R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Mohammed Salim
R v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT ex parte MOHAMMED SALIM
Queen's Bench Division
 Imm AR 316
Hearing Date: 14 February 1990
14 February 1990
Illegal entrant -- alleged deception on entry -- application for entry clearance when aged seventeen as a child of the family -- interviewed when aged eighteen -- application form and replies at interview indicated applicant was single -- in fact married before application made -- whether misrepresentation being first made when applicant aged under eighteen, it was not material -- whether Secretary of State had discharged burden of proof of showing applicant was an illegal entrant -- whether the deception if only practised by the applicant's mother would have sufficed to make the applicant an illegal immigrant -- whether the subsequent grants of leave to enter as a returning resident secured by merely proffering his passport prevented the Secretary of State from treating the applicant as an illegal entrant. Immigration Act 1971 ss 26(1)(c), 33: HC 81 paras 38, 39.
Held:The applicant was a citizen of Pakistan. In 1976 he applied with his mother and siblings for entry clearance to join his father in the United Kingdom. At the date of application he was aged seventeen: on the application form completed by an agent of the British Embassy, his marital status was given as single. Although the details of the interview were in dispute, the court found that at that interview, conducted when he was eighteen, he confirmed that he was single. He had in fact married well before the application was made. That was discovered when his wife and four children applied for entry clearance in 1985: the Secretary of State concluded that he was an illegal entrant by virtue of the false declarations as to his status in 1976/7. Various arguments were advanced on his behalf before the court in challenging that decision. The original misrepresentation had been made when the applicant was under-age; it was therefore immaterial. The misrepresentation, in view of the dispute over what had occured at the interview, had been by the applicant's mother and not by him: following Khawaja and the obiter dicta in Khan, that was insufficient to make the applicant an illegal entrant. In any event, Khan was to be distinguished because there the deception was as to identify and in the instant case it was only as to status. Finally, relying on Addo, the fact that the applicant had subsequently been granted indefinite leave as a returning resident, after the production of his passport, would prevent the Secretary of State thereafter treating him as an illegal entrant. If the applicant were ignorant of his mother's deception as to his own status, on entry, he could not have been a party to subsequent deception, in any event. Held 1. On the facts the court concluded that at all material times the applicant had been aware of the declaration or himself had declared, that he was single when he had been married. The Secretary of State had discharged the burden of proof that was on him, to the standard required in Khawaja. 2. There was no authority for the proposition that the material date for the deception, if any, was only the date of application: the way that the rules were drafted and commonsense inexorably pointed to the critical date being the time when any particular declaration or representation was made. 3. Following Khan, a deliberate deception by the applicant's mother, even if the applicant had been ignorant of it, being designed to secure his entry would have made the applicant an illegal entrant. 4. The applicant could not rely on Addo for the proposition that by merely presenting his passport for re-entry as a returning resident he practised no deception: Patel followed. 5. However if the applicant had remained at all times ignorant of the deception, if that had only been practised by his mother without his knowledge, then there could not have been deception by the applicant on subsequent re-entry to the United Kingdom.
Cases referred to in the Judgment:R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khan  1 WLR 466:  3 All ER 538. Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department  1 AC 74:  Imm AR 139. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Addo (1985) The Times 18 April. Dhirubhai Gordhanbhai Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department  Imm AR 515. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Remi Durojaiye (unreported QBD 13 March 1989).
