PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT:
LEBANON

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Summary

Lebanon: renewed government attention needed to speed up return of IDPs

The Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990 and Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982 displaced a total of almost one million people. When the civil war ended in 1990, some 500,000 people remained internally displaced, and Israeli attacks, particularly on south Lebanon, caused further displacement as late as 1996. Most of the displaced originated from the Mount Lebanon region (62 per cent) and from southern Lebanon (24 percent). No updated reliable survey exists to determine the current number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Estimates range, hugely, between 50,000 and 600,000. According to the Lebanese Ministry of the Displaced, 79,500 people have been able to return since the end of the conflict, excluding returnees to the South and West Bekaa areas. A number of factors have slowed the pace of return, including lack of finances, political rivalries, difficult socio-economic conditions, security concerns, and a steady decrease in initiatives targeting displaced populations since 2000. The return of the displaced remains a challenge for the sustainability of Lebanon’s post-war development. Renewed attention by the government, as well as the international community, is required to speed up the return process and ensure the successful reintegration of returnees.

Background and main causes of displacement

Internal displacements in Lebanon were not continuous, but occurred in separate periods of the civil war (1975-1990) due to internal strife, Israeli military invasions and fighting between Syrian forces and Lebanese militias. It is estimated that at its height up to one million people were displaced. A first wave of population displacement occurred in 1975 when Beirut was divided into Muslim and Christian sectors. In 1985, an estimated 367,000 people were displaced in the Mount Lebanon region. Hundreds of thousands more people were internally displaced as a result of Israeli military invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. In 1989, violent fighting between Lebanese militias and Syrian troops and between militias themselves led to further displacement. A ceasefire was declared in October 1989 when Lebanese parliamentarians signed the Document of National Understanding (the “Taif Agreement”) which was drafted following years of negotiations between the different militias along with Syria in an attempt to reach consensus on internal political reform. In 1990, it was estimated that approximately 450-500,000 people were internally displaced (UNDP 2002). However, in 1996, Israeli air raids and rocket attacks on Beirut and villages in southern Lebanon caused displacement of still hundred of thousands more people (Assaf and El-Fil, April 2000; LNF 2001; ILO, 1997, Sect. 1, 4).

Although the conflict ended in 1990, the far south of Lebanon remained occupied by Israel for another ten years. IDPs from the south began to return home when Israeli troops withdrew from the area in May 2000 (UN SC Resolution 425 (1978)). Cross-border clashes and exchanges of fire between the militia Hizbollah and Israeli security forces have continued to take place since 2000 (UN SC, 21 July 2004). The foremost issue remains the disputed territory of the Shebaa Farms, considered by the UN as Israeli-occupied Syrian territory but currently claimed by Lebanon with Syria’s backing. Since 1978, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been present in south Lebanon to maintain peace and security in the area as established by UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). In July 2004, on the basis of ongoing tensions between Israel and Lebanon along the border, the UN Security Council approved the extension of UNIFIL’s mandate through January 2005 (UN SC, 21 July 2004 and 29 July 2004; UN, 21 January 2004). Syria also continues to maintain some 20,000 troops in Lebanon (Middle East Online, 7 June 2004; AI, 26 May 2004).
In the absence of an updated reliable survey, it is difficult to estimate the number of people still internally displaced. The protracted nature of the civil war was a complicating factor, as the conflict caused both temporary and permanent displacements. While some populations were permanently displaced by internal strife and external aggression, others were able to return to their homes once fighting ceased. This has resulted in large disparities in estimates of people internally displaced, IDP population movements and geographic distribution (ILO, 1997, Sect. 4.1.2). The US Committee for Refugees 2004 report suggests that 50,000 to 500,000 people continue to be in a situation of internal displacement (USCR, 24 May 2004). Other agencies cite the figure of approximately 600,000 IDPs (US DOS, 25 February 2004; UNHCR, December 2003). According to the Lebanese Ministry of the Displaced there are currently 68,000 people in a situation of internal displacement (Ministry of the Displaced, 4 August 2004). The most affected areas of internal displacement were the Mount Lebanon region, specifically in the areas of Alley, El-Chouf and Baabda where an estimated 62 per cent of IDPs originated, and south Lebanon, where an estimated 24 per cent of the IDP population originated (USCR 2003; UNDP 2002).

Today, most internally displaced people live in Beirut and its suburbs, often hosted by relatives or friends (Caritas, August 2004). It is estimated that as many as 70 per cent of the displaced live in poor conditions, often in crowded areas, lacking essential health and social services (Caritas, August 2004; Daily Star, 22 January 2004; UNDP 2002).

**Pace of return slows down**

Although the end of 2002 was set by the government as the target for the return of all displaced, the protracted situation of internal displacement and the laggardly return process remain unresolved post-war issues in Lebanon (Assaf and El-Fil, April 2000; USCR, 24 May 2004). According to the government, only 79,500 people have been able to return to their area of origin, although this figure does not include return movements to south Lebanon and the West Bekaa area. The primary areas where IDPs have returned are Kfar Selouan, Obaye, Al Benieh, Ain Drafil, Kfar Matta, Dfoun, Baawartah, Breeh, and parts of Beirut and its suburbs (Ministry of the Displaced, 4 August 2004).

Return has reportedly been slow due to a number of factors including corruption and political rivalries between government officials, budgetary problems and the lack of suitable economic and social conditions particularly in rural areas, as well as security issues (US DOS, 25 February 2004; Caritas, August 2004; USCR 2004; UNDP 2002, 2001). Experts dealing with the issue of displacement in Lebanon say that 20-30 per cent of the displaced will never return, because they no longer have any social ties to their places of origin (Lebanon Wire, 8 July 2002). Regional disparities are pronounced; socio-economic conditions are much less developed in rural areas, meaning that displaced people are better off in their current location than in their communities of origin. Poor conditions in rural areas led to an increase in migration to towns and cities (UNDP 2002).

A recent survey undertaken by Caritas in 110 villages in the Alley, El-Chouf and Baabda areas of Mount Lebanon, indicates that of a total of 28,400 displaced families, only 5,396 people had returned. The survey found that many IDPs were losing hope of return due to a lack of educational and health services and economic opportunities. Although compensation has been offered to IDPs to rebuild homes, the vast majority of the displaced have reportedly not yet reclaimed their properties (USCR, 24 May 2004). The survey found that many people have in practice only received partial compensation due to shortages in government funds and are unable to return because their homes continue to be uninhabitable (Caritas, August 2004; Lebanon Wire, 8 July 2002).

Return to the Mount Lebanon region in particular has also been impeded by a lack of reconciliation between residents of villages and people who wish to return as a result of sectarian divisions caused by the war (Ibrahim, 7 February 2001; Lebanese government, 30 June 2004; Daily Star, 29 April 2004). Militias displaced populations during the war to create homogenous communities creating tensions along
confessional lines. This has mostly been the case in Breeh in the El-Chouf, Kfar Selouan in the Metn, and Kfar Matta (Monday Morning, 30 April 2003; Lebanese government, 30 June 2004; ILO, 1997).

Return to south Lebanon has been possible since mid-2000, yet return movements to this area have also been slow. Remaining landmines and unexploded shells continue to affect the confidence of people living in the area and those who might otherwise return (NDO 2004; UN HCHR, 11 March 2004). Mine clearance assessments undertaken in the area indicate that most villages and towns have not reached their pre-conflict populations. The assessments also indicate that mainly elderly people have returned and that while property construction has increased, many of those who are rebuilding homes do not reside in them on a permanent basis (MACC SL, 2004). Returns to South Lebanon have also been affected by inadequate security. Cross-border clashes between Hizbollah and Israeli security forces continue to pose a physical threat to civilians (UN SC, 21 July 2004).

National response

Resolving the issue of internal displacement has repeatedly been emphasised as a national priority by governmental representatives, codified in the 1989 Taif Agreement, which declared the return of IDPs an essential condition for permanent reconciliation and peace (Daily Star, 21 January 2004; Monday Morning, 30 April 2003; Lebanese government, 30 June 2004). The agreement binds national authorities to “solve completely the problem of IDPs, and acknowledge the right of every Lebanese citizen displaced since 1975 to come back to the place from which he/she was displaced; to establish the legislation that safeguards this right and ensure the means of reconstruction” (Assaf and El-Fil, April 2000; Taif Agreement 1989). The agreement also pledges financial support to IDPs to reconstruct their homes and villages (Assaf and El-Fil, April 2000; Lebanese government 1989).

Following the conflict, two central government structures were created to implement the return process. A Ministry for the Displaced was established to rehabilitate infrastructure and housing, improve the economic sector, and to achieve national reconciliation, and a Central Fund for the Displaced (CFD) was created to finance the return of the displaced. The government designed a comprehensive return programme, including compensation to IDPs to rebuild their homes, support to the reconciliation process between residents and returnees and socio-economic rehabilitation (Ministry of the Displaced 1997, 2001; UNDP 2002). In early 2004, the Ministry of the Displaced announced a new type of micro-credit loan for IDPs, intended to encourage displaced people to return to their homes by providing them with economic opportunities (Daily Star, 21 January 2004).

According to government representatives, the absence of funds has stood and still stands in the way of the national strategy for the return of people displaced during the conflict (Lebanon Wire, 8 July 2002; UNDP, 2002; Monday Morning, 30 April 2003; Daily Star, 21 January 2004 and 10 August 2004; Lebanese government, 30 June 2004). The Minister of the Displaced announced at the end of June 2004 that 185 billion Lebanese pounds (approximately $122 million) are needed to secure the reintegration of all people displaced by the war (Lebanese government, 30 June 2004).

However, the government has come under criticism for failing to secure the return of IDPs due to mismanagement of funds and political corruption. Reports indicate that large percentages of the Ministry's expenditure went to people who were occupying houses but were not always displaced. Case-studies in villages of return indicate inconsistencies between government discourse and practice. For instance, many returnees have not been paid the full compensation promised and the physical infrastructure of many villages is only partially repaired (ILO 1997; UNDP 1996; Caritas, August 2004; Assaf, 7 April 2000; Daily Star, 18 February 2004)

International response

The international community’s response to the needs of displaced and returnee populations in Lebanon has steadily waned since 2000. While it continues to broadly support post-conflict reconstruction and
development in Lebanon, little funding is being directed to the primary area of displacement, the Mount Lebanon region which is no longer considered a post-conflict region (Caritas, August 2004). Since 1992, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been the key UN agency assisting IDPs and returnees in Lebanon. UNDP continues to provide support to the return and reconciliation process in Alley, El-Chouf and Baabda of the Mount Lebanon region through its “Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced” programme that is expected to be completed in 2005 (UNDP 2002, 2004). European Union programmes supporting IDPs and returnees were largely completed at the end of 2003 (EC, August 2004). A number of national and international NGOs continue to provide a range of assistance to displaced and returnee populations, ranging from housing restoration programmes to micro-credit and financial assistance. However, many no longer receive funds, and rely on their own resources to implement projects for IDPs (Caritas, August 2004).

Most UN agencies in Lebanon as well as donors are currently focusing their efforts on south Lebanon. These initiatives include mine clearance, employment promotion and socio-economic rehabilitation and development. UNIFIL continues to monitor the area. The return of the displaced remains a challenge for the sustainability of Lebanon’s post-war development. Renewed attention by the government is required, as well as the international community, to speed up the return process and ensure the successful reintegration of returnees.

(Updated August 2004)
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background

From the independence of Lebanon to the aftermath of the 1967 Israeli-Arab war (1920-1973)

- Independence of Lebanon was declared in 1941
- The U.S. sent marine troops to re-establish the government's authority in 1958, at the Lebanese government's request
- Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Palestinians used Lebanon as a base for activities against Israel
- Instability of Lebanese government in the context of Palestinian and Israeli attacks against one another

"1920 1 September - After the League of Nations grants the mandate for Lebanon and Syria to France, the State of Greater Lebanon is proclaimed. It includes the former autonomous province of Mount Lebanon, plus the provinces of north Lebanon, south Lebanon and the Biqa, historically part of Syria.
1926 23 May - [...] Lebanese Republic is declared.
1940 - Lebanon comes under the control of the Vichy French government.
1941 - After Lebanon is occupied by Free French and British troops in June 1941, independence is declared on 26 November. [...] 1943 December - France agrees to the transfer of power to the Lebanese government with effect from 1 January 1944.
1957 - President Kamil Sham'un accepts the Eisenhower Doctrine, announced in January, which offers US economic and military aid to Middle Eastern countries to counteract Soviet influence in the region.
1958 14 July - Faced with increasing opposition which develops into a civil war, President Sham'un asks the United States to send troops to preserve Lebanon's independence.
1958 15 July - The United States, mindful of Iraq's overthrow of its monarchy, sends marines to re-establish the government's authority.
1967 June - Lebanon plays no active role in the Arab-Israeli war but is to be affected by its aftermath when Palestinians use Lebanon as a base for activities against Israel.
1968 28 December - In retaliation for an attack by two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on an Israeli plane in Athens, Israel raids Beirut airport, destroying 13 civilian planes.
1969 November - The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Emile Bustani, and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat sign an agreement in Cairo which aims to control Palestinian guerrilla activities in Lebanon.
1973 10 April - Israeli commandos raid Beirut and kill three Palestinian leaders, close associates of Arafat. The Lebanese government resigns the next day." (BBC News 18 March 2002)

For more in-depth materials on the war in Lebanon, see Al Mashriq's website [Internet]

Beginning of Lebanese civil war and intervention of Syria and Israel (1975-1982)

- In 1975, clashes between Phalangists and Palestinians marked the beginning of Lebanese civil war and Syrian troops entered Lebanon in 1976 to restore order
Israel launched a major invasion of Lebanon in 1978 to retaliate against Palestinian attacks and then again in 1982 following an assassination attempt of an Israeli ambassador (Operation Peace for Galilee)

That same year, the Lebanese president was assassinated, the Phalangist militia killed Palestinians in Sabra and Chatila refugee camps in West Beirut, while Israeli troops occupied that part of the city

International peacekeeping force then arrived in Lebanon at the government's request

"From 1975 to 1991, Lebanon witnessed persistent internal conflict, fomented by wider regional conflict, which resulted in the fragmentation of the country. In the civil war (1975/6), Maronite-dominated militias and army units fought an alliance of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), whose constituency was largely among the Lebanese Muslims and Druze. The armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon was a major catalyst for the war. The intervention of Syria, initially on the side of the Christian militias, imposed something of a stalemate, consolidating the cantonization of the country into confessional districts. Syria has remained the dominant force in Lebanon ever since." (Dammers 1998, p.185)

"Civil war begins
1975 13 April - Phalangist gunmen ambush a bus in the Ayn-al-Rummanah district of Beirut, killing 27 of its mainly Palestinian passengers. The Phalangists claim that guerrillas had previously attacked a church in the same district. (These clashes are regarded as the start of the civil war).
1976 June - Syrian troops enter Lebanon to restore peace but also to curb the Palestinians.
1976 October - Following Arab summit meetings in Riyadh and Cairo, a cease-fire is arranged and a predominantly Syrian Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) is established to maintain it.

Israel controls south
1978 14/15 March - In reprisal for a Palestinian attack into its territory, Israel launches a major invasion of Lebanon, occupying land as far north as the Litani River.
1978 19 March - The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passes Resolution 425, which calls on Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory and establishes the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the Israeli withdrawal, restore peace and help the Lebanese government re-establish its authority in the area.
1978 - By 13 June Israel hands over territory in southern Lebanon not to UNIFIL but to its proxy mainly Christian Lebanese militia under Maj Sa'd Haddad.

Israel attacks
1982 6 June - Following the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, "Operation Peace for Galilee".
1982 14 September - President-elect, Bashir al-Jumayyil, is assassinated. The following day, Israeli forces occupy West Beirut, and from 16 to 18 September, the Phalangist militia kill Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut.
1982 21 September - Bashir's elder brother, Amin al-Jumayyil, is elected president.

See UN Security Council's resolutions 425 [Internet] and 426 [Internet] of 19 March 1978, which called upon Israel to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory and decided on the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

For more in-depth materials on the war in Lebanon, see Al Mashriq's website [Internet]
Country plagued by violence and instability until the formation of a national unity government (1983-1991)

- In 1983 Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement on Israeli withdrawal and on the establishment of a security zone in the south but Lebanon abrogated it in 1987
- Christian South Lebanese Army continued to operate in the South, with Israel's support
- The Lebanese government was marked by instability: a Prime Minister and a President were assassinated and for a few years, Lebanon had two governments, a Muslim one in West Beirut, and a Christian one in East Beirut
- In 1989, the National Assembly endorsed a Charter of National Reconciliation, known as the Tai'f Agreement

"Buffer zone set up
1983 17 May - Israel and Lebanon sign an agreement on Israeli withdrawal, ending hostilities and establishing a security region in southern Lebanon.
1983 23 October - Twenty-four US marines and 58 French paratroopers are killed in two bomb explosions in Beirut, responsibility for which is claimed by two militant Shi'i groups.
1985 - By 6 June most Israeli troops withdraw but some remain to support the mainly Christian South Lebanon Army (SLA) led by Maj-Gen Antoine Lahd which operates in a 'security zone' in southern Lebanon. […]
1987 21 May - Lebanon abrogates the 1969 Cairo agreement with the PLO as well as officially cancelling the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel.
1987 1 June - After Prime Minister Rashid Karami is killed when a bomb explodes in his helicopter, Salim al-Huss becomes acting prime minister.

Two governments, one country
1988 22 September - When no candidate is elected to succeed him, outgoing President Amin al-Jumayyil appoints a six-member interim military government, composed of three Christians and three Muslims, though the latter refuse to serve. Lebanon now has two governments - one mainly Muslim in West Beirut, headed by Al-Huss, the other, Christian, in East Beirut, led by the Maronite Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Gen Michel Awn.
1989 14 March - Awn declares a "war of liberation " against the Syrian presence in Lebanon.
1989 28 July - Shaykh Abd-al-Karim Ubayd, Hezbollah leader in Jibshit, is abducted by Israeli forces.
1989 22 October - The National Assembly, meeting in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, endorses a Charter of National Reconciliation, which reduces the authority of the president by transferring executive power to the cabinet. The National Assembly now has an equal number of Christian and Muslim members instead of the previous six to five ratio.
1989 November - President-elect Rene Mu'awwad is assassinated on 22 November and succeeded by Ilyas al-Hirawi on 24 November. The following day, Salim al-Huss becomes Prime Minister and Gen Emile Lahud replaces Awn as Commander-in-Chief of the Army on 28 November.

Civil war ends
1990 13 October - The Syrian airforce attacks the Presidential Palace at B'abda and Awn takes refuge in the French embassy. This date is regarded as the end of the civil war.
1990 24 December - Umar Karami heads a government of national reconciliation.
1991 - The National Assembly orders the dissolution of all militias by 30 April but Hezbollah is allowed to remain active and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) refuses to disband.
1991 22 May - A Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination is signed in Damascus by Lebanon and Syria and a Higher Council, co-chaired by their two presidents, is established.
1991 1 July - The Lebanese army defeats the PLO in Sidon so that it now confronts the Israelis and the SLA in Jazzin, north of the so-called "security zone".
1991 26 August - The National Assembly grants an amnesty for all crimes committed during the civil war, 1975-1990. Awn receives a presidential pardon and is allowed to leave for France.

To view the Lebanese Charter of National Reconciliation, the "Taif Agreement" (1989) [External Link]

For more in-depth materials on the war in Lebanon, see Al Mashriq's website [Internet]

The 1989 national reconciliation agreement (the “Taif Accord”) ends civil war in Lebanon and guarantees the right of all IDPs to return

- The Taif Agreement is officially known as the "Document of National Accord"
- The agreement was endorsed at a Lebanese National Assembly meeting in Taif, Saudi Arabia on 22 October 1989
- The accord restructured the political system in Lebanon by dividing political power equally between Muslims and Christians
- The accord also called for government sovereignty over all Lebanese territory
- The right of all internally displaced people to return to their place of origin was also specified in the agreement

“The Taif Agreement (officially, the Document of National Accord) was the document that provided the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon.”(Krayem, "2003")

“On October 22 1989 the Lebanese National Assembly meeting in Taif Saudi Arabia endorsed an accord for national reconciliation. The Taif accord restructured the political system in Lebanon by transferring power away from the traditionally Maronite presidency to a Cabinet divided equally between Muslims and Christians.

The Taif accord also maps out a security plan for extending government sovereignty over all Lebanese territory. The accord calls for disbANDING militias and strengthening of Lebanese government forces. It also calls for a withdrawal of Syrian forces inside Lebanon and the establishment of a joint Syrian-Lebanese mechanism for making future decisions about the positioning and functions of the Syrian troops. The accord contains a Syria-Lebanese security agreement and calls for taking steps to bring about a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. The security-related parts of the accord are here translated.

The accord was rejected by General Michel Aoun but was accepted by other Maronite leaders. While Syria voiced support for the accord some Syrian-backed militia leaders such as Walid Jumblatt and Nabi Berri expressed disappointment over the accord which they considered superficial and overly favorable to the Sunni Muslim minority.” (Al Mashriq, 2002)

View the peace agreement [Internet]

See also:
"The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement", Hassan Krayem, American University of Beirut, "2003" [Internet]
Israeli troops pulled out of South Lebanon after years of fighting against guerrilla groups in Lebanon (1992-2000)

- On several occasions, Israel launched heavy attacks in Lebanon to end threats against its civilians from Hezbollah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Amal
- In 1996, one of the attacks resulted in the death of over 100 displaced civilians
- In May 2000, Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon, without the assurance that Lebanon would guarantee the security of Israel's northern border

"1992 16 February - Shaykh Abbas al-Musawi, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, is killed when Israeli helicopter gunships attack his motorcade on a road south-east of Sidon
By 17 June all Western hostages held by Shi'i groups have been released.
1992 20 October - After elections in August and September (the first since 1972), Nabih Birri, Secretary-General of the Shi'i Amal organization, becomes speaker of the National Assembly.
1991 31 October - Rafiq al-Hariri, a rich businessman, born in Sidon but with Saudi Arabian nationality, becomes prime minister, heading a cabinet of technocrats.
1993 25 July - Israel attempts to end the threat from Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) in southern Lebanon by launching "Operation Accountability", the heaviest attack since 1982.
1994 21 May - Mustafa Dib al-Dirani, head of the Believers' Resistance, a breakaway group from the Shi'i Amal organization, is abducted by Israeli commandos from his house in eastern Lebanon.

