Michele Giangregorio v. Secretary of State for the Home Department

MICHELE GIANGREGORIO v THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Immigration Appeal Tribunal

[1983] Imm AR 104

Hearing Date: 18 August 1983

18 August 1983

Index Terms:

Practice and Procedure -- EEC national -- Limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom -- Leave curtailed by variation of leave on grounds of inability to support himself and of being a charge on public funds -- Whether under EEC law such curtailment wrong -- Principles to be followed in application of applicable immigration rule in the context of relevant EEC legislation concerned with workers -- EEC Council Directive 68/360, Articles 6(1), 7(1)(2) -- EEC Council Directive 64/221 Article 2.2 -- EEC Council Directive 38/680 Article 7(1)(2) -- HC 82 paras 36, 37 -- HC 394 paras 129, 130, 159.

Held:

The facts are fully set out in the determination below. Held: (i) Paragraph 129 of HC 394 had to be applied in the context of relevant EEC legislation concerned with workers. (ii) EEC legislation, particularly Council Directive 68/360 (apart from grounds set out in Article 10 of that Directive) required an assertion by the Secretary of State that a worker having a right of residence was voluntarily unemployed for that right to be curtailed. (iii) Such an assertion had to be supported by evidence. However, for the purposes of Article 7 of Directive 68/360 it might suffice for the Secretary of State to rely on evidence which could support involuntary or voluntary employment and require the worker to establish that the employment was involuntary.

Cases referred to in the Judgment:

Holz (Unreported) TH/85650/81 (2389) of 16 July 1982. Mustari (Unreported) TH/91145/82 (2472) of 29 September 1982. Demuro (Unreported) TH/89467/82 (2441) of 15 September 1982. Royer [1976] 2 CMLR 619. Levin [1982] 2 CMLR 454. Becker [1982] 1 CMLR 477. Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] 2 All ER 1226.

Counsel:

R Yasnik of counsel for the appellant; B Cottrell for the respondent. PANEL: Professor DC Jackson (Vice-President, Major RAK MacAllan, Sir Stanley Tomlinson

Judgment One:

