Home Office v. Commission for Racial Equality

Home Office v Commission for Racial Equality

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

[1982] QB 385, [1981] 1 All ER 1042, [1981] 2 WLR 703

Hearing Date: 2, 3, 14 OCTOBER 1980

14 OCTOBER 1980

Index Terms:

Race relations - Discrimination - Duty of commission to eliminate discrimination - Commission proposing to investigate immigration control with a view to eliminating discrimination against coloured immigrants - Whether investigation connected with commission's duties - Whether commission's duty limited to elimination of discrimination expressly made unlawful by legislation - Whether enforcement of immigration control amounting to provision of goods, facilities and services - Whether commission having power to conduct investigation - Race Relations Act 1976, ss 20(1), 43(1)(a).

Race relations - Discrimination - Duty of commission to promote equality of opportunity and good race relations - Commission proposing to investigate immigration control - Whether promotion of equality of opportunity and good race relations restricted to areas where unlawful discrimination - Whether inquiry into immigration control would promote good race relations - Race Relations Act 1976, s 43(1)(b).

Race relations - Application of race relations legislation to Crown - Discrimination by Crown in immigration control - Whether Crown activities within scope of legislation - Race Relations Act 1976, s 75(1).

Held:

The Commission for Racial Equality believed that the Immigration Act 1971 was being applied more harshly to coloured immigrants than to white immigrants and informed the Home Office that, pursuant to the commission's general duties under s 43(1) a of the Race Relations Act 1976 and its power under s 48(1) b of that Act to conduct a formal investigation for any purpose connected with carrying out those duties, the commission proposed to conduct an investigation into the arrangements for enforcing the 1971 Act, with the aim of working towards the elimination of discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity among immigrants and good race relations. For the purpose of the investigation the commission wished to examine Home Office documents, to interview immigration officers and to conduct sample surveys of refusals of entry into the United Kingdom or refusals to vary leave to enter or remain. The Home Office issued a summons seeking (i) a declaration that the proposed investigation was ultra vires the commission's powers under the 1976 Act, and (ii) the determination of the question whether the commission had any power under the 1976 Act to investigate the manner of discharging government functions. The commission counterclaimed for declarations that it had power under the 1976 Act to conduct a formal investigation into acts done in administering immigration control and that the duty to work towards the elimination of discrimination in s 43(1)(a) of the 1976 Act was not restricted to discrimination in the fields of conduct specified in Parts II to IV of that Act. a Section 43, so far as material, is set out at P 1044 h, post b Section 48, so far as material, is set out at P 1044 J, post Held - (1) On the true construction of s 75 c of the 1976 Act, the 1976 Act bound the Crown in regard to acts and omissions similar to, but not necessarily the same as, acts which could amount to unlawful discrimination, and the scope of s 75 was not restricted to acts expressly made unlawful discrimination by the Act. Accordingly, the treatment of a coloured immigrant in a wholly different manner from a white immigrant would be an act to which s 75 applied (see p 1048 a to e, post). c Section 75, so far as material, is set out at p 1047 h, post (2) The proposed investigation was not connected with carrying out the commission's duty under s 43(1)(a) of the 1976 Act to work towards 'the elimination of discrimination', for that referred to the elimination of discrimination which was made unlawful by the Act, and by ss 1 and 2 d of the Act discrimination was unlawful only in 'circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision' of the Act and thus only where it was expressly made unlawful under Parts I to IV of the Act, which did not include the control of immigration. In any event the enforcement of immigration control did not amount to discrimination in the provision of 'goods, facilities or services' within s 20(1) e of the 1976 Act (see p 1048 j to p 1049 e, post); Kassam v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1980] 2 All ER 330 applied. d Sections 1 and 2, so far as material, are set out at p 1049 b, post e Section 20(1), so far as material, provides: 'It is unlawful for any person concerned with the provision (for payment or not) of goods, facilities or services to the public or a section of the public to discriminate against a person who seeks to obtain or use those goods, facilities or services--(a) by refusing or deliberately omitting to provide him with any of them; or (b) by refusing or deliberately omitting to provide him with goods, facilities or services of the like quality, in th like manner and on the like terms as are normal in the first-mentioned person's case in relation to other members of the public or (where the person so seeking belongs to a section of the public) to other members of that section.' (3) However, the proposed investigation was connected with carrying out the commission's duty under s 43(1)(b) of the 1976 Act to promote equality of opportunity and good race relations, because (i) that duty was not restricted to areas where there was unlawful discrimination under the Act, and (ii) an inquiry into immigration control could be beneficial in promoting good race relations. Furthermore, bearing in mind that it was a function of the commission to encourage harmonious community relations, it could not be assumed that Parliament did not intend the commission to have power to inquire into the field of immigration (see p 1049 h to p 1050 b, post). (4) Although, therefore, the commission had power under the 1976 Act to conduct the proposed investigation, in view of its limited power under s 50 f of the Act to obtain information, which was dependant on the Secretary of State's authorisation, and since if the investigation was to proceed it could only result in recommendations for changes in the law, the proposed investigation was not likely to interfere with the functioning of government (see p 1048 f g and p 1050 c d, post). f Section 50, so far as material, provides:

'(1) For the purposes of a formal investigation the Commission, by a notice in the prescribed form served on him in the prescribed manner--(a) may require any person to furnish such written information as may be described in the notice, and may specify the time at which, and the manner and form in which, the information is to be furnished; (b) may require any person to attend at such time and place as is specified in the notice and give oral information about, and produce all documents in his possession or control relating to, any matter specified in the notice.

'(2) Except as provided by section 60, a notice shall be served under subsection (1) only where--(a) service of the notice was authorised by an order made by the Secretary of State; or (b) the terms of reference of the investigation state that the Commission believe that a person named in them may have done or may be doing [certain specified acts]...'

Notes:

For the powers and duties of the Commission for Racial Equality, see Supplement to 4 Halsbury's Laws (4th Edn) para 1042B. 13. For the Race Relations Act 1976, ss 1, 2, 20, 43, 48, 50, 75, see 46 Halsbury's Statutes (3rd Edn) 395, 396, 410, 425, 429, 430, 452.

Cases referred to in the Judgment:

Kassam v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1980] 2 All ER 330, sub nom R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Kassam [1980] 1 WLR 1037, CA. R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Anluwalia (22nd February 1979, unreported), DC.

Introduction:

Summons. By a summons dated 14th November 1979 the Home Office sought as against the Commission for Racial Equality the following relief: (1) a declaration that it would be ultra vires the commission's powers to conduct (as it proposed) a formal investigation into the immigration service under ss 48 to 52 of the Race Relations Act 1976 with the following (or any like) terms of reference: to inquire into the arrangements made for the enforcement of the Immigration Act 1971 with special reference to equality of treatment afforded to persons of different racial groups entering or seeking to enter the United Kingdom for any purpose or seeking variations of the conditions of leave to remain therein; and (2) the determination of the question whether the commission had any, and if so what, powers under the 1976 Act to investigate the manner of discharge by the Crown of the functions of government. By a counterclaim dated 28th November 1979 the commission sought declarations that it had power under the 1976 Act to conduct a formal investigation into acts done in the administration of immigration contral and that the duty imposed on it by s 43(1)(a) of the 1976 Act 'to work towards the elimination of discrimination' was a duty to work towards the elimination of all racial discrimination in the United Kingdom and was not restricted to discrimination in the fields of conduct specified in Parts II to IV (inclusive) of the 1976 Act. The facts are set out in the judgment.

Counsel:

Peter Scott QC and Simon D Brown for the Home Office. John R MacDonald QC and I A MacDonald for the commission.

Judgment-READ:

Cur adv vult. 14th October.

PANEL: WOOLF J

Judgment One:

WOOLF J read the following judgment: The Race Relations Act 1976 is Parliament's third attempt at legislating in the delicate area of race relations. The Act provides for the establishment of the Commission for Racial Equality, the defendant in these proceedings. The commission replaces both the Race Relations Board, which had the job of policing or enforcing the previous legislation, and the Community Relations Commission which, under the previous legislation, was responsible for encourating harmonious community relations. Although the members of the commission are appointed by the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, it is expressly provided in Sch 1 to the Act that the commission is not an emanation of the Crown but a corporate body. The commission's duties are expressly set out in s 43(1) of the Act as being threefold:

'(a) to work towards the elimination of discrimination; (b) to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons of different racial groups generally; and (c) to keep under review the working of this Act and, when they are so required by the Secretary of State or otherwise think it necessary, draw up and submit to the Secretary of State proposals for amending it.' In addition to those duties, s 48(1) provides that:

'Without prejudice to their general power to do anything requisite for the performance of their duties under section 43(1), the Commission may if they think fit, and shall if required by the Secretary of State, conduct a formal investigation for any purpose connected with the carrying out of those duties.' (My emphasis.