Israel bombs Beirut
1996 11 April - The start of 'Operation Grapes of Wrath' in which the Israelis bomb Hezbollah bases in southern Lebanon, the southern district of Beirut and the Biqa.
1996 18 April - An Israeli attack on a UN base at Qana results in the death of over 100 Lebanese refugees [displaced civilians] sheltering there.
1996 26 April - The United States negotiates a truce and an "understanding" under which Hezbollah and Palestinian guerrillas agree not to attack civilians in northern Israel, and which recognizes Israel's right to self-defence but also Hezbollah's right to resist the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Lebanon and Syria do not sign the 'understanding' but the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG), with representatives from the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria, is established to monitor the truce.
1998 1 April - Israel's inner cabinet votes to accept United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 425 of 1978 if Lebanon guarantees the security of Israel's northern border. Both Lebanon and Syria reject this condition.

Lahlhud is president
1998 24 November - Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Emile Lahhud, is sworn in as president, succeeding Ilyas al-Hirawi.
1998 4 December - Salim al-Huss becomes prime minister heading a cabinet which includes no militia leaders and only two ministers from the previous administration.
1999 3 June - The South Lebanon Army (SLA) completes its withdrawal from the Jazzin salient (north of the 'security zone') occupied since 1985.
2000 5 March - The Israeli cabinet votes for the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon by July 2000.
2000 18 April - Israel decides to release thirteen Lebanese prisoners held without trial for over 10 years but the detention of Shaykh Abd-al-Karim Ubayd and Mustafa Dib al-Dirani is extended.
2000 24 May - After the collapse of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and the rapid advance of Hezbollah forces, Israel withdraws its troops from southern Lebanon, more than six weeks before its stated deadline of 7 July.

See also U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS), February 2002, Background Note: Lebanon [reference below]

For an analysis of Hizbollah in a local and regional setting, see International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 July 2003: “Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause?” [Internet]

For more in-depth materials on Lebanon's civil war, see Al Mashriq's website [Internet]

Renewed violence in South Lebanon despite withdrawal of Israeli army (2001-2002)

- Lebanese soldiers and police force deployed to former security zone, while the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its area of operations
- Hizbollah guerrillas were not disarmed and continued to patrol along the border with Israel
- The "Shebaa farms", a group of farms close to the poorly-defined border of Lebanon and Syria, have emerged as a potential new flashpoint for conflict between Israel and Hizbollah
- Fear of escalation of conflict between Israel and Hizbollah as of mid-2002
- Lebanese paper warned that instability in the south may discourage investment and slow down reconstruction

"Following the withdrawal [of Israeli troops], the [Lebanese] Government deployed over 1,000 police and soldiers to the former security zone. After the withdrawal, Hizbollah guerrillas maintained observation posts and conducted patrols along the border with Israel. The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) also increased its area of operations following the Israeli withdrawal. Palestinian groups operate autonomously in refugee camps throughout the country. The Government did not attempt to reassert state control over the Palestinian camps or to disarm Hizbollah." (U.S. DOS February 2001)

According to the UN Secretary General, "[t]he sequence of steps in Security Council resolution 425 (1978) is clear and logical: the Israeli forces must withdraw, there must be no further hostilities, and the effective authority of the Lebanese Government must be restored. Thereafter, the Government of Israel and Lebanon are to be fully responsible, in accordance with their international obligations, for preventing any hostile acts from their respective territory against that of their neighbour. It is relevant to recall in this connection that both Governments have committed themselves, despite misgivings, to respect the Blue Line established by the United Nations for the purposes of confirming the Israeli withdrawal in accordance with resolution 425 (1978).

I believe that the time has come to establish the state of affairs envisaged in the resolution. This requires, first and foremost, that the Government of Lebanon take effective control of the whole area vacated by Israel last spring and assume its full international responsibilities, including putting an end to the dangerous provocations that have continued on the Blue Line." (UN SC 31 October 2000, para.16-18)

"The Lebanese government has ignored UN requests to send its army to establish security in the area, saying it will not serve as Israel's body guard." (BBC News 3 January 2001)

The Shebaa farms

"A group of farms close to the poorly-defined border of Lebanon and Syria has emerged as a potential new flashpoint for conflict between Israel and Lebanese Muslim guerrillas. The Syrian-backed guerrilla group, Hizbollah, says Israel must withdraw from the area of the Shebaa farms - which it says lies on Lebanese territory - or face continued attacks. Israel says most of the area lies on the Syrian side of the Lebanon/Syria..."
border and that it will only withdraw from the part marked as Lebanese territory on the United Nations maps. […]

Timur Goksel, a spokesman for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), told the BBC that the area amounted to little more than 10 square kilometers. He said no-one disputed that the village of Shebaa itself was in Lebanon, but most of the farms fell into an undefined area that may be either in Lebanon or Syria. […] [UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan] proposed that all sides should adopt the line drawn after the 1974 Yom Kippur war, pending a permanent delineation of the border. This line forms the limit of the area currently monitored by the UNIFIL forces. […]

Syria agrees with Lebanon that the Shebaa farms area is part of Lebanon. However, Israel points out that it seized the territory from Syria, during the 1967 Middle East War. Mr. Goksel said: 'The UN is saying that on all maps the UN has been able to find, the farms are seen on the Syrian side.' […]

Despite Israel's withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, Syria still has 35,000 soldiers in the country, mostly near Beirut, in the north, and in the eastern Bekaa Valley. Analysts say that peace between Hezbollah and Israel would not be in Syria's interests, because it would increase pressure on Damascus to withdraw its forces and slacken its control over Lebanon." (BBC News 25 May 2000)

"Hizbullah is walking a very fine line dividing legitimate attempts to liberate the Shebaa Farms from plunging Lebanon into a renewed cycle of violence. […] The Shebaa Farms is a powderkeg waiting for a match. Every time Hizbullah attacks Israeli troops in the disputed area, it is flicking lighted matches at that powder keg. […]

One can argue the merits for and against trying to liberate the Shebaa Farms. But there is one certainly: the country can ill afford at this juncture to juggle both a resistance campaign with a drive to revitalize the economy and inspire renewed investor confidence in Lebanon." (Daily Star 17 February 2001)

"Since his return to power in November [2000], Hariri has visited several countries to drum up foreign investment to revitalize the moribund economy. However, continued instability in the South threatens to undermine his efforts to encourage new investment. Hariri's dilemma is having to balance his drive to rebuild the economy with what, at times, must seem an incompatible public support for the resistance and its efforts to liberate Shebaa." (Blanford in Daily Star 20 February 2001)

"Fears are growing of a new military front opening in the Middle East, across Israel's northern border with Lebanon. Such a development would turn the conflict into a more dangerous regional war, probably drawin in both Lebanon and Syria, and perhaps other nations." (BBC News 3 April 2002)

"Alarmed by the growing influence of an armed militia in an already splintered country, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has repeatedly called on the Lebanese government to provide a viable military presence in the south to supplant UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The government has been unable, or unwilling, to do this." (Lackey 15 April 2002)

A senior Western diplomat "said there were indications of new weapons shipments from Iran to Hezbollah, the militia in southern Lebanon that has ties to both Iran and Syria. He said these included longer-range rockets that could be launched deep into Israeli territory, perhaps within the next several days. The diplomat said such an attack could prompt a severe Israeli reprisal that could include an invasion of Lebanon." (Purdum 15 June 2002)

For information on the UN endorsement of Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the reinforcement of the peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, please see "Background information on UNIFIL" [External Link]
For more information on the conflict between Israel and Lebanese guerrilla movements, as well as possible scenarios for the future, see an October 2000 study by the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) [External Link]

For more information on Lebanese guerilla groups – Hisballah and Amal, see A.R. Norton's 1999 report for the Council of Foreign Relations, "Hisballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics" [External Link]

See also BBC News article "Who are Hezbollah?", 4 April 2002, [Reference below]

Former MPs draft new declaration for the implementation of the peace agreement (2004)

- The former MPs belong to a group formed in 2001 called the "Gathering for the Constitution and National Accord"
- The Declaration raises various issues about the implementation of the Taif Accord including the continued presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon
- A number of the former MPs present made statements alluding to the fact that the peace agreement has not been implemented though 14 years have passed since it was drafted

"Lebanese-Syrian relations should be redressed, the Constitution should not be amended for the sake of a presidential extension, and the next president should rule the country and not be ruled by others.

These were the main points in a declaration issued by the Gathering for the Constitution and National Accord, on Wednesday, during a press conference at the Press Federation.

The gathering, most of whose members are former MPs who participated in the 1989 Taif Accord, said its new declaration joins 'more than 82' statements issued over the past three years, since the gathering's creation in August 2001.

'But they have been met by deaf ears with no response from officials,' said gathering member Edmond Rizk, a former MP and minister, adding that '14 years, nine months and 20 days have passed since the drafting of the Taif Accord, and it has yet to be implemented.'

He added that 'national conciliation didn't take place ... and no official showed a real intention of adopting Taif's resolutions.'

Among the various points it raises, the Taif Accord called for a redeployment of Syrian forces to the Bekaa, within two years after it was passed as well as deploying the Lebanese Army to the South. The accord also pushed for a gradual phase-out of sectarian representation in politics and in public office.

Rizk, who read the declaration, mentioned that 'the current and previous political establishment lacks legality,' because 'tens of MPs were appointed in a manner that contradicts the Taif Accord.

Rizk also said that amending the Constitution to extend or renew the presidential term 'over the past eight decades has led to severe splits among the Lebanese, causing damage to the country and the people.'

He added that the next president should not do what is imposed on him, but must 'express his own beliefs ... listen to his citizens, accept advice, and serve his people without using them.'
As for the Parliament's role in imposing checks and balances on the government, the gathering said it was ‘blocked, just like the Cabinet's decision-making powers,’ due to the fact that officials ‘rush to get positions in power, which in turn leads to the breakdown of the principle of power separation and the idea of a unified state.’

The declaration also reiterated that the continued Syrian presence on Lebanese territory violates the Taif Accord. ‘The Syrian Army entered Lebanon in a six-month mission 29 years ago,’ said Rizk. The ongoing Syrian presence, ‘contradicts the Taif Accord ... and the fundamental principles of relations between independent countries.’” (Daily Star, 15 July 2004)

**United States puts pressure on Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon (2004)**

- Syrian troops entered Lebanon in 1976
- Today, Syria continues to maintain a military presence in Lebanon of 20,000 troops (2004)
- The international community has been pushing for Syria to withdraw its troops
- In June 2004, the United States Congress approved an Executive Order that imposes sanctions on the Syrian government on a number of grounds, including its continued presence in Lebanon
- There have been mixed reactions from Arab countries, some that fear the US's sanctions will create further regional instability

“Syrian troops will not withdraw from neighbouring Lebanon before a final Mideast peace settlement is reached and Israel is no longer a threat, President Bashar al-Assad said in comments published Monday.

‘The pullout issue consists of stages. The first relates to the Taef agreement which has been implemented. The other is subject to a Lebanese-Syrian agreement, regional developments ... and the issue of peace,’ in the Middle East, Assad told Al-Qabas daily in an interview.

He said Syrian troops were mainly in the Bekaa valley along with the Lebanese army to ward off any Israeli attack, which could put Damascus at risk.

‘We are no longer present in the Lebanese interior. There are no Syrian troops inside the Lebanese cities,’ Assad said.

‘The presence of Syrian troops is temporary and not at all permanent ... We talk about a strong and independent Lebanon. We recognise its independence ... and we always concentrate on Lebanese sovereignty,’ he said.

Syria has an estimated 20,000 troops stationed in Lebanon, and also dominates its smaller neighbour politically, having the final say in the appointment of the president, prime minister and most MPs.

Damascus is also closely linked to the Lebanese fundamentalist Shiite Hezbollah guerrilla based in southern Lebanon, and is routinely blamed by Israel for any attack on its troops in the disputed border region.

The United States and several European countries have been pressing Damascus to withdraw from Lebanon and the US Congress has passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act, which calls on Syria to end what it terms the occupation of Lebanon.” (Middle East Online, 7 June 2004)

“Thousands of Syrian troops were redeployed within Lebanon or back to Syria during the year. There were mixed reactions among Lebanese political circles to the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, which was adopted by the US Congress in November.

[...]

Exiled opposition leader General Michel Aoun, who testified before the US Congress on the draft Act, was charged by the Lebanese authorities in November with harming relations with a friendly state (Syria), among other offences” (AI, 26 May 2004)

There has been a mixed reaction from the Arab world, including the fear that US sanctions might create further regional instability. See also "Press dismay at Syria sanctions", BBC, 14 May 2004 [Internet]

Situation in south Lebanon along Lebanon-Israeli border is “fragile” according to the United Nations (July 2004)

- The Secretary General reported that in the last six months there has been considerable risk of hostilities escalating in the area of South Lebanon (July 2004)
- The Secretary General reiterated the Security Council’s call for the government of Lebanon to extend measures to return its effective authority throughout the South
- The Secretary General also expressed concern that Israel persists in its provocative and unjustified air violations of sovereign Lebanese territory
- Likewise, the SG expressed concern that Hezbollah’s retaliatory firing of anti-aircraft rounds across the Blue Line is a violation that poses a direct threat to human life
- The SG stressed that the use of live fire across the Blue Line occurs in violation of the ceasefire and poses serious danger to civilians
- On the positive side, the whole of southern Lebanon, including all villages in the formerly Israeli occupied zone down to the Blue Line, successfully took part in municipal elections
- The situation along the Blue Line is also susceptible to volatile regional developments

“The situation in south Lebanon over the past six months can be described as being replete with contradictions. While both Israel and Lebanon proclaimed their aspirations to avoid destabilization of the area, only one month passed without confrontation. Furthermore, single incidents often sparked a chain reaction of violence to which both sides contributed. Importantly, none of those events spiraled out of control, and for this the parties and UNIFIL all deserve credit. Nevertheless, the considerable risk remains that hostile acts will escalate and lead the parties into conflict. I cannot stress enough the need for the parties to abide by their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, to respect the withdrawal line in its entirety and to exercise the utmost restraint. Neither side can afford to discount the risks attendant to ignoring their obligations.

The whole of southern Lebanon, including all villages in the formerly Israeli occupied zone down to the Blue Line, successfully took part in municipal elections. The free exercise of the democratic process is a universally acknowledged marker of stability. It is also a clear assertion of the exercise of authority by the Government of Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon also demonstrated its capacity to exercise its authority through the activities of the Joint Security Force. Nevertheless, events demonstrated that further efforts were required to maintain calm in the south and to halt violations of the Blue Line, especially violations of the ceasefire. I reiterate the Security Council’s call for the Government of Lebanon to extend measures to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces, and to do its utmost to ensure calm. I urge the Government to exert control over the use of force on its entire territory.
It remains a matter of deep concern that Israel persists in its provocative and unjustified air violations of sovereign Lebanese territory. Hezbollah’s retaliatory firing of anti-aircraft rounds across the Blue Line is a violation that poses a direct threat to human life. While Hezbollah use of anti-aircraft weaponry continued the decline noted in my previous report, there were a number of recent occasions when overflights were countered with Hezbollah fire. The use of live fire across the Blue Line should not be permitted. This prohibition also pertains to retaliatory Israeli air strikes on Hezbollah or other positions inside Lebanon, which also pose a serious danger to civilians. One violation of the Blue Line cannot justify another.

[...] The situation along the Blue Line continues to be susceptible to volatile regional developments. This again underscores the need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003).

In a letter dated 9 July 2004 (S/2004/560), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations conveyed to me his Government’s request that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months. In the light of conditions prevailing in the area, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 January 2005.” (UN Secretary General Report on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 21 July 2004, p.5-7)

UNIFIL is mandated to maintain peace and security in South Lebanon. For more information, see “UNIFIL mandate extended through January 2005 due to tensions on Israel/Lebanon border (July 2004)” [Internal link]

For news coverage of clashes along the border, see:
“Extension for UN Lebanon mission urged as tension mounts at withdrawal line”, UN, 21 July 2004 [Internet]

“Lebanon: UN officials work to restore calm after clashes across withdrawal line”, UN, 20 July 2004 [Internet]

“UN envoy calls for end to violations of withdrawal line between Israel, Lebanon”, UN, 8 June 2004 [Internet]

“UN envoy calls for halt to Israeli violations of withdrawal line, retaliatory fire from Lebanese side”, UN, 5 May 2004 [Internet]

“Southern Lebanon more fragile after six months of tension: Annan”, UN, 21 January 2004 [Internet]

Causes of displacement

Two main causes of internal displacement (2003)

- Internal displacement resulted from internal conflict and civil war as well as from the Israeli interventions in 1978 and 1982

“Two categories of IDPs have to be distinguished
- IDPs from the persistent internal conflict and the civil war, which entailed the fragmentation of the country into confessionally based districts.
- IDPs resulted from the Israel invasions in 1978 and 1982. The Israeli invasion of 1978 displaced about 200,000 Lebanese (mostly Shi'a Muslims) and 65,000 Palestinians from the south of the country.” (LNF, 2002)

“Lebanon’s civil war caused the violent fragmentation of a pluralistic society into fairly distinct sectarian areas. At the height of the conflict, up to 1 million people were internally displaced for long periods of time, and many people were often displaced briefly during the course of the fighting. When the civil war ended in 1991, some 90,000 families, or about 450,000 persons, remained displaced. Some 86 percent originated from the Mount Lebanon governorate (62 percent) and southern Lebanon (24 percent). Many of the displaced, particularly from the south, settled in Beirut.

Internally displaced persons in Lebanon include those from the internal conflict and civil war, which broke Lebanon into sectarian districts, and those displaced by the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982. The 1978 invasion displaced about 200,000 mostly Shi’a Muslims and 65,000 Palestinians from the south of the country.” (USCR, 2003)

Displacement due to civil war and Israeli interventions (1975-1990)

- First large-scale displacement in 1975 was sparked by clashes between Christians and Muslims
- Israeli interventions of 1978 and 1982 caused massive temporary and long-term displacements
- After 1982, conflicts between Shi'a militias and Palestinians, as well as between Christian and Druze militias caused further displacement, particularly in Mount Lebanon
- Disagreements over the 1989 Ta'if accords caused the eruption of heavy fighting between Christian militias and Syrian troops, and between the militias themselves, and led to extensive displacement

"The first large-scale displacement began in 1975 and was characterized by confessional divisions. A quasi homogeneity of religious affiliation was violently imposed in different regions of the country and the capital was divided into Christian and Muslim sectors. In 1985 the largest and most destructive wave of forced internal migration (displacing an estimated 367,000 people) took place in Mount Lebanon. The displacement occurred in tragic conditions and struck a sever blow to the national unity of the country. Further massive displacement was caused by repeated Israeli invasions. The Israeli military operations in 1978 displaced more than 120,000 persons from the south to Beirut's suburbs where they often illegally occupied vacant houses, hotels and plots of land. The Israeli invasion of 1982 caused a temporary massive wave of displacement especially from the capital. While the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Beirut permitted a significant return movement, their withdrawal from Mount Lebanon was followed by severe internal clashes and further displacement." (Assaf & El-Fil 7 April 2000)

"The Israeli invasion of 1978 displaced about 200,000 Lebanese (mostly Shi'a Muslims) and 65,000 Palestinians from the south of the country. Although most of this displacement was temporary, some became effectively permanent, with many people resettling indefinitely, particularly in the southern suburbs of Beirut. […] The Israeli invasion of 1982 was on a very much larger scale than in 1978, leading to the occupation of the whole of the southern half of Lebanon, up to and including Beirut. Though primarily against the PLO, the invasion also aimed to restructure Lebanese politics. […] The war saw further displacements from south Lebanon and from west Beirut, which was besieged for more than two months. […]

The aftermath of the 1982 invasion saw further conflict, mainly between Shi'a militias and Palestinians (who were increasingly besieged in their camps), as well as between Christian and Druze militias in the mountains east and southeast of Beirut (Bhamdoun, Aley and the Shouf). Massacres and atrocities were committed on all sides. The outcome of the latter conflict in particular was further displacement and
cantonization, with many Christians (some of whom had been displaced earlier and had returned after the Israeli invasion) expelled from Druze-dominated areas, and later too from other areas further south. […]

The fragmentation of Lebanon into confessionally based districts was accompanied by growing Syrian hegemony (except over the border districts controlled by Israel). The Syrians, like the Israelis before them, aimed to reconstitute the country politically, efforts that eventually bore fruit in the Ta'if accords of 1989. A key aspect of these accords was the abolition of the constitutional Christian domination of parliament and state. Though divided among themselves, many Christian politicians (and the militias under their control) were hostile to Syria and opposed the Ta'if accords. In 1989 and 1990 there was heavy fighting between Christian militias and Syrian troops, and between the militias themselves, leading to further extensive displacement, estimated at about 150,000 people. These displacements were mainly from and within the Christian areas comprising east Beirut and the region to the east and north. The defeat of forces of General Aoun, later followed by the 1992 elections, seemed to many to herald the end of a decade and a half of civil war. Freedom of movement returned to the country, but most of the displaced found they could still not go home." (Dammers 1998, p.185)

**Israeli intervention causes massive temporary displacement (1996)**

- Israeli air raids and rocket attacks on Beirut and in southern Lebanon displaced between 400,000 and 600,000 people in April 1996

"In April 1996, following Hizballah rocket attacks on northern Israel, Israel launched extensive air raids and rocket attacks on Beirut and on a reported 54 villages in southern Lebanon. Estimates of those displaced, many from Beirut itself, were put at 600,000 by the government, but 400,000 or fewer by most independent sources. An informal cease-fire was declared after 16 days and most of the displaced returned home. Undoubtedly, some stayed on in Beirut or in areas they considered safer, but the long-term impact of such large-scale temporary displacement is not so much the immediate creation of permanent IDPs, as that of accelerating rural-urban drift and depopulation of the south, which has seen neither peace nor stability for more than 20 years." (Dammers 1998, p.187)

For more information on the activities of Israeli military forces and Lebanese guerillas during the escalation of military activities that raged in Lebanon and parts of northern Israel in April 1996, see Human Rights Watch's report of September 1997, "Operation Grapes of Wrath", the Civilian Victims [External Link]
POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global figures

Estimates of people still in a situation of displacement in Lebanon: 50,000-600,000 (2002-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimated figure used indicating number of people still in a situation of displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Committee for Refugees</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>50,000 to more than 500,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Committee for Refugees</td>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Committee for Refugees</td>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>250,000 -350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Department of State</td>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>UNHCR is not involved in IDP issues in Lebanon. Its 2004 Operations report cites the estimated figure of 600,000 IDPs in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government figures: 68,000 people still in a situation of internal displacement (2004)

- 68,000 people continue to be in a situation of displacement (August 2004)
- According to the Ministry of the Displaced, there were approximately 300,000 IDPs (end 2001)

According to the Ministry of the Displaced, there continue to be 68,000 people in a situation of internal displacement (Ministry of the Displaced, 4 August 2004)

According to the Ministry for the Displaced, there were approximately 300,000 IDPs as of end 2001.
Government figures on return: at least 79,500 people have been able to return to their areas of origin (2004)

"Effective number of people who were able to return to their area of origin: 79,500 persons/*].

