Somali region, 7 April 2005)

“Near Miesso town up to six people were killed and many more injured after renewed conflict on 15 February. Other incidences have been reported nearby in Bordede and Mulu, with the number of casualties and displaced unknown. According to the NGO CARE, there are now 2,557 IDPs registered in Miesso. A full month ration of food was distributed on February 12, while non-food items were distributed to the 425 new arrivals. CARE has sufficient resources to continue its support of food and non-food items until May 1. CARE conducted a Reintegration Survey of all IDP households between February 6 and 11, to ascertain whether they had any plans for reintegrating themselves into society and where, but the results were inconclusive.” (UN OCHA-EUE, 21 February 2005)

“Joint DPPC/USAID/UN agencies mission, which conducted an assessment of IDPs in East and West Hararghe during the first week of February also visited Miesso Town to monitor IDPs status in the area following the recent referendum between Oromiya and Somali Regions. According to the team there are now more than 4,400 IDPs in the town, of which 452 are newly arrived and not registered. The team reported that there is over-crowding in the tents and more shelter is required. Signs of malnutrition and diarrhea were observed amongst children. CARE, one of four NGOs assisting the IDPs, report that they have received food and funds from USAID and Norway which will enable them to continue assistance in the form of food, water and basic services for another two months. CARE has also conducted a survey to find a resolution for the IDPs living in the town’s temporary accommodation. Last week it interviewed 520 heads of households in the camp to find out whether they intended on returning to their place of origin, what their livelihoods are and their plans for the future. The data is currently being analysed and will be available shortly.” (UN OCHA-EUE, 14 February 2005)

IDPs in the Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples' Region or Southern Region
(March 2003)

• In the SNNP Region about 7,000 people were displaced in 2002
• 5,800 people were newly displaced during 2002 in Yeki District of SNNP Region due to clashes over Shekicho zone's status
• Government refused to allow independent investigation over the conflict despite that about 800 people were killed
• 1,000 Dizzi people were displaced following clashes between Dizzi and Surma groups in July 2002

“Ethnic clashes during the year resulted in a number of deaths, injuries, and the displacement of thousands of persons (see Section 2.d.). For example, in January 92 ethnic Somalis were killed during regional clashes over grazing and water rights. Banditry and lawlessness continued to prevail in the region at year's end.

In March between 600 and 800 persons were killed during clashes between the Sheko-Mejjangar and Manja and the Sheka and Bench-Majji in and around the town of Tepi, capital of the Yeki District, in the Southern Region. Government officials reported 128 deaths; however, the SEPDC reported more than 1,700 deaths. More than 2,000 homes were destroyed and 5,800 persons were displaced as a result of the violence. The clashes involved local officials and members of
each of these communities, and resulted from the dissatisfaction of many Sheko-Mejjangar who had wanted autonomy following an unsuccessful attempt in 1993 to move the Shekicho zone from the Southern Region to the Gambella Region. The Government claimed to have arrested 41 policemen, 39 militia members, and 11 administrative officials for their involvement in the clashes. However, the Government refused to allow an independent investigation of the incident and put the Federal Police in charge of the government's internal investigation.” (USDOS, 31 March 2003 Sect.4)

“Ethnic conflict is "spreading like wildfire" in Ethiopia because the government is failing to tackle the problem, according to a national human rights organisation.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) urged the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to crack down on tribal clashes.

In its latest report, the organisation laid the blame for recent troubles between the Surma and Dizzi tribes who live in southwest Ethiopia at the door of the government.

[…] The latest clashes in the Bench and Maji zone occurred after a member of the Dizzi tribe was killed. In a revenge attack, two Surma were killed. The nomadic Surma then carried out another attack on Dizzi groups living in at least four local districts.

More than 1,000 Dizzi tribe members fled their homes and some 31 people were killed in the clashes which broke out last July, according to the report.

[...] EHRCO said that groups carrying guns in areas where ethnic clashes occur should be disarmed and that elders should be used to calm down tensions.

It also said that talks between the Dizzi and Surma tribes could ensure "an environment of mutual respect, peace and tranquility". (IRIN, 12 March 2003)

IDPs around Addis Ababa (August 2003)

- About 15,000 people remained displaced around Addis Ababa as of August 2003
- 17,000 people of Eritrean origin displaced before Eritrean independence settled in 11 camps around Addis Ababa receive no assistance

“A residual caseload of an estimated 3,000 IDP families/15,000 persons currently residing in temporary shelters in Addis Ababa is also categorized under conflict induced IDPs. The group fled from the seaport of Assab during fighting between the Ethiopian army and EPLF fighters to control of the port before Eritrea formally gained its independence.” (UN OCHA-EUE, 1 August 2003)

“It has also been reported that about 17,000 IDPs who were settled in 11 camps near Addis Abeba have been asked by the government to move. They came from Eritrea before its independence and they haven't received any help for sometime. Despite being given money by the government as compensation for moving, some of the IDPs who had moved out returned to the camps. They were too frightened to live on the streets once they had spent the compensation money. The Ethiopian Human Rights council has condemned the decision to close the camps (IRIN, 12/09/02).” (RNIS No 39, October 2002, p.8)

“There are at least 11 camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) housing more than 17,000 people around the capital Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian government has cleared 3 camps and
given notice that those in the remaining 11 camps must leave by September 19th. Many of the camps’ residents fled from Eritrea shortly before independence in 1991.” (OCHA, 31 August 2002, p.26)

10,000 people fled violence in the Amhara region (June 2002)

- Clashes involving government forces in 2001 displaced 10,000 Amahara civilians and killed 100

“An additional 10,000 persons in western Ethiopia fled their homes to escape clashes between local government forces and ethnic Amhara militias in early 2001. From January to March, land disputes escalated into violence between ethnic Oromos and ethnic Amharas in western Oromiya region, where former military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam forcibly resettled thousands of Amharas after Ethiopia’s 1984 famine. Fighting killed some 100 people and displaced more than 10,000 mostly Amhara civilians north across the Blue Nile River.” (USCR, 1 June 2002)
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Reports on displacement due to repression by government in rural areas (January 2006)

• Reports suggest that the Ethiopian government suppresses rural populations, especially in Oromiya
• Government actions may have led to forced displacement of thousands of people during 2005

"Reports filtering out of the Ethiopian countryside confirm that, following what appears to have been its electoral defeat, the EPRDF government has unleashed on the people its special troops, supported by its paramilitary forces and armed local government officials. In what increasingly bears genocidal characteristics, numerous ordinary people are being indiscriminately killed and wounded. Many are being tortured and intimidated.

First hand witnesses confirm that the repression includes the burning of houses and property, and the confiscation of land and farm animals. Terrified by such tactics, hundreds and possibly thousands of individuals and families have been forced to abandon their farms to save their lives – in the middle of the main period for cultivation.

The brute use of force by EPRDF government on innocent farmers is blatant retaliation for rejecting EPRDF’s candidates. It also aims to intimidate them so that they will be too afraid to bear witness against the orchestration of the investigation of vote counting currently underway under the auspices of the partisan National Election Board (NEB).

Although the repression has been all across the nation, farmers in certain parts of the country have been singled out for particularly brutal treatments. For instance, in Borena Zone in Wollo, especially in Kelala Lemi and Debre Sina districts, mass killings have been reported, not to mention loss of property and internal displacements. There are similar reports from parts of Gonder, eastern Gojjam, Shoa, parts of Wollega and Southern Ethiopia.

Residents of the Ethiopian countryside are particularly vulnerable to targeted atrocities due to their remote geography, lack of quick transport and communication infrastructure for rapid exchange of information, absence of human rights monitoring groups and lack of independent media coverage. Knowing this, EPRDF is acting with impunity.

We appeal to all Ethiopians, and to humanitarian and international agencies to raise their voices so as to put a stop to the killings of our people. The EPRDF government is engaged in ruthlessly revenging and reshaping the outcome of the May 15 elections. It has lost all fear of the consequences after premature adulatory comments by certain groups of the international community about the conduct of the elections.

The irresponsible and brutal measures of the EPRDF government must be stopped before we lose many more lives, and before the government causes further displacements of people from their birth places, destruction of their properties, confiscation of their assets, and the consequent
danger of starvation. We ask all peace loving people around the world, including human rights organizations, to make their voices heard at the earliest opportunity to stem the killings and brutalities. We urge experienced international agencies to conduct assessments as a matter of the greatest urgency. Most Ethiopians are deeply distressed by the genocidal scale of what seems to have been set in train by EPRDF as much as by the apparent silence of the international community." (Ethiopian National Congress, July 2005)

War, drought and internal conflict as cause of displacement (August 2003)

- UN OCHA-EUE estimated about 329,000 IDPs registered as a result of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war
- Out of the 329,040 registered IDPs, about 134,500 had not yet received their rehabilitation grant thus remained displaced as of August 2003
- About 59,000 IDPs had not received their rehabilitation cash grant and neither were assisted by WFP or ICRC
- About 14,200 people were displaced in the Rasso area of the Somali region as of August 2003
- About 4,811 Anyuak people remained displaced in Gambella as of August 2003
- About 15,000 people remained displaced around Addis Ababa as of August 2003
- Out of those 76,500 IDPs, 63,500 had returned but had no access to their lands due to presence of mines
- By February 2003 about 50% of the IDPs assisted by the World Bank-funded Emergency Recovery Program had received their reintegration package

“This refers to the correspondences and telephone conversations made between Ms. Cathy Benetti, Information Officer at NRC in Geneva, Mr. Max Bonnel of OCHA Geneva and Mr. Paul Hebert regarding data on internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ethiopia.

The purpose of this note is therefore, to categorize IDPs in Ethiopia by causes of displacement, provide realistic figures by category and region to harmonize information being utilized at all levels and identify government counterparts that are responsible for keeping records on IDPs and follow – up on cumulative movement of IDP figures in Ethiopia. It should be noted that this summary note do not consider deportees from Eritrea and families of deceased solders who are assisted under the World Bank project on recovery and rehabilitation to those affected by the recent Ethio - Eritrea war.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ethiopia can be classified into three main categories. These are war displaced, drought and conflicted induced IDPs. The war displaced are mainly located in Tigray and Afar National Regional States while drought and conflict induced IDPs are concentrated in the Somali region, Gambella and Addis Ababa.

Based on previous reports and current reviews on IDP figures in Ethiopia in the context of the above category, presently there are about IDP 45,514 families or approximately 227,581 persons registered in Ethiopia as a whole irrespective of the causes for their displacements. Details by category are as follows with an aggregate summary attached as ANNEX A.

**WAR INDUCED IDPs**

Regarding war induced IDPs in Tigray National Regional State, the [regional office for Emergency Recovery Programme (ERP) in Mekele is responsible for proper screening, registration and provision of cash assistance to the IDPs supported under the World Bank project. The office has
confirmed to OCHA Addis Ababa that the figure on IDPs in Tigray region remains unchanged since the last filed report dated 2 April 2003 (report prepared by Ahmed Ali and Dechassa Lemessa of OCHA Addis Ababa covering their field assessment in Tigray between 9 – 22 February 2003). The report indicated that 60,806 families with an estimated population of 304,030 persons were registered as war induced IDPs in the region.

Concerning IDPs in Afar National Regional State (ANRS), the regional office for Social Rehabilitation Fund (SRF) in Asaita; the regional capital has been nominated as the government-implementing partner for providing the IDPs in region with cash grants approved by the World Bank similar to the package considered for IDPs in Tigray region. In this connection, SRF office in Asaita has informed OCHA Addis Ababa that a total of 5,002 IDP families with an estimated population of 25,010 persons have also been registered for assistance under the current World Bank project.

Paragraph (5) and (6) taken together show that the combined number of registered war induced IDPs in Tigray and Afar regions is 65,808 families of which 38,873 families have received their rehabilitation grants under the World Bank project. Both offices in Mekele and Asaita have disclosed that the remaining caseload of 29,935 families will be provided with the agreed cash grants as soon as the World Bank releases additional funds for project implementation. The summary by region is as follows:

26,935 families constituting 134,675 persons located in Tigray and Afar regions have not yet been provided with their assistance cash grants under the World Bank project representing 41% of the registered IDP families there. The status of these families was raised and discussed with senior officials of ERP and the SRF in Mekele and Asaita. Presently, 75,950 individual IDPs in Tigray are being provided with food assisted by WFP and the ICRC. There are approximately 59,000 IDPs, who have not received the cash grant and who are also not receiving WFP or ICRC food assistance. OCHA is investigating to determine if some or all of this group are receiving assistance from other sources (Government/NGO, etc.) and if any of this group may have returned to their places of origin.

Concerning the 75,949 IDPs reported to be under WFP and ICRC emergency food assistance programme in Tigray region, it has been confirmed with WFP Sub-Office Mekele and the regional ERP of Tigray that the individuals are not sheltered in separate camps but rather dispersed in different villages located in war affected zones in Eastern, Central and North-Western region. These IDPs are unable to return to their villages of origin because of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and because for some their land is being used by the Ethiopian army for defence purposes. Out of the above 75,949 IDPs (persons) mentioned above, 12,936 persons are being provided with food assistance by the ICRC at Dowhan along with other drought affected people of Erob Wereda.

DROUGHT INDUCED IDPS
Drought induced IDPs are mainly fund in the Somali region in huge numbers and the majority has been residing in temporary shelters for the last three years. In the year 2000, the UN-EUE took the initiative in establishing a realistic figure on IDPs in the Somali region. It was estimated that there were about 25,000 families/125,330 persons in various locations. The figure was later updated in 2002 by a regional IDP task force comprising the federal DPPC, the regional DPPB of the Somali region and UN-EUE. It was estimated that some 91,820 persons were residing in IDP shelters including about 4,000 Shekash tribesmen who fled their traditional areas of residence because of conflict with the Ogadenis. The task force recommended that a detailed screening be done to establish exact figure and map out areas of origin for project planning for durable solution. As a follow up to the above recommendations, UNDP/IOM are now designing pilot projects for repatriation of the IDP caseload in Fafen and Hartishiek.
Based on the recent assessment on revised needs for emergency assistance, the federal DPPC, the regional DPPB of the Somali region and WFP have agreed that 58,895, instead of the previous estimate of 87,820, is the current accepted number of drought induced IDPs in the region and who are in need emergency assistance up to December 2003.

[...]

Owing the recent flooding in the Wabi Shebelle River, an estimated population of 91,050 persons in East Imi, West Imi, Gode, Kelafo and Mustahil areas of the Somali region were displaced. The IDPs were provided with temporary emergency assistance by UN agencies, ICRC, NGOs and the government until the flooding subsided. This figure was recorded as IDPs created by flooding situation. Since the population has now returned to their villages, the figure has to be disregarded, as they are no longer temporarily displaced.

CONFLICT INDUCED IDPs

It is well known that the root causes of inter clan conflicts in Ethiopia are claims on ownership rights over scarce resources such as communal grassing lands and watering points. Such clashes have resulted in human lives, destruction of property and human displacements. The two most recent conflicts that have resulted in massive displacement are located in the Somali and Gambella regions. Updates on these events need to be considered.

Regarding conflict in the Somali region, the working group on IDPs in the region reported that some 4,000 Shekash tribesmen from Jeno Gaben area of the Somali region were forced to move to Rasso area in North West part of the Somali region because of conflict with the Ogadenis. Following subsequent clashes in Shekash villages, other families were also displaced. Today, the regional DPPB of the Somali region and the federal DPPC have accepted the figure of 2,800 IDP families/14,200 persons as the current conflict induced IDPs in Rasso area. Hence the previous figure of 4,000 persons in the IDP working group report should be revised upwards to 14,200 persons as far as conflict induced IDP population in the Somali region is concerned.

Similarly, in Gambella region, an estimated 2,000 IDP families/10,000 persons from Annuaq tribe that were displaced since early 2002 because of conflicts with Nuer are now residing in Illa Village in Itang Wereda. However, it is now confirmed with the regional DPPB of Gambella region that some of the IDPs have returned home. The residual caseload of 1,000 families/4,811 persons are currently being assisted by the federal DPPC as conflict induced IDPs in Gambella region.

A residual caseload of an estimated 3,000 IDP families/15,000 persons currently residing in temporary shelters in Addis Ababa is also categorized under conflict induced IDPs. The group fled from the seaport of Assab during fighting between the Ethiopian army and EPLF fighters to control the port before Eritrea formally gained its independence.

“8. Of the current total IDP caseload of 76,500 people, 13,000 people in eastern Tigray (Irob zone) are receiving food from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). ICRC is providing relief food assistance in the Irob zone for both drought affected persons and IDPs until November, when the next harvest is expected to improve the food security of the drought-affected population in 2003. Consequently, the number of WFP beneficiaries from July to November will be 63,500. In December, the IDPs of Irob zone will revert to WFP and the beneficiaries will total to 76,500 people. In addition, this Budget Revision includes a contingency stock for an additional 29,500 IDPs. The buffer is for a five-month period, from August to December, as the demarcation related population movements may occur even before September, when the demarcation is due to start.” (WFP, 15 July 2003, p.2)

Note: As of 1 March WFP is providing assistance to 129,084 refugees in nine camps.”

Source: (OCHA, Affected Populations in the Horn of Africa Region, as of 31 March 2003)
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical security

Evictions of IDPs from camps (July 2003)

- 500 displaced families from the 1991 Eritrean independence war were evicted from their Kaliti camp with two weeks notice
- Rehabilitation programme to ensure IDPs self-sustainability prior to closure of the camp were at standstill since half a year and some 300 families received no assistance
- IDPs in Saris and Kaliti areas were scared by three fires of unknown origin
- Government of Ethiopia cleared 3 IDP camps around Addis Ababa and asked residents of the 11 other camps to leave by September 2002
- In September 2002 about 200 homeless persons were forcibly resettled and about 10,000 shacks were demolished by bulldozers

"On Saturday, 17 May, Kaliti Camp for Displaced people in Ethiopia was closed and torn down, despite the fact that around 500 resident families had received very short notice of this abrupt end to their shelter. This camp was originally opened in 1991 to house those people who had been displaced from the North as a result of the Eritrean independence war. JRS has been supporting the rehabilitation of 273 families from the camp; work which continues even though people are now outside the camp.

[...] A rehabilitation programme was launched so that the displaced people could receive training and funds to help rent new homes and to find work.

The last six months has seen a reorganisation of the Addis Ababa City administration and during this period, the work of rehabilitation for Kaliti displaced people was put on hold. Then the local government office suddenly gave two weeks notice to the people in Kaliti that they would have to move. Some families had already been assisted for the move, but nearly 300 other families had not yet received their assistance.

