


Working with the Military



January 1995

Foreword

Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.

Dag Hammarskjöld

What unique merits of military training and experience can lend themselves to emergency humanitarian operations? What lessons can we learn from past associations with the military? What specialist military skills and resources can augment the capacity of UNHCR to respond to a crisis? This training module attempts to address all of these questions.

Military cultures are as varied as the countries which they represent. It is difficult, therefore, to speak of the military without oversimplification. Nevertheless, certain attributes are unique to military organization. It is upon these qualities that this training module concentrates.

The material in this training module has been compiled from many sources, both military and civilian. Much of the text has been derived from interviews with United Nations peacekeepers and UNHCR staff members who have worked together in emergency operations in the field. Drafts of the text were reviewed and refined by experienced and distinguished members of the military, national defence institutions and UNHCR colleagues.

The partnership between UNHCR and the military is still young, and much is yet to be learned. If you have experience to share or any comments or suggestions on how this module can be improved or augmented, please address them to UNHCR Headquarters, to the attention of Mr. Neill Wright, Special Advisor (Military/Logistics) in the Division of Programmes and Operational Support, by one of the following means:

By post: UNHCR Headquarters
 Case Postale 2500
 1211 Genève Dépôt
 Suisse

By telephone: (41 22) 739 86 58

By fax: (41 22) 739 86 70

By Internet: wright@unhcr.org

Introduction

The Purpose of This Training Module

The purpose of this training module is to assist staff members and associated personnel to achieve a better understanding of the relationship between UNHCR and the military, and thereby to contribute to more effective cooperation. It is intended to provide information which will be useful in the field. Much of the content of this module speaks to new experiences for UNHCR or less tangible aspects of working relations. Lessons learned by colleagues in past and present operations in which UNHCR has had the benefit of military support are the main source of information. These materials make no claim to be exhaustive. They should not be taken as a set of guidelines or a field manual. What you will find is the kind of information that will help you develop a productive relationship with members of the military.

How to Use This Training Module

This module may be used for self-instruction or as part of a training course. It may be used at Headquarters or in the field. You will find it most useful if studied prior to your participation in an emergency operation. It is suggested that this module also be taken to the field for periodic review. Each chapter of this module begins with learning objectives and ends with a self-assessment. If you are using this module for self-instruction, after reading each chapter, use these tests to measure what you have learned, and refer to the answer key at the end of the module.

The Contents of This Module

The first part of this module discusses the manner in which the United Nations can respond militarily to a threat to international peace and security, and therefore the circumstances in which UNHCR staff members may come into association with an international military presence. The second part of this module describes characteristics which are common to most military organizations. It is intended to assist the reader to achieve greater cultural sensitivity in dealing with the military. The third section examines the role of the military as a supporting organization in UNHCR's emergency activities. The fourth section refers to specific tasks which the military can carry out in this regard. The fifth section of this module offers ten suggestions on enhancing coordination and cooperation between UNHCR and the military. The sixth section draws attention to some of the detrimental consequences of failure to coordinate international humanitarian and military efforts. A glossary of military terms and abbreviations comprises the seventh section of this document. Also included are a case study and an appendix describing UNHCR's past association with international armed forces.

Note on the Use of Terminology

References to the military in this training module are made in the general sense. Peacekeeping refers to international military forces which are deployed under the command and control of the United Nations. For the purposes of this document, neither term need be more precisely defined. The reader should bear in mind, however, that the majority of military contacts for UNHCR staff members will be United Nations peacekeepers. Peacekeeping mandates tend to grow, as a result of additional Security Council Resolutions, with the addition of duties not foreseen at the time of the first deployments of a peacekeeping force. In particular, peacekeeping forces may acquire duties of an enforcement nature. Although not peacekeeping in the strictest sense, the word "peacekeeping" tends to be used as a generic reference to all United Nations forces, even those whose mandates have evolved to include enforcement responsibilities. Terminology varies among different sectors of armed services. Because the principal contacts for UNHCR staff members will be land forces, this training module is Army-oriented.

Additional Information

These materials do not contain information on security considerations or field safety. For information of this kind, you should consult the UNHCR Guidelines on Security, and contact the UNHCR Field Staff Safety Section.

Part 1: International Military Action

In this chapter you will learn:

- how peacekeeping began and developed;
- the types of military task that peacekeepers perform;
- how international military action is changing.

1.1 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a pragmatic response to threats to international peace and security. It involves the deployment of a multinational military force with the consent of the parties to a conflict for the purpose of promoting the conditions necessary for a lasting settlement of the disputes which gave rise to international tension. As a passive and neutral third force, peacekeeping contingents deploy with weapons sufficient only for self-defense. Peacekeeping was pioneered by the United Nations during the Cold War period, at a time when ideological deadlock between the East and West precluded the establishment of standing forces for the maintenance of collective security as envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations. In a sense, then, peacekeeping represents the common ground upon which fundamentally opposed political blocs were able to agree. Despite the weakness of resulting mandates, in situations where consent was established, peacekeeping has been an effective, non-coercive means of preventing the escalation of conflicts or implementing a peace plan.

The principal, traditional technique of peacekeeping forces has been to place themselves in positions between opposing forces, for the purpose of providing a buffer, to supervise and help maintain ceasefires, and to assist in troop withdrawals and demobilization. This technique and the tasks of peacekeeping forces have evolved over the years, to the point that the majority of the present seventeen multinational deployments described as United Nations peacekeeping forces bear little resemblance to the first peacekeeping force, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), established in 1948, and still in the field today.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar superpower world order, and with the emergence of many new States, the character of conflict has evolved. Disintegrating economies, natural disasters and ethnic strife have all contributed to more complex confrontations, more frequently tending to be internal - rather than international - in character. The United Nations is increasingly asked to intervene in these conflicts, largely to prevent spill-over to neighbouring States. As a result, the 10,000 military personnel that were deployed under the United Nations flag in 1987 numbered, seven years later, over 90,000.

1.2 Peacekeeping Tasks

Peacekeeping tends to be used as a catch-all reference to a wide spectrum of activity. The characteristics common to all blue helmet missions are their multinational composition under United Nations command. Peacekeeping as a technique for promoting international peace and security is continually evolving, in response to conflicts and crises of increasing complexity. A single definition of peacekeeping is therefore difficult to contrive. The tasks assigned to peacekeepers will depend on the mandate given to the mission by the Security Council. Past military activities have included:

- Positioning troops between hostile parties, thereby creating buffer or demilitarized zones and the opportunity to act as a liaison between the parties to the conflict.

- Promoting the implementation of ceasefires and peace accords by observing and

reporting on military activity, assisting in the disengagement, disarmament and demobilization of forces and prisoner exchanges.

- Assisting local administrations to maintain law and order, facilitating free and fair elections by providing security.
- Protecting humanitarian relief operations by securing warehouses and delivery sites and routes, escorting humanitarian aid convoys, ensuring security for humanitarian aid workers, and providing logistic support.
- Supporting humanitarian operations by undertaking engineering tasks for the maintenance of essential utilities, services and aid delivery routes in a time of crisis, disposing of mines and other weapons, delivering humanitarian relief supplies or providing logistic assistance to humanitarian agencies.

1.3 The Legal Framework for International Military Action

The word peacekeeping is not found in the Charter of the United Nations. Nevertheless, its inspiration can be found in the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the first of which, as stated in the Charter, is To maintain international peace and security and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

The Charter invests the Security Council with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Under Chapters VI and VII, the measures which the Security Council can take to achieve this purpose are described. Chapter VI, dealing with the peaceful settlement of disputes, mandates both the Security Council and the General Assembly to make recommendations upon which the parties in dispute can act in order to settle their differences without resort to armed conflict. Chapter VII, dealing with mandatory measures, invests the Security Council with the collective authority of all member States to enforce solutions to a dispute where the Security Council has determined the existence of "a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression." Article 41 provides for compulsory measures not involving the use of armed forces to prevent the deterioration of such a situation: the partial or complete interruption of communications, economic and diplomatic relations. Article 42 provides for the use of armed force "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security".