Areas of origin:
-Kfar Selouan
-Obaye
-Al Benieh
-Ain Drafil
-Kfar Matta
-Dfoun
-Baawartah
-Breeh
-Parts of Beirut and its suburbs" (Ministry of Displaced, 4 August 2004)

*Note: This figure does not include return movements to South Lebanon and in the West Bekaa regions (UNDP, 9 August 2004)

Figures on IDP populations and geographic distribution differ significantly (1997)

- Attempts to compare the figures on population movements and distribution reveals large disparities
- Despite the many discrepancies, all surveys give some indication of the scale of a phenomenon that has affected every region of Lebanon

“Many surveys and studies have been undertaken to determine the magnitude of the problem of permanent displacement. However, any attempt to compare the figures on population movements and distribution reveals large disparities. The most striking difference is the 900,000 put forward by Faour and, at the other end of the spectrum, the 450,000 of the Ministry of the Displaced (hereafter MOD). For the purpose of this report the figures presented in the findings of the Beaudoin and Kasparian's study (1991) will be relied on. In 1987, they estimated the number of the displaced to be 670,000, representing 22 per cent of the Lebanese population. These figures do not include those displaced in the 1989 conflict.

The same variations apply when it comes to the geographic distribution of the displaced population by province, mouhafazat, or by district number, caza. For instance, Faour and Beaudoin and Kasparian estimated the displaced population in the south at 12.2 per cent, while the MOD put forward the figure of 23.1 per cent. Despite the many discrepancies, all surveys give some indication of the scale of a phenomenon that has affected every region of Lebanon.” (ILO, 1997, Sect. 4.1.2)


- Several waves of short and long-term displacement took place during the civil war
- An estimated 810,000 people were displaced between 1975 and 1990
- About 450,000 persons remained displaced at the end of the war
The number of internally displaced persons is difficult to estimate. A UNDP study stated in 1997 that about 450,000 persons were displaced as of 1995. Other organizations refer to that study for their estimates.

"When the civil war ended in 1991, some 90,000 families, or about 450,000 persons, remained displaced. Some 86 percent originated from the Mount Lebanon governorate (62 percent) and southern Lebanon (24 percent). Many of the displaced, particularly from the south, settled in Beirut.

Internally displaced persons in Lebanon include those from the internal conflict and civil war, which broke Lebanon into sectarian districts, and those displaced by the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982. The 1978 invasion displaced about 200,000 mostly Shi’a Muslims and 65,000 Palestinians from the south of the country.

The government offered compensation to internally displaced people to rebuild homes, but the vast majority of the displaced have not reclaimed their properties. The government set the end of 2002 as the target for the return of all displaced, but there were still 300,000 in Lebanon as of mid-2002." (USCR 2003)

"Since the outbreak of the war in 1975, and up to its end in 1990, 810,000 citizens were affected by waves of forced displacement as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>300,000 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1981</td>
<td>150,000 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>200,000 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>160,000 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[...] The number of villages and towns affected [by displacement] numbered 949, of which 174 villages were totally or partially destroyed [...]. The number of destroyed or damaged housing units was 45,020, which further exacerbated the housing problem in Lebanon. (UNDP 1997)

"Lebanon's civil war violently fragmented a pluralistic society into fairly distinct sectarian areas. At the height of the conflict, up to a million people were internally displaced, and many people were often displaced briefly during the war.

When the civil war ended in 1991, some 90,000 families, or about 450,000 persons, remained displaced." (USCR 2002)

Geographical distribution

Most IDPs originated from Mount Lebanon and Southern Lebanon (2003)

"At the height of the conflict, up to 1 million people were internally displaced for long periods of time, and many people were often displaced briefly during the course of the fighting. When the civil war ended in 1991, some 90,000 families, or about 450,000 persons, remained displaced. Some 86 percent originated from the Mount Lebanon governorate (62 percent) and southern Lebanon (24 percent). Many of the displaced, particularly from the south, settled in Beirut.”” (USCR, 2003)

UNDP: majority of displaced population is from Mount Lebanon (1997)

- 62 per cent of the displaced are from the Mount Lebanon while 52.7% of the displaced arrived to Mount Lebanon in 1995
Displacement by governorate of origin and destination (as of 1995)

The first two columns of the graph below show where the displaced families were displaced from, while the last two columns indicate where the displaced families were located in 1995 (UNDP 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mohafazat</th>
<th>Displaced families</th>
<th></th>
<th>Arriving families</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>5,460</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14,274</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>43,880</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>37,284</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>2,961</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>16,780</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>11,152</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70,726</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70,726</td>
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Internal displacement resulted in overpopulation in urban areas whereas rural areas were left nearly empty (1997)

- Internal displacement resulted in major demographic changes in the country
- The civil war displaced many rural communities into urban localities, mainly due to political strategies and militias
- A demographic balance is hoped to be restored with the resettlement of the displaced from overpopulated areas to the nearly empty areas of displacement

“More than a million people have been displaced during the war; some were permanently dislocated, the rest returned when hostilities ceased. The social fabric of rural and urban communities was severely affected; life-styles were disrupted. The massive migratory movements across the country have resulted in the disruption of the cultural and social organization of the displaced communities. They have also affected the receiving societies confronted with different cultural practices and values of those coming from rural backgrounds into an urban environment or vice versa.

Internal migration was a major determining factor in the demographic changes that resulted from the war. As a result of this planned human reorganization of the country, the population of Beirut, for instance, underwent major changes: the exodus of a large part of its original inhabitants was balanced by the inflow of refugees from other areas. In the southern suburbs of the capital, 30 per cent of the population is composed of refugees. As noted earlier, this phenomenon has affected every region of the country to varying degrees (Beaudoin and Kasparian, 1991).
The civil war has displaced many rural communities into urban localities. The forced displacement due to political strategies and organized by the militias reinforced the pre-existing rural-urban migratory trend. The major phenomena which characterized the urbanization process in Lebanon could be summed up as follows:

- the cycles of rural migration prior to and during the war;
- the displacement of the urban population into safer areas, some of which were not yet urbanised at the time;
- the expansion of urban agglomerations to reach neighbouring rural areas (USAID, 1995).

These phenomena have resulted in a continuously changing spatial reorganization. The increased urbanization of the population was paralleled with the emptying of the rural areas from a substantial part of the active population. According to ECWA (Abu Nasr et al., 1985), in 1975 a large proportion of the country's population (65 per cent) lived in urban areas. The UN (EIU 1995) estimated that after the war the capital alone had a population of 1.5 million, which represents almost half of the entire population of the country. The imbalance in the population distribution is one of the main compelling factors for the Government to organize the return of the displaced. A demographic balance is hoped to be restored with the resettlement of the displaced from over-populated areas to the nearly empty areas of displacement.” (ILO, 1997, Section 4.1.2)
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Other factors than security may account for long-term displacement (1997-2002)

- According to UNDP, long-term displacement is not only due to the inability of families to return to their former homes for security reasons, but also due to social and economic considerations.

"In the past, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has questioned the central assumption underlying the Lebanese government's approach to long-term internal displacement: that the solution to the problem lies in reversing the process and returning the displaced to their former homes. UNDP said that the goal of returning the displaced disregards the past 20 years of social and economic changes in Lebanon, and argues that these changes, many the result of rural-to urban migration, would have taken place even in the absence of war." (USCR 2002)

"There is reason to believe that prolonged displacement cannot be explained entirely in terms of the inability of families, for security reasons, to return to the places where they lived before the war. Economic and social considerations have played a role in determining the pace of return.

Displacement produced large-scale demographic shifts resulting in total or partial segregation on religious/sectarian basis. These shifts altered the demographic features of both the areas of origin and areas of destination, affecting in the process the unity of the society and creating real problems at the level of social integration. In addition, the economy suffered from the segregation of the labor market, the increase in the rate of emigration abroad, and the impoverishment of displaced families, reflected in the loss of resources, incomes and jobs; and from the deterioration of conditions affecting housing, education, health care and other services." (UNDP 1997)

Majority of displaced were Muslim early in the war and Christian in later phases (1975-1991)

- In the beginning of the civil war, displacement of Muslims by Christian Militias and of Christians by the Palestine Liberation Organization took place in and around Beirut.
- In the later phases of the war, many Christians were displaced from the mountainous region of the Chouf.

"Before 1975 many parts of Lebanon had predominant confessional groupings, but settlement patterns were complex and intertwined. The civil war led to the wholesale expulsion of Muslims from regions controlled by Christian militias, and substantial displacement of Christians from regions controlled by the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and the LNM [Lebanese National Movement]. Most of these 'population exchanges' took place in and around Beirut, and probably led to the long-term displacement of between 250,000 and 300,000 people, the great majority Muslims.

The later phases of the war saw many Christians displaced from the Shouf, the mountainous region to the southeast of Beirut. The Bekaa region in the east of the country, and to a lesser extent the north of Lebanon, also saw displacement, largely of Christians to areas controlled by the Christian militias, particularly
Zahleh and Beirut. An estimated 650,000 Lebanese left the country altogether during this period (a disproportionate number of them Christian). (Dammers 1998, p.185)

"Displacement was associated with large-scale destruction of villages, towns and housing units, rendering immediate return impossible, and prolonging forced displacement for years after the cessation of military operations." (UNDP 1997)

"Lebanon's civil war caused the violent fragmentation of a pluralistic society into fairly distinct sectarian areas. At the height of the conflict, up to a million people were internally displaced, and many people were often displaced briefly during the course of the fighting." (USCR 2002)

Internal displacements were not continuous but occurred in waves during the conflict (1997)

- A distinction needs to be made between temporary and permanent displacement
- Temporary internal displacement was caused by internal strife and external aggression, such as the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 and the fight between Syrian forces and Lebanese militias
- Permanent internal displacement was provoked by massacres and expulsions aimed at creating confessionally homogenous zones

“Displacement is the most serious phenomenon that affected the Lebanese population as a consequence of war. This internal migration followed a concerted plan that was executed in different stages by numerous actors on the war scene. Two-thirds of the population were displaced. A distinction should be made between temporary and permanent displacement. The former was provoked by internal strife and external aggression, such as the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 and the fight between Syrian forces and Lebanese militias. In those cases, the people would abandon their homes and go back as soon as fighting had ceased. The latter was provoked by massacres and expulsions aimed at creating confessionally homogenous zones.

Displacements were not continuous but occurred in separate, successive waves, corresponding to the different rounds of the conflict. During 1975-76, approximately 300,000 people were displaced in the capital city of Beirut alone. From 1978-82, an additional 150,000 people fled due to fighting in their area and the Israeli invasion. From 1982-90 a further 360,000 people were uprooted (Lebanese NGO Forum, 1994).” (ILO, 1997, Sect. 4.1.2)
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical security

Landmines and unexploded ordinances (UXO) continue to hamper effective restoration of peace and security in Southern Lebanon (2004)

- Landmine casualty figures have fallen significantly yet the remaining landmines and UXO continue to impact reconstruction, socio-economic development, and community life in South Lebanon
- At the end of 2003, an estimated 410,000 mines remained in the former Israeli-occupied area of South Lebanon
- Most mines lie in the area between Naqoura on the Mediterranean coast and Kfar Chouba in the east

“Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and previous periods of conflict in the area dating back to the French mandate continue to hamper the effective restoration of peace and security in the area.

While landmine casualty figures have fallen significantly since initial levels recorded immediately following the withdrawal, the remaining landmines and UXO continue to impact on the reconstruction, socio-economic development and the return of normalcy to community life for those in affected areas.

It can often be misleading to focus on the number of mines however it is useful to note that the south of Lebanon is the most highly contaminated region of the country. At the end of 2003 there remains an estimated 410,000 landmines in the area.

The majority of these mines lie in the immediate proximity of the UN delineated ‘Blue Line’ between Lebanon and Israel. These minefields are known as the ‘border minefields’ and they stretch from Naqoura on the Mediterranean coast to Kfar Chouba in the east. These border minefields remain a risk to the UNIFIL troops operating in the area and to those villages in the immediate vicinity of the Blue Line. Mines and UXO are also present in and around the immediate vicinity of villages throughout the area away from Blue Line. The immediate areas of risk are those village communities living in close proximity to minefields within the former occupied zone other than along the Blue Line.”(MACC SL, 2004)

See also, UNDP's Humanitarian Update on Landmines (2001) [Internet]

For more information on the general situation of human rights in Lebanon, see Amnesty International's report on Lebanon January - December 2003, 26 May 2004 [Internet]

HRW reported that South Lebanese Army and Israel expelled a number of civilians from the south (1999-2000)

- Human Rights Watch reported that families in South Lebanon have been collectively punished by being expelled for the acts or suspected activities of their relatives
Alleged activities included participation in attacks on Israeli military, membership in military wings of Hizballah and Amal, desertion from or refusal to serve in South Lebanese Army

"Since 1985, hundreds if not thousands of Lebanese civilians have been ordered to leave their homes and villages without notice and with no means of appeal. They have been summarily dumped in a no man's land without any possessions save the clothes on their backs,' said Hanny Megally, executive director of the Middle East and North Africa division of Human Rights Watch. " (HRW 10 November 1999)

"Human Rights Watch has documented how Lebanese men and boys have been forced to serve in the SLA against their will. Their families have been punished, sometimes with expulsion from their homes in the occupied zone, if they evaded or deserted from service in the SLA militia. [...] Human Rights Watch has documented cases of SLA militiamen and their families living rent-free in the homes of residents who were expelled." (HRW May 2000)

"The use of expulsion as a weapon to punish the civilian population in the occupied zone has received scant attention in Israel and internationally during the two decades that it has quietly made a shambles of the lives of the men, women, and children forced to leave their homes and communities. Human Rights Watch documented cases of individuals and entire families who have been collectively punished by being expelled for the acts or suspected activities of their relatives. These have included admitted or suspected participation in attacks on Israeli military personnel and installations in the zone, membership in the military wings of Lebanese political organizations such as Hizballah and the Amal Movement, refusal to cooperate with the occupation security apparatus, and desertion from or refusal to serve in the SLA.

The expulsions come in the context of Israel's long occupation of part of southern Lebanon, and the ongoing confrontation between Israeli and SLA military forces and Lebanese guerrillas fighting to oust the occupiers. Historically, it is Lebanese territory, which has been the primary stage for this military conflict, and it is in Lebanon where the bulk of the military activity and civilian casualties have occurred. Both sides have carried out indiscriminate attacks on civilians in violation of international humanitarian law. [...] 

The expulsions and other forcible transfers of Lebanese civilians from the occupied zone are just one of the methods that the occupation authorities utilize to control the civilian population in that territory and thwart the anti-occupation guerrilla forces. The expulsion of civilians from their homes and villages in the zone, like the indiscriminate attacks launched by both sides, cannot be justified by reference to security threats. International humanitarian law categorically prohibits forcible transfers and deportations, which constitute grave breaches of the Geneva conventions and as such are war crimes. [...] 

In villages throughout the occupied zone, members of some families have been hounded for months or years to serve as informers for the ubiquitous security apparatus that is maintained by the occupation authorities through the SLA and with the participation and oversight of Israeli intelligence. For those men and women who refused to succumb to the pressure, expulsion has been a last and punishing resort. [...] 

The SLA practice of forced conscription of teenaged boys who live in the zone has also been a long-standing nightmare for families who are opposed to the occupation and despise Israel's surrogate militia. Some families moved out of the zone on their own initiative to ensure that their sons would not be forced into SLA service. Others stayed in their villages but sent their sons out when they reached fourteen or fifteen years of age. According to testimony, children have been forcibly pressed into service." (HRW July 1999, "Summary")

As little information is available on the treatment of displaced persons in other regions, please see the following reports for a general picture of the human rights situation in Lebanon:

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

General


- Some 320 displaced families live in the Baalbek area, in what are known as the “Gouraud barracks”
- The families are all former residents of Beirut who were displaced from their homes in 1976 during the civil war
- Despite numerous surveys of their living conditions, these IDPs have not yet received compensation and are living below the poverty line with minimum access to health and social services
- The barracks consist of makeshift rooms separated by cardboard, shared toilets and limited access to water and electricity
- Some of the displaced claim to have received neither national nor international assistance

“On the outskirts of historic Baalbek, just meters from the ancient ruins, lie the old Gouraud military barracks, named after a French general, inherited from the Mandate forces, and now providing accommodation for some 320 families living in desperate conditions.

The families are all former residents of Beirut and its suburbs who abandoned their homes in 1976 when the civil war reached one of its climaxes, causing the displacement of hundreds of thousands of who, sought refuge in remote areas. They are living below the poverty line and lack minimum social, health and environmental services.

The number of residents has been counted several times, surveys on their living conditions have been made, and over the years, there have been repeated calls for their problems to be solved by the payment of compensation, as happened with other groups of internally displaced.

But 28 years after they first arrived at the barracks, the families are still there, and have only grown larger in size, since many of the children have married and have families of their own.

The barracks contain a number of lodgings, with each one divided into makeshift rooms separated by cardboard. Toilets, in most cases, are shared and water and electricity are not always available.

In winter, residents are faced with the problems of how to cope with the cold and damp. At times, the temperature drops to minus 7C at night.

Abdo Noon, who keeps a record of residents, said:

‘We have been promised money to evacuate the barracks and find new lodgings. It is said that the location will be refurbished and turned into public offices needed in Baalbek.’

‘But the promises have yet to be fulfilled and although we learned from the region’s parliamentary representatives that the necessary funds have been allocated for this purpose, nothing has been done to solve the problem,’ he added.
Nasibeh Rabah, who looks after her two disabled children, following the death of her husband 17 years ago, complains that no international or local organizations have provided the residents with aid, on the grounds that the civil war has ended.

‘In fact our situation has got worse,’ she said." (Daily Star, 22 January 2004).

**Most IDPs live in Beirut and its suburbs in minimal conditions (2002-2004)**

- Most IDPs live in Beirut and its suburbs, frequently with relatives or friends
- About 70 per cent of the displaced population live in minimal conditions
- During the civil war, the government could not provide the displaced with adequate shelter, security, food and medical care
- The displaced now often live in overcrowded houses while the poorest are in makeshift shelters by rivers
- Ministry of Displaced exempted the displaced from water and electricity fees to improve the condition of the displaced
- Favorable health indicators at the national level conceal regional and social differences

"Most IDPs are centered in Beirut and its suburbs. 70% of them are living on a minimal level while 30% of them have settled well with good businesses. The 70% are located in the crowded areas of Beirut living either free of charge at someones' home (a relative who is out of the country or someone from the village who is well off), while the rest are paying very high rent which they cannot afford and which barely leaves them with anything to spend on food and other necessities. A very low percentage of the IDPs are still living in confiscated homes since the government two years ago forced everyone to leave the homes of others. There are no host centers in Lebanon; every displaced person takes care of himself and his family and they have no special or protected status.” (Cartitas, August 2004)

“Favorable health indicators at the national level conceal regional and social differences, with infant mortality rates reaching 48 per thousand in North Lebanon, for example. Similarly, education indicators are less favorable in areas outside the capital Beirut. Furthermore, the inability to satisfy basic needs is substantially higher in rural areas. Deprivation, specifically in terms of education and health insurance, is twice as important in the regions other than Beirut and Mount Lebanon.” (UNDP, 2002)

"During the years of conflict nothing could be done to put a halt to numerous instances of illegal occupation of property. The fragmentation and disintegration of the government and the power of the militias made it impossible to provide IDPs with shelter, security, food and medical care.