Three fires in the displaced areas of Saris and Kaliti, of mysterious origin, had recently made the displaced residents very nervous. In the last fire in Kaliti, a young student was killed. The nervousness about the fires had caused some families to leave the site before the final deadline."

"(JRS, 29 May 2003)"

"In July there were credible reports from the EHRCO that the Government, in an attempt to "clean up" Addis Ababa, forcibly resettled approximately 200 homeless persons to an area nearly 30 miles outside of the city. In September city bulldozers demolished approximately 10,000 shacks." (USDOS, 31 March 2003, sect.2d)

"There are at least 11 camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) housing more than 17,000 people around the capital Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian government has cleared 3 camps and given notice that those in the remaining 11 camps must leave by September 19th. Many of the camps’ residents fled from Eritrea shortly before independence in 1991." (OCHA, 31 August 2002, p.26)
“In July, Ethiopian authorities provided financial compensation to approximately 18,000 internally displaced persons to vacate some 10 camps near Addis Ababa, the capital, many of which authorities later leveled.” (USCR, 1 June 2003)


See “To render displaced people shelterless is unjust, 53rd Special Report”, EHRC, 3 July 2002, in the bibliography below.

See 'Ethiopia: Fire razes homes in displaced camp' (IRIN, 27 May 2003) [External Link]

Displaced children and women particularly vulnerable (June 2003)

- Conflict and drought undermined social cohesion and protection
- Displaced women and children are particularly vulnerable to physical and psychological trauma
- There has been some reports of sexual abuse and forced labour of displaced women and children
- More than 75 per cent of IDPs assumed to be children and women

“The effects of drought have impacted across Ethiopia and exacerbated pre-existing threats to the survival and well being of women and children. Drought and displacement have undermined traditional family and community cohesion. Traditional capacities and patterns of protection and care have been disrupted or destroyed placing women and children at heightened risk of physical and psychological trauma and exploitation. Documented instances of sexual exploitation of women and children, streetism and child labour have already occurred amongst a small number of IDPs.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.8)

"Out of the estimated 349,837 internally displaced people more than 75 per cent are assumed to be children and women. Among displaced populations, women, children and the elderly generally suffer the most. They often have fewer income generation opportunities, and thus are more likely to be impoverished, particularly in areas such as Tigray and Afar which are among the poorest parts of one of the poorest counties in the world. Women and children (including a number of orphans) who are separated from other family members and find themselves in a strange social environment are often traumatized and disoriented. They are consequently more vulnerable to abuse, marginalisation and discrimination. Situations of social dislocation, such as that prevailing in northern Ethiopia, pose particular dangers to women during pregnancy, childbirth, or post-partum recovery. These situations also expose women and adolescents to greater risks of sexual exploitation, abuse and violence. Displaced people, particularly women, are also more at risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, since families are often split and increasing poverty and lack of other income generation opportunities forces many displaced women into prostitution.” (UNCTE 28 January 2000, pp.34-35)

“Fear of sexual violence within Bale IDP camps was clearly an issue which UNICEF raised with both local administration and NGOs operating in the camps.” UNICEF 14 March 2003)

NEW Human rights record remains poor in Ethiopia (2003)
Freedom of press considerably restricts flows of information concerning the situation of people displaced from ethnic conflicts
Violations of human rights are exacerbated by the fact that lawful protection mechanisms such as the Human Rights Commission or the Office of the Ombudsman were not operational during 2002
32 Nuer IDPs were abducted and little investigations have been carried on the disappearance

“The Government's human rights record remained poor;

[...]
The Government restricted freedom of the press and continued to detain or imprison members of the press.

[...]
The Government limited freedom of association, but the nongovernmental organization (NGO) registration process continued to improve. On occasion local authorities infringed on freedom of religion. The Government restricted freedom of movement. Numerous internally displaced persons (IDPs) from internal ethnic conflicts remained in the country. During the year, neither the Human Rights Commission (HRC) nor the Office of the Ombudsman was operational. Violence and societal discrimination against women and abuse of children remained problems.

[...]
The security forces committed many unlawful killings, including some alleged political killings during the year. The number of unlawful killings during the year was estimated to be between 1,000 and 1,500. There continued to be numerous unconfirmed reports of unlawful killings by government security forces from Oromiya and the Somali regions.

[...]
There were reports in July that Anuak warriors abducted 32 Nuer IDPs from a bus taking them to Fugnido; the Government made little progress in its investigation of the disappearances, and the whereabouts of the 32 IDPs were unknown at year's end [...].“ (USDOS, 31 March 2003 Sect.1a, 1b,1f)
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

General

Tigray IDPs live on meagre resources, government response to include them in PSNP (February 2006)

- The Ethiopian government says to have included IDPs in its Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Tigray
- Displaced in Tigray live in overcrowded dwellings with high mortality rates and little access to food and clean water

The Ethiopian government says to have included all people in Tigray into its Productive Safety Net Programme. It could not be verified yet whether this includes IDPs. (OCHA Ethiopia, email 7 February 2006)

“I recently had an occasion to visit Tigre, northern Ethiopia with the Country Director, Br. Stephen Power. It was evident that the many displaced are trying to settle to a new life, while still cherishing the dream of returning to their former homes some day.

Small dwellings erected to house families of seven are now occupied by as many as 15. Food is in short supply due to the parched land condition and because much of the land that used to yield a good harvest has had to be cleared of landmines before it is safe for farming.

Unfortunately, among the IDPs, there are many suffering from the additional burden of the HIV virus, but call forth the understanding and compassion of their hosts.

For a people used to moving from place to place, to find suitable grazing place for their cattle, displacement was normal. But the type of displacement they are experiencing today is different—what was home is no longer so, for some, their former dwellings have been destroyed and their villages are non-existent.” (JRS, 17 April 2003)

“Tigray Region, which borders Eritrea, has a population of approximately 4 million people and typifies the extremely harsh conditions faced by the majority of Ethiopians. The crude death rate is 13.7 per 1,000, infant mortality rate is 102 per 1,000, while under 5 mortality is 148 per 1,000. The percentage of the population with access to clean and safe water is less than 20 percent (MoH, Health and health related indicators 2001).” (WFP, 1 May 2002, pp.1-3)

Drought causes enormous strain on Ethiopia’s south-east (April 2006)

- Humanitarian aid to Afar, Somali and Borena are ongoing to counter the worst effects of the drought
- Slow funding of the January 2006 Humanitarian Appeal could jeopardise the entire south-east of Ethiopia
- Aid is desperately needed but arriving late
- Malnutrition and diseases, in particular measles, already pose a very serious problem
• Water distribution is essential, as over half of the region's water wells are broken or unusable
• nomads entering Ethiopia from drought-struck Somalia and Kenya increase the pressure on resources
• Ogaden has been conflict-struck for many years; insecurity endangers food and water distribution

"Of the 2.6 million people requiring emergency food assistance in Ethiopia, 1.5 million are in Somali Region and 155,000 are in Borena zone (Oromiya Region). These areas are affected by the same drought as the neighboring parts of Kenya and Somalia. WFP aims to cover around two-thirds of the overall emergency food requirements, which would be up to 1.7 million people, with the remainder covered through bilateral contributions to the government or NGOs. The needs of the chronically food insecure population will be addressed through food and cash transfers under the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) (covering 7.2 million people in the first half of the year and 8.3 million in the second half).

In Afar Region, most of the food insecure population is to be covered by the PSNP; it is essential to start food transfers for this region as soon as possible, as there are needs in the early part of the year. Meanwhile, emergency food stocks are sufficient to address the immediate emergency food needs in the country.

Food dispatches for Somali Region and Borena zone are continuing and food distributions are ongoing. For Somali Region, 10,000 tonnes were allocated to the worst-affected woredas in December and transport and distributions of these allocations continued in January. Some 29,000 tonnes of WFP food has been allocated in January and so far up to one-third has been dispatched. Borena received over 2,000 tonnes in December and 2,900 tonnes have been allocated in January. Emergency distributions include "general" rations of cereals, pulses and vegetable oil. Fortified corn soya blend is also being dispatched for blanket supplementary feeding as preliminary results of nutrition surveys indicate "serious" levels of malnutrition in Somali Region. This is an additional ration for the 35 percent of the population considered to be at particular risk (children under-five, pregnant and nursing women, the sick and the elderly). In the meantime, UNCT has completed a logistics mission to Gode to facilitate an expansion of its presence in the zone in order to ensure effective response." (OCHA, 20 March 2006)

"In January, the government, the United Nations and other aid agencies appealed for US $166 million in emergency food and non-food assistance to help 2.6 million Ethiopians. However, only $19 million of the $111 million earmarked for health and nutrition and water and sanitation has been received so far.

According to the UN, at least 1.7 million Ethiopians are struggling to survive, with limited access to water in the eastern Somali region and in the southern Borena zone. About one in five children in southeastern Ethiopia is malnourished, and two out of every 10,000 die every day, making the need for therapeutic feeding and water access extremely urgent, according to Paul Hebert, the head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Ethiopia.

"We have already identified critical malnutrition rates in the Somali region, with 20 percent of malnourished children. If resources are not made available quickly, we will be unable to feed them and we fear that children might start to die," Hebert said. "If we don't receive new funding quickly, it might jeopardise the whole crisis in the region."

Measles and diarrhoea - which infect weakened children who have no access to clean water - are the main killers during a drought. In the last major drought in 2000, one-fifth of all deaths of
children under the age of five were measles-related, according to the UN. At least 34 people have died of measles in eastern Ethiopia over the last six months.

The food-relief situation does not look good, according to the DPPA and OCHA. Food pipelines will be full only until the end of May, and no new contributions have been announced. "The available stock of food has already been nearly totally distributed. Unless we get new funding, we don't know," said Wodayehu from the DPPA. "We need more support from the donor community if we want to keep the current crisis under control."

"It is worrying that you never get anything [funding] until kids start dying in huge numbers," said Bjorn Ljunqvist, head of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Ethiopia. UNICEF lacks nearly 50 percent of the $10 million urgently needed for additional emergency water tankers and the vaccination of some 1.5 million children against measles. "If the rain doesn't come in adequate amounts, there are a lot of signs that the crisis will spill to the north, that the 1.7 million will jump to 2.5 or three million."

"We don't have precise figures yet, but we expect the needs to increase a lot," OCHA's Hebert said.

The UN has provided $1.7 million to the World Health Organization through its newly created Central Emergency Response Fund to be used to provide aid to the Horn of Africa region, of which Ethiopia will receive $350,000 for life-saving programmes." (IRIN, 10 April 2006)

"The area around Denan, a dry, dusty village in the extreme southeast some 1,400 km from the capital, Addis Ababa, is where the messengers of widespread hunger have made their first call. 'If there is no intervention, then we could be talking about the same disaster we had in 2000,' said Abdullahi Ali Haji, the government's health officer for the area. As many as 98,000 people died during a drought in Ethiopia in 2000, according to estimates by the Journal of the American Medical Association.

Around Denan, the effects of that drought and its impact on communities are still visible. Some 10,000 people continue to live in a makeshift camp on the outskirts of the village, having moved there six years ago in search of food.

'The drought is already here. This is our warning that without immediate help...there will be deaths. We are still assessing the situation rather than making emergency interventions,' Haji added. 'We have to move quickly."

Although some aid is beginning to arrive in this remote region, local residents said it was too little, too late. Aid workers said although urgent appeals for food, water and medicine had been made, often it took weeks, if not months, before the aid arrived. Yet the widespread food shortage in Denan had announced itself before arriving in the area.

While land degradation, overcrowding and global warming have been blamed for the successive droughts that afflict Ethiopia's desolate Ogaden region, poor rains over the last nine years have left many families living on a knife edge. This year the rains failed completely, leaving the area, whose landscape is ribbed and rutted like a crocodile's back, with dried riverbeds and sun-parched valleys.

Food prices have gone up by as much as 50 percent, while the value of livestock has plummeted, affecting mostly nomads, who rely on cattle, sheep, goats and camels for food and income. With
livestock deaths on the increase, many people have started migrating to nearby towns in search of aid. Some of those who have recently been displaced have walked 200 km into the Ogaden from across the borders of neighbouring Kenya and Somalia, where the situation is said to be worse.

In this area alone, about 1.75 million people - mainly nomads - need help, say aid workers.

[...] In good times it is one of the busiest caravan routes in Africa, as daily processions of camels packed with wares travel from Somalia to Ethiopia along the edge of the Rift Valley, their traders making tidy profits. Unfortunately, an earlier crackdown by the authorities on smugglers, coupled with Saudi Arabia's continued ban on meat imports from the region out of fear of Rift Valley Fever, had already left many families without reliable incomes.

'Without urgent help the drought could spiral,' said Bjorn Ljungqvist, the country director for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Ethiopia. 'Urgent emergency intervention in the form of food, water, and vital medicines for women and children is needed to avert an impending disaster.'

For this area alone, the UN needs US $6 million to help - and not just to avert hunger. In 2000, a fifth of all deaths of children under the age of five were measles-related. At the moment, almost half of the region's water wells are broken or unusable, according to UNICEF, and at least 637,000 people depend on emergency water supplies.

[...]

Ogaden, with a population of four million, has yet more problems. Administratively, it is the weakest of Ethiopia's federal regions, with its huge area and sparse population. A long-running conflict between the government and a rebel secessionist group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front, has also severely hampered any real development in the region. In recent months the insecurity has taken a menacing turn, with trucks of food aid being attacked and in some cases burnt. Violent clan disputes - a spill over from the feuding factions in neighbouring Somalia - have also deterred the work of aid workers in the region.

Hospitals are virtually non-existent and schools are too far for children to attend. Gode Hospital, for example, is the only such facility for a population of one million people.

**Conflict induced newly displaced people in acute humanitarian situation in Somali and Oromiya regions (March 2006)**

- There is a growing number of IDPs in a very remote part of Afder zone in Guradamole district
- Concerns raised as IDPs were not planned in the relief food beneficiary number
• There is no water at all in the district

In the extremely food-insecure situation in Somali and Oromiya regions, tribal conflicts kept occurring at the beginning of 2006. (FEWSNET, March 2006)

“In Afder zone deteriorating conditions are reported in West Imi district and among IDPs arriving in Guradamole district from bordering areas in Oromiya Region. […] Due to the referendum, a number of IDPs have moved into Afder, Liben and Shinile Zones, and this poses problems for the on-going relief operation, as these displaced people were not planned in the original relief food beneficiary number. There are serious concerns for a growing number of IDPs in a very remote part of Afder zone in Guradamole district. […] There is a critical shortage of food as the last food delivery to the area was in December 2004. Pastoralists Concern Association Ethiopia (PCAE) recommends the IDPs be supported by the DPPB monthly ration allocation. In Guradamole town there is no water at all. ICRC has distributed tarpaulins and agricultural tools for almost 1,200 IDP households and has started a full two month food ration. MSF-Belgium is starting nutritional and medical interventions shortly. The combination of all of these aggravating factors are triggering a very acute humanitarian situation, which is on the way to becoming an emergency if urgent assistance is not provided.” (UN CTE, 20 April 2005)

Conflict induced IDPs in Bordode/Mieso areas (Somali) in need of planned humanitarian assistance (April 2004)

• Durable solutions necessary to address long standing problems such as the return of IDPs in their village of origin
• Plastic jerry cans and borehole needed to address the difficulty of access to clean water for IDPs in Bordode Woreda
• IDPs most vulnerable because they lack shelter facilities and their areas of locations are particularly infested by malaria
• IDPs need more cooking facilities

“The most urgent issue of concern to the IDPs in Bordode and Mieso is relief assistance in food and non-food items.” (UN OCHA Ethiopia, 24 May 2004)

“UN OCHA-Ethiopia undertook a field mission to the Somali region to assess the situation of IDPs in Fafan, Hartishiek, Mieso and Bordode IDP shelters. The IDPs in Fafen and Hartishiek are mainly drought induced while the caseload of some 14,900 persons in Mieso/Bordode areas are displaced mainly because of conflict over land ownership between Oromo and Somali tribesmen in the Rift valley. Major conclusions and observations of the mission are: 1) IDPs in the region are in need of humanitarian assistance such as food, water, health, shelter materials and clothing. 2) Improved planning and delivery of humanitarian assistance is essential. 3) The IDPs in the areas visited have expressed their interest to return to their villages of origin. Funding of the UNDP/IOM project to return 6,000 of the IDPs needs to occur soon if a durable solution for the long standing problem of IDPs in the region is to be found.” (UN OCHA, 30, April 2004)

The problem of access to clean water

“Bordode/Mieso

21. The IDPs in Bordode Woreda collect water from a seasonal river that is 5 – 7 KM away from their current settlements. The IDPs need plastic water jerry cans. Based on the recommendations
made by the joint rapid assessment mission referred to in paragraph (4) above, the HCS has
delivered 100 pieces of plastic jerry cans of 20 litters and 2 units of hug plastic water containers
of 5,000 litres each to the Wereda Administration in Bordode for the emergency. UNICEF has
also released 2,400 pieces of plastic jerry cans of 10 litres capacity from its stock in Jijiga for
onward dispatch to IDPs in Bordode/Mieso areas. However, the combined assistance made to
the IDPs is far too short of the actual requirements.
22. In order to improve the problem of water with the IDPs and the local population, the regional
Bureau for Water Resources Development has drilled a new borehole near the checkpoint at
Bordode. Although the productivity of the borehole has been tested and certified as potential, the
technicians deployed for this purpose have returned to Jijiga without finishing the remaining
installation works. It was confirmed with local government authorities in Bordode that the required
equipment and construction materials are available on site for completion.
23. The reporting OCHA Field Officer and the Head of the regional Bureau for Water Resources
Development (RBWRD) of the Somali region have discussed the possibility of re-deploying the
technicians back to Bordode to complete the remaining elements of the civil works. The Head of
the RBWRD has assured OCHA that the necessary action will be taken through the Shinille
based water construction crew as quickly as possible.

Action Points
• The quantity of plastic water jerry cans made available to the IDPs by the HCS and UNICEF is
not sufficient. It is recommended that additional units be provided for distribution to the remaining
IDP caseload in Bordode/Mieso.
• The construction works of the borehole in Bordode be completed. This is to ensure that the
borehole facility is put to a productive operation so that the IDPs and the local communities in the
surrounding areas could access to drinking water.

