R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Begum and Ors; R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Khatun and Ors
- Author: High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
- Document source:
-
Date:
4 December 1987
Queen's Bench Division
[1988] Imm AR 199
Hearing Date: 4 December 1987
4 December 1987
Index Terms:
Appeal -- to Tribunal -- whether the procedure rules contain an imperative or directory provision that grounds of appeal should be included in the notice of appeal -- whether grounds of appeal may be submitted outside the statutory time limit for serving notice of appeal. Immigration Appeals (Procedure) Rules 1972 rr 15(2), 16(1), (3), 38: Immigration Appeals (Procedure) Rules 1984 r 16(2).
Held:
In two family cases on appeal to the Tribunal by the entry clearance officer, the appeals were allowed and the decisions of adjudicators reversed. In each case the notice of appeal form had been lodged within the statutory time limit. The forms however under "grounds of appeal" contained only the phrase "to follow". Before the Tribunal it was contended that because the statutory form had not been fully completed in that regard before the expiry of the time limit for notice of appeal, the appeal was out of time. Relying on rule 38 of the procedures rules, to correct irregularity, the Tribunal held that the appeals were in time. They considered the cases on the merits. On application for judicial review the point whether the appeals were timeous was argued again. Counsel also argued that the Tribunal had misdirected itself in law in reversing the adjudicators on the merits of the cases. Held: 1. The tribunal had erred in applying rule 38 to correct a supposed irregularity in the earlier provisions of the rules. That rule could not be prayed in aid in the events which had happened: Ashrafi followed. 2. However, on a true interpretation of the procedure rules, the requirement as to the inclusion of grounds of appeal were directory not imperative. Thus the appeals had been lodged in time. Howard applied. 3. There was no difference, in that regard, in the effect of the wording used in the 1972 and 1984 procedure rules, contrary to the views expressed by the Tribunal in Hamida Begum. 4. In the case of Hamida Begum the Tribunal had failed to assess the case of each of the four appellants separately, and its determination would be quashed. 5. In the case of Khatun, because the adjudicator had placed no reliance on the evidence of the witness he had heard, the Tribunal had not erred in law in making its own different deductions from the evidence as a whole: that application would be dismissed.Cases referred to in the Judgment:
Howard v Secretary of State for the Environment [1975] 1 QB 235: [1974] 1 All ER 644. Ashrafi v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1981] Imm AR 34. R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Kwok on Tong [1981] Imm AR 214. R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Mahendra Singh [1984] Imm AR 1. ECO, Dhaka v Hamida Begum and ors [1986] Imm AR 252.Counsel:
N Blake for Hamida Begum and ors; A Riza for Amina Khatun and ors; R Jay for the respondent Tribunal PANEL: Simon Brown JJudgment One:
SIMON BROWN J: I propose to give both of these judgments together. There are before the Court two applications for judicial review brought by two purported families of citizens of Bangladesh settled in the United Kingdom. The challenges are against the respective Immigration Appeal Tribunal decisions which, in each case, allowed an appeal by an entry clearance officer against the respective adjudicators' decisions allowing the purported families' appeals and directing the respective entry clearance officers to issue entry clearances which would enable these families to settle in the United Kingdom to join the respective sponsors. The two applications were listed for hearing before me on the same day because they both appeared to raise, in some instances, identical and, in others, apparently overlapping points. In the event, as I shall indicate, the points of similarity both of substance and of argument, tended to become less rather than more apparent as the day wore on, but it is nevertheless convenient to dispose of both cases in a single judgment. I shall take first the case of Hamida Begum together with three boys, Azad, Farid and Faruk Miah. In both cases I shall, for convenience and simplicity, refer to the respective applicants as "wife and children". That is not, of course, intended to pre-empt the decision either past or future in these cases. In the Hamida Begum case, the four applicants applied for entry clearance in September 1982. In December 1982 the wife was interviewed, the three sons being then aged respectively nine, six and three. The entry clearance officer, understandably, wished to make further inquiries. In November 1983 he organised a village visit in Bangladesh. Seven of the people living in this remote village were seen. Some were members of the applicants' family, others were not. Suffice for the present to say that the interviews produced a number of discrepant responses, some helpful to some or other of the applicants, some decidedly not so. In particular, a weight of response appeared to build up which was contrary to the claimed relationship in the case of the eldest son, Azad. The information was considered by the entry clearance officer. On 4 December 1983 