Counsel:MS Gill for the applicant; J Laws for the respondent PANEL: Hutchison J
Judgment One:HUTCHISON J: In these proceedings the applicant, Mohammed Salim, challenges the decision of an immigration officer, dated 2 April 1989, that he was an illegal entrant. Following that decision he was given notice that he was liable to be detained and would in due coure be removed from the United Kingdom. He has meanwhile been granted temporary admission and released subject to certain restrictions. I remind myself, before turning to the facts, that in a case such as the present it is for the respondent to satisfy me that the immigration officer's conclusion that the applicant was an illegal entrant was justified on the evidence. The standard of proof is that which applies generally in civil proceedings, namely, proof on a balance of probabilities, the degree of probability being proportionate to the nature and gravity of the issue. Since cases such as these involve grave issues of personal liberty, the degree of probability is high. See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khawaja  1 AC 74 at 97 and 105. The applicant was born on 6 June 1959. His father, Mr Fazil Ahmed, acquired British citizenship by registration in February 1968. In June 1976 his father came to the United Kingdom to settle, and shortly thereafter sought to arrange for his wife, the applicant and the applicant's two young brothers to join him here. On 23 December 1976 the applicant, himself a citizen of Pakistan signed an application form for entry clearance for settlement in the United Kingdom. At that time he was 17 years of age. Plainly there were considerable delays, but in due course in May 1978 the applicant, his mother and two brothers were interviewed by the entry clearance officer at the British Embassy in Islamabad. By this time the applicant was 18 years of age. He was given clearance and travelled to the United Kingdom with the other members of his family, arriving on 16 September 1978 at Heathrow, where he was granted indefinite leave to enter for settlement. Thereafter he made a number of visits to Pakistan, but on his return was on each occasion re-admitted as a returning resident. The last such re-admission was on 21 April 1987. On 6 October 1985 the applicant's wife, Zabeda Begum , applied to the British Embassy in Islamabad for entry clearance for herself and her four children to enable them to join the applicant in the United Kingdom for settlement as his dependants. That is the event that ultimately led to the decision that the applicant was an illegal entrant, the allegation being that in 1978 he deceived the entry clearance officer by concealing the fact of his marriage. When the applicant attended for his interview in May 1978 he was already a married man. The date of his marriage is not known with precision, but it certainly was not later than 1974, and by May 1978 he already had two children of that marriage. born on 22 January 1975 and 18 July 1977. His wife is the daughter of his mothers sister -- that is to say, she is a cousin of the applicant. I turn now to the material documents. The application for entry clearance, dated 23 December 1976 and signed by the applicant, contains a number of standard questions to which answers are inserted in English. The applicant did not speak English and it is clear from the affidavit evidence filed on both sides that the entries were made by a Mr Choudhury, a barrister, who acted as the Embassy's agent in Mirpur for the purpose of assisting local applicants to complete entry clearance application forms and submitting them to the Embassy on their behalf. The applicant, in his second affidavit, says that the form was filled in by an agent who asked questions in the Punjabi language, and evidence filed on behalf of the respondent makes it virtually certain that this was Mr Choudhury. Question 9 reads: "Whether single, married, widowed, or divorced:", and the answer reads, "Single". Turning to the interview, the applicant says that this was conducted by the entry clearance officer through a Punjabi speaking female interpreter. The relevant part of the interview is that headed "Family Tree of Hasham Bibi" (the applicant's mother), and one finds against the applicant's name the word "single". It is to be presumed that the information was initially provided by his mother, but the respendant's evidence is that the system employed involved completing the particulars furnished by her and then indicating by a tick where the applicant had confirmed the account given by his mother. It should be pointed out that, whereas there is a tick against the applicant's name, and there are two ticks against his age, the word 'single' is not ticked; contrasted the position in relation to his sisters where it is. There is another significant feature about the family tree. In the space reserved for information as to the wife's sisters (that is too say the applicant's mother's sisters) there appear particulars of only one sister, Alam Bi. No mention is made of another sister, Fatima, who is the mother of the applicant's wife. The immigration officer interviewed the applicant at the immigration office in Sheerness on 6 May 1987. An interpreter assisted. The record of that interview reads, insofar as it is material, as follows: "I asked him if he knew that he entered the United Kingdom illegally in 1978. He told me no and asked me why. I informed him that since he was married at the time he was not a dependent of his father but had formed a separate household. He replied that nevertheless he had continued to live in his parents' house and had been dependent on them. I asked him if he had been interviewed pesonally at the British Embassy in connection with his application. He told me yes. He confirmed that he gave a family tree with details of his parents, brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles. I