'Those duties' are the three duties I have just recited. In these proceedings the Home Office contends that those provisions do not entitle the commission to conduct a formal investigation into the manner of discharge by the Crown of the functions of government, and, in particular, to make an inquiry into the arrangements made for the enforcement of immigration control.

The evidence is confined to affidavits from Mr David Lane, chairman of the commission, and correspondence between the commission and the Home Office, and the facts giving rise to these proceedings can be summarised as follows. The commission believes that there is a widespread feeling among members of the coloured communities and especially those originating from the Indian sub-continent that the immigration laws and immigration controls operate more harshly on them than on other immigrants of a different ethnic origin. The commission has therefore, from time to time, written to the Home Secretary and other officers of the Home Office expressing its concern and seeking a reassurance with regard to certain aspects of policy. Of particular concern to the commission was the case of the Asian lady who was required to undergo a gynaecological examination at Heathrow Airport as part of the investigation to see whether or not she was entitled to leave to enter this country. On 7the May 1979 the chairman of the commission wrote to the present Home Secretary and, under the heading 'Immigration Control Procedure', expressed the hope that he would respond positively to the requests which the commission had made to his predecessor shortly before the election. That letter quoted an extract from an earlier letter dated 18th April 1978 which read as follows:

'We accept the nacessity for firm control of immigration by the Government. We in no way condone illegal immigration or overstaying or bogus marriages, and we support all fair and reasonable measures that can be taken to deal effectively with such abuses. It is essential, however, that the policy and practice of immigration control should be non-discriminatory and should be consonant with Britain's humane and liberal traditions and with her international obligations. Immigration policy is directly bound up with the task of building a multi-racial society based on equal and civilised treatment for all its inhabitants.'

The letter went on to raise again the question of the gynaecological examination of the Asian lady. It recited the fact that the Home Secretary's predecessor had been asked to take further action, and in particular, to hold an independent inquiry, and also stated that the commission had resolved to hold an investigation itself if it was not satisfied with the Home Secretary's stance. On 12th June 1979 the commission wrote to the Minister of State at the Home Office in the following terms:

'Nationality law and immigration policy

We should be interested to learn more of the Government's intentions. With regard to immigration control procedures and our request for an independent inquiry, the Commission had a long discussion last week. We considered carefully your letter of 21 May and the Home Secretary's view that decisions about an inquiry should await clarification of the House of Commons Select Committe arrangements in the new Parliament. A Select Committee inquiry could of course be valuable and we would be ready to cooperate with it, although its nature would probably be different from the type of investigation which we ourselves have had in mind. We feel, however, that the need for reassurance about the fair operation of the system is pressing an that the delay involved in waiting for a Select Committee decision is undesirable. We still believe that the ideal course would be for the Home Secretary himself to establish an independent inquiry (on the lines suggested in my letter of 7 May), and the Commission adked me to try to arrange a meeting with you in order to discuss this possibility further. In view of this, we decided not to embark on any investigation ourselves before the end of June, and if by that time you felt in a position to set up an inquiry, we would not go ahead with out own. However, if you feel unable to do so, we decided that we would then proceed to conduct a formal investigation with the following terms of reference: "To inquire into the arrangements for the enforcement of the Immigration Act 1971 with special reference to equality of treatment afforded to persons of different racial groups entering or seeking to enter the United Kingdom for any purpose or seeking variations of the conditions of leave to remain therein. The term

'racial group' has herein the meaning assigned to it in section 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976". The Commission adked me to emphasise that, in embarking on an investigation, we would not be challenging the Government's overall immigration policy but would be concerned with the arrangements made for its application, particularly from the point of view of non-discrimination.'