he refused all applications. An appeal was lodged. An explanatory statement in the usual manner was provided by the entry clearance officer, explaining in considerable (indeed, commendable) detail how the adverse determination had been arrived at. Some 18 months later, a month or so before the appeal was heard by the adjudicator, the sponsor submitted to the adjudicator a considerable number of documents in support of the appeal. The adjudicator's determination is dated 28 January 1986. As I have already indicated, he allowed the appeals and directed that the successful appellants be issued with the appropriate entry clearance. Mr Gann, the Adjudicator, set out in his determination a number of examples of the material which had suggested to the entry clearance officer that the application was being fraudulently pursued. He referred to the village visit interviews and commented that they did much to discredit the information given by the wife. He stated that the only evidence presented to him had been given by the sponsor who had freely admitted in 1963 having fraudulently claimed income tax allowances for a wife and three children who were in fact his brother's wife and their children, namely his nephew and nieces. One of the problems confronting the appellants, had been that the marriage certificate had recorded the wife's age on marriage as 28 whereas in fact it was, and had been corrected to be, 18. The adjudicator, before turning to the documents said this: "My task has not been made easy by the deceit practised by the sponsor and the principal appellant" -- that, of course, is his wife -- "or by the replies to questions given by the several persons interviewed by the entry clearance officers, in many cases the replies given by one interviewee conflicting with replies given by another interviewee. Mr Mookerjee" [the appellant's representative] "suggested that the replies were probably evenly balanced for and against the appellant's case. Be that as it may they could not have assisted in dispelling any doubts in the respondent's mind and in fact they may have assisted him to reach his conclusions. In many respects they are so contradictory that I do not derive much assistance from them." The adjudicator then turned to the submitted documents saying that it was "some of those more than anything else which have influenced me in reaching my conclusions". I do not propose to burden this judgment with a detailed reference to all these various documents. But there are two categories in particular which I must deal with. The first important category consisted of three voters' lists. Two of these were female voters' lists respectively for 1976 and 1983. Both showed the wife a. to be of an age consistent with her having been 18 at the date of her marriage (that being, of course, the corrected date given in her marriage deed) and b. described as the sponsor's wife. It is of some additional, if marginal relevance and assistance to the appellants' case that they further show, as has consistently been their case, that the sponsor had also a second wife in Bangladesh called Salima Khatun. As the adjudicator observes, those voters' lists are official documents. The second highly relevant category of documents contains two land deeds, both of which were registered in 1977. Again both these documents are consistent with the wife being the sponsor's wife at that time and further consistent with his having as a second wife, Salima Khatun. Having referred to those and other documents, the adjudicator said: "Having considered the respondent's explanatory statement in depth I am bound to say that I entirely agree with the conclusions which he reached. However, I have commented on the various documents submitted by Mr Mookerjee . . . some of which support the appellants' appeal. I find it difficult not to be influenced by official documents and statements of persons of repute upon each of which I have made comment. I find that on the balance on probabilities each of the appellants is related to the sponsor as claimed." The entry clearance officer appealed. Because of a technical jurisdictional point which is taken by the applicants, it is necessary to indicate something of the course by which that appeal came to be launched and determined and of the procedural rules which govern such appeals. First, the rules: By Rule 15(2) of the Immigration Appeals (Procedure) Rules 1972, Statutory Instrument 1972 No 1684 it is provided: "Application to the Tribunal for leave to appeal . . . may be made or given not later than 14 days after the determination in question." By Rule 16 it is provided: "(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Rule, notice of appeal or an application for leave to appeal shall be given or made by completing so much of Form 2 as relates to the notice and serving it on . . . the Tribunal . . . (3) The grounds of an appeal or application set out in Form 2 may be varied or amplified during the course of the appeal or application." Form 2, unsurprisingly, has within it a box stating: "The grounds of appeal are as follows:". It is thus perfectly apparent that in the situation such as faced the entry clearance officer proposing to seek leave to appeal in the instant case, he was required to apply for that leave within 14 days in Form 2 and therein set out his grounds of appeal. In the event, within the 14 days, namely on 7 February 1986, the entry clearance