Refugee Appeal No. 1613/93 Re BR

 

REFUGEE APPEAL

Re. BR; Refugee Appeal 1613/93 (REF: 25 MAY 1995, REFUGEE STATUS APPEALS AUTHORITY)

AT AUCKLAND Before: R.P.G. Haines (Member) Counsel for the Appellant: Holly McGruther Appearing for the NZIS: No appearance Date of Hearing: 7 April and 5 May 1995 Date of Decision: 25 May 1995

DECISION

This is an appeal against the decision of the Refugee Status Section of the New Zealand Immigration Service declining the grant of refugee status to the appellant, an Indian national born in the Punjab.

INTRODUCTION

The appellant arrived in New Zealand on 12 December 1989. His refugee application was not lodged until 19 March 1993. In an extremely brief handwritten statement just over one page in length, the appellant stated that he was an Ad Dharmi and the follower of Guru Ravi Dass. The basis of his claim for refugee status was that having worked in Bahrain for four years, he returned to his village as a relatively wealthy person and there encountered problems from members of the Brahmin caste. He was threatened by them and made unwelcome. He was ordered to leave the village. Fearing for his life, he came to New Zealand. At the Refugee Status Section interview held on 13 May 1993, the appellant maintained that his case was based on his fear of being killed or ill-treated by members of the Brahmin caste on account of his (the appellant's) having obtained an education, having travelled abroad and because he was perceived as being in a position to possibly influence others to reject the caste system. He added that Brahmins had killed his uncles and cousins, injured his aunt and killed other people in and near his village. He believed that he was unable to move to other villages to avoid his problems as he believed that the caste system existed 'in all villages in India. The appellant did not believe that he could obtain protection from the police as they did not help lower caste people. In a decision dated 31 May 1993, the Refugee Status Section declined the application on the basis that the appellant could avail himself of the protection of the Government of India. In arriving at this assessment, the Refugee Status Section took into account information to the effect that programmes were in place to protect the lower castes in India and that the discrimination and harassment faced by them was not condoned by the Government of India. When this appeal first came on for hearing on 7 April 1995, it was stated by Counsel in opening submissions that the appellant claimed persecution at the hands of the Brahmin caste. In this regard it was submitted that the appellant relied in particular on the fact that his uncle and his uncle's three sons had died at the hands of Brahmins. His aunt had been shot and injured in the same incident. It was said that the Brahmins in his village were specifically interested in him (the appellant) because he had managed to obtain an education, had travelled abroad and that, because of his enlarged outlook, may persuade others to rise up against the Brahmin caste and their social, economic, and political influence and control. However, as the hearing progressed, the appellant presented a substantially different account to that given previously by him. Whereas he had earlier claimed to be a Hindu, he now claimed to be a member of the Nirankari sect. As his evidence developed, it appeared that the emphasis of his claim shifted away from caste towards religion though the two elements were, to a degree, inter-related. As little, if anything, was known about the Nirankari sect and because the appellant was enlarging substantially upon his earlier account, the Authority decided that the hearing should be adjourned to enable the appellant and counsel to prepare the case more meaningfully in the light of the new evidence that was emerging. When the hearing resumed on 5 May 1995, it was submitted that the appellant's case now rested on:

(a)His birth into the Hindu faith and of the lower caste.

(b)His membership from 1975 the Sant Nirankari movement.

(c)The written submissions dated 2 May 1995.

A brief summary of the appellant's claims at the resumed appeal hearing will be given. However, in order to place those claims in context, it is intended to refer briefly by way of background to the caste system and also to the Sant Nirankari movement.