On 9th July 1979 the commission informed the Home Office that it was embarking on a formal investigation with terms of reference virtually identical to those set out in the letter of 12th June 1979. The correspondence then continued with the Home Office indicating that it had been legally advised by the Attorney General that the proposed investigation would be outside the purpose for which the commission was by law established, and the commission indicating that it had received advice to the contrary from leading counsel. Neither side being prepared to alter its view, these proceedings were commenced. In the proceedings the Home Office seeks --

'(1)... a Declaration that it would be ultra vires the Defendants' powers to conduct (as they propose) a formal investigation into the Immigration Service purportedly under the provisions of Sections 48-52 of the Race Relations Act 1976 with the following (or any like) terms of reference: "To inquire into the arrangements made for the enforcement of the Immigration Act 1971 with special reference to equality of treatment afforded to persons of different racial groups entering or seeking to enter the United Kingdom for any purpose or seeking variations of the conditions of leave to remain therein. The term 'racial group' has herein the meaning assigned to it in Section 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976."

'(2)... the determination of the Court on the following question, namely whether the Defendants have any, and if so what, powers under the Race Relations Act 1976 to investigate the manner of discharge by the Crown of the functions of Government (in contra-distinction to such acts of the Executive as by Sections 75 and 76 of the Act are expressly made subject to the application of the Act).' The commission has also sought relief in the form of the following declarations:

'(1) A declaration that the Defendants have power under the Race Relations Act 1976 to conduct a formal investigation into acts done in the administration of immigration control.

'(2) A declaration that the duty imposed on the Defendants by section 43(1)(a) of the Race Relations Act 1979 "to work towards the elimination of discrimination" is a duty to work towards the elimination of all racial discrimination in the United Kingdom and is not restricted to discrimination in the fields of conduct specified in parts II to Iv/ (inclusive) of the Race Relations Act 1976.'

As the Home Office is contending that the proposed investigation is ultra vires the commission, it is relevant to see what Mr Lane had to say about that form which the investigation would take. In his first affidavit which was sworn on 27th November 1979 he stated:

'The aim of the investigation proposed by the Commission is in accordance with the Commission's general duties under Section 43 of the Race Relations Act 1976, and in particular with its duties to work towards the elimination of discrimination and promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups generally. In proposing such an investigation the Commission has in mind its powers under Section 51, if necessary or expedient, to recommend changes in a person's policies or procedures and its power to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for changes in the law.'

In his second affidavit which was sworn on 11th September 1980 Mr Lane said:

'The Commission's investigation would go into great detail and would last longer than a parallel inquiry by the said Sub-Committee. It would examine, among other things, sample surveys of refusal of entry or refusal to vary leave to enter or remain. It would hope to examine Home Office documents, papers and instructions, to interview officials, to hold discussions at ports of entry, and to examine casework records of such bodies as the United Kingdom Immigrants Advisory Service ("UKIAS") and the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI"). Such detailed examination would have to be carried out in large part by members of the Commission's staff, acting under the supervision of the Commissioners appointed to conduct the said investigation.'

Further insight as to what was causing concern to the commission appears from its notes of 7th May 1979, that is, delays in dealing with applications standard of proof, various aspects of discriminatory treatment and a number of other matters including the operation of the appeal system. Clearly the commission has in mind a wider ranging investigation, but not one, according to the letter of 12th June 1979 which challenges the overall immigration policy. In opening the case on behalf of the Home Office counsel contended that it was inconceivable that Parliament could have intended the commission to have the power to embark on an investigation of this sort. In his submission, the documents to which I have referred indicated that it would involve in vestigating the acts of the Home Secretary himself, immigration officers, police officers, adjudicators, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the Lord Chancellor and the High Court in respect of the exercise of its prerogative powers. He stressed that all these bodies were involved directly or indirectly in the enforcement of immigration control. He pointed out that if the commission was entitled to look into immigration, it would also be entitled to look into the working of the police, the Customs and Excise, and the Inland Revenue. He drew attention to the fact that the commissions's powers under the Race Relations Act 1976 were almost the same as those of the Equal Opportunities Commission under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and if the Commission for Racial Equality could look into the functions of government, the Equal Opportunities Commission would also be entitled to do so. Bearing in mind those submissions it is convenient at the outset to consider the extent to which the Act binds the Crown. In this respect the earlier Race Relations Act 1968 was quite clear. Section 27(1) simply stated: 'This Act binds the Crown.' The present Act deals with the matter quite differently. Section 75 provides:

'(1) This Act applies -- (a) to an act done by or for purposes of a Minister of the Crown or government department; or (b) to an act done on behalf of the Crown by a statutory body, or a person holding a statutory office, as it applies to an act done by a private person.

