

**PAKISTAN:
MADRASAS, EXTREMISM
AND THE MILITARY**

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PAKISTAN: MADRASAS, EXTREMISM AND THE MILITARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In its new role as key ally in the U.S.-led war on terrorism, Pakistan's military government has toned down many policies that previously fostered militancy and religious extremism within the country and internationally. Action against the Taliban, al-Qaeda and home-grown sectarian terrorists are examples. But the military's confrontation with its former religious allies is likely, at best, a short-term response compelled by circumstances and foreign pressure.

It is doubtful whether the military government has the intent or the will to set Pakistani society on a sustainable course that would lead to political pluralism and religious tolerance. On a key test – reform of madrasas, Pakistani religious schools that breed extremism of many hues – the military government thus far has acted weakly.

Madrasas provide free religious education, boarding and lodging and are essentially schools for the poor. About a third of all children in Pakistan in education attend madrasas. These seminaries run on public philanthropy and produce indoctrinated clergymen of various Muslim sects. Some sections of the more orthodox Muslim sects have been radicalised by state sponsored exposure to jihad, first in Afghanistan, then in Kashmir. However, the madrasa problem goes beyond militancy. Over a million and a half students at more than 10,000 seminaries are being trained, in theory, for service in the religious sector. But their constrained worldview, lack of modern civic education and poverty make them a destabilising factor in Pakistani society. For all these reasons, they are also susceptible to romantic notions of sectarian and international jihads, which promise instant salvation.

The Musharraf government has pledged, as many previous Pakistani governments have done, to change the status of madrasas and integrate them into the formal education sector. It has also pledged to reform the madrasa system as part of its anti-terrorism actions in fulfilment of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. However, these pledges have not been backed by decisive action or a credible plan to remake the system within a reasonable timeframe.

A madrasa reform law is in the works that would regulate the schools. It would provide for changes in the curriculum, registration and monitoring of finances but even the name of the draft – the *Deeni Madaris* (Voluntary Registration and Regulation) Ordinance 2002 – gives some sense of the lack of commitment to reform.

The bill does not envisage real intervention in the madrasa system because the clergy is opposed. Madrasas will instead be asked to submit to regulation voluntarily, and the law proposes no mechanism of enforcement or punishments for violations. Madrasas would simply be asked to comply with the new curriculum.

Alongside this very gentle prodding, the government is offering madrasas some carrots for good behaviour: free Islamic and modern textbooks and other rewards, including salaries for teachers. Most madrasas have shrugged off both aspects of the plan and have said they will resist any attempts to secularise education. The religious organisations already banned by the government continue to run schools and to produce militant literature.

Both the clergy and independent observers see the government's plans as measures aimed at assuaging

international opinion. In fact, the government's apparent policy shift represents not real change but rather continuity of the military's alliance with the United States and its patron-client relationship with the Pakistani clergy.

U.S. support gives international legitimacy to the military's role in Pakistani politics. A madrasa sector the autonomy of which remains untouched and that is not forced to reform is unlikely to confront the military. On the contrary, the clergy remains a vocal supporter of a politically dominant military and its India policy. This explains why the government's madrasa reforms are cosmetic and lack substance, legal muscle or an intent to institutionalise long-term change.

Madrasas have a long history in Pakistan and in Muslim societies generally. They serve socially important purposes, and it is reasonable for a government to seek to modernise and adapt rather than eliminate them. International assistance to Pakistani education, especially from Western donors, however, should focus heavily on rebuilding a secular system that has been allowed to decay for three decades. Any international assistance for the government's madrasa reform project should be closely tied to proof that it represents a genuine commitment to promote moderate, modern education.

Musharraf's clampdown on foreigners linked to the Taliban and al-Qaeda shows that international pressure can work. It is what will determine if and when the government will enact tangible madrasa reform. International acceptance of the military's domestic manoeuvres in exchange for support in the war on terrorism risks more extremism in the not distant future that will be hard to contain. Wavering by important international actors, especially the U.S., will not only increase extremist threats to Pakistan but eventually also undermine global security and stability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN:

1. Establish a madrasa regulatory authority immediately, to be headed by the interior minister, that should:
 - (a) carry out a comprehensive survey of the madrasa sector for purposes of

- mandatory registration and classification within six months;
 - (b) assist the Pakistan Madrasa Education Board in implementing and monitoring curriculum and financing reforms;
 - (c) coordinate efforts of the various government departments involved in the reform process; and
 - (d) work as the focal point for liaison with the clergy, donors, law-enforcing agencies and international organisations.
2. Institute curriculum reforms for madrasas within six months that ensure:
 - (a) vocational training programs are included;
 - (b) more time is allotted for modern subjects in the new teaching schedule; and
 - (c) recognition of madrasa certificates and degrees is conditional upon adherence to the new teaching regime.
3. Immediately close all madrasas affiliated with banned militant organisations and prosecute their leaders under existing criminal laws if they are involved in incitement to violence.
4. Require all madrasas at the time of registration to:
 - (a) publish annual income, expenditure and audit reports;
 - (b) declare their assets and sources of funding; and
 - (c) disassociate from any militant activity or group.
5. Create a nation-wide Financial Intelligence Unit, as a subsidiary of the banking regulatory authority, to prevent money laundering in the formal banking sector and to curb the hundi system and other informal financial transactions.
6. Keep strict tabs on foreign students who seek admission to Pakistani madrasas and permit their enrolment only if such religious education is not available in their home countries or they have otherwise been carefully screened by both their home authorities and the appropriate Pakistani government authorities.
7. Ensure that madrasa reform is not confined to urban areas but also covers small towns and villages.

TO INTERNATIONAL DONORS:

8. Hold the Pakistani government to its commitments to madrasa reform, and in particular in particular urge it to:
 - (a) close madrasas linked to banned extremist groups;
 - (b) establish a regulatory authority under the interior minister with sufficient powers to overcome clerical resistance;
 - (c) institute mandatory rather than voluntary registration, curriculum reform and financial control mechanisms;
 - (d) end involvement of intelligence agencies in the madrasa sector; and
 - (e) implement parliamentary oversight as soon as possible.
9. Provide financial assistance to help Pakistan upgrade its secular education sector at all levels, with emphasis on vocational training.
10. Provide financial assistance to government programs to reform the madrasa education sector but only if the government closes madrasas affiliated with banned groups, makes it obligatory for all madrasas to disclose their sources of income and declare dissociation from any militant activity or group, and otherwise carries out the reforms described above. Funding for reform projects should be suspended if the government fails to do so. International financial institutions providing, or intending to provide, financial assistance for madrasa reform should also make their grants conditional on the above criteria.
11. Recognising that some donors may have legal or constitutional difficulties with direct support of religious education, they should consider supporting a number of specific projects, including:
 - (a) training new madrasa teachers to teach a wider range of secular subjects;
 - (b) producing madrasa textbooks for modern subjects; and

- (c) supporting civil society monitoring of government performance in madrasa reform and on other education issues.

**TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SAUDI ARABIA
AND THE OTHER GULF STATES:**

12. Publicly identify charities and NGOs suspected of links with militants.

**TO THE G-8 COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES:**

13. Implement fully the eight special anti-terrorism financing recommendations of the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering and urge Pakistan to adopt legislation that meets these standards.
14. Launch, with the help of domestic Islamic organisations, a public awareness campaign to dissuade expatriate Muslims from funding jihadi madrasas and to dispel misperceptions that Islamic education per se is a target of the anti-terror financing laws.

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PAKISTAN: MADRASAS, EXTREMISM AND THE MILITARY

I. INTRODUCTION

In the middle of the room is a frayed straw mat that is broken at the corners. Placed near the straw mat is a wooden bench that extends across the width of the room. Two rows of children sit on both sides of the bench. Their books are placed on the bench. They are reciting their lesson. Their bodies rock back and forth as they recite Arabic verses mechanically, without understanding, without reflecting. This is rote learning. In a few minutes, the repetition of the verses will imprint a pattern on their memory and they will move on to the next verse. This is how hundreds of madrasa students start their school day across the country.

Dr. Muzzaffar Iqbal, "Glimpses of a distorted Culture" *The News*¹

Pakistan's madrasa system of Islamic education has come under intense scrutiny in the wake of the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. The debate evokes images of jihad, warfare training, terrorism and an archaic system of education. Most of these perceptions are a result of generalisations and oversimplification of a complex phenomenon. Madrasas do indeed play a role in violence and conflict but they also have a key place in Pakistan's religious and social life.

There are five distinct types of madrasas in Pakistan, divided along sectarian and political lines. The two main branches of Sunni Islam in South Asia — Deobandi and Bareili — dominate

this sector.² Ahle Hadith/Salafi Muslims have their own schools, as do the Shias, while the predominantly Sunni Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) shuns sectarian tags and maintain madrasas distinct from the sectarian ones.³ The religious, doctrinal differences of these schools are irreconcilable.

All provide free Islamic education, with a sectarian bias. Madrasas also offer free boarding and lodging to students who come mainly from the poorer strata of society and not necessarily from the communities they are based in. Though some middle-class and rich families also send their children to madrasas for Qur'anic lessons and memorisation, they are usually day students.

At a madrasa pupils learn how to read, memorise, recite and render the Qur'an properly. Exegeses of the holy script and other branches of Islamic studies are introduced at the higher stages of learning. Madrasas issue certificates equivalent to a Bachelor's and Master's degree. A madrasa system's university for higher religious education is called a *Darul Uloom* (house of knowledge). The products of the system are *huffaz-e-Qur'an* (those who memorise the holy book in full), *qaris* (those who can recite it aloud with the proper Arabic pronunciation) and *ulema* (religious scholars and teachers of one school of thought or the other). Their job market is predestined and narrow: graduates will work only in mosques, madrasas, the parent

¹ Dr. Muzzaffar Iqbal, "Glimpses of a Distorted Culture", *The News*, 01 May 2000, Sec. Agenda, p. 6.

² Deoband and Bareili are towns in Uttar Pradesh, India, from where two rival Sunni movements arose in the late nineteenth century after the advent of the British Raj. Over 90 per cent of madrasas belong to these two sects.

³ Ahle Hadith/Salafi is a puritanical minority sect in Pakistan that is close to the Saudi brand of Wahhabi Islam. The JI is a political, reformist movement launched in the early 1940s by Abul Aa'la Mawdudi, the foremost twentieth century South Asian theological scholar.

religious/sectarian party and its affiliate businesses or organisations. The objective of the madrasa is to introduce Muslim children to basic Qur'anic teachings, promote an Islamic ethos in society and groom students for religious duties. It is a quirk of history that these religious schools are now associated with violent domestic turmoil and international terror.

Schools of religious studies and the clergy were never as numerous and powerful in Pakistan as today. At independence in 1947, there were only 137 madrasas in Pakistan. According to a 1956 survey, there were 244 madrasas in all of West Pakistan.⁴ Since then, even by official accounts, their number has doubled every ten years. A significant number remain unregistered.

Nobody is sure how many madrasas actually exist.⁵ Pakistan's minister for religious affairs, Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, puts the figure at 10,000, though he acknowledges the problem of definition and suspects it could be higher, with as many as one million to 1.7 million students attending classes at least for short periods.⁶ Most of the madrasa students do not complete their education or appear for the final graduation examinations. One expert has estimated that, by 1995, 20,000 of them were likely to graduate as *maulanas* (holders of the highest madrasa certificate) of one sect or the other, in addition to the 40,000 who had graduated since 1947.⁷ The vast majority of madrasa students are in the age range of 5 – 18 years. Only those going for higher religious studies are above that age.

Ministry officials speculate that 10 to 15 per cent of madrasas might have links with sectarian militancy or international terrorism. The government itself admits all these statistics are unreliable. The lack of credible data makes reform more problematic. It also underscores both the extent of official neglect and, conversely, the special treatment received by a select group of madrasas.

Recruited from the Deobandi seminaries in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, the Taliban have drawn the international community's attention to the madrasa phenomenon. Madrasas were already seen as "supply lines for jihad" in the Soviet Afghan war during General Zia-ul-Haq's rule in the 1980s. Jihadi organisations, recruiting students from a section of these schools, are also held responsible for sectarian killings in Pakistan and the armed insurgency in Kashmir.

But violence in the name of religion neither originated at madrasas nor is their defining characteristic. Madrasas associated with jihad and sectarian and international terrorism are easily recognisable and must not be confused with those that are a normal part of Pakistani life. Both types, however, pose different degrees of threats to Pakistan's stability and international security.

Militancy is only a part of the madrasas problem. The phenomenon of jihad is independent of madrasas and most of jihadis do not come from these schools. Pro-jihad madrasas only play a supporting role, mainly as a recruiting ground for militant movements. Most madrasas do not impart military training or education but they do sow the seeds of extremism in the minds of the students.

In the foundations of the traditional madrasa are the seeds of factional, political, religious, and cultural conflict. Based on sectarian identities, madrasas are, by their very nature, mutually exclusive, driven by a mission to outnumber and dominate rival sects. Students are educated and trained to counter arguments of opposing sects on matters of theology, jurisprudence and doctrines. Promoting a particular sect inevitably implies rejection of the others. So, 'Radd' literature – the 'logical' refutation of the belief system of other sects, aimed at proving them infidels or apostates – is a main feature of the literature produced by madrasa-based parties. In short, madrasa education and upbringing aim to indoctrinate with an intolerance of other religious systems.

⁴ Nadhr Ahmed's 1956 survey quoted by Jamal Malik, *Colonialisation of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan* (Lahore, 1996), p. 180. The number could have been even fewer. According to other estimates in 1957-1958, Pakistan had only 119 seminaries with 4,790 regular students.

⁵ The ministry of education in 1995 estimated the figure at 3,906, which increased to 7,000 in 2000. Rahman, op. cit., p. 16.

⁶ ICG interview with Dr Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, minister for religious affairs, *zakat* and *ushr*, April 2002. The number of children enrolled for normal primary schools education in 2001 was 1,992,132, only a third of whom make it to the middle level, and one-sixths to the secondary and higher secondary schools. See Economic Survey (2001-02), Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Chapter 11, p. 2

⁷ Malik, op. cit., p. 230.

All that said, madrasas do serve many useful functions for about a third of all children in education. They provide free basic literacy through Qur'anic lessons and Arabic texts. Students are also trained in theological studies, jurisprudence and polemics. The clergy they produce conduct religious rituals and ceremonies and run mosques, all essential functions in Muslim societies. All major madrasas also issue edicts on matters ranging from divorce to inheritance disputes, and people come to madrasas for religious counselling.

"Madrasas save people from a life of sin, by advising them according to the Qur'an and Sunnah", says Abul Khair Muhammad Zubair, a Bareilvi scholar who is chief *mufti* of Sindh province.⁸ Homeless and displaced people are given sanctuary. Madrasas house thousands of poor people who otherwise lack access to formal education.⁹ Madrasas address many needs of their communities and serve an important humanitarian role. Mosques and madrasas are thus the focal points of individual and corporate philanthropy in Pakistan.

The crux of the problem comes down the type of education the madrasa imparts. Education that creates barriers to modern knowledge, stifling creativity and breeding bigotry, has become the madrasas' defining feature. It is this foundation on which fundamentalism – militant or otherwise – is built.