The disastrous effects of displacement have had ongoing social and psychological consequences. The fact that large numbers of families have had to live in one house has created tension and conflict. Overcrowding has increased the spread of disease. Drug abuse and delinquency have become prevalent among young people. As moral values have generally deteriorated squatting in somebody else’s property has come to be regarded as normal. Indeed, some of the displaced even claim the right to squat as one of their legitimate rights. Illegal occupation of property has implicitly been condoned by political factions.” (Assaf & El-Fil 7 April 2000)

"With the cessation of military operations, some 450,000 persons were still displaced comprising 90,000 families, of which 70,000 could be considered genuinely concerned. Among these, 45,000 families were occupying other people’s homes and another 12,000 were living in very poor conditions and accommodations." (UNDP 1997)
"Many of the displaced are among the poorest in Lebanese society. The poorest of the homeless, called Muhajjaran, mass along the banks of the Awwali and Zahrani rivers in makeshift shelters in unsanitary conditions. In most cases, however, internally displaced Lebanese have found shelter with friends and families, but often live in overcrowded conditions." (USCR 2001)

"To relieve the displaced of some of their burdens, […] the Ministry [of Displaced] has given the displaced statements confirming their 'displaced status'. Such statements are to be submitted to the Ministry of Water & Electricity so that it will exempt them from the fees accruing since the date of their displacement." (Ministry of Displaced 1998, "water & electricity fees")

See also: "Post-war Lebanon: Women and other war-affected groups", International Labour Organisation (Naila Nauphal), 1997 [Internet]
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

General

Despite decade of reconstruction, basic needs of a third of Lebanese are still not fulfilled (2002)

- There are an estimated one million poor in Lebanon, of whom 75% are urbanized
- Economic growth and reconstruction have favored some regions, like Beirut, to the detriment of other parts of the country
- Growth of service sectors over agriculture and industry
- Without adequate social integration, the problem of poverty, particularly in cities, may prove destabilising
- Low participation of women in public and political life, and in labor force in general

"The economic crisis has nevertheless led to continuation of high levels of emigration, particularly of youth, over the last 10 years, and increased pressure on the living conditions of vulnerable and poor households. Of particular concern regarding the repercussions of the economic crisis are the poverty conditions in the already-depressed regions of the country such as the northern Bekaa and the North. With unemployment estimates hovering as high as 12-14%, this remains a very considerable challenge for the government." (UNDP, 2002)

"Lebanon's remarkable decade of reconstruction following a devastating 15 year civil war saw strong economic growth gradually slide to a halt by 1999. The cost of rebuilding highways, schools, airports, seaports, housing, power stations, and government buildings pushed public debt to 160% of GDP and led to chronic budgetary problems: spending outstripped revenues by over 50%. GDP per person, estimated at €5,200, is below prewar levels. The process of reforming economic policy, modernising manufacturing capacity, improving the investment climate and opening the internal market has begun, and form the basis for economic recovery in the decade to come.

The challenge for Lebanon is to carry through the reforms while reconstructing the economy. The tax system will need to replace revenues lost as customs tariffs fall (they traditionally contributed half of all budget revenues) with VAT, and with more coherent income and company taxes. Privatisation of state agencies, some loss-making, are essential for restructuring. Ways are needed to improve productivity levels suitable in industry, the services sector and in agriculture for an open trading economy, without which future growth will be jeopardised. The second challenge is to tackle poverty and income disparities. The UN estimates that one third of Lebanese lack basic needs. Weak agricultural productivity and a widening gap between rural and urban incomes have led to accelerated urbanisation, environmental degradation, and social imbalance. Policy needs to balance growth with social development, so that transition to a fully liberal economic regime is matched by good governance, the strengthening of democracy, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human and individual rights.[...]

There now prevails significant poverty and income disparities as society is increasingly dichotomised between the very rich and the poor. According to the World Bank's crude Living Condition Index which measures the degree of satisfaction of basic needs, 32% of Lebanese households are at the low end of the
index, 42% at the intermediate level while 26% reach the high end of the index. A UN study calculates that 35% of the population lack basic needs, i.e. live below a poverty line of minimum living standards. There are up to an estimated one million poor in Lebanon today, of whom 75% are urbanised. Economic growth and reconstruction have favoured some regions, notably parts of the Beirut region, to the detriment of large parts of the country. It has also favoured services sectors over typically labour-intensive employing activities in agriculture and industry. Illiteracy reaches 15% to 20% in the disadvantaged areas of the Bekaa valley, South Lebanon and the North, and is acute amongst women. Unemployment, officially given as 8%, is at least double this figure according to studies, and is highest amongst the young. Tight monetary policy, a narrow tax base, and economic recession has led to declining real incomes of many salary earners. The risk of unbalanced growth is social tension and the exploitation of poverty by political organisations which have proved particularly effective in supplying much-needed services on the margins of society. Without adequate social integration, the problem of poverty, particularly in cities, may prove destabilising. Public welfare programmes and social safety nets are largely non-existent in Lebanon, are narrowly based, and often subject to mismanagement. Remittances from expatriates go some way to alleviating the situation amongst underprivileged communities. There is no national health care policy. The system favours equipment, curative and tertiary services driven by the supply of an abundant private sector, rather than primary health care and prevention. There is a need to develop national poverty reduction programmes, to establish a comprehensive social development policy, and to tackle health care.

Particular attention will be paid to the role of women in Lebanon. Rights of women are affected by forms of sectarianism (there is no civil marriage law), incidence of ‘honour’ killings, low participation rate in public and political life (only 2% of the 128 parliamentary deputies are women; only three of the 300 municipal councils are headed by women), when measured against university graduation rates (50% women), and contribution to employed labour force (27%).9 (EU 2002, p2, 9)

**Political, social, economic and legal consequences of displacement (1997)**

- Displacement caused the country to split along religious lines, exacerbated economic imbalances and contributed to the disintegration of social ties
- Illegal occupation of houses and loss of property caused countless legal problems for the displaced

"It is difficult to identify all the negative consequences of displacement at the political, social and economic levels in the immediate and long term. A brief summary of the main consequences of displacement is given below.

At the **political level**, displacement caused the country to split along religious lines, resulting in the loss of identity between geography and the national entity. It also led to greater homogeneity between the sectarian and regional notions, and strengthened the feeling of belonging to the sect/region, which impaired national and social integration.

At the **economic level**, displacement was accompanied by the destruction of productive assets and widespread neglect of agricultural land as farmers - who constituted 55 percent of the heads of displaced families - were denied access to their holdings. The industrial sector sustained direct losses as forced displacement affected the labor force and prevented workers from reaching the work place, especially in large plants which were not relocated, contributing to exacerbate regional and economic imbalances.

At the **social level**, problems emerged in integrating the displaced - who felt alienated as a result of their moving from generally rural socio-cultural surroundings to a different and mostly urban setting in poor housing accommodations - in the societies of receiving areas. The move put severe strain on displaced families especially when displacement was associated with the death of a family member. It also
contributed to the disintegration of social ties, lowering of social and moral standards, and in multiplying problems confronting youth.

Studies carried out on the displaced indicate a general deterioration in their living conditions. Their participation in economic activity fell below the national average and unemployment in their ranks increased. They were also exposed to extensive impoverishment, with an estimated 50 percent among them not able to meet their very basic needs; and 12.5 percent living in absolute poverty and unfit accommodations. The standard of education of the displaced population also fell below the national average, with 50 percent and 24 percent of them reported as not having gone beyond elementary and intermediate levels, respectively.

In addition, many legal problems arose as a result of the displaced being deprived by force of their property or its exploitation, the unlawful occupation of houses, confiscation of property, disadvantageous contracts, and many other legal disputes at a time when resorting to courts was not possible." (UNDP 1997)
PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Lack of government funding has meant that compensation has been partial and many displaced are unable to rebuild their homes (2004)

"The amount allocated for the displaced families for rehabilitation and reconstruction were in general divided into three payments. Unfortunately, many families received only one payment, while others two and some three payments depending on the funds available." (Caritas, 1 August 2004)

The majority of the displaced have not reclaimed or rebuilt former property (2001-2004)

- Large-scale destruction of towns and villages during the civil war prolonged forced displacement
- As of end 2004 the vast majority of displaced persons have not attempted to reclaim and rebuild their property
- Government paid squatter families to rebuild their homes but the vast majority of displaced have not reclaimed their property
- Minister of the displaced stated that issue of compensation needs to be moved away from sectarian wrangling and attention focused on reintegrating the displaced
- Government authorities took measures to make it easier for owners to rebuild their house in the south, following the withdrawal of Israeli troops

"There were no legal restrictions on the right of citizens to return to the country. However, many emigres were reluctant to return for a variety of political, economic, and social reasons. The Government encouraged the return to their homes of over 600,000 internally persons displaced during the civil war. Although some persons began to reclaim homes abandoned or damaged during the war, the vast majority had not attempted to reclaim and rebuild their property." (US DOS, 25 February 2004, Sect.2d)

"The Lebanese government offered compensation to internally displaced people to rebuild homes, but the vast majority of the displaced have not yet reclaimed their properties." (USCR, 24 May 2004)

"Displacement was associated with large-scale destruction of villages, towns and housing units, rendering immediate return impossible, and prolonging forced displacement for years after the cessation of military operations. The number of villages and towns affected numbered 949, of which 174 villages were totally or partially destroyed. The number of destroyed or damaged housing units was 45,020, which further exacerbated the housing problem in Lebanon." (UNDP 1997)

"The Government encouraged the return to their homes of over 600,000 persons displaced internally during the civil war. During the year [2001], the Central Fund for the Displaced continued to disburse funds to assist internally displaced persons return to their homes. The Fund provided approximately $20 million (30 billion Lebanese pounds) for the repair of infrastructure in villages most affected by displacement. Between July 1999 and October 2001, the Fund disbursed approximately $208 million (300 billion Lebanese pounds) for the repair and reconstruction of homes. The Central Fund discontinued payments in November
due to a lack of funds. Although some persons have begun to reclaim homes abandoned or damaged during the war, the vast majority of displaced persons have not attempted to reclaim and rebuild their property." (US DOS 4 March 2002, Sect.2.d)

"Housing: This is a big issue in the lives of the displaced. First of all, so many families have lost their homes and are occupying someone else's houses or buildings that are neither inhabitable nor made as residences. The level of housing deteriorated, building codes were violated. In some cases more than one family live together. In essence, buildings are everywhere on others' or public properties, the disorder in communities got out of hand." (Ministry of the Displaced 2001, I, vi)

"The war will not end except after the return of the last displaced person to his land and property, ' said Helou [Minister of State] […]. Former Aley MP Marwan Abu Fadel also called for a set plan for the return, coupled with a 'comprehensive development plan that would attach the returning residents to their land.' In his remarks, Minister for the Displaced Marwan Hamade said 'we intend to move the issue of compensation away from sectarian wrangling and ensure integration among residents and those returning to their homes.'" (Daily Star 24 February 2001)

According to a resident of the South of the Lebanon, "although there was no central planning before the construction [of the rebuilt village] began, records of the original property deeds were checked and the owners were permitted to build on their respective plots. He added that the authorities had agreed to waive the $5,000 fee for a construction license for five years to encourage the rebuilding of the village." (Blanford in Daily Star 15 February 2001)

Central Fund for the Displaced announced immediate eviction of illegally occupied property (June 2002)

- The Central Fund for Displaced announced eviction of all people illegally occupying properties in June 200

"The Central Fund for the Displaced announced Friday that eviction of illegally occupied properties would be implemented immediately, with the use of force if necessary.

According to fund president Fadi Aramouni, the Displaced Affairs Squad in Beirut will evict people who have received compensation but failed to leave the properties in question. Evictions will also encompass those illegal occupants who were not eligible for compensation.

A meeting was held at the fund's office in the presence of Minister for the Displaced Marwan Hamade and officials from the ministry and the fund. Aramouni said the fund had decided to issue warnings to all beneficiaries of compensation who did not use the money for reconstruction and renovation purposes and urge them to start works." (Daily Star 6 June 2002)

See also, the report of the ministry (1992-1997) on evictions of illegal occupants [Internet/archived]

IDPs persons residing in Beirut had to vacate former homes in return for compensation (1999)

- Displaced families protested that compensation payments were lower than promised originally
"Hundred of residents of Beirut neighborhoods gathered Wednesday at the gates of Speaker Nabih Berri's residence in Ain al-Tineh, demanding a solution to their impending eviction by the Ministry for the displaced.

The displaced families, most of which are originally from the south and occupying residences in Clemenceau, Qantari and Hamra, have been given until the end of the month to sign commitments to vacate their premises in return for compensation. […]

Under the ministry's 1999-2001 plan to return the displaced, $5000 is being awarded per housing unit, and $8,000 in the case of residents of the Israeli-occupied zone, due to their inability to return home.

The eviction orders are long-standing, but have usually been delayed due to the Central Fund for the Displaced's inability to make payments. The protesters were especially incensed that payment levels have been altered, since past payments were calculated per family, and not housing unit. […]

Austerity measures have required paying on the basis of a housing unit, even if multiple families reside there. […] One solution suggested was constructing inexpensive housing for the displaced.” (Ibrahim in Daily Star 19 August 1999)

See also, the Ministry of Displaced report, including a section on evictions of illegal occupants. The report was issued in 1997 [Internet/archived]

Highest destruction of houses and villages occurred in the Mount Lebanon region (1996)

Table 1. Destroyed houses by county

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Damaged</th>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>4424</td>
<td>4845</td>
<td>3231</td>
<td>12500</td>
<td>27.77%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>2576</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>3493</td>
<td>7.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>2225</td>
<td>4.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>2.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12315</td>
<td>23661</td>
<td>9044</td>
<td>45020</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>27.35</td>
<td>52.56</td>
<td>20.09</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Destroyed villages in Aley, Chouf & Baabda area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caza</th>
<th># of villages</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Completely destroyed</th>
<th>Partially destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chouf</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General


- The local economy, basic infrastructure, housing and social systems were largely dismantled following more than 25 years of occupation
- The area once occupied by Israel included an approximate resident population of 104,000 inhabitants (73 villages)
- A number of factors including severe social and economic restraints led to an exodus in particular of youth towards safer areas

“The region of Southern Lebanon has been a region of instability and military conflict for the past twenty five years. The continued Israeli attacks on the region, most recently those in June 1993 and April 1996, have resulted in considerable damage to the basic infrastructure and services, productive sectors, and private housing, as well as the rupture of the economic and social fabrics and systems. The local economy has been badly effected and the prevailing situation has led to a wave of steady migration. After more than 25 years of occupation, the Israeli forces evacuated southern Lebanon in May 2000.

The region of Southern Lebanon referred to within the context of this Programme is bounded from the north and the west by the Litani river, and from the South by the 1949 internationally recognized border between Lebanon and Israel. Thus, it refers to the four districts of Tyre, Bint-Jbeil, Marjeyo, and Hasbaya. The Israeli Controlled Area used to include 73 villages with an approximate resident population of 104,000 inhabitants. In general, residents of the ICA suffered from severe economic and social constraints due to the difficult constraints imposed on them. In addition to the lack of contact with the rest of the country, residents faced the dangers of military actions every day. All of these factors have had serious repercussions on the socio-economic development of the area and the long-term economic prospects of the residents, causing the exodus of a considerable percentage of the residents, especially youth, towards safer areas.

The majority of the families in the southern Lebanon rely on agriculture as their primary source of livelihood. However, such income sources are seasonal and irregular and do not cover the basic needs of families. Agriculture is mostly developed in areas where irrigation water is available. Irrigated areas are planted with fruit trees, whereas cultivation in arid areas is limited to olives and tobacco. Where they exist, irrigation networks are old and need rehabilitation. The marketing of agricultural output is dependent on the local market. In many villages, war related activities used to constitute the majority of the income to households in the region. Basic socio-economic infrastructure is in a very bad condition. Education and health service infrastructure is weak. The road system in the region is in a very poor condition and in urgent need of rehabilitation. The majority of the villages do not have access to water systems, and where they exists water networks are damaged because of the military operations. Some of these villages resort to the use of precipitation water stored in artificial reservoirs without taking any sanitary precautions. Sewer networks is almost in-existent in most villages, and houses depend on sanitary pits with disastrous effects on the underground water and the environment.” (UNDP, 2002)

See also:
Post mine clearance assessment in South Lebanon: few villages and towns have reached their pre-war populations (2003-2004)

- Construction of homes is active in and around villages, yet many of these homes are owned by Lebanese expatriates
- Some people are returning to build their homes, yet many still work outside of their villages of origin, returning only on weekends
- Most permanent residents are elderly
- Returnees to the villages of Rshaf and Hanin who received assistance to rebuild their homes noted that they do not live in them permanently due to lacking socio-economic conditions

*The Operations Emirates Solidarity (OES) is a project for mine clearance in South Lebanon funded by the United Arab Emirates since 2001. The Mine Action Coordination Centre for South Lebanon together with the United Nations Development Programme has undertaken post clearance reviews in demined areas since September 2003 to measure the impact of mine clearance.*

Overview of findings for Villages and Towns cleared in South Lebanon, including At Tiri, Bayt Lif, Bayt Yahun, Bint Jbeil, Dibil, Haddathath, Hanin, Rshaf, Al Ghanduriah, Al Qantarah, Al Qusayr, Deir Mimass, Deir Siriane, Ett Taibe and Sarda

“In general the villages reviewed […] have increased populations since the end of the occupation. Almost none have reached their pre-conflict population numbers however. Many experienced relatively large emigrations of residents during the post conflict period.

[...] Construction of homes is active both in and around the majority of villages. As found in Post Clearance Review of OES1 some of these homes are owned by Lebanese expatriates.

[...] While many of the villages exhibit visible change principally through the presence of new homes and tended land areas surrounding them, some people stated there is not many opportunities within the villages for employment. In some locations people may have returned to build homes but still work outside the villages, returning only in the weekends. The permanent residents today in many of the villages are the elders who, while happy to see some former residents return and activity back in the area, express concern that the former lifestyle of the villages has not returned. In many ways this is to be expected especially amongst the younger generation who left the area and have subsequently developed different lifestyles and needs.

[...] In the OES 2 sector we have two villages who have received considerable assistance from the Kuwaiti Fund. The Fund provided financial payments to former residents of the villages of Rshaf and Hanin whose homes were destroyed as a result of the war. While the returned residents of both villages are appreciative of the assistance they received it was interesting to note them comment that the development that followed the reconstruction of the homes has been very limited. The majority of the people whose homes have been rebuilt do not in fact reside in the villages as there are no work opportunities for them there. Many of these people return to use their homes in the weekends. Those that are actually living there on a permanent basis tend to be elders of the village who work their small land lots sustaining themselves on small scale agriculture.”(MACC SL, pp.4-5)
Caritas Survey: Many displaced unable to return due to lack of socio-economic conditions and funding to rebuild their homes (2001-2004)

- A survey begun by Caritas in 2001 in 110 villages, found that of 28,400 displaced families, only 5,396 people had returned
- The survey was undertaken in Aley, Chouf and Baada in 31 villages completely destroyed and 79 partially destroyed
- Many IDP families have lost hope of returning due to lack of socio-economic conditions (employment, health and educational facilities, etc.) in the Mount Lebanon region
- A number of displaced people have also received only partial funding from the government due to shortage in government funding

"One of the objectives [...] was to gather data on the displaced families since officially no information exist on the subject. Social mapping started in 2001 in the different displaced villages. The objective of the social mapping was the following:

1. Acquire the real number of families who originate from each village.
2. Acquire the real number of families displaced from that region.
3. Acquire the real number of returnees to that area.
4. Find out the reason of non-return

[...]

The social mapping was conducted in three stages dividing the study on the three counties: Aley, Chouf and Baabda areas. 110 villages in total were visited, 31 of which were completely destroyed while 79 were considered partially destroyed [...].

The statistics according to what we saw of the actual situation today are the following:

- Total number of original families: 28,400
- Total number of Displaced Families: 22,273 (78.40%)
- Total number of returnees: 5,396 (24.20%)
- Total number still displaced: 16,877 (75.80%)

[...]

The Displaced families have lost complete hope of proper return. The region is completely ignored in terms of educational, economic and health development and the fact that the government does not have any more funds to compensate the families whose homes were completely destroyed or even partially destroyed is making things worse. There are some families who have received one payment and are still waiting for the second or third. That is why, when passing thru the villages, most homes are skeletal and cannot be lived in.

All this, has contributed to the demoralization of the displaced families since their situation was not properly looked into since 1991 and this issue has been dragging for the past 14 years. A lot of funding was allocated to this issue but unfortunately, the villages are so underdeveloped and empty [...]. All aspects are affecting return: social, economical, reconstruction, health, education etc." (Caritas, 1 August 2004)
Evacuation of Israeli troops from South Lebanon prompted former residents to return to the area (2001)

- Lebanese government has difficulty to cope with the number of applications for a return to south Lebanon following the evacuation of Israeli troops

"Israel's unilateral military withdrawal from south Lebanon in May, followed by the rapid collapse of the Israeli-backed militia – the South Lebanon Army (SLA) – marked the abrupt end of over two decades of occupation for the civilian population. Families who had fled violence, intimidation and impoverishment in the occupied zone began to return as well as those whom the SLA had summarily expelled from their homes." (HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments"

"[T]he liberation of the South and the possibility of people returning to their homes has eased a lot of the pressure that was a problem last year. The only problem we have to deal with is the scope of the issue', including the processing of applications [Shadi Masaad, Director of the Central Fund for the Displaced said], [...] 'because we are not equipped to deal with the 2,500 applications we receive everyday." (Ibrahim in Daily Star 7 February 2001)

The 1989 Taif Agreement declared the return of the displaced necessary for reconciliation and sustainable peace (2000)

- Taif Agreement acknowledged the right of every Lebanese citizen displaced since 1975 to go back to the place from which she/he was displaced
- It also pledged financial support to enable the displaced to reconstruct their homes and villages

"The Document of National Understanding (known as the Taif Agreement after the Saudi city in which Lebanese parliamentarians met to agree it) was signed in 1989. It put an end to the fighting and declared the return of displaced persons a necessary condition for permanent reconciliation and sustainable peace: 'The Lebanese territory is one and undivided land for all the Lebanese people. Every Lebanese citizen has the right to live anywhere on this territory under the sovereignty of law; there is no division, no separation and no settlement of people on the basis of their belonging.