officer submitted Form 2 but in the space allocated to the grounds he inserted the words "Grounds following". Those grounds then did follow but outside the 14-day period, namely on 17 February when the substantive ground notified was as follows: "The adjudicator erred in placing undue weight on the documents submitted in support of the application -- having expressed the view that there was already much to suggest that the application was being pursued on fraudulent lines." The Immigration Appeal Tribunal granted leave on 25 February. The matter came before them in April. A preliminary point was then taken by the applicants' representative -- they were, of course, respondents to the appeal -- that there had been a failure to comply with the procedure rules so that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The determination of that preliminary point forms a substantial part of the Tribunal's determination dated 15 May 1986. It would not be helpful to relate here their approach to the matter, suffice it to say that they concluded they had jurisdiction albeit the route by which they came to that conclusion was, in my judgment, erroneous. They did so by reference to Rule 38 of the 1972 (Procedure) Rules which I need not set out. In my judgment that rule could not avail the entry clearance officer, but on the correct approach he did not need to invoke it. The position, in my judgment, is as follows. It is plain from a series of decisions including the case of ex parte Ashrafi which came before the Court of Appeal in 1981 that the requirement for an application for leave to appeal to be made within 14 days of the adjudicator's determination is imperative; that is to say, if there be no application at all, then there would be no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal: and the tribunal would have no discretion to waive or extend the 14-day time limit. Rule 38 was expressly considered by those authorities and found to be an insufficient basis to overcome that imperative effect of Rule 15(2). When, however, one comes to Rule 16 and the requirement therein contained to include within the application the grounds of the proposed appeal, the position, in my judgment, is different. That requirement, I have no doubt, is not imperative but rather is directory. I will refrain from using the word "mandatory" in this context since, as the authorities show, it is sometimes used as synonymous with "imperative" and at other times as meaning "directory". In my judgment there is a striking, indeed compelling, parallel between the situation provided for by these Immigration (Procedure) Rules and the position arising under the Town and Country Planning legislation in regard to enforcement notice appeals. The latter was considered by the Court of Appeal in Howard v Secretary of State for the Environment [1975] 1 QB 235. The Court was there concerned with section 16 of the 1968 Act which provided: "An appeal under this section shall be made by notice in writing to the Minister, which shall indicate the grounds of the appeal and state the facts on which it is based . . ." The Court of Appeal held that whilst it was imperative that the appeal should be brought within the 42 days provided by that legislation for the bringing of such appeals, the requirement that the notice should indicate the grounds of appeal was to be regarded as directory only. I would add only this. The Tribunal contemplated that position might be different in regard to the 1984 (Procedure) Rules. In these, Rule 16(2) expressly requires that the application specify as part of its particulars the grounds upon which the applicant tends to rely. In my judgment, however, there can be no possible distinction between two sets of rules. It can make no sensible difference that the 1972 Rules introduced the requirement for the specification of grounds by way of reference to Form 2 whereas under the 1984 Rules the requirement is directly included within the rule itself. One of the reasons why these two applications have been listed and, in the event, heard together was because this same point was taken also in the other case. Mr Riza, however, who appears for the other applicant family indicated at the outset of his argument that on material reflection (which, of course, included an opportunity to consider the case of Howard v Secretary of State for the Environment in the course of Mr Blake's submission) he did not think it appropriate to pursue the argument. For the reasons I have given, it is in my judgment unsustainable. I return to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal's determination in the Hamida Begum case. The Tribunal set out part of the explanatory statement and a certain amount of the adjudicator's determination including the reference to the documents. Their own decision is to be found contained in their final paragraph as follows: "We have anxiously considered the submissions in the light of the evidence contained upon the file. It is not disputed that there has been a history of persistent and most blatant deceit in this case, and in our view whatever impression the sponsor made before the adjudicator (and Mr Gann makes no comment as to this) he had forfeited any claim he might have had to credibility. He might have had a stronger claim had his story been supported by his fellow villagers. So far from this being the case they had only added to the doubt and confusion. Whilst