Is it possible to reform this extremism by replacing intolerance through a modern curriculum? Can an austere and rigid system of teaching coexist with modern arts and sciences? The *ulema* running these seminaries in Pakistan and the Musharraf government agree that reforms can – and should – be carried out.¹⁰

This apparent agreement on the introduction of compulsory modern education is, however, riddled with contradictions. Any suggestion of

change in the traditional sector of Islamic instruction makes the clergy suspicious of government intentions. They are willing to teach non-religious subjects but 'secularisation' is their worst fear, and they vow fiercely to resist it. The clergy have a long and successful history of opposing governmental reform plans and preserving the religious bias and traditional format of madrasa education. Madrasas have become the fiefdoms of their clerics, who jealously safeguard autonomy because it gives them unchecked control of finances, their students and what they are taught.

The Musharraf government's dilemma lies in Pakistan's political history, in which the military has retained state power at the expense of democracy and socio-economic development. To prolong their rule, military governments have formed domestic alliances, including with the clergy. In this process, civil society has been undermined and bigotry has flourished. For instance, madrasas multiplied under Musharraf's predecessor, Zia-ul-Haq. The military is now reaping a harvest of militancy the seeds of which were sown a quarter of a century ago.

The tussle over reforms between the Musharraf government and the madrasas should also be placed in a wider historical perspective. Every civilian and military government has formulated plans to reform the madrasa system. Yet reconciling "a 12th century worldview"¹¹ with modernity has remained an intractable proposition. Despite state intervention, the curricula is still based on traditional literature and teaching methods. Its rationale of existence remains virtually unchanged and as emotive as ever: to defend the faith of Islam - if need be through jihad.

That is why madrasa reform is a litmus test for the credibility and political will of General Musharraf's government. To gain domestic legitimacy and external support, he has vowed to end militancy carried out in the name of Islam and religious exploitation.¹² Militant fundamentalism, the government argues, cannot be checked without managing madrasas.

But the madrasa phenomenon cannot be reduced to terrorism nor understood in isolation from civil-military relations, Pakistan-India conflicts, and the

⁸ ICG interview, April 2002. Muhammed Zubair is also president of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Sindh, the major Sunni Bareilvi political party in the country.

⁹ For a detailed analysis of class, family and ethnic backgrounds of madrasa graduates and *ulema* during the 1980s, see Jamal Malik, op. cit., pp. 227-255.

¹⁰ ICG interviews with madrasa administrators, leaders of religious parties, and military officials, March-April 2002.

¹¹ Ghazi, op. cit.

¹² General Pervez Musharraf, address to the nation on radio and TV, 17 October 1999, and also his speech on 12 January 2002.

larger question of separation of state and religion. The Pakistani state partly shares the madrasa worldview or uses it selectively for political purposes. To institute radical reforms and bring religious education closer to mainstream education requires redefining the military's internal policies and external preferences. It is unclear whether the Musharraf government is willing to do either.

II. BACKGROUND

Today, Pakistan does not face any real foreign threat. But from within the country, we have many threats for which we have to have a new beginning to make Pakistan strong in all respects.

General Pervez Musharraf, alluding to religious militancy, in his address to the nation on 12 January 2002.

Madrasas only came to the attention of the international media and policymakers in recent years and have received close attention after 11 September 2001, when some came to be regarded as a serious security threat. However, in Pakistan they have been a contentious political issue for three decades. During that time there has been a huge expansion in their numbers, and some have been recipients of significant government support. To assess the prospects for madrasa reform, it is essential to understand how they came to play the role they do in Pakistani society and why previous efforts at reforms have failed.

A. SACRED VS MODERN: A BRIEF HISTORY

Sectarianism in Pakistan is the modern version of a doctrinal conflict within Islam dating to the seventh century Caliphate. The beginning of the madrasa system in the Muslim world was also, in part, a Sunni reaction to the rise of the Shia sect.¹³ The first chain of madrasas appeared under the rule of Nizam al-Mulk, in eleventh century Iraq. Court patronage helped these to become “an educational system with a definite organisation and purpose” which was to serve as the centre of Muslim educational activity until colonialism left the institution struggling for survival.¹⁴

Under India's Muslim rulers, madrasas were open to both Muslims and non-Muslims. Schools of mystic traditions taught ‘rational’ subjects such as philosophy, mathematics and astronomy, to prepare students for court jobs, the royal bureaucracy and

¹³ Hisham Nashabe, *Muslim Educational Institutions*, Institute of Islamic Studies (Beirut, 1989) p. 9.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 6.

religious duties.¹⁵ The madrasas were, however, a personalised system of education, with itinerant students going to religious teachers for lessons in different fields. That system lacked organisation and permanent infrastructure.

The tradition survived British colonialism in South Asia largely because of a group of early eighteenth century *ulema*, known as the *ulema* of Farangi Mahall, a residential area in Lucknow, India. They developed the Dars-e-Nizami, the first standardised madrasa curriculum. Modified versions are still used as the standard course at all Sunni madrasas in Pakistan and India.¹⁶ This curriculum does not preach militancy or jihad. These reformist scholars shifted the emphasis of madrasa curricula to the rational sciences to train their pupils to become lawyers, judges, and administrators.¹⁷

Other responses to the perceived challenges posed by colonial rule to Islamic ethos, however, reinforced old conflicts and caused new divisions among Muslims at the political, cultural and educational levels. These rifts continue to destabilise Pakistan today.

B. BRITISH RULE: DEOBAND AND OTHER RESPONSES

The need to adjust to British rule produced two major educational movements for Indian Muslims. At one extreme was the development of English learning at Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh (UP); at the other was the madrasa of Deoband (also in UP), a movement that was inward looking and rigid.

The introduction of English education and Western sciences threatened traditional Muslim learning. As opposed to the traditionalists,

progressive *ulema* such as those of Farangi Mahall sought to preserve Islam by introducing changes in the Dars-e-Nizami. Darul Uloom Deoband, established in 1867, however, laid emphasis on scriptural studies, 'purification' of the belief system, and outright rejection of imperialism and its values.¹⁸ The advent of the British had endangered the core values of the clergy, and the Deobandi madrasa "became one of the responses to the power of the West".¹⁹ This anti-Western trait is still a hallmark of the Deobandi school.

During the confrontation with the British, the Deobandi *ulema* institutionalised the madrasa system, and gave it an administrative and academic structure. They adopted Dars-e-Nizami, but only after overturning its emphasis on non-religious studies.²⁰ Rather than militancy and jihad, the avowed purpose of these schools was missionary, to promote faith-based knowledge. By the end of the nineteenth century, around two dozen Deobandi madrasas had been set up in Indian towns.²¹

The madrasa system was thus formalised under the influence of the same foreign culture it was defending itself against. In addition to Persian and Arabic, madrasas adopted Urdu, introduced examinations, printing presses, loudspeakers, textbooks, uninterrupted residence, fixed duration of study, and networks of schools.²² Since then, madrasas have followed this paradoxical pattern of resistance to state authority and modernity, coupled with a selective use of new subjects, techniques and technology.

The puritanical, anti-Shia views of the Deobandis also created fissures within the dominant Sunni Islam. Deobandis clashed with the more flexible Sufi tradition, the shrine culture, music and multi-religious gatherings of which were at odds with Deobandi zeal to purify religion. The Muslim peasantry, however, was integrated into local cultures and Deoband fundamentalism was alien to it. The urban upper classes, too, were not very receptive to a rigorous religious culture. Thus a counter movement, "with a strong inclination towards the cult of saints", was

¹⁵ Malik, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

¹⁶ This account relies on Rudrangshu Mukherjee, "The Other Tradition", *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, 23 February 2002, sec editorial, p. 6. Mukherjee has summarised Francis Robinson, *Spiritual Middlemen: The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia* (New Delhi, 2001).

¹⁷ Before that, Islamic education was normally divided into two categories: *manqoolat* or the transmitted sciences such as exegesis (*tafsir*), traditions (*hadiths*, sayings of the Prophet); jurisprudence (*fiqh*); and *maqoolat*, or the rational sciences (logic, philosophy, theology, rhetoric and mathematics).

¹⁸ See Barbara Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (Karachi, 1989).

¹⁹ Rahman, op. cit., p. 85.

²⁰ A.H. Nayyar, "Madrasah Education Frozen in Time" in Pervez Hoodbhoy, edit., *Education and the State: Fifty Years of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1998).

²¹ Metcalf, op. cit.

²² Rahman, op. cit. p. 85.

founded by Raza Ahmed Khan of Bareilly.²³ Its followers (Barelvis) set up their own madrasas. Sectarianism within Sunni Islam thus started to take shape.²⁴

The main rival of Deoband's rigid fundamentalism was, however, the Anglophile reformist, Syed Ahmad Khan, who instituted the modernist Aligarh school, a precursor to Pakistan's government-run educational system. This enlightened movement outdid the madrasa in outreach. Its schools inspired similar movements in other parts of British India and soon became the mainstream of Muslim education.

While employment in the colonial state sector, politics, arts and literature were Aligarh's domain, the Deobandi madrasas and their religious leadership, organised under the banner of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH),²⁵ opposed learning or using English. That struggle between traditionalist clergy and modernist trends continues in a more intense form in Pakistan.

C. STRUGGLE WITH THE STATE

Immediately after independence, Pakistan – then divided between West and East Pakistan – was split by a power struggle among elite groups. The first generation of political leaders were anglicised and Western educated but lacked secure constituencies in the new country. The bureaucracy and the military, too, were products of the British system, trained and organised along colonial lines. In Pakistan's formative years, the political elites and the civil-military bureaucracy wrestled for power but held the clergy at bay. Some leading *ulema* were co-opted to give the new state a symbolic Islamic identity, but by and large the clergy were excluded from the power game.

Palace intrigues, masterminded and played out by the civil-military bureaucratic elite, and an increasing military role in domestic and foreign policymaking marked that period. The country was without a constitution for nine years. A document enshrining democratic values would have aided the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan, who had little representation in the military and bureaucracy dominated by West Pakistanis. In 1954, Ayub Khan²⁶ became defence minister in addition to commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In October 1958, the army took over government, eliminating an entire generation of politicians by disqualifying 3,500 on charges of corruption.

Much like General Musharraf, Field Marshal Ayub Khan professed liberal ideas and an anti-clerical stance. Ayub opted to expand state control over religious institutions to cultivate a state version of modern Islam, to legitimise military power domestically, and as a rallying cry against India. Since the regime was also aligned to the U.S. in the cold war, military rulers were motivated to create a modern Muslim identity for Pakistan to counter godless communism.

In its bid to contain and co-opt the clergy, the Ayub government first attempted to regulate *auqaf* property – i.e. non-transferrable religious endowments.²⁷ Almost all madrasas were dependent on this income

²³ Malik, op. cit., p. 59.

²⁴ In most of Pakistan, especially in rural Punjab and Sindh, being a Deobandi is considered equivalent to being a Wahhabi, and the term Sunni is generally used for followers of one saint or the other. Despite the mushrooming growth of Sunni-Deobandi madrasas in the 1980s, the situation remains more or less the same in traditional Pakistani society.

²⁵ JUH is the parent organisation of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) of Pakistan. The JUI is further divided into three factions, of Samiul Haq, Fazlur Rahman and Ajmal Qadri (JUI-S, JUI-F and JUI-Q, respectively).

²⁶ Field Marshal Ayub Khan was born on 14 May 1907. He attended Aligarh University, Uttar Pradesh, India, and was selected for the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, England, in 1926. He was commissioned in the Royal British Indian army in 1928. At the time of independence, Ayub Khan was the most senior Muslim officer in the Pakistan army and became the first native commander-in-chief in 1951. The army was directly involved in politics for the first time when Ayub Khan, serving as the commander-in-chief, was inducted as defence minister. He played a key role in Pakistan's entry into US-sponsored cold-war military alliances, the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). On 7 October 1958 Ayub Khan imposed martial law for the first time in Pakistan. After nearly eleven years of rule, his generals forced him to resign in 1969 in the wake of public protests. General Yahya Khan succeeded him. Ayub died in 1974 in his native village in Haripur.

²⁷ Religious endowments are usually arable land, buildings and shops belonging to mosques, shrines, madrasas, graveyards, Hindu and Sikh temples and places of other religions. These assets are non-transferable and have legal protection. The government nationalised this sector in 1960, but the outreach of the *Auqaf* Department is limited. *Auqaf* income can only be spent on mosques and the religious institution to which they belong.

to meet expenses. An *Auqaf* Department was created to regulate shrines and madrasas and bring religious institutions under state control by integrating them in the formal sector.²⁸ Responding to the challenge, by 1959 four *wafaqs* - or federations of madrasas - were organised, along sectarian lines, to defend themselves against the state's attempts to trespass on their autonomy.²⁹

Ayub Khan's reform plan included the introduction of general secular education in madrasas "to widen the outlook of Darul Uloom students and to increase their mental horizon".³⁰ The aim was to enable madrasa students to "enter public professions" and "play their full part as citizens".³¹ The reforms proposed the same primary education syllabus and teaching schedule for madrasas as in the government sector. Religious content would be added but go beyond the Qur'an, *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet) and other traditional subjects to include issues of national importance, propagation of an Islamic nation or even of an Islamic community (*ummah*). "This meant the transformation of Islam from a theological concept to an ideological one".³²

Ayub's madrasa reforms failed to make an impact since all religious parties, except the Jamaat-e-Islami, rejected them. Although the religious parties opposed Ayub, they lacked the domestic support to successfully confront him. It was an estranged protégé, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto³³, who was to do so.

The Zulfikar Ali Bhutto period (1972-77) is significant in the story of madrasas and extremism. Because of Ayub's anti-clergy posture and stress on modern education, madrasas had grown minimally from 1960 to 1971, when only 482 new ones were set up. The pace picked up under Bhutto, and 852 were added by 1979.³⁴ The number has multiplied ever since.

Bhutto was Pakistan's first elected prime minister. His Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had swept the polls in West Pakistan in the 1970 national elections, but did not win a single seat in East Pakistan where the Awami League³⁵ secured an absolute majority. The military's refusal to honour the results led to civil war, conflict with India and Bangladesh's secession. Bhutto took over a humiliated army and a truncated Pakistan in search of a new identity. Attempting to create a national ethos on anti-Indian and pan-Islamic slogans, he highlighted Pakistan's Islamic and supposed Middle Eastern identity, deploying a populist rhetoric mixing socialism, nationalism and populism.³⁶

As a result, the Islamic parties, which had been routed in the 1970 elections, were able to assert themselves in the writing of the 1973 constitution, which declared Islam the state religion (Article 2) and mandated the Council of Islamic Ideology to propose measures to Islamise Pakistan.³⁷ In its preamble, the constitution pledged that the state should "enable Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah".

²⁸ Malik, op. cit., p. 60.

²⁹ These are: the *Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabiya* (Sunni Deobandi); *Tanzim al-Madaris al-Arabiya* (Sunni Bareilvi); *Wafaq al-Madaris al-Shia* (Shia); and *Wafaq al-Madaris Al-Salafiya* (Ahle-Hadith (*Salafi*)). Almost 95 per cent of officially registered Pakistani madrasas are affiliated with these four *wafaqs*. The Jamaat-e-Islami created the *Rabita al-Madaris*, the fifth union of madrasas, in the late 1970s.