The document sought a just and enduring solution to the dilemma of the displaced. It required the government to 'solve completely the problem of IDPs, and acknowledge the right of every Lebanese citizen displaced since 1975 to come back to the place from which he/she was displaced; to establish the legislation that safeguards this right and ensure the means of reconstruction.'

The Taif Agreement thus stressed not only the right of IDPs to return to their place of original residence but also pledged financial support to enable them to reconstruct their homes and villages. This has always been a major issue in all attempts to put an end to conflict in Lebanon. It was one of the main concerns at the Lausanne Conference in 1984. It was also an important feature of the abortive Tripartite Agreement between militias under the aegis of Syria, which provided for the return of IDPs within a period of 'three months after the formation of a new Cabinet'.

The right of IDPs to return to their homes was formalized in 1990 through an amendment to the 1926 Constitution. The right of Lebanese citizens to unrestricted freedom of movement and residence in all parts of the country was enshrined in the constitution. An implicit corollary was rejection of any kind of partition of the territory of Lebanon." (Assaf & El-Fil 7 April 2000)

View the Lebanese Charter of National Reconciliation (Ta'if Agreement) (1989) [Internet]
Obstacles to return and resettlement

Minister of Displaced: Lack of resources is the main reason for the delay in returns (2004)

- The Minister of Displaced refutes accusations of corruption in the ministry; including that it has used its funds for electoral or other personal purposes
- He noted in the interview that almost all villages that witnessed displacement during the war have seen their inhabitants return
- According to the Minister, there are three remaining towns where reconciliation has not been achieved: Brih in the Chouf, Kfarselwan in the Metn and Kfar Matta in Aley
- These villages, according to him, are exceptionally difficult cases
- Reconciliation and the return of the displaced are stipulated by the 1989 Taif Accord yet remain unresolved 14 years after the civil war ended
- According to the Minister, the reason for this delay is financial
- In the mid 1990s, the Lebanese Parliament endorsed a law granting the ministry LL680 billion, to be paid by 2000, yet the ministry claims not to have received this sum

“Minister for the Displaced Abdullah Farhat revealed on Monday that financial obstacles have until now been the reason hindering the return of the displaced to their hometowns. Farhat, who was speaking in the Baabda town of Ras al-Metn during the inauguration of the Exchange Meeting for the Youth in the Southern Metn, hoped that allocations would be released as soon as possible for the displaced file to be closed permanently.

The minister also spoke about the importance of undertaking the reconciliation projects in the mountain through accurate follow-up policies that respect the uniqueness of every file.

Farhat praised Ras al-Metn on succeeding in setting a role model to future towns of reconciliations. Farhat's speech was preceded earlier in the day with a visit to the Saydet al-Beshara Church and to the annual book fair that was inaugurated by Metn MP Ghassan Moukheiber.”(Daily Star, 10 August 2004)

“During his chat with reporters, Farhat raised political and economic subjects. He also tackled the portfolio of the displaced, and the question of why 14 years after the end of the 1975-90 civil war, this file still has not been completed.

An economist, Farhat spoke at length about the current state of the economy and the tense political climate.

‘The problem is that the economy is being held hostage by the political bickering,’ he said, in reference to the constant squabbles between President Emile Lahoud and Premier Rafik Hariri.

‘I believe that the first move that ought to be made is to release the economic portfolio from political bickering,’ he said.

But beyond this dispute, lies a major socioeconomic problem, which Farhat said would need a miracle to be resolved.

[...]

Farhat proved to be a great defender of the Ministry for the Displaced, which has been mostly handled by members of Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt's Democratic Gathering - of which Farhat himself is a member.
‘I don’t think that any other ministry has dealt with the effects of the war like the ministry of the displaced did. ... We have worked with the wounded and the families of the victims. We have made people who had been separated by bloodshed sit together and reconcile. No other ministry has had to handle such a hard task,’ he said.

Farhat refutes accusations of corruption in the ministry; that it had used its funds for electoral or other personal purposes. ‘Before people point such accusations at us, let them tell us who else has done anything to mend the wounds of the war. We have achieved 80 percent of our goal. This is not negligible,’ he said.

Farhat spoke about the achievements of the ministry and the fund for the displaced with great pride. ‘There were some mistakes, of course, but they are very, very minor. On the other hand, it has been able to reconcile with the parents of victims of great massacres - something many people might have thought impossible,’ he said.

Almost all the villages which had witnessed displacement during the war have seen their inhabitants return. There are, however, three remaining towns where reconciliation has not been achieved: Brih in the Chouf, Kfarselwan in the Metn and Kfar Matta in Aley.

These villages, according to Farhat, are yet to be dealt with because they are exceptionally difficult cases. ‘They need human and psychological healing, as well as a lot of resources,’ he said. He said Kfar Matta, is an exceptionally tricky case because of the atrocious massacres there - including the slaying of 180 members of one family, ‘and this is why it is still hanging.’

Matters of ‘reconciliation’ and the ‘return of the displaced’ are binding; they are stipulated by the 1989 Taif Accord. But while they were expected to be completed sooner, they remain unresolved 14 years after the civil war ended.

According to Farhat, the reason for this delay is financial. In the mid 1990s, Parliament endorsed a law granting the ministry LL680 billion, outside the budget allocated to it in the state’s yearly budget, to be paid by 2000. But the ministry still has not seen any of the money.

‘If they pay the money, then the problem would be solved without delay. But we are short of resources,’ he said, adding, ‘we realize that paying such an amount would be a great burden on the treasury, but we cannot proceed without resources. ... People tend to forget the importance of the file of the displaced. It is crucial! And once it is solved, we’ll have closed the door on the war forever. Until then, that door is still open.”’ (Daily Star, 17 June 2004).

For information on support to Lebanon, see "Lebanon: Paris II Meeting", Government of Lebanon, 14 November 2002 [Internet]

Remaining landmines and UXOs pose a problem for return to the South (2003-2004)

- The number of mine accidents and casualties have greatly reduced due to mine risk education and mine clearance in heavily afflicted areas in the south
- In a written statement at the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Hariri Foundation emphasised the problem mines posed for the return of IDPs and long term development of the South
- The Hariri Foundation also noted that unexploded ordnance is not confined to the South only, and that according to the Lebanese Army there are approximately 11 tons of mines/ordnance scattered in the Bekaa Valley, in a 70 sq kilometer area inhabited by 20,000 people
More than 70 mine/UXO civilian and 20 deminer casualties were reported in 2001, but this number reduced to 13 civilian and seven deminers with only one fatality in 2003, a reduction attributed in the main to successful mine risk education and major clearance activities in the most highly afflicted areas in the south. While the number of landmine victims has been significantly reduced, remaining landmines and UXO have continued to affect the confidence of people living in the area and of those who might otherwise return, and, therefore, to seriously and adversely impact reconstruction, socio-economic development and general community life in the affected communities. This leads to the conclusion that a continued concerted mine action effort is not only justified, it is a necessary factor in the process to improve the social and economic well being of Lebanon. (NDO, 2004)

The problem of unexploded ordnance alone continues to pose a serious threat to local populations, particularly in the south. That problem is not confined to the south however. The Lebanese Army estimates that in the Bekaa Valley approximately 11 tons of mines and unexploded ordnance are scattered in a 70 square kilometer area inhabited by 20,000 people. The area is highly contaminated with cluster bombs and other types of ordnance. Cluster bombs were used widely by Israeli forces during the war.

Even though some of the maps of the minefields have been turned over to the United Nations, many minefields are unmarked and unknown minefields are still suspected to exist. Moreover, the process of verifying the accuracy of the maps is a lengthy one. According to UNIFIL officials, at the current rate of clearance, it will take at least four more years to clear known mines. The terrain of Lebanon also presents a more difficult task challenge. The rocky mountainous terrain hampers clearance efforts, driving the costs of de-mining up.

This problem is complicating the return of displaced people and hindering long-term reconstruction and socio-economic development of the south. The full cooperation of all parties to the conflict responsible for the planting of mines is an imperative for humanitarian reasons. (UN HCHR, 31 March 2004)

For further information, see the website of the Lebanese National Demining Office (NDO) [Internet]. See the website of the Mine Action Coordination Centre South Lebanon (MACC SL) [Internet].

See also
- UNDP's Humanitarian Update on Landmines, 2001 [Internet]
- “The Landmine Resource Center for Lebanon” by Habbouba Aoun, Journal of Mine Action, December 2001 [Internet]

Lack of reconciliation in certain areas prevents return of displaced communities (2004)

- In several villages, return has been complicated due to lack of reconciliation between communities, in particular in the Chouf-Aley villages
- Some displaced people believe that it is more a matter of funds

“Some argue that reconciliation in Chouf-Aley villages will not materialize without the election of a municipal council. But others disagree, and maintain that cancelling the elections is the only way to keep the pressure on for the return of the Christian displaced communities to their villages which they share with Druze residents.

‘How could we elect a council if we cannot live in our village and preserve our properties,’ said Mikhael Khouri, a displaced citizen of Abey and a member of the joint committee for reconciliation. ‘The
government has to fulfill its obligation before demanding that we reconcile; we cannot elect it by remote control.’

In 1979, the Interior Ministry decided to suspend all elections in the displaced areas that had not reconciled yet.

‘The government's decision is not wise;’ said Naif Gharzeddine, a displaced medical doctor from Baawirta. ‘The council could assist in the dialogue between concerned parties and help bring them closer,’ he said.

In Daqoun, whose Christian inhabitants are displaced, a group of young individuals, mainly from the Shaaya and Shalhoub families, formed an uncontested council and won by default.

Khouri does not approve of such an approach, ‘because this may delay the return of the displaced, and weakens our collective efforts for compensation and reconciliation,’ he said.

In Abey-Ain Drafil, the present council is 41 years old; out of 10 members only three run the municipal affairs. ‘This should not continue any further,’ said Khouri. ‘We must return as soon as possible before new facts on the ground become irreversible.’

Khouri was referring to new roads and houses built on churches and private properties.

Ain Ksour, another mixed community in Shehhar al-Gharbi, managed to reconcile before 1998 and the displaced returned to elect a municipal council. The inhabitants will participate in the elections next Sunday.

‘In Ain Ksour, the problem and disputes between the two communities were not as severe as in Kfar Matta,’ Mayor Khaddag said. ‘Whereas, in our village the wound is deeper and the division is hard to bridge between the two communities,’ he added.

The problem lies in the hands of the government according to Khouri.

‘We have no dispute with our Druze fellow citizens. In fact, they demand that we return to live with them as we did for hundreds of years,’ Khouri said.

‘However, the Ministry of the Displaced claims not to have the funds needed to compensate for damages and losses. Money is the key to solving all issues,’ he added.

Fouad Hamzeh, the vice president of Abey municipality, agreed with Khouri and said that, ‘Shouf MP Walid Jumblatt told the reconciliation committee that the funds will come from outside the official budget and will help solve the problem very soon.’

Kfar Matta is one of the unbending parties that put stiff conditions on any reconciliation efforts. ‘Therefore,’ said Hamzeh, ‘the file of Abey-Ain Drafil is now separate from Kfar Matta. When the funds become available and there is a return of displaced citizens, the elections will take place three months later.’

Kfar Matta Mayor Fouad Khaddag encourages reconciliation. However, he said that ‘all contacts are made discreetly out of respect to the victims' feelings. The Christian militias shot 108 young men and women at close range during the Israeli presence in the village in 1982,’ he said.
The militias left the victims unburied until their relatives returned five months later. ‘This wound cannot heal easily,’ Khaddag said.

The mayor admits that money, and large amounts of it, is one factor that could compensate for moral and material damages.
But, he acknowledges, ‘Sooner or later, we will come together; we have no other choice,’ he said.” (Daily Star, 29 April 2004)

*See also, “Minister of Displaced: Lack of resources is the main reason for the delay in returns (2004)” [Internal link]*

**Slow return and resettlement due to corruption, political rivalries, lack of finances and security concerns (2002-2004)**

- Several hundred thousand landmines located in the South have caused death and injury and cross-border fighting between Israeli forces and Hizbollah guerrillas continued (2003-2004)
- More funds are needed to speed return of displaced
- Over 50 per cent of return process completed according to CFD
- Experts on the issue of the displacement say that anywhere between 20-30 percent of the displaced will never return, mainly due to the loss of social ties with their areas of origin
- Young displaced people in particular often commute, between place of origin and areas where they have relocated close to jobs, businesses, or schools, giving rise to a type of ‘partial return’

"The resettlement process was slowed by tight budgetary constraints, destroyed infrastructure, political feuds, a lack of schools and economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security still was inadequate in some parts of the country." (US DOS, 25 February 2004, Sect.2d)

“Return has been slow due to corruption and political rivalries between government officials, lack of money, and security concerns. Several hundred thousand landmines located in the south have caused death and injury. In addition, cross-border fighting between the Israeli forces and Hizbollah guerrillas continued.” (USCR, 24 May 2004)

“Return has been slow due to corruption and political rivalries between government officials, lack of money, and security concerns. However, the UN agencies and international donors continued to support the government’s efforts to reintegrate the internally displaced.

Many villages were partially or totally destroyed, employment options were limited, and security was still inadequate. The destruction of infrastructure, shortage of schools, and lack of economic opportunities prevented returns to many villages of origin. Several hundred thousand landmines located in the south have caused death and injury. In addition, cross-border fighting between the Israeli forces and Hizbollah guerrillas continued.” (USCR, 2003)

“Despite efforts to settle the issue, 12 years after the civil war deadlines are still hard to meet. Since the end of the civil war, the return of an estimated 450,000 displaced Lebanese to their villages and towns has been one of the state’s top priorities. Struggling under the heavy burden of public debt and general budget constraints, officials have sought to fund this return through the Central Fund for the Displaced. But deadlines to complete the return have come and gone, mainly due to government austerity policies - leaving no set time-frame for returning people to their original homes. 'Since 1993, both the Ministry for the Displaced and the CFD have been working for the return of displaced citizens within a comprehensive plan,' said Fadi Aramouni, the chairman of the CFD, who was appointed to his post at the end of last year.

In an interview with The Daily Star, Aramouni said that despite officials’ attempts to announce deadlines for the conclusion of the return process, no dates can be given for the time being. 'All we can say is that the CFD and the government are both working hard to complete this process,' Aramouni said.

According to Aramouni, over 50 percent of the process has been completed - though he conceded that ‘it looks like only 10-15 percent.’ He added that completing the returns was contingent upon additional funds,
which are provided either by laws passed by Parliament or irregular contributions from annual budgets. Experts who deal with the issue of the displaced say that anywhere between 20-30 percent of the displaced will never return, because their social ties to their places of origin are irrevocably cut - a phenomenon particularly true for young people who never knew their home village. This group of displaced sometimes opt for maintaining their new residences while visiting their home villages when it is convenient, giving rise to a type of 'partial return.' Aramouni justified what he called the 'weekend or summer vacation return,' by saying most displaced had resettled in places close to their jobs, businesses or children’s schools, and that they chose to go to their home towns and villages only for vacations. Although Aramouni said he understood the reasons for such a trend, he said the fund sought to make the return of these residents to their homes 'permanent and sustainable.'

Aramouni also admitted that in light of increased migration to the cities, his institution was going against the current by trying to motivate people to return to their villages. But he also argued that bringing the displaced back home should be easier now, given the expansion of Beirut’s surrounding areas. According to the CFD chairman, during the past two years a considerable sum of money has contributed to a boost in the fund's activity. 'Over this period, the CFD has spent 50-60 percent of the total sum of the money it spent since its establishment' in 1993. 'Even when we are running low on funds, the CFD has its own administrative work to do,' he said. 'The government has been the only source of cash for our office and consequently the pace of our activity has depended on how much money the Finance Ministry pumps into the CFD.'

Decision-making on CFD expenditures is done in coordination with the Finance Ministry and, as with any other public institution, a sum of money is allocated for the fund in the annual budget. Aramouni said that in 1999 Parliament approved a special grant to the CFD of $300 million, but 'the Finance Ministry is still holding on to the money.' Finance Minister Fouad Siniora told the CFD it will receive funds in the near future. 'A week ago, (Siniora) promised us that our funding problem would be solved,’ said Aramouni, who estimated the total sum spent on CFD activity since 1993 at around $1 billion. He also said the fund needed an additional $800 million to complete the return process. 'For 2002, LL60 billion ($40 million) was allocated to the CFD (from the budget). We hope that funding continues after we receive this sum,' he said.

CFD expenditures cover compensation to displaced citizens whose houses have been either completely or partially destroyed. In the first case, the CFD pays citizens up to $20,000 for reconstruction. This amount, given in three payments, varies according to the property’s building space. In cases of partial destruction, the CFD pays up to $12,000 for renovation, according to space and damage. In this case, the displaced receive compensation in two payments.

Aramouni warned citizens who have received their first payment but have not started reconstruction or renovation to do so soon, saying they would be held accountable for the money they received. He also urged those who have received their first payment and completed 50 percent or more of the work to contact the CFD to receive their next payment. CFD expenditures also cover minor and 'complementary' infrastructure projects, such as the rehabilitation of water networks and the paving of roads, which should provide the minimum conditions required for the return of the displaced. Aramouni went on to say that one of the major issues tackled by the CFD and the Ministry for the Displaced is that of the second-generation of displaced residents. Under the new policy, children of displaced people are entitled to apply for reconstruction and renovation compensation. 'This step is crucial and is in line with our vision for the future of these villages,' he said.

He also said the eviction of illegal occupants of deserted property - a crucial step in the return process - was nearly complete, with only some 'minor exceptions in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the North. 'We blame ourselves for not finishing the issue. It is unacceptable that 12 years after the conclusion of the war, we still have cases of occupied property.

'This has prompted us to revive our eviction plans,' he said, adding that such cases were concentrated in villages of the displaced where no post-war reconciliation has taken place. The government uses the term
'villages of reconciliation' for around 20 areas where war-time sectarian massacres took place involving people from the village. Funding the return in these areas cannot begin unless an official reconciliation and signing ceremony takes place. Aramouni said all the CFD needed to finalize reconciliation was funding, and that only five villages - Kfar Matta, Brih, Kfar Salwan, Dqoun and Awarta - have yet to be compensated.

The CFD pays $20,000 for the family of each victim of the sectarian massacres committed during the civil war. 'The administrative procedure for these villages has been established, but we just need the funds to pay these families,' he said.” (LebanonWire, 8 July 2002)

On corruption and the misuse of funds linked to IDPs, see also "Post-war corruption inevitable without stronger institutions", Daily Star, 18 February 2004 [Internet]

"The dilemma of the country's displaced", Bejjani, Elias, 28 January 1999 [Internet]

Displaced for over 25 years, many do not want to return to their former homes (2002)

- The Lebanese government offered compensation to IDPs to rebuild their homes, but the majority of displaced have not yet reclaimed their properties (2003-2004)
- Director of the Central Fund for the Displaced acknowledged that after 25 years, many displaced persons have become part of a new social context
- Budgetary constraints, destroyed infrastructure, lack of schools and economic opportunities, as well as security concerns also account for slow resettlement process
- According to the Lebanese NGO Forum, common distrust between Christian and Druze populations and leadership, corruption, no clear government policy to guarantee return and the absence of infrastructure are factors explaining slow rate of return

"The end of the war provided an opportunity for many Lebanese to return to their homes and villages and to start rebuilding their lives. However, this return has been difficult and the majority of displaced have not been able to resettle." (USAID 17 November 2000)

"Masaad [Shadi Masaad, Director of the Central Fund for the Displaced] said that when appointed fund director in 1999, he was provided with two sets of statistics; one prepared by local religious authorities who said that the rate of return was about 12 percent, and another provided by the Ministry of the Displaced which set the rate at about 35 percent. According to him, both figures 'are equally right and wrong' depending on whether return is defined as the ability to return or the actual process of return.

'The problem is not with the houses and their reconstruction, its much more complicated than that' [Masaad said]. He said it would be naïve to expect people to move back overnight after being away from their villages for over 25 years and after having become part of a new 'social context.' 'We can't expect people to give up their work, their children's schools, and go back to what would be a new environment, especially since we haven't provided any employment alternatives for them,' Masaad said. (Ibrahim in Daily Star 7 February 2001)

"The resettlement process is slowed by tight budgetary constraints, destroyed infrastructure, political feud, the lack of schools and economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security still is incomplete in some parts of the country." (U.S. DOS February 2001)
"[R]eturn has been complicated by the reality that thousands of homes, villages and businesses were destroyed or severely damaged during the war. Electricity, water and telecommunications networks were destroyed, directly affecting 1.5 million people and cutting off potable and irrigation water. The abandonment of communities and farms not only affected economic growth, but resulted in severe environment degradation, urban overcrowding and unemployment." (USAID 1997, "Executive Summary")

According to Lebanese NGO Forum, "Many reasons explain this poor percentage of returnees:
1. the common distrust between Christian and Druze populations (Christians were forced to leave their region
2. the lack of will and "entente" between the Christian and Druze leadership
3. the widespread corruption that surrounded the return issue: the money allocated to the fund for the displaced was used by some officials in charge of the Fund for personal political reasons, which resulted in spoiled money benefiting to one part of the population at the expense of the other
4. the absence of a clear and firm political decision at government level to end this matter and guarantee the return of all the displaced
5. the absence of government policy to ensure proper infrastructure necessary to encourage the return of the displaced: reconstruction and restoration are not enough if initiatives at government level are not taken to follow up with developmental projects that will ensure socio-economic activities." (Helou 10 April 2001)

See also a survey on return to the South cited in "The Development of South Lebanon: Assessing needs and defining priorities", United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), 4 March 2001 [Internet]
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response

President Lahoud affirms commitment to resolve the issue of internal displacement (June 2004)

- At a meeting with Democratic Gathering Members, the President emphasised that the national reconciliation process would only be complete with the return of all IDPs
- President Lahoud also noted that the resettlement of people displaced by war should be accompanied by setting up development projects that would secure their survival in their villages and towns
- President Lahoud has requested a detailed report to from the Minister of Displaced People on the question of IDPs to be submitted to the council of Ministers
- Minister of Displaced People Abdullah Farhat submitted the report issued by the Ministry on conditions of displaced people by war and means to resettle them
- According to the study 185-billion Lebanese pounds are needed to secure the resettlement of all people displaced by war

“President Lahoud has paid special attention today to ways to re-settle people displaced by war. For this purpose, president Lahoud held a meeting with Democratic Gathering Members and they are: Ministers Marwan Hamdeh, Ghazi Aridi, and Abdullah Farhat and Deputies Nabil Boustani, George Dib Neemeh, Alaa Terrou, Mohammad Hajjar, Elie Aoun, Akram Shehayeb, Ayman Choucair, Henri Helou, and the Secretary General of the Progressist Socialist Party Colonel Sherif Fayad. The meeting was also attended by the director of the Lebanese Presidency Brigadier General Salem Abou Daher.