Health – malaria causing serious concern
• The IDP areas in Bordode/Mieso in particular are malaria infested. The problem is complicated
by lack of shelter facilities. SC – USA field office in Dire Dawa has allocated Birr 5,000 for the
procurement and delivery of 277 pieces of impregnated mosquito nets to Bordode/Mieso. It is
estimated that some 5,400 pieces of mosquito nets and medicine are additionally required for
distribution at the rate of two pieces per family.

Action Points
• It is suggested that 5,400 pieces of impregnated mosquito nets and medicine be made available
for distribution to 2,697 IDP families in Bordode/Mieso.

Shelter Materials – urgent assistance required
24. OCHA Field Officer has noticed the problem of shelter materials and clothing with IDPs in
Fafen, Hartishiek and Bordode/Mieso during the mission. The problem will be rather difficult
during the current rains. Although the HCS and UNICEF have provided 1,300 pieces of plastic
tarpaulins of 4 x 5 meters to Bordode/Mieso, the quantity is not sufficient. The problem of clothing
and blankets with children, lactating mothers and the elderly is critical. The possibilities of
providing sufficient shelter materials, blankets and clothing need to be considered by the
federal/regional governments, humanitarian aid agencies and donors.

Action Point
• The additional requirements of 1,535 pieces of plastic tarpaulin of 4 x 5 meters be made
available for IDP in Bordode/Mieso who have not received shelter materials and some 2,600 IDP
families in Fafen and Hartishiek (1,200 families in Fafen and 1,400 families in Hartishiek) be also
assisted with shelter materials. It is also recommended that sufficient pieces of blankets be
provided for the IDPs in the above camps.

Kitchen Utensils – need for urgent supply
25. As mentioned above, the IDPs abandoned their villages spontaneously because of conflict.
Most of the families do not have basic cooking facilities. The Hararge Catholic Secretariat has
dispatched 100 sets of kitchen utensils. UNICEF has also delivered 1,000 units of utensils for
Bordode/Mieso. It is estimated that some 1,750 more sets of kitchen utensils are required for distribution in Bordode/Mieso.

**Action Point**

- It is suggested that IDP families in Bordode/Mieso who have not received assistance in kitchen utensils be provided with the package on family basis and in line with UNICEF standard.

(UN OCHA Ethiopia, 26 April 2004)

**IDP needs in Doba Woreda in Oromiya region (February 2005)**

- Shelter needed for 2,770 households
- Clothing and utensils needed for 2,874 households
- Full rations needed for at least 16,615 people

“A DPPC/USAID/UN mission to assess the region's request for emergency food assistance estimates more than 16,600 IDPs in and around Doba woreda. Due to the urgency of the situation, a request for immediate assistance has been sent from the field to the federal DPPC. Immediate assistance is requested in the form of shelter for 2,770 households, clothing and utensils for 2,874 households, full rations for 16,615 people and supplementary food for 5,815 people. This is additional to the 2,100 IDPs who moved to a temporary camp in Mieso in late 2004 and does not include the IDPs reported in Goro Gutu woreda, East Hararghe.” (OCHA, 4 February 2005)

**IDPs needs in Miesso in Oromiya region (December 2004)**

- IDPs leaving in deplorable conditions on the soccer field in the centre town
- IDPs are living with no food, water and shelter
- IDPs are receiving very limited assistance

“Following the recent referendum to determine the administrative status of contested kebeles in Oromiya and Somali Region, 2,600 victims of inter-ethnic conflict from Bike Town are currently living as IDPs in Meisso Town. CARE Ethiopia sent an assessment team to the area at the request of the Zonal Administration, which reported that the IDPs were living in deplorable conditions on the soccer field in the centre of town, 50 meters from the livestock market, with no food, water, shelter, blankets or latrines. No assistance had been given to them other than 39 ten person Red Cross tents which had been donated the week after their arrival, along with 2.5 MTs of wheat and a water trailer which is now empty. The site is on a flood plain and night-time temperatures have dropped as low as seven degrees. CARE in consultation with the Zonal and Woreda Administrators and USAID is addressing the immediate needs. The camp is being relocated, pit latrines dug, two roto tankers placed at the site are receiving water daily, and blankets, jerry cans, wood and charcoal, sleeping mats and soap have been purchased to meet their immediate needs for a month. OFDA has release 52 MTs of maize, oil, pulses and CSB to distribute to these IDPs in two half-monthly rounds of distribution in the next month. Concerns remain regarding shelter and the inadequate health clinic service. CARE, International Medical Corps (IMC), Federation of Red Cross Society (FRCS) and Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) are closely monitoring the situation in order to alleviate the problems and an OCHA field officer
accompanied by Oromiya DPPB is also assessing the situation.” (UN OCHA-Ethiopia, 17 December 2004)

Worst drought and destitution in areas where IDPs are present (July 2003)

- The increase of people in need of emergency assistance in 2003 is due to reduced agricultural production declining purchasing power, and lack of adequate targeting
- Acute malnutrition reached 33.9% in the Somali region where 90,000 people were affected by floods
- There is acute lack of seeds particularly in SNNPR area worst affected by drought as of May 2003
- Despite generous donations in food sector, malnutrition has increased due to inadequate quality, targeting, delayed shipment and traditional food sharing
- Drought conditions exacerbated poor health status: measles outbreaks are current and Malaria, the highest cause of morbidity

“More than 12 million people in Ethiopia-most of them children-need food aid immediately, and the situation is getting worse every day. Without substantial new shipments of food, the crisis could become as catastrophic as Ethiopia’s 1983-1984 famine, which claimed nearly one million lives.” (SCF, 28 May 2003)

“The total population in need has risen to 12.5 million from 11.3 million out of a population of 69 million resulting in the need for an additional 79,122 tonnes of food, which means a total of 944,280 tonnes for the May to end December 2003 period. The increase stems from the significant reduction in on-farm production, over estimates of meher production, decline in purchasing power of rural communities, low harvests for crops that usually compensate for food gaps (i.e. sweet potato) and lack of sufficient targeting of beneficiaries at the community level.

The above-mentioned re-assessments were necessary due to the deteriorating nutritional status in many of the worst-affected areas in the country as well as other related factors and indicators of deteriorating food security such as increasing social disruption, school drop outs, distress migration and the dilution of food aid rations in some areas that could not be prevented up to the present time. According to the assessment results an additional 1.2 million people are in need of immediate food aid from May to the end of the year which brings the total to 12.6 million people needing food assistance requiring an additional 79,122 tonnes of food. Additional beneficiaries are highest in Oromiya (710,650) and SNNPR (324,600) followed by Tigray (180,027) and Amhara (11,800).

Over the past two months, the humanitarian community witnessed a dramatic humanitarian deterioration in many parts of Southern Ethiopia, particularly in SNNPR despite ongoing relief food distribution by the Government and NGOs. This is due in part to an increase in the number of needy population who are forced to re-share their food resources, which has seriously diluted the emergency and recovery efforts in some areas.

SNNPR is not the only area in the country that is suffering from reports of high malnutrition levels. A total of 90 nutritional surveys were conducted in 2002 and 2003, which have provided a clearer picture of the areas of concern. The surveys highlighted the need for rapid interventions in the most seriously affected areas such as East and West Hararghe where the migrants remain in camps and with individual families in Bale Zone.
Results from recent nutritional surveys by NGOs indicate severe nutritional status in several areas of the country including districts in Afar, Tigray and SNNPR. The surveys also reported some improvements in other areas that were severely affected in September 2002, which may be attributed to accelerated relief distributions. Similar surveys also indicated the emergence of new hot spots particularly Fik Zone of Somali Region where the food security situation is reported to have seriously deteriorated and the Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) has reached an alarming 33.9%. Severely affected areas require rapid interventions with general ration distribution, supplementary and sometimes therapeutic feeding.

[…]
For many farmers in southern Ethiopia agricultural assistance for long cycle crops is arriving too late to fully benefit from the long rains and the meher planting season. Even though some districts managed to use some of the money left over from last year's budget to purchase seeds, there is a general and acute lack of seeds in many districts in SNNPR. Generally, only half of the listed beneficiary households that are targeted to be supplied with seeds are actually receiving inputs.

[…]
Procurement of therapeutic food has also increased in preparation for the anticipated worsening of the nutritional situation nationwide. In spite of the generous response by many donor countries, food relief has not been able to maintain a satisfactory nutritional level in the drought-affected population, for various reasons: inadequate quantity of food (12.5 Kg instead of the recommended 15 Kg per person per month), inadequate quality (the food basket is often made up of cereals only, with no or little complementary food such as pulses and oil), inadequate targeting to priority areas and beneficiaries, logistic difficulties (many areas cannot be easily reached, and current rains will make it even more difficult), traditional food sharing (in many communities, available food is shared among anybody in the clan, thus diluting the impact upon the actual needy members), delayed shipment, borrowing from other sources, difficulties in compiling correct beneficiary lists, inefficiency of distribution chain in some regions and supplementary food requirements only met by 50%, and not targeted. Plans are to increase UN staff in the region, to enhance response, reporting and monitoring.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.1-5)

“Besides malnutrition, measles is one of the major current threats to the population in Ethiopia, mostly children, and the spread is exacerbated by drought conditions.

[…]
Malaria affects 4 to 5 million people annually in Ethiopia and is prevalent in 75 percent of the country, putting over 40 million people at risk and represents the largest single cause of morbidity. Southern Ethiopia is known for malaria epidemics. As the rains are now ongoing in the southern parts of the country, physically weak and malnourished people are at high malaria risk such as in Omo Shelenko Woreda, Kambata Zone of SNNPR, where in April 33 people died due to a malaria outbreak which can be related to combined factors such as physical weakness due to food shortage and unavailability of malaria drugs.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.5)

“WFP is appealing to donors to provide US$90 million in assistance to cover the organisation's 2003 emergency operation.

[…]
"We have not had enough support to give out a complete cereal ration in Ethiopia and we and our partners have been forced to reduce it from 15 kilos a month to 12.5 kilos. Currently we have commitments of about half of what we need for the new emergency operation. A threat of a pipeline break in September remains."

"I assure you cutting rations is an action we and our partners only take in desperation. Once again - because governments have failed to provide the aid needed - WFP is forced into an exercise in triage. Who will be fed? Who will go hungry?"

Only the most vulnerable Ethiopians have so far received the full 15 kg/per person/per month cereal ration and until it is available for all of those in need, malnutrition rates will continue to rise.
WFP reaffirms its commitment to provide the fuller cereal ration to all food aid recipients in the country with the support of its donors.

One of the areas worst affected by the drought is Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) where approximately 20 percent of the country's population live. Chronic food insecurity is endemic, mainly due to the high population density, under-developed agriculture, a poor early warning system and unfavorable climatic conditions.

[...] In addition to drought, parts of Ethiopia have experienced flooding. In the Somali region, in particular, some 90,000 people have been affected. Destroyed household food stocks in the flooded areas are exposing people to hunger and there is increased threat of disease. The Government of Ethiopia has begun airlifting emergency food aid to the region.

Besides a food shortage, the situation in Ethiopia is exacerbated by the lack of clean drinking water, a widespread seed shortage, and poor sanitation, nutrition and primary health care. WFP is committed to working with other UN agencies and NGOs to address these needs.

To date, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, European Commission, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, Belgium, Australia, Denmark, Japan, the African Development Bank, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Poland and Spain have all provided food assistance to Ethiopia through WFP. Despite these generous contributions, there is still a substantial shortfall of some 230,000 tonnes towards the WFP operation requirements in 2003 of 619,000 tonnes.” (WFP, 28 May 2003)

“The failure of Belg and the subsequent inadequacy of Kiremt rains in pastoral Afar and northern Shinile led to the rapid deterioration of conditions there, including the death of livestock and shortly thereafter the increase in malnutrition among children under five.

In crop dependent areas, while the early cessation of Belg rains had an impact on the land preparation for long cycle crops grown during the main Meher season, the delay in the onset of Kiremt rains caused delays in planting. The immediate result was the absence of a green harvest between August and September and an expected delay in the main harvest by one to two months. Populations dependent on subsistence farming experienced an extended lean season. In areas that are chronically food insecure, this resulted in a rapid deterioration in nutritional status.

The extended dry spell also resulted in the complete failure of high yielding long cycle crops, specifically along the eastern escarpment in Tigray and Amhara and the lowlands of East and West Haraghe, Arsi, Bale in Oromiya Region and in the Rift Valley of SNNPR. Particularly affected are sorghum and maize, staple foods for many of the rural poor, which together account for approximately 40% of total cereal production in Ethiopia.

Due to either the complete failure of crops or the substitution of long cycle crops for lower yielding short cycle crops, the harvest in November/December will only bring short-term relief to food insecurity. Furthermore, the significant reduction in coffee prices has also caused many people to be dependent on food aid in areas where they had been self-sufficient. Therefore, food insecurity in Ethiopia in 2003 is expected to be significantly worse than average.” (UN, 19 November 2002, pp.1-2)

“Other multiple factors contributed to the inability of populations to resist serious effects of the drought. These include incidences of disease outbreaks, poor infrastructure and an economy with limited marketing options.

[...] Where wells dried up and pasture never regenerated, pastoralists moved, often across traditional boundaries and other nations’ borders. In some cases, movements resulted in the spread of
disease, and in others, the cultural tradition of sharing meagre resources in difficult times was
tested to its limits and led to conflict.” (UN, 19 November 2002, pp.1-2)

For more information on the causes of the current famine, read ‘Field Exchange Mar 2003:
Link]

Food

Chronic food-insecurity tackled by government’s PRSP programme (February 2006)

• The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), based on the Poverty Reduction Strategy
  Paper (PRSP), is meant to tackle chronic food insecurity

Combinations of natural and man-made factors have resulted in a serious and growing food
insecurity problem in many parts of the country. About fifteen million people are facing food
insecurity that is either chronic or transitory in nature. The cause for the former is structural, while
the later is usually triggered by short-term emergency situations. About five to six million people
are chronically food insecure. These are people who have lost the capacity to produce or buy
enough to meet their annual food needs even under normal weather and market conditions. The
remaining ten million are vulnerable, with a weak resilience to any shock. Under any emergency
circumstances, the likelihood of these people falling back into food insecurity is high.

Cognizant of this fact, the Government, in close collaboration with its development partners, has
developed a Food Security Programme within the framework of the wider PASDEP - the Plan for
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty - is Ethiopia’s guiding strategic
framework for the five-year period 2005-2010. The PASDEP represents the second phase of the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process begun under the Sustainable Development
and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP), which covered the past three years, 2000/01-
2003/04. The core objectives of the programme are: (i) enable about five to six million chronically
food insecure people attain food security within the coming 3 years and (ii) improve significantly
the food security situation of up to ten million additional food insecure people within three to five
years time. There are two underlying principles: a reliance on helping farmers use their own
resources to overcome food insecurity – both through agricultural improvements and
diversification of offfarm income sources – and a shift away from reliance on foreign food aid. The
programme has three components: direct food production interventions, a productive safety net,
and a voluntary resettlement programme.

Since 2003, the food security programme has been under implementation in most of the
chronically food insecure districts (woredas). Appropriate technologies have been introduced
depending on the socioeconomic conditions of the chronically food-insecure households and
different menus of technological packages have been prepared and disseminated to these
households through the extension services. The packages include provision of improved inputs to
increase livestock and crop production and productivity, moisture conservation and utilization,
credit, training, support for additional income-generating activities, and provision of market
information.

The core objective of the food security programme is to increase food availability and access at
household level through (i) increased crop production and productivity (ii) increased livestock
production and productivity and (iii) increased access to other non-farm income through
agricultural and non-agricultural activities. As stated above, agriculture employs 85 percent of the population and is the most critical area of intervention to sustain food security in the chronically food insecure woredas. The majority of the food insecure population lives in the rural areas, and the major resource available at hand is land and labour. Increasing the production and productivity of food in a sustainable manner is, therefore, critical to address the problem of food shortage. Consequently, the extension programme is being re-oriented to address the problem of moisture deficit in both crop and livestock production, and to promote conservation-based agriculture. The following are major areas of food security programme interventions: Water is one of the most critical resources for crop production in moisture-deficit areas. Productive use of rainwater and surface runoff/run on systems such as pond construction, roof water harvesting, simple diversion schemes, construction of hand-dug wells combined with catchments treatment are important to increase crop production possibilities for vulnerable households. Small-scale irrigation is also very important to improve cropping intensity and thereby reduce the effect of erratic rainfall. The programme is supporting low cost irrigation technologies, such as construction of earth dams, river diversions, and treadle pumps, hand pumps that are managed by individual or group of farmers. Up until September 2004, over 200 000 water harvesting ponds, 155 000 shallow hand dug wells, over 186 000 traditional river diversion schemes and 13 000 small-scale irrigation schemes were constructed in different parts of the country. Soil and water conservation, crop diversification and intensification, and strengthening agricultural extension services are key activities considered to increase crop production and productivity. In livestock production the focus is on introducing improved animal breeds and availability of improved animal feed, water & health. To this effect, the programme centres around the establishment of water points; production of forage and fodder crops at household level; improvement of community grazing land; provision of livestock through saving and credit system focusing on small ruminants like sheep and goat; promotion of livestock diversification; and strengthening livestock extension services both in mixed farming and pastoral areas.

2.3.1 Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)
Despite the recovery in agriculture in the past two seasons (2003/04 and 2004/05), Ethiopia has a structural food problem, and over 7 million Ethiopians (10 percent of the population) required outside assistance even in 2005. For many years, the country’s food aid requirements had been assessed on an annual basis by the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC – recently renamed DPPA, A for agency). This assessment was normally undertaken in October/November, following which the Ethiopian government might issue an appeal to the donor community in December for amounts to be delivered during the next calendar year. Thus food aid needs were continually reassessed and although some food aid assistance was programmed over a longer term, the vast majority was sourced and mobilized in response to annual requests for assistance. In 2004 however, the recognition that a significant number of people are chronically impoverished and constantly in need of assistance, led to a reassessment of the programming of food aid needs for the respective section of the population. Although around 2.2 million Ethiopians still depended on emergency handouts in 2005, unlike earlier years, almost 5 million of the needy were not targeted by emergency food aid but instead took part in the new, ambitious, safety net programme, which was devised in 2003 as part of the government's Coalition for Food Security, and which is being implemented since January 2005 with donor funding. The World Bank’s executive board approved US$ 70 million in December 2004 for the first phase of the programme (mostly in the form of grants), and has pledged US$ 220 million over five years. Total spending will amount to US$ 215 million in the first year, with the balance being provided by other donors (mainly Italy and Canada, as well as the EU with Euro 22 million), although most of this will not be new money but will instead be transferred from emergency feeding allocations. In economic terms, the switch from direct food aid to cash aid is intended to stimulate the development of local markets and enable internal trading between surplus and deficit localities, facilitated by a slowly expanding road network. The programme is designed to address the needs of about 4.8 million chronically
food-insecure people in 267 Woredas. The overall development objective is to improve the efficiency and productivity of transfers to food-insecure households, reducing household vulnerability, improving resilience to shocks, and to provide multi-annual and predictable resources. In this context, it is important to consider the value of the assets that are being protected by the PSNP - at an individual level, a farmer’s ox, cart or plough may be essential for continued production and the programme can claim justification in providing the cash or food that prevents these assets from being sold. The safety net programme is intended to serve a dual propose. One is to help bridge the income gap of chronically food-insecure households, and the second to engage such household in community based asset-building in exchange for the income they earn.

