Ahmet Sabri Genc v. Secretary of State for the Home Department


Immigration Appeal Tribunal

[1984] Imm AR 180

Hearing Date: 16 November 1984

16 November 1984

Index Terms:

Deportation "conducive to the public good" -- On ground of marriage being solely for the purpose of settlement -- Turkish citizen -- Visitor -- Obtained indefinite leave to remain on basis of marriage in United Kingdom in 1975 -- 1979 marriage terminated in divorce -- 1982 appellant returned from abroad with Turkish wife of eighteen years standing -- Whether his deception formed a ground for deportation -- Whether liable to removal as illegal entrant -- Whether respondent could rely on appellant's conduct during previous stay to justify deportation in relation to a subsequent stay -- Whether deportation could be employed as an alternative to removal as an illegal entrant -- Immigration Act 1971 s 3(5)(b); Sch 2, para 9.


The facts are set out in the determination. Held (i) Deportation under s 3(5)(b) must relate to the continued presence of the individual to be deported and could not be based solely on fraud on original entry; (ii) Subject to (i) there was no restriction as to time or place of events which might form the ground on which the decision to deport was taken; (iii) The deceitful use of marriage in this country as a means of obtaining leave to remain formed a "positive and specific ground" for deportation under s 3(5)(b); (iv) An individual might be liable to removal as an illegal entrant and deportation under s 3(5)(b), and in respect of either the standard of proof was as indicated in Khawaja; (v) The decision to deport the appellant in this case was justified.

Cases referred to in the Judgment:

Khawaja (and Khera) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 All ER 765, [1983] 2 WLR 321, [1982, Appendix] Imm AR 139, HL. R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Cheema [1982] Imm AR 124, CA. R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Ghazi Khan [1983] Imm AR 32, DC.


D Anderson of Counsel for the appellant. A Gammons for the respondent PANEL: Professor DC Jackson (Vice-President), RS Charnley Esq, IP Allnutt Esq

Judgment One:

THE TRIBUNAL: Determination The appellant, a citizen of Turkey, appeals against the decision of the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against him by virtue of the Immigration Act 1971 section 3(5)(b). On 20 March 1984 we heard evidence from the appellant and submissions from Mr Anderson and Mr Gammons on the issue of whether the appellant's conduct justified deportation. We reserved our decision. In considering the matter it became apparent that the case raised not only the issue argued but also whether in law the appellant's conduct could be a ground for deportation under section 3(5)(b). The Home Office indicated that it wished to make submissions on that matter and the case was relisted for the hearing of those submissions and any that Mr Anderson might wish to make in reply. Written submissions were made and on 9 October 1984 we heard oral argument. The notice of decision reads:

"You were given indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom on 2 July 1975 on the basis of marriage to Margaret A Taylor. The Secretary of State is now satisfied that you were not free to marry Miss Taylor and, in view of this and of your immigration history, the Secretary of State deems your deportation to be conducive to the public good."

