R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Ali Ajmal

R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Ali Ajmal (TH/36031/78)

Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

[1982] Imm AR 102

Hearing Date: 26 November 1982

26 November 1982

Index Terms:

Deportation - Whether in appeal against decision to deport appellant's marriage of convenience relevant from the compassionate aspect - Whether the Court should take into account the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights where the Convention did not accord with the law, the Immigration Act 1971, or the rules made thereunder - Immigration Act 1971 s 3(5)(a); HC 80 paras 38 & 42.

Marriage - Settlement - Whether a marriage of convenience - HC 239 paras 26, 26A.

Held:

The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, was granted leave to enter for one month, subject to conditions, on 15 November 1974. Subsequent events showed that he had practised deception, had overstayed and taken employment. In February 1977 he left his employment the day after enquiry there by immigration officers, and on 14 March 1977 and 15 April 1977 went through religious and civil marriage ceremonies respectively with a girl of seventeen who had been granted indefinite leave of stay in the summer of 1976. On September 1978 his application to remain was refused on the basis that he had been guilty of deception and breach of his conditions of entry, and had entered into a marriage of convenience. He had no right of appeal against this decision. However, he appealed against a concurrent decision to deport him. This appeal was dismissed by an adjudicator; leave to appeal against that decision was refused by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and an application for judicial review was refused by Mr Justice Hodgson in the Divisional Court. The present appeal is against that last decision. On 27 December 1979 a son was born to the appellant and his wife. Held: (i) There was no other feasible conclusion that the Secretary of State could have reasonably come to, on the facts, than that he was not satisfied that the marriage was not one of convenience entered into primarily to obtain settlement in the United Kingdom. (ii) In order to consider the compassionate aspect (HC 80 Para 38) the adjudicator was under a duty t examine the nature of the marriage. (iii) The Court could not take into account the European convention for the Protection of Human Rights if the Convention did not accord with the law, the Immigration Act 1971, or the Rules made thereunder.

Cases referred to in the Judgment:

R v The Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Malik (unreported).

Counsel:

J Macdonald QC and I Macdonald for the Appellant; A Collins for the Respondent. PANEL: Lord Lane CJ and Sir Roger Ormrod

Judgment One:

Lord Lane CJ: This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Hodgson dated 27th January this year by which he refused judicial review by way of certiorari directed to an Adjudicator and certiorari and mandamus directed to an Immigration Appeal Tribunal who had refused the appellant's application for leave to appeal. The facts of this unhappy case are these. On 15th November 1974 the appellant, Mr. Ali Ajmal, arrived in this country and was granted leave to stay for one month on certain conditions, one of the conditions being that he would undertake no employment. Subsequent events made it plain that the whole of that exercise embarked upon by the appellant was larded with deception and that the object of the exercise was to stay in this country as long as possible regardless of any conditions which might have been imposed upon him. What happened was that he obtained employment, that he seems to have been more or less consistently employed for about two and a half years in various occupations after his arrival in this country. He of necessity had to back his other deceptions by way of changes of name and so on. But by February 1977 the immigration officers were closing on him. At that time he was employed in a restaurant at Southend. The investigating officers called at that restaurant to make inquiries and on the very next day the appellant made himself scarce. As he himself described in evidence which he gave to the investigating officers in due course, he then looked around for a girl to marry so as to legalise his stay here if he could. The search for a girl was successful and he went through a religious marriage on 14th March 1977 and a civil ceremony on 15th of April that year. The girl was then 17. She is now 22. She had come here in mid-summer 1976 with her parents and had been given indefinite leave. So she was resident in this country and she has now, thanks to the time which has gone by, spent a considerable proportion of her life in the United Kingdom. Indeed so much time has gone by now that this case is a very good example, if one is required, of how careful Courts should be in granting extension of timefor making this sort of application for judicial review, and how desirable it is in many cases to inform the opposite party that such an application has been made, so that the opposing party may present themselves before the Court and advance arguments, if they see fit, contrary to the application for extension. On 23rd May 1977 the appellant applied for leave to remain in this country. On 4th April 1978 he was interviewed, and indeed it will be necessary to look at a later stage at some of the answers which he gave. On 12th September 1978 his application to remain was refused on the basis that he had been guilty of deception and of breach of the conditions of entry, and on the basis that the marriage he had formed was one of convenience. There is no appeal against that determination. Indeed if he had then gone back to Bangladesh, from whence he had come, that would have been the end of the matter. But on the same date, 12th September 1978, he was handed a document, originating from the Secretary of State notifying him of a decision to deport him back to Bangladesh. That decision gave him a right of appeal, which he had not had before, and that he exercised. He appealed. On 14th December 1978 the Adjudicator dismissed his appeal. There was an application then on 29th January 1979 to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal for leave to appeal, which was refused. On 15th February 1979 he was advised by his then lawyers that he had exhausted his legitimate remedies and on 27th April 1979 the deportation order was made. There than followed a series of approaches to various people, including his Member of Parliament and the Archbishop of Canterbury, in an endeavour to enlist their help and sympathy whereby the Secretary of State might be persuaded to alter the determination to deport. On 27th December 1979 a son was born to the couple, Mohammed Russell Ali. He is a United Kingdom citizen. On 15th July 1981, this man, by now having changed his legal advisers, on advice from them applied for leave to apply for judicial review. That leave was granted, with the result that we are now here today listening to this appeal from the decision of Mr. Justice Hodgson who heard the application for judicial review. Mr. Macdonald posed at the outset of his address to us the following questions which in his submission were the ones which this Court had to answer and whieh he had to argue: Was this a marriage of convenience? Secondly, did the Adjudicator misdirect himself as to whether it was a marriage of convenience or not? And thirdly, if it was not a marriage of convenience, should the appeal in relation to deportation have succeeded? That was the basis upon which we were asked to approach this problem. It is necessary first of all to look at the statutory enactments governing this situation and also at the rules made by virtue of the Immigration Act, which govern the actions of Immigration Officers and the Secretary of State. First of all section 19 of the Immigration Act 1971 reads as follows:

"(1) Subject to sections 13(4) and 16(4) above, and to any restriction on the grounds of appeal, an adjudicator on an appeal to him under this Part of this Act (a) shall allow the appeal if he considers (i) that the decision or action against which the appeal is brought was not in accordance with the law or with any immigration rules applicable to the case; or (ii) where the decision or action involved the exercise of a discretion by the Secretary of State or an officer, that the discretion should have been exercised differently; and (b) in any other case, shall dismiss the appeal."

"(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) above the adjudicator may review any determination of a question of fact on which the decision or action was based;....". One should remind oneself at this point that the matter which was under review was not the refusal by the Secretary of State to allow this man to stay, but the intention to deport. That was what the Adjudicator was considering, and in order to see what the Secretary of State's powers and duties are with regard to deportation, we turn to section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971, which reads as follows: "A person who is not patrial shall be liable to deportation from the United Kingdom (a) if, having only a limited leave to enter or remain, he does not observe a condition attached to the leave or remains beyond the time limited by the leave....". So it will be observed that when those facts are established, as indeed they were here, then the Secretary of State has the discretion whether to deport or not, the discretion being enshrined in the words "shall be liable to deportation from the United Kingdom". It is also necessary to read certain extracts from the rules as to immigration which are made by virtue of section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. These rules, so far as they are relevant, are first of all contained in HC 80. Paragraph 38 reads:

"In considering whether deportation is the right course on the merits, the public interest will be balanced against any compassionate circumstances of the case. While each case will be considered in the light of the particular circumstances, the aim is an exercise of the power of deportation that is consistent and fair as between one person and another, although one case will rarely be identical with another in all material respects."

Paragraph 42 reads: "Deportation will normally be the proper course where the person has persistently contravened or failed to comply with a condition or has remained without authorisation. (So also where he has been recommended for deportation on conviction of entering the United Kingdom unlawfully.) But full account is to be taken of all the relevant circumstances before a decision is reached." Those are the rules relating to deportation which govern the actions of the Secretary of State and in its turn govern the actions of the Adjudicator if an appeal is made to him. The Adjudicator in this case also took into account the immigration rules relating to marriage, which are contained in HC 239. It is questionable whether he was under a duty or indeed had any right or justification in referring or looking at those rules. But he did, and accordingly I will read them:

"26. Subject to paragraph 26A, a man admitted in a temporary capacity who marries a woman settled here should have the time limit on his stay removed unless the marriage took place within the 12 months immediately preceding his application, in which event his stay should be extended for a further period not exceeding 12 months. Where an extension is granted any restriction on the taking of employment should be removed and, subject to paragraph 26A, the time limit may be removed at the end of that period."