³⁰ Malik, op. cit., p. 60

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was born on 5 January 1928. In 1947, he entered the University of Southern California (U.S.) and in 1949 the University of California (Berkeley), from which he graduated with honours in political science in 1950. He went to Oxford (England) and was called to bar at Lincoln's Inn in 1953. A protégé of General Ayub Khan, Bhutto served as his foreign minister before launching his own political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), in the late 1960s. The PPP won a landslide in

West Pakistan (today's Pakistan) in the 1970 general elections. He became president and chief martial law administrator after the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971. He gave the country a new constitution in 1973 and became its first elected prime minister. Bhutto's government was overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977 and he was executed two years later after a dubious murder trial.

³⁴ Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Religious Affairs: Report of the National Committee for *Deeni Madris* (1979), pp. 194-197.

³⁵ The Awami League is now Bangladesh's main opposition party, headed by former Prime Minister Hasina Wajed.

³⁶ Christele Dedebant, "'Mughal Mania' under Zia-ul-Haq", ISIM Newsletter 8, International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, 2002, at <http://www.isim.nl/newsletter/8/dedebant.htm>.

³⁷ Three religious parties fielded 299 candidates in the two wings of Pakistan. Only 18 were elected, none in the East, now Bangladesh. See Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, (Karachi, , 2001), p. 382.

Bhutto nationalised the education sector but the madrasas were exempted and remained autonomous.³⁸ He also attempted to co-opt the madrasas by offering to grant them the equivalence of public sector certificates and diplomas. The highest degree of the Deobandi *wafaq* was placed on a par with a Master's degree in Islamic Studies from a government university, provided madrasa students passed a Bachelor's level English course. Although madrasa clerics spurned the proposal, Bhutto continued to woo them.

The Bhutto government's curricula reforms for the nationalised education sector increased religious content. Arabic was introduced as a compulsory subject at middle and secondary school levels, and madrasa graduates were employed as teachers, widening their scope of employment.³⁹ It was also then that madrasas established linkages with external sponsors.

The PPP government concluded agreements with Arab countries, most importantly Saudi Arabia, for promotion of Arabic language and Islamic literature in Pakistan. New madrasas opened in areas frequented by Arab royalty, mainly the southern belt of the Punjab.⁴⁰ Literature from Saudi Arabia and money for Islamic education began to flow in, which was to assume mammoth proportions during the Afghan jihad. These linkages, in particular Saudi Arabia's patronage of Pakistani madrasas, especially of the more radical Ahle-Hadith/Salafi branch, thrive even today.

The nexus between the madrasa, militancy and army originated during the Bhutto years. Afghan Islamist dissidents, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhannudin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud,⁴¹ took sanctuary in Pakistan after

Sardar Daud's 1973 coup ousted King Zaher Shah. Reacting to his anti-Pakistan posture, Pakistan allowed them to establish bases for their struggle against Kabul.⁴² Army officers, including Lt. General Naseerullah Babar (the Taliban's patron in the 1990s as Benazir Bhutto's interior minister),⁴³ cultivated the young Afghans. These dissidents, who led the anti-Soviet resistance, were mostly religious teachers (*ustaad*). As a result of Bhutto's policies, the early prototypes of the militant madrasa emerged in Pakistan.

The policy of accommodating the religious lobby, however, boomeranged. Instead of being co-opted by Bhutto, the clergy joined hands with their traditional ally, the military, and formed an alliance with anti-Bhutto political parties to oust him from power.⁴⁴ In the 1977 elections, Bhutto had a short-lived victory over an alliance of all major religious and nationalist/secular parties. Protests in urban centres, organised and led by the traditional clergy and a modernist but jihadi Jamaat-e-Islami, fuelled unrest. The anti-Bhutto movement exploited religious slogans and the street power of madrasas and mosques.

Taking advantage of the unrest, the military ousted Bhutto in July 1977. After the coup, the military rewarded the religious parties, first by co-opting them in government and then by propelling them to the centre-stage of the Cold War.

³⁸ 178 colleges and 3,693 schools in the private sector, including missionary institutions, were nationalised. See Mohammed Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research (Islamabad, 1994), p. 301.

³⁹ Rahman, op. cit.

⁴⁰ ICG interviews.

⁴¹ All three are warlords from the Afghan jihad period. Hekmatyar headed Hizb-e-Islami, a guerrilla Mujahiddin group. He was supported by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988, till the Taliban forced him to leave the country. After exile in Iran, Hekmatyar returned to Afghanistan in early 2002. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the

leader of the predominantly Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami, became the second president of an interim Afghan government in 1992, which was driven from Kabul by the Taliban in 1996. He was a candidate for presidency at the Loya Jirga in June 2002 but withdrew in favour of Hamid Karzai. Ahmed Shah Massoud, known as the 'Lion of Panjshir' for his exploits against the Soviets and the Taliban, led the Northern Alliance until he was assassinated in September 2001.

⁴² Dr. Babar Shah, "The Myth of Talibanisation Strategic Studies" (Islamabad, 2000), pp. 170-73.

⁴³ ICG interviews. Also see Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, (London, 2000).

⁴⁴ According to Lawrence Ziring, even before the 1977 election campaign began, army officers were plotting to overthrow Bhutto, who was no longer seen as the 'saviour of Pakistan' but as a liberal populist trying to further undermine the military after the 1971 humiliation of surrendering to India in Bangladesh. See, Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980) p. 131.

III. THE MADRASA BOOM

The Zia period was the turning point for the madrasa system. Many aspects of Islamic militancy, which Musharraf now considers more dangerous than any “foreign threat”, were introduced to madrasas during General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (1977 to 1988).

Zia suspended the constitution and became the chief martial law administrator in 1977. He initially pledged to hold elections but reneged in 1978, promising Islamisation and accountability of politicians instead. Having ousted a popular and elected prime minister, Zia faced considerable domestic opposition, but the military’s attempts to consolidate power were assisted by events in Central and West Asia with global repercussions.

In Iran, a revolution had given a new direction to Shia fundamentalism. The Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) united Sunni Arabs against Iran, and they wrestled for influence in neighbouring Muslim countries. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. and Arab states joined to help the Afghans wage a jihad against the Communists and also to contain Iran. Pakistan’s military played a key role in this ‘holy war’.

As Zia attempted to consolidate his authority through Islamisation at home and jihad in Afghanistan, the madrasa system was profoundly transformed. Zia’s Islamisation and the Afghan jihad nurtured many, often mutually hostile, varieties of fundamentalism. Each Pakistani sect, its disciples a much sought-after commodity, closed ranks, and fortified itself. As a result, sectarian divisions were militarised. This militancy, and the violent sectarian conflict it inspires, is among the most serious challenges that confront the Musharraf government.

Within Pakistan, the Zia government formulated Islamic rules and regulations for every institution, opening new avenues for madrasa pupils. Sectarianism flourished. Madrasas churned out hordes of religious graduates with few skills or training for mainstream professions. This growing army of extremists in Pakistan fought the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad alongside the Arabs and Afghans and still serves the cause of jihads from India to Russia.

In the first years of Zia’s Islamisation (1979-82), only 151 new seminaries were established. During the next six years, as the Afghan jihad gained momentum, 1,000 more opened. According to the last official update in 1995, 2,010 new madrasas had been registered since 1979, raising the total number registered to 3,906.⁴⁵

A breakdown by sect of official and unofficial data shows that Deobandi madrasas exceed the total of the rest combined.⁴⁶ Unofficial estimates are higher but proportionally similar. Musharraf’s minister of religious affairs argues that state policy has had no part in the radicalisation of madrasas or the disproportionate growth of the more fundamentalist sects: “Intellectual activity and religious education have always been the strengths of the Deobandi tradition compared to the other schools of thought, which explains their high numbers”.⁴⁷

Institutional strength and the tradition of spreading their message through the written word certainly helped the Deobandis against sectarian rivals. But many, including the president of Sindh’s JUP, Abul Khair Muhammed Zubair, argue, “There was a clear bias under the Zia administration. Whenever a dispute would arise over the ownership of a Sunni mosque, the military government invariably favoured the Deobandis.”⁴⁸

Zubair cites his own madrasa as an example. Rukn al-Islam is an old Sunni-Barelvi school built on the upper storey of a mosque. Arbitration by the Auqaf Department supported the Deobandi claim to the mosque, leaving the administrator of the Barelvi madrasa in a unique position. While he administers the school, he says his prayers in a Barelvi mosque two blocks away.

Zubair also points out that this bias was evident in recruitment of *khateefs* (preachers) in the military. Each of the three armed services has a Directorate of

⁴⁵ Directory of *Deeni Madaris*, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan (1995). This was the last official published survey. There is no credible official estimate of unregistered madrasas.

⁴⁶ Out of a total of 2,891, according a 1988 government estimate, 717 belonged to Barelvis, 47 to Shias, and the Salafi Ahle Hadith had 161. Jamaat-e-Islami and independent madrasas accounted for 97. The rest were Deobandi madrasas. Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, *Deeni Madaris Report* (1988).

⁴⁷ ICG interview, April 2002.

⁴⁸ ICG interview, April 2002.

Motivation, which recruits religious professionals to lead prayers and give sermons. “The students of Deobandi madrasas were favoured over the Barelvis in the recruitment process under Zia and that trend is still visible”, says Zubair.⁴⁹

It was in the Zia years that Sunni-Shia divisions assumed an even more militant form. While Sunni sects gained recruits from Saudi patronage and the Afghan jihad, Pakistani Shias were inspired by the 1979 Khomeini revolution. As Pakistan became a battlefield for Arab-Iran disputes, Shia madrasas increased significantly. In 1983-84, there were 116, up from around 70 in 1979.⁵⁰

The Ahle Hadith, the sect closest to the official Saudi creed, registered similar growth. From an insignificant minority, they established hundreds of madrasas in important commercial centres of the Punjab during the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁵¹ Since the Ahle Hadith share with the Deobandis a deep hostility towards Shias, sectarian conflict has become more violent and intricate, posing a challenge to the stability of the Pakistani state.

A. THE FAÇADE OF ISLAMISATION

During the Zia years, the process of Islamising state and society took place at two levels. First, changes were instituted in the legal system. Shariah courts were established to try cases under Islamic law. Legislation was devised to Islamise the economy by gradually eliminating interest-based banking, making it compulsory for the nationalised banks to deduct *zakat* (obligatory Islamic alms), from the deposits of Muslim account-holders. A *zakat* and *ushr* ordinance was issued in June 1980, the first time that a government assumed the role of collector of religious taxes.⁵² An elaborate system of provincial, district and village level *zakat* committees was introduced.

⁴⁹ ICG interview, April 2002.

⁵⁰ Malik, op. cit., p. 198.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² The rate of *zakat*, the Islamic tithe, is 2.5 per cent deducted from all bank accounts over a variable limit, according to the price of gold on the eve of the first day of Ramadhan (in 2001, the government fixed the amount at 5,600 rupees). *Ushr* is levied on the yield of agricultural land in cash or kind at the rate of 5 to 10 per cent of the annual yield according to land categories (rain-fed, canal-irrigated etc).

Secondly, Islamisation was promoted through the print media, television, radio and mosques. A plethora of new ordinances was issued to Islamise public morals, the civil service, armed forces, education system, research organisations and even science and technology. The religious view, in short, dominated public discourse. In a society where many sects co-existed, it acted as an identity marker, heightening sectarian divisions and promoting sectarian conflicts.

Zia's Islamisation was meant to gain domestic legitimacy and undermine his political opposition, the moderate, mainly secular, mainstream political elite. Hence state-controlled Islamic bodies, such as the Council of Islamic Ideology, suggested measures to proscribe parliamentary democracy as a “Western and therefore non-Islamic model”.⁵³ *Ulema* of all sects were given representation in a rubber-stamp parliament (*Majlis-e-Shura*), in 1980. Anti-India nationalism was already couched in religious symbols. Zia also used scriptural texts selectively to justify domestic policies.

Zia's Islamisation required the support of the religious seminaries for credibility. The military government, therefore, wooed Madrasas through a package of enticements. The 1979 education policy envisaged 5,000 mosque schools and established a National Committee for Dini Madaris to transform the madrasas “into an integral part of our educational system.”⁵⁴

B. ZIA'S MADRASA REFORM

A national survey was conducted, and the report of the committee (The Halepota Report⁵⁵) proposed improving the economic condition of madrasas and modernising them with the aim of eventually integrating the religious and the formal education sectors while “conserving the autonomy of madrasas”.⁵⁶

Other than upgrading education to bring it to par with the formal sector and creating jobs for madrasa

⁵³ Waseem, op. cit., p. 387.

⁵⁴ The Ministry of Religious Affairs handout of January 17, 1979, quoted by Malik, op. cit., p. 132.

⁵⁵ After its chairman, Dr. A.W. J Halepota, an educator who had also been associated with Ayub Khan's commission for madrasa reform in the 1960s. Malik, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 139.

graduates, Halepota's suggestions for improving economic conditions of madrasas included direct government financial assistance without conditions. *Zakat* funds were identified as the source of government support.⁵⁷ The recommended curriculum changes did not alter the domination of religious subjects but only suggested inclusion of some modern subjects at the primary, secondary and graduation levels.

The committee's recommendations could not become law because of clergy opposition. Still, Zia implemented much of the Halepota Report and also took other steps to co-opt the madrasas.

The government directed the University Grants Commission (UGC), in June 1980, to draw up criteria of equivalence for degrees and certificates from the religious sector. The highest certificates of *wafaq* boards were conditionally recognised as an MA in Arabic or *Islamiyat*. Without shifting the balance of studies or changing the mediums of instruction and teaching methods, madrasas were thus upgraded to the level of the formal education system. Since these concessions were made without a corresponding change in the structure and system of madrasas, they boosted the sector and encouraged its growth across the country.

C. JIHAD AND SECTARIANISM: THE SCHOOL CONNECTION

Following 11 September, the international community has seen madrasas as schools of militancy and terrorism. Pressured to contain and reform its jihadi madrasas, Pakistani officials argue that there is no connection between madrasas and terrorism. The truth lies somewhere in between.

Two types of madrasas took an active part in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. The first included those created specifically to produce jihadi literature, mobilise public opinion, and recruit and train jihadi forces, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami's Rabita madrasas.⁵⁸ The second consisted of independent chains of madrasas, including those of the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), which opposed Zia politically but were a partner in the Afghan jihad. The Pakistani military, especially the Inter-

Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), funnelled American and Arab money and was responsible for training the jihadis at camps inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Located in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, which have close cultural, linguistic and sectarian affinity with Afghan Pashtuns, the schools of these predominantly Deobandi chains quickly espoused jihad. Their numbers increased rapidly with the influx of Afghan refugees, patronage of the Pakistani military, and Arab financial aid.⁵⁹

These madrasas did not necessarily conduct military training or provide arms to students but encouraged them to join the Mujahideen inside Afghanistan. Madrasas affiliated with the Haqqaniya chain and the JUI faction led by Fazlur Rahman also established networks for jihad in Pakistan's major urban centres. Jihadi seminaries with Afghan and Arab volunteers spread to Karachi and later to the Punjab.

Central Asian, North African and Caucasian Muslims also arrived to participate in the Afghan war. Since many schools, such as the Haqqaniya madrasa at Akora Khattak, have old ties with the University of Medina, and Saudi Arabia had a deep interest in promoting jihad, Middle Eastern money poured into these madrasas.

As recruits grew, so did the importance of the jihadi madrasas. "We did not need the ISI; the ISI and the CIA needed us", says Samiul Haq,⁶⁰ the leader of his own faction of JUI. In fact, the Taliban was founded in the seminaries of Samiul Haq and Fazlur Rahman, which graduated most of its commanders and leaders. Even after the downfall of the Taliban, these jihadi madrasas continue to encourage recruits to join new jihads against targets as diverse as the U.S., Russia, China and India.

