

NIGERIA:

Heightened risk of violence and displacement ahead of 2007 elections

A profile of the internal displacement situation

21 September, 2006

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Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

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OVERVIEW

Nigeria: heightened risk of violence and displacement ahead of 2007 elections

Ethno-religious conflict is endemic in Nigeria, with at least 14,000 people killed and hundreds of thousands displaced since military rule ended in 1999. Since internal displacement in Nigeria is often short-term, and most IDPs seek refuge with host families, data on the scope of the problem is scarce and no accurate estimates of the current number of IDPs exist.

While conflict often breaks out along religious or ethnic lines, poverty and unequal access to power and resources – be they land or oil wealth – are often at the heart of the conflict. Underlying tensions are never far from the surface, and may indeed be encouraged by scheming politicians seeking gain from social division. The high death toll and internal displacement resulting from a wave of sectarian violence across the country triggered by Danish caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed in February 2006, coinciding with a dramatic increase in militant violence in the oil-rich Delta region, were clear warning signs that once violence erupts it can quickly take on a momentum of its own. Violence linked with secessionist demands in Nigeria's south-east, as well as local resistance to the official handover by Nigeria of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon, are further causes for concern. Many observers fear that the level of conflict, and with it the level of internal displacement, may increase as the April 2007 presidential elections draw nearer. Splits within the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, and increasing jockeying for power have seen a rise in the number of political assassinations and a general sense of insecurity across the country. Failure to strengthen Nigeria's fragile democracy and to ensure free and fair elections could ultimately result in massive population movements both within and well beyond the country's borders.

Complex conflicts, complex causes

With a population of about 130 million and more than 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria is Africa's most populous nation – with a multitude of religious, ethnic and political fault lines that periodically erupt into communal violence. This has created a sizeable, albeit fluctuating internally displaced population – particularly since a return to democratic rule with the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 opened up new opportunities for people to express their grievances and new areas of conflict were created by the competition for political spoils.

While some of these conflicts may appear to be caused by a single factor, such as religion or ethnicity, the reality is usually more complex. The introduction of Islamic Sharia law in a total of 12 of Nigeria's 36 states in recent years has caused tensions, but when Muslim and Christian groups have clashed this has usually been caused by other factors – such as pressure on land or unequal access to social services. However, the polarisation that follows is often along religious lines, and the conflict is easily stereotyped as a “religious war”. The same dynamic is often observed with regard to “ethnic conflicts”.

Perhaps the most significant cause of communal violence in Nigeria is the entrenched divisions throughout the country between people considered indigenous to an area, and those regarded as settlers. Even though settlers may have lived in an area for hundreds of years, they are consistently discriminated against in terms of land ownership, control of commerce, jobs and education. In predominantly Christian Plateau state, for example, the majority of “settlers” belong to the northern Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, nomads who have gradually moved southwards as the expanding Sahara desert has dried up their traditional grazing lands (IRIN, 30 December 2005). Hausa-Fulani Muslims have long complained that predominantly Christian farmers steal their

cattle and prevent them from grazing, whilst the farmers counter that cattle encroach on their land. At the same time there are indigenous Muslim ethnic groups fiercely opposed to the perceived expansionist tendencies of the Hausa-Fulanis (IDMC interview, Jos, December 2004). One of the most alarming outbreaks of violence resulting from the tensions occurred in 2004, when a spiral of revenge killings between mainly Muslim cattle herders and Christian farmers in central Plateau state left possibly more than 1,000 people dead and 258,000 temporarily displaced – around 60,000 of them in camps in neighbouring Bauchi and Nassarawa states (GIDPP, Special Report, January 2005).

Closely linked to this is the problem of poverty and unequal access to resources. Despite its oil wealth (Nigeria is Africa's leading oil producer, and the seventh largest in the world), at least two thirds of Nigerians live on less than \$1 per day. Many people believe that conflicts are created and fanned by scheming politicians, particularly elites of the former military regime, relying on the huge pools of destitute and frustrated youths to create social division. The violence can then quickly spread and take on a momentum of its own (BBC, 5 May 2004).

The volatility of underlying tensions was amply demonstrated when in February 2006 as many as 50,000 people were displaced and about 150 killed in a wave of sectarian violence across various Nigerian states, sparked by protests over caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad (NRCS, February 2006). The majority of deaths occurred in the mainly Christian southeast city of Onitsha, where groups of armed youths attacked Muslim Hausa-speakers from the north in revenge for Christian Igbos killed some days earlier in the north of the country. Spiralling violence spread across at least six states, with thousands of IDPs taking refuge mainly in police and army barracks or churches – although many later returned to their homes (BBC, 24 February 2006).

Displacement has also been closely linked to oil production in the Niger Delta. While the Delta region has been volatile for many years, with impoverished local communities accusing successive governments as well as oil companies of depriving them of their fair share of oil revenues, tensions escalated dramatically in early 2006. Armed militia groups used increasingly violent means in their attempt to gain greater control of oil wealth, clashing with the Nigerian army, kidnapping numerous foreign oil workers and destroying oil installations, reducing the country's oil exports by at least 20 per cent (IRIN, 26 June 2006). Violence between local militia and security forces as well as inter-militia fighting in the Delta region has frequently forced people to flee their homes and widespread destruction of property has occurred (HRW, February 2005; AI, November 2005).

Violence leading to displacement could also be sparked by other "flashpoints", particularly in south-eastern Nigeria where growing secessionist demands by the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) have resulted in hundreds of deaths in recent years (IRIN, 4 September 2006) and on the disputed Bakassi peninsula – recently officially awarded to Cameroon but where the local population has been resisting the handover (NRCS, 5 July 2006). In addition, in the commercial capital Lagos, forced evictions by the authorities are reported to have affected more than one million people in the last five years (AI, 24 January 2006), as well as hundreds of thousands in the federal capital Abuja (HIC, 1 June 2006).

Following the refusal of the Nigerian parliament in May 2006 to change the constitution in order to enable President Obasanjo to run for a third consecutive term, widening splits within the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and high-level political assassinations have led to increased fears of a violent election in April 2007 (IRIN, 2 June 2006, 28 July 2006). In July 2006, the Brussels-based think-tank International Crisis Group warned of the "very real potential for the persistent levels of violence to escalate with major regional security implications" (ICG, 19 July 2006).

Numbers guesswork

Complex movement patterns combined with the overwhelming lack of data in Nigeria makes the issue of numbers of IDPs very problematic. There has been no systematic registration or verification of numbers of IDPs and figures are often “grossly misleading,” according to Zanna Muhammed, deputy director of the National Emergency Management Agency (IDMC interview, Abuja, 6 December 2004).

According to Moremi Soyinka-Onijala, Special Assistant to the Nigerian President on Migration and Humanitarian Affairs, estimates on the number of IDPs in Nigeria varied from 500,000 to millions (Brookings, June 2006, p8). The 2005 UN Humanitarian Appeal (CAP) for West Africa put the total number of IDPs in Nigeria at 200,000 (as of November 2004) – although this too must be based on guesswork (UN, 11 November 2004). It is therefore safe to say there is an undetermined number of IDPs in Nigeria.

The vast majority of displaced people in Nigeria seek refuge with family, friends or host communities where their ethnic group is in the majority. Others seek shelter in major towns. Many appear to return to their homes or resettle in the proximity of their home areas soon after the violence has subsided, but an unknown number also resettle in other areas of the country. It is therefore difficult to distinguish between movements of people forced to flee by violence and those moving for economic reasons.

Protection concerns

Human rights organisations have consistently accused the Nigerian security forces of failing to provide security during outbreaks of communal violence, and of using excessive force that has contributed to high death tolls. During the May 2004 clashes in Plateau state, police and army reinforcements were only sent to the town of Yelwa after hundreds of people had already been killed, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW, 11 May 2004). Local media reported that Yelwa residents accused the police and army of assisting the attackers, some of whom were armed with military-issue assault rifles (Vanguard, 8 May 2004).

During the violence between Muslims and Christians in the northern city of Kano, also in May 2004, police reportedly committed dozens of unlawful killings in the name of restoring law and order. According to Human Rights Watch, this followed a pattern of unlawful, arbitrary and extrajudicial killings by the police following outbreaks of communal violence in Plateau, Kaduna and other states over the previous three years (HRW, 17 May 2004). The proliferation of small arms throughout Nigeria has also contributed to the high casualty figures during attacks (AI, 11 May 2004).

In the oil-rich but impoverished Delta region, brutal repression of protests and human rights abuses against civilians by the Nigerian security forces – including “collective punishment” of entire communities – continue to be a “routine tactic”, according to Amnesty International (AI, November 2005).

Need for return and reintegration assistance

While immediate humanitarian needs in the wake of communal violence in Nigeria are often adequately addressed through a combination of national and international humanitarian actors, specialist and longer term needs tend to be neglected.

During the 2004 Plateau state crisis thousands of IDPs received emergency food aid, shelter, medical treatment and water/sanitation from a variety of sources, many of them in camps established in neighbouring Bauchi and Nassarawa states. But once the immediate crisis died down, humanitarian assistance particularly to IDPs attempting to return to areas affected by the

fighting – such as the town of Yelwa – was virtually non-existent. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was the only relief agency present in the area, providing basic health services as well as trauma counselling. Many people witnessed relatives being mutilated and killed, and hundreds of mainly women and girls were abducted. Some were raped, although this was not well documented. Many were visibly suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome (GIDPP, Special Report, January 2005).

Then, less than one year later, the IDP camps were officially closed and the displaced either returned to their home areas in Plateau state or resettled with relatives – spontaneously or as part of official resettlement programmes, particularly in Bauchi state. However, reports from the town of Yelwa, which was largely destroyed in the fighting, indicated that many IDPs were returning to a dire lack of basic services and without the means to start rebuilding their homes. In many cases, incidents of vandalism, burning and looting reportedly took place several weeks after the initial violence precisely in order to deter returning IDPs. This is by no means unprecedented. During the devastating communal violence in the Plateau state capital Jos in 2001, whole villages were razed to the ground (OMCT, 2002, p19), and farmers fleeing the violence in other central region states in 2001 saw their crops ruined and other properties damaged. As part of the strategy to retaliate for the killings of soldiers in Benue state in 2001, government troops were reported to have “regularly plundered” abandoned farms (HRW, April 2002, p14). In October 2002 it was reported that as many as 90 per cent of the 60,000 inhabitants of Odi town in Bayelsa state were still living in temporary structures, having found their original homes destroyed after being displaced in 1999 (OMCT, 2002, p80).

Fragmented humanitarian response

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), established in 1999, is responsible for overall disaster management in Nigeria – including the coordination of emergency relief operations as well as assisting in the rehabilitation of the victims where necessary. It has presence in most states and often supports IDPs in the emergency phase of a crisis, but it does not have the necessary resources to assist people displaced for a longer period of time, or to assist returnees to reintegrate. State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMA) also exist in some states, but with varying performance levels.

The national response is generally constrained by lack of experience in dealing with IDP issues, which has resulted in inefficiencies and support gaps to affected populations, but also by competing mandates. Confusion exists at the federal level over who has the mandate to respond to and assist IDPs – especially between NEMA and the National Commission for Refugees (NCR, informally mandated in 2002 to also cover IDPs) – which results in competition for resources.

Such tension and competition has been partly responsible for hindering the drafting of a national IDP policy, which has been in the pipeline since the creation of the Nigerian Presidential Committee on IDPs in January 2004 (Brookings, June 2006, p16).

Coordination between the various humanitarian actors at all levels is at best inconsistent. In the wake of the 2004 Plateau state crisis, international donors criticised the overall national response on various grounds, including: a lack of coordination; the lack of a proper registration system for IDPs; inefficient use of resources despite adequate financial capacity; lack of proper planning, monitoring and evaluation; and the politicisation of humanitarian assistance. At the same time neither the UN nor international donors such as the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office regarded the situation in Plateau state as a real humanitarian emergency – with major implications for response and funding. Indeed many donors see Nigeria as well endowed and able to address such situations from its own resources. There is a widely held view that the Nigerian government should focus its efforts on addressing the root causes of the problem –

including the equitable distribution of resources – rather than focusing on the symptoms (GIDPP, Special Report, January 2005).

The UN system in Nigeria – headed by a Resident Coordinator who is also Resident Representative of the UN Development Programme – consists of numerous agencies, and has since 2000 been organised around a Development Assistance Framework. So, with a firm focus on development needs, UN assistance to IDPs in Nigeria has been fairly ad hoc. The Red Cross movement as well as a few international NGOs has also been involved in IDP response, albeit in a rather uncoordinated fashion.

Indeed, the overall fragmented response to the 2004 Plateau state crisis in particular demonstrated the need for improved coordination between humanitarian actors at all stages of internal displacement from contingency planning and preparedness right through to post-emergency rehabilitation activities. Although the Nigeria government may have the financial capacity to respond to emergencies, it lacks the necessary institutional capacity and expertise to deal effectively with acute situations of internal displacement. And although the current situation of internal displacement in the country may not amount to an “emergency”, there is clearly potential for increased violence that could quickly spread and cause major population movements.

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

General background on displacement in Nigeria

Displacement caused by widespread communal violence, 1999-2004

- Internal displacement mainly caused by violent clashes between communities and violations of human rights
- What appears to be ethnic or religious conflict is often closely linked to the "indigenes-settler" divide, and often related to competition for political and economic influence
- Changes to the political boundaries and creation of new territories have often led to conflict and displacement
- The emergence of militant organisations such as the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) is one of the factors fuelling communal violence
- Over fifty separate incidents of communal violence reported between 1999 and 2002

BBC, 5 May 2004

"From the deserts of the north to the tropical forest regions of the south and east, [Nigeria] is home to around 120 million people, divided up into some 250 different ethnic groups.

The broad characterisation of a Muslim Hausa-speaking north, and a Christian south made up of two dominant tribes - the Yoruba in the southwest and the Ibo in the southeast - is a vast oversimplification.

In some states across central Nigeria, for example, it is possible to drive down a road, stopping at each tiny settlement, encountering a different language spoken in every single one.

And to further complicate this ethnic mix, over the decades and even centuries, people have moved around what is now modern day Nigeria.

A substantial minority of southern Christians now live in the north, as many northern Hausa Muslims have migrated south.

Complex conflicts

So, conflict between these communities, when it does occur, is a complex affair.

It can be rooted in religious disagreements - the introduction of Islamic law, for example, in some northern states has proved extremely contentious.

But it most often boils down to competition between those that see themselves as the true 'indigens' of an area, and those that are considered to be more recent 'settlers'.

Whatever the historical justifications, the conflict is always and everywhere about access to scarce resources.

This might be farmland, or employment, or access to political power. It could even be jealousy over the provision of water or electricity to one village but not its neighbour.

Economic differences

At their root, these differences are not cultural or religious. They are economic.

The tragedy of Nigeria is that over the past few decades its population has grown rapidly, but despite the country's vast oil wealth, the economy has failed to keep pace.

Nigerians have been getting poorer by the year.

And along with this, the failure of the state to provide adequate education for the vast majority of the population, has produced a frustrated and angry underclass of largely urban, unemployed youths.

It is to this disempowered group that ambitious politicians and religious leaders look for support.

Sometimes it is for the best of motives - to find ways to improve their lot in life by representing their interests.

But more often, the motive is personal ambition.

A politician without a power base is worthless. A politician with an army of supporters behind him can win elections and influence people.

Social division

Many observers in Nigeria believe that the roots of the violence across much of the country are not religious or cultural.

They say the conflicts are created and stoked by politicians both at a local and national level who seek to gain advantage from social division.

It is a cynical view, but one that has strong evidence to support it.

One need look no further than means used to distribute the country's vast oil wealth from the federal government in Abuja to the local level.

It all travels down this path in the form of contracts handed out to political favourites.

Contracts for building roads, schools, and hospitals; for supplying electricity, water and medicines.

In fact, almost all economic activity in the country works on this principle - the awarding of contracts. It makes those with access to the source of power rich, and those who do not have power want it all the more.

Ordinary victims

And caught in the middle of all this are the ordinary Nigerians, whose local disputes are hijacked by cynical politicians prepared to pay sections of the community sums of money to foment unrest.

And that's all it takes.

Once triggered, the violence has its own momentum.

Muslims hear that Muslims are being killed elsewhere and take up arms to kill Christians in their own neighbourhood.

And then, perhaps, Christians in another part of the country will get to hear about their brothers being murdered and carry out reprisals on local Muslims.

It is a cycle that is difficult to break, particularly if it is repeatedly nudged over the edge by the politicians, or even external influences.

Take for example, the riots in the northern city of Kano in October 2001.

That began after a peaceful anti-US demonstration by local Muslims, angry at the bombing of Afghanistan.

It quickly degenerated however into a violent inter-faith battle, most probably stoked up by local political rivalries.

The cause, therefore, was not religious, but because the riots pitted Muslim against Christian, they had the appearance of being so."

Global IDP Project, April 2003

"Seeing that forced internal displacement in Nigeria is a re-occurring phenomenon, periodically challenging the response capacity of the authorities, the workshop [IDP workshop in Jos 17-19 February 2003] tried to address this issue at some length. In order to identify preventive measures to conflict-induced forced displacement, participants were asked to discuss the immediate and, more importantly, the underlying causes of displacement. The immediate causes were easily identifiable and were divided into two categories:

- § Generalized violence between communities and groups of people
- § Violations of human rights

The first category refers to situations of violent conflict in which, state agents do not play a direct role, while the second describes acts tolerated, supported or carried out by agents of the Nigerian state (army, police, civil authorities, etc).

In order to better understand and address these immediate causes of displacement, participants were asked to identify and discuss in groups the underlying causes leading to violent conflict. As such, the groups discussed the following issues:

Conflict between "indigenes" and "settlers"

In Nigeria, a person's status as "indigene" or "settler" has an impact on access to public services like, for example, schooling and employment. According to participants, only an individual whose ethnic group or ancestors originate from the area is considered "indigene". A "settler" might be born where he/she lives but because his/her ethnic group or ancestors do not originate from that particular area that person will always be considered a "settler". Some participants argued that this distinction might be the most important root cause of internal displacement in Nigeria - a factor which is often mixed with, or disguised behind, what appears to be ethnic or religious conflict. In fact, the indigene-settler divide often coincides with the ethnic and religious divisions.

[...]

Ethnic conflict

Participants, representing many of Nigeria's approximately 250 ethnic groups, agreed that so-called "ethnic" conflicts are often not primarily about ethnicity. Different actors tend to use

ethnicity to rally support for their stand in a given dispute, which might in reality be about land, about a chieftain or about access to a large range of economic and/or political resources.

[...]

Religious conflict

Just as in the case of ethnic conflict, participants emphatically stated that so-called “religious” conflict is often not primarily about religion. It was pointed out that for example members of the large ethnic group Hausa/Fulani are not always Muslims, but differences between them and other communities are often portrayed as religious. These differences are rather about community members’ status as “indigenes” or “settlers”, or over access to resources. Participants described the violence in the city of Jos in September 2001 as a typical conflict commonly described as religious, despite it being triggered by tension around the issue of “indigenes-settlers”. The same would apply to the violent crises in Kaduna state in 2000, which, according to participants, was disguised as a conflict over Sharia law. One participant claimed that there have been cases where politicians purposely stirred up sentiments between religious communities to distract attention from their own poor achievements in office.

[...]

Economic injustices

Like in many other countries affected by internal displacement, participants identified economic injustices as a key cause behind conflict and displacement. As described above, this cause is often disguised and hidden in conflict portrayed as ethnic or religious. Participants agreed on the importance of stripping this kind of conflict of its disguise and addressing it for what it is. It was further suggested that in a developing nation like Nigeria, economic injustices have to be overcome both through increased development and a better distribution of existing resources. Vulnerable groups like IDPs need to be specifically prioritized.

Dispute over political boundaries

Participants explained that since 1999, access to political positions and civil servant posts has become more and more fiercely disputed as a source of economic and political power. The drawing up of new administrative boundaries, or the altering of old ones, often allow for an increase of the number of council members or the change of the political dominance from one group to another. A local government seat might be moved from one town to another, often benefiting a different ethnic group.

Changes to the political boundaries are also related to some politicians’ ambitions to create more ethnically and religiously homogeneous political territories. There was some disagreement among participants on the appropriateness of such initiatives. Some argued that there is rather a need for increased cross-ethnic/religious interaction.

In general, changes to the political boundaries and creation of new territories have often led to conflict and displacement. Participants therefore argued that such changes should benefit the larger community rather than a specific group and have to be based on clear and transparent principles."

HRW April 2003, p.22

"Ethnic, religious and regional tension is widespread in Nigeria. But episodes of violence that are ethnic or religious on the surface are often caused by competition for political and economic influence, in a country where politics is seen as one of the few avenues to wealth and comfort. When party lines and other political divisions coincide with ethnic or religious differences, the strong sentiments associated with people's ethnic or religious identity come into play in the political arena. Politicians are often able to capitalize on this sentiment in order to mobilize support, in many cases exacerbating inter-group resentment and hostility. The majority of those killed in the resulting violence are ordinary people not directly involved in politics themselves.

