EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application of VARFOLOMEJEV v. FINLAND

REF. NO:

ORIGIN: COMMISSION

TYPE: DECISION

PUBLICATION:

TITLE: VARFOLOMEJEV v. FINLAND

APPLICATION NO.: 17811/91

NATIONALITY: Soviet

REPRESENTED BY: MÅNSSON, U., lawyer, Helsinki RESPONDENT: Finland

DATE OF INTRODUCTION: 19900803

DATE OF DECISION: 19910902

APPLICABILITY:

CONCLUSION: Inadmissible

ARTICLES: 3 ; 5-2 ; 5-3 ; 5-4 ; 5-5 ; 6-1 ; 6-3-a ; 18

RULES OF PROCEDURE:

LAW AT ISSUE:

STRASBOURG CASE-LAW:

Eur. Court H.R. Tyrer judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, pp. 14-15 paras. 29-30 ; Brogan and Others judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B, p. 33-34 para. 62 ; Soering judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, pp. 35-36 para. 91 ; Fox, Campbell and Hartley judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182, p. 19 para. 40 ; Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991, para. 30 to be published in SEries A as no. 198 ; Cruz Varas and Others judgment of 20 March 1991, para. 76, to be published in Series A as no. 201 EXTERNAL SOURCES: Sections 2 and 7, para. 3, of the Act on the Returning in Certain Cases of Persons Guilty of Hijacking Civil Aircraft (laki 336/75 siviili-ilma-aluksen kaappaukseen syyllistyneiden henkilöiden palauttamisesta, lag 336/75 om återförande i vissa fall av personer som gjort sig skyldiga till kapning av civilt luftfartyg ; Extradition Act (laki 456/70 rikoksen johdosta tapahtuvasta luovuttamisesta, lag 456/70 om utlämning för brott) ; Sections 13 to 25 and 34 of the Extradition Act ; Section 12 para. 4 of the Extradition Act ; Chapter 1, Section 21, of the Coercive Criminal Investigation Means Act (pakkokeinolaki 450/87, tvångmedelslagen

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 17811/91 by Mihail VARFOLOMEJEV against Finland The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 2 September 1991, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

J.A. FROWEIN

S. TRECHSEL

F. ERMACORA

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. WEITZEL

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G. H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the application introduced on 3 August 1990 by Mihail VARFOLOMEJEV against Finland and registered on 15 February 1991 under file No. 17811/91; Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Having deliberated; Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a citizen of the Soviet Union, born in 1969 and resident in Nikolski near Leningrad. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Ulf Månsson, a lawyer practising in Helsinki. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