It is fair to say that the concept of peacekeeping now goes beyond the provisions of Chapter VI, but frequently falls short of the measures contemplated in Chapter VII. For this reason, former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld referred to peacekeeping as "Chapter 61/2".

1.4 The Evolution of Peacekeeping

If traditional peacekeeping measures no longer meet the needs of complex international and internal crises - where interpositioning of neutral troops is an insufficient response to a multidimensional emergency - a new concept of peacekeeping is required. Military doctrines now emerging refer to "second generation peacekeeping" or "wider peacekeeping". They differ from traditional peacekeeping in that they do not necessarily enjoy the same degree of consent of the parties to the conflict, nor are their mandates likely to contain a clearly stated political objective, despite those mandates having been authorized under Chapter VI, rather than Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, some missions may deploy with mandates derived from Security

Council Resolutions under both Chapters VI and VII, as was the case with UNOSOM.¹¹ A newer trend points to deployment mandates ostensibly authorized under Chapter VII, where the threat to international peace and security is difficult to discern. Such was the case with UNAMIR.²

The evolution of peacekeeping occurs in the context of an emerging world order in which the international community is demanding more of the United Nations in terms of response to human crises; and offering less to the United Nations in terms of political, financial and material support. The limits of the United Nations system's present capacity to respond to a large scale crisis was demonstrated by the blunt reality of genocide in Rwanda, followed by the exodus of 1.5 million refugees. Despite the Security Council having authorized strengthening of UNAMIR, the Secretary General was unable to raise sufficient troop contributions to avert disaster. The Security Council then authorized the intervention in Rwanda for humanitarian purposes of a multinational force under French leadership. This kind of delegation, or other arrangements for military-humanitarian missions which are not under the control of the United Nations, are likely to continue in the future. Arrangements of this kind offer larger world powers the opportunity to intervene for humanitarian purposes, while neither yielding to the political priorities of other troop contributing nations, nor undertaking the kind of open-ended commitment that peacekeeping missions seem to demand. For the purposes of this module, there is no need to distinguish between those peace support activities which are carried out under the United Nations banner and those which are not. The military actors are essentially the same.

Review Questions

True or False? Peacekeeping forces derive their authority from Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations; other forces authorized by the Security Council derive their authority from Chapter VII. True or False?

Answer

Peacekeepers can never fire the first shot. True or False?

Answer

Military deployments which are authorised by the Security Council must maintain strict neutrality. True or False?

Answer

Peacekeeping forces will often deploy with sufficient artillery, mortars and mines to create a deterrence against violations of buffer zones and ceasefires. True or False?

Answer

UNHCR and the international military come together most often in civil war situations. True or False?

Answer

Part 2: The Military Partner

In this chapter you will learn:

- how the military approach to problem-solving and decision-making differs from UNHCR's approach;
- how the military develops qualities of leadership, consistency and responsibility;
- how the military organizational culture forms a sound basis for effective, efficient action.

2.1 A Military Standard

Consider the word uniform. This word refers to something that does not change in form or in character, to similarity in every respect between two or more things, to consistency, to conformity. A uniform is the distinctive dress worn by every member of a particular group. When we describe the military, the word uniform can be used as an abbreviation for a number of different qualities. Uniformity is the foundation upon which the operational and social structures of military units are built. It engenders confidence that all members of the military can rely upon standards of behaviour and conduct. It ensures that collective capabilities support the individual parts and that individual parts form a single, cohesive unit. It cultivates an esprit de corps. Initiative within these limits is rewarded, but normally takes place within agreed parameters.

The military ethos encourages patterns of thinking and behaviour which may differ from those of civilians. Military training and discipline create the basic difference of approach to problem-solving from that of civilians. It is also an end in itself, ensuring that decision-makers analyze information and make decisions in a manner which is consistent with that of all other decision-makers. The reason for this is not surprising: in a crisis situation, every member of the military will want the behaviour of others, upon which lives depend, to be as regulated and predictable as possible. To achieve this kind of reliability, a fundamental component of military training is a structured approach to organizational patterns and the decision-making process.

2.2 Organizational Structure

A simple military structure can be viewed as a pyramid. Each component part is made up of individuals of varying ranges of experience. The accumulation of experience by an individual is based on correct analysis and application of tactics learned from past endeavours. Within each unit of the military organization, as with civilian structures, the most experienced will be those in command. Each separate pyramid within the military structure is an image of every other component part, and indeed of the larger structure into which they fit. Each has a commander at the top, who has the authority to make decisions within the sphere of competence of that particular unit; and soldiers at the bottom, who are expected to act upon decisions. Accounting for differences in size, from a structural point of view, every section, platoon, company and battalion is organized in a similar way. With national variations, each army combat unit comprises three smaller combat units and one administrative unit. Thus, a platoon is composed of four sections; a company is composed of four platoons; and a battalion is composed of four companies.

The operational techniques of the military and civilians will often differ. In the case of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, where peacekeepers and UNHCR are asked to undertake a common mission, understanding and accommodating these differences can be decisive to the success of the mission. UNHCR operations have much to benefit from the durability of military organization.

Military Corps Structure (Land Forces)

(diagram)

2.3 Cultural Issues

UNHCR staff members are trained to be sensitive to, and take account of, cultural differences among ourselves, refugees and Government interlocutors. There is a danger that we fail to extend the same cultural sensitivity to our military partners in joint missions. The tendency to look at the military as a "them" is an attitude in itself which undermines effective collaborative efforts. Borrowing the approach of the military in examining lessons of the past, many failures of coordination and misunderstandings have resulted from a neglect to consider the diverging perspectives and objectives of military and civilian actors.

Some cultural issues to bear in mind:

Policy decisions in the military are often made at the top of a reporting chain. These are based upon the maximum possible information, and all channels of communication and reporting are

therefore directed toward the policy decision-maker at the top of the pyramid. This gives the military an important Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information (C4I) capability, and a robust management structure. By contrast, UNHCR devolves decision-making authority to the site of the most information. In most cases, this will be in the field.

In the military command chain, command and control always emanate from a central point. UNHCR does not follow the same decision-making map. In this regard, UNHCR - with its devolution of some kinds of decision-making authority to the field - can appear to the military to demonstrate no clear hierarchical structure. For military interlocutors who are accustomed to an association with other military formations bearing a similar operational structure to their own, this perceived lack of structure could be a source of misunderstanding and even frustration.

UNHCR counterparts to the military - and especially NGO counterparts - tend to receive decision-making authority at a much younger age than do military decision-makers. This generation gap can exacerbate the military-civilian cultural difference.

The military and UNHCR may have different approaches to field deployments. Military units are designed to be self-contained. A unit which deploys in the field, for example, will have a substantial rear support structure capable of meeting all its needs. UNHCR, as a counterpart, is likely to be a fraction of the military unit's size, and staff members will be responsible for acquiring the resources necessary to sustain themselves - and possibly even the activities in which they are engaged. Because military units must be self-sufficient, they will usually be better equipped than their civilian counterparts, but may not be in a position to share resources. This resource gap can be a source of tension, particularly where the military and civilian members of a common mission see different priorities for the use of resources.

Military personnel are results-oriented. Political and financial accountability are high. A military unit will therefore be reluctant to undertake a task for which it has insufficient resources or probability of success. UNHCR and humanitarian agencies in general, particularly those working in emergency relief operations, measure success by achieving maximum efficiency in the use of limited resources, rather than pursuing so quantifiable an "end game" or "goal". In other words, UNHCR will stretch resources on a utilitarian basis. Accountability in this respect is much lower, because the achievement of UNHCR's objectives does not depend on UNHCR alone.