The jihadis of these madrasas also look inwards, fighting a jihad against sectarian rivals in Pakistan. Splinter Deobandi groups, such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba, emerged during the Afghan jihad. With the spread of jihadi madrasas throughout Pakistan and a massive increase in their students, sectarian strife has become endemic and increasingly violent.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 135.

⁵⁸ Malik, op. cit., pp. 208-209.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ ICG interview with Samiul Haq, Akora Khattak, March 2002.

Jihadi madrasas have served a dual purpose for the Pakistani military: as a tool in domestic politics and a strong, active support base for its defence policy, especially against India. The Kashmir jihad began as soon as the jihad in Afghanistan ended. As in Afghanistan, the credit for pioneering the campaign for the Kashmir jihad in Pakistan goes to the JI, the modernist ally of the military.⁶¹

D. MODERNISTS GO MILITANT

According to jihadi folklore, the first Pakistani martyr in Afghanistan, Imran Shaheed, was not a madrasa student but an undergraduate at a government college in Karachi. He was influenced by the militant literature and politics of the Islami Jamiat Talaba, the student wing of the JI.⁶² At the entrance of the Jamaat's headquarters at Mansoor, in Lahore, a large billboard carries the names of hundreds of martyrs of the Afghanistan and Kashmir jihads. Few had ever been to a traditional madrasa.

For a long time, the JI was the face of the Afghan jihad in Pakistan. Unlike the NWFP-based and ethnically biased JUI factions, it professes non-sectarian politics. With a limited but almost exclusively urban constituency, especially among the intelligentsia and through its student wings, the JI appears to have more modernists than other religious parties. It became the military's main ally during the Afghan jihad as well as domestically. As a result, money and arms poured in.

The Jamaat itself has never been a madrasa-based party. Although its student wing dominated politics at Pakistani colleges and universities throughout the 1970s and 1980s, its madrasas are mainly a product of the military-sponsored Afghan jihad. As a political party, the JI is more organised and politically active in the Punjab and Karachi,

but 41 of its 107 madrasas were in the Afghan border area.⁶³ A Jamaat official says:

These madrasas were established to aid and host the refugees. They were all victims of the Soviet aggression and it is no surprise that their children went back for jihad – we didn't have to send them. And our people also went for jihad, but only against the Communists. We refused to become party to the civil war.⁶⁴

It was largely because of the younger JI cadre's involvement with the Afghan groups that weapons and violence were introduced at Pakistani colleges and higher educational institutions during the 1980s, especially Punjab University and the University of Karachi. On campuses throughout Pakistan, the student wings of rival parties continue to settle scores through coercion and violence.

Though a majority of Jamaat members are Sunnis, as was its chief ideologue Abul A'ala Mawdudi, it has not pursued sectarian politics. By and large, it has kept above the sectarian fray that broke out during the Afghan jihad years.

Sectarian conflict remains one of many violent legacies of that period. Because Saudi and Iranian literature, money and networking fuelled old but largely latent conflicts during the Afghan jihad and after, overtly sectarian and militant Sunni and Shia parties have emerged from the madrasas. All sectarian parties banned by the Musharraf government – including the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Tayaba (LeT), Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariah Mohammedi (TNSM), and Sipah-e-Mohammed – either originated at jihadi madrasas or developed their own chains.

Saudi patronage has played a particularly important role in promoting jihadi madrasas and jihadi culture in Pakistan. Because of doctrinal commonality, the Saudi government and Arab NGOs have given extensive assistance to Ahle Hadith (Salafis/Wahhabis) madrasas. This anti-Shia sect owes its allegiance to Saudi Arabia. Shia madrasas have also multiplied because of Iranian patronage, including the activities of the Iranian cultural centres.⁶⁵ They owe their allegiance to

⁶¹ The Jamaat-e-Islami is not averse to secular education. Most of its workers and members are drawn from mainstream colleges and universities. Its power base is in the big cities among the educated classes. The JI was the only religious party that fully supported Ayub Khan's proposals to modernise madrasa education. Compared to the orthodox clergy, the JI worldview is pegged around modernity compatible with Islam.

⁶² ICG interview with Abdul Sattar, a Karachi-based researcher, and others, April 2002.

⁶³ Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁶⁴ ICG interviews with Jamaat officials.

⁶⁵ ICG interviews, February-March 2002. For madrasa growth in the 1980s and location, see Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

Iran. In fact, the tradition of Shia madrasas was very weak and negligible before the 1980s.

Mainstream Sunni Barelvis have been conspicuous by their absence from militant organisations, though some also receive aid from Arab countries and are bitter rivals of the Deobandi sect.⁶⁶ “Sectarian outfits abound with criminals. They are not students of religion and they have stigmatised the name of Islam”, says Abul Khair Muhammed Zubair of JUP.⁶⁷

All Shia and Sunni political parties, however, blame the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies for ‘creating’ sectarianism. “If sectarianism had been a feature of society or a collective trait, there would have been communal violence, one neighbourhood against the other. What we see are sniper shootings and targeted killings”, argues Abdul Malik of JI, who claims that the U.S. and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence together sponsored Sunni sectarian madrasas in the 1980s to counter the impact of the Iranian revolution.⁶⁸ This assertion, however, fails to take account of the role of the proxy battle the Arab countries and Iran were engaged in the region, focusing on Pakistan, to promote their respective brands of Islam during the Afghan jihad.

E. THE RISE OF JIHADI CULTURE

We find young men in university campuses or mosques, invite them for a meal and discuss the situation for on-going attacks being suffered by Muslims in Chechnya, Palestine or Kashmir. We...make them understand their duty to support the jihad struggle verbally, financially and, if they can, physically in order to liberate their homeland.

Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, leader of the London-based Al-Muhajiroun group.⁶⁹

The message of jihad was originally targeted against communism. The purpose was to ensure a continued supply of recruits for the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union. Madrasas and makeshift schools in refugee camps were a prime target of this propaganda war. Teams of preachers would turn up at madrasas soliciting support. The message was simple: all Muslims must perform the duty of holy war in whatever capacity they could. International patrons supplied arms and religious literature that flooded Pakistani madrasas.

Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pashtu, designed by the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska-Omaha under a USAID grant in the early 1980s. Written by American Afghanistan experts and anti-Soviet Afghan educators, they aimed at promoting jihadi values and militant training among Afghans.⁷⁰ USAID paid the University of Nebraska U.S.\$51 million from 1984 to 1994 to develop and design these textbooks, which were mostly printed in Pakistan. Over 13 million were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas “where students learnt basic math by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles”.⁷¹

After the war ended, these textbooks were still used in Afghan schools. Even the Taliban found them suitable. According to Tom Gouttierre, director of the Center for Afghan Studies in Omaha:

It really opened up the door to a monopoly of education by extremist elements functioning inside Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf that undermined the capability of more-moderate elements to create a credible education system...I’ve had Afghans say to me that education in a madrasa is worse than no education at all.⁷²

Traditionally, jihadi texts are not a part of the normal curricula of madrasas. Print material, in general, has always had a sectarian bias, signified by attacks on other Muslim sects and promotion of one’s own. Until the 1980s, verbal and written attacks on other

⁶⁶ A minuscule fringe Barelvi group, Sunni Tehreek, was allegedly involved in the killing of a prominent Deobandi scholar, Yusuf Ludhianvi, in Karachi in May 2000. Barelvi groups, as a matter of rule, are non-violent.

⁶⁷ ICG interview, April 2002.

⁶⁸ ICG interview, April 2002. Every religious, political and opinion leader interviewed by ICG concurred with this view.

⁶⁹ *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 29 December 2000.

⁷⁰ Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway, “The ABC’s of Jihad in Afghanistan”, *The Washington Post*, 23 March, 2002. Sec A, p. 1. After 11 September, the United States removed jihadi images and messages and reintroduced these books for Afghan schools that reopened in March 2002.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Peter Pritsch, “With Pakistan’s Schools in Tatters, Madrasa Spawns Young Warriors”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 October 2001.

religions were comparatively rare. Because of the orthodox clergy's aversion to communism, however, the jihadi message contained in the U.S. and Pakistani-sponsored literature was immediately accepted, and the concept of jihad dominated the curricula of some madrasas. Mosques, too, advocated jihad, and the call for holy war became a permanent feature of sermons.

Like the rest of the jihad enterprise, this propaganda component has developed a dynamic independent of its original patrons. Jihadi publications have gained a large readership in Pakistan and can even be considered an alternative print media. Every major madrasa has its own publication, as do jihadi political parties.

The Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad,⁷³ the parent body of Lashkar-e-Tayaba, claims that its monthly publication, the *Majallah al-Dawa* [has a circulation of 400,000, and the weekly print order of its *Jihad Times* is 200,000. *Zarb-i-Momin* of al-Rasheed Trust reportedly sells 250,000 copies a week. A new daily, *Islam*, was launched from Karachi and Islamabad on 18 September 2001, a week after the attacks in New York and Washington. It sold 60,000 copies daily across the country during the first weeks.⁷⁴ The jihadi

message is also available on audio and videotapes, though these have a limited audience outside their religious groupings.

Jihadi organisations openly persuade people to join or to send their children for training, mainly for the conflict in Kashmir. Graffiti, wall-posters and pamphlets carrying addresses and telephone numbers are still seen in all cities. "Jihad is the shortest route to Paradise", says one of many exhortations. "A martyr ensures salvation for the entire family" is a justification given by some families that support the jihad.⁷⁵ Every organisation engaged in promoting jihad, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, has a fund to help families of "martyrs". Although money is not the primary motivation of jihadis, it is essential to sustain the culture and organisation of jihad.

F. FINANCES

As long as the madrasa does not receive a regular income it will exist with the help of God. In case a regular income is found, as landed property, factories, trade or the promise of a rich gentleman, the grace of God will vanish...and there will be disputes among workers. An uncertain source of income is helpful...participation of the government and rich personalities damaging...Thanks be to God – the alms of righteous people is a permanent source of income.

Muhammad Qasim Nanotvi, founder of Darul Uloom Deoband.⁷⁶

Madrasas and mosques seek alms in cash and kind. They do it very efficiently – each year, they collect over 70 billion rupees (around U.S.\$1.1 billion) from resident Pakistanis. In comparison the *zakat* collected annually by the government is not more than 4.5 billion rupees (U.S.\$75 million) – only a tenth of which is meant for madrasas.⁷⁷ On the other hand, 94 per cent of charitable donations made by Pakistani individuals and corporations goes to religious institutions and causes, and 98 per cent of donors cite religion as their main motivation.⁷⁸

⁷³ An Ahle Hadith organisation, with its headquarters in Muridke, Punjab, the Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad was established by three university teachers in 1987. Lashkar-e-Tayaba, its militant subsidiary, operates in Kashmir.

⁷⁴ Zafarullah Khan, "Medieval Mindset, Modern Media", a research paper read at a media workshop organised by the Freidrich Naumann Stiftung, Islamabad, 28 November 2001. Khan lists four major jihadi outfits with media publications:

1. Lashkar-e-Tayaba publishes monthlies: *Voice of Islam* (English), *Al-Ribat* (Arabic), *Majallah al-Dawa* (Urdu), *Tayyibat* (Urdu; for women), *Zarb-e-Taiba* (Urdu; for young people). The *Jihad Times* is its bilingual weekly in Urdu and Sindhi. Its web-based radio, *al-Jihad* (Urdu/Arabic), is available at <http://www.markazdawa.org>

2. Harkat-ul-Mujahidin prints the monthly *Sada-e-Mujahid* and the weekly *al-Hilal* (Urdu). These publications are sent complementarily to the families of martyrs.

3. Jaish-e-Muhammad publishes a fortnightly in Urdu and English, and a monthly, *Binnat-e-Ayesha* (Urdu; for women). Jaish also offers electronic newsletter at its website <http://www.jaish-e-muhammad.org>.

4. Al-Rasheed Trust, a charity organisation, advocates a jihadi worldview through a daily, *Islam* (Urdu) and a weekly *Zarb-i-Momin* (Urdu/English). The contents of these publications support the Taliban, Jaish-e-Muhammad and, occasionally, the Lashkar-e-Tayaba.

⁷⁵ ICG interviews in Muridke, Punjab, and Abbotabad, NWFP.

⁷⁶ Translation by Jamal Malik, *op.cit.*, p. 137.

⁷⁷ ICG interview, April 2002.

⁷⁸ "Philanthropy in Pakistan: A Report of the Initiative on Indigenous Philanthropy", Aga Khan Development Network,

Most do not support the politics of religious parties but find Islamic education and preservation of Islam the most worthy choice for charity. This heavy reliance on philanthropy makes the clergy a dependent underclass in Pakistani society, not deemed fit for political representation or state power. Therefore, there is an apparent dichotomy between the political failure of the clergy and the public's generosity for religious causes. A recent report on philanthropy in Pakistan concluded: "Pakistanis [display] a curious lack of interest regarding the actual performance of an organisation when determining to whom they should give".⁷⁹ It said 56 per cent of *zakat* donors did not know or care how their money was used.

It is impossible to approximate the total income of the religious sector. Public alms are only one source. Income from *auqaf* lands, shops, shrines and business investments is unaccounted because no madrasa is audited or submits financial statements. The volume of direct foreign assistance, free books, food, clothes, etc., and contributions from charities is also a matter of speculation.

Orthodox and modern Muslims alike provide *sad'aqat* (voluntary alms, to ward off evil or have sins pardoned), skins of slaughtered animals and *fitrana* (*Eid* donations) to mosques and madrasa students to fulfil their religious duty. In the tribal areas and the Pashtun regions of Balochistan, madrasa students go door to door to collect food. Well-off households take it upon themselves to meet the needs of madrasas and their students. Funds, however modest, are also regularly raised at weekly and annual prayer congregations.

Zakat, according to Qur'anic injunctions, cannot be used for mosques or educational projects like madrasas.⁸⁰ Reliant on uncertain income, most madrasas are quite poor. Lack of state financial

aid, however, helps them retain administrative autonomy and independent character.

Reacting to the Musharraf government's declared intention to regulate madrasa finances, Mufti Muhammad Usman Yar Khan, the principal of Jamia Darul Khair, one of the largest JUI (Samiul Haq group) madrasas in Karachi, says:

If a person who has donated even a rupee to the madrasa questions us, I will open up my books to him. But the government has done nothing at all to facilitate the functioning of madrasas, nothing to help us. Why should it now come in and question us?⁸¹

Although most madrasas do not receive *zakat* or other government grants, it is wrong to assume that the government has not funded some.⁸² Zia's government ignored Islamic injunctions against using *zakat* money for mosque and education and its own *zakat* ordinance of June 1980 to extend selective financial help.⁸³ It initially identified 100 madrasas for *zakat* distribution, mostly Deobandis, including Darul Uloom Haqqaniya of Akora Khattak and JI madrasas in the NWFP, the main supporters of the Afghan jihad.⁸⁴

Government has also given land for selective new madrasas. Provincial and local *zakat* committees have continued this tradition of selective state financial patronage. Although these grants are only a fraction of the income of the larger madrasas, they are an incentive for creation of new ones (and also fake, such as the 'ghost schools' in the government sector). *Zakat* is therefore a tool of state patronage.