In 1986 the applicant was called up for military service. In the Soviet Union there is no right to exemption from military service on the ground of conscientious objection. The applicant refused military service, referring to his pacifist views and the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. As a result he was threatened with punishment and subsequently taken from his home to a mental hospital, where he was detained for 17 days. At the hospital he was diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic. At his discharge he received a medical certificate prescribing that he was to remain under constant supervision by his family and that, whenever necessary, he could be re-detained. The authorities subsequently, without hearing the applicant, put a stamp in his military passport stating that he was an invalid of the first degree. As a result he was not allowed to work, to study, to marry, to found a family, to vote or to participate in political activities, nor could he be granted a passport for travelling abroad. In order to obtain work the applicant subsequently forged his military passport to indicate that he was an invalid of the third degree. On 24 June 1990 the applicant hijacked a Soviet aeroplane on its way from Tallinn to Helsinki demanding that it land in Sweden. The plane landed in Helsinki, where the applicant gave up and was arrested. He was found to have been unarmed during the hijacking. The applicant immediately lodged a request with the Ministry of the Interior that he be granted political asylum in Finland, referring to his treatment in the Soviet Union. He further presented his military passport, alleging that the forgery of his invalidity classification could easily be noticed. On 25 June 1990 the Soviet Government, referring to the 1974 Bilateral Agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union on the Prevention of Hijacking of Civil Aircraft (hereinafter "the 1974 Agreement"), requested the applicant's extradition, as he was suspected of having hijacked an aeroplane as well as having illegally left the Soviet Union. In an annex to the request issued by a K.G.B. official it was stated that the applicant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and was an invalid of the first degree. On 27 June 1990 the applicant was remanded for trial by the City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätten) of Helsinki suspected of having hijacked an aeroplane. The Court had regard to the applicable penalty for hijacking, the risk that the applicant might abscond and the need for ensuring his presence at the trial. The City Court decided that the trial would take place before the District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus, häradsrätten) of Vantaa on 24 July 1990. On 2 July 1990 the Ministry of Justice asked the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) to give its opinion on the extradition request. On 3 July 1990 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees submitted an opinion to the Ministry of the Interior on the considerations UNHCR would normally take into account in cases such as the applicant's. It stated inter alia "... As to exclusion, hijacking is generally regarded as a serious crime. However, there have been cases where the refugee status of an applicant has been recognized even where the applicant hijacked a plane to leave the country of origin. These cases have differed in their factual situations but have in common the absence of any serious violence accompanying the hijacking and the fact that the hijacking was the only available means of escaping persecution on the grounds of political opinion. In other words, hijacking is not always a serious crime or a non-political crime in the sense meant in the exclusion clauses. It is not automatically a bar to refugee status. Where there is a well-founded fear of persecution on political grounds, where escape from persecution was not reasonably possible by any other means and where no violence or serious danger to others accompanied the act, the hijacking of a plane in order to leave [the country of origin] should not render an otherwise clearly includable person excluded from refugee status..." Between 5 an 9 July 1990 the applicant, at his own request, was examined separately by a specialist in internal medicine, another doctor, a psychologist and a social worker. The examination was directed by a Chief Psychiatrist. The applicant was considered mentally healthy, and there was no indication that he had previously suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. However, he was found to suffer from a personality disturbance with passive-aggressive features. On 24 July 1990 the District Court, at the prosecutor's request, postponed the trial to 6 August 1990 stating that under Sections 2 and 7, para. 3, of the Act on the Returning in Certain Cases of Persons Guilty of Hijacking Civil Aircraft (laki 336/75 siviili-ilma-aluksen kaappaukseen syyllistyneiden henkilöiden palauttamisesta, lag 336/75 om återförande i vissa fall av personer som gjort sig skyldiga till kapning av civilt luftfartyg; hereinafter "the 1975 Act") the presentation of charges in Finland was a subsidiary measure in relation to the extradition proceedings and would thus come into play where no extradition was granted. As the examination of the extradition request was still pending there was a particularly weighty reason for the postponement of the trial. It further had regard to the serious character and the public importance of the case and the fact that the prosecutor had received the pre-trial records only on 18 July 1990, the short time not allowing him to consider the evidence and to prepare the indictment. On 2 August 1990 the Ministry of the Interior rejected the applicant's request for asylum, stating that he had not submitted any plausible evidence showing that he had been persecuted in the Soviet Union because of his political views, or was in need of protection. Furthermore, according to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees he had no right to asylum, since this Convention was not to be applied to a person suspected of having committed a serious non-political crime outside the country he has fled from. The decision was not subject to appeal. On 6 August 1990 the District Court, at the prosecutor's request, postponed the trial to 17 August 1990, as the examination of the extradition request was still pending and the applicant could in any case have been detained under the Extradition Act (laki 456/70 rikoksen johdosta tapahtuvasta luovuttamisesta, lag 456/70 om utlämning för brott) pending the outcome of the extradition procedure. Having regard to the risk that the applicant might abscond, the District Court further rejected his request to be released from detention on remand. On 9 August 1990 the Supreme Court delivered its opinion on the extradition request, noting inter alia that under the applicable provision in the Estonian Penal Code the applicant could not be sentenced to capital punishment, as the hijacking had caused no casualties. It further found that "having regard to the facts submitted neither the [United Nations] Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nor the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms constitute an obstacle to the extradition of Varfolomejev to the Soviet Union". The Supreme Court found, however, that extradition could not be granted in regard to the applicant's offence of having illegally left the Soviet Union. On 17 August 1990 the District Court, at the prosecutor's request, again postponed the trial, this time to 31 August 1990. The applicant's request to be released from detention on remand was rejected. The District Court referred to the reasons stated in its decision of 6 August 1990. On 20 August 1990 the Ministry of Justice decided to extradite the applicant to the Soviet Union under the condition that without the consent of the Finnish Ministry of Justice the applicant could not be prosecuted or punished for any offence other than the hijacking committed prior to his extradition, nor be further extradited to a third country. The extradition decision was not subject to appeal. Previously, an agreement had been reached with the Soviet authorities that a Finnish psychiatrist would be allowed to participate in a possible mental examination to be conducted on the applicant in the Soviet Union. On 23 August 1990 the applicant was handed over to the Soviet authorities. Subsequently, he was taken to a prison in Tallinn on the basis of a previous decision to remand him for trial. A Finnish psychiatrist participated in a subsequent mental examination conducted on the applicant, at which he was again found to be mentally healthy. The trial took place on 7 and 8 January 1991 before the Court of the Region of Meri. The applicant was convicted of hijacking and sentenced to four years' suspended imprisonment. He was immediately released. The minimum penalty applicable on the hijacking offence was five years' imprisonment, but the Court made an exception in the applicant's case, having regard to the extenuating circumstances, that is his detention in the mental hospital, the incorrect psychiatric diagnosis and the invalidity classification. It was further noted that the applicant had been deprived of his human rights such as the right to work and to study. The public prosecutor appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court of Estonia. On 15 April 1991 the judgment was upheld after a hearing, at which the prosecutor argued that the applicant's diagnosis of 1986 should be considered valid. The applicant's invalidity classification has not been revoked by the Expert Commission for the Establishment of Fitness for Work. He is being paid invalidity pension, which he refuses to receive.