we consider that the documents produced -- notably the voters' list and land deed -- were entitled to some weight when placed in the scales on the opposite side to the lies and discrepancies on the other side, judging the matter on the balance of probabilities we do not consider that they outweighed considerations of the deceit which had been employed by the sponsor and the unsatisfactory matters raised by the village visit. We have to say that we consider the adjudicator's findings unreasonable, and the entry clearance officer's appeal in respect of each of the four respondents is consequently allowed." Mr Blake for the applicants advances one subsidiary and one main criticism of that determinative paragraph. It is convenient first to deal with the subsidiary point. That arises from the form of the long penultimate sentence in which the Tribunal state that they do not consider that the documents, albeit of some weight, "outweighed considerations of the deceit which had been employed by the sponsor . . ." It is apparent to me that the Tribunal were there putting the sponsor's deceit, which in my judgment can only have referred to his long past and fully admitted history of making bogus tax claims, into the balance as a factor weighing against the claimed relationship between the sponsor and the applicants, rather than using that deceit, as in my judgment it could only properly be used, merely to render his evidence weightless on the true issue. Alone, I doubt whether that would have been sufficient for me to accede to this challenge, but in my judgment it does indicate a wrong approach to the matter. More substantial and fundamental, however, is Mr Blake's main ground of criticism. This is that the Tribunal lumped all the applicants together and judged their case as a single appeal rather than, as manifestly they should have done, treated the individual appellants individually. Of course one can readily see how conclusions about certain applicants may bear upon the strength of other applicants' cases. But that is by no means the same as saying that they necessarily all stood or fell together. Indeed this case, in my judgment, is one in which that was very plainly not so. To my mind it is perfectly plain that the wife's claim to her relationship with the sponsor was the strongest and the eldest son's (Azad's) claim to his relationship the weakest, the relationship of the two younger sons falling within the middle of that spectrum. It is unnecessary to recite the specific difficulties facing Azad. In summary, it appered to the entry clearance officer in 1982 that he was older than the nine years he claimed to be. At least two of those interviewed during the village visit in 1983 described him as a "nephew" rather than a "son" of the sponsor. A search of the family compound rooms, although revealing documents relative to the younger two children, disclosed none such relating to Azad. But when the wife's claim is concerned, there is (as it seems to me) very little of weight to be placed in the balance to indicate that she is not in truth the sponsor's wife and a good deal to suggest that she is. Mr Jay, seeking helpfully to analyse the position from the point of view of the respondent Tribunal, suggests that there was material which could properly lead to the conclusion that she was not his wife. He identifies four matters. Firstly, there was her age on the marriage certificate. As I have said, this was initially put as 28 although later corrected to 18. The error was said to have been made by the sponsor. Secondly, there was the lie which she told as to how many brothers the sponsor had. It was plain that he in fact had three whereas she disclosed only one. Thirdly, Mr Jay refers me to the interview held during the village visit by the ECO with a Mr Ramon Miah. He confirmed that the sponsor had two wives but named them as Kushua and Sundori, names quite other than those suggested by all the rest of the evidence. Finally, Mr Jay refers to an interview with another villager who said that the sponsor had but a single wife. As against that, however, the documents relied upon by the applicants to my mind powerfully supported the wife's claim. The voters lists and the land deeds, the two categories of document which even the Tribunal recognised, were entitled some weight, went subtantially to the wife's rather than the minor applicants' claims and, in my judgment, powerfully supported her case. And, of course, it is not necessary for Mr Blake to establish before me that had they considered her case individually, the Tribunal would have been bound to disallow the ECO's appeal from the adjudicator's decision in her favour. It is sufficient for his purpose that I should conclude (a) that they did not give individual consideration to her case and (b) that had they done so, they might reasonably have reached a decision in her favour. I have not the least hesitation in reaching this conclusion. It may be -- though I confess I have doubts about this -- that had they conducted the exercise which Mr Jay invited me to conduct, the Tribunal would have concluded that the wife's claimed relationship was false as well as that of the children. But in any event I am certain that they did not conduct any such analysis. It follows that in the case of Hamida Begum, the Tribunal's decision cannot stand. The matter must be remitted for redetermination of the ECO's appeal in accordance