Thus, the two components of the PSNP are: (a) labour intensive public works, and (b) direct support for labour-poor households. A programme implementation manual has been prepared; training and awareness creation activities were undertaken at different levels; community committees have identified target groups for public works and direct support, and capacity-building measures have been initiated. A Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB) was created to administer the PSNP, reporting to the Ministry of Agriculture. The FSCB undertook the training of regional, woreda level and kabele authorities in the mechanisms of the PSNP. Kabele authorities have been trained to identify suitable projects in conjunction with farmers associations and other community groups and to use existing technical resources to undertake the necessary works with either cash or food aid as payment for the labour. Roughly, 60 percent of the assistance was to be made available to beneficiaries as cash, with the balance being provided as food aid. Almost the entire food aid element was to be provided by USAID and supplied to the PSNP through the channels of Cooperating Sponsors and WFP. Food aid provided through NGOs was complemented with substantial cash inputs to cover non-wage costs of public works and capacity building. Direct support consists of the provision of cash or food to those households that cannot contribute labour to work schemes, including female-headed households and HIV/AIDS-orphaned families, lactating and pregnant mothers are also eligible as beneficiaries. Direct support constitutes approximately 20 percent of the programme, with the majority of all resources (80 percent) going towards the work schemes. Those able to take part in work schemes receive cash or food according to the requests made by each kabele when submitting its programme requirements to the FSCB. In general, requests for food were made in those areas that are traditionally deficient in food supply, while cash was requested in those areas where markets for foodstuffs exist.

The PSNP should have started in January 2005, but did not get under way until March; and only 11 percent of the cash target, and 44 percent of the food target, had been met by May 2005. However, food and cash transfers under the programme picked up strongly in July, and this, combined with the favourable belg harvest, led to improvements in food security. The latest report of the Information Centre of the Federal Food Security Coordination Bureaux (28-11-05) on the status of the safety net transfers, with data collected from sample woredas, indicates that food allocations for 2005 are more or less completed in Oromia (100 percent), Amhara (99 percent) and Tigray (97 percent), and with SNNP showing the lowest performance (85 percent). Cash transfers have also significantly improved in all PSNP regions, with 88 percent for Amhara, 87 percent for Oromia, 86 percent for Tigray, and 83 percent for SNNP. Overall performance on resource transfer, based on sample woredas, stands currently at 86 percent for cash and 97 percent for food.

In general, donor commitments have been met in a timely fashion, or when these were late, have been bridged by local reserves. However, a wide range of deficiencies of the programme became apparent during implementation process. The targeting exercise, for instance, was subject to some confusion, leading initially to the exclusion of some of the most destitute from the programme (since they were deemed to lack the capacity to graduate), particularly in Amhara.
Moreover, the elaboration and implementation of effective procedures for the disbursement of cash has not been straightforward. An internal assessment of the PSNP completed in mid October 2005 identified a series of bottlenecks to cash disbursement, including: Excessively rigorous and slow verification that work programmes had been properly undertaken; Inadequate numbers of trained staff available to account for cash disbursements; Paper-based financial management systems that are both unwieldy and inaccurate; Lack of delegation of financial management; The need to make direct delivery of cash to each beneficiary (as opposed to delivering food to groups of community beneficiaries). Furthermore, the analysis revealed a number of logistical and operational issues, such as, general shortage of qualified staff, continuous meetings and trainings sessions affecting distribution of resources and data processing, distance and location of distribution warehouses, exhaustive time needed to prepare lists of beneficiaries and payroll on hand, telephone communication problems in collecting information, and a lack of clarity in the time frame of resource distribution.

Furthermore, although it had been estimated by both the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) and CSA that the harvest of 2004/05 was the largest ever achieved in the country, market prices did not necessarily reflect this. Prices rose consistently throughout 2005 (see also section 4.3) to such an extent that the cash provided to beneficiaries, depending in a significant number on the PSNP, was inadequate to purchase the minimum standard ration from the market. On the other hand, it was noted that by September 2005, food aid recipients in some areas where prices were extremely high could, if they wished, monetize the standard ration that they received for more than twice the value of the cash package that had been originally estimated to be more than sufficient to purchase both food and non-food necessities. As a result, in some woredas beneficiaries actually refused to accept the cash provided, demanding food instead. Three measures were implemented to resolve these issues. First, the number of beneficiaries was increased to the level of available contingencies under the PSNP. Secondly, disbursements under the PSNP were accelerated by providing a three-month tranche of cash to beneficiaries in a single instalment in late July, and thirdly, a number of woredas were transferred from cash to food, increasing the number of beneficiaries receiving food by approximately one million, and the overall food requirement by more than 100 000 tonnes. In consequence, while the initial estimate had been that PSNP would cover 4.5 million beneficiaries, of whom approximately 1.5 million would receive 150 000 tonnes of food, in the final analysis, beneficiary numbers in 2005 increased to 5.4 million, of whom at least 2.7 million (50 percent) received closer to 270 000 tonnes of food.

That the safety-net programme started at a time of plentiful domestic food supplies was fortunate, as the boost to food demand from the cash injection into the rural economy was met from local sources, not imports. Fundamental to the PSNP, as it is currently enunciated, is the premise that as a result of the benefits made available to those taking part in the programme and of the development of community assets, beneficiaries will eventually "graduate" from the programme to the point where they can survive without assistance. This developmental aspect of the programme is important if it is to arrest and reduce the spiral of chronic impoverishment that continues to draw an increasing number of people into destitution. Having almost completed its first year plan, planning of the second year programme, which is due to start in January 2006, has already started.

FAO/WHO, 26 February 2006, p.6-9)

Malnutrition expected to increase in many parts of the country due to 2006 drought (March 2006)
Irrespective of the amount of rainfall during 2006, food requirements in the north-eastern, eastern and south-eastern pastoralist zones will increase until July 2006 and remain that high until at least the end of the year.

Delayed food delivery will exacerbate the already extreme food insecurity, coupled with severe water and pasture shortages, and a dire in pastoral areas.

Fafen and Hartishek IDP camps display high malnutrition rates and poor health and sanitary conditions

"Emergency food needs are expected to rise steadily as originally projected to fill growing household deficits through June, and then to rise again or remain at stable high levels from July onwards when pastoral areas will face an extended and probably harsh dry season following the gu/ganna rains which are forecast to be below normal. The timing of food aid deliveries will be crucial in containing the crisis and mitigating the real risk of mass starvation in pastoral areas. From June to December large shortfalls of food aid are expected. In June alone deficits as high as 40,000 MT are projected, even without considering the likely increase in emergency food aid requirements from July onwards. Unless additional pledges are made immediately, delayed delivery will exacerbate the already extreme food insecurity in pastoral areas. Severe water and pasture shortages and inadequate public health services, especially in pastoral areas, have significantly increased the urgency of these needs. The areas of most acute and urgent concern continue to be the northeastern, southern and southeastern pastoralist zones and are expected to worsen or remain the same from July onwards." (FewsNet, 28 March 2006)

"In March 2005 a joint DPPB/Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit and SC-UK survey indicated critical malnutrition rates, 24,2 percent GAM and 5.1 percent SAM in Hartishek and 15,5 percent GAM and 1,2 percent SAM in Fafen camp. Even though the situation in terms of water and medical access has improved, neither camp has received food since last ‘Ramadan’ eight months ago. […] Consequently, the team recommends general food rations for both camps urgently, before the reintegration operation begins. The April flood also worsened their situation as the rains damaged their temporary homes and left them in deplorable conditions. Malaria and Diarrhoea are serious threats. In addition there is a need to establish sanitation facilities for both camps." (UNCT, July 2005)

**Malnutrition and mortality rates critically high among drought induced IDPs in Hartishek and Fafen camps in Somali region (April 2005)**

- Under-five mortality rates above two per 10,000 children per day
- During the past five months food distribution have been erratic and irregular
- IDPs lack other coping mechanisms
- IDPs need immediate food distribution, medical support and proper sanitation in the camps
- Plans to reintegrate IDP families back to their homes held up by funding constraints

"A recent SC-UK nutritional survey also indicated critical malnutrition levels and a very high under five child mortality rate in the Hartisheik IDP camp where more than 5,000 people reside. MSF-B is to provide logistical, technical and human resource support to the existing health clinic through UNICEF Emergency Health Kits from the Regional Health Bureau to Hartisheik for an initial three months. The UN Country Team is planning to conduct an assessment shortly on the possibility of returning these IDPs, displaced by drought in 2000, to their place of origin in Degehabur zone. The last food aid allocation for the Region was in November 2004, some of which was distributed in January. The allocation for January was not made due to a change of regional Government officials. Trucks bringing February’s food allocations have been held up due
to efforts introduced by the region to fight corruption and ensure that the food reaches intended destinations, through the provision of military escorts to accompany food being transported to southern parts of the region. However more escorts are needed to follow trucks to all distribution points. Food is now being received in some areas, although the cessation of relief for a period of over two months has radically increased wheat prices. SC-UK is once again providing food assistance to beneficiaries in Fik having secured further resources” (UN CTE, 20 April 2005).

“Alarming malnutrition rates have been reported in two IDP camps in Jijiga zone of Somali Region. Preliminary findings from a SC-UK, DPPC/Ethiopian Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU) nutritional survey indicate critical malnutrition among children. More than 7,000 IDPs have been living in the area for more than 5 years. In Hartishek camp a GAM of 24.2 percent and SAM of 5.1 percent was recorded. The under five mortality rate per 10,000 was 4.7. In Fafen the GAM was 15.5 percent, SAM 1.2 percent and under five mortality per 10,000 was 3.4. According to the report the food security situation of the camps has been deteriorating during the last five months due to the irregular and erratic general ration distribution and lack of other coping mechanisms. The last general food distribution was in October/November 2004. The situation in terms of water, sanitation and health is also considered critical. Recommendations include urgently resuming general food rations, starting targeted feeding programmes and providing free medical services. It also recommends voluntary return of the IDPs to their home areas. UNDP with UN Country Team support are now developing plans with the regional authorities to reintegrate the families in their home areas.” (OCHA, 11 April 2005)

“Mortality and malnutrition rates among children at Hartishek, a former refugee camp in southeastern Ethiopia, are critically high, aid agencies warned on Wednesday. Save the Children UK (SCFUK) has called for immediate food distribution, medical support and proper sanitation at Hartishek, which was once the world’s largest refugee camp, and home to thousands of Somalis. Hartishek now houses internally displaced persons (IDPs) from within Ethiopia. … According to accepted international guidelines, any under-five mortality rates that are above two per 10,000 children per day should be treated as an emergency. SCFUK said the figure in Hartishek has reached 4.87 per 10,000 per day. Severe acute malnutrition of children under five years old has reached 5 percent – which is also an emergency level. … UNICEF would start emergency feeding next week, and that the agency was already trucking in two tankers of water every day. … Humanitarian workers said they feared the Ethiopian IDPs were “slipping through the gap” as aid organisations worked out how best to help the families who have set up home at the camp. A spokeswoman for the UN Development Programme (UNDP) said the agency had been planning to reintegrate the families back to their homes, but the plan had been held up by funding constraints. UNDP was now seeking support from other UN agencies in Ethiopia to help the IDPs, she added.” (IRIN, 8 April 2005)

Despite marginal improvements, food insecurity persists (February 2005)

- 3.2 millions Ethiopian will depend on emergency assistance during the second quarter of 2005
- More than 5 million chronically food insecure need assistance through the rest of the year
- Malnutrition rates increasing in localised areas of the country
- IDPs continue to be affected by a lack of food security

“Despite these improvements, as many as 3.2 million Ethiopians will continue to need emergency assistance for the second quarter of the year and more than 5 million chronically food insecure people require assistance through the rest of the year. The worst affected areas are still predominantly in the northeastern and eastern part of the country, where years of increasing
poverty and unreliable rainfall have worn away at the economic base. ... Malnutrition rates are increasing in localized areas of the country, with particular concern in Afar Region. A recent Goal/DPPC nutritional survey in Abala woreda, Afar Region indicates serious malnutrition amongst children under the age of five. The Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate was reportedly 13.5 percent with aggravating factors. (A GAM rate of above 10 percent in the presence of aggravating factors is considered serious, and one above 15 percent is considered critical).”  
(Fews Net, 21 March 2005)

“The delay in the implementation of the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), along with the late arrival and underestimation of emergency assistance in some areas is increasing food insecurity in a number of chronically food insecure areas, including eastern and southern Tigray, and the lowland woredas of East Hararge, and Arsi Zone of Oromiya Region. Even in 'normal' years, people in these chronically food insecure areas are unable to meet their annual food needs and rely on food aid as early as January to cover deficits. The delayed implementation of the PSNP is expected to lead to an even larger number of people becoming dependent on relief in 2005, because people who do not receive needed assistance on time will either be forced to leave their homes, or draw down on community resources, putting others at risk. Significant food and non-food needs remain in Afar and Somali Regions as the assistance is still insufficient. Consequently, the regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) of Afar intends to increase their estimate of the number of people requiring emergency assistance though that is being verified by the federal level DPPC.” (Fews Net, 22 February 2005)

“The food security situation in Ethiopia remained precarious during the reporting period, but has marginally improved as a result of good Meher season rains in northern and western parts of the country. Despite an overall improvement in crop production from last year, populations in all drought-prone areas are expected to remain highly food-insecure as the year draws to a close.

... Although displacement remains largely localized, IDPs continue to be affected by a lack of food security, harsh living conditions in crowded camps, and a lack of opportunities for education and self reliance.” (UN OCHA, December 2004, p.17, 19)

“A bumper harvest is anticipated in Ethiopia in 2005, but many Ethiopians will still need humanitarian aid, UN officials said this week. Ethiopia’s food production rose this year by 24 percent from 14.27 million mt in 2004, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) said in a joint report released on Wednesday. The increase was due mainly to better rains, increased use of fertilizer and improved seeds, especially wheat and maize, the UN agencies said. However, more than two million Ethiopians will need emergency assistance in 2005 ....” (IRIN, 4 February 2005)

People relocated to settlements in Bale despite fragile nutrition status (March 2003)

- IDPs from Shawe camp were being resettled to Bidri from March 2003
- MSF recorded Crude Mortality Rates as high as 2.4 in January 2003 when the people arrived to Shawe camps
- The 30,000 IDPs in Shawe camp from Hararghe and Arsi were assisted by MSF and arrived around May 2002
- IDPs lack adequate food distribution in Shawe camp and the resettlement disrupts therapeutic feeding to 220 severely malnourished children

"MSF Holland Expressed Concern on the Ongoing Settlement Process in Bale Zone Oromiya DPPB stated that the settlement program to move IDPs from Shawe camp, Bale zone is
underway and as of 28 March about 9,000 people are settled to the new location, Bidri woreda. Bidri is 72 km away from Shawe camp where around thirty thousand IDPs from East and West Hararghe and Arsi have been settled for about 10 months. MSF-Holland, has worked in the Shawe IDP camp since the beginning of January with the supply of potable water, measles campaign and health services including a Therapeutic Feeding Center (TFC). MSF Holland reports that the Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) was reduced from 2.4 to 0.3 while the population remained very fragile due to a lack of adequate food distribution. MSF-H has expressed serious concerns about the settlement process as at the time of settlement 220 severely malnourished children were still under treatment in the TFC. All the children have now left despite the fact that their treatment was not finished. The area of settlement has not been adequately prepared to receive the IDPs from Shawe in terms of shelter, water, food and health services. Noting the fragile status of this displaced population, MSF-H believes that the CMR will inevitably rise once more. MSF-H is committed to this population and is now in the process setting up an emergency mobile clinic while looking at ways to continue the TFC activities. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) on the other hand is providing food aid for the settlers for March and April. According to the DPPB, three water wells were dug and water tankering is underway in the new site. The government is also providing plastic sheets, which are in short supply, and planning to distribute seeds and hand tools. The settlement is expected to finish within one month.” (UNDP EUE, 31 March 2003)

Health

Drought posing health risks to children (January 2006)

Children face high and rising malnutrition rates in the dry, not easily accessible and poorly serviced area. More than 56,000 under-five children are facing malnutrition in the Somali and Oromiya regions of southern Ethiopia – a number that is expected to rise sharply as the drought worsens. Kenya estimates that between 40,000 – 60,000 children and women in the 27 affected districts are malnourished. It is expected that as many as 3 out of 10 children in the drought-affected areas of Somalia will be malnourished.

The combination of high malnutrition rates or wasting with generally low measles immunization rates portends the real possibility of a major measles outbreak. Children weakened by malnutrition are at gravely higher risk of any infection and measles is one of the most virulent, spreading lethally and quickly among the unimmunized. During the last drought in 2000, measles accounted for 22 per cent of all deaths of under-five children in Ethiopia, for example.

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**Health risks in relation to the 2006 drought (April 2006)**

"Clean water, adequate sanitation, immunization, health education and access to primary care health services are also key to curbing disease and death, to prevent the spread of infectious diseases and to treat those who are ill.

In the Horn of Africa, people are at increased risk of malaria, diarrhoea including cholera, acute respiratory infections, tuberculosis, measles and meningococcal meningitis. Experience from previous droughts has shown that measles, when combined with malnutrition, is the biggest risk for children, sometimes accounting for up to half of under-five mortality. Estimated immunization coverage for many areas in the region is low, with, for example, Somalia at 30%, Djibouti at 64%, and Ethiopia at 66%. To prevent major outbreaks of measles, at least 95% of all children between 6 months and 15 years of age need to be vaccinated.