THE CASTE SYSTEM

India's caste system is derived from birth and occupation. The main castes, from top to bottom, are Brahmins (traditionally teachers and priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaisyas (traders and merchants) and Shudras (farmers). Each has hundreds of subcastes originally connected with specific professions, such as Chamars (leather workers), Lohars (blacksmiths), Badhayees (carpenters) and Yadavs (milkmen): Thomas Wagner, "India's Rural Villages Still Ruled by Centuries-Old Caste System" NZ Herald Saturday April 8, 1995. The top three castes-Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaisyas account for only 22% of India's Hindu population, but have dominated Hindu society for millennia. The labouring castes account for half the Hindu population but have only 4-6% of Government jobs: "Caste in a Different Mould" The Economist April 8, 1995 30-3 1. The caste system is sometimes described in more general terms. See for example John Rettie, "Oppressed millions awaken to claim a share in power" Guardian Weekly March 13, 1994 6. In this article, he points out that the Hindu hierarchy indicating the social status of the different caste groups can vary from state to state and sometimes between different areas in the same state. Generally speaking, in his opinion, there are the Upper Castes which range from the Brahmin caste to the landed intermediate castes. Then there are the Backward Castes. These form the lower end of the Hindu caste system and are discriminated against by the Upper Castes. Then there are the Scheduled Castes so called because they are recognised by the Constitution as oppressed. Members of these castes are considered outcast because of their tainted occupations of cleaning toilets, burning the dead and so on. They were formerly known as "Untouchables". Mahatma Gandhi described them as Harijans, meaning the children of God. This term is now considered to be derogatory by members of the Scheduled Castes. Its use has been banned in official documents by the Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh Governments and dropped by several newspapers. The term which has now gained broader currency is that of Dalit: Amnesty International, India: Torture, Rape & Deaths in Custody (1992) 14-15. The following passage is taken from page 14 of the Amnesty International report:

"Dalits and Adivasis [members of the scheduled tribes] are the poorest and most vulnerable groups of people in India. Their special vulnerability has been recognised as requiring extra protection, notably in the Indian Constitution, Article 17, which forbids untouchability and its practice in any form, and in the 1955 Untouchability Offences Act (which was retitled the Civil Rights Protection Act in 1976).

The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was passed in September 1989, making illegal some 24 social and economic abuses of the scheduled groups. The Act makes it a criminal offence for legal and administrative proceedings to be deliberately abused by police or security forces in cases involving members of scheduled groups. It allows states to establish special courts to try such cases and provides for legal aid and for compensation for victims of abuse.

Since this legislation was passed, however, human rights violations against Dalits and Adivasis have persisted and police are frequently reported culpable. In May 1990, the then Prime Minister V.P. Singh, stated tin parliament that his government would take the "sternest action" against those involved in violations against members of the scheduled groups. However, this and similar official statements have not resulted in an appreciable increase in the Judicial 'investigation and prosecution of police officers involved in such offences. Not one special court was known to have been established under the Act by October 1991"

However positive progress is being made. In particular, the lower castes are discovering their political power. Since January 1994, Uttar Pradesh, which almost borders the Punjab, has been ruled by a coalition of two caste-based parties, the Samajwadi Party (an alliance of Backward, Castes and Muslims) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (representing untouchables). This is the first time that an openly caste-based combination has attained power, and suggests that the national parties may increasingly have to worry about caste based rivals: "The Hills are Ablaze" The Economist October 8, 1994 28. It is reported that 'in Uttar Pradesh, encouraged by ambitious job and education quota systems for lower castes, northern Indians who once were relegated to poverty and humiliation are beginning to acquire property, raise their incomes and move into the nation's swelling middle class. Economic reforms are helping that slow transition, spurring industrialisation that is creating new job opportunities: Thomas Wagner, "India's rural villages still ruled by centuries-old caste system" NZ Herald Saturday April 8, 1995. More recently, the result of the latest state-assembly election in the northern state of Bihar confirms that people are voting, increasingly, on caste lines, and therefore that whoever represents the big lower castes is likely to win. In the election, the Janata Dal, which is dedicated to advancing the lower castes by reserving for them Government jobs and college places, increased its tally from 121 to 163 out of 320 seats. Its allies won another 34. The new Government is also committed to using job-reservation and patronage networks to improve the lower castes' prospects. Thus, in both Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which together account for a quarter of India's population, the main electoral divide is not left against night, or communalism against secularism, but upper against lower castes: "Caste in a different mould" The Economist April 8, 1995 30-31. Increasingly economists and industrialists are recognising that India can never be a strong market economy unless there are real benefits for the poor: Patrick Donovan, "India's moguls set for a rich feast" Guardian Weekly April 2, 1995 13. Reverse discrimination in favour of backward and scheduled castes has proved to be controversial. Backward castes, untouchables and tribesmen account for about 70% of India's people. Muslims account for another 11%, and several states-(including Uttar Pradesh) have started including Muslim groups in the "backward" category eligible for reservations. So reverse discrimination benefits the vast majority of the population, not a minority as in the case of American blacks, and national parties are wary of antagonising such a majority. The Supreme Court has held that reservations should not exceed 50%, to protect candidates of real merit. The Constitution provides a 23% reservation for untouchables and tribesmen, so the Court ruling applies a ceiling of 27% for the backward castes and Muslims. But many southern states have long had reservations above that limit. In 1993, the Tamil Nadu Government past a law setting reservations at 69%, in defiance of the Supreme Court ruling. Not a single national party dared oppose Tamil Nadu's reservation policy. On the contrary, they all got together and amended the Constitution to place this law beyond judicial scrutiny. The state government in Karnataka has now proposed a bill increasing reservations to 75%, and wants a constitutional amendment like the one Tamil Nadu got. It may get one; but legal experts suspect that the Supreme Court may strike these amendments down: "The hills are ablaze" The Economist October 8, 1994.