'(2) Parts II and IV apply to -- (a) service for purposes of a Minister of the Crown or government department, other than service of a person holding a statutory office; or (b) service on behalf of the Crown for purposes of a person holding a statutory office or purposes of a statutory body; and (c) service in the armed forces, as they apply to employment by a private person, and shall so apply as if references to a contract of employment included references to the terms of service...'

It is not necessary for me to set out the whole of the remaining provisions of s 75. In relation to sub-s (1) it was contended on behalf of the Home Office that that only applies to acts which could be done by a private person. it was accepted that the combined effects of sub-ss (1) and (2) meant that, if the Crown unlawfully discriminated in the employment field, then the Act would be enforceable against the Crown. So if it discriminated in the engagement of Immigration officers the Act would have an application in the immigration field. However, apart from discrimination which was expressly made unlawful under the Act, the Home Office contended that it did not apply to the Crown or government departments. Thus, in the course of argument, counsel for the Home Office contended that if an immigration officer treated coloured immigrants in a wholly different manner from the way in which he treated white immigrants this would not be an act to which s 75 referred, because it was not an act capable of being done by an individual. I cannot accept this restricted interpretation of s 75. It is true that only an immigration officer and not a private person can purport to exercise immigration control. However, the type of act to which I have just made reference is one which a private person in a different capacity is quite able to perform, for example a doorkeeper at a nightclub, and so it seems to me that that would be an act falling within s 75. After all it is only a government department who can engage immigration officers. A private individual cannot do that. But the Home Office concedes that such an engagement would be an act within s 75. Nonetheless, the wording used in s 75 was clearly intended to have a more restricted effect than the wording contained in the previous Act. It appears to me that an act for the purposes of s 75, which is defined in s 78 as including a deliberate omission, means some act which, while not necessarily the same, is one similar to the kind of act which can amount to unlawful discrimination under the Act of 1976. It does not, in my view, include activities of the sort involved in formulating and expressing government policy, or the hearing of cases before the courts and tribunals. i draw attention to the contrast between the word 'act' and the word 'functions' used in s 71. However, my view as to the proper interpretation of s 75 only plays a limited part in resolving the issues between the parties. Section 75 does not give any direct help as to what is the proper subject matter for inquiry by the commission. It only assists as to the extent which the Act can be enforced against the Crown. As to this the commission on its own has only extremely limited powers. While the commission has wide powers to hold a formal investigation, its ability to require persons to furnish written information or to attend to give oral information is very limited unless the Secretary of State is in agreement with the steps which it proposes to take. Section 50(1) enables the commission to serve a notice requiring information to be given but, with an exception which is not relevant here, such notice can only be served where it is authorised by the Secretary of State or the investigation is one where the commission believes that the person named has been guilty of unlawful conduct under the Act. The result, therefore, is that in the case of the proposed investigation in question, or any investigation into a like subject, unless the Secretary of State were prepared to make an order giving the necessary authority the commission would be without teeth and would not be able to get any information from anyone who is not prepared to volunteer it. The fears expressed by counsel for the Home Office, to which I referred at the outset, must be judged in the light of this real restriction on the commission's powers. The section of the Act which is at the heart of the dispute between the parties is s 43. Section 48 makes it clear that formal investigations must be for a purpose connected with the carrying out of the three duties set out in s 43, which I have already cited. So it is necessary to decide whether the proposed investigation is connected with the carrying out of those duties. The duty specified in s 43(1)(a) refers to the elimination of discrimination. Counsel for the Home Office, in my view rightly, contends that this means the elimination of discrimination which is made unlawful by the Act. The Act does not make all discrimination unlawful. Subject to s 20 to which I will make reference hereafter, it is common ground that the existence of immigration control and the enforcement of that immigration control is not discrimination made unlawful by the Act. As such immigration control involves discrimination, counsel for the Home Office argues that it cannot have been intended that it should be the duty of the commission to work for its elimination bearing in mind it is authorised by the Immigration Act 1971. The reasons why immigration control is not discrimination for the purposes of the Act are as follows. Discrimination is defined in s 3(3) of the 1976 Act as any discrimination falling within s 1 or s 2 of the Act. Both ss 1 and 2, in defining discrimination, do so in respect of 'any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act'. Although