put it to him that he had left out details of his mother-in-law's branch of the familiy and thus concealed his marriage. He replied that he had told them that she was an aunt." When the ommission to mention his mother-in-law in the family tree was put to him he denied any deliberate omission and said that he could not recall if the question had been raised in the interview. He denied any deception. He was not asked about the answer to question 9 in the original entry clearance application. In the light of these enquiries the immigration officer concluded that the applicant had obtained entry to the United Kingdom in 1978 by concealing the fact of his marriage and that this had been a deliberate deception. It is to be inferred, having regard to what I have said about the information contained in the family tree part of the interview, that the immigration officer also concluded that the applicant's mother was a party to the deception. The applicant's account of matters has been supplemented by two affidavits filed in these proceedings. In the first, sworn in support of the notice of motion, he dealt with the interview in May 1978 with the entry clearance officer, who he said asked a number of questions about the family tree. He said that to the best of his knowledge no questions were asked about his marriage and children. He denied using any deception at that interview, asserting that he answered all questions that were put to him truthfully and that it never occured to him that he should disclose matters about which he had not been asked. His second affidavit, sworn in reply to that filed on behalf of the respondent, deals, first, with the entry clearance application of 23 December 1976. As I have already mentioned, he deposed to the fact that that was filled out by an agent (Mr Choudhury) who asked questions in the Punjabi language, and said that in answer to paragraph 9 he told the agent that he was travelling along with his mother and he was never asked about his marital status. As to the interview in May 1978 he points out correctly that in the familiy tree section there is only one tick against his name (though, as I have said, there are two against his age) and contends that this indicates that he was not asked about his status. As I have already implied, the point that is really taken here is that the word "single" is not ticked at all, from which it is suggested that whatever he was asked to confirm he was not asked to confirm that. He also deals with the matter of his mother's sisters, and for the first time and in contradiction to his answers at the interview with the immigration officer asserts that his wife's mother was a step-sister and not a sister and that the omission to mention her is accounted for by the fact that his mother was not asked about step-sisters. Bearing in mind where the burden of proof lies, it is logical that I should deal first with the arguments advanced by Mr Laws on behalf of the Secretary of State. He submits that it has been proved to the requisite high standard that both, the applicant and his mother deliberately misrepresented the applicant's marital status, that misrepresentation was material in that it secured entry which would, had his true status been known, have been denied, and that in the circumstances, whether on the basis of his own of his mother's deliberate misrepresentations, he has been shown to be an illegal entrant. I propose to deal with the submissions in a slightly different order, considering first the basis of the contention that the information as to the applicant's marital status was material in securing his admission. The definition of an illegal entrant is to be found in section 33(1) of the Immigration Act 1971: ". . . a person unlawfully entering or seeking to enter in breach of . . . the immigration laws, and includes also a person who has so entered." Section 26(1)(c) provides that a person is guilty of an offence if, on any examination under schedule 2 of the Act or otherwise, he makes or causes to be made to an immigration officer or other person lawfully acting in execution of the Act a return statement or representation which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true. At page 118D in his speech in the case of Khawaja Lord Bridge said this: "My Lords, in my opinion, the question whether a person who has obtained leave to enter by fraud 'has entered in breach of the Act' is purely one of construction. If the fraud was a contravention of section 26(1)(c) of the Act . . . and if that fraud was the effective means of obtaining leave to enter -- in other words if, but for the fraud, leave to enter would not have been granted -- then the contravention of the Act and the obtaining of leave to enter were the two inseparable elements of the single process of entry and it must inevitably follow that the entry itself was 'in breach of the Act'. It is on this simple ground and subject to the limitations that it implies that I would rest my conclusion that those who obtain leave to enter fraudulently have rightly been treated as illegal entrants." The reason Lord Bridge uses the expression "in breach of the Act" in this passage is that the term "immigration laws" in the definition of "illegal entrant", which I have already quoted, is itself defined in the same subsection as meaning: ". . . this Act and any law for purposes similar to this Act which is for the time being or has . . . been in force in any part of the United Kingdom and Islands." The applicant's entitlement to enter was governed by the provision of HC 81. Part 4, headed "Passengers Coming for Settlement", covers the admission for settlement of the dependants of a person who is already in the United Kingdom and settled here. Paragraph 38 provides that children under 18 years of age are to be admitted for settlement where on parent has already settled and the other is being admitted