The appellant gave evidence before us and from that evidence and the explanatory statement the following facts emerged. The appellant came to the United Kingdom on 24 June 1973 and was admitted as a visitor. After an extension was granted the appellant applied for variation of his leave so that he could take employment. This application was refused on 19 September 1973 and an appeal from the refusal dismissed on 8 January 1974. The appellant remained in this country without authority. On 27 June 1975 the appellant went through a ceremony of marriage with Miss Margaret Taylor (apparently also known as Margaret McNamara). On 2 July 1975 indefinite leave to remain was granted to the appellant on the basis of that marriage. On 19 December 1979 the appellant and Margaret Taylor (now Margaret Genc) were divorced. On 7 October 1980 the appellant requested that his new passport be endorsed to show that there were no conditions attached to his stay in the United Kingdom. He said that his marriage to Margaret Genc had ended in divorce and, at a later stage, a copy of a divorce decree (dated 19 December 1979) was produced. The passport was endorsed as requested. On 16 August 1982 the appellant returned to the United Kingdom from abroad accompanied by his wife, Mrs Hava Genc, and a child, Pakize Genc (born 25 November 1973). The appellant and his wife Hava Genc said that they had married in 1980, that Hava Genc had previously been married to Ahmet Bayrak who was the father of Pakize. It later transpired that the appellant and Hava Genc were married in Turkey on 12 October 1964 and that they have four children (including Pakize). When interviewed by an immigration officer in connection with his marriages, the appellant said that he was ignorant of any legal restriction of marriage to one wife only. In his evidence to us he said that he had known Miss Taylor one and a half years prior to the marriage; that at the time of the marriage he loved her and wished to come to an understanding. He believed that he was free to marry her even though he was already married. The appellant said that he told Miss Taylor that he already had a wife in Turkey and she said that she did not mind. He did not discuss the marriage with any other Turkish people. The appellant also said that he told Miss Taylor that he was in this country without authority. After the marriage, he said, she told him to go to the Home Office about his immigration status. After the marriage the appellant and Mrs Margaret Genc lived together for 3 1/2-4 years and they parted as she wished to go to Manchester and his business kept him in London. The appellant said that he lied on his entry in 1982 about his marriage to Hava Genc as he had taken legal advice in Turkey and knew that she would not be allowed in if he told the truth. He and his wife brought only the youngest child, the others being cared for by maternal uncles. Mr Anderson submitted additional documentary evidence from accountants showing that the appellant had been involved in business and that in 1981 and 1982 he was a partner in a business called The Shen Kebab House. In evidence the appellant said that he had remained a partner until June 1983 and that if permitted to remain he would buy a shop. He has worked as a waiter and a chef, has never claimed Social Security and pays Income Tax. When his passport was renewed in 1980 he had no further concern about his future in this country. It was accepted by Mr Anderson that the appellant's "marriage" to Miss Taylor was invalid. However, he asked us to hold that to the appellant the marriage was valid and that in any event the relationship was close to a marriage, the parties living together for over 3 years. It was not a marriage of convenience. The appellant, said Mr Anderson, had built up a business and if allowed to remain would engage in business activity. Mr Anderson said that the facts did not infer a deliberate and sustained campaign by the appellant to bring his wife and family here from Turkey. Any lies told in 1982 were as the result of advice. Mr Gammons contended that in 1975 the appellant knew that he was not free to marry and that there was a clear attempt in 1982 to disguise his first marriage. Mr Gammons argued that the case fell within the parameters of the phrase "conducive to the public good" as the appellant had abused the immigration process and that in order to be fair as between one person and another the appellant should be deported. As we have indicated the case raised the issues of whether the appellant's conduct: 1. is as alleged by the Secretary of State. 2. if as alleged, is capable in law of forming the basis of deportation as being "conducive to the public good". 3. if as alleged and capable of forming the basis as set out in 2 is such that the decision to deport is justified. Conclusion as to the facts -- the appellant's conduct Mr Genc did not strike us as a man who did not know what he was doing in going through a marriage ceremony with Miss Taylor. Viewed objectively we would require strong evidence to conclude that a man already married in Turkey would not appreciate the need at least to make enquiries as to the validity of a second marriage in this county. Part of Mr Genc's case is that he has been successfully involved in business and we cannot accept the picture of the innocent and naive Muslim in a country, the social and legalframework of which is distinct from that which he knows. Mr Genc married Miss Taylor in June 1975 when he had been here for 2 years. Mr Genc admitted that he told lies both on entry in 1982 when his wife and child came with him and earlier -- as he said "to earn bread and butter". It seemed to us that Mr Genc's sense of priority did not place truth very far up the ladder and we have to view his contention that he thought he could marry Miss Taylor in the context of his evidence as a whole and our impression of him. Mr Genc and Miss Taylor married on 27 June 1975 (when admittedly Mr Genc was an overstayer) and on 2 July 1975 Mr Genc applied for indefinite leave to remain. In evidence Mr Genc stated that he had been advised so to do by Miss Taylor, but we are of the view that it is hardly conceivable that the connection between the marriage and the leave was not in the forefront of Mr Genc's mind. Certainly in 1982 he clearly thought there would be difficulties in admitting that he was married to Hava Genc before marrying Margaret Genc and thereby obtaining leave to remain. It was certainly not made clear to us why it was that the appellant thought there might be difficulties even though he was now divorced from Margaret Genc if, as he says, he thought there was nothing wrong from the start. The Secretary of State bases his case on the manipulation of the immigration legislative framework by the appellant through deception. That alleged deception is entering a marriage known to be invalid for the purposes of obtaining leave. We bear in mind that as deception is at the heart of the Secretary of State's case he is required to establish it to a high degree of probability (see R v Khawaja [1982] IAR 139). We are of the view that considering all the evidence and the appellant's approach that the Secretary of State has made out his case in that the appellant did deceive in order to obtain leave to remain. He admittedly deceived on entry in 1982 in order to obtain entry for his wife and child. Does the deception form a ground for deportation under the Immigration Act 1971 section 3(5)(b) Mr Gammons urged us to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v IAT ex parte Cheema [1982] IAR 124. In this well-known decision the Court of Appeal approved the use of section 3(5)(b) to deport an immigrant on the grounds that he had entered into a marriage solely to enable him to settle here. The appellant in that case had been admitted as a visitor in 1977 and had married in 1978. On 7 March 1979 he was granted indefinite leave to remain on the basis of his marriage following a successful appeal to an adjudicator. However, because of events subsequent to the decision to grant indefinite leave the Secretary of State, on 1 July 1980, decided to deport the appellant then being satisfied that the marriage had been entered into solely to enable him to settle here. In upholding the Tribunal decision, in turn upholding the Secretary of State's power to do so under section 3(5)(b), Lord Lane (delivering the judgment of the Court) said:

"Marriage is still, like it or not, one of the cornerstones of our society, despite recent trends of behaviour. If a person chooses to use a ceremony of marriage or the status simply as a dishonest and deceitful way of avoiding the law -- the immigration law or any other law -- then I consider it properly open for the Secretary of State to come to the conclusion that that person's continued presence in this country is not conducive to the public good, and that conclusion is well within not only the literal meaning of the Act, but also within the spirit of the Act which Professor Wade suggests rightly, if I may respectfuly say so, which the actions of the Secretary of State should be."

The suggestion of Professor Wade to which Lord Lane referred was that the power under section 3(5)(b) must be exercised reasonably. In considering the application of Cheema, it should be stressed that first the application did not involve in any way fraud on entry, secondly that it was decided prior to the House of Lords decision in Khawaja and thirdly that it was based, as Lord Lane said, on the use of marriage (that being a cornerstone of society) in a dishonest and deceitful way so as to avoid the law. The emphasis on deceit means that for the Secretary of State to succeed, relying on the principles of Cheema, he must establish deceit and as Khawaja emphasises the burden is on the Secretary of State to do so and the standard of proof requires a high degree of probability. It must be recalled that the marriage in Cheema took place in 1978 when the rules in force required the Secretary of State to establish that a marriage was one "of convenience entered into primarily to obtain settlement here with no intention that the parties should live together permanently as man and wife" for an extension of stay, based on marriage, to be refused. There was, therefore, some coincidence between the power of the Secretary of State to refuse an extension and the grounds relied on in Cheema as grounds on which deportation under section 3(5)(b) could be justified. Further, it should be remembered that in Cheema the Tribunal came to the clear conclusion that the marriage was one of convenience ie not only entered into primarily to obtain settlement of the appellant here but also with no intention that the parties should live together permanently as man and wife. While this is not expressly referred to in that part of the judgment of Cheema which is so often quoted, it is clear from the judgment of Lord Lane as a whole that he had this point in mind. In setting out the background to the case Lord Lane quoted from Woolf J at first instance who in turn quoted from the Tribunal summarising the marriage as a ploy to enable the applicant to settle in this country "not motivated by the normal reasons for marriage, namely to live together permanently as man and wife". In R v IAT ex parte Ghazi Khan [1983] IAR 32, Stephen Brown J held that deception after entry could justify proceeding under section 3(5)(b), when the matter of complaint came down to an allegation of "marriage of convenience" it was not open to the Secretary of State to issue a deportation order because a man may have entered into a marriage simply with improper motives. "It would be very strange indeed if when the "marriage of convenience" is considered as a ground for making a deportation order and one of the limbs stated to be necessary as an ingredient of that matter is not present, the finding should be held to be valid." The notice of refusal in Ghazi Khan read "having regard to the circumstances of your marriage . . . the Secretary of State considers that it is conducive to the public good to deport you". It appears from this and from the decision of Stephen Brown J that if the Secretary of State alleges in shorthand or precisely that the marriage lacks certain characteristics and that this lack is the ground of deportation it is for the Secretary of State to establish it. Conversely it should not be assumed that the existence of a ground on which an extension of stay can be refused is necessarily a ground on which deportation under section 3(5)(b) could be justified. Especially is this so, it seems to us, under HC 169 as those rules have been interpreted by the majority of the Tribunal in the decision in Bhatia (3456). The failure of an applicant to establish that his marriage (whether genuine or not) is not for the primary purpose of settlement here is far removed from the establishment by the Secretary of State on Khawaja principles that the marriage is a deceitful misuse of a cornerstone of our society. However, in the present case on the evidence we have found that the appellant used the ceremony of marriage (knowing or deliberately shutting his eyes to the fact that he could not marry) to obtain leave to remain. Apart from the question of whether his subsequent departure and re-entry has an effect on the legal consequences of the deceit the case falls squarely within the principles of Cheema. In our view the appellant did use the ceremony or status of marriage "as a dishonest and deceitful way of avoiding the law". In so holding we must not be taken entirely to accept the invitation of the Secretary of State expressed in the supplementary explanatory statement to agree with his opinion that implicit in Lord Lane's judgment in Cheema is the view that "the ground of liability to deportation contained in section 3(5)(b) of the Act may properly be invoked against persons whose actions and behaviour threatens the integrity of immigration control but who are not subject to removal under paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 of the Act". We deal later with the relevance of the power to remove under Schedule 2 of the Act but we would emphasise that our decision in this case is based on the establishment by the Secretary of State of his case that the appellant, has, as we say, deceitfully used the ceremony of marriage to obtain indefinite leave to remain in this country. To our mind that establishes a "positive and specific ground" within the principles set out by Lord Bridge in Khawaja, a requirement which seems to us, is entirely consistent with the decision in Cheema. The appellant's liability to removal as an illegal entrant The Secretary of State summarised his original and amended view of the case in the supplementary explanatory statement, paragraph 2:

"As regards the appellant's re-entry in August 1982 the Secretary of State originally took the view that the appellant was an illegal entrant because he had obtained re-entry by deception by providing evidence that he had indefinite leave to remain which, on the Secretary of State's then understanding of the law, had been vitiated by the deception practised to obtain it (ie bigamous marriage). The Secretary of State had to reconsider the case in the light of the judgment of the appellate committee of the House of Lords in Re Khawaja and Re Khera and he concluded that the appellant could no longer be regarded as an illegal entrant as the indefinite leave to remain granted on 2 July 1975 could no longer be regarded as vitiated in law. The Secretary of State then considered whether it would be conducive to the public good for the appellant to be deported by virtue of Section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act. In concluding that he should be so deported the Secretary of State took account not only of the deception practised on his re-entry in August 1982 but of his disregard for immigration control as evidenced by his overstaying from May 1974 until he applied on 2 July 1975 for his stay to be regularised; and the fact that he obtained indefinite leave to remain fraudulently by means of a bigamous marriage."

This argument was supported by the contention already cited that implicit in Lord Lane's judgment in Cheema is that deportation under section 3(5)(b) may properly be invoked when persons are not subject to removal under paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 of the Act. So far as it applied to this case, the argument takes as its premise that the appellant is not subject to removal as an illegal entrant. It is true that, as is said in the explanatory statement, the indefinite leave granted on 2 July 1975 to the appellant is not vitiated. However, it does not seem to us that it follows that a subsequent admission on the basis of the previous indefinite leave cannot be illegal entry. When the appellant left the country the leave granted in 1975 lapsed (see for example R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Ram [1979] 1 All ER 687). Where subsequently leave is granted on the basis of leave acquired through deceit an entrant may be treated as an illegal entrant if he is guilty of deception on the subsequent occasion. It was stressed in Khawaja that deception may arise from silence in some circumstances. In Apaga (2889) the Tribnunal examined the application of Khawaja to multiple entries and said: "In the context of illegal entry we do not accept Mr Davies' distinction between documents which lie about themselves and documents which contain entries obtained by a lie (or more generally deception). In our view the presentation of a passport containing entries known by the holder to have been obtained through fraud in the context of seeking leave to enter is either (a) a representation known by the holder to be false or (b) deception through silence. A person seeking leave to enter to the United Kingdom who has already obtained leave recorded in the passport and who has obtained that leave fraudulently is positively presenting a basis for the application for leave known to be based on fraud. Such a basis is to be contrasted with that reflected in a passport recording leave granted without fraud but which leads to the granting of leave by mistake to re-entry (as eg in Ex parte Ram [1979] 1 All ER 687). Further as a matter of general principle it would require specific provisions to lead to a conclusion which allowed the obliteration of illegality solely through departure and re-entry. This is not to say that an illegal entrant may not later be admitted as a lawful entrant (as indicated by HC 394 Paragraph 67). But it is to say that an illegal entrant cannot cure the illegality by keeping quiet about it on re-entry. In our view the offence under section 26(1)(c) does not depend on whether the leave granted by reason of deception is void or valid. The presentation of a passport with a stamp recording leave, is not simply a representation that the leave is valid but that it has been obtained without fraud. Indeed to view a passport containing a stamp reflecting leave granted through fraud as representing to the immigration officer as the granting of leave when none was granted is to categorise the representation as one never likely to occur to the representer. It is to read back into the notice of representation a (somewhat artificial) legal conclusion said prior to Khawaja to result from it. It accords more with the representer's knowledge to see the passport holder as representing that, so far as he knows, the stamps in the passport reflect leave granted in accordance with the immigration laws. That being so any presentation of a passport containing a stamp