The state's sponsorship of jihad and jihadi culture promotes new money raising techniques as clergy and jihadi madrasas exploit the public's religiosity and reawakened zeal. Collection boxes, with jihadi slogans and invitations to share jihad's blessings, are in mosques and shops. Prominent industrial houses and traders contribute. In Karachi, for example, the Memon community of rich merchants and industrialists is one of the biggest financiers of

August 2000, sec. 4, p. 44. The report concludes, "the strong religious character of giving in Pakistan co-exists comfortably with different motives. Pakistanis attributed...all forms of giving to an almost equal combination of religious faith (98 per cent), human compassion (98 per cent), social responsibility (87 per cent) and civic duty (84 per cent).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ "The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah, and (for) the wayfarers". The Qur'an, 9:60 (Translation of Marmaduke Pickthal).

⁸¹ Interview with Tehmina Ahmed, *Newsline* (Karachi), January 2002), p. 43.

⁸² Officials estimated that only 36 per cent of the registered madrasas obtained government funds in 2001. Arshad Sharif, "Madrasa: Influence of Foreign Countries to be Contained", *Dawn*, 11 December 2001, p. 1.

⁸³ Malik, op. cit., p. 143.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

religious institutions and organisations.⁸⁵ This trend is visible throughout the country.

The biggest source of financing is external, from foreign states as well as private donors and Pakistani expatriates. Contacts in the Arab world are a matter of pride for the clergy. It is a mark of distinction if a scholar has spent time at a university in Saudi Arabia or Egypt's al-Azhar University. Ties are well established between individuals (*ulema* who frequent Arab countries) and at the organisational level. Madrasas may be wary of government aid but foreign funding – private or state – is a status symbol. Indigenous madrasas have thus become part of a global financing network. Private charities collect alms (including *zakat*) from overseas Pakistanis in the Gulf, Britain and North America where Pakistani religious parties and jihadi groups have loyal constituencies.

Arab-Afghan NGOs, which mushroomed during the Afghan jihad, are also major madrasa sponsors. Involvement of Arab governments – directly or through charities – is no secret. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Kuwait have been identified as some that fund Pakistani madrasas, although none will acknowledge providing direct financial assistance.⁸⁶ Pakistani intelligence agencies have, however, identified 120 madrasas that receive funds from foreign governments.⁸⁷ The actual number might be higher because money is also sent through unofficial channels, mainly the *hundi* system⁸⁸ or simply individual messengers carrying cash.

'UK-based charities' has become a euphemism for the financiers and supporters of Islamic groups

from Britain. Some also collect *zakat* for madrasas and their students.⁸⁹ Since the Afghan jihad years, the diversion of funds for educational and humanitarian projects to jihadi activities has been normal practice. It has, therefore, become difficult to separate finances for terror from those for charity. For example, the Lashkar-e-Tayaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed collect as much as £5 million (U.S.\$7.4 million) each year in British mosques in the name of Islam.⁹⁰ Although both groups are banned in Britain as well as Pakistan, the Kashmiri diaspora – around one million strong in Britain – continues to provide these donations.

Transferring these funds through either formal or informal channels is no problem since networks established during the jihad are still in place. A common mode of transfer is through commodities, including precious metals, jewellery and gems, instead of currency transactions.

The fall of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1990 exposed the complicated nature of financing mechanisms devised in part to aid Afghan guerrillas. The aftershocks of the BCCI collapse are still felt in Pakistan.⁹¹ The bank's methods of money laundering, influencing state policies, and diverting funds to religious enterprises have survived. However, the money trails are more informal now, making them harder to trace.

A selective section of the *ulema* have gained wealth and their madrasas have flourished due to foreign connections and state patronage. Since their religious orientation meshes with an anti-India, anti-Hindu bias, they are staunch supporters of the military's domestic and foreign policies. The experience of the four civil governments preceding Musharraf's takeover illustrates the nexus between an overgrown institution and its religious allies even when the military does not control the state directly.

⁸⁵ ICG interview with Sattar, op. cit.

⁸⁶ Arshad Sharif, op. cit.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ In this system, known also as '*hawala*' in South Asia and the Middle East, and '*fei qian*' in China, money is not transferred through physical or electronic means. Moneychangers, or hawaladars, receive cash in one country and their counterparts in another country dispense an identical amount (deducting minimal fees and commissions) to a recipient or to a bank account. Letters or paper '*chits*' or even emails are used to convey the necessary information (the amount of money, the date it has to be paid, etc.) between hawaladars. It is estimated that U.S.\$2 billion to U.S.\$5 billion move through the *hawala* system annually in Pakistan and Afghanistan, more than the total of foreign transfers through the banking system.

⁸⁹ See, for example, <http://www.ukiew.org/zakat.html>. This charity is one of five supported by pop singer Yusuf Islam, formerly Cat Stevens. It justifies use of *zakat* money for madrasas but Yusuf Islam's official web site condemns acts of terrorism and violence in the name of Islam (see, <http://www.yusufislam.org.uk>).

⁹⁰ Shrabani Basu, "Kashmir's hidden war chest in Britain", *The Telegraph* (Calcutta), 10 June 2002, p. 1.

⁹¹ Paul Watson, "Millions in Royal Debt Has Pakistan in Predicament", *Los Angeles Times*, 28 April 2002, sec. A, p. 5. Also see http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci.

IV. MADRASAS UNDER CIVILIAN RULE

For the Bush administration, the military is the only Pakistani institution capable of delivering a decisive blow to militancy and international terrorism. Its participation in the war against terrorism is also seen as a departure from past Pakistani policies of supporting the jihad. The military government's decision to side with the U.S., however, represents continuity, not change.

Since the early 1950s, the Pakistani military has sided with the U.S. not because of a commonality of outlook and goals but to attain or retain power. Using U.S. approval and support to undermine its political opposition, the military has manipulated the political process and undermined democratic civilian institutions. After 11 September 2001, the U.S. has also been willing to condone the military's continued dominance because of a perception that the political elite is either too weak or unwilling to take on the militants and the religious right. The records of the four elected governments that preceded Musharraf, however, tell a different story.

A. MILITANCY AND BENAZIR BHUTTO

In 1988, the military handed power to civilians after a decade of direct rule. Until the re-imposition of military rule in 1999, none of four elected governments was allowed to complete its term, and each change took place through overt or covert military intervention. The military's control over foreign and defence policies was decisive, overt and often independent of civil authority.⁹²

Kashmir, the nuclear program, Afghanistan and all other matters of strategic importance were kept away from the civilian authorities. In line with the military's internal and external preferences, jihad was promoted in India and Afghanistan. Militants were also strengthened within Pakistan against the military's perceived opponents.

Despite the curbs on their functioning, civilian governments did try to contain the power of the

mullahs and to reform religious education. This was motivated by concerns about the threats posed to national security by increasingly assertive jihadi movements.

The proliferation of madrasas continued in the 1990s. More seminaries and mosques opened, producing thousands of graduates in religious studies. The end of the Afghan jihad and the return of Pakistani jihadis added to the strength of extremists. When the Afghan jihad degenerated into civil war, disillusioned Afghan and non-Afghan fighters also came to Pakistan looking for another cause. The Kashmir insurgency was one. Other countries with large Muslim minorities also proved fertile grounds for an international jihad. As a result, Pakistani jihadi parties became even more active and numerous, promoting local and regional militant movements.

Their biggest triumph was the ascendancy of the Taliban. Both factions of the JUI were instrumental in raising the force of young fighters, led by former jihadi commanders, and mobilising them to end the era of warlords in Afghanistan. Having played second fiddle to the JI during the jihad of the 1980s, the JUI and its madrasas had gained access to power both by allying with the ruling Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and establishing links with Inter-Services Intelligence and the Interior Ministry.⁹³ Aided by the Pakistani military, the Taliban took over most of Afghanistan. Their victory further fuelled Sunni extremism and stoked ambitions of turning Pakistan into a Sunni state.

As the Sunni right took on its Shia adversaries, and sectarian strife spun out of control, the Benazir Bhutto⁹⁴ government tried to control the madrasas.

⁹³ For the full story of the rise of the Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, *op. cit.*

⁹⁴ The daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir was born in June 1953 in Karachi. She studied at the Jesus and Mary Convent, Karachi, and then graduated in 1973 with a degree in political science from Harvard University's Radcliffe College. She went to Oxford, England, for graduate studies in philosophy, politics and economics (PPE). After her father was ousted, she returned to Pakistan, spending five years in prison, and was exiled in 1984. Bhutto returned to Pakistan in 1986 to lead her father's party and became the first female prime minister of a Muslim country in 1988. Her first tenure ended after eighteen months when she was removed in August 1990 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, at the military's request and on charges of corruption. Bhutto reclaimed her office in the 1993 elections and served three years before being ousted in a similar fashion in 1996 and going into exile. She lives in London and Dubai.

⁹² Masood Haider, "Army Kept PM in Dark", *Dawn*, Karachi, 14 May 2002, p. 1.

Her authority, however, was restricted as the military continued to seek 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and to 'bleed India in Kashmir'. The ISI carried on its jihadi mission, brooking no civilian interference. "The Foreign Office and the ISI never saw eye to eye," says Hameed Gul, an ex-chief of the intelligence agency.⁹⁵

Benazir Bhutto banned entry of Arab students and made it compulsory for all foreign students and their madrasas to obtain a "No Objection Certificate" (NOCs are issued by the foreign ministry after police and intelligence agencies investigate the credentials and character of applicants). Provincial *zakat* committees were instructed to end funding to madrasas without proper scrutiny. The government also approached foreign governments responsible for funding Pakistani sectarian institutions.⁹⁶

All four provinces were asked to submit reports on the functioning of madrasas with the intention of curbing their autonomy and stemming sectarianism. The government's initial research on a regulatory madrasa law revealed the existence of 746 extremist madrasas in Punjab alone.⁹⁷ Pledging to reform the madrasa sector, PPP interior minister Naseerullah Babar disclosed the government's intention to introduce compulsory audits, new curricula, and registration.⁹⁸ None of this happened.

The Bhutto government's intention to curb extremist madrasas was strongly opposed by the religious parties. Its authority was violently challenged by the Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariah Mohammadi (TNSM) in Malakand Division of the NWFP. Closely linked to the Taliban, the TNSM threatened to impose Taliban-style order in the areas it controlled. The government retreated and nothing could be done before Bhutto was again dismissed in September 1996 by a military-backed president.

⁹⁵ Mubashir Zaidi, "The loss of strategic depth can be attributed to the unholy shadow of the Foreign Office – former ISI chief, Hameed Gul", *Herald*, December 2001, p. 48.

⁹⁶ Nasir Malik, "Financial Squeeze to Discipline Madrasa", *Dawn*, Karachi, 23 January 1995, p. 1.

⁹⁷ "746 Punjab Madrasas Involved in Sectarian Activities", *The News*, Islamabad, 7 March 1995, p. 1.

⁹⁸ "Law to Check Working of Religious Schools Soon", *The News*, Islamabad, 2 January 1995, p. 12.

B. SECTARIAN CONFLICT AND NAWAZ SHARIF

Unlike Bhutto, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Nawaz Sharif⁹⁹ was aligned with the military, sharing its perceptions and policies toward Afghanistan and Kashmir. Yet the Sharif administration vowed to weed out sectarianism, echoing the concerns expressed by the Bhutto government. With strong support in the Punjab, Sharif took some tough actions against religious extremists in his home province. Like Musharraf, Sharif was also willing to side with the U.S. against the militants. After his Washington tour in July 1999, Sharif's anti-militancy policy became even more pronounced and effective.

"Nawaz Sharif was worse than Benazir", said an official of the JUI, "because he was rattled by the advance of the Islamic parties and tried to subdue them".¹⁰⁰ While the religious right accuses Sharif of hounding madrasa personnel in the name of sectarianism, a former Punjab police officer describes the government's campaign against sectarian extremists as "criminal-specific". "If they were in any way related to madrasas, we did not let it deter us. Sharif was in fact planning to extend the scope of special anti-terrorist courts to Punjab also".¹⁰¹ Terrorists wanted by police and illegal foreign students were special targets of the anti-militancy drive. In January 1999, Sharif narrowly survived an assassination attempt, reportedly by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, an extremist Sunni group.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Born in 1949, Nawaz Sharif has a law degree from the University of Punjab. A protégé of General Zia-ul-Haq, Sharif became the chief minister of Pakistan's biggest province, Punjab, in 1985. He led the anti-PPP Islamic Democratic Alliance (II) in 1988 and retained power in the province when the PPP government was installed at the centre. Heading the Pakistan Muslim League, he became prime minister in 1990 but could not complete his term. He was sacked on charges of corruption by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1993, with overt military backing. Sharif returned to power in 1997 with a two-thirds majority in parliament. Two and a half years later, on 12 October 1999, he was overthrown in a bloodless coup by General Musharraf. After his conviction and jailing for the attempted hijacking of Musharraf's plane, he was released from prison and sent into exile in Saudi Arabia where he remains as a guest of the royal family.

¹⁰⁰ ICG interviews at Akora Khattak, March 2002.

¹⁰¹ ICG interview.

¹⁰² This group splintered from Sipah Sahaba Pakistan, the anti-Shia sectarian party, to avenge the murder of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi by Shia terrorists. The more radical of the two Sunni groups, LeJ was led by Riaz Basra, Pakistan's most wanted

“Drunk with power Nawaz Sharif forgot everything and making sectarian killings an excuse he tried to lay hands on persons of whom all Muslims...are proud of and whose presence is a great blessing for Pakistan”, Masood Azhar, leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, wrote in his message of congratulation to his followers after the October 1999 coup.¹⁰³

Sharif's anti-extremist operations, however, had limited success. “Most of them [militant madrasas] are located either in the NWFP or Azad Kashmir, with only a few in the Punjab. The [Sharif] government is well aware of this but has not taken any action because of political expediencies”, an official claimed.¹⁰⁴ In October 1999, political expediency led to Sharif's ouster by Musharraf.

Despite its brevity, Pakistan's democratic transition revealed that the size of the madrasa sector and the number of students do not translate into popular support. In the 1997 general elections, the JUI of Fazlur Rahman was the only religious party to win seats (two) in the 217-member National Assembly. Although mainstream political parties have accommodated religious parties and their leaders in electoral alliances, the Pakistani religious right has thus far failed to gain public support on its own.

This lack of political support is as consistent a feature of Pakistan's electoral politics as the forced removal of popularly elected governments. Ostensibly, General Musharraf sacked Nawaz Sharif for interfering in military matters of promotion and transfers. However, the signs of a thaw in Pakistan-India ties after Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Lahore in February 1999 and Musharraf's failed Kargil operation in Kashmir contributed directly to Sharif's fall. From May to July 1999, India and Pakistan fought a limited war after the Pakistan military and Pakistan-backed militants infiltrated across the Line of Control into the Kargil sector of Kashmir. When the battle turned against Pakistan, the Sharif government became the casualty since the military

attempted to divert domestic attention to the many failures of the political leadership.

Civilian governments in Pakistan have, however, had very little control over aspects of domestic and regional policy that the military considers its domain. Only when its policies undermine its institutional interests and domestic stability, such as support for militant movements did after 11 September 2001, does the military reverse course, blaming previous allies for all sins of omission and commission. Musharraf's government is no different. The general has himself raised the stakes by openly blaming religious parties for Pakistan's crisis. His government's actions, however, reveal a piecemeal, tentative and ad hoc approach to a complex problem.