Tension between Muslims and Christians in many northern states has been on the rise since the extension of Shari'a (Islamic law) into these states' criminal codes. While politicians and others supporting the new laws argue that Shari'a will be more effective at fighting crime, many observers see fervent backing for Shari'a by northern politicians as an effort to retain support among their predominantly Muslim populations despite the leaders' inability to deliver on other promises to their constituents. Riots caused by the proposed extension of Shari'a occurred across several northern states in 2000, particularly in Kaduna, where at least two thousand people were killed; since then, inter-religious tension in those states has continued to simmer. The November 2002 riots in Kaduna State, triggered by protests related to the Miss World contest that was due to take place in Nigeria, highlighted the dangerous nexus between politics and religion. Around 250 people died in three days of rioting, sparked by an article that was perceived as blasphemous by some Muslims. But virtually everyone with whom Human Rights Watch researchers spoke in Kaduna believed that the violence resulted from political tensions between the governor, who is Muslim, and some of his erstwhile supporters who believed he was selling them out to southern and Christian interests."

" The last three years of elected civilian government in Nigeria have witnessed an alarming spate of violence and egregious human rights violations. In over fifty separate and documented incidents, over ten thousand Nigerians have reportedly been victims of extrajudicial executions at an average of over 200 executions per incident. Security agents, acting in most cases on direct orders of the government, have been responsible for many of the deaths as well as accompanying rapes, maiming and torture of thousands of women, the aged, children and other defenseless civilians. The International Committee of Red Cross estimates that hundreds of thousands of people have been internally displaced and scattered in several makeshift refugee camps without adequate food and medical supplies, and in most unhygienic and deplorable conditions.

[...]

The unusually high incidence of internal displacement in Nigeria occasioned by these incidents of violence is surprising in the absence of a more widespread impairment of the political authority of the government through sustained civil conflict, territorial contestation or contested sovereignty. This incidence of internal displacement must be seen as evidence of a systemic and systematic failure on the part of the government to exercise its responsibilities of protecting inhabitants of the territory of Nigeria. This constitutes on the part of the Nigerian government an egregious failure of the responsibilities of sovereign authority." (OMCT 2002, p. 31)

IRIN 5 January 2000

"Since Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in as president in May 1999, communal conflicts have increased in Nigeria in number and intensity, causing hundreds of deaths and displacing thousands.

The most common explanation provided to IRIN by analysts in Lagos and Port Harcourt is that the introduction of democracy has acted like the release of a pressure valve, enabling people to vent their pent-up anger and express themselves more freely.

'The causes for these communal conflicts have been there all along,' Dr Peter Ozo-Eson, Director of Projects for the Centre of Advanced Social Sciences, told IRIN. However, "under successive military governments, particularly the suppressive and brutal regime of Sani Abacha, not many of these conflict areas have been able to give vent to their anger as the fear of military's brutality has kept them in check," said Ozo-Eson, whose institution is a Port Harcourt think-tank involved in conflict analysis.

[...]

One of the factors fuelling communal violence has been the emergence of increasingly militant groups such as the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), a pro-Yoruba organisation, Ijaw youth groups in the Niger Delta (although the Ijaw Youth Council says it espouses non-violence) and the Arewa People's Congress (APC), formed to protect the interests of the Hausa-Fulani in the

north. Clashes in November 1999 between Hausas and Yoruba at a market in Ketu District in Lagos resulted in at least 30 casualties. The disturbances were blamed on the OPC, which denied that it was involved."

HRW 2003

"Inter-communal violence continued in many parts of the country. There were several outbreaks of violence in Plateau State, where scores of people were killed between May and July in several local government areas. In February, more than seventy people were killed in Idi-Araba, an area of Lagos, in clashes between the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups; the OPC was reported to have been involved in the violence. The police were typically absent or overstretched during such disturbances, or else intervened once most of the violence had subsided; in some cases, their participation aggravated the situation as they were seen to be taking sides. In many cases, local politicians and other influential figures in the local communities appeared to be responsible for fuelling inter-communal violence and mobilizing youths to fight."

For an overview of various armed groups, see Amnesty's report "Vigilante violence in the south and south-east", 19 November 2002 (available through the source list at the end)

Displacement related to inter-ethnic violence

Ethnic violence increased sharply since 1999, often fuelled by the emergence of militant ethnic groups

- Nigeria accounts for one-quarter of West Africa's population and has 250 ethnic groups
- The introduction of democracy was followed by more open conflicts and the emergence of increasingly militant groups (1999)
- The Nigerian Constitution mandates proportional ethnic representation, but inter-ethnic tensions prevail

US DOS, August 2000

"The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria accounts for one-quarter of West Africa's people. Although less than 25% of Nigerians are urban dwellers, at least 24 cities have populations of more than 100,000. The variety of customs, languages, and traditions among Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups gives the country a rich diversity. The dominant ethnic group in the northern two-thirds of the country is the Hausa-Fulani, most of whom are Muslim. Other major ethnic groups of the north are the Nupe, Tiv, and Kanuri. The Yoruba people are predominant in the southwest. About half of the Yorubas are Christian and half Muslim. The predominantly Catholic Igbo are the largest ethnic group in the southeast, with the Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw (the country's fourth-largest ethnic group) comprising a substantial segment of the population in that area as well. Persons of different language backgrounds most commonly communicate in English, although knowledge of two or more Nigerian languages is widespread. Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo are the most widely used."

US DOS, February 2001, sect.5

"Since Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in as president in May 1999, communal conflicts have increased in Nigeria in number and intensity, causing hundreds of deaths and displacing thousands.

The most common explanation provided to IRIN by analysts in Lagos and Port Harcourt is that the introduction of democracy has acted like the release of a pressure valve, enabling people to vent their pent-up anger and express themselves more freely.

"The Constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination by the Government. In addition the Constitution mandates that the composition of the federal, state, and local governments and their agencies, as well as the conduct of their affairs, reflect the diverse character of the country in order to promote national unity and loyalty. This provision was designed as a safeguard against domination of the Government by persons from a few states or ethnic and sectional groups. These provisions were included in response to previous domination of the Government and the armed forces by northerners and Muslims. The Government of Olusegun Obasanjo was an example of this diversity. Obasanjo is a Yoruba from the southwest, the Vice President is a northerner, and the Senate President is an Igbo. The Government also attempted to balance key positions and deputy positions among the different regions and ethnic groups. For example, the Minister of Defense is from one of the middle-belt states, while his deputy is a southwestern Yoruba. The Senate used its oversight role to reject many of Obasanjo's ambassadorial appointments and insisted on three nominees from each state for each appointment. The political parties also engaged in "zoning," the practice of rotating positions within the party among the different regions and ethnicities to ensure that each region and ethnicity is given adequate representation. Nonetheless, claims of marginalization by members of southern minority groups and Igbos continued. The ethnic groups of the Niger Delta, in particular, continued their calls for high-level representation on petroleum issues and within the security forces. Northern Muslims, who lost previously held positions within the military hierarchy, accused the Obasanjo Government of favoring southerners. Traditional linkages continued to impose considerable pressure on individual government officials to favor their own ethnic groups for important positions and patronage."

IRIN, 5 January 2000

"One of the factors fuelling communal violence has been the emergence of increasingly militant groups such as the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), a pro-Yoruba organisation, Ijaw youth groups in the Niger Delta (although the Ijaw Youth Council says it espouses non-violence) and the Arewa People's Congress (APC), formed to protect the interests of the Hausa-Fulani in the north. Clashes in November 1999 between Hausas and Yoruba at a market in Ketu District in Lagos resulted in at least 30 casualties. The disturbances were blamed on the OPC, which denied that it was involved."

Background on the hostility between the Yorubas of the West and the Hausa-Fulani of the Muslim North

- O'odua People's Congress (OPC) emerged in 1994 as an organization active in the southwest of Nigeria to protect the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group
- The Yoruba allegedly perceive the civil service, the military, the diplomatic service and educational establishments dominated by Northerners
- ...while northerners see the south controls commercial activities in the economy, banking and the financial sector

EPCPT October 1999, 'Nigeria: The Transition to Democracy and the South-Western Opposition'

"The British colonial administration of the 350 ethnic groups making up Nigeria comprised two separate phases. In the mid-nineteenth century the Protectorate and Colony of Southern Nigeria was established. This was followed by the Protectorate and Colony of Northern Nigeria which was declared in 1900. The British amalgamated the two regions in 1914. In 1947, a colonial

constitution split Nigeria into three unequal political regions: north, west and east. The north, dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, was larger and more populous than the other two regions. There is a very significant minority population in the north. The west was, and still is, dominated by the Yoruba, while the Ibos were the largest group in the east. These three regions have now been balkanised into Nigeria's present thirty six-state federal structure. In spite of this departmentalisation, north-south divisions have remained alive in Nigerian politics [...]

The [North-South] conflict is a relatively recent development which intensified following the cancellation of the results of the June 12, 1993 elections by the Nigerian military rulers. The Yoruba saw the cancellation of the elections, which were won by a Yoruban, as the climax of a series of injustices perpetrated by the northern power elite. [...]

Since Nigeria's political independence in 1960, most of its leaders have come from the predominantly Muslim north of the country. In the early 1960s, fears of political marginalisation caused the Eastern Region to attempt to secede from the Nigerian federation. These fears were resurrected during the Sani Abacha era. The south, of which the south-west is only a part, has complained about marginalisation and the prolonged control of political power by the northern power elite. The northern ruling elite is believed to have benefited from all the regimes, military and civilian alike, to the detriment of the south. The clamour for a power-shift to the south became more insistent in June 1993, following the convincing victory of chief Moshood Abiola at the presidential polls. With Abiola's victory, the south seemed to have achieved its call for a power-shift in its favour. The nullification of these elections led to sustained and organised protest and opposition. The most articulate opposition to this prolonged northern domination came from the Yorubas of the south-west, especially after June 1993.

[...]

The north has, over the years, been accused of conniving to permanently control the nation's governance, to the exclusion of others of southern extraction. The Yoruba allege that the north dominates the civil service, the military, the diplomatic service and educational establishments.

[...]

In summary, the south-west believes that successive governments in Nigeria have only pursued one goal - primacy of the north - which serves as a generic canopy for other interests.

[...]

If the south-west feels marginalised, so does the north. There is a wide spread belief in the north that the south controls commercial activities in the economy, banking and the financial sector, education, the public service, etc. The north had held on to political power in part, to secure itself from complete marginalisation. Spokesmen for the northern power elite have repeatedly made it clear that the north is marginalised economically, educationally, and in all the facets of the public service. Northerners generally perceive leaders of the south-west and their demands as a selfish, and pursuing an ethnic agenda. Indeed, there is very little respect for the position of the south-west among the average northerners, since it is seen as an ethnic position.

[...]

The cancellation of the June 1993 election marked a turning point in the history of the face-off between the north and south. In Lagos, which is the nerve-centre of the south, the announcement was followed by rioting which led to a massive loss of life and the mass destruction of property.

Renewing their struggle, the Yoruba forged links with several organisations to help realise their aims. Affiliated ethnic organisations came to the fore in this process. Prominent among the organisations formed during the Abacha regime were NADECO, Afenifere and the Odudua Peoples' Congress (OPC). [...]

These organisations, led by notable Yoruba leaders, formed themselves into an opposition, supposedly to free the country from what was believed to be the clutches of the northern power elite.

[...]

This remained the situation until the deaths of general Abacha and chief Moshood Abiola. Chief Abiola's death was treated by leaders of the south-west as murder perpetrated by the state. Abiola's death re-ignited the clamour for a government of national unity, restructuring, a power-shift, and a true federal constitution fashioned through a sovereign national conference.

The renewed calls intensified, and took a violent turn with the establishment of another Yoruba platform called the Oduduwa Peoples' Congress. The congress, which is a Yoruba socio-cultural organisation led by youths, resorted to the use of direct confrontation with military and police forces. This groups which is strong in Lagos and other parts of the south-west, has clashed with the state forces on several occasions. The group benefited from recruits earlier displaced by the crisis of structural adjustment and its accompanying poverty. These clashes resulted in the destruction of lives and property. On some occasions the Oduduwa Peoples' Congress adopted violation of law and order and instigation of the civil society against the government in carrying out their activities.

[...]

In May 1999, chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military leader of Nigeria was sworn in as the elected civilian president of Nigeria. Even though he is a Yoruba from the south-west, he was not a favourite candidate of the south-west. As such, he gained his winning votes outside the region. With Obasanjo's electoral victory, a power-shift has been achieved, even if by default, meeting one of the principal demands of the Yoruba south-west.

[...]

However Obasanjo's government has encountered a number of problems in its first two months in office. Aside from numerous scandals concerning elected officials, various parts of the country have been plagued by community conflicts. One of the most dramatic is the conflict between the Hausa settlers and the indigenous Yoruba in the south-western town of Sagamu. What apparently started as a fight about a Yoruba traditional festival, expanded into interethnic violence that also spread to the northern city of Kano. In the following days hundreds of people were killed in the two towns."

More background on the O'odua People's Congress (OPC)

HRW February 2003, pp. 20, 22

"Nigeria has witnessed an increase in the activities of ethnic and regional militia, vigilantes, and other armed groups in the last few years. One of the better-known of these groups is the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), an organization active in the southwest of Nigeria which campaigns to protect the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group and seeks autonomy for the Yoruba people. The OPC is a complex organization, which has taken on several different roles as it has adapted to the changing political and security environment in Nigeria. One of several Yoruba self-determination groups, it was established in 1994 with the aim of overcoming what it alleged was the political marginalization of the Yoruba. It has since evolved in several different directions. Its activities have ranged from political agitation for Yoruba autonomy and promotion of Yoruba culture to violent confrontation with members of other ethnic groups, and, more recently, vigilantism and crime-fighting. In its two main spheres of activity—ethnic militancy and vigilantism—the OPC has been responsible for numerous human rights abuses and acts of violence, and its members have killed or injured hundreds of unarmed civilians. However, OPC members have been victims as well as perpetrators of human rights abuses. Hundreds of real or suspected OPC members have been killed by the police; many others have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and detained without trial for extended periods.

The most widespread killings by the OPC took place in the context of clashes between Yoruba and other ethnic groups, which reached a peak during 2000; however, violence and human rights abuses continued in 2001 and 2002. There have also been numerous individual cases in which OPC members have killed or injured people, in the course of their vigilante work and in attempts to extort money. The OPC's activities have led them into direct confrontation with the police: there

have been repeated, violent clashes between the two, with casualties on both sides. OPC members have attacked police stations on many occasions, and have killed and injured several policemen."

Central region seriously affected by ethnic clashes and displacement during second half of 2001 and early 2002

- The Tiv-Jukun conflict has many causes, including land disputes, political power, and population growth
- Initial clashes in Nassarawa were caused by the killing of a Hausa traditional ruler, for which the Tivs were blamed
- Fighting in June 2001 between Tiv and Hausa-speaking ethnic Azaras in Nasarawa State forced many people to flee to Benue State
- In July 2001, the violence spread to Nasarawa's capital, Lafia, and later to Taraba State, displacing some 25,000 more people
- Several hundred thousand IDPs from the neighboring states ended up in camps in the Benue State
- October 2001: major displacement inside Benue itself after military operation triggered by the killing of 19 soldiers near the border with Taraba
- Reported in January 2002 that IDPs continued to arrive in Benue as fresh threats of reprisals were reportedly issued against Tiv settlements in neighbouring Taraba State by members of the Jukun community

IRIN, 25 June 2001

"Fighting between Tivs and Hausa-speakers [Azaras] in Nassarawa State followed the 12 June killing by unknown gunmen of Musa Ibrahim, a Hausa traditional ruler, and members of his entourage. His people blamed the incident on the Tivs and launched reprisal killings, forcing many to flee to nearby Benue State where Tivs form the majority.

[...]

Local newspapers had reported growing tension in the area since April when violence first broke out between the two groups over allegations by the Tiv that Ibrahim, a leading landowner, was encroaching on their land.

The region affected by the latest disturbances lies to the east of Nigeria's capital, Abuja. A major agricultural area, it is inhabited by substantial populations of Christians, mainly Tivs, and Muslims, mostly Hausa-speaking. This has raised fears that the conflict may take on a religious dimension if anti-riot policemen already deployed to the area fail to bring the situation rapidly under control."

In July 2001, the violence spread to the state's capital, Lafia,

IRIN, 27 June 2001

"Ethnic clashes that began two weeks ago in central Nigeria's Nassarawa State have spread to Lafia, the state capital, where more than 25 people have been killed, Radio Nigeria reported on Tuesday [26 June 2001].

[...]

Radio Nigeria said mobs swept through Lafia on Tuesday attacking members of rival ethnic groups, burning houses and putting thousands of people to flight. "No fewer than 25 lives, mostly of children between two and five years old, have been lost in the rampage," a correspondent said. He said that the police were overwhelmed by the scale of the violence."

...and then to neighboring Taraba State

IRIN-WA, 6 July 2001

"A report by the mainly government-owned 'Daily Times', cited by the Reuters news agency, said at least 20 people were killed and more than 25,000 forced from their homes when bands of Fulanis and Jukuns attacked their Tiv neighbours in the Donga local government area."

HRW, April 2002

"The violence in Taraba intensified in the second half of 2001. Organized bands of Tivs, Jukuns, and Fulanis were responsible for scores of deaths of civilians and widespread destruction of homes during this period, with attacks taking place on a weekly, and sometimes a daily basis. From the first week of September 2001 onwards, in particular, there was a series of attacks and counter-attacks by Tiv and Jukun armed groups, including on border towns and villages. These continued into December 2001 and January 2002."

Later on the conflict spilled over to the Benue State**UN OCHA, 18 June 2002**

"Benue State is seen more as a receiving state for displaced persons from other states, rather than a state that has caused substantial numbers of displaced persons. The Tivs are the predominant ethnic group in Benue State. The majority of the Tiv population is Christian with a very small percentage of Muslims. Although the state has experienced some minor conflicts within the Tiv population, it had not seen any major conflict between the Tivs and other ethnic groups living in the state until the Tiv/Jukun clashes and subsequent military attack in 2001. The last major conflict was between the Tivs and the Idomos in the 1970s."

IRIN, 24 October 2001

"Following a fresh outbreak of violence in Taraba State between Tivs and Jukuns early this month [October 2001], the federal government began to deploy troops around the borders between Benue and Taraba to end the bloody feud. But on 10 October [2001], a contingent of 19 soldiers was ambushed and captured at Vatse, near the border, by a Tiv militia. A few days later their mutilated bodies were found in a primary school in nearby Zaki Biam, A Tiv stronghold."

The militia's action, local people said, was prompted by previous incidents in which armed men in uniform have attacked several Tiv communities. Among the Tivs, there is a strong suspicion that elements in the military were backing their Jukun rivals either in sympathy with Nigeria's Minister of Defence, retired Lt-Gen Theophilus Danjuma – who is Jukun – or with his approval."

IRIN, 30 October 2001

"The army went to the Benue/Taraba borders following a request by the state authorities for assistance in their search for a local militia who had earlier abducted and killed 19 soldiers, and to recover their bodies and weapons, the government statement said."

UN OCHA, 18 June 2002

"The military invasions from Taraba attacked 22 towns around the Taraba/Benue border, causing widespread destruction to houses, other buildings and farms, as well as the indiscriminate killing of many people, including women and children. To date, there has been no response from government to assist with the rehabilitation of communities destroyed during the clashes. One of the main towns attacked was Zaki Biam, which is one of the main market towns for the area. A lot of property was destroyed including Federal Government property. Most of the population fled, including local government officials. The attack was reportedly conducted by military (from the Jukun ethnic group) from Taraba State in retaliation for the killing of 19 government soldiers by the Tivs in Benue State. The Federal Government has reportedly not acknowledged responsibility of the military for this attack. A Judicial Commission of Inquiry has been set up to investigate the Taraba/Benue/Nasarawa crisis."

AI, 24 October 2001

"Although reports differ, it appears that more than 100 inhabitants of villages along the border between Benue and Taraba States - and possibly as many as 200 - were killed between 22 and 24 October 2001 when government soldiers went on the rampage, opening fire on civilians. Troops are also reported to have destroyed numerous buildings."

AI, 19 December 2002, p21

"Amnesty International considers that the operation carried out by the armed forces between 22 and 24 October 2001 was in fact a studied act of revenge. Soldiers went on rampage, opening fire on civilians and setting them ablaze. An overwhelming majority of the 200 people who were killed were from the Tiv ethnic group. The troops destroyed houses and property in over 9 villages along the border between Taraba and Benue States. Heavy weapons, machine guns, and grenades reportedly destroyed only Tiv villages. Gbeji, the village where the 19 soldiers had been first taken when they were captured, was especially targeted: over 130 civilians were killed there after being gathered in the street and set on fire or shot, and the village was completely razed. The town that suffered the highest level of destruction was however Zaki Biam, the place where the 19 soldiers were reportedly killed. Six months later, the town of Zaki Biam had not yet been rebuilt."

IRIN, 29 October 2001

"Up to 300,000 people are currently [October 2001] displaced in Nigeria's central region as a result of communal clashes and recent attacks launched against several communities by the army, local officials said.

Shima Ayati, who heads a committee in Benue State that caters for displaced people, told journalists at the weekend that many of the victims were Tivs who fled fighting with Jukuns in neighbouring Taraba State. Others were survivors of the massacre of more than 200 people perpetrated by soldiers last week in several communities near the Benue/Taraba borders in apparent reprisal for the killing of 19 soldiers by a Tiv militia earlier this month.

[...]

Large numbers of displaced people are staying in several camps around the Benue State capital, Makurdi, where they joined others who had fled an earlier fighting in June [2001] between Tivs and Hausa-speaking Azeris in nearby Nasarawa State."