THE TRIBUNAL. The appellant who is an Italian national appeals against the decision of an adjudicator (Mr CO Richards, JP) dismissing his appeal against variation of leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The variation of leave on 18 March 1982 required the appellant to leave the United Kingdom by 2 April 1982. The appellant is a national of an EEC member state and as a consequence his right to remain in the United Kingdom depends not only on the Immigration Act 1971 and the applicable Immigration Rules but also on the Treaty of Rome and EEC Regulations and Directives insofar as these are directly applicable to him. The appellant's status as an EEC national is referred to in letters from the Home Office of 1981 and 1982 annexed to the explanatory statement. However the statement itself makes no reference to it or to the residence permit relevant to EEC nationals. The notice of refusal also does not refer specifically to it but is couched in the context of a residence permit. It reads: "On 15 January 1975 you were issued with a residence permit valid to 23 December 1979 extended to 14 May 1982 on 15 May 1981. However during that time you have been unable to support yourself and you have fallen a charge on public funds. The Secretary of State therefore varies your leave to remain so as to require you to leave the United Kingdom by 2 April 1982." Neither the statement nor the notice of refusal refers to any Immigration Rule. Hearing before the adjudicator Before the adjudicator the case was treated as falling within HC 394 paragraphs 129 and 130 which read: "129. The duration of a residence permit or of leave to enter or remain should be curtailed if it is evident that the holder is living on public funds although capable of maintaining himself. 130. A person issued with a residence permit for 5 years should have the time limit on his stay removed after he has remained here for 4 years in employment, in business or as a self-employed person, unless, in the light of all the relevant circumstances of the case, including those set out in paragraphs 88 and 129, there are grounds for not removing the time limit. If the time limit is not then removed, the case should be reviewed on the expiry of the residence permit. In the case of a person issued with a residence permit for employment, a renewal limited to 12 months may be appropriate if he has been unemployed for more than 12 consecutive months during the previous 5 years." The appellant did not give evidence. For the appellant it was argued that (i) Paragraph 129 was in conflict with EEC Directive 68/360, (ii) the grounds of withdrawal of a residence permit set out in that Directive were the only permitted grounds and that the appellant's case did not fall within them, and (iii) the matter should be referred to the European Court of Justice. The adjudicator held: (i) (following the Tribunal decision in Holz (2389)) "that the appellant had to prove that he had not been living on public funds though capable of maintaining himself" and this he had not done with respect to the period 22 September 1978 to December 1980; (ii) (noting the Tribunal decision in Mustari (2472) that there was no conflict between the EEC law and the rule) the decision was in accordance with the law and immigration rules applicable to the case; and (iii) a decision of the European Court of Justice was not necessary. The grounds of appeal to the Tribunal are: "(i) The appellant had been in employment for an aggregate of more than 4 years and considering rules 130 and 88 of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules he should be allowed to remain in UK. (ii) Article 7(1) and (2) of Directive 68/360 EEC permit workers to remain in the country of work. If worker is involuntarily unemployed and further the residence permit must be renewed for at least 12 months when renewed first time." The issues Mr Yasnik submitted that: (i) The appellant's residence permit was wrongly curtailed under EEC law, (citing in particular Art 7 of EEC Directive 68/360) and that HC 394 paragraph 129 was inconsistent with that Article; (ii) if the Tribunal was not clearly of the opinion that the submission in (i) was correct it should refer the matter to the European Court of Justice in accordance with Art 177 of the Treaty of Rome; (iii) (a) in any event the appellant should be permitted to stay in accordance with HC 394 paragraph 130 as he had been in employment for more than 4 years; or (b) the Tribunal should recommend that the appellant be permitted to stay in the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion bearing in mind that the appellant has been in this country for over 8 years. The evidence Lacking oral evidence the facts are to be gleaned from the explanatory statement and annexures which were before the adjudicator and copy letters from three of the appellant's employers in the period November 1974 -- March 1982. Mr Yasnik also submitted to us a letter dated 13 January 1983 to the appellant from the Manager, Unemployment Benefit Office, Keyworth Street, London, which reads: "I reply to your letter dated 23 December 1982. I am afraid that I am not in a position to state whether or not your unemployment was involuntary; the Department does not, and cannot, have all the information required to make such a certification. May I suggest that you request a statement from your former employer." The facts The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 1 November 1974 and was in regular employment from 25 November 1974 until 22 September 1978 when he sustained injury. He was unfit for work until 11 August 1979. Since that time his employment has been irregular. He was employed from 5 December 1979 to 3 January 1980, from 5 May 1980 to 29 August 1980, from April 1981 until June 1981 and from 6 July 1981 until February 1982. There is some evidence that in December 1980 and January 1981 the appellant was suffering from arthritis of the knee and was unable to work. It seems from the explanatory statement that in 1974 the appellant was granted a residence permit expiring on 23 December 1979. On 4 March 1980 the appellant requested removal of the time limit attached to his stay and there followed Home Office inquiries into the appellant's past and then present employment record. On 15 May 1981 as the appellant was in work his residence permit was extended until 14 May 1982. From the explanatory statement it appears that the appellant received sickness benefit from September 1978 until August 1979 and unemployment benefit from August or September 1979 until 5 May 1980 (presumably excepting December 1979 -- January 1980 when he was employed). It is not clear during which precise periods the appellant was receiving supplementary benefit. However, it seems that he was in receipt of such benefit during parts of 1981 and from 2 February 1982 until 18 March 1982 (the date of decision). In reviewing the facts the adjudicator quoted the explanatory statement paragraph 13 which in setting out dates of receipt of public funds draws no distinction between the types of benefit received by the appellant in its grounds. The adjudicator drew attention to the medical certificates relating to the appellant's state of health in December 1980 and January 1981 in apparently drawing a distinction between unemployment due to illness and other causes. However he seems to have overlooked the injury which the appellant suffered in 1978 in concluding that from 22 September 1978 until December 1980 the appellant was living on public funds although capable of maintaining himself. Mr Cottrell agreed before us that the appellant was either in work or unable to work because of illness from November 1974 until August 1979. The applicable law and rules (i) The Immigration Rules Before the adjudicator the case was treated as falling within HC 394. However we raised the question whether, as the appellant prior to 1 March 1980 had limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom for employment, HC82 contains the applicable rules (see HC 394 paragraph 159). This depends on whether the reference in HC 394 paragraph 159 to "approved employment" was intended to and can be read as covering EEC nationals admitted and remaining for employment. On reflection we think in principle that the admission of an EEC national is not for employment but because of a right to seek employment, and it seems accepted that the phrase "approved employment" in the Immigration Rules refers to employment approved by the Department of Employment (See the Tribunal decision in Arif (2411) and that of Forbes J in Re Gopal (2 March 1983). In any event the applicable paragraphs of HC 82 (paragraphs 36 and 37) are for all purposes relevant to the present appeal identical to HC 394 paragraphs 129 and 130. It should be said that in the current Immigration Rules (HC 169) the provisions relating to the variation of leave to enter or remain of EEC nationals are considerably amended. In particular the power to curtail the duration of residence permit of an employee no longer refers to being a charge on public funds. It is framed in terms of non-employment with the proviso in paragraph 143 that:

"However, the duration of a residence permit issued to a worker will not be curtailed solely on the grounds that he is no longer in employment where this is because he is temporarily incapable of work as a result of illness or accident or because he is involuntarily unemployed."

(a) HC 394 paragraph 129 The paragraph provides that a residence permit "should be curtailed if it is evident that the holder is living on public funds although capable of maintaining himself". No distinction is drawn between types of benefit. The phrase "capable of maintaining himself" may be construed as referring only to incapacity through illness or as including incapacity through lack of available work. Though the issue has been raised before the Tribunal on more than one occasion it does not seem to have been decided. In Gabriella Piccaluga (2351) the Tribunal leaned to the view that it included inability to find work (but came to no decision on this point) and in Demuro (2441) gave involuntary unemployment as an example of incapacity of maintaining oneself. However in Holz (2389) the Tribunal seems to have accepted the fact of seeking work as evidence of a capability to maintain oneself. We agree with the Tribunal decisions in Holz, Mustari and Demuro insofar as looking only at paragraph 129 it is for the Secretary of State to assert and produce evidence that the holder of a residence permit is living on public funds although capable of maintaining himself. It is for the holder of the permit to rebut such evidence through assertion of the necessary facts. The burden of proof in that context lies on the appellant (Immigration Appeal (Procedure) Rules 1972 rule 31(2). However in our view it would be wrong to treat paragraph 129 separately from the requirements of the EEC legislation. This view does not perhaps entirely fit with the approach in Holz but seems to be more akin to that in Mustari and Demuro. We therefore return to paragraph 129 and consider its application to the appellant in the context of the EEC legislation. (b) HC 394 paragraph 130 In our view in providing for the removal of the time limit the paragraph clearly contemplates 4 years in employment during the 5 year period of a residence permit. It provides for the possibility of the removal of the time limit prior to the expiry of the 5 year period followed by a further review at the end of that period. It follows that the 4 years of employment cannot be made up of employment in and subsequent to the 5 year period. Application to the appellant As a result the appellant had no claim under this paragraph for removal of the time limit on his stay and therefore remained subject to curtailment of his leave to remain. Any relevance of the aggregate period of employment in our view goes only to the consideration of a recommendation to the Secretary of State for the exercise of discretion outside the rules. We consider this at the end of the determination. (ii) EEC legislation The directly relevant legislation is Directive 68/360 which is part of the complex EEC legislation structure providing for the Freedom of Movement for Workers. The secondary legislation is contained not only in Directive 68/360 but also in Regulation 1612/68 and is enacted to attain the objective of Art 48 of the Treaty of Rome. The principle of Freedom of Movement for Workers is reflected not only in provisions based on rights of residence (with which we are most directly concerned in this case) but also in entitlement of workers to social security benefits. It has been held by the European Court that Art 48 creates directly applicable individual rights; and that Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 68/360 determine the scope and detailed rules for the exercise of those rights (see eg Royer [1976] 2 CMLR 619; R v Pieck [1981] 3 All ER 46) and give effect to the rights based on the Treaty (see Levin [1982] 2 CMLR 454; Rutili [1976] 1 CMLR 140). In Becker [1982] 1 CMLR 477 at pp 512-513 the European Court ruled that a Member State could not rely as against individuals on any provision of national law not conforming with any provision of a Directive defining rights of those individuals against that State precisely and unconditionally. In our view it follows from the above decisions that the EEC legislative provisions at issue in this case (in particular Art 7 of Directive 68/360) control the effect of the Immigration Act and Rules. (a) Is the appellant a "worker" It is established that "worker" must be interpreted according to a community meaning and not national meanings (see Levin [1982] 2 CMLR 454 applying the case of Unger [1964] CMLR 319). The term together with "work in paid employment" determines "the area of application of one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and must on this basis not be interpreted strictly" (Levin at p 467). At various time during his residence in the United Kingdom the appellant has been unemployed. However, the protection of "workers" under Art 48, and relevant regulations and directives extends (i) to potential workers -- including those who "are actually working in paid employment or who seriously wish to do so" or "who perform or wish to