Preliminary assessments show that 20 out of every 100 children under the age of five in the region are suffering from malnutrition, putting them at increased risk of death. This is above WHO’s emergency threshold of 15%. Children who are severely malnourished require special care. Other vulnerable groups include people with HIV/AIDS, whose immune systems are already weakened. Malnourished women who are pregnant or who are breastfeeding are at increased risk of anaemia. This can lead to complications and death during childbirth.

WHO has begun supporting the countries' Ministries of Health in helping to coordinate the health response of the many humanitarian actors already working in the region. WHO is helping to promote disease prevention and surveillance, monitor malnutrition to help identify cases of moderate malnutrition before they become severe, train health workers in proper diagnosis and treatment of disease and malnutrition and deliver essential drugs and medical supplies. WHO is also working with UNICEF and Ministries of Health to promote immunization campaigns, and to deliver measles immunization and vitamin A supplementation."  (WHO, 7 April 2006)

**HIV/AIDS prevalence exacerbated by frequent population movements (March 2003)**

- 2.2 million people live with HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia, including 200,000 children
- Drought and destitution may accelerate HIV/AIDS transmission through recourse to sex work as a survival strategy

"With 7.3% of the adult population infected by HIV/AIDS, Ethiopia is one of the most severely affected countries in the world. This has reduced family and community cohesion, disrupting the traditional patterns of protection and care, placing children and women at heightened risk of trauma and exploitation.

[...]

With an estimated 2.2 million people living with HIV/AIDS, including 200,000 children, Ethiopia has one of the largest HIV/AIDS affected populations in the world. Clearly the drought may accelerate the transmission of HIV/AIDS given the population movements, potential for increased sexual violence and sex work as a survival strategy."  (UNICEF, 14 March 2003)

**Water and Sanitation**
People in need of emergency water assistance increased from 2.6 to 4.2 million during 2003 (June 2003)

- In Ethiopia only 28% of the population has access to water supplies and only 17% to sanitation services
- As of June 2003, 4.2 million people are in need of emergency water supply, and 381,000 of them were in need of water tankering
- IDPs will need longer tankering support
- Six regions worst affected by drought in need of water assistance are Somali, Oromiya, Tigray, Afar, Amhara, and SNNPR
- Many previously functioning schemes have been damaged in Tigray
- About 290,000 IDPs were in need of water and sanitation improvements in 2000

"Ethiopia is among the least developed countries in the world with regard to water and sanitation coverage, with 28% coverage for water and 17% for sanitation countrywide. Actual coverage is even lower if we consider that, due to over-use and lack of adequate maintenance, an estimated 30 to 60 % of the existing water schemes at times are not functional. […]"

In the context of the current drought crisis, a recent Emergency Water Supply need survey by UNICEF, in cooperation with Ministry of Water Resources and Regional Water Bureaux, in the 6 Regions most affected by drought, has revised the figures of people in need of emergency water supply as of end of April, from the originally estimated 2.7 million to 4,241,447. 381,942 of them were earmarked for emergency water tankering, of which 120,979 (i.e. 32%) have been served by UNICEF funded tankering during the period January-May. If rains continue in sufficient quantity, the need for water tankering should gradually reduce, releasing more resources for long term solutions. However IDPs and newly resettled populations, will need longer tankering support, as well as many of the recently opened Therapeutic Feeding Centers in various locations.

[...] Six regions with the most affected population have been selected for special attention. They are Somali, Oromiya, Tigray, Afar, Amhara, and SNNPR." (UN, 3 June 2003, p.7)

"About 25% of the total IDP population are women and children. They have not only been displaced but have been subjected to very difficult living conditions through the last two years. Many are still living in caves and open fields under plastic sheets. Supply of domestic water to these people has been one of the most difficult tasks for the Regional Administration.

Already many returnees are returning to parts of Irob, Tahtay Adiabo, Laelay Adiyabo and Atsbi Weredas in Tigray Region. A recent assessment of the water supply situation in these areas revealed that many of the previously functioning schemes have been damaged. Hence, rehabilitation and/or construction of new water points is a prerequisite to the return of many displaced people." (UN CTE 22 August 2000, sect. 5.5)

"The living conditions of IDPs in 1999 have worsened in many areas due to lack of water supply and poor sanitation. Strains have been placed on host communities already coping in many areas with the effects of drought. It is reported that an additional 290,000 IDPs still need assistance to improve water supply and environmental sanitation conditions in their living areas. The Bureau of Health in Tigray has reported that the morbidity and mortality is steadily increasing in places where there is lack of water supply and poor environmental sanitation conditions." (UNCTE 28 January 2000, p. 46)
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

IDPs likely to be disadvantaged in local allocation system (January 2004)

IDPs can depend less on their habitual networks. Given the great power by kebele officials in terms of access to basic services, identity cards and land, and given the fact that obtaining these goods and services depends a lot on the good relations with kebele officials, it must be presumed that IDPs often have a distinct disadvantage over the local population in getting access to these services.

"The State at local level is experienced through the wereda, kebele and nus kebele (subkebele) executives, committees, assemblies, and associations, along with other state or stateinitiated organizations. These include: the local offices of government bureaux, encompassing development and extension agents, health workers and tax collectors; local social court judges and officers, police and militiamen. The objectives of the state sector structures are to ensure the implementation of government laws, policies, and programmes (including those intended to bring about socio-economic development), and to see that government taxes and other dues are collected. A point of concern is the frequent conflation of the role of tax collector with that of the agricultural development agent: even where extension agents are not explicitly involved in tax collection, they are often associated with pressure for repayment of credit loans related to the extension packages, and these involvements, usually perceived as repressive and negative, do little to enhance their capacity to play a positive part in animating communities for social change. State structures have been closely accompanied in the core EPRDF-administered areas by the less visible party structure of cadres, officers, and local cells. There is evidence that the local administration is normally conceptualized by the villagers as a fusion of both state and party authority. Ethiopians are well aware of the wide-ranging powers of these administrative bodies and are conscious of the fact that they need to maintain good relations with their officials. Observers describe how all who are dependent on the support or approval of the state, rely on their contact with kebele (and to a lesser extent wereda) officials.

Anyone who wants health services, tap-water and electricity, or who is applying for a job in the public sector, needs a letter from the kebele to the concerned authorities, showing that they are citizens entitled to the services or employment. The kebele owns houses, which are rented out to residents. Kebele officials issue the identity cards, which Ethiopians require to be able to move around freely and get access to all kinds of services.

This system which resulted in a degenerate and largely uncontrolled situation was, as noted above, radically revised from late 2001, following changes to professionalize local government. It remains to be seen whether wereda and kebele administration can be reformed to any appreciable degree by these means. Any such change would have to militate against the weight of three decades of abusive tradition, built on top of centuries of moribund and hierarchical local administration in the imperial period. In pastoralist areas, the state is significantly less visible or present than in settled agricultural areas. Whilst some attempts have been made to design mobile service delivery arrangements, initiatives are embryonic. Given the prevalence of conflict in pastoral zones, the primary pastoralist experience of the state has often been of its security forces." (Writenet, January 2004, p. 33 ff)
IDPs self reliance particularly disrupted by loss of assets and access to farmland (May 2002)

- Landmines and unexploded ordnances remain a serious problem
- Cross-border petty trade activity was brought to total halt particularly impoverishing people closest to the border
- Displaced families unable to support themselves split in search of cash-opportunities exacerbating women and children's vulnerability
- Lack of access to their farmland, livestock and other productive assets make most displaced completely dependent upon relief assistance
- Most of the displaced come from areas that are chronically drought affected

“Owing to their displacement, people were not able to plant or harvest the main season (meher) crop for three years. In addition, they suffered from the loss of cross-border trade. A recent report stated that ‘With the obvious and tragic exception of the lives lost, the interruption of economic relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia is probably the most devastating result of the war […].’

9. While the consequences of conflict affect all people in society, it is women who have borne the disproportionate burden of displacement. Many males joined militia groups while others were recruited into the army, thus leaving women solely responsible for the household during the period of the conflict. It is estimated that, following the cessation of the conflict, the number of female headed households among the IDP population was approximately 37 percent, which is in line with the national average […]. While many men returned to their homes following demobilization, they were faced with the destruction of their former holdings and thus, were unable to recommence productive activities.

10. The coping mechanisms employed by women include petty trading, such as selling firewood, borrowing, the production and sale of ‘tella’ (local beer), and begging. The small income generated from these activities is used to pay for rent and to purchase spices, condiments and non-food items, such as soap,

11. The vast majority of those displaced were hosted by local communities, who were also extremely poor, with a significant number requiring relief food assistance for many years to meet minimum food needs.

12. WFP assistance to IDPs began in March 1999 in response to the Government of Ethiopia’s request for emergency assistance for Ethiopians internally displaced by the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. A Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed in June 2000, which was followed by a Peace Agreement in December 2000. A Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) was established between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and with the deployment of over 4,000 UN Peacekeepers, many IDPs gradually began to return to their areas of origin and rebuild their livelihoods. However, as it was not possible to plant for the Meher harvest, WFP food assistance was extended to end November 2001, with provision to assist up to 322,500 IDPs and deportees, although the actual number of beneficiaries never exceeded 307,500. Between March 1999 and November 2001, over 135,000 tonnes of food aid was distributed through EMOP 6080.0/6080.1 at a cost of almost US$70 million. During this time, those displaced depended solely on WFP food assistance, with no other sources of food available. Therefore, a full food basket was provided to meet the minimum caloric requirements.” (WFP, 1 May 2002, pp.3-4)

“Altogether throughout the war, seven woredas were severely affected: people had to leave and infrastructure was destroyed, either because they were directly occupied by Eritrean military forces or because of precautionary evacuations. Some 42 tabias, suffered damage or destruction
of houses, schools, clinics along with the laying of landmines and proliferation of UXOs, affecting farmland, pastureland and water points.

[...] Approximately 10 percent of the total population of Tigray was displaced and lost the agricultural production, livestock, sources of livelihood, homes and belongings. Cross-border petty trade, an important source of income in the border areas, which included the selling of vegetable, spices, livestock, locally brewed drinks came to a complete halt. Access to cash reduced dramatically and though the presence of the military accounted for some economic activity (especially purchase of goats and sheep), people living around the border areas experienced a loss of their purchasing power and became generally poorer. Once away from their areas of origin, IDPs were not able to support themselves, their children and the elderly members of the family. As a consequence, families split and women and children became the most vulnerable amongst the displaced. As the authorities in Tigray did not promote settlement in organized camps and encouraged the IDPs to integrate in the communities outside the conflict areas, many IDPs joined families or relatives, or just tried to make a living in the host communities. These were communities already under stress due to the drought and the failure of harvest seasons during 1999/2000. Many displaced people however, were forced to live in caves, under bridges and in makeshift shelters in extremely harsh conditions. In some areas of high IDP density – at various locations of Tigray’s northern belt – camp-like settlements emerged." (Buffoni, 31 December 2001, pp. 7-8)

"As a result of the war with Eritrea, some 500 civilian deaths were reported in Tigray, 750 children were orphaned and the whereabouts of 641 civilians remains unknown. Schools, hospitals and other parts of the community infrastructure have been destroyed or damaged. Four farming seasons have already been lost, and more than 70,000 hectares of land rendered uncultivable and unproductive due to the presence of landmines. Although the Ethiopian Government and humanitarian partners are anxious to support the return of the remaining internally displaced persons to their homes in border areas, landmines and unexploded ordnance remain a serious impediment to resettlement activities. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 167 people, mostly children, have been reported killed or injured by landmines since February 2000." (SC 9 August 2000, para.10)

"The agricultural activities in all the weredas along the border with Eritrea were affected by the war. While the main impediment for the returning farmers is the risk of landmines, farmers are also short of seeds, oxen, farm tools, fertilizer, and storage facilities. The period when planting long-cycle crops for the meher – or main cropping – season in Tigray Region has passed and the only crops which still can be planted at this late stage are crops such as teff and chickpea whose planting dates may be extended to early September if rains are adequate and continue into October. It is critical, however, to begin mobilizing resources now for the 2001 planting season to ensure that the maximum area is planted so that recovery can begin.

As agricultural production has been severely disrupted among the displaced, food assistance to most IDPs and returnees will be required through November 2001, at which time the next meher harvest is expected. To support the return of IDPs to safe areas, food assistance will be a major component of the relief and rehabilitation plan." (UN CTE 22 August 2000, sect. 3.1)

"Most displaced are completely dependent upon relief assistance, since they lack access to their farmland and many have lost their livestock and other productive assets. Although some water, sanitation and health support has been provided, the conditions in the displaced settlements and areas hosting significant numbers of integrated displaced are precarious and in need of improvement. In addition, in order to halt further environmental destruction, alternative sources of fuel (besides wood or charcoal) are needed. Even if a peace settlement is reached during 2000, most people will be unable to return to their homes due to the threat of landmines in and around
their homes and farms, as well as the fact that they have lost their access to their property and assets. They are expected to continue to be dependent upon assistance throughout the year.

[...] In addition to the loss of agricultural production, many of the displaced have lost their other means of livelihood as well. Many people left their homes with few personal belongings, including livestock. Most are unable to support themselves. Cross-border petty trade, which previously made up a significant portion of the local economy in border areas and included livestock sales as well as sales of vegetables, spices, and gesho (used in brewing local drinks), has been completely suspended. This has dramatically limited the ability of those living close to the border to have access to cash. To some extent, the livestock trade has been buoyed by the demand from the military, but in general a decline in purchasing power of the local residents has been observed.

In addition to the stress created by the war environment, most of the displaced come from areas that are chronically drought affected, and many have been dependent upon external assistance for many years. Many host families, who are now at the end of their coping strategies, are relying upon assistance as well due the fact that they have suffered from crop failure this year.” (UNCTE 28 January 2000, pp. 29, 30-31)
DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

General

Access to land, identity cards and public services goes through local kebele officials (January 2004)

“Anyone who wants health services, tap-water and electricity, or who is applying for a job in the public sector, needs a letter from the kebele to the concerned authorities, showing that they are citizens entitled to the services or employment. The kebele owns houses, which are rented out to residents. Kebele officials issue the identity cards, which Ethiopians require to be able to move around freely and get access to all kinds of services.” (Writenet, January 2004)

See also under

IDPs likely to be disadvantaged in local allocation system
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

General

Traditional Ethiopian social structure is hierarchical (January 2004)

- Ethiopian culture is fundamentally hierarchical and vertically oriented
- It does not lend itself naturally to democratisation
- Democratisation is a long term process which must focus on every level of social and political structures

Traditions of hierarchy and community. “Abyssinian” (i.e. highland Amhara/Tigrayan) political culture emphasizes a strictly hierarchical understanding of a vertically stratified society, where each member’s socio-political position and status is clearly defined and respected. Social and political interaction and behaviour are guided by an elaborate set of norms and rules, which establish socio-political order on the basis of a rigid collective system of deference and sanction. This is not to say that all Ethiopian cultures accord with highland norms. However, since control of the Ethiopian state has historically been associated with the Amhara/Tigrayan socio-political tradition, it provides the context for the formation of the dominant trends in the political culture of contemporary Ethiopia.

Customary leaders, family relations, and community organization. Indigenous processes of socialization commonly teach that people are not equal, and assign different roles and differential status to individuals on the basis of class, ethnicity, gender, age and property. This provides cultural validation for an unequal distribution of power and resources that is entrenched and resistant to change. The character of the Amhara household as “less a family unit than … a vertically ordered set of status-roles”,64 means that it continually reaffirms patterns in which men are superior to women, and elders to younger. Moreover, religious or political office gives added authority, whereas members of certain despised groups (craftsmen, potters, tanners, hunters) will always be classified as inferior. As a result, male household heads mediate family affairs, and representatives of the state at each level mediate public affairs, with little likelihood of challenge from their subordinates or plain citizens, in either case. Male power-holders, including religious leaders, define the norms of social conduct that limit the social space of women. In particular, religious leaders, Christians, Muslims and traditional believers, have power to define appropriate social behaviour and conduct, a capacity that, for instance, severely limits the social space of women in Ethiopia. In every village of Orthodox Christian Ethiopia, the highland areas of Amhara and Tigray in particular, several priests and deacons ensure that the norms and rules of the church are followed, a set of precepts that, inter alia, puts restrictions on when farmers can work in their fields (in order to uphold the prohibition of physical labour on saints days), and confines women to narrowly defined gender roles. In the Muslim communities of the lowlands, and highland pockets, the Imams and other religious leaders also wield strong influence over appropriate social behaviour. Afar and Somali communities, in particular, have strong and elaborate customary codes, which work in parallel with sharia and state law.

All across Ethiopia, elder age is accorded a high socio-political value in the local community. Shimagile (elder) councils are frequently used to settle local disputes (over land or grazing rights, for instance) by formal and informal means, and it is male elders who are first heard in community meetings. In some Ethiopian communities, as for instance among Borana...
Oromo, particular age groups have traditionally defined roles in society in relation to administration, protection, and arbitration. Although the institution of elders can play a positive role in mediating power relations at the local level, elders are not in themselves representative of the local community as a whole. Not all elders achieve the status of respected *shimagile*: women are excluded, as are also elders from despised occupational minorities. The associational life of peasant communities is focused on the accomplishment of practical tasks. Several common types of local association offer forms of mutual socio-economic support to members, particularly at times of stress or expense, such as weddings or funerals: the almost ubiquitous *senbete*, a Christian religious association to take care of church affairs; *idir*, which is a burial network for mutual support in relation to deaths and funerals; *equub*, a credit and savings collective; and *mahaber*, which binds together smaller groups of villagers to celebrate a common guardian saint, but which also serves as a socio-economic welfare network. The leadership of these organizations is selected by and among the villagers themselves, normally bringing existing peer groups together for practical purposes. As such they tend to be instruments less of social transformation than of reconstitution of the – often iniquitous - *status quo*.