SANT NIRANKARI MOVEMENT

The subject of Nirankari Sikhs is dealt with at length by John C. B. Webster in The Nirankari Sikhs (Delhi: The MacMillan Company of India, 1979). The appellant, however, claims to be a member of the Sant Nirankaris. The origins of this movement are referred to in Webster op. cit. 32-35. The quote is from 33:

"... it would be wrong to see the Sant Nirankaris as an offshoot of what might be described as traditionalist-modernist tensions within the Nirankari cult, as the nature of their origins were quite different. Since versions of their origins differ and since the matter is of considerable importance, these versions should be examined with some care.

The first point to be made in this connection is that today the Nirankaris and Sant Nirankaris are as different as night and day. The former are Sikhs, whereas the latter claim to be a new world religion with distinctive forms, customs and secret mantras. Patterns of worship vary greatly, the Sant Nirank-aris being far more boisterous, unrestrained and uninhibited than the Nirankari Sikhs. Perhaps, most important of all, the place of the guru is very different within the two groups; for the Sant Nirankaris he is the central figure and 7 an object of worship, whereas for tile Nirankari Sikhs he is neither. The continuities between Baba Dayal and the Nirankari Sikhs arc clear, whereas the Sant Nirankaris represent a sharp break with that tradition. The connections between the two, beyond the similarity of their names, are almost accidental, unless one views the Sant Nirankaris as a reaction to the puritanism of the Nirankari Sikhs as they seem to oppose almost everything the latter stand for."

The Sant Nirankaris are viewed with some hostility by "orthodox" Sikhs-Christopher Shackle, The Sikhs (Minority Rights Group Report, Revised Edition, July 1986) 8:

"The dangers of reabsorption into the great Hindu majority of India have been an ever-present nightmare to those seeing it as their duty to maintain the distinctive traditions of Sikhism.

This is certainly a natural consequence of a minority consciousness, which also manifests itself in the more passionate feelings which are evoked against the groups which have broken away from the community from within. Though the splinter movements which arose during the time of the Gurus have long since faded away, their formal execration Is still a part of the Khalsa vows. Similar feelings are aroused by breakaway sects of more recent origin, including those arising from the claims to personal guruship made by some reformers of the last century, especially by one of their off-shoots, the Sant Nirankari movement."

At op. cit. 12, Shackle notes that the mesmeric figure of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (1947-1984) first came into prominence through association with a violent clash between Sikhs and members of the "heretical" Sant Nirankari sect at Amritsar in April 1978, which left twelve Sikhs and three Nirankaris dead. Bhindranwale also found his popularity with more radical Sikh opinion increased by his widely reputed involvement in the murder in Delhi in April 1980 of the head of the Sant Nirankaris, Gurbachan Singh. See further the Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre, Otawa, Canada Response to Information Request of May 22, 1989 (ind 0896).

THE APPELLANT'S CASE

It is intended to provide a brief summary of only the appellant's case as eventually presented on appeal.