counsel for the commission argued strongly to the contrary, I am satisfied that the use of this reference to 'any circumstances relevant for the puroses of any provision of this Act' confines the definition of discrimination to discrimination which is expressly made unlawful under Parts II to VI of the Act. This was the view taken by the Court of Appeal in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Kassam [1980] 2 All ER 330, [1980] 1 WLR 1037 as to the interpretation of the similar provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and also of Eveleigh LJ in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Anluwalia (22nd February 1979, unreported) in relation to that Act. While I accept those cases were only concerned in deciding what was unlawful discrimination, I would apply the same reasoning to the interpretation of the word 'discrimination' in s 43(1)(a). Enforcement of immigration control could only give rise to unlawful discrimination for the purposes of the Act if the activity in question fell within s 20(1), that is, if it amounted to discrimination in the provision of 'goods, facilities or services'. In the Kassam case the Court of Appeal concluded that the words 'facilities' and 'services' did not cover the giving of leave to enter or remain by the Secretary of State under the Immigration Act 1971, and, while reserving his position if there should be an appeal, counsel for the commission accepts that, in view of that decision, I am bound to treat discrimination in the immigration field as not being discrimination made unlawful by the Act. It follows that the commission is not entitled to rely on s 43(1)(a). Omitting for the moment s 43(1)(b) and turning to s 43(1)(c) , which deals with the duty to keep under review the working of the Race Relations Act 1976, on the evidence before me the commission cannot rely on s 43(1)(c) since, so far as the commission is concerned about the working of any Act, it is the Immigration Act 1971 and not the 1976 Act. There remains s 43(1)(b) which is the duty under s 43 which was relied on by Mr Lane in his first affidavit. In dealing with this part of s 43 counsel for the Home Office divided his submissions into two parts. First of all he dealt with the words 'to promote equality of opportunity' and said this was merely the obverse of the 'elimination of discrimination', and therefore the arguments which I have just dealt with in relation to discrimination should lead to the same conclusions about the promotion of equality of opportunity. While I had reservations about this part of counsel's submissions and questioned whether there was not some difference, his submission is supported by the terms of ss 47(1) and 51(1) and, were it not for the additional words in s 43(1)(b) referring to the promotion of 'good relations' as well as equality of opportunity, I would have concluded that s 43(1)(b) only refers to the promotion of equality of opportunity in an area where discrimination would be unlawful. However,I do not consider that this limited view of s 43(1)(b) can apply to the duty to promote good relations. The contrast between the wording in ss 47(1) and 51(1) and that in s 43(1)(b) is significant. It is interesting to see that the same dual reference to equality of opportunity and good relations appears in ss 44(1) and 70(1). I consider the explanation for the reference to good relations in s 43(1)(b) is the fact that the commission combines the duties of its two predecessors. The elimination of discrimination and the promotion of equal opportunity reflects the duties of the old board. The duty to promote good relations is a reflection of the duty which was contained in s 25 of the Race Relations Act 1968, which required the Community Relations Commission to encourage the establishment of, and assist others to take steps to secure the establishment of, harmonious community relations. The commission takes the view that an inquiry into the control of immigration could be beneficial in promoting good relations between racial groups. Such an investigation seems to me to be an investigation which the commission could properly regard as having this result and as being connected with the carrying out of its duty under s 43(1)(b). Immigration clearly has a very real impact on race relations. A country which has had no immigration, in consequence of which the persons concerned are all of the same colour, race, nationality and ethnic or national origins, does not require a Race Relations Act. Immigration control is bound up with problems as to the ability of this country to absorb different racial groups. Bearing in mind the dual functions of the commission, I cannot accept that Parliament must be assumed to have intended, as the Home Office contends, that the field of immigration should be a no-go area for the commission. Nor do I accept that the consequences of my conclusion are as drastic as the Home Office submitted. I have already indicated that unless the Secretary of State is prepared to supply it with teeth, the commission has limited powers to obtain information. This limitation may mean that without the Home Office's co-operation the investigation is not worthwhile. However, if the investigation proceeds, with or without that co-operation, the only result will be that the commission may be able to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for changes in the law or otherwise and to publish or make its report available for inspection. Results hardly likely to substantially interfere with the functioning of government. [His Lordship, having heard submissions on the point, then decided not to make any declarations.]

DISPOSITION:

Applications refused.

SOLICITORS:

Treasury Solicitor; Bindman & Partners (for the commission).