**Perceptions of competition, pluralism, and “democracy”**. Whatever the formal progress towards democratization, a system of social classification along the lines described continues to be widely reproduced, imbuing new generations with cultural notions that individuals are rightly ranked according to a set of criteria which invest some people with greater worth than others – both in social and political terms – and determine, moreover, that one should always be subservient to any individual regarded as superior. This sustains a hierarchical stratification of society, where one is constrained by a system of collective sanctions to obey the orders from above, be they paternal instructions, or a demand from the *kebele* to attend a political meeting. In terms of the decentralization of access to decision-making, and control over material resources, this situation has profound implications. If relations are to be democratized and transformed, these transformations must take place at every level and in every sphere of social relations and expectations. Similarly, the corollary of this position is that there is a powerful weight of inertia in the pre-existing social and cultural arrangements, which counteracts the attempts of any force (be it ruling or opposition party, or civil society group) committed to their reform. The fundamental dynamics of socio-political development in Ethiopia do not naturally favour democratization, but the perpetuation of hierarchy and authoritarianism at every level of interaction. Many of Ethiopia’s rural citizens do not imagine that they should debate and select from alternative means of asserting control over their own lives. Nor do they consider it appropriate that their peers should do so, let alone those they regard as inferior. Rather, the major source of the political agenda remains the central government. In this kind of socio-political context, there is little realistic alternative to the communication of political programmes from the top down, and from centre to periphery, whatever the aspirations or protestations to the contrary of those responsible for their promulgation.
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

Return

Return movements difficult to monitor (2005)

There are estimated to be between 150,000 – 200,000 IDPs in Ethiopia due to conflicts alone. These figures include 62,000 people displaced by the 1998 – 2000 Ethio-Eritrean border war, around 50,000 displaced in Gambella due to inter-ethnic clashes, as well as over 85,000 people forced to leave their homes as the result of Somali-Oromo clashes around Bordode/Mieso areas and Guji-Gabra conflict in Borena zone of Oromia. These estimates do not include displacements due to other causes like drought, floods and economic shocks. As of September 2005, it is not clear at all how many of these displaced have been able to return to their places of former residence and to re-establish their livelihoods. What is clear, is that many of these people remain displaced and many are in need of assistance.

The above estimates should be treated with caution because they are provided by different authorities at federal and regional levels, and by NGOs and international agencies. The Government of Ethiopia does not have a policy on IDPs and no single authority in Government has responsibility for IDPs. Data collected at different levels is often the subject of much debate and dispute without any central mechanism for resolution. In addition, often the estimates are not revised when displaced populations return home or move to other locations.

Thousands of drought-IDPs assisted to return in Somali region (February 2006)

- Some 6,000 IDPs have lived in Fafen camp since 2000
- Reintegration into home communities has been assessed in summer 2005 and carried out later in the year
- by February 2006, the return of 6,000 IDPs from Fafen has been successfully carried out

The United Nations Country Team's Recovery Programme moved the last caseload of IDPs comprising approximately 1,414 individuals (237 Households) from Fafen camp to Degehabur zone in the region. The strategy aims at repatriating and reintegrating 6,000 IDPs from Hartisheik and Fafen camps to their place of origin in Somali Region.

IDPs from other zones in Somali Region still remain in the two camps. The UNCT is now looking at post return activities especially livelihood strategies and interventions to ensure the sustenance reintegration of the IDPs in Degehabur." (OCHA, February 2006)

"In Fafen, according to official figures the number of IDPs is 6,000. These IDPs came to Fafen as it was one of the few fertile places in the region where people could survive the 2000 drought. These people have been more or less dependent on the host community. Recently though, the community of Fafen has been expressing signs of fatigue with the IDPs, who are draining their increasingly depleted resources.

A joint UN Country Team mission is currently working towards the permanent reintegration of camp dwellers to their home communities. The principal partners in the UNDP led joint mission
are IOM, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, FAO and WFP. The regional government is also actively supporting the reintegration efforts within the overall framework of the UNDP-sponsored Regional Recovery Programme and the Pastoralist Community Development Programme, funded by the World Bank. The DPPB and Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB) have also initiated processes of reintegration by selecting camps in Hartishek town and Fafen Valley, Jijiga zone, as pilot sites for the reintegration exercise. Subsequently, UNDP and IOM selected a 5,600 IDP caseload who will be moved from Hartishek and Fafen camps to Deghabur zone, as most of the IDPs are from the zone (Degahabur, Aware and Degahamadow woredas).

Prior to securing movements the UNCT tried to assess short to medium term needs of the returning population and their home communities. It also tried to link these needs with longer term recovery needs of developing sustainable livelihoods that effectively prevent further displacements. The communities in the return areas are increasingly turning to agro-pastoralism, and as such characterise a dramatic cultural shift amongst these people away from nomadism towards a more sedentary lifestyle. The IDPs do not want to return to pastoralism either. To this end, Ogaden Welfare Development Association (OWDA) and the Government Line Bureaus have conducted assessments in terms of social services and priority actions in the areas of return.

The socio-economic situation of the region is characterised by a low level of development, low income, high level of mortality, low level of nutritional status, limited access to health services, low rate of school participation and lack of clean drinking water. The integration program has been delayed for a number of reasons including lack of funds, severe drought in the areas of return and the recent floods. In addition, the IDPs status is also problematic: it has not been possible to easily determine those who are IDPs, that is, those who voluntarily moved due to drought, from voluntary migrants.

After the April flood waters subsided, the favourable gu rains improved the situation in the region, including areas of return, and using UNDP’s allocated US$ 400,000 and in-kind support from the region and the UNCT, it was agreed to kick start the project. Meanwhile, funds needed to cover additional requirements will be complemented by collaborating partners and a mobilisation of additional resources. However, since distinctions between IDPs and other vulnerable populations are difficult to produce and particularly problematic to apply, it is recommended to first urgently revalidate who are IDPs.

In March 2005 a joint DPPB/Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit and SC-UK survey indicated critical malnutrition rates, 24.2 percent GAM and 5.1 percent SAM in Hartishek and 15.5 percent GAM and 1.2 percent SAM in Fafen camp. Even though the situation in terms of water and medical access has improved, neither camp has received food since last ‘Ramadan’ eight months ago. “We need food” said Fituma. “We are so weak; we need to get our strength back before moving”. Consequently, the team recommends general food rations for both camps urgently, before the reintegration operation begins. The April flood also worsened their situation as the rains damaged their temporary homes and left them in deplorable conditions. Malaria and diarrhoea are serious threats and there is immediate need for distribution of Insecticide-Treated Nets. In addition there is a need to establish sanitation facilities for both camps.

These factors and the fact that they are depending on the host community, who have little to share has made the IDPs desperate to return. Abdi Jebril Mohammud, spokesman of the Fafen IDPs said “just put me in a truck and let me die in my birth place.” According to reports, some households have already started to migrate from Hartishek, escaping the poor conditions there, to Togwajale in search of labour, since Hartishek is no longer active for trade due to the ban on contraband by the government.

[...] While there is consensus that the IDPs should return to there original locations, the process should not be a desperate measure. There is need to sensitisie the IDPs prior to movement and a
revalidation exercise is needed in the camps, as previous experiences show that reintegrated camp dwellers often appear at a later date on food distribution lists in the camps. There is also need to mobilise resources to fill the 78 percent funding gap as the overall operation needs US$3,710,000 to return the first caseload of 5,600 IDPs. As a result serious attention should be paid to the finalisation of the operation plan and necessary preparation should be done before the move of the first cluster of 950 IDPs selected as part of the first case load scheme." (OCHA, July 2005)

**More than a thousand of internally displaced families returned to Zalambessa in precarious conditions (September 2003)**

- IDPs gradually returned to the town over the past two years to start rebuilding their demolished houses
- One of the priorities for the returnees is the access to clean water as there is only one water pump serving the entire population

"More than a thousand families have returned to an Ethiopian border town destroyed during the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said on Tuesday.

The families, who fled Zalambessa during the bloody conflict, which ended in December 2000, have returned to start rebuilding their demolished houses, the ICRC added.

Zalambessa was the scene of some of the heaviest fighting during the border war - which cost the two countries some 70,000 lives and millions of dollars in lost revenue. People have gradually been returning to the town over the past two years.

The ICRC is now distributing four truckloads packed with thousands of tarpaulins and blankets as temporary shelter for the returning families. Tents have also been erected as emergency health centres run by the Ministry of Health for 10,000 people for the next three months.

"Many of the displaced from Zalambessa are living in precarious conditions," the ICRC said in a statement from their offices in Addis Ababa. "The first priority for the returning population is the access to clean water," the organisation added.

A single water pump serves the entire population of the town, which is a few kilometres from the 25-km wide temporary security zone that separates Ethiopia and Eritrea." (IRIN, 9 September 2003)

**Between 169,000 and 228,000 conflict-induced IDPs unable to return (August 2003)**

- UN OCHA-EUE estimated about 304,030 IDPs registered in Tigray 5,002 registered in Afar
- UN OCHA-EUE estimated about 329,040 IDPs registered as a result of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war
- Out of the 329,040 registered IDPs, about 134,675 had not yet received their rehabilitation grant thus remained displaced as of August 2003
- About 59,000 IDPs had not received their rehabilitation cash grant and neither were assisted by WFP or ICRC
- As of July 2003 WFP planned to assist 76,500 IDPs, out of whom 13,000 were unable to return home due to landmines and army-presence
- Out of those 76,500 IDPs, 63,500 had returned but had no access to their lands due to presence of mines
- By February 2003 50% of the 315,000 IDPs assisted by the World Bank-funded Emergency Recovery Program had received their reintegration package
- It was believed that in Tigray’s western zone 75% of IDPs had returned home by February 2002
- In Tigray’s trading centers, a minority of IDPs established small businesses and decided not to return
- From 2002 WFP defined categories of IDPs eligible for humanitarian assistance as those resettled but with little access to land and those who cannot return due to insecurity which represents 75,000 people
- From 2002 IDPs who resettled and resumed farming and those who could resettle but were no longer considered ‘genuine’ IDPs by WFP but could however qualify for the ‘chronically-food-deficient-assistance-program’

“From the above, it is clear that the total number of families displaced in Tigray and Afar National Regional States as a result of the last two wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea after Eritrea gained its independence is 65,808. If the average family size of 5 persons per family is assumed, then the total estimated population would be 329,040 and not 315,000 persons as reported by certain quarters. The working figure of 315,000 said to be utilized by the World Bank for the caseload in Tigray region might have not included those IDP families and their depends in Afar region.

With regard to the progress made in the repatriation of war induced IDPs in Tigray and Afar regions, the senior management of ERP in Mekele and ERF office in Asaita have confirmed to OCHA Addis Ababa that those families who have received their rehabilitation grants under the World Bank project have returned to their villages of origin. In other words, 38,873 registered IDP families/194,365 persons have already returned home.

From the above, it follows that 26,935 families constituting 134,675 persons located in Tigray and Afar regions have not yet been provided with their assistance cash grants under the World Bank project representing 41% of the registered IDP families there. The status of these families was raised and discussed with senior officials of ERP and the SRF in Mekele and Asaita. Presently, 75,950 individual IDPs in Tigray are being provided with food assisted by WFP and the ICRC. There are approximately 59,000 IDPs, who have not received the cash grant and who are also not receiving WFP or ICRC food assistance. OCHA is investigating to determine if some or all of this group are receiving assistance from other sources (Government/NGO, etc.) and if any of this group may have returned to their places of origin.

Concerning the 75,949 IDPs reported to be under WFP and ICRC emergency food assistance programme in Tigray region, it has been confirmed with WFP Sub-Office Mekele and the regional ERP of Tigray that the individuals are not sheltered in separate camps but rather dispersed in different villages located in war affected zones in Eastern, Central and North-Western region. These IDPs are unable to return to their villages of origin because of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and because for some their land is being used by the Ethiopian army for defence purposes. Out of the above 75,949 IDPs (persons) mentioned above, 12,936 persons are being provided with food assistance by the ICRC at Dowhan along with other drought affected people of Erob Wereda.” (UN OCHA- EUE, 1 August 2003)
“8. Of the current total IDP caseload of 76,500 people, 13,000 people in eastern Tigray (Irob zone) are receiving food from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). ICRC is providing relief food assistance in the Irob zone for both drought affected persons and IDPs until November, when the next harvest is expected to improve the food security of the drought-affected population in 2003. Consequently, the number of WFP beneficiaries from July to November will be 63,500. In December, the IDPs of Irob zone will revert to WFP and the beneficiaries will total to 76,500 people. In addition, this Budget Revision includes a contingency stock for an additional 29,500 IDPs. The buffer is for a five-month period, from August to December, as the demarcation related population movements may occur even before September, when the demarcation is due to start.” (WFP, 15 July 2003, p.2)

“17 In recognition of the need to continue to provide assistance to former displaced populations who have begun to rebuild their livelihoods, many humanitarian agencies are exploring ways of including these groups into relief and recovery initiatives, be they food based or cash based e.g. WFP’s emergency operation for small-scale farmers and drought-affected pastoralists, and development activities; the World Bank supported Emergency Recovery Project (ERP); and NGO interventions.” 15. In February 2002, the DPPC led a joint assessment of food aid requirements for residual IDPs in Tigray Region. This assessment included participation from WFP, USAID, the regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST, an indigenous NGO responsible for food distributions to IDPs). Terms of reference were prepared jointly, with the methodology consisting of interviews with district and sub district officials and visits to areas where former IDPs had returned, as well as to areas where IDPs remained displaced. The findings of this assessment revealed the need to provide continued assistance to a residual caseload of approximately 76,500 people:

- 63,000 have returned to their places of origin, but have no access to cropping or pasture land;
- 12,500 have been unable to return to their home areas due to landmine or security concerns; and
- 1,000 ethnic Kunamas5 living in Northern Tigray (who were subsequently assessed by a WFP nutritionist).” (WFP, 1 May 2002, p5)

“Eligible beneficiary identification and household needs assessments have been completed for nearly all IDPs, families of deceased militia, and deportees/returnees from Eritrea. The total number of project beneficiaries are 63,000 IDP households, 68,000 families of deceased, and 71,000 deportee/returnee households from Eritrea. As of February 2003, 50% of the IDP households, 70% of the families of the deceased, and 55% of deportees have received rehabilitation assistance under ERP.” (WB, 5 June 2003, p2)

“As early as June 2000, IDPs started returning in stages to their areas of origin. In Badme area some even returned earlier. In other areas along the border, many farm families only temporarily retreated from their homes and villages during shelling and fighting.

[…] The vast majority of the more than 300,000 listed IDPs have now [Feb 2002] returned to their homes and areas of origin.

[…] In the eastern zone, approximately 10,000 IDPs originating from Zala Ambessa area, i.e. ‘tabias’(‘tabia’ is the Tigrigna language name for ‘kebele’ that is the smallest administrative unit of the Ethiopian Federal Government). Marta and Addis Tesfa, remain in and around Adigrat. Furthermore, although up to possibly 50% of Zala Ambessa inhabitants returned to their houses in the town’s ruins, the rest of the Zala Ambessa population remain displaced in and around Fassih, a location in-between Adigrat and Zala Ambessa on the main road. […]

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The proximity of their displacement (a one-hour walk) enables them to monitor developments and offers them the opportunity of occasional visits to their homes. They do not wish to return permanently yet. Government officials have dissuaded them and recommended waiting for the Border Commission's decision before returning. Furthermore, their houses have been destroyed and the danger represented by the presence of mines remains.

[..]
Local government authorities stated that most of the approximately 300 households (~ 1,500 - 2,000 people) that had to leave their homes prior to and during the border conflict have now returned to their homes in this central zone of Tigray. However, a small number of people remain in the makeshift camps in which former IDPs used to crowd into. Only a few are genuine IDPs that cannot return to their homes due to the danger of mines or their areas being occupied by the army. The rest of the people living in these makeshift camps such as Maychena or in Abakh, are partly petty traders and people engaged in other small businesses that provide various services to soldiers of the armed forces, and partly Ethiopian nationals from Eritrea.

In the western zone, the woreda administration in Humera town confirms the return home of 75% of 32,000 war-displaced from seven tabias bordering or situated near the border, i.e. Bereket, Humera, Hillegien, Hilet-Koka, Rawian, Adebay and Adi-Goshu. The main IDP centre of the zone was Ba'eke, a trading centre 45km south of Humera town on the Humera-Gonder road. IDPs from Hilet-Koka tabia were temporarily moved to Adebay tabia, closer to their homes. The presence of land mines hampers their return and resumption of agricultural activities. In addition, the school in the tabia was destroyed during the war.

In all three administrative zones of Tigray, namely in trading centres, whether newly established to supply the armed forces such as Abakh or whether traditional ones such as Ba'eke, a minority of IDPs were able to establish their own businesses and decided not to return home. Prostitution in Ba'eke is still important with a ratio of about one prostitute per ten soldiers according to MSF-Holland who carried out a survey in Ba'eke. The dangers of vastly increasing HIV/AIDS prevalence is being looked into through the MSF-Holland HIV/AIDS care, counselling, information, awareness and behaviour-change program.

2.1.3 Humanitarian recovery assistance to (former) IDPs under way
a) Food aid beneficiary discrepancies for 2002
Until the end of 2001, all registered IDPs received standard food rations provided through the WFP/REST IDP-food-assistance-program. As for 2002, WFP suggests to separate former and present IDPs into the following 4 different categories that would enable the identification of those still in need of assistance: (1) resettled and resumed farm activities, (2) resettled but with no or little access to cropping or pasture land, (3) could resettle but for a variety of reasons have not, and (4) cannot return because of security constraints (land mines & UXO).

From the four categories, arguably only category (2) and (4) could further be considered for food assistance under the IDP food aid program for 2002. People of category (1) and (3) would no longer be eligible for food aid through the IDP program because they cannot be considered genuine IDPs anymore. They could nevertheless qualify for food assistance under a chronically-food-deficient-assistance-program. According to this categorisation, approximately 75,000 people still qualify for the IDP-food-assistance-program.” (UNDP EUE, 19 February 2002)

Obstacles to return

Return constrained by presence of landmines (April 2005)
The resettlement of populations of both countries displaced by border conflict in Tigray and Afar hampered by mines, lack of services and water rehabilitation

- IDPs around Adigrat advised not to return because their areas of origin are contaminated with landmines
- As many as 100,000 landmines may have been planted in the Badme area (Western Zone of Tigray)
- Threat primarily confined to the “no man’s land” between the trenches along the confrontation lines
- UNICEF identified 150 accidents involving landmines in Tigray during 2000
- By February 2001 the Ethiopian army had removed some 236,000 landmines on the front lines
- Most of casualties are children herding cattle

"Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to constitute a major threat in the Temporary Security Zone and adjacent areas, hindering the resettlement of the population of both countries. During the period from December 2004 through February 2005, there were five reports of incidents concerning mines and/or unexploded ordnance in the Temporary Security Zone, three in Sector Centre and two in Sector West, in which three people were killed and 11 injured.

The Mine Risk Education field teams, established by the Mine Action Coordination Centre, continued to focus their outreach activities on populations in both Sectors, especially those living in areas suspected to be dangerous. During the reporting period, the teams provided mine-risk education, assistance and advice to almost 4,000 people." (SG Report, 7 March 2005, para.17, 19)

"About 75,000 of the approximately 300,000 persons who had been uprooted during the border war with Eritrea remained internally displaced in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray and Afar regions at the end of 2002.