Sunni terrorist who was killed by police in a staged 'encounter' in May 2002, five months after his arrest. The group is likely to become dysfunctional after his death.

¹⁰³ <http://www.dalitstan.org/mughalstan/mujahid/azhar005.html>.

¹⁰⁴ Nasir Jamal, “Madrasas: Who Control What They Teach”, *Dawn*, 31 December 1996, sec. National, p.13.

V. THE MUSHARRAF PLAN

The tyrannical rule of Nawaz Sharif has reached its natural conclusion. The honourable armed forces of Pakistan have taken a necessary step at an extremely critical time and saved the country from a grave disaster.

Masood Azhar, leader of Jaish-e-Mohammad, from an Indian jail welcoming the 12 October 1999 coup.

I didn't mention many world leaders in my State of the Union (address). But I mentioned President Musharraf for a reason ... I'm proud to call him friend.

President George Bush, at a press conference with General Musharraf in Washington, 14 February 2002.

One of General Musharraf's stated objectives when he assumed power on 12 October 1999 was to stop exploitation of religion and the violence associated with it. Pressure from the U.S. after 11 September and UN Security Council's resolution 1373 gave impetus to his pledge to deal decisively with extremists in Pakistan.

Musharraf's government has, however, relied mostly on cosmetic measures to advance its stated goal to crack down on militants and reform madrasas. Since international pressure rather than a desire for change has shifted its stance, the government remains reluctant to initiate fundamental changes in the very policies it promoted that have spawned militancy.

Pakistan was one of only three countries to have recognised the Taliban government before 11 September 2001,¹⁰⁵ and it withdrew its support only after the Taliban were conclusively defeated. The government is not deterred from acting against the militants because of the threat of a domestic backlash. In fact, events after 11 September underscore the lack of popular support for extremist political parties and jihadi groups and the extent of their dependence on the military.

Madrasa street power soon evaporated after the military government's turnabout on the Taliban. As demonstrations fizzled, the jihadis retreated. However, despite an upper hand and unfettered executive powers, the Musharraf government has failed to take decisive action against the militant groups or to reform the madrasa system.

Musharraf's counter-militancy steps and declared intent to end extremism through madrasa reform are at best tactics to ward off international pressure, appease the U.S., and keep power with U.S. acquiescence. The military's Kashmir policy is mainly unchanged. Although Indian military pressure and international diplomacy forced the government to announce a halt in cross-border infiltration, this is a tactic, not a permanent change in Kashmir policy or the military's ties with the jihadis. As the military's domestic legitimacy declines, Musharraf's main objective is regime survival, not creation of a democratic, tolerant culture by eliminating extremism.¹⁰⁶

In fact, there are many similarities between the regime survival strategies of Generals Zia and Musharraf. Zia aligned himself with the U.S. in the Soviet-Afghan war and used U.S. support to retain power. Musharraf cooperates with the U.S. in the war on terrorism. Assured of U.S. support, he gave himself an extension as the chief of army staff on 6 October 2001. Abandoning pledges of restoring democracy, he has also publicly announced his intention to retain power past the three-year deadline set by the Supreme Court.

Following the examples of Ayub and Zia, Musharraf held and won a rigged referendum on 30 April 2002, extending his presidential tenure for five years. A report of the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan states:

The vast majority of voters fell in the category of 'captive voters' – prisoners (voting inside

¹⁰⁵ Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the others.

¹⁰⁶ According to Musharraf's proposed constitutional amendments, the president will have the authority to appoint and dismiss a prime minister and his cabinet, dissolve the National Assembly, appoint state governors who will have the power to appoint and dismiss state chief ministers, their cabinets and legislature on the advice of the president. These powers override the federal, parliamentary form of government provided in the original constitution of 1973. See "Proposals of the Government of Pakistan on the Establishment of Sustainable Federal Democracy, Package-I", *Dawn*, 26 June 2002, sec. Supplement.

prisons was claimed to be 100 per cent), state and local bodies employees, factory workers (who were driven to the polling booths located within the factory premises in controlled batches). Voluntary turnout was very low.¹⁰⁷

More concerned about continued Pakistani military cooperation, the U.S. tacitly approved the referendum, calling it 'an internal matter' to be decided by Pakistani courts.¹⁰⁸

Like Zia, Musharraf is also bent on distorting the process to make it easier for the military to manipulate and control the elected government after the October 2002 election. Sardar Yousuf Leghari, president of the Sindh Democratic Front, a nationalist political party, says that:

Musharraf will keep power as president but transfer responsibility to the elected representatives. Already, changes in the constitution and the election system have ensured that any future civilian government would remain subservient to the military and the president.¹⁰⁹

Musharraf thus intends to consolidate his internal standing through political manipulation and to gain international acceptance for continued military rule by pledging to eliminate religious extremism. So far, Musharraf has succeeded in gaining international, particularly U.S., support without changing his government's policies, more specifically its policies toward religious extremism.

A. DEALING WITH THE JIHADIS

This dichotomy in the government's intentions and its policies is most evident in its approach toward jihadis and jihadi madrasas. Musharraf has banned eight militant groups, including some active in Kashmir, frozen their accounts and arrested thousands of activists.¹¹⁰ The government

has supported U.S.-led Coalition forces in their military operations inside Afghanistan. Since May 2002, the Pakistani military has even taken the lead in hunting down al-Qaeda and Taliban personnel on Pakistani territory, in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and elsewhere in Pakistan.

The interior minister, General Moinuddin Haider, says the most militant sectarian groups, Sipah Sahaba and Sipah Mohammed (SM), have 285 schools, "obviously they'll be teaching their *maslak* (sect) ... we'll be looking at them very seriously ... enough is enough".¹¹¹ This is an understatement. Previous governments had identified more than 700 militant madrasas in Punjab alone and more than 120 schools in the NWFP.¹¹² More importantly, instead of taking on the jihadi madrasas, the government has looked the other way and facilitated pro-Taliban jihadis even after 11 September.

Pakistani paramilitary and police turned a blind eye to the hordes of volunteers crossing the Afghan border to fight alongside the Taliban. In the last week of October 2002, Sufi Mohammad, the leader of the TNSM (now banned), crossed with 10,000 volunteers, including madrasa students, for the jihad against America. There is no evidence that the Musharraf government tried to restrain the TNSM or prevent its jihadis from crossing the border. "They should go to Afghanistan rather than disrupting civil life here", stated an official of the NWFP province.¹¹³

A large proportion of the 10,000 people who went for the jihad against America in Afghanistan were killed. A lawyer filed a constitutional petition in the Lahore High Court, bringing treason charges against Sufi Mohammed for misleading his followers and getting them killed. The petitioners informed the court that over 5,000 of TNSM warriors had died fighting for the Taliban.¹¹⁴ A TNSM spokesman had admitted that around 3,000 fighters had gone missing.¹¹⁵ Many thousand are still in Afghan prisons or are being held by warlords for ransom. The families of some of the

Tehreek-e-Fiqhe Jafaria; vii) Sipah Mohammed; and viii) Harkatul Mujahiddin.

¹¹¹ Tehmina Ahmed, Interview with Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider, *Newsline* (Karachi), January 2002, p. 41.

¹¹² "746 Punjab Madrasas Involved in Sectarian Activities", *The News*, Islamabad, 7 March 1995, p. 1.

¹¹³ ICG interviews with officials, March 2002.

¹¹⁴ Staff Reporter, "LHC Admits Plea Against TNSM Chief," *Dawn*, 17 January 2002, sec. National, p. 6.

¹¹⁵ Bureau Report, "300 TNSM Men Taken Prisoner" *Dawn*, 28 November 2002, sec. National, p. 6.

¹⁰⁷ Interim Report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan on Referendum, 1 May 2002.

¹⁰⁸ Masood Haider, "U.S. stance on referendum vague", *Dawn*, 7 April 2002, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ ICG interview, April 2002.

¹¹⁰ The banned groups are: i) Jaish-e-Mohammed; ii) Sipah Sahaba Pakistan; iii) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; iv) Lashkar-e-Tayaba; v) Tehreek-e-Nifaze Shariat-e-Mohammadi; vi)

young men whom the TNSM had persuaded to fight the jihad in Afghanistan staged protests and demanded action against Sufi Mohammad. Only then was the TNSM leader arrested and imprisoned on his return for crossing the border without proper documents and possession of illegal arms. Many believe he deliberately courted arrest to avoid the backlash of the tribesmen. Under public pressure, a tribal jirga in Kurram Agency, NWFP, recommended imprisonment, and he has been sentenced to seven years in jail.¹¹⁶

The most visible closures of madrasas also took place in the NWFP. On 15 January 2002, three days after Musharraf banned some militant groups and the police sealed their offices, all madrasas belonging to them were shut voluntarily in Mardan district by madrasa administrators themselves. But the madrasas reopened soon after because most students had nowhere to go.

Like closure of these madrasas, most arrests of banned jihadi groups' activists also proved temporary. Leaders including Hafiz Saeed of LeT and Azhar Masood of Jaish were placed under house arrest or even re-imprisoned but without serious criminal charges. Jihadi madrasas continue to function, albeit in low-key. Although their public visibility was reduced, few jihadis face criminal cases. Most charges are limited to the minor offense of disturbing public order.

The half-hearted manner in which the government has apprehended sectarian and jihadi activists explains the lack of a violent response. In the Punjab, for example, where most arrests have been made, instead of pursuing cases of terrorism or initiating criminal charges under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997, the government detained extremists preventively only for three months.¹¹⁷ Most were released after giving the law-enforcing agencies assurances of good behaviour and announcing their dissociation from the banned groups.

The government has also frozen banks accounts of more than 50 organizations suspected of links with sectarianism or international terrorism. As details of the accounts reveal, this action is also cosmetic. The Jaish's frozen account had 900

rupees (approximately U.S.\$15); two accounts of the Harkatul Mujahiddin contained around 5,000 rupees.¹¹⁸ Although some larger seizures have also been made, the freezing of accounts is unlikely to dent the financial health of these groups.

Officials interviewed by ICG were not certain when the anti-terrorism recommendations of the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)¹¹⁹ would be fully incorporated in banking laws.¹²⁰ Nor are there any signs that the government intends to put in place a new legal framework to conform to the FATF recommendations as it has pledged in connection with UN resolution 1373. "Pakistan has ratified or acceded to nine of the twelve UN [anti-terrorism] conventions. Full ratification of all of them will take time as an inter-ministerial committee is reviewing the recommendations", says an official.¹²¹

There is yet another explanation for why extremist groups have not seriously resisted the government decision to ban them and their activities. The general impression is that they have gone 'underground'. Tahir Butt, a former LeT worker, however, denies this: "We are fighting the battle of Pakistan. We cannot have any differences with the army. We'll do as it says". Others say the mounting confrontation with India requires unity with the army. "Musharraf

¹¹⁸ Rauf Klasra, "Government seizes 50 Afghan bank accounts", *The News*, 1 January 2002, p. 1.

¹¹⁹ The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is an intergovernmental body founded at the G7 meeting in Paris in 1989 to monitor the implementation of measures against money laundering. FATF is made up of 29 member countries and governments and two regional organisations – the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Commission.

¹²⁰ The FATF Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing (issued 31 October 2001) are:

1. Ratification and implementation of UN instruments;
2. Criminalising the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering;
3. Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets;
4. Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism;
5. Increasing international co-operation;
6. Regulating alternative remittance systems;
7. Disclosing wire transfer details; and
8. Regulating non-profit organisations.

More details can be found at:
www1.oecd.org/fatf/SrecsTF_en.htm.

¹²¹ ICG interview, June 2002.

¹¹⁶ "Mixed reaction to TNSM chief's sentence", *Dawn*, 23 April 2002, sec. National, p. 17.

¹¹⁷ ICG interviews with police officials.

is America's man, but he is an individual. People and the army are one", says Abdul Malik of JI.¹²²

Predictably, the clergy wholeheartedly supports the government's India policy. In June 2002, the Muttahida Mahaz-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of all major religious parties, staged rallies against India and backed Musharraf's defence policies, reaffirming the decades old principal-agent relationship between the military and the clergy.

This also explains why non-Pakistani madrasa students and jihadis have been the prime target of the government's anti-militancy efforts.

B. FOREIGNERS IN MADRASAS

The Musharraf government's cooperation in the war on terror is most conspicuous and effective in its joint operations with the FBI and CIA against the foreign militants in Pakistan. High-profile cases, such as the arrest of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubayda, and military raids in the tribal areas are indicators of this trend. A ministry of defence official, who has been part of the joint Pakistan-U.S. anti-terror investigation teams, says that, "nine out of every ten suspects arrested in Pakistan or handed over to the United States are Arabs or Afghans".¹²³

Action against suspect charities and relief organizations has focused on Gulf-based entities. The Kuwait-funded NGO, Lajnat Al-Dawa Al-Islamiah, the Qatar-based relief organisation, Qatar Charity Association, and the Saudi-based Islamic Relief Agency are the three prominent education and development NGOs that have faced joint police action by FBI and Pakistani agencies. These operations remain Arab-specific.¹²⁴

The Afghan Support Committee (ASC), an umbrella group of relief organisations, says that many of its affiliates have been forced to abandon their offices and stop relief work. "Arab NGOs may possibly close down seminaries and other projects

in Pakistan", an official said.¹²⁵ Most of these organisations date back to the Soviet-Afghan war.

Pakistan has been host to thousands of foreign jihadis since the 1980s. In most cases, their home countries were not willing to take them back, and these jihadis feared persecution if they returned to countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria. Those who did not participate in the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal moved to Pakistan. Jihadi madrasas provided them sanctuary and the Pakistan military other jihadis to fight. These foreign jihadis also fought alongside the Taliban. Hence the inflow of Arabs continued even during the 1990s.

Some officials estimate that there are 35,000 foreign students in Pakistani seminaries or working with Islamic charities or NGOs.¹²⁶ Half are Arabs, 16,000 are Afghans and the rest come from Central Asia, Burma, Bangladesh and elsewhere. As government policy under General Zia, Afghan students were allowed free movement. Many gravitated to large madrasas in a number of cities including Karachi, Islamabad, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Quetta and Peshawar. Others remained closer to home, joining the madrasas in the tribal areas. Foreign students are mostly at madrasas run by Arab NGOs, Ahle Hadith/Wahhabi seminaries, in the Rabita schools run by the JI, or at other institutions like the International Islamic University in Islamabad.

The Arabs differ from Pakistani and Afghan jihadis in many respects. They do not mingle well with locals, not least because of the language barrier. They have an affinity for the more rigid and radical Ahle Hadith and Deobandi sects and strongly reject local cultural variations of Sunni and Shia Islam. Compared to Pakistani and Afghan counterparts, Arab jihadis are usually from well-off families and thus become a source of funding for their Pakistani hosts. They also help their Pakistani patrons network with likeminded individuals and groups in the Middle East.

During the free-for-all jihad in Afghanistan of the 1980s, no restrictions were placed on the entry of foreign jihadis into Pakistan. On the contrary, they were encouraged to join the holy war. Documentation and registration were lax, if not non-existent. The Musharraf government has ordered that no madrasa should accept new foreigners unless they have a

¹²² ICG interviews in Muridke, March 2002.

¹²³ ICG interview.

¹²⁴ Zulfiqar Ali, "Madaris raided, record seized: CID, FBI operation in Peshawar", *Dawn*, 22 June 2002, sec. National, p. 22.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Masood Haider, "Pakistan to expel Arab, Afghan students", *Dawn*, 8 March 2002, p. 1.

permission certificate from their own countries and are properly registered with the interior ministry.