During the first half of 2002 IDPs from neighboring states continued to seek shelter in Benue State**IRIN-WA, 25 January 2002**

"Meanwhile, more displaced people recently arrived in the central state of Benue as fresh threats of reprisals were reportedly issued against Tiv settlements in neighbouring Taraba State by members of the Jukun community. A spokesman for Benue's governor said on Saturday that at least 1,000 people had moved into the state from Taraba after being threatened, according to the Lagos-based Guardian newspaper."

ICRC, 18 March 2002

"Tiv's continued throughout January to leave Taraba state for Benue state. No official number is available. The only indication comes from Agasha camp in Benue where the IDP population grew by 1200 individuals in January."

IRIN, 11 January 2002

"At least 100 people are believed to have died in communal clashes in Nasarawa State, central Nigeria, over ownership of a fishpond, local officials said on Thursday.

Thousands of other people were reported to have fled the clashes, while crops, livestock and houses were destroyed. Most of the displaced, particularly women and children, have taken refuge in safer areas within the state. Others were said to have fled into neighboring Benue State.

"The fighting, which broke out on Monday in Loko and Udege districts of the state, quickly spread, affecting about eight villages," Hashidu Adamu, an official of the Nasarawa State Ministry of Local Government, told IRIN.

Umaru Suleiman, the Nasarawa State police commissioner, was reported by local media as saying that urgent measures had been taken to bring the situation under control. Several teams of a special anti-riot division of the police had been sent into the area to restore order, he said."

UN OCHA, 18 June 2002, p.9

"The [Dauda]camp [in Benue] comprises seven large buildings and some temporary huts that were constructed to accommodate additional IDPs at the height of the displacement. There were reportedly 9,500 initially displaced in the camp, although many have since returned. The current figure given for the population of the camp was 2000. Most of the displaced in the camp are from the Tiv ethnic group who fled fighting in Plateau State. These IDPs explained that they were attacked, their houses destroyed and their property looted. Some of them were also killed. As a result, they fled, first to Nasarawa State in temporary settlements, and then, because they were not welcome in Nasarawa, they moved to Benue State. The IDPs stated that they were attacked because of their growing population, which threatened the other ethnic groups."

Ethnic clashes in Lagos displaced thousands, February 2002

- Clashes between Yorubas and Hausa-Fulanis
- Police sources stated that the situation worsened with the involvement of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) militia
- In October 2000 clashes between a Yoruba group and Hausa-Fulanis also caused the displacement of some 3,000 Hausas
- Reports that attacks on Hausa or northerners in the southwest have been followed by reprisal attacks on Yoruba in the north

IRIN, 4 February 2002

"Southwest Nigeria, which includes Lagos, is the home region of the Yoruba, one of the country's three main ethnic groups - the others are the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo. In the past three years, the region has experienced repeated clashes between locals and Hausa-speakers in which hundreds of people have died. These clashes, which have followed the return to civil rule in 1999, form part of what is seen by many as the worst cycle of communal violence Nigeria has experienced since civil war in 1967-1970."

HRW, February 2003, pp.1, 20, 22

"One of the more recent incidents of ethnic violence involving the OPC took place in Idi-Araba and surrounding areas in Mushin, Lagos, on February 2 to 4, 2002. Clashes between Hausa and Yoruba claimed more than seventy lives. Human Rights Watch spoke to many residents of the area and eye-witnesses of the violence, including members of the Hausa and Yoruba communities, and people from other ethnic groups who found themselves trapped by the violence. Most of them confirmed that OPC members had participated in the violence; however, Human Rights Watch has not been able to ascertain whether the violence was planned in advance by the OPC, or whether OPC members or supporters joined in to support the Yoruba once the fighting between Yoruba and Hausa had already started. A journalist who covered the

crisis told Human Rights Watch: "The OPC galvanized people. They just provided the leadership and the others followed. The OPC was like a vanguard. It started off with a minor disagreement which escalated into an ethnic conflict. Many of the people involved didn't even know what had sparked it off until later."

[...]

According to residents of the area, the police did not have any visible presence until the evening of the second day. There were reports that several people were then shot dead by the police. Eventually, the military were also sent in to quell the violence and it was they, and not the police, who finally restored order. By that time, scores of people had been killed, both Hausa and Yoruba; more than a hundred others had been seriously injured; hundreds of houses and public buildings had been burnt to the ground. Most of the victims were adult men, but there were also several teenagers among them, and several women. The majority of deaths and injuries were inflicted with machetes; some people were also burnt to death. Some people were killed in their houses, others as they were trying to flee, yet others were shot at point-blank range or stabbed where they stood. The victims included both Hausa and Yoruba, but the evidence collected by Human Rights Watch indicates that a higher number of those killed were Hausa.

[...]

Thousands of people were displaced by the fighting in Idi-Araba; 2,500 were evacuated by the Red Cross alone, while many others left spontaneously, in the general panic. The violence had a lasting impact in Idi-Araba, an area where previously, Yoruba and Hausa had enjoyed good relations; there were many mixed marriages, and past disagreements had generally been resolved peacefully. When Human Rights Watch visited the area three months after the violence, the fear and shock were still palpable. Many residents were genuinely shocked by the violence."

Fears of reprisals in north following Lagos clashes:

IRIN-WA, 8 February 2002

"Relief organisations continued efforts on Friday to provide aid to victims of recent ethnic clashes in Nigeria's commercial capital, Lagos, amid fears of reprisal attacks in the north of the country, officials said.

[...]

In the northern city of Kano, where Hausas are in the majority, troops and policemen patrolled the streets in anticipation of reprisal attacks against Yorubas. Many people were reported to have taken refuge in police and military barracks in the city.

Fears of imminent reprisal attacks heightened after the Arewa Consulative Forum (ACF), a group of influential northern leaders, issued a statement on Thursday accusing President Olusegun Obasanjo's government of not making any significant effort to enforce a ban issued last year on the Oodua People's Congress, a Yoruba militia accused of spearheading attacks on northerners in southwest Nigeria."

HRW, February 2003, p.11

"In several instances, attacks by the OPC on Hausa or northerners in the southwest were followed by reprisal attacks on Yoruba in the north. For example, following the killings in Sagamu in July 1999, violence erupted in the northern city of Kano, widely seen as an act of retaliation by the Hausa. Similarly, riots broke out in Minna, capital of Niger State, following the violence in Ajegunle in October 2000. The same has been true in reverse: clashes in the north between Yoruba and Hausa have had repercussions in the south and appeared to strengthen the resolve of the OPC to "fight the Yoruba cause." This was notably the case with the explosion of violence between Christians and Muslims in the northern city of Kaduna, in which an estimated 2,000 people were killed in February and May 2000, and which was followed by violence in the southwest."

Similar clashes occurred also in October 2000:

IRIN-WA, 17 October 2000

"Ethnic clashes between a militant Yoruba group and Hausa-Fulanis have claimed dozens of lives in the past three days [October 2000] in Nigeria's commercial capital, Lagos, prompting authorities to impose a curfew in the most stricken neighbourhoods.

Official reports put the death toll at 24, while AFP reported up to 100 people dead. The news agency reported some 3,000 Hausas had sought protection in police and army barracks in the high density Lagos neighborhood of Ajegunle.

Reports said hundreds of police have been deployed to the area and helicopters patrol overhead. Vehicles, homes and businesses were burned. The violence broke out following clashes at the weekend in Ilorin between police and members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), a militant Yoruba group, over the traditional leadership in the town. The violence spread to Lagos on Sunday when OPC members reportedly attacked a settlement mainly populated by Hausa-Fulanis, in pursuit of suspected criminals."

Summary of main conflicts and its causes in Nasarawa, Benue, Taraba and Plateau States (June 2002)

- Nasarawa State's clashes related to a mix of ethnic, economic and land issues..
- Benue State also faces clashes, of an ethnic, political or economic nature or having to do with the indigene/settler issue
- The conflict in Taraba State mainly involves the Tiv, Jukun and Fulani ethnic groups and revolves around political, land, demographical or indigene/settler issues
- The clashes in Plateau State are mainly related to the indigene/settler issue reinforced by religious tensions

"NASARAWA STATE

[...]

Conflicting parties within state

Bassa and Ibiri in Toto (about 50km from Keffi). This is one of the oldest crises in Nasarawa state. The main ethnic groups are the Ibiri (majority) and the Bassa. There is a small population of Tiv, who tend to side with the Bassa. The main cause of the Ibiri and Bassa clashes in Toto is their inability to live together.

Tiv and Bassa. In 2001, the killing of an Ibiri Paramount Chief reportedly by the Tivs triggered a crisis in the area, causing the resettled Bassa's to flee once again. The Bassa were seen as allies of the Tivs, who were accused of the death of the Paramount Chief.

Tiv and Hausa-speaking Azaras. June 2001.

Communal clashes over fishpond. Jan 2002.

Causes of tension/conflict

Ethnic

Land disputes

Economic - lack of employment opportunities for youth results in their recruitment into militia groups.

[...]

BENUE STATE

[...]

Conflicting parties within Benue State

Tiv and Jukun/military
Tiv and Idomos

Benue State is seen more as a receiving state for displaced persons from other states, rather than a state that has caused substantial numbers of displaced persons. The Tivs are the predominant ethnic group in Benue State. The majority of the Tiv population is Christian with a very small percentage of Muslims. Although the state has experienced some minor conflicts within the Tiv population, it had not seen any major conflict between the Tivs and other ethnic groups living in the state until the Tiv/Jukun clashes and subsequent military attack in 2001. The last major conflict was between the Tivs and the Idomos in the 1970s.

Causes of tension/conflict

Ethnic
Indigene/settler issue
Political
Economical

One of the main causes of the clashes between Tivs and other ethnic groups is the indigene/settler issue. The Tivs are seen as settlers and therefore are deprived of many rights given to indigenous groups, i.e. discrimination in education, economic opportunities, political representation, etc. The Tivs are, therefore, fighting for equal rights which they believe they are entitled to as indigenes of the state.

Other causes of the clashes are fear of political and economic domination by the Tivs. The Tiv ethnic group are substantive farmers and are rapidly increasing in population. This is seen as a threat to other ethnic groups as they fear political domination by the Tivs. Also, due to their strength in the farming sector, the Tivs are seen to be more economically productive than other groups and, hence, are economically more powerful. This also is seen as a threat. (It has been noticed that in states/communities where Tivs have been forced to leave, there has been a negative impact on the local economy due to the reduced agricultural production).

The lack of employment opportunities for youth often results in the recruitment of youth into fighting militia groups.

[...]

TARABA STATE

[...]

Conflicting parties within the state

Tiv/Jukun - In 1991/2 there was serious conflict between Tiv and Jukun. Militia groups, comprising mainly youth as young as 14/15 years, set up checkpoints along road, stopping vehicles and killing ethnic lines. Both Tiv and Jukun communities were attacked and houses destroyed causing people to flee. There were further clashes in Oct 2001 and January 2002.

Tiv/Jukun and Fulani

Mambilla/Fulani - In 1997/8, the Fulanis brought in mercenaries from Niger and Chad to assist them in fighting against indigenous groups, causing displacement of the indigenous groups within and outside the state.

Jukun-Chamba/Kuteb - Conflict between these groups has been going on for years, although there has been no large scale fighting since 1999. There have two contributing factors to the more recent clashes. First, a paramount chief (Kuteb) was killed prompting retaliation from the Kuteb. Second, there is an ongoing dispute over the boundary of a new LGA area created within the state in 1999. The original LGA was Takum, where the Jukun-Chamba held the political majority (previously Kuteb). The new LGA created, Ussa, comprises mainly Kuteb communities. However, there are significant numbers of Kuteb in three communities about 5km from Takum, which have been told to join the Ussa LGA. These communities have refused to join the Ussa

LGA as the Takum LGA is much closer. Consequently, these communities have not been registered and they have no voting rights. This issue is currently being addressed by the Federal Government.

Causes of tension/conflict

Political

disputes over land; and

fear of political domination by the Tiv ethnic group due to their rapid population growth.

indigene/settler issue

Tiv/Jukun/Fulani - land issue. The Jukuns say that the Tivs are settlers.

Mambilla/Fulani - land issue

Fulani/Indigenous groups - land issue

Jukun-Chamba/Kuteb - boundary dispute & killing of paramount chief

There is high unemployment, particularly among the youth in Taraba, making them easy targets for recruitment into militia groups. Skills training and job creation opportunities would help to reduce this problem to some extent.

[...]

PLATEAU STATE

[...]

Conflicts within the state

Hausa-Fulani and other ethnic groups

Violent clashes erupted between the Muslims (mainly Hausa-Fulanis) and the Christians in Oct 2001 and again in Jan and May 2002. As a result, there is presently an 11pm to 6am curfew and army patrols on the streets of Jos. During the clashes, buildings and vehicles were burnt, people were killed and thousands fled both within the state and to neighboring states, including Benue, Kano and Kaduna. It was alleged that the Chief of Police at that time ordered police officers to protect a mosque. He also allegedly changed the command (to Muslim commanders) of some police satellite stations prior to the clashes. These allegations have not been confirmed, however, the Chief of Police has since been changed. During the fighting, it was alleged that the Hausa-Fulanis sought assistance from fellow Hausa-Fulanis in Bauchi State, who came in military uniform to fight with the Muslims. Subsequently, the Government of Bauchi State was accused of involvement in the clashes.

Causes of tension/conflict

Political

Economic

Indigene/settler issue

Religion

The main causes are primarily economic, political and related to the issue of indigeneity. A secondary cause is religion, which is often used to incite people to action.

The Christian population maintain that they are indigenous to Plateau State and that the Hausa-Fulanis came to Plateau State to work in the mines. The Hausa-Fulani see themselves as indigenous to Plateau State and the majority do not have any extended family ties in neighboring states. Over the years, the Hausa-Fulanis have become the most economically productive group and have also increased in population. Consequently, they are now seeking more political representation.

Efforts to introduce Sharia Law in Plateau State have also caused conflict between the Muslims and Christians. The introduction of Sharia law is seen as an infringement on the right to freedom of religion and will, therefore, not be accepted by the Christian segment of the population.

Potential for future conflict

From limited discussions, it appears that the Christian population do not want the Hausa-Fulanis in government. It is, therefore, likely that there may be increased tension and possible conflict around the forthcoming elections, especially in areas where the Hausa-Fulanis are in the majority." (UN OCHA 18 June 2002)

More details about the conflict and displacement in Nassarawa (2002)

- Crisis in Nassarawa rooted in fears of political domination by Tivs that are considered settlers by other ethnic groups (e.g. Hausa)
- Reports on raids on Tiv villages already in February 2001
- Claimed that the Nassarawa state government did not respond to the simmering conflict

OMCT, 2002, pp. 147-148, 160-161

"The cause of the crisis in Nassarawa is apparently rooted in fears of political domination and marginalisation. The settler-indigene factor comes in where ethnic groups within the state suggest that the Tiv are settlers in Nassarawa and as such should curb their political ambition. When the administration of Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu appointed two Tiv persons, one as Special Advisor to the state government and the other as Permanent Secretary in the public service of the state, the administration was accused in some quarters of favouring Tivs. The Tiv claim that as early as March 10, 2001 the Tiv Youth Organisation of Nassarawa State addressed a letter to the state government calling its attention to the incessant terror inflicted on the Tivs living in Azara and Awe Chiefdoms, home to the assassinated Alhaji Musa Ibrahim, *Sarkin Azara* (the traditional Prime-Minister of the Azara Chiefdom). Before this, displaced persons from Nassarawa say that on February 4, 2001, Tiv villages around Agyaragu in Obi Local Government Area were raided and 11 persons killed, homes and property burnt and looted. Government's attention was drawn to this but no response was forthcoming or any arrest made. By March 27, the wildfire of ethnic conflict spread to communities in Kundum, Quampam LGA of Plateau State and quickly spread into Awe LGA sweeping across Wuse, Akin, Tangwa, and the entire Azara chiefdom. The Tiv insist that in spite of several distress calls, the Nassarawa state government simply stood by and ignored the complaints.

[...]

Displaced persons are one of the saddest legacies of inter-ethnic conflict between the Tiv and Jukun and the recent military campaign in the Benue. As at August 2001 the Tiv-Hausa violence in Nassarawa State had bred over 100,000 displaced persons scattered across camps in Benue State. The numbers apparently overwhelm the National Commission for Refugees. It is impossible to assemble credible statistics on displaced persons fleeing the Benue/Taraba violence and the Army reprisals. The entire population of displaced persons is spread across camps in Benue State, including Agasha, Daudu, Yelwata, Ukpian, Udei, Torkura, Kyato, Jootar, Chito and Kaseyo camps.

[...]

Most of the displaced persons trekked to the camps through the bush. They had to find refuge in the absence of immediate postconflict assistance. Most victims have never heard of the National Emergency Relief Agency. Mbawan Shizun did the trek from Dooshima. Suwa Vurun walked from Gassol in Taraba with her family of 10. Suwa's husband died escaping the Killing because they had no aid to lift him. He was old. Persons she identifies as Jukun attackers burned the family

house immediately after they set off. After 3 weeks in the bush she reached Agasha with surviving members of her family."

Background to the Tiv-Jukun conflict, 1940-2003

- The "Middle Belt" between Nigeria's north and south, comprises the Tiv, Jukun and numerous minority ethnic groups and communities
- The violence between the Tiv and Jukun, coexisting in Benue and Taraba States has numerous causes, affecting populations of both ethnic groups in neighbouring Adamawa, Plateau and Nassarawa States
- The Jukuns are in majority in Taraba and the Tivs in majority in Benue
- Violence relates to disputes over land, traditional rulership, political authority, and fears of domination and marginalisation
- The dichotomy between "settlers" and "indigenes" is a main root cause behind the conflicts

OMCT, 2002, pp. 132-133

"The Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the southwest and the Igbo in the southeast dominate Nigeria's national scene. However, the broad characterisation of a Muslim Hausa-speaking north, and a Christian south made up of two dominant ethnic groups-the Yoruba and Igbo is a vast oversimplification. Over centuries people have moved around what is now modern Nigeria. The Middle Belt, which runs west to east between and separating Nigeria's north and south, comprises the Tiv, Jukun and numerous minority ethnic groups and communities. Apart from being the food basket of the country, this region also has the largest concentration of officers and men of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Over the years, traditional warriors from the Chamba, Alago, Mumuye, Egon, Fulani and other minority ethnic groups in the region have been drawn into violence against one another, but none on so brutal and protracted a scale as that between the Tiv and Jukun. [...] The violence between the Tiv and Jukun, coexisting in Benue and Taraba States has numerous causes, affecting populations of both ethnic groups in neighbouring Adamawa, Plateau and Nassarawa States. The violence relates to disputes over land, traditional rulership, political authority, and fears of domination and marginalisation. Central to the violence, however, is the constitutional issue of citizenship rights encapsulated in the explosive dichotomy between "settlers" and "indigenes". There is competition for access to resources between those that consider themselves "indigenes" (the Jukun) and those that are considered as more recent "settlers" (the Tiv). The Middle Belt happens to be one of the last parts of Nigeria to be brought under central governmental control, and one of the last to be offered modern education and public services. This has made the struggle for access to resources, be it access to farmland, electricity, employment or political power, fierce in the extreme. Despite the country's vast oil wealth, the narrowing of economic opportunity has produced a frustrated and angry underclass of unemployed youths. It is to this disempowered group that politicians look for support, with disastrous consequences in the region as in other parts of Nigeria."

HRW, April 2002

"The conflict in the Taraba-Benue area, which has been going on for decades, is principally between the Tivs, on the one hand, and the Jukuns, on the other; in recent years, the Jukuns have formed a close alliance with the Fulanis. The Jukuns form the majority in Taraba, while the Tivs form the majority in Benue. There are also sizeable Tiv minorities in Taraba, Nasarawa and Plateau states, and a small Jukun minority in Benue. The conflict in Taraba between Tivs and Jukuns has tended to center around competition for land, as well as control over economic resources and political power. Political battles have been especially intense around the control of Wukari, the traditional Jukun center in Taraba State. There have been disputes over the siting of the boundary between Benue and Taraba states, respect (or disrespect) for boundary

demarcations, and political control of the border towns and villages. In broad terms, the Jukuns claim to be the original inhabitants of Taraba State, or "indigenes," and consider the Tivs as settlers. The Tivs reject this view, on the basis that they too have been living there for several generations and therefore have equal rights; they complain of being marginalized and excluded in Taraba. Likewise, the Jukun minority in Benue also complain of marginalization, lack of employment opportunities, and insecurity.

There has been periodic fighting between these groups since the late 1950s, with sporadic outbreaks in 1964, 1976, and again in 1990-1992. Over the years, the communities have found increasing difficulty in living together peaceably. Benue is often referred to as the Tiv state, and Taraba as that of the Jukuns. Political polarisation has gradually turned into physical segregation too: as violence has intensified in Taraba, an increasing number of Tivs have fled into Benue. Tivs have complained of persecution in Taraba and talk of a deliberate campaign of "ethnic cleansing," primarily by the Jukuns, allied with the Fulanis, and now additionally backed up by the military. They have claimed that these operations are deliberately timed to ensure that the Jukuns have the political advantage in Taraba in the run-up to elections scheduled in 2003. In addition, the rivalries between Tivs and Jukuns have always had the potential to escalate into an even more serious conflict at the national level, as both groups are well represented in the national army."