1. The appellant is a 33 year old married man who comes from a village in the Jalandhar district of the Punjab. His wife and son are still in India. He has two brothers and two sisters, all of whom are married. The appellant is the second youngest child.

2. The appellant is of the Ad Dharmi caste, a subcaste of the Shudra or labourers' caste.

3. The appellant's village is predominantly Hindu, not Sikh, and for generations members of the appellant's family have worked as labourers in the fields owned by the village Brahmins. Their life as described by the appellant is one of poverty, long hours of toll in the fields and of exploitation by the Brahmins. The appellant's mother and father are illiterate, as are his two sisters and his eldest brother. Only the appellant and his youngest brother received an education, the appellant progressing to university where he completed the first of a three year course of study for a Bachelor of Arts degree. His youngest brother has now been recruited into the Punjab Police.

4. The education of the appellant and his youngest brother was made possible by a cousin called Mohinder Pal who paid the school fees and related expenses and employed the appellant and his younger brother part time in a small business which made saddles for bicycles.

5. Mohinder Pal was a prominent local leader of the Sant Nirankanis and as a result of his influence, the appellant himself joined the movement in 1975 when he was fourteen years of age. Subsequently the appellant accompanied Mohinder Pal to Nirankari meetings within the local district and would listen to Mohinder Pal giving speeches. He says that he (the appellant) became well known in the local district because people often saw him with his cousin. The appellant even accompanied Mohinder Pal to New Delhi on several occasions.

6. The appellant left University at the end of 1983 after successfully passing the first year exams. His parents encouraged him to leave India in order to work in Bahrain because Mohinder Pal began to receive a number of threats and the appellant's parents believed that the appellant himself could be at risk. The appellant explained that as far as he could tell, there were two reasons for hostility to the Sant Nirankaris. First, they are regarded as a heretical sect by Sikhs. Second, because the Sant Nirankaris do not accept the caste system, they are seen by upper castes, particularly Brahmins, as a threat to their entrenched and privileged position in the Hindu hierarchy.

7. The appellant left India for Bahrain in 1983 and remained there until 1988 working as a painter.

8. In 1987, the appellant's cousin, Mohinder Pal, along with his father (the appellant's uncle) and two brothers were killed by Sikh terrorists while watching television in their home. The appellant has produced a newspaper clipping of the incident. The appellant believes that both Brahmins and Sikh terrorists were involved in the killing. He understands from information given to him by witnesses present both at the time of the killings and at the subsequent police investigation, that Brahmins in the village paid Sikh terrorists to eliminate Mohinder Pal as he was encouraging the villagers in the district to rebel against the cast e system.

9. In 1988, the appellant returned home for three months on leave. One evening, while at home with his parents and two brothers, three village Brahmins arrived and threatened them with hockey sticks. The appellant was told that if he went to another Nirankari meeting, he would be killed just like Mohinder Pal. His family was also threatened. During the incident, the appellant was struck approximately four times with a hockey stick, but not hard. He said that the intention of the Brahmins was not to cause injury, but to frighten the family and in particular to reinforce their threat to the appellant that unless he left, he would be killed.

The appellant spent the rest of his leave staying with other relatives and friends.

10. The appellant next returned to India 'in 1990. Because of his fears, he moved around once again and it was during this time that he made arrangements to come to New Zealand.

11. The appellant says that although his parents and two brothers are also Sant Nirankaris (although not zealously so), they have not come to any harm on that account, nor on account of their being associated with the appellant.

12. When pressed as to the reason why he fears return to his village in India, the appellant explained that 'in the village he is associated with his deceased cousin, Mohinder Pal and is also known to be a Sant Nirankari. Further, having spent most of the past eleven years overseas, he will be seen as a person possessed of some wealth. The Brahmins who arranged for Mohinder Pal's death would assume that the reason for the appellant's return to the village was to exact revenge and that he (the appellant) would have sufficient money in order to pay people to kill the persons concerned and to bribe the police. Therefore, the Brahmins and die persons actually responsible for killing his cousin would make a pre-emptive strike and kill the appellant before he could do them harm.