Where lives are at stake, as will be the case in almost any military response to a given situation, the military approach will seek to know and account for as many variables as possible. Military training and planning are geared toward this end. Planning is also a central feature of every UNHCR operation. Because UNHCR sometimes faces difficulties in acquiring the resources necessary to complete a particular task, often in an unfavourable political environment, UNHCR plans are, by necessity, flexible. These two approaches derive from differing operational demands. In field operations, where the motivations for the two approaches may not be appreciated, some friction can arise. The military may become exasperated by what may be viewed as short-notice changes of plans, and civilians may have difficulty understanding the lack of flexibility of the military when changing circumstances affect a particular task.

Review Questions

Answer the following: What aspects of UNHCR's organizational structure are similar to that of the military?

Answer

What aspects of UNHCR's organizational structure differ from that of the military?

Answer

Seven areas of cultural difference between the military and UNHCR are described in Part 1. How many can you recall?

Answer

Part 3: The Role of the Military in UNHCR Emergency Operations

This chapter will help you become more familiar with:

- how UNHCR and the international military may become associated in emergency operations;
- how international military support can create a better environment for UNHCR's humanitarian activities;
- how the international military can help provide international protection to individuals who fall under the High Commissioner's mandate.

3.1 Military Support for UNHCR Operations

UNHCR's humanitarian activities may be linked to the military in two ways. First, where law and order are lacking and humanitarian activities are carried out in an insecure environment, peacekeepers or other international armed forces may be mandated by the Security Council to ensure the secure delivery of assistance to the victims of the conflict in question. Second, military resources may be used to augment the capacity of UNHCR to implement the High Commissioner's mandate.

3.2 Protection of Humanitarian Operations

The security of all United Nations activities and personnel is the responsibility of the authorities, lawful and de facto, of the parties to a conflict. This is a fundamental component of the principle of consent.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, parties to a conflict will at times be unable or unwilling to control all threats to the safety of personnel or operations. Peacekeeping forces will always have a mandate to use force in self-defense and in defense of United Nations and associated personnel. Peacekeeping mandates may also include specific duties relating to the defense of personnel or the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. One task of a peacekeeping force in joint missions will be, therefore, to create the conditions in which operations, both humanitarian and military, can be carried out in reasonable safety and security. The need for United Nations military protection of personnel, convoys and premises points towards a failure of consent (except where this need is the result of actions by elements that are genuinely "uncontrolled"). A similar erosion of the consensual basis of activities will result from allowing local authorities to neglect their responsibility for the security of operations. Local officials will tend to view a United Nations joint mission as capable of meeting all its own needs, a notion which will be reinforced by the presence of armed personnel. In these circumstances, abdication of responsibility becomes a substitute for consent.

Maintaining and appearing to maintain impartiality and neutrality is a difficult task where the possibility of the use of force in defense of humanitarian operations arises. In effect, the very act of carrying out a mandate to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance may compromise the foundation of these activities. For this reason, UNHCR and peacekeeping commanders have relied upon negotiations to ensure access, with military escorts for deterrence. While the non-use of force in these circumstances is open to criticism, in contrast the delivery of assistance by force would only achieve short-term gains, because an environment hostile to international operations would inevitably develop. Further, when the international military uses force, association with the military creates the risk of retaliation against UNHCR staff members. In order to avoid placing the military in the undesirable position of having to use force, UNHCR staff members should carefully design their activities to avoid the possibility of misunderstandings and attacks. This requires an understanding of why and where attacks might take place. Familiarity with the local political and economic situation is essential. Experience has shown that warehouses in particular will always be prime targets for the disaffected. Aid stocks are likely to be the only valuable commodity in a war-affected economy, constituting an allurements for criminals and the distressed alike. The movement of aid and personnel to and from warehouse premises will attract similar negative

attention.

3.3 A Military Role in International Protection

In emergencies involving armed conflict, protection issues may be particularly sensitive, because the issues which arise - notably population displacement and ethnic hatred - may be the foundation and even the objective of the conflict in question. International Humanitarian Law, designed to protect civilians, is increasingly violated or ignored by the parties to a conflict. Humanitarian action to protect the victims of conflict may broach a whole range of undesirable political implications, such as complicity in "ethnic cleansing", compromising neutrality or impartiality, or manipulation for political, military or criminal ends. In ethnicity-based conflicts, for example, minority populations may come under threat. International actors may be manipulated into evacuating threatened civilians, which may unintentionally assist one party to the conflict in concentrating its own population or expelling another; or which may assist criminal elements to profit from selling safe passage. Protection officers should provide guidance to military counterparts to avert undesirable ramifications from these well-intentioned interventions.

3.4 A Military Role in International Humanitarian Assistance

Governments will seek to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, the security of troops contributed to peacekeeping operations. In the absence of the standing force arrangements envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations, military contingents will continue to rely on their own logistic and other resources for their support, and may be subject to funding constraints. It is likely, therefore, that the capacity of the international military to contribute logistic support to humanitarian aid efforts will be restricted by their own need for security and guaranteed logistic resupply. Nevertheless, such contributions can significantly augment the capacity of UNHCR and other agencies to respond quickly and effectively to a humanitarian crisis. The military is likely to have greater logistic capacity and much greater human resources in the field than will UNHCR. These resources can be of great value to the humanitarian action. When a military deployment undertakes humanitarian activities - such as transporting humanitarian aid, monitoring aid delivery or maintaining aid supply routes - members will be expected to do so in uniform, armed (as necessary), remaining visibly under military command and control, and acting within the established Rules of Engagement. UNHCR should continue to decide the scope and priority of these tasks following negotiations with local civil authorities, and in consultation with the appropriate peacekeeping commanders.

Part 4: Military Tasks in Support of UNHCR Activities

In this chapter, you will become familiar with:

- the kinds of tasks that the military can undertake in support of UNHCR operations, and the collateral benefits of military activities;
- the kinds of tasks that the military can undertake in the field of international protection.

4.1 UNHCR Staff Security

Avoidance of security incidents is, of course, preferable to extraction of personnel from tense or volatile situations. Activities directed to reinforcing the consent of the local authorities and winning the confidence of the local population, and security awareness training for UNHCR staff by the military are the best guarantee that personnel will not come to harm. Collateral benefits for the humanitarian work of local or non-associated personnel will also result. If the international military has not undertaken any activities of this kind, UNHCR officers in the field should work with members of the military to design appropriate training programmes for staff members. Information on the military activities of the parties to the conflict may not always be available to UNHCR staff members. The dividend of regular security briefings by members of military contingents will be the ability to plan with a proper assessment of the risks associated with carrying out a particular activity. Staff members should always seek the advice of the international military on security and safety precautions. To do so, a dependable communications network is essential. A first priority of

staff members establishing a field office in an insecure environment where there is an international military presence should be to devise a reliable means of communication.

4.2 Escorting UNHCR Convoys

The use of military escorts for humanitarian convoys has both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, military escorts provide deterrence against potential aggressors. Where armoured vehicles are used as convoy escort, greater physical security (not to mention psychological security) is offered. In the event of an actual attack, escorts provide a self-defensive capability. On the negative side, however, escorted convoys tend to move slowly, especially where heavy armoured vehicles are used. Aggressors tend not to differentiate between convoys and their escorts. Where the relationship between local populations and the international military has deteriorated, unarmed humanitarian personnel may become collateral targets of aggression. Civilian actors also tend to expose themselves to greater risk than do members of the military, a problem which may be compounded by a false sense of security when heavy armoured vehicle escorts are in use. In armed conflict situations, the military can assist UNHCR with alternative techniques for the protection of convoys. These include advance notice to warring parties of convoy movements and route condition negotiations, alternate route selection, static and mobile patrols and the employment of local police escorts. Heads of UNHCR field offices should consult peacekeeping commanders on the best means of achieving these ends, in consideration of the prevailing circumstances in their part of the mission area.