Although security in Tigray and Afar improved considerably during the year, most displaced people could not return home because pervasive landmines severely limited access to farm and pasture land. Damaged health clinics and water systems also presented risks to many war-displaced Ethiopians wanting to return home, particularly children." (USCR, 1 June 2003)

"Ethiopia is a country suffering a high degree of contamination from landmines and other ordnance left over from a sequence of conflicts dating back to the Italian occupation of the mid-1930s. Contamination in the former combat zones of the more recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea pose a threat to IDPs returning home and to the deployment of UN peacekeepers. During the recent conflict with Eritrea, it is thought that as many as 100,000 landmines may have been planted in the Western Zone of Tigray alone.

[...]
In Ethiopia where only a limited danger area survey has been carried out, there is an immediate need for a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS3) to provide data for future mine action. The survey provides not only mined-area information, but also provides sufficient information to facilitate the implementation of mine awareness and victim assistance programmes. While casualty rates from land mine/UXO casualties remain relatively low (4-5 incidents monthly since November 2000) in Tigray and Afar, populations that have moved back to home areas continue to face risks, especially children who comprise more than 70% of reported victims. Mine risk education will need to continue, complemented by support to emergency surgical and trauma care, physical rehabilitation for victims and development of an integrated surveillance system. These measures will be linked to humanitarian de-mining activities under the overall coordination of the recently formed Ethiopian Mine Action Office." (UN November 2001, p. 4)
"In June 1998, the UN Mine Action Service, in conjunction with UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR and WFP, undertook a preliminary assessment of the landmine/unexploded ordnance situation in Ethiopia. The mission identified a need for UN involvement in the development of a national capacity for mine action provided that certain preconditions could be met, the most fundamental of which was the cessation of the conflict with Eritrea and the establishment of a mechanism for civilian coordination in humanitarian mine action. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000 in Algiers opens the way for the full re-engagement of the United Nations in providing direct capacity-building assistance to the Government of Ethiopia in Humanitarian Mine Action.

Ethiopia has a major landmine/UXO contamination problem resulting from successive conflicts over the past 70 years. According to the US Department of Defense (DoD), there are 21 types of mines known to have been used in Ethiopia in past conflicts, from the Italian occupation of the 1930’s to the 1977/78 Ogaden war with Somalia and the civil war which ended in 1991. Clearance operations have been undertaken since 1995 by the Ethiopian Demining Project, a non-combat unit of the national defense force established with the assistance of the US DoD. Clearance has not been conducted to international humanitarian standards, however, and there is a recognised need to build a national capacity in this regard.

During the more recent conflict with Eritrea, it is thought that as many as 100,000 landmines may have been planted in the Badme area (Western Zone of Tigray) alone as trenches in the area were lined with landmines (anti-tank and anti-personnel). Other areas where landmines are known to have been laid include Irob and Gulomakeda woredas in the Eastern Zone of Tigray, particularly the areas around Zelambessa and Alitena towns, and the Bure front in Afar region along most of the line of contact. A prerequisite for the safe return and reintegration of many of the estimated 360,000 war displaced people in Tigray and Afar will be the containment and reduction of the landmine/UXO threat." (UN February 2001, pp. 38-39)

See also "UN launching mine action programme (September 2000)

Resettlement programmes

Resettlement plans for 2006 in Amhara (February 2006)

- Many of the resettled people in Amhara did not stay at the resettlement site
- The regional Food Security Programme Coordination and Disaster Response Office prefers improvement of existing resettlement sites in 2006 to resettling new families

"An OCHA team together with government partners has assessed the humanitarian situation in Amhara Region from 31 January to 15 February 2006. The mission’s main objective was to assess the humanitarian situation in drought and landslide affected areas and to follow up on progress made by the government and other partners following the recommendations of the joint UN mission to west Amhara resettlement sites in November 2005. The team reported that almost half of the settlers have not remained in the resettlement sites. So far the government has no controlling mechanism in place to screen people but has acknowledged the problem. Meanwhile, the regional Food Security Programme Coordination and Disaster Response Office (FSPCDPO) has shown an interest to form a regional resettlement forum which could involve the wider humanitarian agencies (UN, donors, NGOs, etc) for constructive discussion and information exchange that enables agencies to help avert possible humanitarian crises in the future.

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Preparation for 2006 resettlement is ongoing in host areas. Activities underway include: consultations with the hosting community, road construction, transporting food and household items, surveying works to delineate settlers housing and farm sites, water point development, establishing satellite health posts, etc. The regional council has decided to resettle 50,000 households but the RFSPCDO says the number could reduce and the main focus in 2006 will be on consolidating works in old settlement sites. (OCHA, February 2006)

A number of studies show the successes and failures of resettlement programmes which were often carried out without proper preparation. Instead of providing a relief from malnutrition and insufficient harvests, poorly planned resettlement can lead to increased malnutrition (See in sources: Forum for Social Studies)

Government’s resettlement programme gives mixed results (December 2004)

- Concerns raised over lack of food, health, water, shelter, agriculture and resources capacity of regional and local authority to manage the programme
- High level of malnutrition and access problems to the resettlement sites are reported
- Until 2006 the Government plans to resettle approximately 2.2 million people in response to food insecurity
- Experts say resettlement programmes could lead to ‘colossal’ deforestation and other environmental damage if not properly administered
- A joint resettlement working group assessment found that sufficient planning, preparation and capacity is needed to avoid situations of ‘serious’ concern
- Death rates are high at a resettlement site in the Amhara region in the north

“The government’s five year resettlement programme has continued during the reporting period, with mixed results. Concerns continue over food, health, water, shelter, agriculture and the resource capacity of regional and local authorities to manage the programme. Access to the sites and high levels of malnutrition, especially in Oromiya have been reported. As a result, there have been calls for increased assistance, including the provision of non-food items, especially oral rehydration salts and medicines. In addition, it has been recommended that a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation be established in order to streamline the programme.

In June, pre-positioning of food in the lead-up to the rainy season (mid-June-September) was undertaken by WFP in Oromiya (where 262,000 have been resettled) and other sites. Regional authorities procured cereals. The DPPC has continued to conduct assessments of humanitarian needs in these sites during the reporting period to identify needs and intervene as appropriate. A visit to the Illubabor resettlement sites in mid-July revealed an improvement in the condition of resettled population and access to the main resettlement sites. However, the mission confirmed that 49 smaller sites continued to experience access problems due to poor roads.

A joint Government and UN assessment of resettlement sites in Oromiya in November revealed continuing problems, with reported food shortages arising out of crop failure, cases of diarrhoea and high malnutrition rates and in some sites, a three-month lag in the delivery of supplementary food because of lack of access. The main Meher rainy season rendered many of the resettlement sites inaccessible. OCHA is continuing to work with the Oromiya Regional Authorities to develop a plan of action for assistance requirements in the coming months.” (UN OCHA, December 2004, p.20)
The massive resettlement scheme - under which 2.2 million people will be moved over a three-year period - has drawn criticism from the international community. But the government says the US $220-million programme, which is a central plank of its effort to slash dependency on foreign aid, has already achieved success" (IRIN, 12 January 2004)

“The resettlement programme is part of the government's $3.2-billion rescue package aimed at reversing years of dependency in the country. With funding from the international community, the government is trying to slash food dependency for 15 million people in the country." (IRIN, 8 June 2004)

“However, the UN's Emergency Unit for Ethiopia (EUE) has commented that whereas resettlement can bring benefits it must be properly managed. It warned at a recent conference on resettlement that the project could lead to "colossal deforestation" and other environmental damage if not properly administered.

Meanwhile, a study by the EUE on resettlement in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State has also warned of dangers of malaria in the camps.

Médecins Sans Frontières - Holland (MSF-H) has also raised concerns. It criticised one resettlement programme in the south where 15,000 people were moved with "inadequate planning and implementation".

It also expressed alarm over the numbers of deaths at a resettlement camp in the Amhara region in the north, where a nutritional survey it carried out in late October had shown that at least 69 people had died there over the last six months." (IRIN, 12 January 2004)

“(a) The UN Country Team in Ethiopia has been participating in a resettlement working group, together with donors and the World Bank, set up to monitor current humanitarian conditions at the sites of the government voluntary resettlement programme in various parts of the country. Three teams from the working group have returned from visits to resettlement areas in Tigray, Amhara and Oromiya regions. Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region was separately assessed. […]

(b) While regional governments are currently responsible for covering food needs in resettlement areas, some areas may need additional support, especially with fortified blended food, until regional governments have effective procedures in place for procurement and timely delivery of food. There is some urgency for food to be pre-positioned in the resettlement areas, many of which are in remote locations, ahead of the long rainy season of July-September. […]

(d) A key finding of the assessment by the joint resettlement working group teams is that in areas where there has been adherence to the principles and guidelines set by the government, i.e. sufficient planning, preparation and capacity, this has resulted in a better resettlement programme.

(e) However, a recent WFP rapid nutritional assessment, conducted with the Oromiya regional Government's Emergency Nutritional Coordination Unit (ENCU) and the district health office, found worrying levels of malnutrition among 205 surveyed children in the Chawaka resettlement site in Illubabor zone of Oromiya region. The preliminary results of the resettlement working group team show similar findings in other parts of the Chawaka site.” (WFP, 2 April 2004)

“Resettlement is not a new phenomenon in Ethiopia. The former military regime, which was overthrown in 1991, resettled 600,000 people during its 17-year rule. About 33,000 people are believed to have died during the then forcible translocation. But it is the scale and size of the current programme that has caused concern.” (IRIN, 8 June 2004)
The international medical relief organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has discovered very high rates of mortality and malnutrition among the settler population in Tach Armachaho, situated in the Amhara region of Ethiopia.

A nutritional survey carried out by MSF in late October has revealed that, in the remote area of Abrihigira, at least 69 people have died over the last 6 months. Thirty-two of these were children under the age of five. This equates to an under-five mortality rate of 5.5 per 10,000 per day - a catastrophe against any benchmark indicator. […]

Children aged one to three years have been affected primarily - which increases the likelihood that the poor nutritional status is disease related.

MSF has been working in Tach Armachaho for the past year treating Kala Azar, a little known disease that is endemic in this area. An initial analysis in Abdurafi and Abrihigira shows that the trigger for the current crisis is likely to have been the lack of access by road to these areas in combination with a lack of monitoring by the Ethiopian government for a relatively small population of 3,000 settlers the majority of which are adults. […]

The lack of year round access to the area [Tach Armachacho], especially in the rainy season, has exacerbated an already dire situation. Poor access to drinking water due to water pumps breaking down and not being fixed has forced the population to rely on river water, resulting in high rates of diarrhea. The inaccessibility of the area has caused ruptures in the drug supply, no monitoring and reporting of morbidity or mortality data, and a total inability of the health services to refer and treat emergency cases.” (MSF, 1 December 2003)

Badly planned resettlements in severely drought-affected Oromiya (June 2003)

- Ethiopian people from the Hararghe province are being moved by authorities for the third time
- 850 households resettled in Sera have nothing: insufficient shelter, water, food and no health and other facilities
- Nothing was prepared for the resettlement and people are worst off than where they came from

“For the third time, within a short period of time, a group of Ethiopians from the Hararghe province will be moved by the authorities. It concerns 850 families which belong to a larger group that moved from Hararghe to a former army base near Bale - and from there were moved by the authorities to a location near Biddre, both in the Oromya district.

Because of the bad preparation of the resettlement by the authorities, the living conditions for the displaced in Biddre are dire; there is insufficient shelter, a limited water supply, a lack of health care and insufficient food distribution.

Heavy rains have worsened the health and access situation, and respiratory infections and diarrhoea are common. Also at the new location (Sera) nothing was prepared for the 850 families, and the water supply is even worse than in Biddre. The reason for the move is so that people can start planting in time for the next harvest.” (MSF, 3 June 2003)
Resettlement of drought affected people in Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (July 2003)

- 100,000 heads of household will be moved from eastern zone of SNNPR to its western zone
- At the first stage only household heads are resettled to prepare the sites for the whole family and resettled families can keep their lands in areas of origin for three years
- Some critical of the schemes request land re-distributions in their areas of origin instead of being sent away
- Hosts request that problem of land shortage for next generations is sorted as precondition to resettlement

“It is reported that the regional government planned to resettle a total of 100,000 heads of households within three years (2003-2005), out of which 20,000 will be resettled this year. The resettlers come predominantly from eastern zones and special woredas of the region where population pressure is greatest and food insecurity is most chronic, e.g. Sidama, Gedeo, Wolaita, Kambata & Tambaro, and Hadiyya Zones as well as Konso and Derashe Special Woredas (see map below). These selected resettlers will be mainly hosted in the zones and special woredas in the western parts of the region, considered as possessing ample space with productive land such as Sheka, Kefa, Bench-Maji, and Dawuro Zones as well as Basketo and Konta Special Woredas […].

Most available spaces meant for resettlement in the receiving areas are located at remote and marginal lowland areas infested with malaria and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness). […]

In principle, the regional government intends to implement 'low scale integrated resettlement schemes', providing only basic relief support (until they produce their first harvest) and social services such as health, education, potable water, credit, feeder roads, and grain mills. The approach adopted by the regional state to move only the heads of households initially and then other family members will follow after having established basic needs in the receiving area. The resettlers are entitled to maintain their land usufruct right in the home areas for three consecutive years. Except selling or mortgaging, they can either sharecrop or cultivate the land by using either part of the family labour left behind or making institutional arrangements through social networks. […]

**Criterion for selection:**
Primarily, resettlers are from chronically food insecure areas that depend on regular relief support. Ideally, those targeted are the landless, food insecure, healthy, young adults, and peasant farmers capable of producing enough (if possible surplus) by enduring the inevitable initial hardships in the new sites. Resettlement is restricted only to smallholder farmers at productive age. […]

**Views of settlers:**
Resettlers rather preferred to resettle in nearby locations than a long distance from their places of origin. Many volunteered to resettle within their kebele as a first priority. If this is not possible, their preference is progressively to resettle within the respective woreda or zone. However, the choice for resettlement outside one’s zone and special woreda is opted as a last resort.

[...]

Some reportedly argued against the resettlement scheme itself. Instead, they requested land redistribution by reducing from those who possess plenty rather than sending them away on the pretext of lack of land, which induced them to opt for “voluntary” resettlement. They are rather sceptical about the potential for many successes. Some seem psychologically not ready to leave their origins, which they consider ‘an area where one’s umbilical cord is buried’. Besides, the excessive failure of past resettlements in the country has had an adverse influence on the new recruits.

[...]

Perception of hosts:
The host communities are very keen and sensitive about the adverse effects of the scheme on their local natural resources, particularly forest upon which their livelihood is embedded. They seem rather suspicious of the planned scheme and of the newcomers and have insisted on setting a precondition to accept resettlers so long as the latter do not destroy their forest resources. They demand closer consultations and understanding between the sending and receiving areas. Orientation about the hosts’ traditional natural resource management practices should be provided to the resettlers before relocating them.

Some hosts are sceptical and hesitant, stating that any available space in their area is meant for their own next generation. The host communities want to set preconditions to address the land shortage problems their own children will have to face and only then would they welcome resettlers. In other words, they are willing to accept the newcomers from disaster prone areas so long as their internal land holding problems are solved simultaneously.

In the mean time, the hosts expect the resettlers to be hardworking farmers who can contribute to the improvement of the new setting. They warned the authorities to be careful not to bring resettlers who may drag-in social problems. In receiving areas such as Sheka, the local people leave their livestock in the jungle and fetch them only when needed. Their beehives stay in the forest from where they also collect wild coffee and spices. Hence, host communities emphasized that introduction of any form of social misbehaviours with the arrival of resettlers might flare-up tensions as a consequence. They meanwhile expect resettlers to be sensitive to the local people’s socio-economic and cultural set-ups. Instead of resettlers who attempt to make profit at the expense of the local communities, the hosts preferred to accommodate smallholder subsistence farmers.

The hosts overwhelmingly expect the government to provide infrastructure and social services (such as rural roads, health services /human & livestock/, water points, schools, grain mills, inputs, etc.) facilities alongside the arrival of resettlers. If expectations are not met in terms of basic infrastructure and social service provision, disillusionment and negative attitudes of hosts may be more destructive than constructive to the success of resettlement.” (OCHA, 3 July 2003)

75,000 people including war-displaced to be resettled in Humera in Tigray (April 2003)

- 75,000 people to be moved from central to western Tigray by September 2003 despite no adequate water supply, shelter materials, health services and food shortages
- Despite lack of preparation in areas of resettlement people were mobilized in February 2003
- Zonal officials in April 2003 reported continued lack of shelter-materials, inadequate water supply and health services, and food shortages
As of April, food aid promised until resettled people can harvest their first crops had still not been delivered

Land in areas of origin will be kept for two years and in the first stage, only heads of households will be resettled to prepare for permanent living.