"26A. An extension of stay or leave to remain will not be granted, and any time limit will not be removed, under paragraph 25 or 26 if the Secretary of State as reason to believe that the marriageis one of convenience entered into primarily to obtain settlement here, with no intention that the parties should live together permanently as man and wife. Furthermore, an extension of stay or leave to remain will not normally be granted to an applicant under paragraph 25 or 26, and the time limit on his stay will not normally be removed under those paragraphs, if: (a) he has remained in breach of the immigration laws before the marriage;....". Then comes the following passage which at first blush is not easy to follow: "In deciding whether to exercise his discretion to grant an extension of stay or leave to remain to an applicant who comes within sub-paragraph (a), (b) or (c) above the Secretary of State will take account of any evidence which shows that the marriage is not one of convenience despite the circumstances in which it was contracted."

Mr. Macdonald's submission with regard to paragraphs 38 and 42 of HC 80 was that the words "all material circumstances" include the question whether this was a marriage of convenience, or whether the refusal of leave to stay was correct, and for two reasons: first, he submits, because by rule 68 it is in the public interest that the Adjudicator should see that the policy of the rules relating to marriage was carried out, and it was in the public interest that families should stay together; and secondly, because of the words in rule 38, "consistent and fair as between one person and another", if it was the practice that an overstayer with a genuine marriage was allowed to stay, it would not be fair, because of a mistake by the Secretary of State as to the genuineness of the marriage of this appellant, that he was to be treated differently. Here the Adjudicator said it was right to take into account the rules relating to marriage, and in Mr. Mecdonald's submission he was right. One turns now to these considerations. If the Secretary of State, submits Mr. Macdonald, believes that this man had contracted a marriage of convenience, he has no discretion under the rules, and so will not grant leave. So, the submission goes, the Adjudicator is entitled to review the question of marriage of convenience or no, despite the fact that it is technically unappealable for the reasons which I have already indicated. He did consider the question of marriage of convenience. He sets out a case, says Mr. Macdonald, to show that it was not a marriage of convenience, because the appellant intended to stay with the girl and not to leave her. Yet he labels it as a marriage of convenience, and therefore he misdirected himself and exercised his discretion wrongly, and accordingly the appeal should be allowed. Likewise it is said, and this was an argument raised in reply, the Secretary of State deprived himself of the power to exercise his discretion properly, and that is a matter which should be the subject of review, and accordingly this appeal shoald be allowed. On the last point Mr. Macdonald referred us to a decision of Mr. Justice Forbes in R. v. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal Ex parte Malik (unreported), a decision on 16th November 1981, which is said to be the subject of an appeal to this Court, although we do not know about that. I am bound to say, as far as that case is concerned, it has no relevance to the present circumstances at all. That case was concerned with inquiring whether an appeal against the decision not to allow him to remain in this country was correct or not. In this case we have gone beyond that. The circumstances in this case, as I have said, preclude an argument on that point. We are concerned simply with the deportation question. Consequently the conclusion of Mr. Justice Forbes, although interesting, are not applicable to the present circumstances. Finally Mr. Macdonald suggests that this is a matter where the European Commission of Human Rights should be engaged. The Covention, particularly Articles 8 and 14, should be regarded by the Court, and he suggests that we should take them into account. Those Articles read as follows: Article 8: "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence

"2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

Article 14: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." That Convention is not part of the law of this country. If it happens to be in accord with the law, so much the better. But on the other hand if it does not accord with the law, the Immigration Act or the rules made thereunder, then it is a matter of which we cannot take any account. In fact in my view the circumstances in this case are rather more simple than the submissions of Mr. Macdonald would lead one to believe. There were two separate issues before the Secretary of State in September 1978. The first one was whether in all the circumstances, namely the deception practised by the appellant, the fact that he had lived here in the way I have described for two and a half years or more, and also the question of his marriage, the Secretary of State had reason to believe that there was a marriage of convenience. Having come to the conclusion that there was such reason to believe, he had no option but to refuse leave. Against that there could be no appeal except possibly by way of judicial review. It is to be noted that the Secretary of State has not decided whether in fact there was a marriage of convenience. He is deciding whether he had reason to believe there was a marriage of convenience. Accordingly one looks to see, for the sake of completeness, what the circumstances were which he considered before coming to the conclusion that he had such reason to believe. These are to be found in the Home Office Statement, and read as follows:

"The interviewing officer asked the appellant for details of his marriage and in response he furnished the following information. It was his first marriage and the Islamic ceremony took place on 14th March 1977 at 6 Stockbridge Road, Winchester. Ten to twelve people were present at the ceremony which had been preceded by a meal.The witnesses to the wedding were his father-in-law and a Mrs. Hilda Ali. The register office wedding took place just over a month later on 15th April 1977. The interviewing officer asked the appellant exactly how he met his bride. The appellant replied that he had been 'looking round for a girl to legalise himself'. The interviewing officer pursued this point and enquired if the appellant had married purely with the intention of legalising his stay in the United Kingdom. The appellant replied that he had, and went on to tell the interviewing officer that he had been introduced to his wife by a Mr. Mahmoud of Portsmouth. He stated that although there had been no dowry he had given his wife saris, shoes, blouses and sweets. He maintained that they lived together as husband and wife."

Turning over the page one finds this: "However, during the course of the interview on 4 April 1978 the appellant freely admitted that his marriage had been contracted to enable his stay in the United Kingdom to be legalised. Furthermore serious discrepancies had arisen between the statements made by the appellant and Razia Khatun concerning their marriage.

"In view of all the information available the Secretary of State was not satisfied that the marriage was other than one of convenience entered into primarily to obtain settlement in the United Kingdom for the appellant with to intention that he and his spouse should live together permanently as husband and wife. On 12 September 1978 the Secretary of State accordingly refused the application. This refusal did not attract a right of appeal."