In March 2002, the government identified 300 foreigners for expulsion from Pakistan and said another 7,000 were under scrutiny.¹²⁷ It is not known, however, how many have actually been sent back to their countries or handed over to the U.S. for terrorism investigation. What is known is that hundreds voluntarily left madrasas when a crack down became imminent.

Soon after an FBI team arrested Abu Zubayda in April 2002 in Faisalabad, an industrial town in the Punjab, “students from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Thailand, and other countries either shifted to rented houses ... or returned to their respective countries”.¹²⁸ The administrator of an Ahle-Hadith seminary in Faisalabad said that they had left to prevent the police and FBI from harassing the madrasas and not because they were linked to any terrorist group or activity.¹²⁹

The government seems to exercise more control and leverage over homegrown militant groups than those run by Arabs or Afghans. There has been no significant backlash from banned Kashmiri groups about the curbs on cross border militancy imposed by the government. Cross-border infiltration into Kashmir, which has triggered a dangerous military standoff with India, appears to have been considerably reduced – at least for a time – because of international pressure and the danger of war with India. Non-Pakistani groups, whose members have scattered across the country after the Taliban’s fall, however, remain a threat.

These groups do not have the same nexus with the Pakistani military and its policies as the local jihadis. The government has, therefore, taken on the foreigners more forcefully and with tangible results. Pakistani religious groups are unwilling to challenge the government, continue to support the military’s nationalistic policies, and remain dependent on its patronage. Even if they resent Musharraf’s pro-U.S. stance, they, unlike the

foreign jihadis, are unlikely to take on the government.

Action against the foreigners is being orchestrated by the intelligence agencies, mainly the ISI. This explains why the ministries of education and religious affairs are leery of dealing with religious militancy question in the madrasa debate.

C. MODEL MADRASAS

The government is carrying forward the process started by the 1979 [Halepota] committee to raise the standard of madrasa education. We are not undermining madrasas but working to improve their condition and status.

Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the minister for religious affairs, at a press conference on 20 June 2002.

Curricula and regulatory reforms are as much a test of government intention to contain militancy as actions against sectarian and jihadi terrorists. Government strategy for madrasa reform rests on creating model institutions with standard curriculum, a model it hopes all will follow.

In December 1999, the military government’s supreme decision-making body, the National Security Council, formed a working group “to suggest ways and means to improve the existing madrasas and to secure fuller coordination among the madrasas and the national education system without affecting the autonomy of madrasas”.¹³⁰

Based on the recommendations of this working group, on 21 March 2001, the cabinet decided to set up one model madrasa each in Karachi, Sukkur and Islamabad. On 18 August 2001, an ordinance was issued to establish a Pakistan Madrasa Education Board (PMEB), for these model religious schools, with a grant of 30 million rupees (U.S.\$500,000).¹³¹

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ “Foreigners leave madaris’ hostels”, *Dawn*, 8 April 2002, sec. National, p. 18.

¹²⁹ ICG interview.

¹³⁰ Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, “Education Sector Reform: Action Plan 2001-2004”, 1 January 2002.

¹³¹ The board consists of the secretaries of the ministry of education and ministry of religious affairs; the chairman of the University Grants Commission; two ulema who are or have been members of the Council of Islamic Ideology (to be nominated by the chairman); the director general of the Dawa Academy of the International Islamic University, Islamabad; a

The centerpiece of the reform plan, the PMEB will eventually have four provincial chapters.

“Admission to the model madrasas will not be on sectarian grounds, nor will the teachers and the administration belong to one school of thought”, says Dr Ghazi, the minister for religious affairs. “We will present them as an example for the other madrasas to follow”. The minister, formerly a teacher at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, describes his university as a ‘reformed, modern madrasa’ which can serve as such a model. “I have inaugurated hundreds of new madrasas since becoming minister in many cities of the country, and all of them are forward-looking and well-equipped for the teaching of modern subjects”, he says.¹³²

On 3 November 2001, the PMEB finalised a curriculum for the model madrasas, which will also be prescribed to the rest of the sector. Madrasa unions (*wafaqs*) will be asked to affiliate with the PMEB. In addition to normal Islamic courses, the new scheme will introduce English, mathematics, social studies, and elementary science from the primary to the secondary levels. Computer science, economics, political science, law, and Pakistan studies will be integrated within madrasa education at the intermediate and higher levels. The policy is based on the assumption that the traditional sector will willingly change to move in step with the modern world.

Leaving nothing to chance, the government is also offering incentives, devising a formula to grant university status to “renowned and selected” madrasas that will be authorized to conduct examination and issue degrees and certificates.¹³³

Initially, the madrasa *wafaqs* treated the proposed measures with indifference or hostility. “Musharraf must learn from what happened to Ayub Khan, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. All of them tried to undermine religious education under western influence and met divine punishment”, said Irfan-ul-Haq Haqqani, a

nephew of Samiul Haq, who teaches at Akora Khattak.¹³⁴ The warnings were backed by threatened protests. Madrasa administrators set up a united front to prevent the government from transgressing on madrasa autonomy.

The government initiated a dialogue with the *ulema*. After a series of meetings, on 27 March 2002, the representatives of madrasa *wafaqs* agreed to introduce the proposed courses. “But we’ll develop our textbooks and syllabus and will not follow the government prescription blindly. Secular and atheistic views cannot enter the madrasa”, said Abdul Malik of the JI, who is also president of the *ulema*’s united front.¹³⁵

For the clergy, the government’s model madrasa project is a showpiece with little relevance to, or impact on, traditional education. The *ulema* point out that some modern subjects are already part of the madrasa curricula. All madrasas that have the capability or resources teach a modern syllabus to varying extents. “We are not averse to modern education”, Irfanul Haq Haqqani said, pointing to the computer section at Akora Khattak, “but ‘real modern knowledge’ cannot override divine knowledge”.¹³⁶ The government agrees. In fact, the model madrasa plan does not alter the balance of studies towards formal education.

The real source of discord between government and clergy is over direct official intervention in more tangible matters such as registration, finances and curriculum. In response, the government tries to walk a fine line, hoping to assuage international pressure and mollify madrasa administrators who are loath to compromise their autonomy.

D. NEW MADRASA LAW?

On 19 June 2002, the Musharraf government proposed another ordinance and issued it for public debate.¹³⁷ Its title – the Deeni Madaris (Voluntary

professor who is also the head of the department of Islamic studies in a university; provincial education secretaries of all the four provinces; a president or Nazim of a madrasa *wafaq*; the president of the Tanzim al-Madaris; and the Nazim of the Rabita al-Madaris.

¹³² ICG interview, April 2002.

¹³³ Ministry of education report, 2002, op. cit.

¹³⁴ ICG interview, March 2002.

¹³⁵ ICG interview, April 2002.

¹³⁶ ICG interview.

¹³⁷ Under Article 89 (Clause-1) of Pakistan’s constitution, laws are enacted by parliament’s approval. In the absence of a parliament, or when neither of the two chambers of parliament is in session, the president can issue ordinances which are valid for 120 days and attain the status of a law (or become an act) only after parliament’s approval. An ordinance lapses after 120 days unless it is re-promulgated by

Registration and Regulation) Ordinance 2002 – sums up its half-hearted approach, aimed both at satisfying the clergy and meeting international demands and its promises to the UN.¹³⁸ The text makes evident that the ordinance's prescriptions are not compulsory.

Negotiations with the *ulema* on this proposed ordinance have remained stalled for months. There are two points of contention: mandatory registration and official financial scrutiny. No madrasa is willing to open its books to public officials. Nor are they willing to comply with regulations and restrictions on their activities.¹³⁹ The draft of the ordinance has moved from one ministry to another, bogged down by the clergy's intransigence and Musharraf's reluctance to confront the *ulema*. As a result, the 19 June 2002 ordinance has been diluted and could be diluted even further.

Under the ordinance, no new madrasa would be set up without permission of the relevant district authorities. Existing madrasas should register on a voluntary basis with their respective chapters of the PMEB within six months after the ordinance becomes enters into force – a process that is likely to take many more months. The proposed ordinance also 'bans' preaching sectarian hatred and militancy at madrasas. Madrasa administrators will have to give an undertaking in this regard.¹⁴⁰ Madrasas that do not comply will not be eligible for *zakat*, grants or any other government donation. They may also face as yet unknown punitive measures.

the president or approved by parliament. The madrasa ordinance has been approved by the cabinet, but the president has yet to promulgate it. Because there is no parliament in Pakistan, the ordinance becoming a law is still a distant prospect. The ordinance setting up the Pakistan Madrasa Education Board is in force, however, after being promulgated by the president.

¹³⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1373 was adopted on 28 September 2001. It reaffirms UNSC resolutions 1269 and 1368 against terrorism, financing of terrorism and any activity related to or facilitating terrorist organisations. Pakistan, in its report submitted in December 2001 to the counter-terrorism committee set up under this resolution, pledged to reform the madrasa system as one of the steps it is taking to curb terrorism.

¹³⁹ ICG interviews, April 2002.

¹⁴⁰ Laws in this regard already exist in Pakistan. Section 153-A of the Pakistan Penal Code of 1860 explicitly criminalises incitement to violence "on grounds of religion, race, caste..." and can be applied to sectarian madrasas.

Because a majority of madrasas do not receive *zakat* or any other kind of assistance from the government, the threat of sanctions is little more than posturing. Officials estimate that merely one-third of registered madrasas receive *zakat* money which, in any case, is minuscule compared to private donations and funding through informal channels. Scoffing at the government's threat, madrasa representatives point out that schools are sustained by contributions, not by official grants.¹⁴¹

The ordinance also states that, "a registered madrasa will not receive any grant, donation or aid from any foreign sources or allow admission to foreign students or make appointment of teachers without valid visa and 'no-objection' certificate from the interior ministry".¹⁴² It does not explain how the government intends to translate intent into action. Similar pledges by all previous governments were followed by little success in monitoring and controlling madrasa finances.

This ordinance lacks specific measures to check foreign funding for militant madrasas. Officials say the relevant foreign governments have been approached to obtain scrutiny of all donations, but modalities have yet to be spelled out.¹⁴³ Moreover, foreign funding is rarely routed through formal channels and requires more intrusive methods if it is to be traced and controlled. Does the government seriously expect private donors and charities voluntarily to send donations through the interior ministry and the PMEB? The minister of religious affairs says: "This does not mean the government wants to control foreign funding. All the money will be forwarded for the specific madrasa it is meant for. It is only a way of monitoring".¹⁴⁴

It appears that the clergy's defiance will prevail. Instead of taking strong action and laying down a clear legal framework, the Musharraf government is dithering. Its policy is incoherent and it has displayed a lack of will to introduce any law that might antagonise the clergy. Co-opting and appeasing the clergy is its way of going about reforms. In doing so, Musharraf has gone even further than the clergy's

¹⁴¹ ICG interviews.

¹⁴² "No help without registration: Ordinance okayed", *Dawn*, 20 June 2002, p. 1.

¹⁴³ ICG interview with officials of the ministry of religious affairs, June 2002.

¹⁴⁴ Dr Ghazi's press conference at the Pakistan Information Department, 20 June 2002.

former patron, General Zia. He has agreed to grant recognition to all certificates and degrees from the madrasas provided they follow PMEB rules and developed an extensive assistance project for which international aid is sought.

E. PACKAGE OF INCENTIVES

The ministry of education seeks 14 billion rupees (U.S.\$233 million) for a program to introduce a new curriculum and to “encourage madrasas to register with the government”.¹⁴⁵ This indicates that the government hopes to entice madrasas to register voluntarily. Officials say that the package was devised after the ministry received back only half the registration forms it sent to 7,000 madrasas in 2000.¹⁴⁶ An incentives program, the ministry hopes, will encourage the *ulema* to cooperate, boost the registration process, improve education standards and help in “spreading Islamic values at national and international levels”.¹⁴⁷

The education ministry’s project has two main components. First, the government will distribute 1,200 million rupees (U.S.\$20 million) among 10,000 madrasas. Under one-time grants over three years, the ministry will provide free books on both Islamic studies and formal subjects and ten cupboards for each madrasa library.

Secondly, the project will cover the cost of hiring teachers for formal subjects, computers (five for each madrasa, with a printer), and teacher training. Under this scheme, 16,000 teachers will initially be hired for a three-year term at the primary level in 4,000 madrasas. At the secondary level, the government will pay for 12,000 teachers at 3,000 madrasas. Another 3,000 teachers will be paid to teach formal subjects at 1,000 intermediate level madrasas. The project will also fund training and capacity building for 31,000 already employed teachers.¹⁴⁸

The entire project is either bureaucratic wishful thinking or an exercise in public relations for a Western audience. The government knows well enough that there are not 10,000 registered madrasas, and it is not even sure how many exist. But it purports to have determined already how many books it needs to buy and how many teachers are required to teach the new curricula of formal subjects. Officials play down these objections. “Even if they are not registered, various government departments, including the intelligence agencies, have been collecting information on them” a mid-level *auqaf* official says.¹⁴⁹

Clearly, this project glosses over divisions and differences within the religious education sector. The ministry has labelled all madrasas as ‘units’ and plans to treat them identically, including those attached to militant groups, and without regard to differences in wealth or sect. Even if most madrasas agree to receive the proposed government assistance, its impact is likely to be counterproductive. Madrasas would gain parity with the formal sector of education as far as certificates and degrees are concerned without having to shift the balance of studies towards more secular and modern subjects.

“This is our aim: to Islamise the entire education sector and to integrate religious studies with modernity so that our youth are capable of countering the West in its own language and with its own tools”, says Abdul Malik of the II.¹⁵⁰ He believes that the clergy has already been successful in Islamising the formal system of education and that modernisation of madrasas should be the next step.

Dr Ghazi, the minister, shares this view: “Islam cannot be confined to madrasas and mosques; it has to be in the bazaar, universities, banks...every sphere of modern life”.¹⁵¹

A new generation of modern religious schools is already transcending old barriers of class, gender and ethnicity in Pakistan. Networks of religious education for women and children, far more sophisticated and modern than the old madrasa, are competing with private schools and the government sector. Some, such as the al-Huda and Hira schools, indoctrinate young women through preaching and religious mobilisation. Scores of private foundations

¹⁴⁵ Rauf Klasra, “Curricula of 8,000 madaris being changed”, *The News*, 10 June 2002, p. 1.

¹⁴⁶ ICG interview.

¹⁴⁷ Ministry of Education project briefs of June 2002.

¹⁴⁸ All figures are from the ministry of education’s project briefs produced in June 2002. At a press conference on 20 June 2002, the minister of religious affairs stressed that training and hiring of teachers would be at the request of the madrasas themselves.

¹⁴⁹ ICG interview.

¹⁵⁰ ICG interview.

¹⁵¹ ICG interview.

are promoting an amalgamated version of Islamised Western education with strong sectarian and ideological content. Their sources of funding and patterns of networking are quite similar to those of traditional madrasas. Women and children of urbanised, upper middle-class families are, therefore, being indoctrinated with the same zeal that marks the madrasa system. The stereotype of the turbaned, provincial Taliban is being remoulded in a presentable package, as an extremist ideology permeates the upper classes of Pakistani society.