known to reflect leave granted through fraud is itself a representation that is not true. At the very least the presentation of such a passport without a word is deception through silence." We concur and follow that view. Such an approach is consistent with that adopted by Woolf J in R v Secretary of State, ex parte Aurang Zeb (7 December 1983). In 111 v Secretary of State, ex parte Ali Kul (27 March 1984) Forbes J held that an entrant whose passport had clearly been tampered with could not be said to be an illegal entrant if he did nothing except present that passport. In our view, that is radically different from the presentation of a passport containing a leave stamp which, on its face, would cause leave to be given, that stamp having been obtained by the person presenting the passport by fraud. Although in Ali Kul Forbes J interpreted Khawaja as requiring a positive mis-statement, his statement, his remarks must be seen in the context of the case before him -- and as qualified by the express reference in Khawaja to deception through silence. In our view, therefore, the deception practised by the appellant in presenting a passport containing a stamp indicating leave granted, knowing, as we have found, that that leave had been obtained by deception was in itself deception and brought the appellant within the purview of the Immigration Act, Schedule 2 paragraph 9. In the light of this conclusion, the questions for us are the extent to which the Secretary of State: "1. May rely on conduct during a previous stay as a ground for deportation under section 3(5)(b) in relation to a subsequent stay. 2. May employ section 3(5)(b) as an alternative to reliance on Schedule 2 paragraph 9 (removal of illegal entrants). 1. Conduct during a previous stay In R v Khawaja, Lord Bridge gave us his view that section 3(5)(b) was intended "for cases where the continued presence of the deportee would be objectionable on some positive and specific ground". As we have said, this appears to us to be entirely consistent with the Court of Appeal in Cheema and we have held that the Secretary of State has established such a ground in this case. Although the deportation must relate to the continued presence of the deportee at the time of the decision to deport there is no restriction as to the time or place on events which form the ground on which the decision is taken. Clearly such factors may go to the justification for the decision but they are just as clearly not excluded. In this case it seems to us that the appellant cannot improve his position vis-a-vis deportation simply by departure and entry -- particularly when the re-entry was by virtue of the deceit practised during his earlier stay. 2. Deportation and illegal entrants In R v Khawaja, Lord Bridge indicated that in his view the power to deport under section 3(5)(b) was never "intended to be invoked as a means of deporting a perfectly respectable established resident on grounds arising from the circumstances of his original entry", he suggested that when such fraud was exposed the provisions which were applicable to such a case were those relevant to the removal of an illegal entrant. In R v IAT, ex parte Ghazi Khan [1983] IAR 32, Stephen Brown J held that he was bound by this powerful dictum of Lord Bridge. Stephen Brown J pointed out that the dictum had received approval from Lord Fraser, Lord Scarman and Lord Templeman. In Ghazi Khan the deception relied upon was first, misrepresentations made on entry and, secondly, deception after entry consisting of a statement made by the appellant to immigration officers and the deception inherent in his marriage. Stephen Brown J held that the matters concealed at the time of entry could not found the power to issue a deportation order under section 3(5)(b). The decision in Cheema was apparently not considered in Ghazi Khan and, it being decided after the arguments in Khawaja, was not referred to in that case. However if the dictum in Khawaja as applied in Ghazi Khan were inconsistent with the decision in Cheema we are clear that it would be our duty to follow Ghazi Khan (see the comments of Lord Simon in Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1975] 1 All ER pages 821-822). We therefore approach the case on the principles set out in Ghazi Khan. We should say first that we see no inconsistency between the decision in Cheema and the dictum of Lord Bridge in Khawaja as applied by Stephen Brown J in Ghazi Khan. As we have said the decision in Cheema was concerned with the variation of leave granted and Lord Bridge's dictum and the decision in Ghazi Khan were concerned with fraud on entry. Further, in our view the basis of the decision in Cheema falls squarely within the ambit of Lord Bridge's dictum as being a "positive and specific ground". Secondly, it is to be noted that both Khawaja and Ghazi Khan were concerned with