Relevant domestic law

and practice According to the 1974 Agreement a person suspected of having hijacked a civil aeroplane registered in one of the two countries and which has landed in the other country shall be returned to the country of registration if the suspect is a citizen of that country. However, according to Article 11 of the 1974 Agreement the provisions of the Agreement are without prejudice to the rights and considerations of a Contracting State in matters regarding inter alia the right to asylum. Extradition based on the 1974 Agreement is regulated by the 1975 Act, as well as by the Extradition Act. In extradition cases which fall under the 1975 Act Sections 13 to 25 and 34 of the Extradition Act are, insofar as they are applicable, to be applied. Under Section 2 of the 1975 Act measures shall be taken immediately upon a request for extradition. Under Section 7 para. 3 of the same Act the Ministry of Justice shall, provided that it does not allow an extradition, refer the matter to the prosecutor for the purpose of presenting charges. Section 16 para. 1 of the Extradition Act reads: "If the person whose extradition is requested, during the investigation or in a petition submitted to the Ministry of Justice before the decision, alleges that lawful conditions for the extradition are not fulfilled, the Ministry shall, if the extradition request is not immediately rejected, before its decision ask for the opinion of the Supreme Court. The Ministry may also otherwise ask for an opinion, if necessary." Section 17 reads: "The Supreme Court examines, having regard to Sections 1-10 or other provisions in international treaties binding upon Finland, whether the request for extradition may be granted. If the Supreme Court finds an obstacle to the extradition the request may not be granted." Under Section 12 para. 4 of the Extradition Act the Government may, when granting an extradition request, state the conditions under which the extradition shall take place. However, in cases which fall under the 1975 Act the Government may only state conditions in order to prevent the extradited person from being prosecuted or punished for any offence other than the hijacking committed prior to his extradition or the further extradition of the person to a third country. According to Chapter 1, Section 21, of the Coercive Criminal Investigation Means Act (pakkokeinolaki 450/87, tvångmedelslagen 450/87) the Court shall, when remanding a suspect for trial and provided the examination of the charges has not already started, decide when the trial is to take place. It has to take place within four weeks, but the Court may for particularly weighty reasons postpone the trial for two weeks at a time, provided this is requested by the prosecutor before the day of the trial. The postponement is not subject to ordinary appeal. However, under Chapter 1, Section 27 para. 2 of same Act it is possible to lodge an extraordinary appeal (kantelu, klagan) on the basis of an alleged procedural fault by the Court.