4.3 Support to Local Authorities

Local authorities will tend to view a UNHCR mission which enjoys the support of the military as capable of meeting all its own needs. This notion will be reinforced by the presence of international armed forces which provide security for humanitarian personnel, convoys and premises. Local authorities are responsible for the security of operations, and should be reminded as required of this obligation. Where local authorities fail to protect personnel or premises from warring factions or criminal elements, there is an implication that the consent under which humanitarian operations are undertaken is disavowed. A component of most military units (often known as "G5" or "S5") is dedicated to dealing with local authorities, and will seek to avoid the foregoing undesirable difficulties. Continuous, open communication between UNHCR and the international military will ensure the pursuit of unified objectives.

4.4 Liaison with Military Authorities

In a consensual humanitarian and military operation, the establishment of goodwill between UNHCR and the military on the one hand, and the various local authorities on the other hand, will encourage the re-establishment of law and order, economic growth and the restoration of an effective civil administration. It is the common political, military and humanitarian goal to bring about the transition from emergency to reconstruction, rehabilitation and development. In effect, the military contribution in this continuum is to create the conditions where the presence of the international armed forces is no longer required. This is a task uniquely suited to the experience and training of the military. Military-to-military liaison plays a vital role. UNHCR can benefit greatly from this specialized skill, having both access to local military authorities and insulation, where necessary, from them.

4.5 Public and Military Information

UNHCR and military units will each have their own public information structures. Separate public information offices have the advantage that officers will not be required to answer questions beyond their sphere of competence. Coordinated activities, including joint statements or press conferences, will allow passage of information, without requiring one organization to answer questions on the other's behalf. Equally important is the effective use of military information (intelligence). Commanders and heads of humanitarian missions alike require military information for the purpose of executing tasks in the conflict environment. The collection, collation and dissemination of military information is a skill that UNHCR staff members will most certainly lack. Sharing of military information - giving early warning of population movements or a change in

security conditions, for example - will be of great benefit to a UNHCR emergency operation.

The collection and use of military information is obviously a matter of great sensitivity. The parties to the conflict will doubt the neutrality of any party which is in contact with their opponents, especially where the neutral party shows an interest in military matters. It is difficult to demonstrate the need for military information for operational uses by civilian organizations. Military expertise in the handling of such information may therefore be central to humanitarian operations.

4.6 Protection Activities

The presence of international armed forces as both witnesses and a stabilizing influence can lend significant passive protection to endangered civilians. Patrolling in vulnerable communities, for example, reduces the opportunities for anonymous acts of aggression against minorities.

Protection officers should endeavour to form a link with military counterparts in order to provide guidance in protection matters. As a general rule, the military should be requested to defer to UNHCR (or ICRC, as appropriate) in protection matters, unless, of course, lives are in imminent danger. Where the latter is the case, a minimalist approach should be recommended, to avoid unwanted political ramifications resulting from individual humanitarian acts by the military. Where moving an individual out of danger would suffice, for example, moving the individual across an international frontier might not be warranted. Many simple measures can be taken by the military to reduce the vulnerability of a given population. These might include:

- maintaining presence in proximity to buildings and installations essential to the life of a community, such as hospitals, water and power generating stations, places of worship, schools and nurseries;
- maintaining presence in areas of dispute to ensure maximum freedom of movement of civilian populations, including freedom to flee to a place of safety;
- maintaining presence in rural communities to facilitate the safe conduct of agricultural activity and food production;
- maintaining presence in proximity to the location of valuable cultural properties;
- ensuring access by local population to medical care, including escorting medical practitioners in areas of confrontation;
- liaison between opposing parties to a conflict to ensure continuity of commercial activity;
- liaison between opposing parties to a conflict to ensure continuity and repair of essential infrastructure.

A vital aspect of a community's return to normality will be the voluntary return of its displaced members. The military can make a significant contribution to the creation of an environment suitable for return, by undertaking the repair of roads and bridges and other engineering tasks, for example, or by mine clearing and the collection and disposal of weapons and explosives. Similarly, the military can monitor ceasefires, supervise border crossings and assist in the demobilization of militias.

4.7 Health and Medical Support

Military contingents should be self-sufficient with respect to medical care, and will often bring with them what appear to local populations to be large medical structures and resources. They are generally not deployed for humanitarian purposes, but rather for the care of their own and associated personnel. Lack of access to these medical facilities may therefore generate local resentment. While the mandate of medical components of military forces may not allow direct assistance to local populations on a humanitarian basis, medical officers can make meaningful contributions. Assistance to UNHCR medical programmes, the World Health Organization and other medical components of a humanitarian operation (including NGOs) in programme development, technical assistance and especially medical logistic support have all been central

aspects of past activities. Medical support may be made available to local medical authorities, either directly or through a United Nations or NGO health sector programme. The humanitarian role of military medical personnel in this respect is essentially the same as military engineers. Medical evacuations may also be a feature of military efforts in a conflict or crisis situation. The military capacity to undertake medical evacuations combines medical and logistic expertise. To ensure the success of the evacuations of medically vulnerable individuals, protection officers will have to coordinate closely with the military to ensure that appropriate attention is given to the legal aspects of evacuation.

4.8 Transporting Humanitarian Aid

In comparison with the military, UNHCR lacks the trained personnel and assets necessary to undertake a large-scale logistics operation. Emergency relief operations may have the advantage of short-term donations of military logistics resources in order to "bridge the gap" created by pipeline delays. In the cases of the Sarajevo and Rwanda-Burundi airlifts, for example, several countries loaned aircraft and crews, and seconded Air Force officers to UNHCR. The same may be the case for ground transportation, where a donor nation makes available military assets and personnel, as if providing the services of a specialized implementing partner. Unless personnel are seconded to UNHCR, they must remain within their military command structure.

4.9 Repair and Maintenance of Infrastructure

Vital infrastructure repairs may be undertaken for operational or humanitarian reasons. Infrastructure repairs may also be undertaken to establish goodwill in a given community. The extent of the commitment of civil or military agencies to infrastructure repair will depend on the mandate provided by the Security Council and the availability of international resources. To the extent that ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance requires efficient and accessible routes and delivery sites, a military mission in support of humanitarian operations will always have an infrastructure repair component. The benefit of military engineering elements for humanitarian operations is beyond question. Rarely will humanitarian organizations be in a position to provide similar expertise and resources. Where infrastructure repair is not a mission objective, assets may be provided on an "as available" basis. In the latter case, priorities for repairs should be established between the civil authorities and the appropriate humanitarian agency. When planning this type of assistance, UNHCR staff may wish to remind engineering elements to bear in mind that the aim of humanitarian assistance is to sustain life and to strengthen local institutions' efforts to relieve suffering and build self-reliance, as a first step toward reconstruction, rehabilitation and development. As a first step, infrastructure repair need only address immediate needs.