with this judgment. I turn very much more shortly to deal with the other application before the court, that of Amina Khatun and three children, Fatima Begum born 18 October 1974, Tahid Miah born 12 November 1976 and Rahamia Begum born 25 July 1981. Those dates are the claimed dates of birth. They are not accepted by the respondents. The four applicants originally applied for entry clearance to join the sponsor in England on 7 April 1981. There was a fifth applicant for entry clearance, namely Takur Miah, who also claimed to be a son of the sponsor, the oldest son, whose application was belatedly withdrawn in 1984, it being then recognised that he was not a son. Entry clearance was initially refused in September 1983. Thereafter the sponsor confessed to having committed tax frauds in the past and, in the light of such confession, the applicants were further interviewed. On 8 October 1984 the entry clearance officer again refused to grant the entry clearances sought. The matter came on appeal before the adjudicator, Mr Care, initially on 5 June 1985. Various documents were submitted to the adjudicator on the applicants' behalf. After the sponsor had given a certain amount of evidence, the hearing was adjourned for those documents to be further examined on behalf of the entry clearance officer. The matter came back before the adjudicator on 16 October 1985 when the hearing was resumed. The sponsor was recalled. He gave limited further evidence-in-chief. When the opportunity came for the ECO's representative to cross-examine him, that was declined. He was not cross-examined. The ECO's representative submitted that it was one of the worst cases of fraud, that there had been no full confession, that the documents were essentially unhelpful to the applicants' cause, that there was no independent evidence, and that it was on that basis that he had not cross-examined the sponsor. The adjudicator's determination is dated 15 November 1985. It was by no means comprehensive. It is convenient to recite the bulk of it as follows: "I had before me some (rather posed) photographs, many remittance receipts in the wife's false name -- which is also, despite the sponsor's denial of knowing anyone by that name, his brother's wife's name; two other remittance receipts in the first appellant's name, three letters and some birth certificates. There were two school certificates for Fatima and Tahid (also known as Shamim), two voters' lists, one of 1976 giving the wife's age as 30 and one in 1983 giving it as 28. "The sponsor is repaying @2,850 to the Inland Revenue. He visited Bangladesh once in the early days and then regularly after he says he married. "His brother's wife (of the same name as the sponsor's falsely claimed own wife's name) said in 1978 on her family tree that the sponsor's call name is Kolchum and he had two children Shamin (alias Tahid) born in 1975/76 and Fatima born on 1967-7. She was not according to the application." I interpolate that that last sentence was a reference to Fatima's stated date of birth on the application form being 18.10.74; in other words, the adjudicator was pointing to a discrepancy in that regard. The adjudication continues: "It is this last evidence which is claimed as independent verification of the appellant's present claims. There is a marriage certificate for a marriage taking place on 24 September 1970 but registered on 17 August 1981. It is clear from the Explanatory Statement of 16 October 1984 -- that the first appellant was clinging vehemently to the version that Takir Miah is a son and the sponsor's brother that her name is Kamirun Nessa. She said she was 18 when she married in 1972 -- none of this ties up with ages in the voters' list nor the Nikanama [the marriage certificate]. "The discrepancies recorded in the two interviews of 12 March 1984 and 16 October 1984 are very numerous. I now have before me the appellant's claims to the entry clearance officer and the sponsor's evidence. "Neither the sponsor nor the first appellant are credible: and if honesty were a criterion for admission to the United Kingdom they would not come. Unfortunately if they are able to satisfy me that they are married and the other appellants are their children they have a right to come. "Because there is independent evidence; the pattern of the sponsor's behaviour; his payment of nearly @3,000 to the Revenue and some small corroborative assistance from the letters I am satisfied they are related as claimed. It is with some regret therefore that I must allow this appeal . . ." After an initial notice of application for leave to appeal in form similar to that in the other case, namely with grounds of appeal "to follow", an economical ground was eventually lodged thus: "The adjudicator's determination is against the weight of the evidence." The ECO's appeal came before the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Their determination is dated 13 June 1986. I need recite only part of the last substantive paragraph of their determination as follows: "In our view the ground of appeal is well-founded. The adjudicator's findings set out in the extract from the determination quoted above are reasonable having regard to the weight of the evidence. The Tribunal differs only in the conclusions to be drawn from such findings. We think consequent upon the disclosure of the tax fraud, the sponsor would be obliged to pay the sum directed by the Revenue