IRIN, 24 October 2001

"Many analysts link the current bloodletting in central Nigeria to political problems dating to the colonial era. During this period the British delegated powers over this vast region inhabited by many ethnic minorities to its ally, the Hausa-Fulani Muslim caliphate that held sway in many parts of northern Nigeria. The Tivs were one of non-Muslim minorities who vehemently opposed Hausa-Fulani influence, resulting in a major eruption of violence in the early 1960s that required military intervention to contain. While the Tivs preferred political alliances with southern political parties, the Jukuns teamed up with the Northern Peoples' Congress, controlled by the Muslim feudal oligarchs of the north. Violent eruptions between the two groups were recorded in 1959, 1964, 1976 and 1991-92."

EPCPT, October 1999, 'Nigeria: The Tiv-Jukun Conflict in Wukari, Taraba State'

"The political dimensions of the conflict are two-fold: traditional and modern. The former concerned control of the local government council and political appointments and other resources. The latter centred around the Jukun's refusal to include any Tiv person on the Wukari Traditional Council, where decisions are made that affect them.

Land is another issue which is frequently named as a cause of the conflict. However, while land is frequently mentioned, it is in reality only a vent for political and other forms of conflict. Although it is often said that the Tiv are encroaching on the farmlands owned by the Jukun, it turned out that the real issue is that the Tiv do not follow the traditional laws of land administration, which require them to obtain permission from the village head, ward head, district head and paramount ruler before starting to farm on a piece of land. Instead the Tiv would not accept that they are settlers and did not recognise the Jukun as the original indigenes. [...]

Another factor in the conflict is the high population growth of the Tiv, which creates a need for more and more farmland. The Tiv also often invite relatives from neighbouring Benue State, which increases the demand for land, as well as the numerical strength of the Tiv. The Jukun feel that their culture, of which they are extremely proud, is being undermined by this influx of Tiv and have embarked upon a 'rejukunisation' process.

These various causes led to an extremely violent confrontation between the Tiv and the Jukun in 1990-92. No one, including the government or the groups involved, can give exact figures of

casualties. However there was massive burning of houses, business premises, and schools, accompanied by looting of property.”

Further clashes in Benue state, April 2005

- An attack by Fulani herdsmen from Taraba state on Tiv farmers in neighbouring Benue state killed at least 14 people and caused hundreds of Fulanis to flee in fear of reprisals
- The attack was the first in Taraba state since the deadly conflict between the Tiv and Jukun tribes in 2001, that displaced thousands

Reuters, 13 Apr 2005

“At least 14 people, including a toddler and a pregnant woman, were shot or hacked to death by ethnic Fulani militias who attacked two villages in the central Nigerian state of Benue, a local lawmaker said on Wednesday.

Mzenda Iho, speaker of the Benue State House of Assembly, said Fulani herdsmen from neighbouring Taraba state, armed with guns and machetes, stormed the remote farming villages on Sunday, killing people and burning scores of houses.

[...]

He represents the Katsina-Ala district, where the two villages are located, in the regional assembly.

[...]

Police said they knew of nine confirmed casualties -- all from the Tiv tribe of farmers -- in the violence and said reinforcements had been sent to the area.

"The situation is being closely monitored, while the patrol of the area has been intensified," a police spokesman said by phone from Makurdi, the capital of Benue state.

Iho said hundreds of Fulani have fled the area for fear of a reprisal attack. He said tension between the two ethnic groups had been high since the arrest last month of two Fulani men accused of raping a Tiv girl.

The attack was the first in the region since 2001, when a bitter conflict in Taraba state between the Tiv and another tribe, the Jukun, spilled over into Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau states, killing hundreds and displacing thousands.

More than 11,000 people have died in ethnic and sectarian violence in Nigeria, the world's eighth-biggest oil exporter since President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected in 1999, ending 15 years of military rule.”

Displacement related to ethno-religious conflicts

Displacement related to religious conflicts occurs mainly in the north, 1999-2003

- Displacement is caused by religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the north, which also take on an ethnic character
- Constitutionally, there is freedom of religion, however, the government restricted this in certain respects with regard to the implementation of Shari'a law by some northern states
- In October 1999, Zamfara state instituted Islamic Shari'a law in its entirety, after which other states followed

IRIN, 22 November 2001, 'Nigeria: Focus on tension between communities in Kaduna State'

"In 1804, Fulani nomads, who had migrated from the Fouta Djallon area of Guinea and had become late converts to Islam, decided to launch a 'jihad' or Islamic war to expand the religion among the Hausa states.[...]"

Having defeated the Hausa, the Fulani learnt their language and intermarried with their ruling classes. Soon the two groups fused to become virtually one indistinct ethnic group under the rule of the Sokoto caliphate.[...]

But when the British arrived to colonise Nigeria, they forged an alliance with the Sokoto caliphate in pursuit of the indirect rule system. [...] It was then that the caliphate extended influence over even non-Muslim areas, to the chagrin of the ethnic minorities of northern Nigeria.

'Even with the attainment of independence, most of them have not been able to throw off the yoke of caliphate domination bequeathed by the colonialists,' Chike Ezemo, of the social sciences faculty, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, told IRIN. 'This has been a constant source of tension and suspicion between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities in much of northern Nigeria.'

The other source of conflict in Kaduna is growing pressure on land as a result of migration. The Hausa-Fulani, who are mainly migrant traders, have established sizable communities among the ethnic minority groups in the state. And in recent decades the rate of southward migration has been accelerated by the advance of the Sahara Desert. Many Hausa-Fulani farmers are therefore seeking land for agriculture."

"This type of displacement-generating conflict occurs mainly in the north of the country between Muslims and Christians. Since the north is predominantly Muslim, their Christian adversaries tend to belong to other ethnic groups, usually from the south of the country. The result is that these conflicts, though primarily religious, also take on an ethnic character. In recent times, there have been major religious conflicts in Kano, Bauchi, Yola, Kaduna and other cities in the north. Sometimes, radical Muslim sects like the Maitatsine group initiate these conflicts, targeting both Christians and more liberal Muslim sects. There is little doubt that the worsening social security situation in Nigeria is leading more and more people into revivalist and millennialist sects in both the Muslim and Christian religions. They are not only ultra conservative in approach but accept holy wars as divinely ordained." (Ibeanu 1998, p.50)

Background on the application of Sharia law by some states in the north of Nigeria (1999)

US DOS, February 2001, sect.2c

"The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, including freedom to change one's religion or belief, and freedom to manifest and propagate one's religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance; however, the Government restricted these rights in practice in certain respects. The status of respect for religious freedom deteriorated during the year due to the implementation of an expanded version of Shari'a law in several northern states, which challenged constitutional protections for religious freedom and sparked interreligious violence.

The Constitution prohibits state and local governments from adopting an official religion; however, it also provides that states may elect to use Islamic (Shari'a) customary law and courts. About half of the population is Muslim, about 40 percent Christian, and about 10 percent practice traditional indigenous religion or no religion. Since independence, the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts has been limited to family or personal law cases involving Muslims, or to civil disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims who consent to the courts' jurisdiction. However, the Constitution states that a Shari'a court of appeal may exercise "such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of the State." Some states have interpreted this language as granting them the right to expand the jurisdiction of existing Shari'a courts to include criminal matters. Several Christians have alleged that [...] Islam has been adopted as the de facto state religion of several northern states. [...]

[...]

In October 1999, the governor of Zamfara state signed into law two bills aimed at instituting Islamic Shari'a law in his state. Implementation of the law began on January 22. Zamfara's law adopted traditional Shari'a in its entirety, with the exception that apostasy was not criminalized. Following Zamfara's lead, several northern states began to implement varying forms of expanded Shari'a; by year's end 9 states had adopted variations of Shari'a law - Sokoto, Niger, Kano, Kebbi, Jigawa, Yobe, Zamfara, Katsina, and Kaduna states.

[...]

As the result of nationwide violence in February and March [2000] related to the expansion of Shari'a laws [...], several northern state governments banned open air preaching and public religious processions. [...]

On February 29 [2000], in response to the nationwide violence, President Obasanjo convened a meeting of the Nigerian Council of State [...]. The result of the meeting was an agreement that northern governors would halt initiatives to expand Shari'a laws and return to the northern Nigerian Penal Code; however, a few states continued to expand their Shari'a laws. [...]."

Major displacement as religious violence breaks out in Kaduna State - February 2000, July 2001 and November 2002

- Several thousands temporary displaced by religious riots in Kaduna in November 2002
- Physical segregation of the city increased after these riots, leaving the population deeply polarised
- Conflict has made Christians originally from southern Nigeria leave Kaduna and return to their home regions in the South
- Ethnic/religious violence caused renewed displacement in July 2001
- In 2000 over 63,000 people were displaced within Kaduna and its surroundings
- Clashes followed the introduction of Sharia law in 1999, but tensions go back as far as the British rule, and have an ethnic, agricultural, and political dimension as well

Displacement in 2002:

IRIN, 28 November 2002

"More than 30,000 people were displaced during four days of religious riots in the northern Nigerian city of Kaduna, the Nigerian Red Cross said on Thursday [28 November 2002].

Red Cross spokesman Patrick Bawa said more than 1,000 people were injured while over 200 died in the clashes between Christians and Muslims.

The violence had erupted last week after Muslim militants protested against a 16 November article in the Thisday daily dismissing their opposition to the Miss World contest which was due to be held in Nigeria. The writer, Isioma Daniel, suggested that the Prophet Mohammed would have approved of the beauty pageant and may even have chosen one of the contestants for a wife.

"More than 7,000 families were displaced in the violence, and if you multiply the number by an average of five people a family you get more than 30,000," Bawa told IRIN.

The Nigerian security forces brought the situation in Kaduna under control on Sunday, although tension was still high in the city. Bawa said some of those who had fled their homes had started going back. The Red Cross, he said, planned to conduct a fresh needs assessment in the city to determine the numbers yet to return and their current plight.

Humanitarian workers in Kaduna said many of the displaced remained in the police and military barracks where they had taken refuge, afraid of renewed violence if they went home. Thousands of residents, especially Christians from southern Nigeria, were leaving the city and returning to their home regions, they said."

HRW, July 2003

"The 2000 violence also caused large-scale population displacement, leading to a sharp segregation of communities in some areas. By 2002, residents were describing particular areas of Kaduna town as '100 per cent Christian' or '100 per cent Muslim.' This was largely as a result of the 2000 events, and to a lesser extent the clashes of previous years. Christians and Muslims increasingly moved to areas which were dominated by people of their own faith in the hope of finding safety there; many of them did not return to their original areas of residence. Following the 2002 violence, this physical segregation of parts of the city appears to have increased — an indication of deepening polarization in what was once a genuinely mixed population. Many of the people interviewed by Human Rights Watch in December 2002 explained that they had moved homes not because they did not want to live with members of other faiths, but that it was a 'survival tactic': they expected to be safer surrounded by their own community in the event of any future resurgence of violence."

Displacement in 2001

ICRC, 5 July 2001

"On Saturday [30 June 2001], in Kaduna (central Nigeria), yet more families were displaced by ethnic strife. The Nigerian Red Cross and the ICRC have since carried out non-food distributions for around 1,000 people with no means of subsistence."

Displacement in 2000

IRIN-WA, 3 March 2000

"Fighting in the northern city of Kaduna began on 21 February [2000] following a march organised by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) to protest the proposed introduction of Islamic law in the state of Kaduna. The clashes in the state capital, in which at least 400 were killed, created fear between people who formerly lived as neighbours."

IRIN-WA, 10 March 2000

"The approach of the Muslim Festival of Eid ul Kebir, to be celebrated next week, has created fears of fresh communal violence in Nigeria following clashes between Muslims and Christians in which nearly 1,000 people are reported to have died in the past two weeks."

Christians and non-indigenes have been fleeing the northern city of Kano while Muslims have been pouring out of Port Harcourt in the southeast, AFP reported.

The movement has been sparked by fears of a resumption of the incidents in the northern town of Kaduna, where Muslims killed about 400 people, mainly Christians, and the retaliatory killing of a similar number of Muslims in the southern state of Abia. The clashes were related to the proposed introduction of Islamic law in northern states."

OMCT, 2002, pp. 96, 97-98

"When Kaduna state announced plans to implement Shari'a law, the large Christian minority in the state protested on February 21 [2000], leading to several days of violent confrontations. Estimates of the number of persons killed range from 1,000 to 1,500; many churches and mosques were burned. Many Christians in the north, fearing continued violence, returned to their historic homelands in the southeast.

On February 28, when the bodies of the victims from the Kaduna violence were returned home to the southeast, reciprocal violence erupted in Aba, Abia state, and, to a lesser extent, in the neighboring towns of Owerri, Imo state, and Onitsha, Anambra state. This violence was characterized by attacks on the minority Muslim Hausas by the majority Igbos. Estimates of the number of persons killed range from 400 to 500. Many of the Hausas were victimized due to their ethnic identity rather than their religious beliefs." (US DOS February 2001, sect.4)

"On Wednesday 23 March 2000, the crisis spilled over to outlying LGAs, particularly Kachia and Birnin Gwari. In Kachia LGA, Muslims were attacked. Their residential houses, shops, clinics, courts, filling stations and the market were destroyed. It later spread to neighbouring villages like Sakainu, Katul, Adadgai, Slowai, and Gumel. At the end of the crisis about 350 residential houses were destroyed in Kachia LGA alone, displacing about 25,000 people. Hundreds of people were killed. Many of those displaced trooped to NASA Army Barracks for safety. In Birnin Gwari, Mararaban Jos, Gadan Gaya etc. Christians were attacked. Their properties were destroyed and many of them were either killed or displaced. Several Churches and residential houses were also destroyed.

[...]

Over 63,000 people were displaced within Kaduna and its surroundings. This excludes thousands of others that fled to their places of origin or fled to live with relatives elsewhere. It is estimated that up to 75% of those displaced were women and children. More than twenty refugee camps were opened in military barracks, Police barracks, private residences, schools and churches. Individual as well as corporate properties were destroyed."

More background on the religious clashes in Kaduna State:

IRIN, 22 November 2001, 'Nigeria: Focus on tension between communities in Kaduna State'

"Reputed for decades to be the melting pot of Nigeria's cultures, the northern state of Kaduna has witnessed some of the most violent confrontations between different ethnic and religious groups since President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected in 1999.

[...]

Trouble started brewing in 1999 when a number of overwhelmingly Muslim northern states, including Kaduna, constitutionally adopted the controversial Islamic legal code or Sharia.

Under Sharia law, drinking of alcohol is punishable by flogging, stealing attracts amputation of limbs, while adulterers can be stoned to death. As Sharia rapidly caught on, it was obvious it would create trouble in Kaduna whose population, like Nigeria's, is almost half muslim and half non-Muslim. Each of the groups would seek to assert perceived rights or lay claim to demands long suppressed by military repression.

In a number of ways Kaduna is a miniature of Nigeria, a federation of 36 states. Not only is it made up of a multiplicity of ethnic groups, it also has a culturally distinct north that is predominantly Muslim and a south that is mainly Christian.

[...]

While Muslims in Kaduna embraced the religious code, counter-protests by Christians soon resulted in ethnic and religious violence, which first engulfed the state capital of Kaduna with its two million people. When the first two bouts cleared - the first in February and the second in May 2000, more than 2,000 people had been killed. Scores of houses and other property had also been destroyed.

[...]

'Sharia served as a catalyst to alert the non-Muslim ethnic minorities of the need to resist and fight perceived domination by Hausa-Fulani Muslims,' Samson Bako, a Kaduna-based human rights activist, told IRIN.

[...]

The other source of conflict in Kaduna is growing pressure on land as a result of migration. The Hausa-Fulani, who are mainly migrant traders, have established sizable communities among the ethnic minority groups in the state. And in recent decades the rate of southward migration has been accelerated by the advance of the Sahara Desert. Many Hausa-Fulani farmers are therefore seeking land for agriculture.

According to Bako, the Hausa-Fulani - being richer and having a more advanced system of social organisation with links to the emirate system- are often appointed to head chiefdoms or districts among the people where they have settled. "Attempts to exercise this power often leads to confrontation as resentful local people resist them," he said.

[...]

Since the 2000 riots, Kaduna State governor, Ahmed Makarfi, has initiated reforms to reduce ethnic and religious tensions, including introduction of a modified version of Sharia, to try and accommodate feelings of both religious communities. Under the system which became operational on 2 November, the Muslim legal code will only apply in predominantly Muslim areas while canon or customary law will rule in areas inhabited by Christians and non-Muslims.

Makarfi has also created new chiefdoms and districts for the non-Muslim ethnic minorities of the state. He also changed the line of authority, making the chiefs answerable not to the Zaria Emirate Council, but to the state government."

Kano: displacement after imposition of Sharia law, June 2000, and after religious violence following US action in Afghanistan, September-October 2001

- There was an exodus of Christians and southerners from Kano State prior to the official introduction of Sharia law in June 2000
- US air strikes against Afghanistan resulted in clashes in Kano between Muslims and Christians, which caused the displacement of thousands of people (September-October 2001)
- There were fears of reprisal attacks against northern Muslims living in southern Nigeria

IRIN, 19 June 2000

"An exodus of Christians and southerners from the northern state of Kano prior to the official introduction of Sharia law there on Wednesday has begun, 'The Post Express' newspaper reported on Saturday.

Residents, fearing that the launching of Islamic law in the state could precipitate killings, decided to relocate to other parts of Nigeria, the daily said. However, a Kano state official denied on Sunday that Christians and southerners were leaving.

[...]

In February, hundreds of people were killed or injured, private and public buildings destroyed when Christians demonstrated against [sic!] the introduction of Sharia in the northern city of Kaduna, some 200 km southwest of Kano.

Kano and Kaduna have large Christian populations, unlike the states of Zamfara and Sokoto which adopted the Islamic code earlier this year."

US air raids against Afghanistan provoked religious violence (September-October 2001)

IRIN-WA, 15 October 2001

"Heavily armed troops were maintaining an uneasy calm in Nigeria's northern city of Kano on Monday after protests by Muslims against U.S. air strikes against Afghanistan resulted in two days of clashes with Christians in which scores died, residents said.

Thousands of protesters had poured onto the streets from mosques after Friday prayers in northern Nigeria's biggest city, denouncing U.S. air raids on Afghanistan and bearing portraits of Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden, suspected of being behind the 11 September terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.

The march remained peaceful until a scuffle with a group of Christians resulted in widespread violence. Burnt cars littered the streets on Monday and several burnt buildings were still smouldering. Worst hit by the violence was the Sabon Gari quarters inhabited mostly by Christians and non-Muslims.

(...)

Thousands of residents who fled their homes are taking refuge at police stations and military barracks. Many more, especially southerners, are fleeing the city in droves.

This has raised fears of imminent reprisal attacks on northern Muslims living in southern Nigeria as has been the pattern with the country's recent cycle of religious and communal violence."

Ethno-religious violence in Bauchi state creates thousands of IDPs, June-August 2001

- Thousands displaced after Christians rebelled against the imposition of Islamic law in Tafawa-Balewa, which is mainly Christian
- Renewed religious violence in Bauchi State after government's plans to introduce Sharia law

Economist.com, 5 July 2001

"Reports from Bauchi state in the north of the country tell of hundreds killed, and thousands displaced, after Christians rebelled against the imposition of Islamic law in Tafawa-Balewa."

"Several people died in the clashes which, newspaper reports said, were sparked by an attempt by a Muslim bus driver in the town to segregate men from women in keeping with the requirements of Islamic law. Tafawa Balewa is mainly Christian." (IRIN 18 July 2001)

Same pattern of violence and displacement in August 2001

IRIN-WA, 29 August 2001

"Renewed fighting between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria's northern Bauchi State over plans by the government to introduce strict Islamic law has claimed several lives, witnesses said on Wednesday.

The latest outbreak of violence in the Tafawa Balewa local government council involves two communities, the mainly Christian Kutaru and the predominantly Muslim Zwall. "Fighting broke out last week and no fewer than 15 people have been killed while many more have been injured," Musa Kaltung, a bus driver who travelled through the area en route to Lagos, told IRIN.

The new violence comes hot on the heels of another conflict in Tafawa Balewa.

Nigerian Red Cross officials said fighting between Christian Jarawas and Sayawas and Hausa-Fulani Muslims in June and July left more than 400 people dead and more than 22,000 displaced. The tense situation was just being brought under control when the latest clashes erupted, they said."

Ethno-religious violence between Hausa-Fulanis and other ethnic groups in Plateau State displaces thousands, September 2001- 2002

- Major displacement caused by the September 2001 clashes between the Hausa-Fulanis (mostly Muslims) and "indigenes" groups (mostly Christians) in the State capital Jos
- Tensions rooted in disputes between one side seen as "indigenes" and the other as "settlers"
- After five days of fighting the Red Cross put the total number of displaced in Plateau State at some 60,000
- Although calm returned to Jos, violence spread to other parts of Plateau State such as Langtang, Kuru and Pankshin districts
- New displacement during 2002 because of retaliatory attacks and bandit raids apparently involving Fulani herdsmen and elements from neighbouring Niger and Chad

HRW, April 2003, p.23

"The concept of "indigene" in Nigeria refers to persons or ethnic groups that are purportedly native to a certain area; "indigene certificates" issued by a person's supposed "home" state must sometimes be presented in order to receive certain jobs or benefits through the state. The "indigene/settler" distinction has caused a great deal of hostility in Jos and other areas of Nigeria. Particularly for many Hausa/Fulanis who have been in Plateau State for generations, it is the only home they know and they resent being viewed as outsiders. At the same time, "indigenes" in Jos accuse the Hausa/Fulanis of attempting to take over areas of the city for themselves and to exclude the "indigenes" from economic or political activity. Disputes between "indigenes" and "settlers" had set off days of rioting in Jos in September 2001 that engulfed the city and killed up to a thousand people."