That decision, it seems to me, not only had no right of appeal against it, but was one which could not on any view be criticised on the facts. There was no other feasible conclusion to which on those facts the Secretary of State could reasonably have come. That is the end of that chapter of the story. The Secretary of State thereupon, as already explained, had the power, if he thought fit, to make a deportation order under section 3(5)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971, which has already been read. Then, I repeat, if the man had left of his own free will, there would have been no further appeal. If he does not, the procedure has to be that the Secretary of State has to serve on the man a notice of intention to deport. Then, as already indicated, the man can appeal against that, and that is what he did. The circumstance then is that the Adjudicator deals with the appeal. He has to take into account, just as the Secretary of State did, the provisions of paragraphs 38 and 42 of HC 80 which have already been read. Strictly speaking, as Mr. Collins rightly points out, paragraphs 26 and 26A are not really a matter for him to consider. But, and this is where the confusion, if any, may arise, what the Adjudicator has to do so part of his duty is to consider all the circumstances, including the family circumstances of the appellant -- which will include the situation of the wife, the situation of the child, if there is one. That is on the compassionate aspect of the case. He is not, repeat not, reviewing the unreviewable Secretary of State's decision that this mand should not stay. He is reviewing the discretion of the deportation order. In order to consider this compassionate family aspect, he can look at the marriage and he can make up his own mind as to the strength or weakness of that marriage. And so not directly, but indirectly he is under a duty to do what he did, to examine what the nature of the marriage was, namely was it a marriage carried out simply for the purpose of staying here, or was it a genuine marriage accelerated by the fact that life was getting difficult for the appellant as the investigation officers got nearer to him; looking at it, I repeat, from the compassionate point of view and not from the point of view from which the Secretary of State had to look at it. Consequently he was exercising a discretion afresh, as he is entitled to under section 19 of the Immigration Act 1971. That discretion has to be looked at as at the date of the Secretary of State's decision, which is a point which does not arise here to any great extent, if at all, because there was so short a space of time between the Secretary of State's determination in September and the determination of the Adjudicator in December of the same year. The conclusion that the Adjudicator came to was that he was not satisfied that it was a true marriage of convenience. This is what he said: "Since the date of marriage Mr. and Mrs. Ali have been living first with his parents-in-law and latterly, since August 1978, in one room above a restaurant at Sidcup, Kent, in which Mrs. Ali works as a cook. I am satisfied on the evidence before me that this is a subsisting marriage and it seems probable that Mr. and Mrs. Ali will continue to live together even if Mr. Ali no longer remains in the United Kingdom. However, while accepting this as a genuine marriage in the sense that Mrs. Ali undoubtedly entered into it with honourable intentions, while Mr. Ali sensibly picked a marriage partner whom he likes and wishes to live with, I find that for Mr. Ali's part it was undoubtedly also a marriage of convenience. Mr. Ali had been here for a very long time without any permission either to remain in the United Kingdom or to take employment. The immigration authorities were hot on his heels in February 1977 and I have no doubt whatsoever that he left Southend with the intention of finding a suitable bride as rapidly as possible. I have little doubt that he did not qualify for an extension of stay in terms of paragraphs 26 and 26A of HC 80 (as contained in HC 239). If I am wrong in thinking that he did not so qualify in terms of those rules, I nevertheless consider that he could properly have been refused an extension of stay in terms of paragraph 4 of HC 80...", which he then sets out. A little lower down the page he says: "On the facts which I have outlined above I find that there is a strong prima facie case for the deportation of Mr. Ali in terms of paragraphs 38 and 42 of HC 80." There he is turning his attention to precisely the point to which his attention ought to have turned. "He is undoubtedly someone who has persistently contravened the conditions under which he was admitted and has remained for a long period without authorisation. It only remains for me to consider whether there are compassionate circumstances which outweigh the public interest that such a person is deported. Two such circumstances have been put forward." Then he sets these out, namely, the fact that her relations are in this country, the little boy who is a patrial, the other matters which have already been put forward, together with an examination of what would happen if Mr. Ali were deported to Bangladesh, difficulties about visiting relations in this country and so on. He comes to the view that, in the exercise of his discretion afresh, this is a case where the deportation order ought to be made. He was not concerned with the previous ruling of the Secretary of State, except in so far as it came in by a side-wind, on the question of compassion. It remains for me to consider what the Adjudicator meant by using the expression "However, while accepting this as a genuine marriage in the sense that Mrs. Ali undoubtedly entered into it with honourable intentions, while Mr. Ali sensibly picked a marriage partner whom he likes and wishes to live with, I find that for Mr. Ali's part it was undoubtedly also a marriage of convenience." It seems to me that that is a reference specifically to the difficult words which are contained in the proviso to section 26A. It is not altogether easy to understand what the words "which shows that the marriage is not one of convenience" in that proviso mean when read against the earlier use of the expression "marriage of convenience" in the body of that paragraph. It seems to me that in the first mention of it at the top of the paragraph, that is using the expression in a precise fashion, the meaning being a marriage entered into primarily to obtain settlement here and with no intention that the parties should live together permanently as man and wife. Likewise it seems to me, when that expression is used in the proviso in the way that I have read, that is using it to indicate the sort of situation which exists in the present case, namely a marriage genuinely intended to stay as a marriage, but one which was stimulated or expedited or forced upon the husband by the knowledge that the immigration officers were breathing down his neck. If one interprets it in that way, and if one interprets the remarks of the Adjudicator in the light of that meaning of the words "marriage of convenience", it seems to me that the whole matter becomes clear. What the Adjudicator is saying is this: "I have to examine the question of compassionate grounds for staying here afresh. I have to exercise my discretion afresh. The evidence which has been put before me as to the situation at the date when the Secretary of State was examining this matter is September lead me to believe that this marriage was intended by this man to be a permanent marriage. He had found a girl whom he liked. He had found a girl with whom then he intended, if possible, to stay married and to remain in England. But", says the Adjudicator, and I am sure this is what he means, "although to that extent the marriage was a genuine one and not one of convenience, the rapidity with which the courtship developed into matrimony leads me to believe irresistibly that the only reason for the marriage taking place when it did was the fact that this man knew that he was about to be deported unless he did something about it." It that is the case, then it seems to me that the Adjudicator has scarcely put a foot wrong. The only foot he may have put wrong was to pay too much attention to paragraphs 26 and 26A. The fact remains that he has examined all the right points. He has examined the law which guides his actions correctly. He has examined afresh the facts, as he is bound to do by the terms of the statute, and he has come to his own conclusion on discretion taking all the right matters into account. I cannot see how he can be faulted. The learned Judge came to that conclusion on the same grounds or nearly the same grounds. I think this appeal accordingly ought to be dismissed. I only add one thing, the request for judicial review with regard to the refusal by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to grant leave to appeal stands or falls with the matter which I have been deciding, and that must go too.