In this regard, it should be mentioned that the appellant told the Authority that as a result of Mohinder Pal's death, the appellant had decided to abandon his involvement in the Sant Nirankari movement. Asked whether this fact would lead his potential assassins to accept that he (the appellant) no longer posed a threat to their caste position, the appellant replied that it would make no difference for the simple reason that their desire to kill him had nothing to do either with his religion or caste. Rather it was solely due to the fact that he would be perceived as a person looking for revenge. The appellant was quite certain that the death feared by him would not be on account of his caste, religion or membership of the Sant Nirankari movement. It would be solely due to the fear held by those who were responsible for the death of Mohinder Pal that the appellant would take revenge against them unless they struck first.

13. On the issue of relocation, the appellant said that no matter where he went in the Punjab or elsewhere in India, his potential assassins would be able to track him down, particularly if he maintained his connections with his mother and father. He also believed that once it was known that his wife and child had gone to live with him, that he would be traced through them.

14. He believed that it would be difficult for him to relocate and it would take him some six to seven years to establish himself somewhere else in India.

THE ISSUES

The Inclusion Clause 'in Article I A(2) of the Refugee Convention relevantly provides that a refugee is a person who:
"…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." This being a case involving a non-state agent of persecution, the relevant issues are,

1. Is there a genuine fear?

2. Is the harm feared of sufficient gravity to constitute persecution?

3. Is the harm feared related to any of the five grounds recognised in the Convention, or is it related to other factors?

4. Is the fear well-founded at all?

If so:

(a)As to the whole of the country of origin?

(b)As to only part of the country of origin, in which case, can the appellant genuinely access domestic protection which is meaningful, and is it reasonable, in all the circumstances, to expect the appellant to relocate elsewhere in the country of origin?

In our decision in Refugee Appeal No. 1/91 Re TLY and Refugee Appeal No. 2/91 Re LAB (11 July 1991) this Authority held that in relation to issue (4), the proper test is whether there is a real chance of persecution. In relation to the issue of relocation, the relevant principles are explained and discussed in Refugee Appeal No. 11191 Re S (5 September 1991), Refugee Appeal No. 18/92 Re JS (5 August 1992), Refugee Appeal No. 135/92 Re RS (18 June 1993) and Refugee Appeal No. 523/92 Re RS (17 March 1995).

ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT'S CASE

Notwithstanding the substantial changes to the appellant's case between the Refugee Status Section interview and the appeal hearing, he is accepted as a credible witness. His explanation for not disclosing that he was once a Sant Nirankari is believable. That is, most of his friends in New Zealand are Hindu or Sikh and he believes he would face hostility from both groups should his full background emerge. It was not until the appeal hearing that he felt confident to disclose this information. His account as detailed at the appeal hearing and summarised above is therefore accepted. The remaining issues are more conveniently dealt with under the two limbs of the appellant's case.

MOHINDER PAL AND THE SANT NIRANKARI MOVEMENT

It is accepted that the appellant is genuinely fearful of coming to harm at the hands of those responsible for killing his cousin, Mohinder Pal. In relation to this limb of the appellant's case which is directly related to Mohinder Pal, it is further accepted that the serious harm feared by the appellant at their hands is of sufficient gravity to constitute persecution. However his claim must fail as there is no Convention reason for the feared harm. The appellant was quite explicit that those who wish to do him harm are motivated only by a sense of self-preservation. They believe (albeit mistakenly that the return of the appellant to the village would signal an intention on his part to exact revenge for the death of Mohinder Pal. In striking at him first, the persons concerned do not think of the appellant in terms of caste, religion or a social group. In short, there is no Convention reason to this limb of the appellant's claim. In the alternative, even if the third issue is resolved in favour of the appellant, the appeal must fall on the alternative ground that his fear of persecution for a Convention reason, is restricted only to the immediate locality of his home village. By relocating elsewhere in the Punjab or by moving to another state in India, the appellant would be able to remove himself from danger as the risk of harm, such as it is, is confined only to the district of his village. By moving elsewhere, he can access domestic protection which is meaningful. He produced no evidence at all to support his belief that the Brahmins in his village would be able to track him down wherever he went in India. In a large and populous country, such a claim is fanciful. In addition, his fear of harm at the hands of Sikh extremists wherever he goes in India cannot be sustained in the face of the available evidence. That evidence was adduced before this Authority by the appellant's solicitors in Refugee Appeal No. 523/92 Re RS (17 March 1995). For the reasons set out in that decision from page 68 and following, there is no real chance of the appellant coming to harm at the hands of Sikh extremists either in the Punjab or elsewhere in India. It is for a claimant to establish that he or she cannot genuinely access domestic protection which is meaningful, and that relocation is unreasonable: see Refugee Appeal No. 523/92 Re at 47. In this regard, the appellant has failed to adduce any evidence. Clear and convincing evidence of the state's inability to protect must be provided. Absent such evidence, the claim to refugee status. should fail, as in terms of Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689, 724-725 (SC:Can), nations should be presumed capable of protecting their citizens. As to the reasonableness component of the relocation test, the appellant is well educated, youthful and, by his sojourns in Bahrain and New Zealand, has proved himself to be adaptable in new communities.