COMPLAINTS

1.The applicant complains that the denial of asylum in Finland and his extradition violated Article 3 of the Convention. He submits that, although he has always been mentally sound, he has already been detained against his will in a mental hospital and subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. Abuse of psychiatry in order to suppress dissidents still exists in the Soviet Union, according to inter alia Amnesty International. When asylum was refused it was known to the Finnish authorities that the psychiatric diagnosis and the invalidity classification were still considered valid in the Soviet Union, although a mental examination in Finland had shown that the applicant was not, and had never been, mentally ill. The Government took a great risk that he could again be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, as they did not stipulate, as a condition for the extradition, that the diagnosis as a paranoid schizophrenic and the invalidity classification be revoked. Moreover, the revocation as such of the diagnosis does not guarantee that the invalidity classification will be changed, as a decision in the latter regard is made by completely separate authorities. Especially having regard to the situation in the beginning of 1991, of which there were clear indications already at the time of the extradition, there were no guarantees that the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union would end. 2.The applicant further complains that the District Court's decisions to postpone his trial and to keep him remanded for trial, although no charges had been presented, violated Article 5 paras. 2, 3 and 4, and Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (a) of the Convention. The pre-trial investigation was concluded and the records were ready for examination already on 12 July 1990. However, no charges were presented before the District Court, although the applicant continued to be detained on remand. The applicant furthermore claims compensation from the Government under Article 5 para. 5 of the Convention. 3.The applicant finally complains that the reasons invoked by the prosecutor in support of the requests for a postponement of the trial violated Article 18 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 3 August 1990 and registered on 15 February 1991. On 3 August 1990 the applicant requested that the Commission under Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure indicate to the Government that the decision on the extradition or, alternatively, the enforcement of such a decision, be suspended. On 20 August 1990 the Acting President of the Commission decided to reject the request.