Judgment Two:

SIR ROGER ORMROD: I agree with the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice and have very little to add for my own part. I would like to say one thing about rules 26 and 26A which have been the subject of a great deal of discussing in this case. It seems to me that the problem has been greatly complicated and unnecessarily so. Rule 26 in the first place provides a general rule that a man admitted in a temporary capacity, who marries a woman settled here, should have the time limit on his stay removed. It is then qualified in various ways and it is further qualified by rule 26A. Rule 26A provides for two different situations, as I see it: the first is where the Secretary of State has reason to believe that the marriage is one of vonvenience entered into primarily to obtain settlement here with no intention that the parties should live together permanently as man and wife -- that is category 1. If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that a particular marriage falls into that category, then the rule is that there should be no extension of time and no time limit should be removed. In other words there is no discretion. But category 2 consists of marriages which have taken place in slightly odd circumstances. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) prescribe three such circumstances: (a) is a marriage taking place after a man has been in breach of the immigration laws before the marriage, (b) provides for the marriage taking place after a decision has been made to deport him or he has been recommended for deportation, and (c) refers to a marriage to a different person from that whom he was proposing to marry when he was admitted. (d) deal with a marriage which has been determined and finally (e) a marriage which has simply broken up. In those cases the prima facie rule that the time limit should be removed does not apply. But the proviso requires the Secretary of State, in exercising the discretion which he has in these circumstances, to take into account any evidence which shows, as the proviso is worded, "that the marriage is not one of convenience despite the circumstances in which it was contracted". If one were to re-write the last line of that proviso and put it into the positive tense, and make it read "the Secretary of State will take account of any evidence which shows that the marriage was genuine despite the circumstances", I think all the difficulties in construing this proviso would disappear. The only point of law that I can find, despite Mr. Macdonald's eloquent argument in this case, is one which I find exceedingly obscure, speaking for myself. His point seems to me to be that while the Adjudicator has arrived at a different assessment of the marriage than that which the Secretary of State did at an earlier stage, the Adjudicator's conclusion in some way reacts back on the Secretary of State's decision. For my part I simply cannot see the reasoning which leads to that submission. The two things seem to me to be entirely different. It may well be of course that people will say "Here is the Secretary of State arriving at one conclusion and the Adjudicator at another. How bizarre." Maybe it is bizarre. But it is equally bizarre to suggest that because the Adjudicator has arrived at a different assessment of the marriage, that in some way invalidates the Secretary of State's earlier conclusion. It seems to me a non sequitur. Obviously this case on its merits has attracted a great deal of attention in various quarters. It should be said that this Court is just as well aware of the merits of this case, such as they are, as any of the persons who have been involved in various ways in it. But it is a disservice, in my judgment, to litigants who may have a strong case for compassion, to endeavour to strengthen their position by making an application for judicial review, in the hope that this Court will do something for them. This Court is not concerned with merits at all. The only power this Court has is to intervene in the event that something has gone wrong with the procedure which was carried out by the immigration authorities. It is I think a pity that people should seek by way of judicial review to obtain compassionate relief, which, for all I know, they may well be able to obtain in other ways. This merely prolongs the agony and causes a great deal of expense. I would just like finally to say one thing in conclusion.In the light of the decision of the judgment of Lord Diplock, which is reported in "The Times" this morning in relation to judicial review, I think it would be right for us to stress, and stress very strongly, that part of his speech in which he refers to the differences between proceedings by way of judicial review and proceedings by way of action, in particular the important provision that the time limit for judicial review proceedings is three months. He emphasised in his speech the great importance to public authorities, who are being challenged by way of judicial review, that the challenge should be made promptly and within the time limit. He constrasts the slow time scale of procedure by way of action. That seems to me of peculiar importance in these immigration cases, because time is of the essence in these cases. I for my part would agree entirely with Mr. Collins's suggestion that where applications are being made to extend the time to apply for judicial review to the Court, such applications should be served on the other side who should be given full opportunity of resisting the extension of time. Otherwise judicial review procedure will drift backwards into the unsatisfactory state in which proceedings by way of action is and has always been. For these reasons I too would dismiss the appeal.

DISPOSITION:

Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs, save legal aid taxation of appellant's costs. Leave to appeal to House of Lords refused.

SOLICITORS:

Kingsley Napley & Co; The Treasury Solicitor.

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