4.10 Specialized Actors: United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), Military Observers (UNMOs) and Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs)

Members of UNCIVPOL and UNMOs are generally unarmed and widely deployed in the field. These two features give UNCIVPOL and UNMOs access to local populations, and they are well-placed to receive and disseminate information. In past and present missions, both have offered UNHCR the advantage of a field presence in remote locations, and have undertaken specific humanitarian support duties. In larger United Nations missions, Civil Affairs Officers may also be deployed. These civilian political specialists form the policy-making branch of the mission. Their area of expertise relates to political liaison, information, legal affairs and negotiations. The role of the local civilian police officer is to maintain law and order and to ensure that the rights and freedoms of individuals are respected. In the environment of emergency operations, where the maintenance of law and order may be quite tenuous, the police officer will rely principally upon credibility and a perception of fairness. A reputation for impartiality and neutrality are therefore the police officer's greatest assets in these circumstances. Duties have varied in United Nations operations in which civilian police have played a part. The role of UNCIVPOL has generally been to monitor the performance and conduct of local police (including militias) and to assist them in the execution of their duties, including the prevention of smuggling and black marketeering. UNCIVPOL does not have the authority to maintain law and order, but rather, simply, to monitor,

report and advise local police in the performance of their duties. UNCIVPOL's duty is to the war-affected population and not the local administration. As such, UNHCR and UNCIVPOL have complementary protection mandates, and can do much to assist one another in achieving their respective missions.

UNMOs' duties are more specific to the military component of a United Nations emergency operation, and their responsibility is not directly to local civilian populations. Nevertheless, they are generally well-equipped and widely dispersed in the field, and are therefore an excellent source of "eyes and ears" on the ground. UNMOs have proven an invaluable source of information on the effect of military activities upon a local population, including population movements, humanitarian needs and protection concerns. Their very presence in vulnerable communities has acted as a stabilizing influence, providing significant "passive" protection to local populations.

Duties will vary from mission to mission. In general, police and UNMO duties with a humanitarian component will include a combination or aspects of the following: activities related to ensuring the maximum freedom of movement of local populations, supervision of the passage of humanitarian aid, monitoring and reporting on the situation of minorities, investigating reports of missing persons, maintaining buffer zones between opposing parties to a conflict, staffing police/observation posts and conducting mobile patrols, and ensuring that local police and other authorities carry out their duties in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards of conduct. Complementary humanitarian tasks (in addition to the foregoing) might include assisting UNHCR to gather information on beneficiary needs and monitoring aid distribution, as well as investigating reports of killings, atrocities and human rights violations. UNCIVPOL and UNMOs may also undertake duties related to the security of warehouses, transportation routes and air and sea ports.

The politically unstable environment in which most emergency operations take place requires awareness of how events affect UNHCR's protection and assistance activities. UNHCR staff members may find regular contacts with CAOs a profitable means of staying "politically in touch". Their range of contacts and familiarity with local and international political trends may also be useful in setting the stage for a particular UNHCR activity.

Review Questions

Answer the following:

How can humanitarian activities be compromised by "the very act of carrying out a mandate to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance"?

Answer

In what two ways may UNHCR's humanitarian activities be linked to the international military?

Answer

What are the disadvantages of security support from the international military?

Answer

What limitations can be expected with respect to the ability of international military contingents to assist UNHCR operations with logistic support?

Answer

Part 5: Cooperation and Coordination with the Military

This chapter will help you:

- to devise practical measures to build an effective partnership with the military;

- to plan for undertakings in cooperation with the military.

5.1 Achieving an Effective Partnership

Difficulties may arise in coordinating civil and military activities for many reasons. The gamut of humanitarian agencies and NGOs - representing a wide spectrum of interests and priorities, being of varying sizes, structures, operational styles and organizational cultures - may be confusing to the members of the military, who are accustomed to working with counterparts whose organizational structure is similar to their own. By the same token, some civilians, wary of compromising both their independence and impartiality, and apprehensive about working with an organization which is perceived to be aggressive, may be reluctant to cooperate with the military. Without a proper understanding of each other's role and without effective coordination, the efforts of the political, humanitarian and military components of an international crisis response can work at cross purposes. Coordination mechanisms will vary with the mandates and conditions of the particular operation. Nevertheless, the following approaches should be common to all combined efforts.

5.2 Coordination Mechanisms: Ten Steps to Effective Coordination

Central Coordination. The size, composition and objective of any international emergency operation will vary. In general, it is fair to say that political, military and humanitarian elements will form the corps of a United Nations response. In principle, these components should be coordinated by one office or individual. Because UNHCR maintains offices or some form of activities throughout the world on a constant basis, a UNHCR response to a humanitarian emergency is likely to be underway before the political and financial aspects of deploying peacekeepers are sorted out in New York. Similarly, the appointment or designation of a Special Representative of the Secretary General may take place long after UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies have developed their own approaches to meeting the needs of the victims of the emergency. Central coordination will be complicated when military action is not carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. **The early establishment of informed and reasonable expectations** is essential to the success of any common mission in the field. Even within the United Nations system, the structure and style of agencies varies. Some agencies, like UNHCR, are long-established and comfortable with a particular mandate or method of operation. Others may be less established or, as with recent UNHCR experience, adapted on an ad hoc basis to undertake unfamiliar activities. Most United Nations agencies tend to devolve authority to decision-makers in the field. By comparison, the military is deployed for relatively short duration tours of duty, and accustomed to a centralized decision-making structure. Awareness and accommodation of these differences in operational cultures will greatly enhance the ability of UNHCR and the military to work cohesively with one another.

To assist the military to understand the nature of a humanitarian mission, attention might be drawn to the following principles:

Humanity: Human suffering should be relieved wherever it is found. The inherent dignity and other human rights of individuals and groups must be respected and protected.

Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance should be provided without discrimination. Relief must address the needs of all individuals and groups who are suffering, without regard to nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex or ethnicity.⁵¹ Needs assessments and relief activities should be geared to give priority to the most urgent cases.

Neutrality: Humanitarian relief should be provided without bias toward or against one or more of the parties to the political, military, religious, ideological or ethnic controversy which has given rise to the suffering.

The rotation of personnel can limit the continuity of a burgeoning relationship between military and civilian actors. Replacement personnel may not share with their predecessors the understanding of roles which had been established. One means of ensuring a common perception is to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding, which, subject to amendment,

describes the responsibilities and objectives of the military contingent and UNHCR. Although such a document has no legal significance, it may help to avoid problems of coordination and cooperation.

Ten Steps to Effective Coordination

(diagram)

The delineation of common geographic areas of responsibility strengthens coordination between the civil and military components of a common operation. UNHCR, in working with local civil authorities, generally defines territorial responsibilities for its own units along existing administrative boundaries, with field offices in the respective municipal, county or provincial capital. Military commanders should be encouraged to follow the same practice, although UNHCR should remain flexible where this is not possible. Using existing geographic divisions simplifies relations with local authorities and allows greater access to local administrative information. Lines of confrontation tend to change. Basing areas of responsibility upon factional-control of territory is therefore generally unwise.

Compatible communications equipment with shared frequencies are essential to coordination on the ground. During the start-up phase of past and present joint operations, a major limitation on coordination between the military and United Nations agencies was the lack of common means of communication. Military contingents bring with them their own communications equipment, which may not be compatible with that of other national contingents, UNHCR or other agencies. Domestic communications are likely to be unusable. Where communications equipment cannot be made compatible, it may be necessary for one of UNHCR or the military to provide the appropriate equipment to the other.

Collocation or location in close proximity to one another allows UNHCR and military units to maintain constant contact for better coordination and security. From the military point of view, collocation will reduce the need to stretch resources. The establishment of UNHCR offices, however, may take place before the deployment of military units, in locations unsuitable for military bases. Similarly, the scale of military deployments may deny suitable premises for civilian actors. From the UNHCR point of view, military sites may be unsuitable for the establishment of field offices, as they may be less accessible to populations in need of assistance.

The exchange of liaison officers is a means of preserving continuing cooperation. Reciprocal exchange of liaison officers has proven a practical means of ensuring quick dissemination of information and the constant presence of a focal point for enquiries and better coordination of efforts. The Head of the UNHCR mission should therefore be prepared to request and receive seconded officers from troop-contributing nations. Similarly, field offices should receive and/or exchange liaison officers, whenever possible, with international military contingents. These individuals become well-known among their counterparts, and help put a human face on the relationship between the organizations.