perform an activity of an economic nature" -- therefore including part time employees (Levin pp 468, 469). (ii) those who have worked but although not working at the moment of decision are "capable of taking another job" (see Unger [1964] CMLR at p 331). A worker who becomes voluntarily unemployed is casting considerable doubts upon the serious wish to work. The drawing of the boundary of EEC protection at the point of voluntary unemployment is underlined by provisions of Art 7 of Directivwe 68/360 directly relevant in this appeal. Before considering any question of curtailment of the appellant's residence permit however, it is important to ascertain the source and extent of the appellant's right to reside in the United Kingdom. Right of residence flowing from employment (a) Relevance of residence permit The right of residence is not based on either the acquisition of a residence permit or the possession of the documents pre-requisite to its acquisition. The European Court has made it abundantly clear that the residence permit is proof of the right of residence -- that its function is declaratory rather than creative (see Royer [1976] 1 CMLR 619 at p 639; R v Pieck [1981] 3 All ER 46). Many of the problems surrounding claims of residence as workers seem to stem from the "transference of thought" (as two commentators have put it) as between Art 48 which provides for a substantive right to stay for employment, and Directive 68/360 which seems to base a right of residence on the production of documents entitling the "worker" to a residence rooted permit. However, it seems essential toseparate the right of residence in the qualification of "worker" from the residence permit which is proof (and presumably only the best method of proof) of that right. (b) Limitations on the right of residence Once having qualified for residence the only restrictions on that right are (i) those based on "public policy, public security or public health" and such grounds cannot be invoked to service economic ends (Directives 68/360 Art 10, 64/221 Art 2.2). (None of these grounds apply to the appellant's case, public policy being construed restrictively as relating to matters fundamentally opposed to the State (See R v Bouchereau [1977] 2 CMLR 800 at p 824) and in any event because of Directive 64/221 Art 2.2 necessarily excluding incapacity to obtain work flowing from rife unemployment) (ii) the ability to withdraw the residence permit on the grounds of voluntary unemployment implied from the general principles of the purpose of the EEC legislation focussed on "workers" and the specific wording of Art 7 of Directive 68/360 which reads: "1. A valid residence permit may not be withdrawn from a worker solely on the grounds that he is no longer in employment, either because he is temporarily incapable of work as a result of illness or accident, or because he is involuntarily unemployed, this being duly confirmed by the competent employment office. 2. When the residence permit is renewed for the first time, the period of residence may be restricted, but not to less than twelve months, where the worker has been involuntarily unemployed in the Member State for more than twelve consecutive months." Subject to these limitations the right of residence of a "worker" continues -- a right underlined by the provision that, apart from a temporary residence permit based on a limited fixed period of employment, a residence permit "must be valid for at least five years from the date of issue and be automatically renewable" (Directive 68/360 Art 6.1). It is important to stress that in the case of an EEC national who is a worker his right to reside does not depend primarily on any leave to remain granted under the Immigration Act. His right stems from the EEC legislation. Application to the appellant In this case the appellant was granted a residence permit valid for 5 years and expiring on 23 December 1979. It is agreed that the appellant was in regular employment until September 1978 and that he was "temporarily incapable of work through illness or accident" until August 1979. He was employed from 5 December 1979 to 3 January 1980 and so on the expiry of his residence permit he was actually employed. Further it seems that the appellant was in receipt of unemployment benefit while he was unemployed during the period August 1979 until May 1980. The appellant had not been involuntarily unemployed for twelve months prior to 23 December 1979 so as to attract Art 7.2 of Directive 38/680. It may be implied from Art 7.1 of Directive 38/680 that the renewal of a residence permit may be refused on grounds of voluntary unemployment. However in this case the Secretary of State does not seem to have considered the question of the appellant's right of residence stemming from the EEC legislation after the expiry of his residence permit. In our view the appellant had a right of residence unless either (i) he had put himself out of the protection of the EEC legislative provisions based on workers through voluntary unemployment or (ii) (possibly) until the right of residence had been curtailed by the Secretary of State because of voluntary unemployment. Whichever is the