"Some 75,000 people are expected to be moved from central Tigray to western areas of the region within the next five months. Several thousand started moving in late February. [...] Nevertheless zonal officials reported gaps in the present resettlement programme such as lack of roof thatching materials for new houses, inadequate water supply and health posts, and shortage of food that should be supplied to the new settlers until they bring in their own first harvest," it said. "(IRIN, 7 April 2003)

"Tigray region suffered from prolonged civil war and the Ethio-Eritrea border conflict being the most recent conflict that inflicted heavy social, economic and material damages to the country as a whole. Furthermore, like most parts of the country, the region has been hit by recurrent droughts and has been suffering and still is from the 2000 and 2002 droughts. [...] As a matter of fact, large areas and population segments of Tigray Region have been under constant humanitarian assistance due to food insecurity both chronic and acute for the last 12 years. [...] Voluntary resettlement programme underway in Humera

According to the Rural Resettlement Programme Desk Officer for Tigray Region, the Zonal Administrator of West Tigray Zone and the Kefta Humera Woreda council in Humera, preparations are well underway at all levels to resettle 15,000 households (about 75,000 persons) this year until September 2003. The major objectives of current resettlement initiatives are mainly to reduce environmental degradation in areas of origin by transferring drought-affected people to more fertile and less populated areas for increased food production and subsistence farming. People affected by the Ethio-Eritrea border conflict that are said to have shown inerest for resettlement may also be included for resettlement. One of the potential areas selected for resettlement is the Humera district of West Tigray Zone. [...] Most of the people will be moved from Central Tigray Zone and will settle along the Tekeze River and the Shiraro-Humera road that is currently under construction and planned to be finished in June. Nevertheless, zonal officials reported gaps in the present resettlement programme such as lacking roof thatching materials for new houses, inadequate water supply and health posts, and shortage of food that should be supplied to the new settlers until they will bring in their own first harvest. Nevertheless, resources were not confirmed from any source so far. One option suggested by the zonal administrator was contributions from the local people. Despite these gaps, reportedly, mobilization of the people started end of February 2003. Certainly, it is unlikely that enough preparation is made to make the start of the resettlement smooth enough to begin with. The resettlement is to be conducted in phases and the first phase started at the end of February when 5,000 households (only heads of households will move initially) will be moved voluntarily to the new sites. The officials reported that the settlers would be allocated 2 hectares of land per household, which they have to clear and prepare with their own labour by using farm implements to be provided by the regional government. The settlers are expected to construct their own houses after their arrivals, but they will be provided seeds and an ox on credit. Officials at all levels are hoping that the resettlement programme will become successful this time with a different voluntary approach. The land holding of settled families in areas of origin will remain unchanged for at least two years to give the settlers the opportunity to return or to leave part of their family behind while preparing the resettlement farm for a permanent living." (UNDP EUE, 2 April 2003, pp. 1, 3,4)
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Access coordination problems due to regionalisation policy

Poor coordination of humanitarian activities in Borena (Oromiya) due to re-zoning (February 2006)

"Borena zone is suffering from a lack of coordination at all levels and among different partners working in the zone, due in part to the recent re-zoning (the previous Borena zone was split into Borena and Guji zones), high staff turnover, and other priorities for officials." (UN OCHA, February 2006)
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

General

National response is inconsistent and ad hoc (February 2006)

At the national level, the Federal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA, formerly DPPC with ‘C’ for Commission) is the main government actor responsible for the emergency needs of IDPs, in collaboration with relevant ministries such as Health, Agriculture and Water Resources. There is however no coordination mechanism and no government policy dedicated particularly to IDPs and issues related to them. The early-warning system maintained by the government to allow early response to drought-induced displacement does not cover conflict-induced displacement. The DPPA mandate only includes assistance and not protection, return, resettlement or finding durable solutions. IDP issues are dealt with on an ad hoc basis unless it seems politically expedient to deal with them officially.

Thus, the main obstacle to a more systematic and comprehensive national response to IDP needs is the absence of a government institution clearly mandated to coordinate development and reintegration assistance to IDPs. The scope of IDPs programmes would include “root causes of displacement and a definition of the scope of prevention and protection, as these are broad terms which are difficult to quantify.” (OCHA, 24 May 2004)

DPPA works in close cooperation with national and international NGOs, the UN agencies and regional authorities. In collaboration with the DPPA, regional governments, local NGOs and IDP committees, ICRC, UNICEF, WFP and international NGOs such as Care International, Save the Children provide protection and assistance to IDPs in Ethiopia. For instance, the DPPA in collaboration with the WFP have been assisting people internally displaced by the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict in the Tigray region since 1999. As of 2006, all Tigrayans should fall under the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which provides food or services for work. So far, it could not be verified if the PSNP reaches all of the estimated 62,000 remaining IDPs in Tigray.

In other areas, the government is reluctant to give the attention required to address IDP protection needs. Following the displacements of recent past months in disputed lands between Oromiya and Somali regions, the DPPA, the UN, USAID and other NGOs carried out missions to assess IDPs humanitarian situation in the areas affected of the displaced. However it is not yet clear how the response has been organised in order to address the root cause of displacement and to find durable solutions to IDP needs. It is known that at least until May 2005, Care International will be providing food and non-food assistance to some 2,500 newly displaced in Miesso in Oromiya (OCHA, 28 March 2005).

There are serious gaps in the response to the needs of IDPs in Somali region as illustrated by the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in IDP camps. The provision of assistance to IDPs in the region has been erratic and irregular. Since January 2005, the Ogaden Welfare and Development Association mandated for food distribution in IDPs camps has exhausted its stocks (OCHA, 4 February). UNICEF which has been assisting IDPs in the country for years is planning to start nutritional activities in the camps. The ICRC have provided aid that will guaranty food security for the next two months to 1,200 displaced families and 800 families who have been hosting the displaced in Guradamole in the Somali region (ICRC, 19 April 2005). Conversely, there are other displaced people with little option to return home in the Somali region who have been taken off
the assistance beneficiary lists after 5 years and the government is reluctant to continue to deal with them as IDPs (OCHA, 18 April 2005).

In the Gambella region since the violence which exploded in December 2003 and which forced thousands of people to flee their homes, the UN carried out the first assessment mission in October 2004. Recently, the government announced that six soldiers will be tried for their role in the massacre which took place in Gambella region. As the security situation is tense, many areas of displacement in the region remain inaccessible and persons affected lack assistance (UN CT, 20 April 2005; IRIN, 18 March 2005). Some 3,000 newly displaced receive food aid from the government (OCHA, February 2006)

In addition to coordination, the general funding crisis, a common concern to humanitarian actors in the country, is also one of the main obstacles to planned systematic and comprehensive response to IDP needs in Ethiopia (WFP, 12 April 2005).

International response

There is a wide range of international agencies - both NGO and UN - active in Ethiopia, providing humanitarian and development aid. As stated in an OCHA document proposing a country-wide IDP assessment, assistance for IDPs is incoherent:

"Lack of reliable information on the numbers of IDPs, profile, location, categories (disaggregated by gender and age), causes of displacement, and ambiguities over who is an IDP and who is not are often cited as the major factors constraining effective and timely humanitarian response to these people. As a result IDPs in Ethiopia are generally considered to be the most vulnerable groups in the community. Without an authority with central responsibility for IDPs there is no clear coordination or aid delivery mechanism to address their issues and needs. Assistance is ad hoc at best. The basic needs for food and non food items are not provided to IDPs in a regular manner leading to an appalling humanitarian situation in many camps. DPPC does provide food assistance to IDPs in some circumstances upon written request by relevant regional authorities. In some cases, ICRC or NGOs have provided assistance upon request by local authorities. Commitment to coordinate development and reintegration assistance to IDPs in a manner that mirrors the mechanism for emergency aid is largely missing.

The Guiding Principles set out a number of principles relating to the rights of IDPs to protection from displacement, humanitarian assistance, return, resettlement and reintegration. Primary responsibility for promoting the security, welfare and liberty of people rests with the state. In order to apply the Guiding Principles effectively in Ethiopia there is a need to raise national awareness of the problem and develop a national policy on internal displacement. The belief is that by so doing a better commitment and capacity will be developed to respond to future displacements and to address the current outstanding IDP cases across the country by the government with support as appropriate by humanitarian partners.

Specifically, the government should be in a position to take the following key steps in line with the framework for national responsibility, so as to meet its obligations towards displaced people.

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects
2. Raise national awareness of the problem
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of the IDPs
4. Support training on the rights of the IDPs
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs
8. Encourage national human rights institutions to integrate displacement into their work
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decision-making
10. Support durable solutions
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient” (OCHA, 2005)

ICRC attempts to provide non-food items and water to newly displaced who are not recognised by the government. Many other organisations engage in development aid, to the point that the head of OCHA Ethiopia had to call for an increase in emergency food aid, particularly in the view of the drought that had hit the Horn of Africa in the first months of 2006.

Coordination mechanisms

The 2006 Humanitarian Appeal, a document presented jointly by the Ethiopian government and humanitarian agencies, “focuses on life-saving and livelihoods protection activities in the four key sectors of food, agriculture, health and nutrition, and water and environmental sanitation” (p.5). The Appeal is led by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA, formerly DPPC).

The Appeal mentions IDPs as one of the most vulnerable groups, along with women, small children, youth and adolescents (p.10). However, the document generally does not refer to IDPs, nor does it seem to target IDPs specifically with the proposed programmes. It must be presumed that IDPs are included in the ‘vulnerable populations’.

The Appeal identifies three cross-cutting issues: HIV/AIDS (prevalence of 4.4%), gender and child protection, and education (p.10, 11) It will focus specifically on alleviating the effects of the drought in Western Somalia.

Reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Khartoum Declaration on Internal displacement, 2003

- In 2003, Ethiopia signed the Khartoum Declaration on internal displacement

KHARTOUM DECLARATION

Ministerial Conference on Internally Displaced Persons in the IGAD Sub-Region

We, the Ministers representing the Member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) meeting in Khartoum,
Noting the conclusions and recommendations of the Experts Meeting from 30th August to 1st September, 2003;
Considering the situation of internally displaced persons, (IDPs) in the sub-region;
Recalling the decision taken by the IGAD Council of Ministers during the AU Summits in Durban and Maputo in 2002 and 2003 respectively, to convene an IGAD ministerial meeting on the issue of internal displacement caused by natural and man made disasters;
Cognizant of the fact that the aims and objectives of IGAD include promoting peace, stability and development in the sub-region, and determining that finding durable solutions to internal displacement is an indispensable step to realizing lasting peace stability and development;

Reaffirming the undertaking by the IGAD Member States to facilitate the voluntary return, reintegration or resettlement of displaced persons in cooperation with relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations in accordance with the existing national, regional and international instruments;

Recognizing that the problems of internal displacement affect all Member States in the sub-region and constitute a threat to socio-economic development, political stability, national security and the environment;

Noting with great concern that displaced women, children, elderly and disabled persons constitute the majority of the internally displaced and are often among the most vulnerable;

Noting with deep concern also that resources made available by the international donor community are still below the basic needs of the IDPs;

Reaffirming that the primary responsibility of protecting and assisting the internally displaced and finding durable solution lies with the national Governments and that the role of the international community is to complement the national effort;

Taking note of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as a useful tool for developing and evaluating appropriate national policies and legislation on internal displacement and noting also that the Principles compile the existing international law related to internal displacement;

1. Express our concern over the persisting problem of internal displacement in the region, and the growing deterioration of the humanitarian situation of the IDPs, due to the recurrence of natural disasters and intra- and interstate conflicts;

2. Take note with appreciation of the efforts of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and commend him for promoting prevention of internal displacement, assistance to internally displaced persons, and durable solutions to their plight;

3. Commend the efforts of the Member States, UN agencies, other international agencies, donors as well as national and international NGO's which have continued to provide assistance to IDPs;

4. Call upon the international community to continue providing support for meeting the urgent needs of IDPs and in implementing rehabilitation, recovery and sustainable development programmes;

5. Call for the strengthening of co-operation between IGAD, AU, the UN and its agencies, particularly the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other humanitarian organizations, with a view to coordinating their programmes and activities related to IDPs and streamlining their actions in the struggle to mitigate disasters in the sub-region;

6. Reiterate our commitment to continue to address the root causes of the problem of internal displacement and to continue creating conditions conducive for voluntary return and reintegration, local integration or resettlement of IDPs;

7. Agree to cooperate in encouraging the development of comprehensive national policies on internal displacement and in this regard,

i. Acknowledge that such policies must be consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law;

ii. Note that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement can serve as a useful tool for addressing IDP issues;

iii. Commit ourselves to continue directing particular attention to the development of policies ensuring the protection of the internally displaced and to addressing the needs of especially vulnerable groups, such as women heads-of-household, children, disabled and elderly persons;

iv. Reaffirm that such policies should take into account the needs and rights of internally displaced persons as well as the host communities;

v. Call upon the international community to support Member States in developing such policies;
8. Pledge and urge all concerned actors to provide humanitarian access to internally displaced persons for humanitarian organizations and to protect the safety and security of humanitarian workers;

9. Call upon the international community and member states to provide the necessary funds for the IGAD Executive Secretary to establish a unit on forced displacement within the IGAD Secretariat to, inter alia, collect data on displacement in the region, disseminate the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, provide technical assistance to member states in developing and monitoring policies on internal displacement, and explore further means of sub-regional cooperation to address issues of forced displacement;

10. Endorse the proposal of the Current Chairman of IGAD Council of Ministers to declare the 2nd of September of each year as IGAD IDPs Day;

11. Reiterate the need for firm commitment of all authorities in the IGAD sub-region to intensify their efforts with a view to finding lasting and durable solutions to the problems of displacement in order to enhance the prospects for long-term peace, security and development;

12. Urge Member States and all authorities in the IGAD region to continue to ensure the full participation of all segments of the displaced populations, in particular women and children, in decision-making on issues which affect their rights and welfare, including voluntary return, reintegration, local integration, resettlement and peace building programmes;

13. Appeal to Member States and the International Community to provide support and resources for reconstruction, resettlement and rehabilitation efforts of countries emerging from conflicts;

14. Intensify efforts aimed at enhancing democracy, rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and international humanitarian law in order to ensure stability and security in the sub-region;

15. Call on Member States to take the necessary steps to implement the relevant provisions in the Declaration and Recommendations adopted by the OAU Ministerial Conference on Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons held in Khartoum, Sudan from 13-14 December 1998;

16. Invite Member States to work out modalities to ensure the implementation of this Declaration and to report progress on implementation to the 23rd Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers.

Khartoum, Sudan
2 September 2003

**Known references to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (as of July 2004)**

- References to the Guiding Principles Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

**Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation**

None

**Other references to the Guiding Principles**

None
Availability of the Guiding Principles

The Guiding Principles are widely available in Arabic. Published by OCHA.

Source: OCHA; Mr Francis Deng, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons; Mr Sergio Vieira De Mello Assistant to the Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs,


Date: 11 April 2001

Training on the Guiding Principles

About 30 Representatives of national and regional governments, UN agencies, as well as international and local NGOs participated in the workshop on internal displacement in Ethiopia which took place in Addis Ababa on May 24-25, 2004. See the document containing conclusions and recommendations.

The workshop was organized by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Pastoral Communications Initiative Project (PCI), with the support and facilitation of the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Global IDP Project

Date: 24-25 May 2004


Recommendations

Recommendations of IGAD expert meeting, Khartoum, September 2003

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EXPERTS MEETING
(adopted by the Ministerial Conference, 2 September 2003)

A. Member States

1. Develop national policies on internal displacement using the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as a useful reference, much as some member states have already begun to do. Such policies should:
   a. Comprehensively address all phases of displacement: prevention, protection and assistance during displacement, and durable solutions;
   b. Specify the institutional arrangements for addressing IDP issues;
   c. Address the protection, assistance and reintegration needs of displaced women and children, who make up the majority of the displaced, with special attention to women heads of households, adolescents and other especially vulnerable groups;
d. Ensure that the particular needs of elderly and disabled persons are adequately addressed;
e. Integrate protection into programming for IDPs;
f. Support and strengthen the efforts of host communities;
g. Integrate humanitarian and development approaches that promote self-reliance and support the coping mechanisms of IDPs;
h. Promote durable solutions, i.e. return, resettlement or integration, and ensure that they are carried out voluntarily and in conditions of safety and dignity;
i. Provide the necessary support so that chosen durable solutions remain viable for the long term;
j. Give access to land and facilitate abandoned return of property of IDPs;
k. Involve the displaced in decisions related to their assistance, protection and durable solutions and, in particular, ensure that women, children, the disabled and the elderly are given a voice;
l. Protect the natural environment in areas of displacement.

2. Empower the community and work in cooperation with national civil society and the international humanitarian community to address IDP issues;

3. Establish national human rights institutions and encourage them to address the issue of internal displacement;

4. Ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, human rights law and regional standards by all military and civilian personnel;

5. Take the necessary steps to implement regional, i.e. OAU/AU and IGAD decisions and plans of action relating to displaced persons, and take note of the AU’s interest in developing a specific protocol on IDPs, using the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement among the references;

6. Commit themselves to work together towards sustainable peace in the region as a durable solution to the problem of displacement, including by supporting peace-building initiatives and the development of a “culture of peace”

7. Support and encourage the use of traditional methods of dispute settlement and conflict resolution in a manner consistent with international humanitarian and human rights standards;

8. Provide humanitarian access to internally displaced persons for humanitarian organizations and to protect the safety and security of humanitarian workers;

9. Provide for security in IDP encampments and settlements;

10. Address human rights abuses, such as sexual assault, exploitation, enforced prostitution, ill-treatment and other gender-related security issues;

11. Address abduction and recruitment of children;

12. Address the dangers of landmines, in particular through clearance and mine safety awareness campaign;

13. Compile accurate and timely data on the internally displaced, disaggregated by age and gender;

14. Ensure that IDPs are included in HIV/AIDS prevention and response strategies and programmes;

15. Allocate resources in national budgets to respond to internal displacement;

16. Provide a progress report to the IGAD Secretariat on the implementation of these recommendations on a semi-annual basis.

B. IGAD

17. Develop a regional strategy on internal displacement;

18. Develop regional strategies to address phenomena that exacerbate problems of internal displacement, including small arms proliferation and cattle rustling;

19. Assist member states in developing national policies, plans and strategies on issues of IDPs;
20. Integrate consideration of internal displacement into IGAD’s Disaster Risk Management, early warning, and peace promotion programmes;
21. Provide a forum for states to discuss IDP issues and exchange information and to incorporate these issues into the existing IGAD Civil Society Forum as well;
22. Disseminate and provide information to Member States about the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and best practices;
23. Facilitate in developing regional projects / programmes in mitigating disasters and formulation of rehabilitation projects / programmes based on the IGAD regional Disaster Risk Management Programme that has been developed with the member States;
24. Accelerate and strengthen the implementation of CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning) in support of preventing further displacement;
25. Compile, analyze and disseminate data on internal displacement;
26. Study and assess situations of internal displacement in IGAD member states and make recommendations;
27. Convene a meeting with donors to address the return and reintegration needs of IDPs.

To implement these recommendations, it is further recommended that IGAD:
28. Establish a Unit within the Secretariat to handle issues of forced displacement;
29. Seek resources from the member states and the international community for IGAD to carry out the recommended activities and fund the Unit.

C. The International Community

30. Support the strengthening of national capacities, both governmental and non-governmental, for addressing the protection, assistance and recovery needs of internally displaced persons;
31. Strengthen the institutional capacity of the IGAD secretariat in developing programmes for addressing internal displacement;
32. Respond to humanitarian crises quickly and with adequate assistance;
33. Devote greater efforts and resources to bridging the relief to development gap, including by developing flexible funding mechanisms to support transitional strategies;
34. Find ways to break down institutional barriers to a holistic approach to the problems of internally displaced persons, refugees, demobilized combatants, and other persons affected by conflict, that also ensures attention to their specific needs;
35. Make greater efforts to work in full partnership with governments and national NGOs to address IDP issues.
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