HRW, 18 December 2001

"Unlike other parts of Nigeria, which have experienced inter-communal violence with tragic regularity, Jos, until September 2001, had always been viewed as a peaceful city. To many Nigerians, the Plateau State motto of 'Home of Peace and Tourism' was more than an empty slogan. Indeed, many people fleeing conflicts in their own areas had sought protection and safety in Jos; some had even settled there. Some observers believe that this regular influx of populations from neighboring states may have ended up destabilizing the tranquility of Jos. People fleeing in 2000 and 2001 from clashes in Kaduna, Bauchi, Taraba, and Nasarawa states may have inadvertently contributed to creating an atmosphere of fear among inhabitants of Plateau State by testifying to the atrocities they had left behind, some of which were still

continuing. The increase in the population in Jos, in particular, also created an increase in economic pressures, leading in turn to the scarcity of some goods and increase in prices. Resources became stretched, and tensions began to rise.

[...]

The specific incident that sparked off the violence occurred outside a mosque in the area of Jos known as Congo Russia. On Friday, September 7, a young Christian woman tried to cross the road through a congregation of Muslims outside the mosque. She was asked to wait until prayers had finished or to choose another route, but she refused and an argument developed between her and some members of the congregation. Within minutes, the argument had unleashed a violent battle between groups of Christians who appeared at the scene and Muslims who had been praying at the mosque or who happened to be in the neighborhood.

[...]

From that moment onwards, the fighting spread uncontrollably. According to testimonies from different parts of the town, the violence raged from Friday, September 7 to Monday, September 10. After a brief lull, it flared up again on Wednesday, September 12, with further killings and destruction. By Thursday, September 13, when the fighting ceased, hundreds of people had been killed, many others were missing, and thousands of homes, buildings, and other property had been destroyed."

IRIN-WA, 12 September 2001

"Ethnic and religious violence spread to other parts of Plateau State in Nigeria as calm returned to the state capital, Jos, after four days of fighting between Muslims and Christians, humanitarian workers said.

'As at yesterday, the situation in Jos was getting back to normal but new crisis areas erupted again,' Patrick Bawa, spokesman of the Nigerian Red Cross, told IRIN on Tuesday. Other areas that experienced fresh fighting, he said, included Langtang, Kuru and Pankshin districts.'

[...]

The Red Cross said, also on Tuesday, that '60,000 people have been displaced so far' in Plateau State alone."

Retaliatory attacks during 2002 continued to displace people:

IRIN-WA, 4 January 2002

"An armed attack by a militia group, during which 17 people died and several others were wounded, led this week to the displacement of some 3,000 residents of a village near Jos, capital of central Nigeria's Plateau State, state police told IRIN on Wednesday. The assailants are believed to be Muslim Hausa-Fulani who attacked Dagwom Tutu village, Vwang district, in retaliation for casualties suffered by Muslims during violent confrontations with local Christians in September 2001, Governor Joshua Dariye said. Those displaced were reported to be mainly Hausa-Fulanis who fled to Jos fearing reprisals for the attack."

IRIN, 12 August 2002

"Intermittent communal clashes have rocked Plateau State since September 2001, when ethnic and religious clashes between Muslims and Christians in Jos, resulting in the loss of over 1,000 lives. Since the beginning of the year several clashes have occurred in parts of the state, in which mainly local Christians have engaged Muslim Hausa-speakers whose origins are further in the north of the country. Scores of people have died and thousands have been displaced."

Several reports after mid-2002 about bandit raids apparently involving Fulani herdsmen and elements from neighbouring Niger and Chad:

IRIN, 29 July 2002

"At least 15 people died [23 and 24 July 2002] when an armed group launched an attack on policemen deployed to trouble spots in Nigeria's central Plateau State, police sources said on Saturday.

[...]

The motive of the attackers was not immediately clear, but in recent years there have been many reports of former rebels from Niger and Chad crossing into Nigeria and Cameroon to engage in banditry.

Last week's incident adds a new dimension to intermittent communal unrest that has rocked Plateau State since September 2001, when fighting between Muslims and Christians in the capital, Jos, resulted in the loss of over 1,000 lives. Clashes that have occurred this year in parts of the state have pitted indigenous people, most of them Christian, against more recent Muslim settlers from farther north. This is the first reported incident involving foreign elements."

IRIN, 25 October 2002

"Scores of people have died in central Nigeria's Plateau State in a series of raids by bandits and clashes between farmers and herders, residents and officials said.

In the latest incident, on Tuesday night, a group of gunmen identified by locals as Fulani herdsman attacked the farming village of Maza, north of the Plateau capital, Jos. At least eight people were killed in the ensuing fighting.

Plateau State Governor Joshua Dariye confirmed the incident in a broadcast on Wednesday and appealed for calm. "I want to assure you that this situation is under control as security agents have taken total control," he told residents.

Reports from the Shendam and Langtang districts said more than 35 people were killed in raids on several villages by armed bandits thought to include Fulani herdsman and bandits from Nigeria's northern neighbours, Niger and Chad, who have been operating in the region in recent years.

"The attacks have been persistent in the past two weeks and many people have died who remain unaccounted for," Isaac Dabup, a Langtang resident, told IRIN.

Plateau State has often experienced violent attacks on remote village communities since September last year when clashes between Muslims and Christians erupted in Jos, resulting in the death of more than 1,000 people.

While the state is predominantly Christian, large communities of Muslim Hausa-speakers, including Fulani herders, reside there. Local people said aggrieved Fulani herdsman who lost relatives and their cattle herds in the 2001 violence had since been launching reprisal raids on isolated local communities."

See also: [*Background on the opposition between the Yoruba's of the West and the Hausa-Fulani of the Muslim North*](#)

For an elaborate report on the background, the incidents of violence, the role of the security forces, the impact of the Jos crisis on other areas, as well as the response of the government, see the HRW report "Jos: A city torn apart", accessible through the internet link mentioned below.

Renewed violence in Plateau State causes major displacement, state of emergency declared in May 2004

- In February 2004 the Red Cross reported at least 2,500 people fled violence between Muslims and Christians in Plateau State and sought refuge in neighbouring Bauchi State
- Among the victims were 48 Christians killed by Muslim Fulanis in the town of Yelwa after they had taken refuge in a church
- In response, Christian Taroks launched a "devastating" attack on Muslim Fulanis in Yelwa at the beginning of May, killing several hundred and displacing thousands
- The conflict was essentially over land and cattle - not over religion
- President Obasanjo responded by declaring a state of emergency in Plateau

IRIN, 4 March 2004

"At least 2,500 people have fled Plateau State in central Nigeria following a fortnight of violence between Muslims and Christians that has left 62 dead and more injured, the Red Cross said on Thursday.

Patrick Bawa, a spokesman for the Red Cross in Nigeria, told IRIN that his organisation had registered 2,500 displaced people in neighbouring Bauchi State by Wednesday afternoon and more were still arriving.

[...]

Around 100 of the arrivals were injured and in need of treatment. The Red Cross provided first aid, and 16 people with severe injuries were sent to hospital, he added.

While troops and policemen have restored calm in most of the affected areas, people were continuing to flee the districts "because they're not too sure of their security," Bawa said.

Police said the latest outbreak of religious clashes in the Shendam and Langtang districts of Plateau State had claimed at least 62 lives over the past two weeks.

The victims include 48 people who were killed last week during a Muslim raid on the town of Yelwa on 24 February. Most were killed as they sought refuge in a church compound.

The bloodletting appeared to be in reprisal for a Christian attack on a nearby Muslim village in which 10 people were killed.

Four policemen have so far died in the fighting which has involved automatic rifles as well as bows and arrows."

HRW, 11 May 2004

"Armed members of the predominantly Christian Tarok ethnic group on May 2 attacked the town of Yelwa, in the southern part of Plateau State, apparently in reprisal for earlier attacks against Taroks by members of the predominantly Muslim Fulani ethnic group. Local sources described the attack on Yelwa, where the majority of the population is Fulani, as devastating.

Several hundred people were killed according to credible accounts based on the testimonies of local residents, although an accurate death toll is not yet available. The perpetrators used fire arms and machetes, and the victims were buried in several mass graves. There was also widespread destruction in the town. Thousands of inhabitants of Yelwa have been displaced, and the area has become extremely polarized."

BBC, 5 May 2004

"Mutilated and charred corpses were still lying on the main street of the remote market town on Tuesday, reports a Reuters correspondent in the town.

Almost every house lining the main street of Yelwa was burned and some were still smouldering. A mosque was also destroyed, Reuters reports.

Thousands of Muslims lined the roadside chanting religious slogans and vowing revenge on the attackers.

'Allah will avenge us. The pagans have killed our people,' said one man.

In Christian villages near Yelwa, hundreds of youths were sitting on the roadside, apparently awaiting further violence, Reuters says.

[...]

House-to-house

Eyewitnesses told the BBC that several thousand men from four predominantly Christian ethnic groups surrounded Yelwa on Sunday.

Some of the men wore uniforms, while others were stripped to the waist and painted black.

They carried what a crowd of townspeople described as sophisticated weapons. Then they went from house to house killing whoever they could find.

Fighting for land

Justice Orire, secretary general of the Nigerian Muslim umbrella organisation Jama'atu Nasril Islam, asked where the Christian militia had got machine guns from, if they had not had outside backing.

He said Muslims from Yelwa reported that their cattle were being taken, or prevented from grazing, and they felt there was an attempt to get them to leave the area, even before this week's events.

In February, 48 Christians were killed by armed Muslim Fulanis in Yelwa after they had taken refuge in a church.

Muslim Fulani cattle herders and Christian Tarok farmers have been clashing in central Nigeria for more than two months

They are fighting mainly over land and cattle. Thousands of people are reported to have fled the fighting."

BBC, 19 May 2004

"Both houses of Nigeria's parliament have approved the state of emergency in the central state of Plateau declared by President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The president ordered the measure to control continuing violence between the state's Muslims and Christians.

Several opposition politicians have already condemned the move as undemocratic.

President Obasanjo said serious action was needed to deal with a situation that he called 'near mutual-genocide'.

Earlier the newly appointed governor of Plateau, Chris Ali, made a call for peace in the troubled state, warning that if Nigerians wanted to see where hatred and intolerance could lead, they should consider what happened in Rwanda.”

Plateau State violence sparks revenge attacks in Kano and Adamawa States, May-June 2004

- About 30 people are killed and 10,000 displaced in two days of violence between Muslims and Christians in the northern city of Kano in May 2004
- IDPs are mainly Christians fleeing from attackers in the predominantly Muslim city
- Thousands of IDPs find refuge at the main military and police barracks
- The violence was seen as a reprisal for the killing of several hundred Muslims in the town of Yelwa, Plateau State, about one week earlier

IRIN, 12 May 2004

“Police have imposed a dawn to dusk curfew in Kano, the largest city in northern Nigeria, where about 30 people have been killed in two days of religious violence, sparked off by a Muslim protest demonstration against a massacre committed by Christians.

Kano State police commissioner Abdulganiyu Daudu told reporters on Wednesday that about 30 people had been killed in the city of eight million people.

A further 45 had been arrested and 40 had been injured after mobs of youths armed with clubs, machetes and jerry cans of petrol roamed the streets on predominantly Muslim Kano, attacking suspected Christians, burning their homes and property, he added.

[...]

State-run Radio Nigeria said an estimated 10,000 Kano residents, mostly Christians fleeing from their homes in troubled parts of the city, took refuge at the main military and police barracks on Wednesday. Grief stricken relatives of the missing tried to trace their loved ones.

[...]

The two days of violence in Kano were sparked off by a protest demonstration on Tuesday against the killing of several hundred Muslims in the small town of Yelwa in Plateau State in central Nigeria on 2 May.

The Nigerian Red Cross has estimated that more than 600 Muslims were killed in the attack by militia men of the mainly Christian Tarok tribe. Most of the dead were from the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups which dominate northern Nigeria.

Angered by the massacre, thousands of Muslims marched from Kano’s main mosque to the state governor’s office on Tuesday. But the protest, called and led by Islamic leaders, quickly degenerated into a riot as mobs launched assaults on Christians.”

BBC, 12 June 2004

“Christians and Muslims clashed in Numan [Adamawa state], following a long-standing dispute over the rebuilding of a mosque which was destroyed in communal violence last year.

The latest fighting began when the local chief, a Christian, complained that the minaret overlooked his palace compound.

The Red Cross says that in two days of fighting, 41 people were killed and 145 injured.

At least 2,000 people were displaced when their homes were burned to the ground."

Thousands displaced by religious cartoon riots, February 2006

- As many as 50,000 people were displaced and about 150 killed in a wave of sectarian violence across various Nigerian states at the end of February 2006, sparked by protests over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad
- The majority of deaths occurred in the mainly Christian southeast city of Onitsha, where groups of armed youths attacked Muslim Hausa-speakers from the north in revenge for Christian Igbos killed some days earlier in the north of the country
-
- Spiralling violence spread across at least six states, with thousands of IDPs taking refuge mainly in police and army barracks or churches – although many later returned to their homes
-

NRCS, 22 February 2006

"The reprisal attacks that started in Onitsha, Anambra State in the South-Eastern Nigeria on Tuesday, February 21, 2006 continued unabated. The situation has now spread to the neighboring Enugu State. Some of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are now fleeing the South East returning to the North. The total numbers of **IDPs have increased to 50,000 people** with about **150 people reported dead**. Kotangora, Niger State has reported attack and burning of some churches and shops and over 10 people killed. Majority of the shops in Kontagora are now closed. Red Cross Team headed by the Zonal Disaster Management Officer, North Central Zone is on ground to assist and conduct Damage and Needs Assessment (DANA)."

IRIN, 23 February 2006

"At least 123 people have been killed in four days of sectarian violence across Nigeria, after protests over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad fuelled underlying religious and ethnic tensions.

Two-thirds of the deaths in the past six days have occurred in the mainly Christian southeast city of Onitsha, where groups of armed youths took to the streets to seek revenge against Muslims in reprisal for deadly attacks on Christians last weekend in the predominantly Muslim north.

At least 80 people were slaughtered during two days of violence in Onitsha, leading Nigerian human rights group Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), said on Thursday. 'We counted at least 60 dead on Tuesday, and on Wednesday no less than 20,' Emeka Umeh, who heads CLO in Anambra State, told IRIN.

The violence erupted following the rumoured arrival in Onitsha on Tuesday of the corpses of Christian Igbos killed in the north. The reports sent angry crowds of armed youths onto the streets, bent on hunting down Muslim Hausa-speakers from the north.

The toll was expected to rise further following reports of attacks against Muslims in the nearby towns of Awka and Nnewi. Anambra state governor Chris Ngige late on Wednesday slapped curfews on both towns. Onitsha was already under curfew.

Killings of Muslims were also reported on Wednesday in the city of Enugu, the capital of Enugu State, about 100 kilometres north of Onitsha.

In northeast Nigeria last weekend, protests over the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad turned violent, claiming 18 lives in the city of Maiduguri. On Monday and Tuesday at least 25 people were killed in Muslim attacks on Christians in the northern city of Bauchi.

With Nigeria's population of 126 million people roughly split between a predominantly Muslim north and a Christian majority south, analysts say the cartoon controversy has simply served as a spark for this latest episode of sectarian violence."

Displacement related to communal conflicts over land

Land disputes in Ebonyi State caused displacement in July 2001

- Fighting between two communities in Ebonyi State displaced more than 1,000 people, many of whom took refuge in and around Afikpo town.
- Cause of the clashes was a land dispute in 2000 between the two communities

IRIN, 24 July 2001

"Renewed fighting between two communities in southeastern Nigeria's Ebonyi State has claimed at least 27 lives, local officials and residents said on Tuesday [24 July 2001].

The fighting between the neighbouring communities of Akaeze in Iro local council and Osso Edda in Afikpo South displaced more than 1,000 people, while several homes, two schools and a community health centre were destroyed, Samson Agwuocha, a resident of Afikpo, told IRIN.

[...]

Many of the displaced people have taken refuge in Afikpo town and neighbouring communities. Residents of the affected communities trace the latest incident to lingering anger and the desire for vengeance by families whose members died in fighting over the disputed land last year, in which at least seven people were reported killed."

Land clashes in Mambilla Plateau (Taraba State) displace hundreds, January 2002

- Following a dispute over grazing land between local farming communities and Fulanis, fighting broke out which displaced hundreds
- Clashes like these have become frequent in parts of central and northern Nigeria, increasing desertification being an important cause

IRIN, 8 January 2002

"Dozens of people died and hundreds were displaced in clashes that broke out a week ago between local farming communities and nomadic Fulani herders in Mambilla plateau, northeastern Nigeria, police and local officials said.

'No fewer than 40 people died both on the side of the Fulanis and the Mambilla,' Gamji Yusuf, an official of the Sarduna local government area, which includes Mambilla, told IRIN. 'Many Fulani herdsman have since fled across the border into Cameroon for fear of reprisal attacks.'

Taraba State Police Commissioner Egbe Mfom told journalists on Monday in the state capital, Jalingo, that the fighting broke out on 31 December in Tonga Maina village following a dispute over grazing land. He said the violence was brought under control with the deployment of anti-riot policemen to the affected areas.

'We have also arrested a number of people, who said they were hired by some influential people to engage in the fighting,' Mfom said. Some of those arrested were reportedly foreigners from neighbouring countries and were paraded before journalists along with weapons, including a sub-machine gun, said to have been recovered from them.

Clashes between pastoral and farming communities linked to disputes over grazing land, have become frequent in parts of central and northern Nigeria in recent years. Some analysts have blamed the trend on increasing desertification, which is pushing herders southwards in their search for pasture, often putting them in conflict with farmers."

People displaced from farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe states after attacks by armed cattle herders, February 2003

- 20 farming communities in Dumne (Adamawa State) attacked from 26-28 February 2003, temporarily displacing some 20,000 people
- More detailed assessment later found that nearly 4,000 IDPs from the Dumne attacks required urgent assistance, in May 2003 it was reported that these IDPs had returned, but that shelter remained a problem as houses had been burned
- Assumed that attackers were nomadic herdsman from neighbouring Chad
- Similar attacks in the Gombe State during the same period affected 14 villages and over 3,700 people were displaced
- Reported in May 2003 that about 3,000 IDPs in Gombe were still sheltered at relatives and friends, while about 1,500 IDPs were still staying at a temporary school shelter

IRIN, 4 March 2003

"At least 40 people were killed when a group of heavily armed men attacked the town of Dumne in northeastern Nigeria, police said on Monday [3 March 2003].

The attackers, thought to be nomadic herdsman from neighbouring Chad, attacked the rural town on Friday. 'We have so far confirmed that 40 people were killed, including seven policemen, a soldier and 32 civilians,' police spokesman Chris Olakpe told reporters.

He said the security forces had sent reinforcements to the area to restore order and that police had begun investigating the motives of the attackers, some of whom were arrested and were being questioned.

Residents of Dumne said the attack was launched in the middle of the night. Dozens of houses were set ablaze, as was the town's market. Some people who escaped from the burning houses were shot or hacked to death with machetes. Most of the victims were women and children, they said.

According to reports from the area, some of the residents believed the attack was not unrelated to a violent dispute over grazing land in September 2002 between local people, who are mainly farmers, and nomadic herdsman.

Parts of central and northeastern Nigeria have recorded many violent disputes between indigenous farming communities and nomads in recent years, as increasing desertification on the country's northern fringes forces grazers southward.

A year ago, a similar conflict in the Mambilla plateau, which is in the same region, resulted in dozens of deaths and forced more than 25,000 Fulani herdsman to flee across the border to Cameroon.

The northeastern, where Nigeria meets Cameroon and Chad, has been particularly volatile in recent years, with heavily armed groups, remnants of Chad's rebel wars, often crossing the border to fight in local conflicts."

IFRC, 16 April 2003

"Udawa cattle herders attacked and burned 34 farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe States in February and March 2003 resulting in 63 dead, 563 injured and 23,700 displaced. The displaced persons, mostly women and children, fled their villages to urban centers in search of safety, shelter and means of sustenance.

1- Adamawa State

Following an attack on 20 farming communities by armed Udawas cattle herders in Dumne, in Song Local Government Area of Adamawa State from 26-28 February, Adamawa Red Cross branch reported that that over 500 people were injured, 63 people died and over 20,000 persons displaced. Several people sought refuge in a temporary shelter at the Central School of Dumne town. Calmness has returned to Dumne town and the attacked villages. The assessment team visited Dumne town, which hosts a large number of the internally displaced persons (IDP), who are still looking for assistance. The victims who look frail are housed in a temporary shelter without potable water and toilet facilities.

The Commissioner for Special Duties of the State informed the assessment team that the number of IDPs requiring urgent assistance was 3,820 (532 families). The team assessed three destroyed villages and observed that returnees were making efforts to rebuild their houses. It was clear that the farming communities lost most of their property and their houses were burnt down. They have been without any outside assistance except for some food provided by the local Red Cross branch. The team also observed cases of diarrhoea, malaria and infected wounds on those injured during the crisis."

IFRC, 9 May 2003

"[9 May 2003:] Presently, all the 532 displaced families (3,820 persons) have moved back to their burnt villages and houses after receiving some food and non food items assistance, which lasted them for not more than 3 weeks.

The returned families have not been able to repair and restore their houses and farming due to their inability to afford basic housing repair materials. Shelter remains a critical problem as rainy season commences shortly. Food has become a more serious problem as they have to depend on the good will of their friends and relations, who provided short time assistance in line with local norm.