on the same occasion as the child in question. Paragraph 39 reads: "Generally, children aged 18 or over must qualify for admission in their own right; but, subject to the requirements of paragraphs 34 and 35 an unmarried and fully dependent son under 21 or an unmarried daughter under 21 who formed part of the family unit overseas may be admitted if the whole family are settled in the United Kingdom or are being admitted for settlement." Mr Laws submitted that the applicant who, both at the date of his entry clearance interview and at the date of admission was over 18 and 21, would therefore have been refused admission had his status as a married man been known. Mr Gill, on behalf of the applicant, contended that the material date for the purpose of these provisions was the date of the submission of the application for entry clearance, when the applicant was only 17, and argued that accordingly any misrepresentation that there may have been was immaterial. He was not able to point to any authority which substantiated the contention that the critical date was the date when application was submitted, and I can see no escape from Mr Law's submission that the way in which the rules are drafted, as well as common sense, inexorably point to the conclusion that the critical date is the time when any particular declaration or representation is being made. Any other conclusion would have the most remarkable results. I next consider Mr Law's submission that it has proved to the requisite high standard that the applicant himself deliberately misrepresented his status. He relies principally upon the answer to question 9 in the entry clearance application form. There can, as it seems to me, be no doubt whatever that if a question in terms of question 9 was put to the applicant and he gave an answer which justified the entry made then that was a deliberate deception. The fact that that answer appears in a form which bears the applicant's signature raises a prima facie inference that that is what occured. It will be remembered that the applicant was not asked about this form in his interview with the immigration officer, but he deals with the matter in his evidence in support of this application. In his first affidavit, in a passage which I have not yet cited, he said that his mother received help from an agent to apply, and that he was asked to sign his name on a form printed in English, and was unaware of the contents of the form. This is to be contrasted with his second affidavit where, in a statement which is at variance with his first affidavit and also self-contradictory, he says that the form was filled in by an agent who asked him questions in the Punjabi language, that in answer to paragraph 9 he told him that he was travelling along with his mother and that he was never asked about his marital status. This, if true, must import that Mr Choudhury when purporting to ask question 9 substituted some other question. Mr Gill, on the applicant's behalf, was driven to submit that the probable explanation for what happened was that Mr Choudhury had had a general discussion with the applicant's mother, from which he gathered the necessary family background, and had then proceeded to fill in the form on the basis of that discussion, and that Mr Choudhury, seeing that he and the other two boys were applying at the same time as his mother, had simply made the assumption that all three were single without asking about it. It was not inconceivable, he suggested, that an agent such as Mr Choudhury would put down answers which he assumed were correct and he suggested that the investigative procedures then were not as good as they have since become. As to the notes of interview in May 1978, Mr Laws again suggested that the overwhelming inference was that the information as to the applicant's status had been provided or at least confirmed by him. True, he conceded, there is no tick against the word "single", but the immediately adjacent ticks indicate that the applicant must have been asked about these matters. The suggestion is that with whatever degree of logic or lack of it this family had conceived the idea that the safest way of concealing the marriage was to eliminate references to the wife's side of the family. Mr Laws, naturally, places particular reliance upon the late emergence of the suggestion that the sister was only a step-sister and the inconsistency of this with the applicant's answers in the interview with the immigration officer. Mr Gill, on the other hand, argued that there was no provision in the form on which the interview was recorded for questions about step-sisters and invited me to accept that the omission to mention Fatima is explicable on that basis, and that in any event there is no reason to think that it was the applicant who suppressed her name, if it was suppressed. While it is a possible conclusion that there was a design to deceive in this connection, he submitted that it is not a probable one because there are too many imponderables and too many points as to which there may have been misapprehension. I have carefully considered Mr Gill's arguments on this crucial issue, which like all his submissions were attractively and cogently presented. However, I cannot escape drawing from the entry clearance application the inference which Mr Laws invites me to draw, namely, that question 9 was asked the applicant says as much and must have been asked in the terms in which it appears in the form. I cannot avoid the inference that the recorded answer results from what the applicant said. I think that, quite apart from the matter of the sister, the immigration officer was amply justified in drawing the inference, as I do, that it was conclusively proved that the applicant had deliberately misrepresented his status in 1976 and 1978, and that his entry was thus procured. While the argument based on the omission of the sister