correct approach to the boundary of the appellant's right it seems to us that the appellant's right of residence attained in 1974 continued from December 1979. As will be seen it is our opinion where the right of residence is said to cease because of voluntary unemployment it is for the Secretary of State to assert that ground; and in any event such evidence as there is goes to show that any unemployment prior to December 1979 was either due to illness or was involuntary. In our view the right of residence must at least be of the duration of the residence permit and therefore the appellant had a right of residence at least until either 1 November (the anniversary of his date of entry) or 23 December (the anniversary of the date of issue of the permit) 1984. At all times relevant to this case the appellant had a right of residence and it is that right which the Secretary of State had to curtail to remove the appellant's ability to remain in this country. It is our view that the granting of a residence permit in 1981 was irrelevant to the appellant's right to remain as in 1981 he had no need to seek leave to remain and that the limit set upon that right of 14 May 1982 was a limit which the Secretary of State had no power to impose. However the Secretary of State retained the power he always had of curtailing the appellant's right of residence on the grounds of voluntary unemployment. In substance this is what was done in the so called "variation of leave to remain" so that the leave expired on 2 April 1982. Curtailment of the right of residence The issue is whether the Secretary of State complied with the joint requirements of EEC Directive 68/360 Art 7 and HC 394 paragraph 129 in curtailing the appellant's right of residence in the notice of variation dated 13 March 1982. In our view there was no such compliance. Art 7 impliedly authorises curtailment of the right to reside if the appellant was voluntarily unemployed. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment is critical to the curtailment and in our view any exercise of the power to curtail must be overtly based on "voluntary unemployment". In this case the notice of refusal was couched in the highly ambiguous terms that "you have been unable to support yourself and you have fallen a charge on public funds". Neither ground indicates necessarily that it is the appellant's voluntary unemployment that is the critical factor. The explanatory statement makes no reference to the relevance of EEC legislation and indeed approaches the whole issue exclusively in Immigration Rule terms. The one reference to voluntary unemployment is in paragraph 9 and refers to one period of such employment in 1981 of not more than four weeks. It seems clear from paragraph 13 of the statement that the Secretary of State placed no more emphasis on this period than on any other and no importance seems to have been placed on the nature of the unemployment. We appreciate that our view that the Secretary of State must assert that a worker within the protection of the EEC legislation is voluntarily unemployed runs counter to previous Tribunal decisions. However, consistent development of workers' rights by the European Court of Justice and the change in the Immigration Rules so that HC 169 paragraph 143 incorporates precisely the wording of Art 7.1 of Directive 68/360 fortify us in our view of the current state of European law. However we should deal with two particular points arising from previous Tribunal decisions (i) the burden of proof and (ii) the effect, if any, of the word "solely" in Art 7.1. (i) The burden of proof Insofar as previous Tribunal decisions have taken the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment it has been said that it is for the holder of a residence permit to rebut the assertion and produce evidence that he was "capable of maintaining himself" through evidence of involuntary unemployment. One of the ways in which this could be done, said the Tribunal in Demuro (2441) was by obtaining evidence from a competent unemployment office. We do not dissent from the view that placing a burden of proof of involuntary unemployment on the holder of the residence permit is consistent with EEC legislation and in particular Art 7 of Directive 68/360. But we do not see that Art 7 directs that it be so placed. Secondly it obviously does not follow that as it is so placed under HC 394 paragraph 129, Art 7 does not impose any obligation on the Secretary of State to base the grounds of curtailment on involuntary unemployment. In our view Art 7 requires the Secretary of State to assert voluntary unemployment, although it may well be sufficient to produce evidence which could indicate voluntary or involuntary unemployment (eg the receipt of supplementary benefit) and require the holder of the permit to establish that the employment is involuntary. It is however essential in our view that the ground of curtailment be voluntary unemployment. We stress that nothing we have said has any relevance to the burden of proof under HC 169 paragraph 143. Finally on the question of burden of proof we have not considered whether the condition that involuntary unemployment be