Regular inter-agency meetings will improve cooperation and avoid duplication of efforts. Where a peacekeeping force's mandate includes responsibility for the security of UNHCR operations, these meetings are also the appropriate forum for sharing security information, conducting security briefings and organizing security training. Inter-agency meetings also provide the opportunity for participants to gain greater familiarity with the programmes of other agencies; for the presentation of plans and evaluation of past ventures; for the coordination of activities; the sharing of resources and information; and for the creation and implementation of common strategies. A frequent problem for the military is direct approaches from several different humanitarian organizations on matters that should be coordinated by the lead agency for humanitarian activities.

Routine contact between desk officers helps to ensure operationality. Communications should take place on a daily basis, or as necessary, between officers of each organization with complementary responsibilities. This implies a pairing of counterparts: the Special Representative of the Secretary General with the Special Envoy of the High Commissioner; the Force

Commander with the UNHCR Representative or Chief of Mission; battalion or field commanders with UNHCR Heads of Field Offices; military operations officers with UNHCR logistics officers; civil affairs officers with UNHCR field officers; military public information officers with UNHCR public information officers (and so on).

Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOCs) may be created by the military at command headquarters. While the coordination of humanitarian efforts is not a military responsibility, CMOCs have proven an efficient means of overcoming coordination difficulties. These cells typically provide a convenient focus for requests for military assistance. They provide a meeting place where all members of the military chain of command can have access to civilian actors and, similarly, where civilians can have access to the military. Where the military organization seeks to establish centres of this kind, UNHCR participation is encouraged. Although CMOCs have no tasking authority, they introduce to an operation the advantage of a passive information-sharing focal point.

Assessment or Reconnaissance missions (or "recces") are the equivalent of UNHCR assessment missions. It is an opportunity for a military unit to gather information about a particular place in order to be able to plan an upcoming mission. Military contingents will usually undertake a pre-deployment reconnaissance mission. These present a good opportunity to establish with the incoming unit achievable mission objectives, to share information and the benefit of experience, to introduce local contacts, to address the military-civil relationship - in general, to avoid "reinventing the wheel". UNHCR should actively seek to assist the military by preparing briefing kits and conducting joint familiarization meetings.

Review Questions

Answer the following: The "Ten Steps to Effective Coordination" diagram is reproduced below. Fill in as many of the steps as you can remember.

Answer

What single feature do each of the Ten Steps to Effective Coordination have in common?

Answer

How are UNHCR's humanitarian activities linked to the international military?

Answer

What are some of the advantages to military support for UNHCR's activities?

Answer

What are some of the disadvantages to military support for UNHCR's activities?

Answer

Part 6: Challenges to Effective Coordination

This chapter will reveal:

- some of the challenges common to UNHCR and military endeavours in emergency operations;
- consequences which may follow from a failure to coordinate humanitarian and military activities.

6.1 Continuing Consent

The express consent of the parties to a conflict is a precondition to the deployment of a

peacekeeping force, in accordance with the principle of non-intervention which is contained in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. Practical reasons also motivate insistence on consent, not the least of which will be the safety of peacekeeping personnel. UNHCR also requires the consent of Governmental authorities¹¹¹ before relief activities commence, and shares the same practical concerns.

Consent and neutrality are related concepts. A party to a conflict, for example, would not agree to the deployment of a peacekeeping force where the neutrality of the force is in doubt. At the same time, as United Nations forces must be strictly neutral, consent to their deployment will always be required. The same cannot always be said for other international military actors, where deployment may be in pursuit of both humanitarian and national objectives. Indeed, military forces - especially those which are not experienced in United Nations peacekeeping operations - are not accustomed to operating in a consensual environment, because the traditional role of the military is to impose the will of the State upon an unwilling adversary.

A major challenge for peacekeepers and UNHCR alike in joint operations has been the maintenance of consent. The maintenance of consent for UNHCR in operations which involve non-United Nations military may be even more difficult. Consent is rarely unconditional or open ended. Attempts by local or international authorities to manipulate the civil or military components of a joint operation to gain political, economic, military or criminal advantage will undermine consent and reduce the opportunity to provide relief to the suffering. Restraints on the ability of UNHCR or peacekeepers to carry out their respective mandates indicate a failure of consent, and therefore the very basis upon which operations are founded. Activities directed toward reinforcing consent are therefore essential. For UNHCR, this means carrying out activities with visible demonstrations of the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Visibility is greatly enhanced by consultation and negotiation; and by the prominent display of "UNHCR" on vehicles, premises and even by wearing UNHCR apparel.

6.2 Linkage

Linkage occurs when the parties to a conflict condition humanitarian activities upon other humanitarian actions or the progress of political or military events. The acceptance of linkages by humanitarian or military actors violates the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. From a practical point of view, acceptance of linkages creates operational gridlock, because linkages tie the continuity of humanitarian programmes to matters beyond the control of the operation's participants. The insistence on linkages by the parties to a conflict also suggests a vitiation of consent. The military, more accustomed to autonomy, may find it difficult to apply this principle, as to them it may appear to prevent the achievement of reasonable objectives. An escort commander who is told at a checkpoint that passage of his humanitarian aid convoy is conditional upon sharing some of the aid with needy locals, for example, may not immediately appreciate the implications if he has not been briefed about the problem of linkages and the fact that each linkage - however apparently reasonable - may become a precedent for obviously unreasonable demands.

6.3 Negotiations

The overall mission objectives of the political, humanitarian and military actors in a United Nations operation are essentially the same - or, at least, convergent. At the field level, however, short-term objectives may differ among the United Nations components. In operations which involve a non-United Nations military support component, the national interests of the troop-contributing State may come into play. Each of the political, humanitarian and military elements must exercise caution and sensitivity in order to avoid interference with the others' pursuits. In practice, this requires restraint and strict limitation of negotiations and mediation to each party's respective sphere of competence. The alternative is the nightmare of linkage, which inevitably leads to operational paralysis.

6.4 The Use of Force

Where direct engagement takes place between peacekeepers and a party to a conflict, whether

in self-defense or under an enforcement mandate, the impartiality and neutrality of the United Nations will be compromised. However serious the humanitarian needs of a population, it would be impossible for UNHCR operations to remain unaffected. The confidence and support of the population allied to the faction targeted will be damaged. The United Nations will be viewed as supporting the enemy. Experience in Bosnia and Somalia suggests that the transition from being in a war zone to being at war can be remarkable swift. The remarkable restraint shown by peacekeepers - sometimes interpreted as weakness - has in many situations preserved the opportunity to continue humanitarian operations. The use of force may also be contemplated, or even mandated, to achieve humanitarian objectives. Such use would convert a humanitarian action to a military one, albeit with the same objectives. In such circumstances, where UNHCR could no longer maintain a separate neutrality, the continuity of operations would be placed in doubt.

Review Questions

Answer the following: What are three means by which a military partner could compromise UNHCR's activities in a situation of conflict?

Answer

How can compromising action by the military be pre-empted by UNHCR staff members?