might not be conclusive on its own, it does, in my judgment, provide strong support for this conclusion, as does the assertion in the interview that the applicant was single. Mr Law's second submission on which he would need to rely only if, contrary to the conclusion I have just stated, it had not been proved that the applicant himself had been guilty of deliberate deception as to his status was that it was certainly proved that his mother had perpetrated such deception. If the information in the entry clearance application was not provided by the applicant, it must have come from his mother; and the same can be said for the information recorded in the interview notes. There is no evidence to controvert these assertions; there is no affidavit from the applicant's mother. It will be remembered that Mr Gill's argument on the applicant's behalf involved the suggestion that probably the agent in the first place and the Embassy representative conducting the interview discussed matters with the applicant's mother and that as a result of those discussions the various documents were completed without any significant participation by the applicant. If this were correct, it does not of course serve to cast any doubt on the proposition that his mother must have deceived the authorities, and I cannot accept Mr Gill's submissions that the interview notes may have been compiled without such deception on the part of someone. Mr Gill argues that in the light of the decision of Khawaja a conclusion that entry had been obtained by virtue of the deliberate deception of the authorities by the applicant's mother rather than by the applicant himself would be insufficient to make him an illegal entrant. Given the conclusions at which I have arrived it is, strictly, unnecessary to resolve this point. However, since the matter has been fully argued, I propose to state my conclusions upon it. There is no doubt that the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khan  1 WLR 1466 is authority for the proposition that a person is an illegal entrant where he has entered in breach of the immigration laws as a result of deception, even though it was a third party who perpetrated the deception. Mr Gill, recognising this, relied on the fact that Khan had been decided before Khawaja, and drew attention to a passage in the speech of Lord Bridge in the latter case casting doubt on the correctness of the decision in the former. However, Mr Gill accepted that Lord Bridge expressly reserved consideration of the point for a future case and the passage in his speech which is relied upon cannot in any sense be said to be an assertion that is wrongly decided. Accordingly, as it seems to me, it is necessary to look at the speeches in Khawaja to see whether there is in that decision anything inconsistent with the proposition that, in circumstances such as the present, the applicant is an illegal entrant even if it be assumed that he was unaware of the deception practiced by his mother. Mr Laws drew attention to the passage in Lord Bridge's speech (page 118), which I have already cited, and submitted that that analysis is as apt to a case where the deceit had been practiced by a third party as it is to a case where the applicant himself has perpetrated it. Further, he submitted, that if one returns to the definition of "illegal entrant" in section 33(1) of the Act, that definition is entirely apt to cover such a case. There would need to be words of exclusion, he submitted, if third party deception were not to count. Mr Laws suggested that Lord Bridge's reservations about the decision in Khan might have been occasioned by a passage in the judgment of Megaw LJ at page 1469H in which the learned Lord Justice used words suggeting that any material non-disclosure, even if inadvertent and innocent has the effect of making the entrant an illegal entrant. However, I cannot accept this suggestion, for Lord Bridge said that he was not convinced that the case of Khan was rightly decided. He would not have used those words, it seems to me, he had merely been querying the passage referred to. Nevertheless, I have to say that I find Mr Laws's arguments convincing and I would hold that even if, contrary to my earlier conclusion, the applicant himself was innocent of knowledge of the deception, the fact that it was a deliberate deception by his mother which was designed to secure his entry and had that effect means that he was an illegal entrant. It is suggested that such a conclusion is in some way repugnant or unfair. However, I think that it is helpful to test that suggestion by considering a case where, unlike the present, the deception has been discovered almost immediately after the entry of the person on whose behalf it was practiced. I have to say that it does not strike me as being in any way repugnant or unfair to catergorise such a person as an unlawful entrant. Obviously one feels sympathy for an applicant such as the applicant in the present case, where many years have elapsed between the perpetration of the deception and its discovery, but his case is no different in principal from that which I have instanced. Mr Gill made a further submission based upon the fact that in the case of Khan the deception was as to the identity of the entrant, whereas in the present case it was as to his status. Mr Laws submitted, and I accept, that it is impossible to draw any distinction on this ground. Mr Gill advanced a further argument, based upon the applicant's subsequent departures from and returns to the United Kingdom, that, since on each occasion when he returned he was admitted as a returning resident, his re-admission was not procured by any deception, and accordingly, beginning with the first re-entry, he can no longer be catergorised as an illegal entrant. The argument finds support in a passage in the well-known text book "Immigation Law and Practice" by