confirmed by the competent employment office creates an exclusive method of proof binding on the State and the individual. It is arguable that as a Directive is binding "only as to the result to be achieved" but not as to "the choice of form and methods" (see Treaty of Rome Art 189) it does not exclude other methods of proof. What seems to us to be clear is that the Secretary of State cannot rely on failure to comply if the State has not created a process through which the necessary confirmation can be obtained. In this connection we draw attention to the letter to the appellant from the Employment Office. We draw no conclusion from it save general concern in the context of Art 7 as we have not seen the letter to which it was an answer. (ii) "Solely" It is possible to argue that Art 7 has no effect in cases such as the present where an appellant is in receipt of public funds, and this is a ground for withdrawal of the residence permit. In Holz (2389) the Tribunal took this point but also appeared to accept that proof of involuntary or temporary employment would be sufficient to establish the appellant's case. Whatever the word may mean in the context of Article 7 we do not think that it could possibly be used as an argument that simply adding another ground to involuntary unemployment removes the case from Art 7. Further and in particular the receipt of public funds as an unemployed worker could not form such a ground consistently with the EEC requirements of lack of discrimination between nationals of EEC member states (see eg Regulation 1408/71). Reference to the European Court of Justice It was Mr Yasnik on behalf of the appellant who asked us to consider the settling of a question for reference to the European Court of Justice if we were not in his favour in his argument based on the EEC legislation. As we are his application falls away. For the respondent Mr Cottrell made no such application -- although his view was that there was no conflict between the Immigration Rules and Directive 68/360. We have held that there may be a conflict if paragraph 129 is read as entitling the Secretary of State to curtail leave on the basis of involuntary unemployment or if the paragraph is seen as not requiring the Secretary of State to assert voluntary unemployment as a ground of curtailment. Particularly as we are differing from previous decisions of the Tribunal we considered seriously whether we should refer the question of the interpretation of Art 7 to the European Court of Justice. We considered the criteria set out in Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] 2 All ER 1226 and especially expense and delay in the context of an Immigration Rule now limited in its scope of operation by the making of a new and different rule. We also bear in mind the interpretation of the relevant EEC legislation by the European Court of Justice and as will be evident from the previous part of the determination are of the view that a reference is not called for in this case. Summary In our view therefore: (i) HC 394 paragraph 129 has to be applied in the context of relevant EEC legislation concerned with workers; (ii) EEC legislation, and in particular Directive 68/360 (apart from grounds set out in Art 10 of that Directive) require an assertion by the Secretary of State that a worker having a right of residence is voluntarily unemployed for that right to curtailed; (iii) The assertion of voluntary unemployment must be supported by evidence, but for the purpose of Art 7 that it may suffice for the Secretary of State to rely on evidence which could support involuntary or voluntary employment and require the worker to establish that the employment is involuntary. (iv) In this case: (a) the appellant's right of residence was renewable in December 1979 and apart from the grounds specified in Art 10 of Directive 68/360 could be curtailed only on the ground of voluntary unemployment; (b) the Secretary of State did not assert that the appellant's employment was voluntary and, indeed, nowhere treated the distinction of voluntary and involuntary employment as critical; (c) following from (a) and (b) the Secretary of State's purported curtailment of the appellant's right of residence by the notice of variation of leave of 13 March 1982 was invalid; and (v) there should be no reference to the European Court of Justice. The appeal is allowed and the Secretary of State directed to consider the immigration status of the appellant in the light of the principles adumbrated in the determination. Mr Yasnik asked us to consider making a recommendation to the Secretary of State based on the appellant's employment from 1974 to 1978, his illness preventing him from attaining the qualifying period of 4 years for the purpose of HC 394 paragraph 130, his periods of employment since 1978 and the lack of relevance of any ground within HC 394 paragraph 88. Our decision removes the necessity for such a recommendation but we would have been content to join with the adjudicator in drawing these matters to the attention of the Secretary of State.

DISPOSITION:

Appeal allowed

SOLICITORS:

Messrs Bax Gibb

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