Answer

Part 7: Glossary of Military Terms and Abbreviations

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| Air Strike | The offensive use of Air Force weapons against targets on the ground. |
| AOR | Area of Responsibility; see also TAOR. |
| APC | Armoured Personnel Carrier; an armoured vehicle. |
| Blue Helmets | A slang or generic term for United Nations peacekeepers. |
| Bn | Battalion; a unit of soldiers and officers comprised of three or four companies, with a complement of between 600 and 1000 individuals. |
| C2 | Command and Control; methods utilized by the military for decision-making, passage of orders and reporting. |
| C3I | Command, Control, Communications and Information. |
| C4I | Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information. |
| Campaign Plan | The plan of a series of related military operations designed to accomplish a common objective within a specified time frame. |
| CAS | Close Air Support; the use of Air Force weapons against targets on the ground in defense of friendly personnel or installations. |
| Casevac | Casualty Evacuation; the transfer of an injured person from the site of injury to a medical aid facility. |
| CIMIC | Civil-Military Cooperation; see also G5. |
| CO | Commanding Officer. |
| COMCEN | Communications Centre; the focal point of communications at each command headquarters, normally consisting of a switchboard and message centre, with cipher and transmission capacity. Communications related to the planning and direction of operations are usually channelled through the Operations Room. |

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Comms | Communications; a method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another. |
| Coy | Company; a unit of soldiers and officers, normally comprised of three or four platoons, with a complement of between 150 and 300 individuals. |
| CP | Command Post or Checkpoint. |
| DMZ | Demilitarized Zone. |
| End State | The ultimate conditions resulting from a course of events. |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal; disposal of an artillery or mortar shell, mines or other ammunition. |
| FAC | Forward Air Controller; an individual who identifies or marks ground targets for attack by Air Forces. |
| Fwd HQ | A detachment from the main headquarters located in the field, near the confrontation. |
| G1 | The division at a military command centre responsible for administrative, discipline, legal and personnel matters. |
| G2 | The division at a military command centre responsible for military intelligence matters. |
| G3 | The division at a military command centre responsible for operational matters. |
| G4 | The division at a military command centre responsible for logistics (including medical logistics) matters. |
| G5 | The division at a military command centre responsible for relations with local civilian populations; see also CIMIC. |
| HQ | Headquarters; see also Fwd HQ and Rear HQ. |
| LS | Landing Site (for helicopters). |
| LZ | Landing Zone (for helicopters). |
| Medevac | Medical Evacuation; the transfer of a patient by road or air for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment in another location. |
| NCO | Non-Commissioned Officer; a lance corporal, corporal, sergeant or staff sergeant, with limited authority over private soldiers. |
| Officer | Commissioned military personnel who command soldiers or units or work as a desk officer in a headquarters. |
| OP | Observation Post. |
| Ops | Operations. |
| Ops Room | Operations Room; the location or focus of operational activities within a military unit of company size or greater. |
| Peace Enforcement | The use of military measures by a neutral international armed force in order to terminate an armed conflict. |
| Peacebuilding | Diplomatic and military action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and consolidate peace and prevent relapse into conflict. |

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| Peacekeeping | refer to Part 1.1 of this training module. |
| Peacemaking | Action to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means, especially those specified in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. |
| Platoon | A unit of soldiers and officers, normally comprised of three or four sections, with a complement of 30 to 40 individuals. |
| Private Soldier | The most junior soldier. |
| Rank | The grade or class of an individual in the military, which denotes a level of authority and responsibility; when used in the plural, it may refer to a group of private soldiers; typical ground force ranks in ascending order are Private, Lance Corporal, Corporal, Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, Warrant Officer, Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier (General), Major General, Lieutenant General, General and Field Marshall. |
| Rear HQ | A detachment from the main headquarters located away from an area of active combat, primarily concerned with logistics matters. |
| Recce | Reconnaissance; a reconnaissance mission. |
| RV | A rendezvous at a prearranged time or place. |
| Section | A unit of soldiers, normally numbering approximately 10 individuals. |
| Sitrep | Situation Report; a periodic report of events which affect a particular operation, mission or task. |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure; a written guideline describing how a common task or activity is to be carried out. |
| TAOR | Tactical Area of Responsibility; a specified territory for which operational responsibility is assigned. |
| UNCIVPOL | United Nations Civilian Police. |
| UNMO | United Nations Military Observer. |
| UNMP | United Nations Military Police. |

Review Questions

Do the following: Test yourself on military terms and abbreviations. What is the meaning of each of the following?

AOR

CAS

Comms

EOD

G4

Ops

Rear HQ

RV

Sitrep

SOP

Case Study

Review the following: The civil war in Fredonia has entered its seventh month. The country has been divided, roughly in half (see map). Ethnic Fredonians control most of the southern region. Fredonians of Vassalian descent control the northern regions. UNHCR, at the request of the Secretary General, expanded its **existing operations** in the region to include assistance to the **internally displaced** in Fredonia. The Report of the Secretary General, presented to the Security Council six months ago, contains recommendations which include the deployment of a peacekeeping force, to augment a small observer mission already in place, in the areas of Fredonia where the conflict is most active. It was then the unwritten opinion of the Secretary General that Fredonian and Vassalian leaders would **consent** to such a deployment. However, the Secretary General was not able to raise sufficient troop commitments to meet the requirements of such a peacekeeping mission.

Last week, following the widely-publicised discovery of a mass grave near Popote, the capital of Fredonia, fighting intensified on all fronts. Refugees pour out of the country. Neighbours in formerly-harmonious communities are turning against one another. Minority Vassalians in the southern region are being rounded up and forced from Fredonian Government-controlled territory. The Vassalian militia, which controls the main access routes to Popote, is preventing food from reaching the capital by road. The UNHCR Chief of Mission has negotiated unsuccessfully with Vassalian leaders for freedom of movement of UNHCR personnel and convoys. The Vassalians insist that they will not allow any passage until all Vassalian prisoners-of-war are released. Meanwhile, horrific images flood television screens all over the world.

The Presidents of Politsania and Ruritania, reacting to political pressure at home, offer to meet the troop requirements for the peacekeeping mission on one condition: the peacekeeping force will be under Politsanian **command and control** and not the United Nations banner. Seeing no alternative, the Security Council, commending the efforts of humanitarian agencies and NGOs and finding that the situation in Fredonia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, "**acting under Chapter VII**, authorises all Member States, in coordination with the Secretary General, to take military action appropriate to ensuring that humanitarian needs in Fredonia are met".

A **recce** party from the combined Politsania-Ruritanian force sets out from Popote in the direction of Wapitembo, the provisional capital of Vassalian-controlled territory, where UNHCR has a field office. The team of ten officers is led by the commanding officer of a Politsanian **battalion**, to be deployed in Wapitembo in five days. The team travels in convoy by road, escorted by Ruritanian **APCs** which arrived in Popote the day before. At a checkpoint in Hapa, a village on the Fredonian side of the line of confrontation, the convoy is stopped by Government soldiers. Placing mines in front of the lead vehicle, the soldiers demand food in exchange for free passage. Negotiations ensue. Tension mounts. The Ruritanian soldiers, anxious to demonstrate their "more robust" approach to peacekeeping, threaten to break across the checkpoint.

Hours later, the delegation arrives in your office in Wapitembo, tired but unscathed, their enthusiasm apparently undimmed. The Politsanian commander apologises for his party's delay, explaining what occurred at the checkpoint. In fact, no force was used to gain passage. Rather, the delegation was allowed to proceed on the strength of a promise to return with a small amount of UNHCR aid stocks, which will, in effect, buy the party's return to the capital. The commanding officer also confirms that the Politsanian battalion will deploy in Wapitembo, with duties that include support to UNHCR operations. You then begin to discuss how the Politsanian efforts can best complement UNHCR's activities.

Review Questions

Answer the following: Why does the Security Council specify that its Resolution is passed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations?

Answer

Why might the Presidents of Politsania and Ruritania decline to submit their troops to United Nations command and control?

Answer

The Presidents of Politsania and Ruritania, in a joint press release, refer to their combined forces as "a peacekeeping mission". Is this a peacekeeping force?

Answer

What were the options of the Politsanian-Ruritanian military at the Hapa checkpoint? What are the operational implications of each option?

Answer

What does the commanding officer mean by "support to UNHCR operations"? What suggestions would you make to the commanding officer as to how his battalion could support UNHCR operations?