Farming activities is seriously affected and delayed during the rainy season since they had lost their farming implements when their communities were attacked."

Gombe State

IFRC, 16 April 2003

"In Gombe state, 14 villages were attacked by Udawa armed cattle herders from 15-17 February injuring over 63 people. The Gombe Red Cross branch reported that over 3,700 people were displaced. Calm has returned to the area and the IDPs are sheltered at both Bambam Secondary School and Primary School. Food is in short supply as containers were destroyed together with several corn milling machines and people have to trek into the neighboring states to Taraba and Adamawa looking for milling facilities."

IFRC, 9 May 2003

"The situation of the displaced persons in Dadiya and Maitukun communities, Bambam Local Government of Gombe State is far from resolved as about 3,000 IDPs have left a temporary school shelter to stay with relatives and friends around the shelter area, while about 1,500 IDPs are still staying at the school shelter. The condition of the people is very pathetic and the children are getting malnourished due to irregular and poor feeding. Children are developing fever and diarrhea at the camp."

Plateau State: farmers killed as they flee nomad attack, February 2004

- Nomads kill 49 townspeople in the farming town of Yelwa, Plateau State, in February 2004
- Although tensions were growing between Muslim and Christian communities in the region, the conflict was over land rather than religion per se

See also 'Renewed violence in Plateau State causes major displacement, state of emergency declared in May 2004' in the section on displacement related to ethno-religious conflicts

AFP, 25 February 2004

"Nigerian troops and police have deployed to keep the peace in a small farming community in the country's central highlands after nomadic fighters slaughtered 49 townspeople, officers said Wednesday.

Plateau State's police commissioner, Innocent Ilozuke, said that most of the victims died after seeking shelter in a church from the raiders, thought to be members of the Fulani ethnic group, which attacked the town of Yelwa.

[...]

Nomads and farmers, who compete for grazing land, often clash in central Nigeria, where deep ethnic and religious divisions fuel tensions over control of the region's sparse natural resources.

Yelwa is a small farming community in the Shendam local government area 300 kilometres (190 miles) east of Nigeria's capital Abuja, in a part of Plateau State which has frequently been the scene of fighting since 2001.

[Plateau State's police commissioner] Ilozuke said the headquarters of the state's intelligence and criminal investigation teams had been moved to Yelwa to probe the latest clash, which is believed to be a spillover from fighting nearby earlier this month.

On February 13 trouble flared between the mainly-Christian Tarok community and the Muslim villagers of Mavo in the Wase district neighbouring Shendam, leaving 11 people from both sides dead, officials said last week.

Community tensions in Plateau have often been exacerbated by differences between the Muslim and Christian communities in the region, although religion does not appear to have been a factor in Tuesday's attack.

Most of the people of Yelwa are Muslims, like the Fulani who are said to have attacked them.”

Further deadly clashes in Adamawa state, February 2005

- In February 2005 dozens of people were killed in Adamawa state when Fulani herdsmen attacked 'indigenous' farming communities in a dispute over grazing land
- Clashes are part of pattern in several parts of central Nigeria, caused partly by increasing desertification and shrinking pasture land
- Allegations were made that former rebel fighters from Chad and Niger are involved in the violence

IRIN, 8 February 2005

“At least 30 people have been killed in a week of clashes between farming communities and nomadic cattle herdsmen in Adamawa state, near the eastern frontier with Cameroon, local officials and residents said on Tuesday.

The deadliest fighting took place last Thursday when ethnic Fulani herdsmen attacked the farming village of Bali, killing 28, said Saidu Adamu, a local government official.

‘Farmers in the area have been complaining that cattle have been grazing on their land, and on Tuesday last week killed two Fulani herdsman over the dispute,’ Adamu told IRIN. ‘This latest incident was obviously a reprisal,’ he added.

One Bali resident, Kwanga Dogo, told IRIN that the attackers had been armed with assault rifles, machetes and bows and arrows and had stormed the village in the early hours of the morning.

Dogo said the dialects spoken by some of the assailants suggested they hailed from nearby Chad and Niger, but police and local officials would not confirm the claims.

Dogo said he had escaped from the village and had fled to the state capital, Yola.

Adamawa state police chief, Hafiz Ringim said police reinforcements were being sent to the affected area to stop the violence from escalating.

Over the last decade, clashes between indigenous farming communities and nomadic herdsmen have increased in several parts of central Nigeria, including the country's eastern flank.

Increasing desertification in northern Nigeria has been forcing herders further south into the central region in search of pasture, raising the ire of farmers that work the land.

Remnants of former rebel forces in Chad and Niger have moved into Nigeria during this period, engaging in banditry.

Residents and police have in the past blamed these armed gangs for some of the violence, alleging that they often hire themselves out as mercenaries.”

Conflict over farmland in southeastern Nigeria, April 2005

- In a resurgence of perennial conflict over farmland, dozens of people were killed in clashes between two rival communities in Cross River and Ebonyi states in April 2005

IRIN, 26 April 2005

“Dozens of people died in clashes last week between two rival communities in southeastern Nigeria over ownership of prized farmland, residents and officials said Tuesday.

More than 50 people were killed in the worst day of the violence last Thursday when fighters armed with machetes and rifles, believed to be from Cross River State, rampaged through a settlement of people across the border in neighbouring Ebonyi State, residents said.

John Otu, Ebonyi commissioner for information, confirmed there were many deaths but said he could not give definite figures. He said a longstanding dispute over farming land flared up again last week, with retaliatory attacks culminating in Thursday’s mayhem.

‘The people are farmers and this is the farming season which often brings such conflicts,’ Otu told IRIN.

Ebonyi governor, Sam Egwu, on Saturday met his Cross River counterpart, Donald Duke, in an effort to calm rising tension in the area and stop the violence from spreading.

Police officials said reinforcements had been sent to the area to prevent more fighting and Otu said no further violence has been reported between the two communities.

Thousands of people have died in Nigeria in communal, ethnic and religious clashes often triggered by land disputes since the 1999 election of President Olusegun Obasanjo ended more than 15 years of repressive military rule.”

Conflict related to new administrative boundaries and political elections

Communal violence related to demarcation of new administrative boundaries

- 15 new states and 300 new local government areas created after mid-1980s
- Affected communities not properly consulted during redrawing of the boundaries and existing historical demarcations were ignored
- Location of capital of any new local administrative area (LGA) often contested, especially if communities belonging to different ethnic groups are involved
- The location of the capital of an LGA is seen by some ethnic groups as the chance to free themselves from neighbours, or to take revenge at rivals, while others see it as a denial of their right to self-determination

- Military governments have in the past sought to reward certain ethnic groups seen as their supporters, for example through the creation of new administrative areas and the location of their capitals

OMCT, 2002, pp.12-13

"In the fifteen years of military rule preceding the inauguration of the present elected government, a total of additional 15 states and over 300 local government councils were arbitrarily created in Nigeria. These creations necessitated re-adjustment of existing local boundaries. However, in the process of redrawing these boundaries the affected communities were not consulted and existing historical demarcations were ignored by state officials who carried out the exercise. A National Boundaries Commission exists in Nigeria. Apart from the tardiness of the Commission's work, its powers are limited to making recommendations on internal boundary questions, recommendations that the government is not obliged to implement. Petitions and protests by affected communities seeking redress for lost assets, including farmlands occasioned by the exercise of creation of new administrative units, were either ignored or brutally repelled. Consequently, the communities are periodically pitched in violent conflict in an effort to seek local solutions."

Ibeanu, 1999, pp. 172-173

"Perhaps the most common conflicts in Nigeria today are linked to the process of transition from military to civilian rule. Not only has the state targeted many opponents as individuals, but there have been many other conflicts involving groups. The most significant, however, are numerous conflicts associated with decentralization of government, particularly the creation of new local administrative areas (LGAs). For one thing, their creation has reopened a number of old inter-communal rivalries, some dating to the colonial era. For another thing, the enormous power that people have come to associate with government, especially the tendency for people who occupy political positions at all levels of the state to amass personal wealth and influence, has made 'government', even at the very local level, a highly contested terrain. In addition, because of the tendency for governments in Nigeria to focus attention only on certain areas, urban centres and capital cities in particular, to the negligence of the vast rural areas, the location of the capital (the seat of government) of any new LGA is hotly contested. This contest is particularly fierce if communities belonging to different ethnic groups are involved. Moreover, some local communities and/or ethnic groups see in the creation of local governments an opportunity to free themselves from overbearing neighbours. Others see it as an opportunity to get back at rivals. Still others see it as a denial of their right to self-determination, especially where their request for a local government is denied. The situation is worsened by the manipulation of old inter-communal rivalries by politicians who seek office in the newly created local councils. It was therefore to be expected that the creation of 181 new LGAs in the country in late 1996, as part of the transition to democracy, would unleash a new fury of violence across the country."

Communal violence and displacement because of dispute about boundaries between Ile-Ife and Modakeke communities in Osun State, 2000

- Conflict depicted as a conflict over land ownership between the Ife "landlords" and the Modakeke "strangers/tenants".
- crisis caused over 2,000 deaths and several more injuries in the past two decades
- Obafemi Awolowo University in Ile-Ife used in 2000 as shelter for over 10,000 IDPs from the communal clashes prior to their moving to other neighbouring towns such as Akure, Ibadan, Ilesha, Lagos, and Ondo
- Research in 2002 found many houses still destroyed

OMCT 2002, pp. 38, 42, 43, 44, 45-46

"Ile-Ife and Modakeke are two neighbouring communities in Osun State of southwestern Nigeria. Both communities are so close together that it is said to be impossible to delimit a clear-cut boundary between them. A visitor to the area would hardly know when s/he left one community for the other as both communities have, through long historical interaction, including inter-marriages and extensive business and development partnerships, evolved into a single large conurbation. The two communities belong to the Yoruba nation. Despite this closeness, both communities have a long and surprising history of mutual antipathy that frequently spills over into spasmodic crises and violence.

[...]

In the aftermath of the dispute over the creation of a separate LGA for the Modakeke community, hell was let loose between the Ife and Modakeke communities in August 1997. Tempers rose and the atmosphere within became charged after the Military Administrator announced on August 14 the relocation of the headquarters of the new LGA to Oke-Igbo, which, according to the Military Administrator, was a neutral ground belonging to neither the Ile-Ife nor the Modakeke. The Modakekes, however, claimed that Oke-Igbo was part of Ile-Ife and that the announcement by the Military Administrator was a poorly disguised attempt at maintaining the *status-quo ante*. They accused the Ooni of using his enormous wealth and influence with the then ruling military regime to perpetuate his "oppression" of their community.

[...]

The most recent clash between both communities occurred in February 2000. As before, the centrepiece of the disturbances was citizenship rights often framed as a struggle over land ownership between the Ife "landlords" and the Modakeke "strangers/tenants". For their part, the Modakekes see the Ifes as aggressors and bullies against their bid for autonomy and dignified citizenship. Once again dangerous weapons such as different calibres of guns, machetes, knives, charms, broken bottles, stones, etc. were employed during the clashes.

[...]

The crisis between the Ife and Modakeke communities has recorded over 2,000 deaths and several more injuries in the past two decades. Although not without a history, this crisis and the attendant violence seems to have acquired greater intensity in recent times in terms of the quantity and quality of human rights violations associated with it.

[...]

In addition to violations of life and physical security, the Ife/Modakeke crisis has made thousands of people internally displaced. During the research trip in February 2002, more than two years after the last active clash between both communities, the research team counted 53 houses on both sides that were totally destroyed and remained to be re-built or rehabilitated. According to Ehile Mannaseh, once again, "on 4 March 2000, my (law) chambers were burnt down. All properties, including law books were burnt when they razed down the Mayfair Shopping Complex around 7.00 a.m."⁷⁹ Some other of the destroyed houses had been or were being rebuilt, while many others still remained as relics of the poor relations between both communities. Many other places of abode in surrounding villages were also destroyed thereby compounding the problem of internal displacement. Villages and farm settlements such as Abiri, Aromoko, Atakumosu, Deede, Ogudu, Ogundale, and Toro were reportedly looted and overwhelmed by the combatants. Mr. Opatola, a survivor, testified that the combatants "also went to the villages and hamlets and forcefully took over farms, they burnt houses." Initially in 2000, the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, served as a temporary refugee camp for over 10,000 persons displaced as a result of the communal clashes prior to their moving to other neighbouring towns such as Akure, Ibadan, Ilesha, Lagos, and Ondo."

Controversy over demarcation between LGAs in the Cross River and Akwa Ibom states caused violence and displacement, 2001

- After the "old" Cross River state was split into Akwa Ibom and the "new" Cross River States a controversy emerged about the demarcation of local government areas that were split by the new state border
- Tension between the Ibibios ethnic group in Itu LGA (in Akwa Ibom) and the Efiks dominating the Odukpani LGA (Cross River State)
- Ikot Offiong (a.k.a. Ikorofiong), a community of Efik ethnic group located in the proximity of the Ibibios dominated Itu LGA
- Ikot Offiong attacked in early 2000 and its inhabitants had to seek refuge in Odukpani LGA
- December 2001: attacks by armed militia inside the Odukpani LGA causing new IDPs and Ikot Offiong IDPs fleeing for the second time
- Reported in October 2002 that IDPs from Ikot Offiong remained in an abandoned housing estate in Calabar

OMCT 2002, pp.171, 173, 175-176, 178, 181

"To most Nigerians, the expression, "Calabar" is synonymous with everybody from Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, or at least, the southern Cross River State and the whole of Akwa Ibom State. To such people also, the difference between Efik and Ibibio (two major ethnic groups found in these states) is akin to the proverbial six and half dozen. These reasons make the inter-ethnic violence that recently erupted in the area difficult to comprehend.

[...]

Prior to 23 September 1987, Cross River State comprised the present Cross River and Akwa Ibom States of Nigeria. The two states are part of what is known as the South-South geo-political zone or the Niger-Delta area of Nigeria. From its creation in May 1967, the state was known as South Eastern State until 1976 when the name was changed to Cross River State. On the creation of Akwa Ibom State on September 23, 1987 the federal government, under then military "president" Ibrahim Babangida, announced the distribution of LGAs between both states. Itu and Odukpani became the border LGAs in Akwa Ibom and Cross River States respectively.

[...]

The Ibibios constitute the predominant ethnic group in Itu LGA, a predominance they enjoy in Akwa Ibom State as a whole. Odukpani LGA is predominated by the Efiks and other groups such as Qua/Ejagham, Kiong and other ethnic groups who are also found in other LGAs in Cross River State. Sandwiched among the Ibibios of Itu LGA is Ikot Offiong (a.k.a. Ikorofiong), a community of Efik ethnic group. The Ikorofiong occupy both sides of the Cross River, southerly of the Itu Bridge. They and other Efik settlements in that area make up Mbiabo, one of the seven Efik royal branches.

[...]

As stated earlier, the LGAs in the old Cross River State were shared such that Itu and Odukpani belonged to Akwa Ibom and Cross River States respectively. As straightforward as the apportionment seemed, a controversy soon arose as to where the exact line of demarcation was. On the one hand, the border was alleged to be the Cross River as a natural feature separating both LGAs and by extension, states. On the other hand, some in Akwa Ibom State asserted that the border lay at a point further eastward of Cross River, at Okpokong River, which is about five kilometres away. They claimed that the purported inclusion of some communities in the disputed areas in Odukpani LGA was a nullity as the Cross River State Variation Order #2 or the Local Government Creation Law #5 of 1983 had been repealed by Decree #1 of 1984. It must be clearly stated that given either of the two arguments as to the boundary of the two states, Ikot Offiong would still be in Akwa Ibom State.

[...]

Sometime in early 2000, according to some respondents and newspaper reports,¹⁸³ some unknown persons suspected to have been deployed from Oku Iboku attacked Ikot Offiong, razed property and sacked the community. Unconfirmed reports say scores of people were killed in that incident. An ancient Presbyterian Church in Ikot Offiong that became a refuge for fleeing

residents was equally razed. Ikot Offiong inhabitants became internally displaced and ran across the Cross River to their Efik kin in Cross River State. That attack was in response to a decision of an Akwa Ibom High Court, which ruled in favour of Ikot Offiong in a land dispute with their Oku Iboku neighbours.

The crisis in Odukpani LGA

Following the crisis in Itu LGA and the influx of displaced people into Odukpani LGA, the Cross River State government kept promising the displaced people of its willingness to provide a proper settlement for them, with the assistance of the federal government, but this has yet to arrive or be received. On December 18-19 2001, armed militia entered Usung Esuk in Odukpani LGA of Cross River State and attacked the village and their harboured visitors, Ikot Offiong. Lives and property were destroyed and many rendered homeless.

[...]

The entire Ikot Offiong community has been displaced twice: first from their ancestral home in Itu LGA in Akwa Ibom State and next in Usung Esuk, in Odukpani LGA of Cross River State where they had gone for refuge. For Ikot Offiong, the entire village was destroyed and has been rendered uninhabitable with the alleged planting of gmelina in the area. It would perhaps require extra efforts to resettle them on the same spot as many of them insist on going back to their ancestral home in Akwa Ibom State. With the local government and presidential elections due soon, the Ikot Offiong community and its members individually, still being displaced are unlikely to exercise their rights to vote or be voted for.

Today the internally displaced persons from Ikot Offiong are harboured in an abandoned housing estate in Ikot Ekpo, Calabar Municipal LGA, a property that the new owners the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Authority (NEPZA) are threatening to take possession of soon. This serial displacement has precluded the Ikot Offiong community from carrying out their traditional fishing and farming. Their children are also no longer able to continue their education."

Clashes between communities in the Akwa Ibom state displace hundreds, April 2003

Xinhua, 30 April 2003

"At least 22 persons are feared dead as fighting between Ifiayong Usuk and Mbiakong communities in Nigeria's southern state of Akwa Ibom continued for the seventh day, local radio reported Wednesday [30 April 2003].

According to the report, about 200 houses had been destroyed and 228 families displaced.

The report said that displaced persons who could not be settled down at the camps were continuing to stream to Uyo, the capital of Akwa Ibom, for safety.

Tension still remained high in the trouble spots although more police had been dispatched to the area to suppress the riots and maintain social order.

Fighting between the two warring communities erupted on April 23 when youths from Ifiayong Usuk allegedly kidnapped an Mbiakong woman on a farmland which had been in dispute between the two villages.

Obong Etim Orok, chairman of the Local Government Transition Committee, on Tuesday called on the state and federal governments to intervene and take over the disputed land."

Displacement caused by conflicts in oil-producing southern Nigeria

People from Nembe in Bayelsa State temporarily displaced as political factions attack and counterattack, July 2002

- Dozens of people reported killed in a political conflict in Ogbolomabiri, a part of Nembe town, in July 2002
- Fighting in Nembe between two rival youth groups related to Bayelsa politicians competing for political power
- Political power particularly attractive as it means control over funds received from the oil companies
- HRW mission in February 2003 found that Nembe remained less populated than normal

HRW, April 2003, pp. 5, 9

"In Nembe local government area (LGA), dozens of people were reported killed in a political conflict in Ogbolomabiri, a part of Nembe town, in July 2002. Fighting first broke out in Nembe on July 5, 2002, the day of the local primaries for the PDP, the national ruling party as well as the party of the Bayelsa State governor. Conflict in Bayelsa at the time of the PDP primaries was not limited to Nembe; the Ijaw Council for Human Rights (ICHR), a local human rights organization, also documented outbreaks of violence in Brass and Ogbia LGAs. The fighting in Nembe occurred between two rival youth groups, whose patrons were Bayelsa politicians eager to secure the vote in Ogbolomabiri for their respective political factions. Many residents fled the town. On July 20, another serious spate of violence occurred as the group that had been ousted on July 5 returned to reclaim its previous position of authority. Thereafter, some residents returned to the town, though many have stayed away. When they spoke with Human Rights Watch researchers in February 2003, many residents believed that violence was likely to break out again at the general elections.

Background

Nembe has been aptly described as a semi-republic within Nigeria. A town isolated by water and lack of infrastructure in the creeks of the Niger Delta, the town of Nembe has been effectively ruled for around the last ten years by so-called youth groups, and their patrons, with little direct intervention from government. Those in control of the town also control the relatively lucrative relationship with Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), which operates one of the most productive wells in West Africa in the Nembe area. Recently, fighting has occurred between two youth groups based within Ogbolomabiri. Chief Lionel Jonathan, who in July 2002 was Commissioner for Environment under Bayelsa State Governor Alamiyeseigha and director of the governor's re-election campaign organization, is the patron of one of these groups, the Isongo-furo. Throughout the mid- to late-nineties, Jonathan controlled Ogbolomabiri through the Isongo-furo group, which ruled through violence and intimidation. According to testimonies of local residents, the Isongo-furo had openly displayed arms when they were in control of the town.

[...]

Human Rights Watch researchers visited Ogbolomabiri in February 2003 but were unable to speak with any representatives of the Isongo-furo there because the youth group had been effectively banned from returning to the community. Virtually all the Ogbolomabiri residents we spoke with in Ogbolomabiri or Port Harcourt reported that they had fled the area either when the fighting began on July 5 or in the days immediately following, with the exception of one young woman who told us that her entire family had fled and she would have, too, had she had the means. Though many residents returned after July 20, the town is still less populated than it once

was. The Isenasawo were in full control of the town when we visited. They claimed, and a representative of the Chief's Council agreed, that they had turned over management of the relationship with oil companies to the Chiefs' Council, where it had traditionally been until the early 1990s.