[...]

Minister Hamdeh said talks mainly focused on the question of displaced people in the Mount Lebanon region and means to allocate needed funds to re-settle them mainly in the villages of Breih, Kfarmatta, Shahar, and Kfarselwan. To meet such a goal said Hmadeh, the move required a follow up and the blessing of president Lahoud himself, in a bid to achieve reconciliation between residents of those villages and people wishing to settle again in their home villages. Hmadeh added, what was presently required is the issuing of a special law that would allocate funds to secure their resettlement.

For his part, Minister of Displaced People Abdullah Farhat handed his Excellency a report issued by the Ministry on conditions of displaced people by war and means to resettle them. He said, According to the study 185-billion Lebanese pounds are needed to secure the resettlement of all people displaced by war.

For his part, president Lahoud again reiterated his full commitment to deal with this humanitarian question, saying the displaced people problem remained one of his prior concerns. President Lahoud made it clear that the national reconciliation process would be fully completed once all displaced people by war were resettled in their home towns and villages.

By doing so, president Lahoud added, we would be folding once and for all a page full of painful events. The head of the Lebanese state made it clear that the resettlement of people displaced by war should be accompanied by setting up development projects that would secure their survival in their villages and towns.
He said, 'The return of people displaced by war to their villages is not only a demographic question. It is an indication that Lebanon has achieved national reconciliation and has fully recovered. Their resettlement implies that Lebanon is healthy again after folding once and for all a tragic page in its history and which had constituted a deep wound in the Lebanese body.'

President Lahoud requested Minister of Displaced People Farhat to submit a detailed report on the question of displaced people to the council of Ministers to be discussed in depth by participants and approve the required funds to secure their return to their home towns and villages. President Lahoud said, the report should include the estimate cost of their return to their villages.” (Republic of Lebanon, 30 June 2004)

**New type of micro-credit loan is available for displaced (2004)**

- Minister of the Displaced, Mr. Abdullah Farhat inaugurated a new type of micro-credit loan offering financial assistance to the displaced
- The programme was launched in 1996 but was originally restricted to the agricultural sector
- The European Union contributed $1.7 million to the loan programme

“Minister of the Displaced Abdullah Farhat has inaugurated a new type of micro-credit loan offering financial assistance to the displaced as well as economic projects in trade and agriculture.

The minister also expressed hope that the outstanding government compensation would be paid to those who had returned to their homes and villages, which they were displaced from during the civil war.

He said that people should ‘persevere’ in demanding their right for state compensation. Speaking during a news conference at his office in Starco, he said that payment of compensation should be carried out cautiously in order to avoid negatively affecting the exchange rate of the national currency.

Farhat added that it was insufficient to pave the way for displaced people to return to their homes and properties without providing them with job opportunities.

The loan program started in 1996, and it was originally restricted to the agricultural sector. The European Union (EU) used to provide the loans with the help of Banca di Roma.

He said that the equivalent of $1.7 million was contributed by the EU. ‘The distribution of the money, which was first supervised by the Union of Rome Universities, continues today with up to 163 loans remaining to be paid, which brings the total loaned amount by the EU to $2 million.’” (Daily Star, 21 January 2004)

**Lebanese army assists the displaced (2003)**

“For the national good, one of the LAF most important activities has been assistance of the displaced in returning to their villages and rehabilitating infrastructures of villages.

(…)

After the war stopped in Lebanon, landmines became a serious problem. The LAF’s engineering units started collecting information about mine fields and suspected areas. They launched a program for mine clearance and set priorities with urban areas as top priority.” (LAF, 9 September 2003)

*The Lebanese Army has also assisted with rehabilitation and mine clearance. For further information, see the website of the LAF [Internet]*
Opposition criticizes "government's continuous postponement of resolving the issue of the displaced" (2002)

“Central Fund for the Displaced president Fadi Aramouny briefed the Maronite patriarch on Friday on plans to complete the return home of all those who had abandoned their houses during the 1975-90 civil war. Speaking to reporters after calling on Cardinal Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, Aramouny said he had acquainted the prelate with the results of a study on the displaced had conducted since his recent appointment as president of the fund. He added that despite the economic hardship in the country, the state was determined to 'close this (displaced) file and meet its requirements.' Aramouny expressed confidence in the fund’s capability of carrying out in full a contemplated program related to the displaced. Meanwhile, the National Liberal Party issued a statement following a weekly meeting Friday criticizing what it described as the government’s continuous postponement of resolving the issue of the displaced.” (Lebanon Wire, 2 March 2002)

Government and Lebanese NGOs organized reconciliation meetings between Christian and Druze communities (2001-2002)

- Ministry of the Displaced sponsored several reconciliation meetings between Christian and Druze residents in 2000 and 2001
- Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network (LCRN) conducted reconciliation workshops

"During the year [2000], the Ministry of the Displaced sponsored several reconciliation meetings between Christian and Druze residents in eight villages throughout Chouf and Aley." (U.S. DOS February 2001)

"During the year [2001], the Ministry of the Displaced sponsored several reconciliation meetings between Christian and Druze residents in eight villages throughout Chouf and Aley." (U.S. DOS 4 March 2002)

"An NGO, the Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network (LCRN), has undertaken a number of activities trying to increase understanding and cooperation between returning members of displaced communities and the communities with which they were in conflict." (Salem 21 March 2001)

"[I]n December 1999, with the help of a strongly committed group of young adults from two Lebanese mountain villages: Rramlieh and Majdel Moosh, LCRN was able to conduct a major groundbreaking workshop on collaborative problem solving and reconciliation. The workshop saw the light after more than three months of pre-training negotiation and good offices with the aim of bridging the gulf that has been separating the two villages for eighteen years as a result of the inter-confessional war. […] The workshop, which lasted two full days, included dialogue and communication skills, empathy exercises, interpersonal, collaborative negotiation skills as well as a facilitated dialogue on a joint program of action between the two villages. […] It is difficult to determine the complete success of the initiative or whether the conflict has been buried beyond resurrection. Preliminary signs, however, are greatly encouraging. The participants have continued working together jointly and have attended several mutual social and religious events - something that the village has not seen in almost two decades. " (LCRN 2001)

Two successive plans of return and their achievements (2000-2002)

- First Minister for the Displaced was former militia leader Walid Jumblatt who had played a role in the largest displacement of population during civil war
- According to Lebanese Institute for Human Rights, implementation of return plan was characterized by coordination problems and inconsistencies
• New Minister for the Displaced, Anwar Khalil, who was appointed at the end of 1998, set the end of 2001 as the target for the return of all IDPs to their homes

• In November 2001, the Central Fund for the Displaced discontinued payments due to a lack of funds

• In March 2002, President of Central Fund reaffirmed plans to complete return of the displaced

"The IDP question is one of the most pressing and contentious post-war issues and for many years it was highly politicized. Though huge funds have been allocated to resettling the displaced, remedies have generally been both ineffective and unjust. […]"

**Initial plan of return**

Following ratification of the Taif Agreement, the Ministry for the Displaced was created to deal with the issue of war-displaced persons and a Central Fund for the Displaced founded to finance projects of return. A range of ministries agreed to contribute to the reconstruction of infrastructure in areas of return. While these initiatives seemed promising, the nomination of the former militia leader Walid Jumblatt as Minister for the Displaced was highly controversial. The same war leader who had played a role in the largest displacement (that from Mount Lebanon) was now given national responsibility for IDP return.

The government estimated that $400m was needed to cover the return of all the displaced in Lebanon. Figures indicate that although $800m was spent from 1991 to 1999, only 20 per cent of the displaced were able to return to their villages. Only nine per cent of those who returned were fully reimbursed for expenditure on house reconstruction, the great majority of returnees having to pay for reconstruction from private funds. Overt and blatant mismanagement and embezzlement of funds led to tension between the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, the parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri and the Minister for the Displaced.

**Shortcomings of the initial plan**

Implementation of the IDP return plan was characterized by deficiencies and inconsistency. There was a lack of coordination between the Ministry for the Displaced and the ministries in charge of infrastructure and social services. Cash payments were made to rebuild and restore houses in regions where the infrastructure and social services were inadequate or non-existent. Elsewhere in areas where such services existed, no restoration or reconstruction payments were available. Some returnees proceeded to rebuild properties without receiving payments while some who received reconstruction grants did not return and spent the money on other things.

The absence of planning and coordination for infrastructure projects was a major impediment to return. Some regions were provided with electricity but not with potable water. Many properties remained inaccessible as feeder roads were not rehabilitated. Insufficient attention was paid to building the socio-economic basis for sustainable return, providing social services and encouraging employment. The participation of NGOs was not encouraged despite their experience and wealth of human resources. Reconciliation and practical measures to restore civil peace and coexistence were not prioritized although of vital importance in those villages which had witnessed violent conflicts before and during the displacement.

The major obstacle to return of IDPs – the illegal occupation of their houses – has primarily been resolved by paying squatters to leave. The level of payment has varied enormously from place to place and for properties of a similar nature. Total expenditure on evacuation has taken a disproportionate 61 per cent of all funds allocated for IDP return in the period 1993-1998. […]

**A new approach**

The presidential election in October 1998 and the formation of a new government pledged to put an end to corruption have offered new hope that serious efforts can be made to deal with the issue of the displaced.
Anwar Khalil, the Minister for the Displaced appointed in December 1998, has set a target for the return of all IDPs to their homes by 2001. The Lebanese Cabinet has approved his plan, and allocated $750m to achieve this goal. The Ministry’s initial plan was amended in November 1999 to allow payment to the children of IDPs to enable them to construct or purchase dwellings and to recompense IDPs who have repaired their properties at their own expense. The Ministry is continuing to work on the reconstruction of schools, health centres and places of worship. IDPs have been exempted from paying electricity and water bills while reconstructing their property and some zoning regulations have been waived.

Despite austerity measures resulting from a huge budget deficit, the new government has put the issue of return high on its list of priorities. Shadi Masaad, the new head of the Central Fund for the Displaced, has admitted that most past irregularities were the result of political interference: 'direct orders from politicians or as a result of political accords'. One of the most important aspects of the new approach is the depoliticization of the IDP issue. It is to be hoped that electoral and other political considerations will no longer be the main determining factors when funds are allocated to IDPs.

A large backlog of applications, for evacuation and for reconstruction, remain unprocessed. Statistics on the exact number of returnees are not available. Seventy thousand households are still awaiting reimbursement of money they have spent on reconstruction." (Assaf & El-Fil 7 April 2000)

"Barring major complications, the Central Fund for the Displaced will wrap up its task and close by the end of 2001, according to the fund's director. But Shadi Masaad disclosed during a news conference on Tuesday one of the dark secrets of the drive to return the displaced too much time has passed and too many ties have been irreparably broken to expect a complete return. Although the fund has dealt with over 50 percent of evictions, renovation, and reconstruction, the rate of return is still far below that figure." (Ibrahim in Daily Star 7 February 2001)

"The Central Fund discontinued payments in November [2001] due to a lack of funds." (US DOS 4 March 2002, Sect.2)

"Through 2000, the Ministry was able to finalize reconciliation in more than 40 villages of Mount Lebanon, rehabilitate or reconstruct more than 85% of damaged housing units in Alley, El-Chouf and Baabda; and carry out socio-economic activities in coordination with governmental institutions, UN agencies, donors, NGOs and the local Communities. The multi-sectoral activities of the Ministry entail coordinated efforts with the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and line ministries in the area of infrastructure rehabilitation in the Mount Lebanon region. MOD has also forged partnerships with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) for the implementation of community based activities and projects in a variety of development sectors, as well as partnering with the European Union, USAID, and other donor communities." (UNDP 2002, B.)

"Central Fund for the Displaced president Fadi Aramouny briefed the Maronite patriarch on Friday on plans to complete the return home of all those who had abandoned their houses during the 1975-90 civil war. Speaking to reporters after calling on Cardinal Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, Aramouny said he had acquainted the prelate with the results of a study on the displaced had conducted since his recent appointment as president of the fund. He added that despite the economic hardship in the country, the state was determined to 'close this (displaced) file and meet its requirements.'

Aramouny expressed confidence in the fund’s capability of carrying out in full a contemplated program related to the displaced. Meanwhile, the National Liberal Party issued a statement following a weekly meeting Friday criticizing what it described as the government’s continuous postponement of resolving the issue of the displaced." (Daily Star 2 March 2002)
Ministry of Displaced offers children of displaced compensation in order to accelerate return process (2001)

- Social workers and other experts have argued that the children of the displaced, due to the lack of strong childhood ties with their original villages and towns, are difficult to lure back.
- Parliament endorsed in 2000 funding for compensating second-generation displaced

"The Ministry for the Displaced announced on Thursday that it would soon start compensating the children of originally displaced people as part of efforts to boost the effectiveness of the return process.

Speaking during a news conference at his office in Starco, minister Marwan Hamade stressed the importance of encouraging the younger generations to return to the regions from which their parents were uprooted during the war.

'The project cannot be complete without the return of all sections of society,' he said. 'It’s very difficult for young men and women to give up their lives and move to what has become a new environment to them. That’s why we have to give them the incentive to take this step.'

The official figure of approximately 450,000 displaced was based on 90,000 families with an average of five members. There are varying estimates of the percentage of those who have returned, but few believe that it exceeds 40 percent.

Social workers and other experts have argued that the children of the displaced, due to the lack of strong childhood ties with their original villages and towns, are difficult to lure back.

Parliament last year endorsed funding for compensating second-generation displaced, which Hamade indicated will require approximately $630 million.

According to Hamade, the first stage of compensation will cover married sons and daughters of originally displaced adults.

He said that in the future, and provided the money is available, more categories including single sons and daughters could be included.

However, Hamade stated that if two or more children of the original displaced had previously received compensation, then no other children eligible for payments in the family would be entitled to additional funds.

'The parent should also have owned a home that was destroyed during the war,' Hamade also said.

Once the children collect the money, they are obliged buy a home in their village or in a neighboring one if they are unable to rebuild their own home.

The minister said that there would be no need to fill in new applications, as the ministry could always rely on information available from previous applications. But, he continued, if the marital status of the concerned children had since changed, the records must be updated.

Hamade also said that in the next few years, the ministry would start compensating those who completed restoring and rebuilding their war-damaged homes at their own expense.

In the cases of completed restoration of houses, Hamade said owners have to prove that the house was damaged during the war and that it was later restored.
'This is public money and we must be careful how we spend it, otherwise we could pay compensation to 3 million Lebanese,' he cautioned." (Ibrahim 2 March 2001, Daily Star)

**Government development plan for Southern Lebanon (2001-2006)**

- The government of Lebanon launched a five-year development plan for Southern Lebanon extending through 2006
- The initial figure for the programme was estimated at 1200 million Lebanese pounds

**Post-Conflict Socio-Economic Rehabilitation Programme for Southern Lebanon**

“Southern Lebanon has always been at the top of the national development agenda. The government of Lebanon has placed the achievement of peace at the top of its priorities. The full implementation of UN Security Council resolution 425 has always been at the top of the political agenda, irrespective of the different parties. The continued conflict has reinforced the national cohesion vis-a-vis the acute problems Southern Lebanon is facing. The government commitment to handle priority rehabilitation of infrastructure and has been strengthened.

After the Israeli withdrawal, the government of Lebanon launched a five-year development plan for southern Lebanon of a total of 1200 million LBP distributed as follows: 896 million LBP for basic infrastructure and services, 103.4 million LBP for socio-economic development, 191.3 million LBP for victims assistance and 8.6 million LBP for mine clearance. These figures are no more than initial estimates of the financial implications of implementing the Government National Programme in southern Lebanon. The projects included are based on the 5 year plan of the Government extending for the year 2006.” (UNDP, 2002)

**National structures responsible to implement return (1993-2004)**

- Ministry was established in 1993 to rehabilitate infrastructure and housing, improve the economic sector, as well as education, health and social services, and to achieve national reconciliation
- The Central Fund of the Displaced was formed in order to finance the return of the displaced
- Another coordinating structure, A'idoun, looked at socio-economic elements necessary for long-term return in cooperation with UN Agencies

**Ministry of Displaced Persons**

"[T]he direct reasons of the program [of return of the Ministry] are:
Objective 1: To rehabilitate the reconstruction sights in the areas of return
Objective 2: To rehabilitate the infrastructure
Objective 3: Housing
   a-Repairing the destroyed houses
   b-Rehabilitate the partially destroyed houses
   c-To reconstruct the totally destroyed houses
   d-To evacuate the illegally occupied houses
Objective 4: Resetting the general services, social and educational services and develop them. Provide educational, health and social services. Support the work of local associations.
Objective 5: To rehabilitate the productive economical sectors
Central Fund for the Displaced
"The Central Fund of the Displaced was formed in order to finance the return of the displaced. In addition it is supposed to finance the return, and its security, of the displaced to all the Lebanese areas. It also gives grants and loans for similar reasons. The Fund coordinates with the Ministry in a complementary manner. It handles the following:
- Investigate the cases of illegally occupied houses and making payments for the occupiers.
- Assess technical reports to make compensations for rebuilding
Observe the progress of work and assess the second payment in coordination with the Ministry" (Ministry of the Displaced 2001, II, D.)

A'idoun
"It is a nationally implemented program called, UN Reintegration and SocioEconomic Rehabilitation of the Displaced, in cooperation with UNV's, Ministry of the Displaced, UNDP and UNESCO. […]

"A'idoun" program is predetermined to remedy any socio economic need for the return of citizens. In the first stage, building of houses was the goal. The biggest challenge of return is to make it a permanent return, as the residents have spent enough time in the city. The fact remains, would they want to return to the rural life where so many of the living conditions are lacking or have been destroyed. It is obvious that making this return permanent should come from […] a development program which would support the socio economic duties […]. [A'idoun] worked in cooperation with UNCHS Habitat […]." (Ministry of the Displaced 2001, II, D.)

"Other State ministries responsible for addressing the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced persons in virtue of the duties entrusted by the Lebanese Constitution and Laws:

Lebanese Council of the South (South Lebanon)
The Lebanese Council for the Reconstruction and Development (CDR)" (Ministry of Displaced, 4 August 2004)

"The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is the primary government institution that is responsible for the planning and the development of programmes for the country as a whole." (UNDP, 2002)

See the website of the Ministry of the Displaced (archived) [Internet]
See the report of the Ministry on achievements 1992-1997 (archived) [Internet]
See the website of the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction [Internet]

Selected UN activities


- The second phase of the project aims to strengthen the return process and is focused on reconciliation efforts
- The expected completion of the programme is 2005
- Phase two of the programme directly targets the displaced, returnees and residents in 4 main pivots (Damour, Joun, Harf, and Bhamdoun) in three Cazas of Alley, El-Chouf and Baabda
- In total, the programme is estimated to provide assistance to more than 11,600 resident and returning families
• The second phase of intervention includes a focus on employment and income generation through small-scale socio-economic interventions, social rehabilitation and small-scale community infrastructure.

• The objectives include supporting the reconciliation process for the returnees and residents, the rehabilitation of the socio-economic sector and mobilizing and coordinating resources.

**UNDP is currently implementing Phase two of the project, which is expected to extend until 2005 (UNDP, 21 July 2004)**

*The total budget for the programme amounted to US$ 4,450,000 of which US$ 1,700,000 was earmarked for the first phase. UNDP contributed 30% of the total budget while the Lebanese government contributed 40%. Additionally US$500,000 was contributed by Norway and US$300,000 by AGFUND (UNDP “Reintegration and Socio-economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced” Brochure, 1997)*

**“Reintegration and Socio-economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced: Phase II**

Following the completion of the first phase of the programme, and the realization that cross-cutting concerns for a sustainable return process entails the implementation of a sustainable human development approach for achieving reconciliation at the local level between confessional groups, reducing poverty, and expanding socio-economic rehabilitation efforts, UNDP and the Ministry decided to initiate a second phase of their joint socio-economic rehabilitation programme for the displaced.

The second phase of the programme was given an operational function, with the objective of producing a demonstrative effect in sustaining and expediting the return of the Displaced. The second phase of the programme directly target the population in the region, (displaced, returnees and residents), in 4 main pivots (Damour, Joun, Harf, and Bhamdoun) in three Cazas of Alley, El-Chouf and Baabda, thus targeting more than 11,600 resident and returning families. The strategy employed by the programme during its second phase of intervention included a focus on employment and income generation through small-scale socio-economic interventions (agricultural development, handicrafts, small credit and income generation), social rehabilitation (education, health, environment, youth, women, and vulnerable groups), and small-scale community infrastructure (agricultural roads, irrigation canals, sports playgrounds, retaining walls, etc.). An overarching strategy was a focus on reintegration and conflict resolution through youth mobilization in villages.

