Norris v. Government of United States of America

The court was asked whether:
(a) it could properly require a person resisting extradition on art.8 grounds to demonstrate exceptional circumstances;
(b) the gravity of the crime in respect of which extradition was sought was a relevant factor;
(c) the interference with family life had to be considered only from the point of view of the person whose extradition was sought, or also form the viewpoint of other affected family members; and
(d) the possibility of prosecution in the requested state was relevant.

In relation to point (a):

" 52. It is of critical importance in the prevention of disorder and crime that those reasonably suspected of crime are prosecuted and, if found guilty, duly sentenced. Extradition is part of the process for ensuring that this occurs, on a basis of international reciprocity. It is instructive to consider the approach of the Convention to dealing with criminals or suspected criminals in the domestic context. Article 5 includes in the exceptions to the right to liberty (i) the arrest of a suspect, (ii) his detention, where necessary, pending trial, and (iii) his detention while serving his sentence if convicted. Such detention will necessarily interfere drastically with family and private life. In theory a question of proportionality
could arise under article 8(2). In practice it is only in the most exceptional circumstances that a defendant would consider even asserting his article 8 rights by way of challenge to remand in custody or imprisonment....

56. ?Exceptional circumstances? is a phrase that says little about the nature of the circumstances. Instead of saying that interference with article 8 rights can only outweigh the importance of extradition in exceptional circumstances it is more accurate and more helpful, to say that the consequences of interference with article 8 rights must be exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance of extradition. A judge should not be criticised if, as part of his process of reasoning, he considers
how, if at all, the nature and extent of the impact of extradition on family life would differ from the normal consequences of extradition."

On point (b):

"63. I do not accept Mr Perry?s submission that the gravity of the offence can never be of relevance where an issue of proportionality arises in the human rights context. The importance of giving effect to extradition arrangements will always be a significant factor, regardless of the details of the particular offence. Usually the nature of the offence will have no bearing on the extradition decision. If, however, the particular offence is at the bottom of the scale of gravity, this is capable of being one of a combination of features that may render extradition a disproportionate interference with human rights."

On point (c):

"64. When considering the impact of extradition on family life, this question does not fall to be considered simply from the viewpoint of the extraditee... This issue was considered by the House of Lords in the immigration context in Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 39; [2009] AC 115. After considering the Strasbourg jurisprudence the House concluded that, when considering interference with article 8, the family unit had to be considered as a whole, and each family member had to be regarded as a victim. I consider that this is equally the position in the context of extradition."

On point (d):

"67. Extradition proceedings should not become the occasion for a debate about the most convenient forum for criminal proceedings. Rarely, if ever, on an issue of proportionality, could the possibility of bringing criminal proceedings in this jurisdiction be capable of tipping the scales against extradition in accordance with this country?s treaty obligations. Unless the judge reaches the conclusion that the
scales are finely balanced he should not enter into an enquiry as to the possibility of prosecution in this country."