Residents flee political violence in Ogu/Bolo River State, August 2002

- Political violence and intimidation in Ogu in the Rivers State linked to Governor's struggle to consolidate his power.
- Reports of fleeing residents seeking shelter in the state capital, Port Harcourt but numbers not confirmed
- "Hundreds" of IDPs from Ogu still sheltered in Port Harcourt in February 2003

HRW, April 2003, pp. 10, 12-13

"On August 6, 2002, about one month before the national voter registration process was due to begin, fighting broke out between the ANPP and PDP factions in Ogu, the headquarters of Ogu/Bolo local government area, during a personnel audit of the local government's staff. At least one person was reported killed, several people were injured, and significant property was destroyed. Hundreds and perhaps thousands of members of the ANPP and other residents fled Ogu, some of them moving into sites for groups of displaced persons in the state capital, Port Harcourt. Since that date, there have been several killings linked to the political conflict between the two parties, and political opponents of the PDP are still unwilling to return home.

On March 5, 2003, Marshall Harry, national vice chairman of the ANPP for the South-South zone, was assassinated in Abuja. Although those responsible for the killing have not yet been identified, the case called attention to the violent nature of conflict in Rivers State between Governor Peter Odili of the PDP and his opponents. Marshall Harry, a Rivers State politician, had been a major critic of Governor Odili's administration. According to southern-based non-governmental organizations, there have been frequent bouts of political violence and intimidation in Rivers State over the last year or more, as Governor Odili has attempted to consolidate his power.

[...]

Human Rights Watch visited two sites set up in Port Harcourt for displaced persons from Ogu; each was still hosting hundreds of people in February 2003. These sites were not set up by the government but rather were supported by private individuals. One was set up through Chief Ada George in the Rivers State UNPP headquarters and the other was at the premises of a church. We were unable to confirm the claim by ANPP and UNPP members from Ogu that tens of thousands of persons had been displaced. Some of the people we spoke with reported they had lost their means of livelihood and had received no support from the state or federal government."

Ogoni clashes displace hundreds, May 2002

- Multinational oil companies have been accused of causing rivalries by favouring one local community over another
- The conflict in Bori town, southern Nigeria, between two communities of the minority Ogoni ethnic group displaced hundreds
- An official stated that the clashes were linked to jostling by politicians ahead of the coming elections, meant to manipulate longstanding differences between two communities for political ends
- Some IDPs seeking shelter in the nearby city of Port Harcourt

IRIN-WA, 17 May 2002

"At least 15 people were killed and hundreds displaced in clashes between two communities of the minority Ogoni ethnic group in Nigeria's southern oil region, residents said on Tuesday.

Catholic Church officials said about 100 people who fled the clashes had taken refuge at the main parish church in the nearby city of Port Harcourt, where they were provided some relief assistance.

The clashes over ownership of parts of Bori, the main town of the 500,000 strong Ogoni in the Niger Delta, had the Yege and Lakpor communities engaged in reprisal attacks during most of last week. Several houses were also destroyed.

Armed policemen were deployed to the area to stop the violence and a meeting of traditional rulers, community leaders and youth groups was convened on Tuesday to mediate an end to the latest crisis in the area."

BBC, 11 May 2002

"Whatever the immediate cause of this latest disagreement, the plight of the Ogoni people - living in poverty amid the vast riches of the oil fields of the Niger Delta - has long been recognised.

Multinational oil companies have been accused of favouring one local community over another, provoking mutual rivalries, and successive governments have at best ignored and at worst repressed violently local rights activists."

The events could also have had a political motive:

IRIN, 14 May 2002

"With the end of military rule and the emergence of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, Nigeria's federal government has taken steps to end the legacy of impunity left in Ogoni by the military.

But with elections due later this year and early in 2003, fears have been expressed that political manipulation may lead to more violence in Ogoni and other parts of Nigeria. MOSOP had warned earlier this year the activities of some politicians were creating the atmosphere for violence in Ogoniland.

A MOSOP official told IRIN the latest events were linked to jostling by politicians ahead of the coming elections. "It's a case of some people manipulating longstanding differences between two communities for political ends," he said."

Oil resources makes competition for political power particularly violent in the southern Delta region, 1999-2004

- Risk that inflow of money from oil companies to local communities reinforce factional violence within a community or between one village and the next
- Impunity for abuses more likely in the Delta as lack of infrastructure limit information flows
- Violence linked to state corruption and competition for public posts
- The federal government has established a Niger Delta Development Commission with the mandate to develop the oil producing areas

- Widespread deployment of army, navy, and paramilitary Mobile Police at oil facilities across the delta

See also Amnesty International, *'Nigeria: Are human rights in the pipeline?'* 9 November 2004

HRW, April 2003, p.23

"In Nigeria's southern Niger delta region, the oil-related resources at stake coupled with grinding poverty have meant that competition for political power is particularly violent. At the community level, groups that control the relationship with locally-operating oil companies may derive at least some benefits in terms of employment of unskilled labor and small-scale development of their communities. Although this inter-communal competition does not necessarily fall along ethnic lines, when it does the violence may become even fiercer. Serious fighting in Warri, Delta State, during a senatorial primary election in February 2003 and further clashes in March 2003 provide a case in point."

IRIN, 12 December 2001

"The 70,000-sq km Niger Delta is one of the three largest wetland areas in the world, with a unique but fragile ecosystem. It produces more than 90 percent of the crude oil that is the lifeblood of the Nigerian economy. However, more than four decades of oil exploration and production by international oil companies in the area left massive environmental degradation. As a result the farming and fishing communities of the region watched their yield decline dramatically over the years.

[...]

In the past decade, neglect suffered by the region also fuelled restive feelings among impoverished locals. Violence swirled through the region as angry youths disrupted oil operations, kidnapped expatriate employees of oil multinationals for ransom or fought each other for the few benefits that came from oil companies. On the eve of Obasanjo's election in 1999, violence in the region had spiralled out of control and become a threat to Nigeria's oil production, often cutting exports by as much as a third."

HRW, October 2002, pp.2, 3, 7

"When a civilian government was reinstated in Nigeria in 1999, many of those living in the Niger Delta region, the source of Nigeria's oil wealth, hoped that a "democratic dividend" would end decades of neglect they had suffered under successive military regimes. From the early 1990s a cycle of protest and repression had led to the militarization of large parts of the delta, notably in Ogoniland, a small area of Rivers State where demonstrations leading to the closure of oil production had led to a five-year deployment of a special military taskforce to the area and the 1995 execution of nine minority rights leaders, including author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. The situation has eased under the new government, and in particular Ogoniland is no longer occupied. But there is still widespread deployment of army, navy, and paramilitary Mobile Police at oil facilities across the delta. In November 1999, five months after the new government headed by President Olusegun Obasanjo took office, soldiers destroyed the town of Odi, in Bayelsa State, killing hundreds of people. Though the past three years have seen no incident of similar seriousness in the delta area, past human rights violations by the security forces have gone unpunished and new abuses related to oil production continue to be committed. Moreover, though vastly increased sums of money are flowing from the federal government to the delta region, under a new "derivation formula" that requires at least 13 percent of the oil revenue to be returned to the states where it is produced, ordinary people living in the delta see little if any benefit from these funds.

[...]

The environment of the Niger Delta, and the difficulties of transport and communication in the mangrove forest areas, where telephones are not accessible to most people, means that often

information is late and unreliable. Impunity for abuses-too often the norm in Nigeria-is thus even more likely in the delta. There have not been any attempts to investigate or prosecute those who were responsible for hundreds of deaths and massive property destruction in Ogoniland and Odi.

[...]

The federal government has tried to respond to discontent in the delta region by setting up a Niger Delta Development Commission with the mandate to develop the oil producing areas. [...] In any event, the states and local government authorities in the delta region have showed themselves largely unable to spend effectively the increased sums they are receiving. As a result, discontent among the people of the delta remains high, both with the government and with the oil companies. Conflict related to local government, state, and federal elections that will take place during 2002-2003 has already been more bloody in the Niger Delta than elsewhere in Nigeria. Occupations of oil facilities and other protests directed at the oil companies continue unabated.

[...]

[Oil companies]are thus targeted for protest by the communities in which they work. Responding to these protests-which range from politically motivated occupations of their facilities that close down production to essentially criminal hostage-taking for ransom-the oil companies now have quite extensive programs for community development projects in the "host communities" for oil facilities, make substantial payments for allowing oil work to be carried out both to local government authorities and to other interest groups in the areas they are working, and frequently hire youth as "ghost workers" or for "surveillance contracts" in order to satisfy a demand for employment that cannot be met in this capital- rather than labor-intensive industry. In other cases, they hand out cash payments, sometimes to legitimate representatives of the communities where they operate as compensation, for example for spills, but often to individuals or groups who have gone into hostage-taking or oil facility occupation as a means of earning a living. These payments, even the best intentioned, have themselves generated problems. The companies have in most cases taken insufficient care to monitor the use made of their money; in particular, to ensure that it does not reinforce factional violence within a community or between one village and the next. In addition, they continue to fail to monitor closely security force activity at or near their facilities or where work is being carried out on their behalf, or, in many cases, to intervene with the authorities when abuses are committed.

[...]

The presence of the oil companies in the Niger Delta exacerbates communal tensions of the type seen across Nigeria. The weakness of conflict resolution structures-whether the courts, responsible elected and appointed state officials, or the law enforcement agencies-means that many disputes in Nigeria are settled violently that could have been resolved through peaceful means. In Nigeria generally, the level of state corruption means that government positions are highly sought after and that competition for party candidacy or electoral victory often leads to violence. In the Niger Delta, the stakes are higher, even at local government level, because of the amount of money that flows to the delta, both through state structures and directly from the oil companies. Conflict related to local government, state, and federal elections that will take place during 2002-2003 has already been more bloody in the Niger Delta than elsewhere in Nigeria."

Environmental pollution caused by the oil production is also a cause behind ongoing conflicts:

Ibeanu, 1998, p.49

"These conflicts date to the very beginnings of oil exploration in Nigeria. Most of them, however, date to the past ten years and still remain unresolved. Several oil-producing communities, especially in the Rivers, Delta and Cross-River states, have had to cope with continuing military and police 'occupation' and systematic state repression, sometimes taking the form of extra-judicial killings enacted in summary executions. The disputes usually arise over environmental pollution and material deprivation in these communities. Villages like Umuechem, Obagi, Brass, Nembe Creek and Rumuobiokani, as well as dozens in Ogoniland, all in Rivers state, have experienced extensive population displacement resulting from environmental pollution caused by

crude oil mining and refining, as well as from material deprivation and state violence. The relationship between the multinational oil company Shell, the Nigerian state and the Ogoni people, which culminated in the mock trial and execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, is well-documented."

Political violence in Delta region, 2003-2005

- Warri is a base for oil operations and tension between the communities has been intensified by the competition for benefits from the oil companies.
- One root cause is the tension between the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ijaw ethnic groups linked to the number of electoral wards allocated to each community and the drawing of boundaries between wards
- More than 200 people were killed in 2003 in fighting between Ijaws and Itsekeris around Warri, mostly over claims of ownership of oil-bearing land
- In June 2004 at least 50 people were reportedly killed in a clash between government troops and Ijaw militants near the oil city of Port Harcourt
- In September 2004 at least 100 people were reported killed and more than 6,000 displaced in Port Harcourt in violence the government blamed on an Ijaw militia group led by Asari Dokubo
- A Human Rights Watch mission to Rivers State in November 2004 found that months of clashes between Asari's militia and his main rival, Ateke Tom, had caused the displacement of tens of thousands of villagers and serious human rights abuses
- In February 2005 government troops allegedly killed at least 30 people and torched houses whilst investigating an oil dispute between two communities in Bayelsa state

November 2002

IRIN, 5 November 2002

"Tension is mounting in Nigeria's oil region Delta state over recent deployment of troops amid allegations by residents that they were subjecting several ethnic Ijaw communities to harassment.

Residents of villages including Diebiri, Batan, Ajuju, Ewerigbene and Kumusi said scores of heavily armed naval personnel have been deployed in their riverine communities since an oil spill last month, which affected their farmlands and fishing areas."

January 2003

HRW, April 2003, pp.26-27

"Some of the most recent large-scale violence in Nigeria broke out in and around Warri, Delta State, on January 31, 2003, and again in March 2003. On January 31, the PDP attempted, for the second time, to hold party primaries for Delta South Senatorial District. There is a history of conflict between the Itsekiri, Urhobo, and other ethnic groups in the area, but the immediate tension between the Itsekiri and Urhobo was motivated by a dispute over the number of electoral wards allocated to each community and the drawing of boundaries between wards. The military also played a major role in what happened; according to reports, one of the first casualties was a soldier, and many of the initial deaths were a result of military reprisal. The exact number of people killed over several days of fighting is unclear, but it seems likely that at least dozens died. According to news reports in the first day or two of fighting, individual eyewitnesses had reported seeing twelve, eighteen, and twenty bodies; a local organization estimated that at least two hundred people were killed. The Nigerian Red Cross reported that the fighting had left more than six thousand people displaced from their homes.

The Itsekiri and Urhobo ethnic groups are two of the main groups in Warri South local government area, with Ijaw and other groups also represented. The January 2003 conflict was not the first time that ethnic groups in the area had clashed. In 1997, a dispute between the Ijaw and Itsekiris over the location of the local government headquarters led to a crisis that left scores of people dead. Again in 1999, fighting between the Itsekiri and Urhobo led to many deaths. Both clashes occasioned the intervention of the military, which was still patrolling the area when the crisis broke out in January 2003. Because Warri is a major base for multinational oil operations, tension between the communities has been intensified by the competition for benefits from the oil companies.

The delineation of wards in the local government in the lead-up to the repeat senatorial primary left Urhobos feeling disenfranchised. The specific issue was whether the number of wards controlled by the Urhobo would increase from two to four. According to news reports, officials from the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had recognized only two Urhobo wards in accrediting delegates for the primaries, despite claims from some Urhobo groups that INEC had earlier approved two additional wards.

On the afternoon of January 31, Urhobo youths from Okere, disgruntled by their inability to participate in the primary, proceeded to an Itsekiri area of Okere and began to loot and burn property. Soldiers who had been stationed there since the earlier crises intervened, and one soldier was shot and killed during the attempt to stop the rioting; it was unclear whether he was killed accidentally by other security forces or by the rioters. Meanwhile, a group of Itsekiris voting at the township stadium heard of what had happened and began to rush to Okere; on their way, they encountered an army detachment. According to one version of events, the soldiers opened fire on the Itsekiris in reprisal for the earlier killing of a soldier, apparently either not realizing that the earlier burning and looting that led to a soldier's death had been committed by Urhobos, or not knowing the people they had encountered were Itsekiris. The random shooting by soldiers reportedly led to several deaths among the Itsekiris as well as passersby. Over the next two days, as the Itsekiris attempted to avenge their losses, killing, looting, and burning of homes and other buildings spread to various surrounding neighborhoods. Although the military intervened early on, they were unable to halt the violence completely, and the fighting renewed in intensity on February 2. On February 3, the state government imposed a dusk to dawn curfew. As military reinforcements were sent to the area, most activity in the city ground to a halt, although a local organization reported that this still did not stop some attacks and counter-attacks. Fighting finally appeared to peter out on February 5 and 6.

From March 13, 2003, serious fighting broke out again, primarily in Warri Southwest LGA. In clashes between the Ijaws and the Itsekiris, and between the Ijaw and the military, scores of people were killed and dozens of villages destroyed over a period of around two weeks, according to reports from local non-governmental organizations, journalists and other sources. One of the reasons for the fighting between Ijaws and Itsekiris was a dispute over the distribution of electoral wards, which the Ijaws believed favored the Itsekiris. The majority of the victims in the fighting between the two groups were reported to be Itsekiris. After four military personnel were killed on March 13, a large contingent of Nigerian army, navy and police was deployed to the area, clashing primarily with Ijaw youths. There were reports of indiscriminate reprisal attacks by the security forces on Ijaw communities, particularly in the village of Okerenkoko; dozens of Ijaws were reported to have been killed."

March 2003

IRIN, 19 March 2003

"Violence has escalated in southern Nigeria's Niger Delta, with militants from one community attacking villages populated by a rival ethnic group and storming an oil facility, officials and residents said on Tuesday.

At least seven people were killed on Monday [17 March 2003] when armed Ijaw militants in speed boats attacked the Itshekiri villages of Aruton and Madangho, residents said, bringing the death toll in a week of clashes to 15.

[...]

Many displaced residents of the affected communities took refuge inside ChevronTexaco's Escravos compound and arrangements were being made to transfer them to other safe locations, Omole added.

The latest violence brought to 15 the number of people who had died since Ijaw militants and naval troops exchanged gunfire at the Ijaw village of Okerenkoko on 13 March. Five civilians and two soldiers were killed in that clash.

[...]

The conflict is directly linked to a violent dispute which broke out in Warri in February between the Urhobo and the Itshekiri communities over the delineation of electoral wards ahead of general elections in April-May. The Ijaws have sided with the Urhobo, alleging that the distribution of wards favoured the Itshekiri."

IRIN, 21 March 2003

"At least 60 people were killed on Thursday [20 March 2003] in Nigeria's volatile Niger Delta oil region during a pitched battle between troops and ethnic Ijaw militants fought a pitched battle, military sources and militants said.

The latest confrontation signaled a worsening of a confrontation that has disrupted the operations of oil transnationals in the area and cut Nigeria's oil exports of about two million barrels a day by more than 10 percent.

[...]

Oil giants Royal/Dutch Shell and ChevronTexaco, which have operations in the conflict-ridden area have been pulling out their staff and shutting down facilities. They have also been helping to evacuate scores of displaced people from communities affected by the fighting."

May 2003

IRIN, 14 May 2003

"At least 25 people have been killed in a fresh outbreak of political violence in the volatile southern oil town of Warri, residents and officials said on Wednesday.

Residents said violence between supporters of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the rival Alliance for Democracy (AD) broke out on Monday in the Effurun district of Warri and continued on Tuesday. Several buildings were burned down.

"More than 25 people have been killed and some houses are still burning," Thompson Mukoro, a resident, in Warri, the capital of Nigeria's Delta state, told IRIN."

AFP, 15 May 2003

"Some 12,000 people have fled fighting in the southern Nigerian oil city of Warri, the Nigerian Red Cross said Thursday [15 May 2003] as it launched a relief operation.

At least 18 people have been killed in three days of riots between armed political gangs in the Effurun district of the Niger Delta city, according to witnesses. Press reports speak of up to 25 casualties.

'As of last night, around 12,000 people have been displaced,' Red Cross president Emmanuel Ijewere told AFP.

'These are people either made homeless because their houses have been burnt or were forced to flee the conflict area,' he said."

July 2003

IRIN, 29 July 2003

"Renewed fighting between militias from the Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic groups in Nigeria's volatile Niger Delta have killed at least 25 people in the past week and displaced hundreds, residents said on Tuesday.

And in yet another incident underlining escalating restiveness in the region, women protesters occupied an oil facility belonging to oil giant Royal/Dutch Shell to back demands for jobs and amenities for their community while an employee of Chevron-Texaco has been kidnapped by armed militants.

An attack on Abi-Gborodo, an Itsekiri village on the bank of Warri River last Thursday in which at least 15 people were killed, was followed on Friday by an apparently retaliatory attack on the nearby Ijaw village on Mangorogbene in which 10 people were killed, local officials said.

'The information we have now is that at least 25 people have died in these attacks,' Mike Birisibe, an official of Warri North local government, where the incidents occurred, told IRIN. He said hundreds of people had fled their homes while several others were still missing, presumed injured and likely to die in the bush.

He said attempts were made by armed attackers suspected to be Ijaw militants on Saturday and Sunday to invade the mainly Itsekiri town of Koko - still largely in ruins following attacks in April - but were repelled by troops now stationed there."

August 2003

IRIN, 22 August 2003

"The Nigerian Red Cross said on Friday about 100 people were killed in five days of ethnic violence that rocked the southern oil city of Warri.

The federal government meanwhile set up a task force protect oil wells in the area and crack down on the massive theft of crude oil from pipelines.

The shadowy figures behind this racket are widely believed to have flooded the Niger Delta with sophisticated weaponry that used by the tribal gangs to attack each other and the government's security forces.

Fighting erupted between rival militias of the Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic groups on 15 August, defying a night curfew declared by the Delta State government. Gangs of armed youths armed with automatic rifles engaged each other in a series of gun battles.

Calm returned to the city on 20 August as troop reinforcements arrived. The Delta State government said it had persuaded the warring groups to agree a truce.

'With calm now returning to the city we are beginning to see the extent of the damage and have reason to believe close to 100 people died,' Emmanuel Ijewere, president of the Red Cross told IRIN.

He said more than 1,000 people had been treated by the Red Cross, mostly for minor injuries, while more than 4,000 had been displaced from their homes."

October 2003

IRIN, 23 October 2003

"Fresh ethnic clashes around the Nigerian oil town of Warri have claimed several lives over the past week, threatening a fragile ceasefire secured between rival tribal militias in the troubled Niger Delta, residents said on Thursday.

More than a dozen people have been killed since Saturday in violent clashes between armed groups from the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo tribes, the main ethnic groups inhabiting the Warri area, they said.

Ijaw militant leader Bello Oboko said a boatload of Ijaws, mostly women and children were attacked on Tuesday by armed men while travelling between the riverside towns of Ogulagha and Burutu. He blamed the attack - in which he said four people died - on rival Itsekiri militants.