Answer

The Politsanian commander seeks your advice on how best to coordinate the efforts of his battalion and UNHCR. What are your recommendations?

Answer

What is the meaning or implication of the words printed in bold typeface in the preceding scenario?

existing operations

internally displaced

consent

command and control

acting under Chapter VII

recce

battalion

APCs

Appendix

A History of UNHCR Cooperation with the Military in Field Operations

This appendix describes some examples of the relationship between UNHCR and the military in field operations over the course of the last several years. It is intended to illustrate the variety of forms of these operations, from mere coincidence of missions to formal agreements under which responsibilities are delineated. The descriptions are not meant to be exhaustive.

Nicaragua

There was no formal relationship between UNHCR and the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The 1987 agreement on a peace process among Central American States titled "Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America"

included a significant repatriation component. ONUCA's mission, under Security Council Resolution 650 (1990), was expanded to include the voluntary demobilization of Nicaraguan resistance and the reduction of the Sandanista army. Some interdependence of missions therefore arose. The majority of the Contras who were repatriated, however, were moved under the auspices of the Organization of American States, and not UNHCR. The need for coordinated activities between the ONUCA peacekeepers and UNHCR, therefore, rarely arose. In field locations, ONUCA and UNHCR offices were frequently located in close proximity, and sharing of information was regular. In result, the two missions were able to ensure cooperation.

Namibia

Although the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was composed of civilian, police and military components, it was essentially a political organization, the principal mandate of which was to monitor the dismantling of the South African military presence in Namibia and to supervise free elections. Under the general framework of the demands put forward by the Security Council in Resolution 385 (1976), UNTAG entered into several Memoranda of Understanding with the Government of South Africa in 1989 which addressed the presence of the United Nations in Namibia. No formal relationship between UNHCR and UNTAG was mandated by the Security Council. However, Resolution 385 and subsequent Resolutions referred to the return of refugees as a precursor to registration of voters and elections. UNHCR's role as the United Nations organ responsible for voluntary repatriation of refugees was therefore implicit. UNHCR concluded a separate Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of South Africa with respect to the repatriation. Some national contingents expressed frustration with the apparent inability of UNHCR to define military support tasks. At the same time, UNHCR was generally more efficient at bringing humanitarian resources to bear than the civilian component of UNTAG, due to its independent sources of funding.

Northern Iraq

The United Nations Guard Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) was established and deployed with the consent of the Government of Iraq, detailed in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in Baghdad in April 1992. The principal task of this semi-military multinational contingent was to protect United Nations personnel, assets and operations. As a single-purpose support Force having no humanitarian role, no significant problems of interface arose. The previous year, the Security Council in Resolution 688 (1991) authorized Coalition Forces to deploy in Iraq for humanitarian reasons, without the consent of the Iraqi Government. UNHCR was the lead agency for humanitarian relief, having entered operations with the consent of the Iraqi Government. It was felt by some senior UNHCR personnel that UNHCR priorities and policy were, at times, subordinated to the will of Coalition Forces. In particular, the creation of the safe area in Northern Iraq allowed the Turkish Government to prevent Iraqi Kurds from seeking asylum in that country, contrary to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Coalition Force members disagreed with UNHCR, at times, as to whether the conditions existed for refugees to return to Iraq in safety and dignity. On the other hand, the presence of Coalition Forces in Turkey allowed UNHCR to have access to the southeastern region for the first time. UNHCR's lack of preparedness to take over coordination of the safe havens led to a review of its emergency planning procedures.

Cambodia

Cambodia represents the United Nations most ambitious attempt to implement a comprehensive plan to establish a lasting peace. Following the signing in Paris in 1991 of the framework agreement "A Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict", the Security Council established, by Resolution 745 (1992), the Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC's mandate included seven distinct components: human rights, civil administration, electoral, police, repatriation, rehabilitation and military. UNHCR and the military remained independent under the umbrella of UNTAC, allowing each to maintain credibility and the confidence of all parties, even when the larger organizations relations with the Khmer Rouge were strained. The relationship between UNHCR and the military was limited, in that the Force

Commander's instruction did not require substantial support to UNHCR; and in any event, there was no UNTAC military presence on the Thailand-side of the border. The main task for the military in Cambodia was security. Problems which affected the relationship between the military and UNHCR were mostly those beyond their common control. These included early difficulties with UNTAC, mostly having to do with bureaucracy, lack of flexibility and conflicting priorities.

Former Yugoslavia

In the former-Yugoslavia, operations are carried out where armed conflict is continuing. UNHCR's operation predated the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and takes place throughout all of the former-Yugoslav republics. UNPROFOR's mandate is restricted to Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Joint activities between UNHCR and UNPROFOR commenced in mid-1992 when, under Security Council Resolutions 764 and 776, UNPROFOR was requested to take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Since that time, military contributions in support of humanitarian activities have included demining, security, repair of roads, bridges and essential infrastructure; and providing Air Force assets for the implementation of the humanitarian aid airlift into besieged Sarajevo and air drops of humanitarian aid into other inaccessible areas. In this theatre of operations, humanitarian and military operations have become closely entwined. The lack of a political framework under which objectives are delineated, and a military mandate which potentially includes enforcement action have been the most serious threats to ongoing cooperation. Close coordination at all levels, however, has ensured reasonable collaboration.

Rwanda

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was authorized by Security Council Resolution 872 (1993). By the terms of the Resolution, UNAMIR was assigned particular duties, including "to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations". In early 1994, the Security Council passed Resolutions 918 and 925, recognizing that UNAMIR's role included the facilitation and security of humanitarian relief operations. UNAMIR's mandate, however, was not extended beyond the borders of Rwanda. There is no specific reference to UNHCR in any of the Security Council Resolutions concerning UNAMIR, and therefore no formal legal link between UNAMIR and UNHCR. Nevertheless, substantial coordination of efforts has followed, particularly having to do with the operation of Kigali Airport and UNHCR's emergency relief airlift. Because the Secretary General was unable to raise sufficient troops to meet the authorized strength of UNAMIR, the Security Council, in Resolution 929 (1994), authorized the deployment of the Armed Forces of Member States as a temporary humanitarian measure. The French-led multilateral OPERATION TURQUOISE then ensued. OPERATION TURQUOISE achieved substantial success in establishing safety zones for threatened populations, but undertook few activities related to UNHCR's humanitarian operations. The American OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE was instrumental in establishing and maintaining the air bridge and supporting humanitarian activities. Coordination was maximized in both cases by the secondment of Air Force officers to UNHCR's Air Operations Cell in Geneva and by the establishment of Joint Logistics Cells and Civil-Military Operations Cells in the field.

Georgia

The 1994 Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed by representatives of Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia and UNHCR provides for the repatriation to Abkhazia of persons displaced by the internal conflict which broke out in 1992. The agreement specifies that the repatriation is contingent upon the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. Already present in the area was the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), deployed under the authority of Security Council Resolution 858 (1993). UNOMIG then had a mandate limited to ceasefire verification. Subsequent fighting invalidated this mandate. A series of Resolutions beginning with 892 (1993) extended the mandate of UNOMIG and included more general military observation duties. At the time of the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement, only 21 of the authorized 55 UNOMIG observers had been deployed. At the same time, the Russian Federation deployed troops in Georgia. It remains to be seen whether

the parties to the Quadripartite Agreement will accept the Russian force as fulfilling the peacekeeping force deployment requirement. The terms of the Agreement establish in effect a relationship between UNHCR and the peacekeeping force. Given the lack of an arms length international military presence, UNHCR's principal military contact will be the Russian Force, despite the presence of UNOMIG. Should a multinational deployment take place under the terms of the Quadripartite Agreement, a unique chapter in UNHCR's involvement with the military will have been written, because, for the first time, UNHCR played a pivotal role in the creation of the peacekeeping force's mandate.