fraud on initial entry and in the present case we are concerned with fraud not only on a second entry but on an entry subsequent to that in which the fraud alleged took place. Thirdly, this case differs from Cheema in that the appellant left the country after he was granted indefinite leave. The case differs from Ghazi Khan in that the deceit after entry preceded the deceit on entry. In our view the circumstances with which we are presented lie outside the scenario with which Lord Bridge was concerned and lie outside the circumstances presented to Stephen Brown J in Ghazi Khan. We are not faced with the situation rooted in fraud on initial entry. Here the allegation of fraud is focused initially on an application for leave to remain. Even if Lord Bridge's dictum can be taken to encompass fraud on any entry, in our view we do not think that the appellant can change the character of the deceit so as to make it "on entry" and thereby exclude it from the provisions of section 3(5)(b). The conduct of the appellant is not that of a "perfectly respectable established resident". There is a continum of deceit rooted predominantly in conduct while in this country. It may or may not be right to divide deceitful conduct into parcels and allocate part to on entry and part to after entry (as seems to be contemplated by the decision in Ghazi Khan). It cannot be right that an entrant can, simply by leaving and returning, exclude conduct from the consideration of deportation proceedings which otherwise would be relevant. In our view, therefore, the appellant's conduct does provide a basis for the consideration of deportation under section 3(5)(b). In holding this, we stress that it is not on the basis that the appellant's conduct does not make him subject to consideration for removal as an illegal entrant. It is on the basis that the case does not fall within the category excluded by Lord Bridge from the consideration of deportation under section 3(5)(b). In our view it would have remained open in this case for the Secretary of State to consider the removal of the appellant as an illegal entrant focusing on the deceit of the appellant on entry in 1982 -- both in regard to the statement as to his wife and, more particularly, presentation of a passport containing a leave stamp, that leave having been acquired through deceit. If the Secretary of State had maintained his decision to proceed against the appellant as an illegal entrant he would of course have been faced with the need to establish that according to the principles of Khawaja. In the event, the Secretary of State chose to take the deportation avenue. In so doing he is still faced with the need to establish his case to a degree of probability proportionate to the nature and gravity of the issue. Ex hypothesi this issue is precisely the same whether the Secretary of State chooses to make a case against the appellant on the basis of conduct justifying deportation under section 3(5)(b) or under Schedule 2 paragraph 9. 3. Was the decision justified? Following Cheema, the decision of the Secretary of State is clearly justified unless there are factors (including particularly those set out in HC 169 para 156) which militate against deportation. Mr Anderson pointed to the fact that the relationship between the appellant and Mrs Margaret Genc could not be called a marriage of convenience -- they had lived together for over 3 years. The appellant had built up a business here and he had been here for 10 years. Mr Gammons stressed the need, so to exercise the power of deportation, that it is consistent and fair and said that the appellant had acted so as to misuse the system of immigration control. In our view the decision to deport the appellant is justified. Taking the factors referred to in paragraph 156 the appellant's age (36) is at the most neutral. The length and quality of residence (10 years in work) is a factor to be weighed in his favour. However, there is nothing in the evidence to show any strength of connection with the United Kingdom and his domestic circumstances show, if anything, a connection with Turkey. His relationship with Margaret Genc is over and in any event its importance to him as compared with Hava Genc and his children is unclear. Hava Genc and the children clearly have little connection with this country and it cannot be argued that the deportation of the appellant will uproot them from a society into which they have become integrated. While the appellant did apparently build up a business he had sold his share prior to the date of the decision. We have considered all the factors which have been put before us but as we say we cannot find that these are sufficient to outweigh the public interest in deporting the appellant on the grounds of his deceit.


Appeal dismissed


Sylvester Amiel & Co

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