and that because he has been paying the money does not assist the respondent's case. The adjudicator referred to other matters which he considered supported the respondents' appeal before him, but the unsatisfactory documentary evidence, the fundamental and numerous unresolved discrepancies by stated close family members and past fraud, when taken together with the sponsor's and principal respondent's lack of credibility bring us to the conclusion that the onus of establishing the claim relationships on the balance of probabilities has not been discharged." They accordingly allowed the appeal. Mr Riza, in a helpfully succinct argument, takes two closely related points. Essentially he submits first that it was not fair in principle to allow the appeal in the absence of there having been any cross-examination of the sponsor before the adjudicator. Secondly, he submits that the Tribunal acted in excess of the proper scope of their appellate function. In a helpful skeleton argument submitted to the court, Mr Riza expands on the first point thus: "A failure to cross-examine a vital witness for the appellants cannot be rectified by appeal to the IAT." Essentially the way Mr Riza puts this first point is that an adjudication in favour of the applicants must be recognised as owing something to the adjudicator's assessment of the sponsor as a witness. The point depends upon Mr Riza making good his underlying contention that the adjudicator must have had regard to the witness's demeanour and, in the light of it, found his evidence to be of some value and support to the applicant's case. I entirely accept that had the adjudicator placed any weight or reliance on the sponsor's evidence having regard to a favourable impression formed as a result of observing him during the course of his oral evidence, this would be a well-founded argument. It fails, however, because I am wholly satisfied that the adjudicator utterly rejected the sponsor's evidence; that is to say, he attached to it no weight or value whatsoever. The crucial sentences in his adjudication are, to my mind, these: Firstly, "Neither the sponsor nor the first appellant are credible . . ."; and secondly, "Because there is independent evidence [which he then specified] I am satisfied they are related as claimed." Of course it followed from his allowing the appeal as a result of the independent evidence that in the event he accepted that what the sponsor had been saying about the claimed relationships was true. But that is not to say -- and I do not for a moment accept -- that he placed the least weight on the sponsor's evidence or formed other than a wholly unfavourable impression from his demeanour if indeed demeanour added anything whatever to his assessment of the sponsor's evidence. That conclusion necessarily is inconsistent with Mr Riza's success upon his second and related point also. The point was developed by reference to Woolf J's decision in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Mahendra Singh [1984] Imm AR 1. I need not refer to this in any detail. It is illustrative of what, in any event, is the well-established principle that a tribunal should be alert to and conscious of the likely danger of interfering with an adjudicator's decision without having heard the witnesses' oral evidence on the basis of which that determination has been arrived at. Plainly in cases where a Tribunal has derived advantage from the opportunity of observing live evidence, then an appellate body is necessarily handicapped and is accordingly properly reluctant to disturb the evaluation of that evidence and the conclusions of fact based upon it. As was pointed out by Glidewell J in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Kwok on Tong [1981] Imm AR 214, the position of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal is very similar to that of the Court of Appeal when dealing with an appeal against a finding of fact by the first instance judge. If the finding depends in whole or in part upon the credibility of witnesses, then the first instance judge would have had an opportunity of hearing that evidence which is denied to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal would be correspondingly slow to differ from such finding of facts. As I have indicated, however, in my judgment that is not a principle which comes into play in the instant application. This is not a case where an assessment of the sponsor's demeanour upon his giving oral evidence informed this adjudicator's decision. Certainly it in no way influenced him in favour of the applicant. Thus the Tribunal was identically placed to the adjudicator when it came to an overall evaluation of the effect of the evidence. The Tribunal was thus not only entitled but bound to reach their own independent conclusion as to where the balance fell. I am wholly unsurprised in the light of the material before them and before this court that they, in the result, found the balance fell against the applicants and accordingly allowed the ECO's appeal. In my judgment there is thus nothing in either of Mr Riza's grounds. The application in this case fails and must be dismissed.DISPOSITION:
Application by Hamida Begum and ors allowed; Application by Amina Khatun and ors dismissedSOLICITORS:
Winstanley-Burgess (Hamida Begum), Karim Laxman (Amina Khatun); Treasury SolicitorDisclaimer: Crown Copyright
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