CASTE

This limb of the appellant's case falls on the second issue in that while he will face continued discrimination in his home village by virtue of his membership of the Ad Dharmi caste, it must be remembered that the Refugee Convention was not intended to protect persons against any and all forms of even serious harm. Refugee recognition is restricted to situations in which there is a risk of a type of injury that would be inconsistent with the basic duty of protection owed by a state to its own population. See Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1991) 103-104:

"As a holistic reading of the refugee definition demonstrates, the drafters were not concerned to respond to certain forms of harm per se, but were rather motivated to intervene only where the maltreatment anticipated was demonstrative of a breakdown of national protection. The existence of past or anticipated suffering alone, therefore, does not make one a refugee, unless the state has failed in relation to some duty to defence its citizenry against the particular form of harm anticipated."

It is clear from the information on the caste system referred to earlier (and in respect of which the appellant was afforded an opportunity to comment at the appeal hearing) that while the caste system does severely disadvantage certain groups, generalisations, can only be taken so far. In the appellant's case, he was able to benefit from an education to an advanced degree, and in at least two nearby states, namely Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the state legislatures are controlled by coalitions of lower castes. In addition, in several other states lower castes have benefitted from targeted development projects, hiring quotas and special programmes. It is the Authority's assessment that while the appellant may well face discrimination in India because of his caste, that discrimination cannot properly be stigmatised as persecution which, as noted in Hathaway Law of Refugee Status (199 1) at 112 is appropriately defined as the sustained or systemic failure of state protection in relation to one of the core entitlements which has been recognised by the international community. On the evidence before the Authority, it cannot be said that there has been a breakdown in India of protection of lower castes. In any event, by relocating either to Uttar Pradesh or Bihar, the appellant would be able to take advantage of the lower caste governments there in power. In the circumstances, there is no need to address the issue of Convention reason.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the Authority's conclusions are as follows:

1. The appellant holds a bona fide subjective fear of returning to India.

2. In relation to the harm feared by him at the hands of the Brahmins in his village and Sikh extremists, such harm is of sufficient gravity to constitute persecution.

The harm feared by him as a member of the Ad Dharmi caste is not of sufficient gravity to constitute persecution.

3. The harm feared at the hands of village Brahmins and Sikh extremists is not related to any of the five grounds recognised in the Convention.

In view of the answer to issue 2, it is not necessary to make a finding on Convention reason in relation to the appellant's alternative ground, namely his caste.

4. The harm feared at the hands of village Brahmins and Sikh extremists is not well founded at all. In the alternative, it is well-founded only in the district in which the appellant's home village is situated and the appellant can genuinely access domestic protection which is meaningful by relocating elsewhere in the Punjab or in India; and it is reasonable, in all the circumstances, to expect him to relocate.

As to the appellant's caste, in view of the answer given to issue (2), it is strictly speaking unnecessary to make a finding on the issue of well-foundedness. However, it is the Authority's view that such difficulties as the appellant may experience in his village can be avoided by relocating elsewhere and thereby accessing meaningful domestic protection. It would be reasonable, in all the circumstances, to expect the appellant to relocate elsewhere in India.

For these reasons, the Authority finds that the appellant is not a refugee within the meaning of Article IA(2) of the Refugee Convention. Refugee status is declined. The appeal is dismissed.