In accordance with the needs assessment carried out in the first phase of the programme, activities carried out during the second phase focus on the following sectors:

a) Reconciliation: among returnees and local population, youth and children through community participation in programme implementation, training/workshops in civic education and conflict resolution; sports and cultural activities.

b) Social Development: equipment and supplies for the existing dispensaries, training for health personnel; basic equipment to primary schools, training for teachers; basic services and income-generating activities for vulnerable groups;

c) Economic Development: agricultural and livestock production, small-scale family businesses, credit and marketing systems, employment and income generation;

d) The project also ensures that Environment and Gender are maintained as cross cutting issues within the activities and the impact.

**The objectives and targets of the second phase can be summarized as follows:**
1. Supporting the reconciliation process for the returnees and residents targeting 11,600 families by the year 2000, through:

promoting ownership of the programme by community committees, CBOs, NGOs, youth clubs and other community affiliation (animated meetings with local committees and other groups to create linkages among people, design and implementation of focused reconciliation programmes and activities using native talents and skills, setting up a mobile peace wagon for training on conflict resolution and peaceful means, and social integration, and implementing a communication strategy including publications, audio-visual material with incentive to reconciliation and peace building attitudes)

Promoting reconciliation and re-integration of children and youth promoted (equipping the existing identified youth clubs, organizing training courses for staff of youth clubs on reconciliation and conflict resolution techniques, organizing youth sports and socio-cultural activities and environmental activities; organizing day camps for children, and conducting training of instructors)

Mainstream vulnerable and marginalized groups within communities (develop demographic profiles, formulate the needs in project proposals and mobilize resources.

2. Supporting the rehabilitation of the socio-economic sector in the region and help create new employment opportunities, through:

Rehabilitation of basic social services (equipment for public schools and training of instructors, equipment and supplies for existing dispensaries and health centers, training on primary health care, implementing a school health programme, and implementing pilot priority projects)

Rehabilitation of agricultural productive infrastructure, and provision of technical assistance to farmers and agricultural cooperatives (technical assistance to farmers, training courses on the various agricultural issues, capacity building for cooperatives, execution of small community infrastructure projects, explore marketing options, and provide equipment to cooperatives)

Strengthen access to credit (technical assistance and guidance to credit NGOs, training sessions for credit borrowers, and manage the EU credit project)

3. Mobilizing and coordinating resources and establish an information system for a sustainable return process, through:

Implementing fund raising strategy (preparation of a Regional Development Plan and design a resource mobilization strategy)

Setting up a Programme Information/communication System (GIS, communication strategy).” (UNDP, 2002)

UNDP also provides support to socio-economic rehabilitation of demined areas in South Lebanon, including a project in 2004 that is expected to encourage the return of IDPs. See "Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of Demined Areas in Lebanon 2004", UNDP, 2004 [Internet].
See also UNDP-Lebanon’s website, in particular “Displaced Project: Resource Mobilization fact sheet”, UNDP, 2002 [Internet]

UNDP’s assistance to the displaced programme phase 1 completed: strengths and achievements (1994-1997)
The Programme was designed to support local IDP communities and provide technical assistance to the Lebanese Ministry who possessed limited management and financial resources.

The first phase of the programme (1994-1997) provided support to the Ministry, including its Statistics and Planning Division, its Technical Division and the Credit Unit.

In the first phase, UNDP also provided assistance in management and coordination.

An evaluation mission carried out in 1996 concluded the project successfully established statistical databases to monitor the return of IDPs and compile information on a wide variety of geographic, demographic, social and economic indicators.

The project also facilitated coordination between governmental bodies and international and local organisations and provided support to resource mobilisation.

UNDP has contributed to the return of IDPs in Lebanon since 1992 when it supported the Ministry of Lebanon to implement the programme "A'idoun" which was launched in 1994.

“The first phase of the programme aimed at:
1. Supporting the local communities in displaced villages in identifying their social and economic needs, and finding ways to respond to those needs;
2. Providing technical assistance to the Ministry of the Displaced in the development of programmes and projects that are needed for the returning process that aim at encouraging returnees to reintegrate their region;
3. Mobilizing resources for different programmes and projects for returnees.” (UNDP brochure)

“Reintegration and Socio-economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced: Phase I
The mandate of resettling more than 500,000 Lebanese with its various dimensions, including the ever-present multi-confessionalism, constituted a huge challenge for a newly created Ministry with limited management and financial resources. It was in this context that UNDP Project on reintegration and socio-economic rehabilitation of the displaced was conceived in order to provide the required technical assistance to the Ministry.

The first phase of the programme, which extended between 1994-1997 was conceived as a technical backstopping to a newly created Ministry, acted as a socio-economic programming unit for the Ministry, supporting its Statistics and Planning Division, its Technical Division and the Credit Unit. It has also supported the Ministry in the management and coordination with line Ministries, NGOs and donors, playing a crucial role in mobilizing support for the socio-economic development of the region, especially in issues of restoration of basic social services, employment generation, and agriculture and environment development. The programme also managed EU assistance for agricultural development and credit provision, as well as initiated youth development projects targeting out-of school youth and young adults providing skill training, civic education and confidence building and establishing of national youth teams for community rehabilitation and emergencies in the Mount Lebanon region.

The programme was externally evaluated in 1996. The evaluation mission concluded that the programme was successful in establishing statistical databases to monitor the return of the displaced; compiling baseline data on existing social structures, health services, public and private schools, vulnerable groups, municipalities and agricultural cooperatives; assessing of socio-economic needs in the communities; preparing related project proposals; developing a credit programme for agriculture with the European Union and the Lebanese private sector banking; providing technical assistance to the returnees; organizing social integration activities; facilitating coordination between governmental institutions, international organizations and local NGOs; and mobilizing resources.” (UNDP, 2002)

**UNDP in cooperation with UNESCO and the Ministry of the Displaced also implemented a programme called "A'idoun" in 1992 that was aimed to meet the socio-economic needs for the return of the displaced and that was launched in 1994.**
UNIFIL monitors the situation in South Lebanon, provides assistance to civilian populations and clears mines (2004)

- UNIFIL provided assistance to the Lebanese civilian population including medical care, water projects and equipment for schools and orphanages and social services to the needy
- UNIFIL cooperates closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies, in particular the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, UNICEF, and ICRC
- The project Operation Emirates Solidarity, funded by the United Arab Emirates, was successfully completed in May 2004, resulting in the location/destruction of 60,000 landmines
- As a result of the project 5 million square metres of previously contaminated land was cleared and accessible to local communities
- UNIFIL also continues to work in collaboration with UNDP and other agencies advocating for socio-economic needs and facilitating funding and implementation of development projects in South Lebanon
- UNIFIL remains focused on maintaining the ceasefire patrols of its area of operation
- As at 30 June 2004 UNIFIL comprised 1,991 troops

An overview of current activities:

“UNIFIL provided assistance to the Lebanese civilian population in the form of medical care, water projects and equipment and services for schools and orphanages and supplied social services to the needy. UNIFIL assistance was provided from resources made available primarily by troop-contributing countries. UNIFIL cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies, in particular the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the United Nations Children’s Fund, ICRC and other organizations and agencies operating in Lebanon.

The presence of a large number of minefields in the UNIFIL area of operation, which are now largely concentrated along the Blue Line owing to comprehensive demining in other sectors, remained a matter of serious concern. Since January one infant had been killed and nine Lebanese civilians injured as a result of exploding mines and ordnance. UNIFIL continued with its operational demining activities, clearing over 800 mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance in an area of land measuring 15,000 square metres. UNIFIL also carried out regular mine-risk education for local schoolchildren.

Collaboration between the United Nations, the Government of Lebanon and various donors continued to yield impressive landmine clearance results in southern Lebanon. The National Demining Office obtained some additional IDF minefield maps, handed over as part of the prisoner exchange agreement. Most notably, Operation Emirates Solidarity, funded by the United Arab Emirates, was successfully completed on 29 May 2004. Overall, the project was responsible for the location and destruction of some 60,000 landmines, resulting in the release back to the community of 5 million square metres of previously contaminated land within a two-year period.

My Personal Representative continued to work in close collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other United Nations agencies in advocating for socio-economic needs and facilitating the funding and implementation of development projects in the south. UNDP continued to lead
the efforts of the United Nations system in working with the Lebanese authorities for the development and rehabilitation of the south.

[...] UNIFIL remained focused on maintaining the ceasefire through mobile and air patrols of its area of operation, observation from fixed positions and close contact with the parties, the latter with a view to correcting violations, resolving incidents and preventing escalation. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), through Observer Group Lebanon, supported UNIFIL in the fulfilment of its mandate.

As at 30 June 2004 UNIFIL comprised 1,991 troops, from France (205), Ghana (650), India (648), Ireland (6), Italy (52), Poland (238) and Ukraine (192). UNIFIL was assisted in its tasks by 51 UNTSO military observers. [...] In addition, UNIFIL employed 405 civilian staff, of whom 111 had been recruited internationally and 294 locally. Major General Lalit Mohan Tewari ended his tour of duty as Force Commander, handing over command of UNIFIL to Major General Alain Pellegrini. Staffan de Mistura continued to act as my Personal Representative for southern Lebanon” (UN Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 21 July 2004, p.4-5).

For more information on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, see UNIFIL’s website [Internet].

UNIFIL mandate extended until January 2005 due to tensions on Israel/Lebanon border (July 2004)

- UNIFIL was established by Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 and has been present in South Lebanon since March 1978
- UNIFIL was established to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli troops from South Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the government in reestablishing authority in the area
- In July 2004, on the basis of mounting tensions between Israel and Lebanon along the withdrawal line, UN Secretary General recommended extending UNIFIL’s presence an additional six months
- The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1553, extending the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 January 2005

According to Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, UNIFIL was established to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security; and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. UNIFIL’s mandate was last extended until 31 July 2004 by Security Council Security Council resolution 1525 (2004) of 30 January 2004 (UNIFIL, 2004)

“Endorsing the Secretary-General’s recommendation that it renew the mandate, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1553 (2004), reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries.

It encouraged the Government of Lebanon to continue efforts to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces. Stressing the importance of the continued extension of such measures, the Council called upon the Government to do its utmost to ensure a calm environment throughout the south, including the Blue Line.

The Council expressed its concern over the tensions and potential for escalation, as noted in the Secretary-General’s report of 21 July 2004 (document S/2004/572), and reiterated its call on the parties to continue to fulfil their commitments to respect the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the Organization and UNIFIL.
Condemning all acts of violence, the Council also expressed great concern about the sea, land and continuing air violations of the withdrawal line. It urged the parties to end those violations, to refrain from any act or provocation that could further escalate tension and to abide scrupulously by the obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel.” (UNSC, 29 July 2004)

“Amid mounting tensions at the withdrawal line between Israel and Lebanon, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recommended extending the UN force in the area for an additional six months.

Over the last two days, the situation has taken a turn for the worse marked by deadly violence. ‘It has been some 48 hours of increased tension and there have been a number of provocative acts during this time,’ Mr. Annan's Personal Representative for Southern Lebanon, Staffan de Mistura, said today. He called on all parties ‘to exercise maximum restraint to restore calm and to abide by their commitments to maintain such calm.’

On Monday, a car bomb in Beirut killed a Hezbollah official. The following morning, Hezbollah and Israeli military forces engaged in an exchange of fire which resulted in the deaths of two Israeli soldiers and one Hezbollah fighter. That evening, Israeli jets violated Lebanese airspace, including over Beirut, at low altitudes.

The flights created sonic booms which ‘caused great anxiety amongst the civilian population,’ the envoy said. ‘As we have stated many times in the past, one violation does not justify another,’ Mr. de Mistura said. ‘Indeed, as we have seen, such actions lead to possible escalation which is clearly not in the interest of either party.’

The Secretary-General cites the ongoing clashes in recommending that the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) be extended through January 2005, warning that ‘considerable risk remains that hostile acts will escalate and lead the parties into conflict.’

He also appeals to all sides to rein in their forces. ‘I cannot stress enough the need for the parties to abide by their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, to respect the withdrawal line in its entirety and to exercise the utmost restraint.’

Mr. Annan voices deep concern that Israel ‘persists in its provocative and unjustified air violations of sovereign Lebanese territory.’

Hezbollah's retaliatory firing of anti-aircraft rounds across the Blue Line ‘is a violation that poses a direct threat to human life,’ he adds.

On the positive side, he notes that the whole of southern Lebanon - including all villages in the formerly Israeli-occupied zone down to the Blue Line - successfully took part in municipal elections.

Hailing this development as ‘a clear assertion of the exercise of authority by the Government of Lebanon,’ he urges the country's authorities to ‘ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces, and to do its utmost to ensure calm.’”(UN, 21 July 2004)

See also:
“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the period from 21 January to 21 July 2004”, 21 July 2004 [Internet]

Background on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and on border tensions between Israel and Lebanon, see UNIFIL’s website [Internet].

UN efforts focused on the rehabilitation and economic development of south Lebanon (2004)

“I wish to stress the need for an intensified focus by all concerned on the rehabilitation and economic development of the south. The achievements made in demining over the past year, accomplished through exemplary cooperation among the United Arab Emirates, the United Nations and the Lebanese authorities, were part of an encouraging trend supporting stability and social and economic development. In this respect, I urge the Government of Lebanon and the international donors to bolster their efforts. The United Nations remains strongly committed to assisting Lebanon in its economic rehabilitation of the south.” (UN SG, 21 July 2004, p.6)

UN Second Country Cooperation Framework in Lebanon: support in regions of displacement (2002-2006)

- Among the goals of the UN in Lebanon are to support post-conflict reconstruction and development in two regions of the country: Mount Lebanon’s area of internal displacement and liberated South Lebanon
- Promotion of integrated regional development as a means of poverty alleviation under two main programmes serving the poorest regions of Baalbeck-Hermel and Akkar
- Current projects in support of development in South Lebanon include job creation and income generation in former-demined zones, including to support the return of IDPs

Two key goals of the Second Country Cooperation Framework for Lebanon are:
"Support to post-conflict reconstruction and development consolidates UNDP’s intervention in two regions of the country: Mount Lebanon’s area of internal displacement and liberated South Lebanon. The theme of peace consolidation will continue to guide UNDP’s activities in these two programmes, with special emphasis on youth, in addition to community-based rehabilitation and rebuilding institutional capacity at the local level. UNDP will support the Government in fulfilling the country’s development needs and priorities as a means for strengthening social solidarity. In addition to supporting small-scale income generation activities, replicable ICT initiatives, seen within the context of a comprehensive strategy for ICT as a development tool, will be harnessed to consolidate educational, vocational and outreach opportunities within and across communities. As a culmination of UNDP’s advisory support in this area, principally targeting the challenge of de-mining the former occupied zone of southern Lebanon, a project for national capacity building in mine action is envisaged. " (UNDP 2002, "2002-2006")

“Promotion of integrated regional development as a means of poverty alleviation by consolidating projects dealing with socially and economically marginalized areas under two main programmes serving the poorest regions of Baalbeck-Hermel and Akkar. In its evolution from a crop-substitution to a rural and community development project, the second phase of the Baalbeck-Hermel programme introduced participatory local planning and solicited the interest of donors around grass-roots support mechanisms. The Government intends to initiate a participatory process of consultations with various donors and stakeholders based on a comprehensive framework of work for the development of this area of the country. UNDP has been asked to assist in this respect. The project in Akkar will also target local capacity building to complement the Government’s World-Bank funded community development programme in the region.” (UNDP, 2002)
**UNDP provides support to post conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation and development in South Lebanon**

"The development objective of the Southern Lebanon Post-Conflict Development Programme will be to stimulate post-conflict economic recovery, social rehabilitation and balanced development in the medium and longer terms, so as to lay the basis for the sustainable human development of the region. The expected results of the Programme are peace consolidation, a reversal of the migratory flow between the region and the capital, and the creation of a favorable environment for the economic and social recovery of Southern Lebanon communities." (UNDP, 2002)

**Current projects include Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of Demined Areas in Lebanon 2004**

"The project will help people in the demined areas of the former occupied land of South Lebanon build an economic base for themselves through income generation and job creation. Following more than 25 years of isolation and lack of economic support this project aims to support socioeconomic development, add to social stability, and prevent internal displacement. It is also hoped that the project will lead to sustainable development.

**Activities**
- Procurement of supplies to enable multi-cropping and to produce livestock;
- Provision of technical support;
- Enhancement of marketing capabilities and techniques;
- Training on implementation and management.

**Expected Outcomes**
- Income generation and support to the inhabitants of the former mined areas;
- Return of the displaced;
- Creation of job opportunities." (UNDP 2004)

**The UN Team includes other key organisations such as:** the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), International Labour Organisation (ILO) Regional Office for Arab States, United Nations Development Organisation (UNIDO) Regional office, and the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation Regional Office for Education in the Arab States (UNESCO), World Health Organisation (WHO), and the Mine Action Coordination Centre Southern Lebanon (MACC SL).

For more information, see the website of the UN System in Lebanon [Internet].

**International response**

**EU support moves from support to return of IDPs to broader socio-economic recovery (2001-2004)**

- The EU has provided humanitarian and post-conflict assistance, including support to IDPs since 1978
- Since 2000, the EU has largely focused on the provision of assistance directed to socio-economic development, particularly in South Lebanon
- The EU also provides support in a number of fields in Lebanon, including democracy and human rights, environment protection and support to Palestinian refugees
Current projects focus on socio-economic recovery in South Lebanon. Most projects directly supporting the return and reintegration of IDPs were completed in 2003.

“Réhabilitation agricole du Liban-Sud
Budget : € 1.990.420
Bénéficiaire : Istituto per la Cooperazione Universitaria - ICU (Italie)
Objectifs : Le projet contribue au développement rural du Liban Sud, en créant des conditions économiques adéquates pour stabiliser la population résidente, encourager le retour des réfugiés et déplacés dans leurs zones d'origine, et favoriser leur réintégration avec la population résidente. Le projet vise directement la réhabilitation et l'amélioration des services de formation, d'assistance technique, de mécanisation agricole et de transformation de produits agricoles dans les kazas de Marjeyoun, Hasbaya et Bint Jbeil. Il suit la gestion des activités des centres de services.


Ø Formation : 46 sessions de formation ont été organisées avec les agriculteurs, concernant des sujets variés. Plus de 350 agriculteurs ont pu bénéficier d'une intervention individualisée. De même, 5 sessions de formation ont été dispensées au personnel du Ministère de l'Agriculture collaborant au projet, 4 conférences informatives regroupant plus de 220 participants, sans oublier la réalisation et la diffusion de nombreuses fiches didactiques et des interventions auprès des responsables de coopérative.
Ø Centres de services : 3 centres de services ont été construits ou réhabilités au cours de l'été 2002, et équipés de matériel de travail du sol et de pressoirs, courant octobre 2002. Près de 250 tonnes d'olives ont été pressées dans les 3 centres (production de plus de 35 tonnes d'huile), et plus de 560 agriculteurs ont ainsi bénéficié, au cours de cette période, des prestations proposées. Près de 150 apiculteurs ont eu recours au centre pour l'extraction de miel. Un logo certifiant la qualité des produits, et apposés sur les bouteilles et pots, a été aussi créé et se trouve maintenant en cours d'enregistrement au Ministère de l'Economie libanais. Près de 1300 agriculteurs ont bénéficié des services de location de machines agricoles, et plus de 400 du service de fournitures d'intrants (engrais et pesticides). A terme et de façon progressive, les centres seront gérés conjointement par le Ministère de l'Agriculture et les représentants des coopératives locales.
Ø Bureau de commercialisation : le projet appuie depuis mi-2003 la création et le fonctionnement d'un bureau de commercialisation des produits agricoles, à la Chambre de Commerce, d'Industrie et d'Agriculture de Saïda, pour la recherche de débouchés locaux.

§ Réhabilitation du Liban-Sud : restauration de logements et micro-crédits
Budget : € 1.511.300
Bénéficiaires : Misereor (Allemagne) / Caritas (Liban)
Objectifs : Il s'agit de faciliter la réintégration des familles au Liban-Sud à travers un fonds de micro-crédits. Les micro-crédits seront utilisés pour la réhabilitation des logements et le financement de projets économiques viables dans le périmètre de l'ex-zone occupée.
Ø Restauration des logements : La réhabilitation des logements vise spécifiquement la cuisine et la salle de bain, les portes et fenêtres, le carrelage des chambres, les enduits internes et externes. 300 familles devraient bénéficier de ces facilités, pour un montant moyen de US$ 2.000 et un maximum de US$ 3.000. Les remboursements mensuels sont établis sur 30 mois et intègrent une durée de grâce de 30 mois. Le taux d'intérêt est fixé à 9%.
Ø Financement de micro-projets économiques : 300 petits entrepreneurs devraient bénéficier de prêts moyens de US$ 3.000, avec un maximum à US$ 4.000 dollars. Le remboursement est établi sur 48 mois, et prévoit la possibilité d’un délai de grâce pouvant varier de 1 à 6 mois selon la nature du projet. Le taux d'intérêt est de 10%.
Réalisations en 2003 : Le projet a démarré en juillet 2002. 3 bureaux d'accueil du projet ont été établis à Jezzine, Marjeyoun et Hasbaya, afin de recevoir les bénéficiaires. À la fin 2003, les crédits « logement » ont tous été octroyés. Sur les 300 crédits disponibles pour projets économiques, presque la
moitié a été remise. Des visites de suivi continuent. Une prolongation de 9 mois permettra de finaliser le
projet.