MacDonald, (second edition,) where at page 387 he quotes from the first eddition the following paragraph: "Where illegal entrants leave and on their return to the UK are granted indefinite leave as returning residents, the key question is whether they commit an offence under s 26(1)(c). In my view they do not, unless they are asked express questions about their earlier entry and lie. Under the old law the deception was the false representation that the indefinite leave stamped in the passport was valid. It was not. Now it is [this is the result of its being held in Khawaja that leave to enter procured by deception is voidable rather than void]. There is no misrepresentation or deception involved in presenting an immigration officer with an indefinite leave stamp. It now means exactly what is says. It no longer bears hidden secrets about its validity or existance. My view is that there is involved no representation about removability and unless the immigrant is asked questions there is no duty to disclose how any earlier leave stamped in the passport was obtained. Under the classic definition of a fraudulent deception representations must be of existing facts not past history. Even where someone is a returning resident immigration officers have a general discretion to refuse leave to enter if a previous leave to enter or remain has been obtained by deception (para 76 of HC 169). Questions may be asked in a particular case. False answers given may make the return entry illegal, but not otherwise." As the author points out, this passage was approved and applied by Hodgson J in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Addo (1985) The Times 18 April. However, that decision has been dissented from by the Court of Appeal in ex parte Patel  Imm AR 515. In that case Gildewell LJ at 526 cited the following passage from the judgment at first instance of Webster J: "I, of course, acknowledge that the case of Khawaja decided that there is no positive duty of candour approximating to a requirement of utmost good faith on an immigrant to disclose all material facts in relation to an application to enter, but that case also decided that silence as to material facts is capable of amounting to deception as to render a person who has gained leave to enter by such deception is an illegal entrant. I acknowledge also that for a representation to be false within the meaning of the subsection it has to be a representation of present, not of previous fact. But in my view the applicant when he entered the United Kingdom in the present case, by presenting his passport with its entry clearance, to the immigration officer impliedly stated, by that conduct, that, 'I believe that I am entitled to present to you this passport, which I believe has not been fraudulently obtained and which contains an entry clearance which I believe has not been fraulduently obtained'. Expressed more colloquially, the representation is 'This is my passport on which I rely in seeking to gain entry: there's nothing wrong with it, so far as I know'. Such a statement or representation, if to be implied, was false to the applicant's knowledge and in my judgment on entering the United Kingdom in those circumstances he was guilty of an offence under section 26(1)(c) of the Act." Glidewell LJ said that he agreed with the reasoning and the conclusion of Webster J. Mr Laws naturally relied on the decision in Patel and submitted that where someone presents himself as a returning resident he was necessarily impliedly representing that his earlier status was a lawful status and that it was only on that basis that he was permitted to enter. He referred me to an unreported decision of Otton J in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Remi Adekola Durojaiye in which Otton J reached a decision consistent with the passage in the judgment of Glidewell LJ in Patel and invited me to do the same in the present case on the basis that in principal it was indistinguishable. He pointed out that, if the approach favoured by Hodgson J were correct, it would mean that any illegal entrant could quickly and simply acquire a status of legality by making a short trip abroad and returning, and suggested that this would be a surprising and undesirable result. Mr Gill responded to these submissions by arguing, first, that any implied representation in the present case was not a representation of present fact and, second, that for there to be an implied representation there must be knowledge on the part of the representor of the deception. The first point, it seems to me, is unsustainable for the reason explained in the passage from Patel, which I have cited and which is binding on me. However, I am impressed by the logic of the second point insofar as the finding that the applicant was an illegal entrant depends upon deception by his mother of which he was and remained unaware. In such circumstances, how can the implied representation on re-entry be said to be false to the applicant's knowledge. Accordingly, had this case depended on a finding that the applicant's mother alone was guilty of the deception which procured his original entry, I should have found in his favour on the basis of this argument. As it is, however, I have already indicated that I am satisfied to the necessary degree of probability that it has been proved that the applicant himself was guilty of deliberate deception when he concealed the fact of his marriage in 1976 in the entry clearance application and 1978; that his entry was procured by that material misrepresentation; that accordingly he was then and remained, despite his subsequent journeys abroad and returns, an illegal entrant; that in the circumstances the immigration officer's conclusion that he was such was justified and that the present application must fail.
SOLICITORS:Rahman & Co; Treasury Solicitor
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