THE LAW

1.The applicant complains that the denial of asylum and his extradition violated Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, which reads: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." The Commission recalls that according to its established case-law the right to asylum and the right not to be expelled or extradited are not as such included among the rights and freedoms mentioned in the Convention but that the expulsion or extradition of a person may nevertheless, in certain exceptional circumstances, raise an issue under the Convention and in particular under Article 3 (Art. 3). In the Soering case, the European Court of Human Rights stated as follows (Eur. Court H.R., Soering judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, pp. 35-36, para. 91): "In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3), and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country. The establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the standards of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention." According to the Court's case-law, ill-treatment, including that in connection with punishment, must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The assessment of this level depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex and state of health of the victim (above-mentioned Soering judgment, p. 39, para. 100). For punishment or for treatment associated with it to be "inhuman" or "degrading", the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation inherent in a given form of legitimate punishment (Eur. Court H.R., Tyrer judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26, pp. 14-15, paras. 29-30). The Commission further recalls that the existence of a risk of ill-treatment in a case of extradition should be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of the extradition. However, regard can also be had to information which has come to light after the extradition, as such information may be of value in confirming or refuting the appreciation made by the Contracting State or the well-foundedness of the fears of the extradited person (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Cruz Varas and Others judgment of 20 March 1991, para. 76, to be published in Series A as No. 201). In the present case the Commission observes that the Government, in their extradition decision, noted the Supreme Court's opinion according to which under Estonian law the applicant could not be sentenced to death. Moreover, the Government noted the Supreme Court's finding that the Convention did not hinder extradition. It appears from the file that an agreement had been reached with the Soviet authorities that a Finnish psychiatrist be allowed to participate in a possible mental examination in the Soviet Union. This agreement was subsequently complied with by the Soviet authorities to which the result of the examination carried out in Finland had been submitted. It further appears from the file that the Government, in connection with the extradition, requested to receive information regarding the further proceedings in the applicant's case following his extradition. Thus, the Government took considerable care in order to preclude a real risk that the applicant would be exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. In view of the above the Commission considers that the information available to the Finnish Government at the time of the extradition with regard to the personal situation of the applicant and the development in the Soviet Union did not show that the applicant, upon his extradition, would run a substantial risk of being exposed to such treatment. The information which has subsequently been provided by the applicant's lawyer about the applicant's trial and present situation is not such as to refute the appreciation made by the Government at the time of the extradition. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 2.The applicant further complains that the decisions to postpone his trial and to keep him remanded for trial, although no charges were presented, violated Article 5 paras. 2, 3 and 4, and Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (a) (Art. 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 6-1, 6-3-a) of the Convention. He furthermore claims to be entitled to compensation from the Finnish Government under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention. (a)The Commission has first considered the complaint under Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention, which reads: "Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him." Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention contains the elementary safeguard that any person arrested should know why he is being deprived of his liberty. Whilst the information in this regard must be conveyed "promptly" it need not be related in its entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment of the arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in each case according to its special features (Eur. Court H.R., Fox, Campbell and Hartley judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A No. 182, p. 19, para. 40, with further reference). The Commission considers that, in view of the circumstances, the applicant must have been immediately aware of the reasons for his arrest, as well as of the nature of the charges against him. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. (b)The Commission has secondly examined the complaint under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, which reads: "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial." The Commission does not find it necessary to consider whether the possibility to appeal under Chapter 1, Section 27, second paragraph of the Coercive Criminal Investigation Means Act constitutes a remedy which the applicant should have used in order to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, as the complaint is manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons. The applicant was brought before the City Court of Helsinki on 27 June 1990. Thus, he was brought "promptly before a judge" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Brogan and Others judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A No. 145-B, p. 33-34, para. 62). As regards the reasonableness of the applicant's detention pending trial the period to be considered under this provision started on the day of the arrest, that is 24 June 1990, and ended not later than 23 August 1990. The Commission observes that, when postponing the applicant's trial and maintaining his detention on remand, the District Court of Vantaa had regard, on the one hand, to the subsidiary role of the domestic criminal proceedings in relation to the proceedings regarding the extradition request, and, on the other, to the risk that the applicant might abscond, as well as to the gravity of the offence and the public importance of the case. In these circumstances the length of the applicant's detention cannot be regarded as unreasonable for the purposes of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. (c)The Commission has thirdly examined the complaint under Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention which reads: "Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful." The Commission observes that the City Court of Helsinki on 27 June 1990 remanded the applicant for trial. The District Court of Vantaa on 24 July, 6 August and 17 August 1990 decided to continue the detention on remand. At least on the two last-mentioned occasions the applicant challenged the lawfulness of his detention. Furthermore, there is no indication that the applicant could not have challenged the lawfulness of his detention before the City Court on 27 June 1990 and before the District Court on 24 July 1990. Thus, he was entitled to take proceedings with a view to having the lawfulness of his detention being decided speedily. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. (d)The applicant further claims compensation from the Finnish Goverment in accordance with Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention which reads: "Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation." The Commission does not consider it necessary to examine whether the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies in respect of this complaint, as it has found no violation of Article 5 paras. 2, 3 and 4 (Art. 5-2, 5-3, 5-4) of the Convention. Consequently, no violation can be found under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. (e)The applicant further complains of violations of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (a) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-a) of the Convention. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, insofar as it is relevant: "In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law..." Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention reads: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ... to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;" The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities (see, as the most recent authority, Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991, para. 30, to be published in Series A as No. 198). In the present case the Commission notes that, while a procedure for prosecution in Finland was initiated, it was interrupted by the applicant's extradition to the Soviet Union. In the light of the case-law of the Convention organs the Commission finds no violation of the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. Furthermore, there is no substantiation of the applicant's complaints under Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 3.The applicant finally complains that the reasons invoked by the prosecutor in support of the requests for a postponement of the trial violated Article 18 (Art. 18) of the Convention which reads: "The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed." The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 18 (Art. 18) of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority, DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE. Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission (H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
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