Curiously, the National Education Assessment System (NEAS), a brainchild of the ministry of education that currently is being considered for funding by the World Bank, does not include the madrasa sector. If the government is serious about its madrasa reform, it should place any new scheme for madrasa curricula and teaching practices under the purview of this system. Oversight by international organisations like the World Bank might ensure that curricula changes meet the standards set by UN conventions. In its present shape, the government's unconditional incentive package is at best a short-term strategy to avoid a direct conflict with the clergy.

F. WHO CONTROLS REFORMS?

The government's plan lacks a focal point. It is dispersed among a number of ministries, including interior, foreign affairs, religious affairs, and education. The role of the omnipresent intelligence agencies is never discussed by the clergy, or the government officials dealing with madrasa reforms, or by the international donors and agencies funding reform projects. The input of many departments might be necessary because of the multiple internal and external dimensions of the problem. However, cogent reforms and effective implementation require a permanent central authority, answerable to parliament – if or when one is elected.

The dispersion of responsibility creates uncertainty on such basic issues as the number of schools, their location, and their needs. The ministries of education and religious affairs both have jurisdiction over registration. Their functions overlap also in curriculum development and implementation. Neither, however, is qualified to address the issue of militancy. Nor is there any

clear demarcation of the role of the intelligence agencies.

Absolute confusion, therefore, abounds. The *Auqaf* Department in Peshawar told a journalist it had no record of newly constructed mosques and unregistered madrasas or any information about their sources of funding since no foreign/Arab NGOs or individuals had sought prior government approval. "In principle, the *Auqaf* Department should have to maintain record of mosques and seminaries, but the government had vested the task with the secret agencies", a senior official says.¹⁵²

Qari Ruhullah Madni, provincial minister for *auqaf* and religious affairs, admits his department was totally bypassed in the process of registering new mosques and madrasas in the NWFP.¹⁵³ Similarly, *auqaf* officials in other provinces are still waiting for formal orders to register these institutions, despite repeated government announcements that all religious institutions will have to formalise their presence.

Effective madrasa reform requires new procedures that minimise the role of the military and intelligence agencies. Information and policy on madrasas should not be the monopoly of the state's security arm. If procedures remained unchanged, reforms and modernisation would be counterproductive even if a civilian government tries to restructure the madrasa sector.

In fact, after the October 2002 vote, elected government could be powerless in the face of extremism nurtured by militant madrasas. If Musharraf's political game plan succeeds, the elected government will have as little authority as its predecessors in the 1990s. Real power will rest with the president and the military and its agencies. Civilians will only be there to take the blame for the military's mistakes, including its failure to contain and eliminate jihadis and their militant madrasas.

¹⁵² "Auqaf Department has no record of madaris", *Dawn*, 14 January 2002, sec. National, p. 13.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

VI. CONCLUSION

Since taking power in October 1999, General Musharraf has made numerous pledges to modernise madrasas, change their image, and integrate them into the formal education sector. Two and a half years on, the government has done little to change its madrasa policy. The clergy backed Musharraf's coup and still supports his policies towards India. They will, however, defy any attempt to reform madrasas system or eliminate Islamic militancy.

If the government really intends to address both issues, it cannot and should not count on voluntary cooperation of the clergy. Any serious attempt at madrasa reform needs an earnest effort and a focal point. The former should come from the government. The latter can be provided by creation of a Madrasa Regulatory Authority, headed by the minister of interior.

The authority should be responsible for overseeing madrasas and enforcing government policy. Its governing body should include senior officials from the ministries of religious affairs and education, the home secretary of each province, and *ulema* and educators from the non-governmental sector. Such a high-powered body, solely responsible for madrasa reform and management, could change the sector but only with the full support of government machinery.

At present, the government speaks with many, often confusing, voices on religious education and militancy. A central regulatory authority could provide a focal point for donors, foreign governments and the media as well as facilitate co-ordination between Pakistani government departments. After elections in October 2002, such an authority should be answerable to a parliamentary committee. The mandate and powers of the current madrasa education board are too limited to produce significant change. The government must administer laws on madrasa reform, not merely prescribe them, as it does now through the PMEB.

The availability of credible data is a prerequisite to understanding the extent of the problem and tackling it. Musharraf's reform plan, as well as international opinion, is based on speculative figures. The reform plan also fails to take into

account the diversity of the madrasa system, lumping all madrasas together. Alongside curriculum change and other structural reform, the government must carry out a detailed survey that classifies madrasas meaningfully, separating those that pose a threat and those that do not.

The task could be performed by the proposed regulatory authority through a task force composed of the ministries of interior, religious affairs/*auqaf* and education. This task force should determine the actual number, types, and financial needs of madrasas and related vital information. The standard procedure of sending registration forms to madrasas and waiting for compliance has failed to yield results in the past and will fail in the future.

Thorough reform of madrasa education can do much to contain extremism in Pakistan. The reading of the Qur'an (*nazira*) and retention of verses (*hifz*) are traditions in almost every Muslim household and are also taught at formal schools. There are many precedents that show that modern education can co-exist with these two features of madrasa education. NGOs such as the National Rural Support Program have helped some local communities to transform their madrasas by including modern education. The religious identity remains intact but there is less emphasis on traditional subjects.

The Minhajul Qur'an schools¹⁵⁴ are another successful example. They have dropped the emphasis on religious studies and made Dars-e-Nizami optional. Pupils who wish to pursue religious studies and become Islamic scholars can opt for Dars-e-Nizami after ten years of normal modern education. The government should compel madrasas to adopt these models and encourage other private sector organisations to launch similar initiatives. This is the only way to help the million and a half students of the madrasa sector gain higher education in mainstream disciplines.

Employment opportunities for graduates of religious institutions are limited. Their prospects would improve with introduction of English, computer literacy, mathematics, Pakistan-focused social studies and economics at the various stages of madrasa education. Vocational training programs to produce teachers, paramedics, electricians, craftsmen and

¹⁵⁴ These schools are the educational project of a Sunni-Barelvi party, Pakistan Awami Tehreek (Pakistan People's Movement, or PAT).

other skilled workers would be even more useful in creating jobs for madrasa pupils, giving them a stake in supporting madrasa reform. But none of these changes are possible without strong government intervention and international assistance.

Apart from incentives, the government should also give the law teeth. Any meaningful action so far against Pakistani sectarian groups and jihadis has been the result of the presence of U.S. forces and intelligence agencies. Arrests have mainly targeted Arab activists or the lower cadres of local sectarian militant groups. Most madrasas aligned with the jihadi and sectarian parties continue to work unhindered, belying government claims that extremists groups have been banned.

Only a small number of madrasas have direct links with terrorist or sectarian extremist groups. The Musharraf government must publicly identify them and in particular close down those schools and training facilities the umbrella organisations of which are now illegal. This step is long overdue. In any case, direct and permanent oversight, rather than occasional raids and crackdowns, is required if the madrasa system is to be kept free of militancy.

The international community can also play a valuable role in promoting tangible madrasa reform. While some donors may have legal reservations about assisting religious schools, curriculum development and teaching of modern subjects is one area where external help, including funding, would prove most useful. The World Bank and the education ministry are negotiating a project to institute a National Education Assessment System. Revision and designing of school textbooks is part of this project. Since the government has pledged to integrate the madrasa system into the formal sector of education, NEAS should also cover madrasa education. Donors could help the curricula wing of the ministry of education design new courses and fund teacher training and vocational programs.

The government has said it would 'ban' direct foreign aid for madrasas of the sort that has flowed in during recent years but it has no plan for a compulsory audit of madrasas. There is a pressing need to monitor foreign funds to militant madrasas, but no country can counter illegal

money networks on its own. This requires sharing of information and resources, and international policing of suspect funds moving around the world.

The Pakistan government should create a nationwide Financial Intelligence Unit, as a subsidiary of the banking regulatory authority, which could coordinate financial intelligence efforts with the countries that are the main sources of funding, especially the Gulf states and a number of Western countries such as the United Kingdom. It could also act against money laundering in the formal banking sector and curb transfers in the informal sector.

Post-11 September, the role of charities operating from the United Kingdom, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and elsewhere has been widely investigated. Publicising the names of suspect external charities and notifying the government about their partners in Pakistan is essential.

Instead of imposing a blanket ban on Islamic charities, distinctions should be made between funding for educational, development and philanthropic causes and for terrorism. Moderate Muslims run most Islamic organisations, mosques and charities based in Western countries. They can be educated on this score.

The complex problem of madrasas cannot be addressed through simplistic solutions or cosmetic changes. The entire exercise of countering militancy and reforming madrasas hinges upon Pakistan's internal politics. At the root of the madrasa problem lie the politics of civil-military relations. Successive military governments have legitimised the dominance of the armed forces over civilian society and the state by co-opting relatively marginal groups such as the clergy and attracting the support of major powers. General Musharraf is similarly co-opting the clergy and garnering the support of important external actors, in particular the U.S., by assisting operations against the remnants of al-Qaida. This bodes ill for Pakistan's long-term future.

The extremist philosophy espoused by some madrasas has thrived in the absence of a legitimate political process. The militant clergy and the Pakistani military share a common hostility towards India and a common perception that Pakistan should be ruled not as a democracy but as an authoritarian state.

No fundamental change in the way madrasas influence society and politics in Pakistan will take

place without a change in the nature of the country's governance. The overarching presence of the military has rendered civilian institutions ineffective and submissive. Madrasa reforms, political reforms, economic reforms are all dependent on whether the military can reform itself and submit to the will of the people expressed through the ballot.

Islamabad/Brussels, 29 July 2002

APPENDIX A

MAP OF PAKISTAN



APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

BCCI:	Bank for Credit and Commerce International		several efforts to free Azhar. The Pakistan government has banned the group, and its leader is under house arrest.
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology		
Dars-e-Nizami	The basic curriculum of all non-Shia madrasas, though each sect modifies and supplements it with courses to suit its own brand of Islam. Dars-e-Nizami was originally developed in the eighteenth century.	JUI	Jamiatul Ulema-e-Islam JUI is the main Sunni-Deobandi political party and successor in Pakistan to the Jamiatul Ulema-e-Hind in pre-partition India. The party is divided into three factions, denoted by the initials of their leaders: JUI-Samiul Haq, or JUI-S, JUI-Fazlur Rahman (F), and JUI-Ajmal Qadri (Q). The JUI madrasas were the main supply line of Afghan jihadis in the 1980s.
Hifz	Memorisation of the Qur'an. A hafiz is someone who has memorised the full text of the holy book and can recite it impromptu. Nazira – reading from the holy book – and hifz are a madrasa's primary function.	JUP	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan
IRI	Islamic Research Institute		Sunni-Barelvis' political party, the JUP too is divided into many factions, the major one led by Shah Ahmed Noorani, a religious scholar and businessman from Karachi. The Barelvis are non-violent and do not have a record of militancy, although a fringe group, Sunni Tehreek, was allegedly involved in the murder of a prominent Deobandi scholar, Yusuf Ludhianvi, in Karachi in May 2000.
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami. The vanguard of modernist Islam, the JI is the most organised and politically active religious party in the country. Its madrasas are run by the Rabita al-Madaris al-Arabiya and are considered the pioneers of jihad. The student wing of the JI, the Islami Jamiat Talaba, is known for politics of violence in mainstream colleges and universities where it is a dominant group.	LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. An offshoot of the Sipah Sahaba Pakistan and more militant in its views against the Shias, LeJ has had strong contacts with the Taliban and training camps inside Afghanistan. LeJ has been banned. Its leader, Riaz Basra, was killed in a 'staged' encounter in May 2002, on a tip-off from a rival faction within LeJ.
JM	Jaish-e-Mohammed. Organised by some breakaway segments of the LeT and Harkatul Ansar (HUA), it is an India-specific militant group whose leader, Masood Azhar, was released from Indian imprisonment in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages in Afghanistan. The 1994 HUA kidnapping of U.S. and British nationals in New Delhi and the July 1995 kidnapping of Westerners in Kashmir were two of	LeT	Lashkar-e-Tayaba. An avowedly militant Ahle-Hadith organisation, the LeT is the armed faction of the Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad, an Ahle Hadith organisation based in

	Murdike, Punjab. The LeT runs training camps in Punjab and Pakistani Kashmir, mainly in the areas along the Line of Control. It operates in Indian Kashmir and is not known for domestic sectarian violence, although it has close links with the anti-Shia militant parties.			predominantly Sunni Pakistan. The party has been banned and renamed the Millat-e-Jafaria Pakistan (Pakistan's Shia Nation).
Minhajul		TNSM		Tanzim-e-Nifaze Shariat-e-Mohammedi. A localised radical movement for implementation of Islamic laws in some Pashtun tribal areas. Its leader, Sufi Mohammed, led the largest jihadi contingent from Pakistan in support of the Taliban in fall 2001 and is now under arrest.
Qur'an	A chain of schools set up by a moderate Sunni religious party, providing formal education alongside religious studies.	USAID		United States Agency for International Development
PMEB	Pakistan Madrasa Education Board	Wafaq		Arabic for federation or union. These are loose umbrella organisation of madrasas. Of which there are five in Pakistan: Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabiya (Sunni-Deobandi madrasas), Tanzim al-Madaris al-Arabiya (Sunni Barelvi); Wafaq al-Madaris al-Shia (Shia) and Wafaq al-Madaris Al-Salafiya (Ahle-Hadith (Salafi), and Rabita al-Madaris al-Arabiya of the Jammat-e-Islami.
PML	Pakistan Muslim League. The founder party of Pakistan, originally called the All India Muslim League. Many politicians claim to be leaders of the 'real' Muslim League in Pakistan and have their own factions. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif heads the biggest grouping of Muslim Leaguers, known as PML(N).			
PPP	The Pakistan People's Party. The Bhuttos' party, founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967 with a socialist, egalitarian agenda. Benazir Bhutto, twice prime minister and now in exile, heads the PPP.	Waqf (plural. Auqaf)		Religious endowment, usually arable land, buildings, shops (but not money or cash), belonging to mosques, shrines, madrasas or other religious institutions. These assets are non-transferable and have legal protection. The government had partially nationalised this sector in 1960, but <i>auqaf</i> income can only be spent on mosques and the religious institution they belong to. The <i>Auqaf</i> Department does not cover all madrasas, mosques or shrines.
SM	Sipahe Mohammed. The militant Shia group that has been engaged in tit-for-tat targeted attacks against the Sunni extremists groups.			
SSP	Sipahe Sahaba Pakistan. An offshoot of the JUI, the SSP was created in the mid-1980s in reaction to the rise of Shia extremism in Pakistan and is among the pioneers of organised sectarian terrorism. The party has its stronghold in the city of Jhang, Punjab, and contests elections.	Zakat		The Islamic tithe, deducted from bank deposits on the first day of Ramadhan, the month of fasting, at the rate of 2.5 per cent. The minimum amount liable to <i>Zakat</i> varies according to the price of gold.
TJP	Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan. The Shia political party that first emerged in 1979, after the Iranian revolution, as a movement for the implementation of Shia laws in			

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organisation committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are at Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris and a media liaison office in

London. The organisation currently operates eleven field offices with analysts working in nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories and across four continents.

In *Africa*, those locations include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in *Asia*, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan; in *Europe*, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the *Middle East*, Algeria and the whole region from Egypt to Iran; and in *Latin America*, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governments currently provide funding: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Foundation and private sector donors include The Ansary Foundation, The Atlantic Philanthropies, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Ford Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Fund, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Ruben and Elisabeth Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

July 2002

APPENDIX D

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* The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program in January 2002.

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