§ Réhabilitation économique et sociale au Liban-Sud
Budget : € 1.812.388
Bénéficiaires : Première Urgence (France) / Association d'Aide au Développement Rural
(Liban)
Objectifs : Ce programme vise le soutien aux projets économiques individuels des
populations défavorisées des cazas de Marjeyoun, Bint Jbeil et Hasbaya, représentant 92 villages : actions
de formation technique, générale et agricole nécessaires, appui direct aux projets économiques viables,
accès au crédit et octroi de « kits professionnels ».
Réalisations en 2003 :
Ø Formation : depuis le début du projet, 134 sessions de formation ont été organisées (formation
générale, technique et agricole), plus que le nombre de sessions prévu, pour un total de 2,257 bénéficiaires.
Ø Kits professionnels : 260 kits professionnels ont été remis, pour une valeur moyenne de € 1,270. A
noter que 55% des bénéficiaires de kits professionnels sont des femmes. (Les remboursements ont été
terminés)
Ø Micro-crédits : En mars 2003, le volet micro-crédits a été transféré au partenaire local ADR, tous les
crédits ayant été remis à cette date.
Ø Micro-projets : 4 micro-projets ont été lancés en 2002, notamment un soutien à l'équipement de
coopératives (secteurs apiculture et huile d'olives), mais aussi la création d'un atelier de couture. Deux
nouveaux projets ont été lancés en 2003 (atelier de saponification et un projet de création d'un restaurant).
à l'étude. Le montant des micro-projets varie de 19.000 à 36.000 €.
L'argent collecté, issue des remboursements des volets kits professionnels et micro projets, est utilisé pour
la mise en place de projets dont peut bénéficier l'ensemble de la collectivité et/ou une population
particulièrement défavorisée (projets communautaires). A la fin de 2003, cinq projets ont été réalisés
(rehabilitation d'une source d'eau et d'un orphelinat, achat d'un bus scolaire, aménagement d'une cour pour
école primaire, et extension d'un dispensaire). Le restant de l'argent sera consacré à des donations en
équipement pour des projets dans le casa de Marjeyoun (casa qui n'a pas bénéficié d'un projet
communautaire)." (EC Delegation to Lebanon, 28 July 2004)

"For the period 1995-99 the principal objectives of EU assistance have been to assist Lebanon's post-war
institutional and economic reconstruction. […] Lebanon has also benefited from humanitarian and
rehabilitation programmes directed principally to displaced persons affected by civil war, and for the
rehabilitation of South Lebanon." (EC January 2001, pp. 30-31)

In June 2000, the European Commission "approved a 1.21 million Euro humanitarian grant in favour of
South Lebanon and West Bekaa. This assistance, managed by the European Community Humanitarian
Office (ECHO) will allow non-governmental organisations to implement a humanitarian assistance
programme, mainly medical." (EC June 2000)

The EU also provides support in other fields, including democracy and human rights, environment
protection and support to Palestinian refugees, for more information see “Our Projects today” [Internet]

EU assistance since 1978 (Grants)

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<th>Reconstruction and rehabilitation of war damages (around € 65 million)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• war damage assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• technical assistance to ministries and public institutions involved in infrastructure reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>• reconstruction and rehabilitation of more than 400 primary and secondary public schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>• credits for the return of displaced people to their home villages</td>
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<td>• Rehabilitation of the electrical power station in Bsalim</td>
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<th>Social and economic development of the country (around € 18 million)</th>
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<td>• support the initiatives of fighting drug use and the rural development of the Baalbeck-Hermel</td>
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credit lines for developing agricultural and agro-industrial activities in Mount Lebanon and Southern Lebanon regions

- creation of a risk capital fund (Lebanon Invest)
- equipment for hospitals and day care centres especially in Southern Lebanon
- socio-economic integration programme in Southern Lebanon.

emergency assistance to refugees and disadvantaged (around € 31.3 million)

- food and medical aid to the Palestinian camps
- humanitarian and medical assistance to the population affected by the war in Lebanon particularly Southern Lebanon and West Bekaa), and by the economic situation.

assistance to the liberated region in South Lebanon (around € 13.2 million)

- food and medical aid to the Lebanese population
- rehabilitation of damaged houses
- support to social and economic rehabilitation
- support to the rehabilitation of agriculture
- assistance to former prisoners and their families
- demining

Under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Lebanon has also received Euro 246 million in grants, including financial assistance in support of reintegration of displaced people, economic and social recovery and development in Lebanon (EC Delegation to Lebanon, 2004 “Summary of the cooperation EU/Lebanon since 1978)

The E.U. has supported NGO partners in the implementation of projects including support to the return of the internally displaced in the Chouf region, economic reintegration in South Lebanon, and support to the socio-economic rehabilitation of IDPs, for more information on EU supported projects for IDPs and refugees in Lebanon, see “Support to refugees”[Internet]

See the website of the Delegation to the European Union to Lebanon [Internet]

UAE funds mine/UXO clearance in South Lebanon to encourage return and security (2002-2004)

- The project, named “Operation Emirates Solidarity” project is funded by the UAE and conducted in partnership with the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon
- The project has resulted in clearance of over 60,000 landmines, returning nearly 5 million square metres of land back to local communities in the formerly Israeli occupied zone of South Lebanon
- The south of Lebanon is the most highly infected part of the country, with some 500,000 landmines planted around the area
- The landmines are mainly located along the border of Lebanon, stretching from Naqoura in the west to Kfar Chouba in the east

“Recognizing the serious humanitarian nature of the problem posed by landmines and unexploded ordinance in the former occupied areas of southern Lebanon following the Israeli withdrawal, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced their assistance to mine clearing in the formerly occupied south.

The project was named Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES) and is funded through the generosity of His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nhayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Operation is an ongoing success, gives high visibility to the UAE and is being conducted in partnership with the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon (GoL).
One of the key successful components of the ongoing mine/UXO clearance in Southern Lebanon is the UAE supported Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South Lebanon (MACC SL) and its task planning, prioritization, monitoring, co-ordination and Quality Assurance activities combining to facilitate the unprecedented clearance of over 60,000 landmines in 24 months, thus releasing nearly 5 million sq m of contaminated land back to the local communities” (MACC SL, May 2004).

Background
“Landmines and unexploded munitions leftover from the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and previous periods of conflict in the area have hampered the effective restoration of peace and security in the area. While casualty figures of landmine victims have been drastically reduced, the landmine and UXO remaining have continued to impact on the reconstruction, socio-economic development and general community life in the affected villages. The south of Lebanon is the most highly infected part of the country with some 500,000 landmines planted in the area. The majority of these mines lie in the immediate area of the UN delineated ‘Blue Line’ between Lebanon and Israel. These minefields are known as the ‘border minefields’ and they stretch from Naqoura in the west to Kfar Chouba in the east. These border minefields remain a risk to the UNIFIL troops operating in the area and to those villages in the immediate vicinity of the Blue Line. The emphasis in 2003 has been on the survey and clearance of these mined areas, with a secondary task carried out by UNIFIL to survey and mark those mined areas along the Blue Line.” (MACC SL, 2003, p.2)

For further information, see
- The website of the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South Lebanon (MACC SL) [Internet].
- The National Demining Office of Lebanon website [Internet]
- UNDP documents relating to the problem of mines for displaced and returnee populations in South Lebanon [Internet]

Caritas provides a wide range of services to returnee and displaced populations in Lebanon (1984-2004)

- Since 1984, Caritas has provided broad assistance to displaced and returnee populations
- In 1991, Caritas worked to support return, including by providing grants for reconstruction and loans for economic development, assisting 12,500 IDP families
- In 1998, Caritas began to focus its attention on the Mount Lebanon region
- Since 1998, Caritas has implemented projects in about 22 villages including rehabilitation of homes, micro-credits, reconstruction of a school and youth developments
- These programmes have benefited approximately 750 IDP families

"Caritas Lebanon is a member of Caritas International, which is an international confederation. It has 120 national autonomous member organizations, which extend and support the Church’s commitment in the field of service and social action.

According to its statutes, its mandate is to help its members to 'spread charity and social justice in the world'.

Caritas Lebanon was one of the first NGOs to start activities with the displaced mainly those of Mount Lebanon area. Since October 1984, Caritas Lebanon has been actively involved in the implementation of several projects concerning the displaced.

It was highly active when Displacement from the Mount Lebanon area occurred and when the families from the South of Lebanon had to flee their homes. Its emergency programs included the provision of food aid, blankets, shelters, medicine, and educational aid to the Displaced families.
In 1991, after the war ended, it became clear that the area mostly affected by displacement was the Mount Lebanon area where most atrocities occurred. The destruction was so great that Caritas Lebanon put all its efforts on this issue. Caritas’ plan was and still is to work as a parallel partner with the Government of Lebanon by supporting the families whose return depends on the finalization of the construction of its home aiding the government in its reinsertion plan.

Its involvement started on different levels: from the provision of grants for home reconstruction, to the granting of soft loans for economic development, to the aid in infrastructure development in the various villages. The number of families benefiting from these programs amounted to approximately 12,500.

**Caritas Lebanon and the displaced today**

In 1998, caritas Lebanon looked in-depth at the situation of the Displaced families in the Mount Lebanon region and decided to open a specialized office for this issue in order to implement specific projects in certain targeted villages in order to aid the government in its reinsertion plan. The area mostly targeted by Caritas is Mount Lebanon since most of the displacement and destruction occurred there.

Since 1998, developmental projects were implemented in about 22 villages, which include the rehabilitation of homes, micro-credits, reconstruction of a school and the focus on youth development by building recreational centers in the villages and activities. Approximately 750 families have benefited from this program since then. The families are always followed up in order to ensure their return and to understand the obstacles facing them if they have not returned yet." (Caritas, 1 August 2004)

**Caritas implements programmes to encourage return of IDPs including, housing restoration in areas of return (specifically the Chouf villages and East Saida including the villages of Mtolleh, Aalman, Jneileh, Majdalouna, Mazmoura, Mohtokra and Mazraet el-Dahr; provision of plant crops and agricultural knowledge to farmers in the Chouf region, and support to women and young girls from displaced families that have returned to the Hammana (high Metn) area, including the villages of Bmaryam, Falougha, El-Kourayye, Khalwat, Tikhnay, Chbenieh, Khraiby, Kobay El-Kala’a. Since 1992, Caritas has granted credits and financial assistance to facilitate the return of IDPs, mainly in Mount Lebanon and East Sidon, but also throughout the country. Caritas also provides professional training and a micro-credit programme.** (Caritas, 2004)

**Caritas assists populations in war damaged regions including rehabilitation projects in South Lebanon (Jezzine, Marjayoun and Hasbaya). For more information, see Caritas Lebanon’s website [Internet]. Caritas also provides programmes that assist youth and children IDPs, see for example, “Educational activities for the youth in displaced villages”, 26 July 2004 [Internet]**

**Non-profit organisation SARADAR provides IT training courses to displaced populations (2002-2004)**

- Saradar IT Programme is an initiative to provide information technology to disadvantaged communities
- In its first phase, the project has focused on providing information technology to IDPs in Baabda, Aley and Chouf (Mount Lebanon) focusing specifically on women and children
- The project is intended to complement programmes of the Ministry of Displaced and UNDP in regions of displacement to encourage sustainable return and development in war torn areas
- In 2003, the IT programme was provided to IDPs in Araya, Bhamdoun and Kfarhim
- In 2004, the programme will be provided to IDPs in Jezzine
“The Saradar IT Programme® is a unique initiative to introduce the world of Information Technology to communities who do not have access to computers and the Internet because of income, education and/or location constraints.

Based on the principles of ‘equal opportunities for all’ and the ‘right to access information’, this project aims at facilitating access to technology, by delivering IT skills training in disadvantaged areas of Lebanon. It will focus, in its first phase, on the internally displaced populations in the cazas of Baabda, Aley and Chouf (Mount Lebanon) and specifically, women and children.” (SARADAR 2004)

“The Saradar IT Programme® complements the MOD and the United Nations UNDP joint activities in the regions of displacement, with the hope of encouraging uprooted persons to return for good; at the same time, contributing to the development of these villages by motivating the private sector to participate in community-oriented projects, targeting particularly disadvantaged and remote areas in Lebanon.” (SARADAR 2004)

For the second year in a row and within the scope of the Saradar IT Programme objectives to ensure the ‘right to access information and technology’, the Saradar Mobile Computer School fulfilled its commitment to dedicate, each summer, free IT training courses to the villages of displacement located in the three cazas of Baabda, Aley and the Chouf. This year, the itinerary, started from June 29 until October 4, was established to cover the lower parts of these regions as opposed to the 2002 calendar: the caravan stationed in Araya, Bhamdoun and Kfarhim.

A new destination was included in the SITP summer programme 2003: the caza of Jezzine, another region in Lebanon that deeply suffered from displacement as a result of Israeli occupation of this part of the country. At the initiative of the Youth Club of Kfarhouna in collaboration with the concerned municipality, the Saradar mobile school arrived in Kfarhouna on September 14. (SARADAR, 13 July 2004)

“For further information, on the programme, see SARADAR’s website [Internet]

Selected NGOs and groups assist IDPs and returnees in Lebanon (2004)

Caritas

“During the civil war, Caritas Lebanon provided immediate, free assistance to victims of the complex and lengthy conflict. With the end of the war, social needs have changed; prolonged economic crisis has created rising unemployment and widespread financial hardship. Additionally, some old pre-war problems have re-emerged. In particular, government development projects have proven insufficient to meet the needs of remote and rural areas.

Caritas Lebanon is therefore shifting its focus from short-term charitable giving and assistance to longer-term rehabilitation and development projects. International experience has shown that such projects foster greater independence, self-confidence and better long-term economic prospects for their beneficiaries than do one-time charitable giving and assistance.
Caritas caries out case studies to assess the particular needs of each region and drafts its development projects to respond to these specific needs.” (CARITAS, 2004)

In addition to providing support to a number of disadvantaged groups, CARITAS programmes provide assistance to internally displaced people as well as programs in war damaged regions, in particular South Lebanon. For more information, see CARITAS Lebanon's website [Internet]

The Lebanese NGO Forum
“As of 1991, the year that marked the end of the war in Lebanon, The Lebanese NGO Forum (LNF) focused its attention on the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as they represented 15 to 25 percent of Lebanon's population (3.2 million, excluding Palestinians and non-Lebanese nationals) subjected to long-term uprooting. The LNF developed and initiated a special resettlement program to address this large-scale human tragedy, ranging from infrastructure rehabilitation to legal awareness and education campaigns, in an effort to eliminate the sequels of war, participate in the consolidation of national reconciliation and contribute to the reconstruction of the Rule of Law in Lebanon.” (LNF, 2002)

For more information, see the website of the Lebanese NGO Forum (LNF) [Internet]

Maronite Outreach
“Maronite Outreach in Lebanon is a parish program that aims at the creation of a grassroots effort for the preservation of Christianity in Lebanon. It works from within the church and in the light of the directives issued by Pope John Paul II in order to ensure the survival of our faith, heritage, and values, and the continuation of our mission of love in Lebanon.” (Maronite Outreach, 2003)

Maronite Outreach’s goals include the development and execution of projects that ensure the return of displaced families and discourage emigration. For more information see the website of Maronite Outreach [Internet]

For further information on organisations working in Lebanon, the UN website lists a number of organisations involved in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process in Lebanon, see UNDP Civil Society Organisations [Internet]

See also "Interaction Member Activity Report Iraq, its Neighbors and Lebanon: A Guide to Humanitarian and Development Efforts", March 2003 [Internet]


- In 2001, the UN Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (ESCWA) launched an initiative to promote socio-economic development in South Lebanon
- The eight tracks for support to South Lebanon include urban development, social issues, vocational training, environment and small businesses
- The tracks were identified following discussions with representatives of Lebanese officials and the local communities in South Lebanon

“Recognizing that sustainability can only be achieved through a comprehensive and community based approach to post-conflict development; ESCWA has identified eight tracks for possible assistance to the south.

Having held discussions with representatives of the community, ESCWA specialists formulated project ideas that address clear needs in the physical, social and economic domains.
Two of the eight tracks are presently being implemented.” (ESCWA, 2004)

The eight tracks identified are: Social issues, urban development, agriculture, energy, water and environment, transport, information and communications technology, and vocational training and small businesses. Current ESCWA partners include the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs, Association d'Aide au Development Rural (ADR), Fondation Saradar, Mercy Corps, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Background

“Responding to requests from Lebanese officials and the local communities in the liberated areas of South Lebanon, the Executive Secretary decided to launch an ESCWA initiative to help in the socio-economic development of the region. ESCWA undertook a locally specific approach, in providing assistance appropriate to the economic circumstances of the region and utilizing local resources in the development process.

The first step was taken on 6 October 2001, when Ms. Tallawy and a small ESCWA team made a visit to the South to talk directly with the inhabitants of the local communities and assess their priority needs in order to identify the ways in which ESCWA could help.

Community meetings were organized in Kfar Kila and Marjeyoun. Municipal council members, teachers, NGOs, housewives, shopkeepers, farmers and landowners –all were there to voice the development priorities of their villages. Some suggestions were presented in writing, while discussions at both meetings revolved around a number of needs. Heading the list were: vocational training, especially for women and school dropouts, upgrading infrastructure and urban facilities, undertaking projects to create job opportunities, developing irrigation systems for agriculture and taking measures to protect the environment.

ESCWA documented the issues raised at the meetings and used the material for analysis and setting of priorities. On 6 December 2002 a team of ESCWA experts, headed by the Executive Secretary, held working session in Kfar Kila and Marjeoun with the representatives of the community. The value of this visit was that it presented an unprecedented opportunity for the people of the communities to meet and initiate constructive contact with specialists who could, in time, make a difference in their lives. In each of the two locations, several separate working groups composed of community representatives and one or more ESCWA specialists were formed. Among the areas covered by the groups in their discussions were infrastructure, education, agriculture, land use and cadastral, social, welfare, disability and vocational training. Residents were invited to elaborate on the needs and requests that they have previously raised.

One major key to success will be to strengthen local alliances in devising communal approaches appropriate to the special development circumstances of South Lebanon.” (ESCWA, 2004)

For further information see the website of ESCWA South Lebanon [Internet]

See also the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (ESCWA) website [Internet]

Arab Gulf states are main donors for reconstruction of Lebanon (2002-2004)

- Recent UNDP reports list Arab countries as the main source of Lebanon's external funding (2004)
- The World Bank has provided an average of € 120 million since 1992, including funds for post-war emergency recovery (2002)
- The Arab Gulf States are also significant donors, Saudia Arabia committed €240 million from 1995-1999 and Kuwait €137 million (2002)
• The United States has contributed between €12 and €15 million in grants (2002)
• The United Nations allocates around €16 million a year in technical assistance for health, refugees, rural development, education, social development and agriculture (2002)

“Donor coordination in Lebanon is active, with bi-monthly meetings devoted to addressing common issues and providing an opportunity for each donor to present its program. The most recent UNDP reports list Arab countries as the main source of Lebanon’s external funding, led by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (transport infrastructure); the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (human resource development, energy); the United Arab Emirates (demining); Saudi Arabia (infrastructure, social services); and the Islamic Development Bank (infrastructure). Also active are the World Bank (broad-based development); the EU (training and capacity building, administrative development, rural development, trade); France (technical cooperation, water and waste water, training); UN organizations (broad-based development); Italy (agriculture, infrastructure, water and waste water), Canada (development administration, economic management), and Norway (technical cooperation, social services, mine awareness). Most of the funding comes in the form of loans or soft loans that are channeled to the Council of Development and Reconstruction and approved by the Council of Ministers in contrast to the USAID assistance, which is totally channeled to the NGO community and the private sector in the form of grants. USAID assistance, ranking approximately 10th in resources, is among the top three donors in aggregate spending. USAID’s main donor partners are the World Bank, the EU, Italy and UNDP for rural development, agriculture and environment; the EU, Italy and UNDP for administrative reform and municipal development; the EU for trade (Euro-Med and WTO agreements); and the French Development Agency for water resources management.” (USAID, 24 May 2004)

"The World Bank has provided an average of €120 million a year in new lending to Lebanon, since 1992. It has a total of €840 million in its loan portfolio, of which 42% is disbursed (mid-2000). Bank lending covers a broad range of development activities: post-war emergency recovery, irrigation, health, solid waste treatment, education, administrative rehabilitation, roads, agriculture, power sector, and vocational and technical training. The World Bank, like other donors, faces problems of delays in project design, contract conditions and delivery mechanisms. Two new loans were signed in 2000 for education (€62 million) and municipal infrastructure (€88 million); and in 2001 for community development (€22 million).

The Arab Gulf states are significant donors. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development committed €240 million from 1995-1999, mainly in infrastructure, as well as in human resources development. Saudi Arabia has provided €165 million over the same period, similarly channelled to infrastructure (hospitals, roads, water, in recent years). This is managed through the Saudi Development Fund. Kuwait (€137 million) focuses its investments in transport infrastructure, services, and social development.

The United States operates a non-governmental programme directed at NGOs working in rural areas, including the South, and – as of 2000 – to support WTO accession. Annual allocations range between €12 and €15 million in grants. This is likely to rise to €45 million a year in line with trade liberalisation improvements. The UN system allocates around €16 million a year in technical assistance for health, refugees, rural development, education, social development and agriculture, via its family of agencies." (EU 2002, p15)

For more information on current US funding, see US AID [Internet]
For information on the World Bank, see the World Bank in Lebanon’s website [Internet]. See also Lebanon’s "Donor Support to Southern Lebanon" website [Internet]
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Known references to the Guiding Principles (as of August 2004)

Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
None

Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
None

Availability of the Guiding Principle in local languages

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<td>Syrian Arab Deterrent Force</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILMG</td>
<td>Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWA</td>
<td>Institute of World Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCRN</td>
<td>Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNM</td>
<td>Lebanese National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>South Lebanese Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN-Habitat or UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Center for Human Settlements</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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