[...]

But Daniel Iremiji, who leads the Itsekiri Youths Council, denied it was a premeditated attack. He blamed Ijaws instead for sparking the latest clashes.

[...]

Ijaws and Urhobos have in the past been allies against the Itsekiri, who are perceived by both groups to be getting more than their fair share of benefits accruing from oil operations in the western Niger Delta.

But the alliance appears threatened by the clashes between the Urhobo village of Okwagbe and the Ijaw village of Ayakoromo in Burutu local council area over a land dispute."

IRIN, 9 December 2003

"More than 200 people have been killed this year in fighting between Ijaws and Itsekiris around Warri. Much of the fighting have been over claims of ownership of oil bearing land, which the poor communities in the region believe will attract to them amenities and other benefits that flow from oil production.

Following fighting in October in which more than 100 people had died, the Nigerian government had sent in a military taskforce to pacify the region and it has since imposed a fragile truce between the warring sides."

June 2004

IRIN, 7 June 2004

"At least 50 people died in a clash between government troops and Ijaw militants near the oil city of Port Harcourt in southeastern Nigeria at the end of last week, witnesses and a local human rights organisation said.

However, a military spokesman denied there had been any casualties when troops raided the nearby community of Ogbakiri before dawn on Friday.

The armed forces said they shot dead 17 pirates in an unrelated incident near Warri in the west of the oil-rich Niger Delta on Saturday.

Eye witnesses, including local residents, said the security forces used gunboats, helicopters and ground troops in the attack near Port Harcourt. They said the security forces killed more than 50

people as they occupied Ogbakiri and exchanged fire with militants said to have abducted two policemen.

They accused the security forces of firing indiscriminately and burning houses in Ogbakiri and in other neighbouring communities."

September 2004

IRIN, 10 September 2004

"At least 100 people have been killed and more than 6,000 displaced from their homes in Nigeria's oil city of Port Harcourt as a result of gang violence over the past month and attempts by the security forces to suppress it, a local human rights group said on Friday.

The Lagos-based Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR) said thousands of residents in Port Harcourt and nearby villages had been forced to flee their homes as a result of these clashes.

They involved at least two local militia groups which have political connections. The armed bands finance themselves by tapping oil illegally from pipelines in the Niger Delta and selling it to tankers waiting offshore."

CDHR said the worsening security situation around Port Harcourt raised questions about the legitimacy of the government of Rivers State, of which it is the capital.

According to official results, Governor Peter Odili and his People's Democratic Party (PDP) each won 98 percent of the vote in last year's elections.

This is the party of President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was returned to power for a second four-year term in the April 2003 elections.

All the main opposition parties and many independent observers protested at what they said was widespread fraud.

Obasanjo's government blames the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, a group of armed Ijaw militants led by Asari Dokubo, for the recent spate of attacks on Port Harcourt.

Last week, the federal authorities sent in extra troops to start 24-hour street patrols in the city of three million people, which controls most of Nigeria's strategic oil production."

HRW, February 2005

"On September 27, 2004, the leader of a powerful armed group threatened to launch an 'all-out war' in the Niger Delta -- sending shock waves through the oil industry -- unless the federal government ceded greater control of the region's vast oil resources to the Ijaw people, the majority tribe in the Niger Delta. The threat, made by Alhaji Dokubo Asari, leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), followed the deployment of federal government troops to quell months of intense fighting between the NDPVF and a rival armed group, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom. The threat also provoked an immediate response from multinational oil companies, global financial markets, and Nigerian government officials. Shell Petroleum Development Company, which produces about half of Nigeria's approximately 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd) production, shut down a facility that produces some 28,000 bpd because security concerns prevented the company from traveling to the area to fix a technical problem. The threat of supply disruption rattled already twitchy oil markets, and helped push global crude prices above an unprecedented U.S. \$50 a barrel.

A Human Rights Watch fact-finding mission to Rivers State in November 2004 found that months of fighting between the armed groups has led to serious human rights abuses against ordinary Nigerians. The violence between Asari's NDPVF and Tom's NDV occurred mainly in riverine villages southeast and southwest of Port Harcourt, known as the oil capital of Nigeria, and within Port Harcourt itself. Since late 2003, the running fight for control of these villages and towns has resulted in the deaths of dozens of local people and forced tens of thousands to flee their homes. Schools and businesses have closed, and homes and property worth millions of dollars has been destroyed. Hundreds of mostly young male fighters have also been killed. The violence has created a profound climate of fear and insecurity in Rivers State, leaving local people reluctant to return to their homes or to seek justice for the crimes committed.

The recent violence in Rivers State is primarily the result of a struggle between the NDPVF and rival NDV for control over illegal oil revenues. Underlying the conflict are several key issues that fuel the violence, including: the manipulation of frustrated youth¹ by political leaders, traditional elites, and organized crime syndicates involved in oil theft; the impact of oil money on community politics; crushing poverty and youth unemployment; and the widespread availability of small arms and other lethal weapons. Human Rights Watch found strong evidence to suggest that senior members of the state government at one time gave financial or logistical support to Asari and Tom, laying the foundations for a later conflict that would spin out of control. Both the leaders of armed groups and their backers have been emboldened in their acts of brutal violence by the prevailing culture of impunity. Across the Niger Delta, as throughout Nigeria, impunity from prosecution for individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses has created a devastating cycle of increasing conflict and violence."

February 2005

IRIN, 24 February 2005

"Residents in a rural town in the southern Niger Delta said government troops killed at least 30 people and torched houses during a raid carried out as part of investigations into an oil dispute between two local communities.

More than 200 soldiers in gunboats attacked the remote town of Odioma in the Nembe district of Bayelsa state on Saturday, burning houses and firing at the inhabitants as they fled in confusion, residents said.

Nimi Barigha-Amange, a clan chief in the area, said more than 30 bodies had been recovered and that many people were still missing.

Felix Tuodolo, a local minority rights activist, circulated a list compiled by the Odioma community of 33 people allegedly killed by the soldiers.

But a spokesman for the Nigerian army denied that there had been any deaths in the incident, which took place near the Atlantic coast 80 km southwest of Port Harcourt, the hub of Nigeria's vital oil industry.

[...]

Both Odioma and the neighbouring town of Obioku each lay claim to a stretch of swampland adjoining the two communities where Shell recently began drilling for oil.

Earlier this month, a boat taking local leaders mediating in the dispute to Obioku was attacked by gunmen, whom the authorities suspect came from Odioma. Four local officials were among the 12 people killed in the attack.

Army spokesman Yusuf said troops had been sent to hunt down those responsible. But he said the soldiers came under fire as they approached Odioma last Saturday and opened fire in return.

A Shell spokesman declined to comment on the violence, saying the land dispute was a matter for the Nigerian authorities to resolve. Shell has in the meantime suspended drilling activities in the disputed patch of swamp land, known as Owukubu.

Violence between communities laying competing claims to oil land and the jobs and welfare amenities associated with it, is rife in the impoverished Niger Delta, the region that produces much of Nigeria's 2.5 million barrels of daily oil exports.

In response to violence by gangs of criminals and militants who steal oil from pipelines, kidnap workers and generally disrupt oil operations, President Olusegun Obasanjo's government has deployed thousands of troops to the region in the past two years."

POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global figures

Undetermined number of IDPs in Nigeria, 2006

Complex movement patterns combined with the overwhelming lack of data in Nigeria makes the issue of numbers of IDPs very problematic. There has been no systematic registration or verification of numbers of IDPs and figures are often “grossly misleading,” according to Zanna Muhammed, deputy director of the National Emergency Management Agency.

According to the Nigerian presidential adviser on Migration and Humanitarian Affairs, in April 2006, estimates on the number of IDPs in Nigeria varied from 500,000 to millions. The 2005 UN Humanitarian Appeal (CAP) for West Africa put the total number of IDPs in Nigeria at 200,000 (as of November 2004) – although this too must be based on guesswork. It is therefore safe to say there is an undetermined number of IDPs in Nigeria.

The vast majority of displaced people in Nigeria seek refuge with family, friends or host communities where their ethnic group is in the majority. Others seek shelter in major towns. Many appear to return to their homes or resettle in the proximity of their home areas soon after the violence has subsided, but an unknown number also resettle in other areas of the country. It is therefore difficult to distinguish between movements of people forced to flee by violence and those moving for economic reasons.

UN estimate of total number of IDPs is 200,000 – but reliable statistics are non-existent, November 2004

- The 2005 Humanitarian Appeal (CAP) for West Africa puts the total number of IDPs in Nigeria at 200,000 (as of November 2004)
- According to the Nigerian government, 250,000 people remain displaced across the country (as of June 2004), and as many as 800,000 have been displaced in the last four years
- There is no independent verification of these figures, as data collection and tracking of population movements have been virtually non-existent

The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Humanitarian Appeal 2005 for West Africa, 11 November 2004, p9, states that there are 200,000 IDPs in Nigeria

GIDPP, 30 June 2004

“The government estimates that there are currently 250,000 IDPs in Nigeria..... [but] in the case of recent attacks and displacement in general, no systematic effort has been made to objectively document population movement in Nigeria.”

IRIN, 2 January 2004

“Some 800,000 people have been displaced from their homes as a result of communal and religious clashes that have rocked Nigeria over the past four years, according to the government's National Commission for Refugees (NCR).”

Igna Gabriel, the head of the NCR, told reporters in the capital Abuja on Thursday that areas with the highest concentrations of displaced people were Plateau and Benue states in central Nigeria, Yobe State in the Northeast, Cross River State in the Southeast and the oil-rich Niger Delta.

He did not provide any breakdown of the figures by state or region.

However, Gabriel said Plateau State had the highest number of displaced people as a result of clashes between Christians and Muslim communities there. These had led to the burning down of 72 villages over the past two years, he noted.

More than 1,000 people were killed in sectarian clashes between Christians and Muslims in Jos, the Plateau State capital, in September 2001.

Subsequently a low intensity conflict spread to the surrounding countryside, where the mainly Christian farmers clashed repeatedly with the predominantly Muslim livestock herders.

Several hundred more people died in these skirmishes, which forced several thousand people to abandon their homes.

Gabriel said most of the displaced people in Nigeria were women and children who were psychologically traumatised and required counselling as well as food and other material assistance."

Geographical distribution

Estimates of number of people displaced by violence in Plateau State, February-May 2004, vary between 40,000 and 258,000

- Following the February-May 2004 attacks in Plateau State, there were anything between 40,000 and over 258,000 IDPs either within the state or in neighbouring Bauchi and Nassarawa states
- Most IDPs were absorbed in host communities, making it difficult to ascertain figures accurately

NRCS, 1 October 2004

"Plateau State witnessed series of ethno-religious conflicts since the year 2000. The most recent one was in May, 2004 which led to the displacement of over 40,000 people from Plateau to neighboring Bauchi and Nasarawa States. The figure included people displaced in Kano as a result of a reprisal attack immediately following the attack on Yelwa in Plateau State.

As at October, 2004 there are a total of 625 families consisting of 3,128 people displaced in both Bauchi and Nasarawa States in this order;

BAUCHI

- Unguwan Barno Primary School	1,320
- Women Centre	734
- Boto Village	122
- Maraba Liman Katagum	54
- Tashan Mai Alewa	43

NASARAWA

- Shinge	645
- Shabu	110
- Nasarawa Eggon	100

The displaced persons in Kano have either been integrated into the community or relocated to their States of origin or other States.”

Reuters, 4 August 2004

“More than 258,000 people are still displaced from religious clashes in Nigeria that killed hundreds of people in the central state of Plateau three months ago, officials said on Wednesday.

Christian militia massacred hundreds of Muslims in Plateau in early May after a series of tit-for-tat killings over land and political power, forcing thousands to flee and prompting President Olusegun Obasanjo to assume emergency powers.

“Over 258,000 persons in the state (Plateau) have been identified as having been displaced during the state's ethno-religious crisis,” said Thomas Kangnaan, Chairman of the Plateau State Committee on the Census of Displaced Persons.

The majority have remained in Plateau and had no access to aid, relying mostly on family and friends to survive, aid agencies said. About 60,000 people in camps in neighbouring Bauchi state have received medical attention, water and access to makeshift schooling.”

AFP, 15 August 2004

“A total of 141,345 people were displaced while 10,463 houses were damaged in a wave of Christian-Muslim violence in two Nigerian states in May, a state-run relief agency said Sunday in a statement.

The states of Plateau, in the centre, Bauchi in the north and Taraba in the east took in the highest number of displaced people, respectively 45,000, 36,240 and 30,150, according the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).

Some of the displaced people remained in camps three months after the unrest, although most had now left, NEMA said.”

GIDPP, 30 June 2004

“Briefing the IASC on a recent mission to Nigeria, UN OCHA reported that as a result of the recent attacks in Plateau there are an estimated 40-60,000 people displaced inside the state and in the neighbouring states of Bauchi and Nassarawa. Others are reported to have gone to Kano and other northern states. Most IDPs live with host families and relatives and do not readily consider moving into IDP camps. This makes it difficult to ascertain actual figures of IDP populations. In the case of recent attacks and displacement in general, no systematic effort has been made to objectively document population movements in Nigeria.”

Some 20,000 people displaced from farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe, February-March 2003

- 20 farming communities in Dumne (Adamawa State) attacked from 26-28 February 2003, temporarily displacing some 20,000 people
- In May 2003 it was reported that all IDPs in Adamawa

- Reported in May 2003 that about 3,000 IDPs in Gombe remained sheltered with relatives and friends, while about 1,500 IDPs were still staying at a temporary school shelter

IFRC, 16 April 2003

"Udawa cattle herders attacked and burned 34 farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe States in February and March 2003 resulting in 63 dead, 563 injured and 23,700 displaced. The displaced persons, mostly women and children, fled their villages to urban centers in search of safety, shelter and means of sustenance.

1- Adamawa State

Following an attack on 20 farming communities by armed Udawas cattle herders in Dumne, in Song Local Government Area of Adamawa State from 26-28 February, Adamawa Red Cross branch reported that that over 500 people were injured, 63 people died and over 20,000 persons displaced. Several people sought refuge in a temporary shelter at the Central School of Dumne town. Calmness has returned to Dumne town and the attacked villages. The assessment team visited Dumne town, which hosts a large number of the internally displaced persons (IDP), who are still looking for assistance. The victims who look frail are housed in a temporary shelter without potable water and toilet facilities.

The Commissioner for Special Duties of the State informed the assessment team that the number of IDPs requiring urgent assistance was 3,820 (532 families)."

IFRC, 9 May 2003

"[9 May 2003:] Presently, all the 532 displaced families (3,820 persons) have moved back to their burnt villages and houses after receiving some food and non food items assistance, which lasted them for not more than 3 weeks."

Gombe State

"The situation of the displaced persons in Dadiya and Maitukun communities, Bambam Local Government of Gombe State is far from resolved as about 3,000 IDPs have left a temporary school shelter to stay with relatives and friends around the shelter area, while about 1,500 IDPs are still staying at the school shelter. The condition of the people is very pathetic and the children are getting malnourished due to irregular and poor feeding. Children are developing fever and diarrhea at the camp."

Ethno-religious violence in Kaduna State forced thousands to flee in 2000, 2001 and 2002

- More than 30,000 people were displaced during four days of religious riots in November 2002
- Ethnic clashes displaced some 5,000 people in Kaduna in July 2001
- Christians protesting against the introduction of Shari'a law caused ethnic and religious clashes in February-March 2000, and displaced 80,000
- Reprisal attacks against Muslims in southeastern states further displaced some 40,000 people

Displacement in November 2002

IRIN, 28 November 2002

"More than 30,000 people were displaced during four days of religious riots in the northern Nigerian city of Kaduna, the Nigerian Red Cross said on Thursday [28 November 2002].

Red Cross spokesman Patrick Bawa said more than 1,000 people were injured while over 200 died in the clashes between Christians and Muslims.

'More than 7,000 families were displaced in the violence, and if you multiply the number by an average of five people a family you get more than 30,000,' Bawa told IRIN.

[...]

Humanitarian workers in Kaduna said many of the displaced remained in the police and military barracks where they had taken refuge, afraid of renewed violence if they went home. Thousands of residents, especially Christians from southern Nigeria, were leaving the city and returning to their home regions, they said."

Displacement in July 2001

ICRC, 5 July 2001

"On Saturday [30 June 2001], in Kaduna (central Nigeria), yet more families were displaced by ethnic strife. The Nigerian Red Cross and the ICRC have since carried out non-food distributions for around 1,000 people with no means of subsistence."

UNDP, 21 August 2001

(Figure given by UNHCR: 4,991 IDPs)

Displacement in February-March 2000

IRIN, 7 September 2001

"In the northern state of Kaduna more than 2,000 people were estimated to have been killed in February and May 2000 when protests by Christians against plans by the state government to introduce strict Islamic law resulted in widespread fighting across ethnic and religious lines.

According to the Nigerian Red Cross, more than 80,000 people who were displaced during the crisis received humanitarian assistance. But the effects of the conflict were even more far-reaching. As victims from the mainly Christian south fled to their home areas, reprisal attacks broke out against suspected Muslim northerners in several southeastern states, causing more deaths, injuries and displacement. The Red Cross estimates that a further 11,000 families or more than 40,000 people were displaced by reprisal attacks in the south."

IDPs from surrounding states seeking shelter inside Benue State, 2001- 2002

- Government figures indicating that as many as 475,000 IDPs had sought shelter inside Benue State by end-2001
- Initial assesment indicated that the majority of the IDPs in Benue camps were women and children (July 2001)
- By mid-2002 reported that most of the IDPs had returned
- From the 10 original camps, only Dauda and Ukpiani camps remained open by July 2002 – hosting some 2,000 IDPs
- But, local NGOs claiming in October 2002 that 35,000 IDPs remained in Benue; including 10,000 in the Agasha camp

JUNE 2001:

IRIN-WA, 25 June 2001

"Thousands of people have been seeking refuge in and around the central Nigerian town of Makurdi following more than a week of ethnic violence in which dozens have been reported killed, local residents said on Monday [18 June 2001].

"No fewer than 5,000 people who fled Nasarawa State in the past week are currently quartered in a camp set up on the outskirts of Makurdi (the Benue State capital) by the state government," John Iyorche, a resident of Makurdi told IRIN.

[...]

'At least two similar camps exist in other parts of the state with a comparable number of displaced people as well,' he added."

OCTOBER 2001:

IRIN, 29 October 2001

"Up to 300,000 people are currently displaced in Nigeria's central region as a result of communal clashes and recent attacks launched against several communities by the army, local officials said.

Shima Ayati, who heads a committee in Benue State that caters for displaced people, told journalists at the weekend that many of the victims were Tivs who fled fighting with Jukuns in neighbouring Taraba State. Others were survivors of the massacre of more than 200 people perpetrated by soldiers last week in several communities near the Benue/Taraba borders in apparent reprisal for the killing of 19 soldiers by a Tiv militia earlier this month.

[...]

Large numbers of displaced people are staying in several camps around the Benue State capital, Makurdi, where they joined others who had fled an earlier fighting in June [2001] between Tivs and Hausa-speaking Azeris in nearby Nasarawa State."

DECEMBER 2001/JANUARY 2002:

IDP statistics from the Benue Emergency Relief and Crisis Management Committee as of December 2001 indicate that a total of 100,467 persons representing families were displaced from the Nasarawa-Taraba crisis in 9 recognized IDP camps in Benue State. An additional 374,952 IDPs were registered to be living with host communities in 14 LGAs of Benue State. Some of these include IDPs from Plateau State who were residing in Guma LGA in Benue State. (See tables below).

IRIN, 24 October 2001

"While camps set up outside Makurdi, the Benue State capital, for people displaced by the fighting in Nasarawa, were still not completely empty, a new influx from the fighting in Taraba has filled them up. Local officials estimate that some 30,000 people are now living in the camps, in need of urgent relief assistance."

ICRC, 18 March 2002

"Tivs continued throughout January [2002] to leave Taraba state for Benue state. No official number is available. The only indication comes from Agasha camp in Benue where the IDP population grew by 1200 individuals in January."

DECEMBER 2001 STATISTICS OF THE LOCATION OF IDPS IN BENUE

(Source: UN OCHA 18 June 2002):

IDPs in recognized IDP camps

Name of camp	Location	# F/H	Total # IDPs	Male	Female	Child
Sankera	LGEA primary school, Sankera, Ukum LGA	715	10,180	4,500	5,680	3,780
Chito	LGEA primary school, Chito, Ukum LGA	900	19,755	8,105	11,650	5,360
Tor-Donga	LGEA primary school, Tor-Donga, Katsina-Ala LGA	188	3,117	1,153	1,964	1,017
Abeda	LGEA primary school, Abeda	125	2,115	1,114	1,001	731
Dauda camp & environs	LGEA primary school, Dauda & Dauda environs	1,125	23,000	11,230	13,120	7,180
Agasha	LGEA primary school, Agasha, Guma LGA	615	15,000	6,110	7,990	5,614
Ukpam	Ukpam camp, Guma LGA	766	11,500	-	-	-
Umanger	Umanger	130	2,500	-	-	-
Torkula	Torkula and environs	723	12,100	-	-	-
	TOTAL:		100,467			

IDPs living in host communities

LGA	# IDPs	State Displaced from
Unum	47,350	Taraba
Guma	87,814	Nasarawa, Taraba and Plateau
Logo	38,579	Taraba and Nasarawa
Katsina-Ala	22,500	Taraba
Vandeikya	28,705	Taraba
Kwande	25,340	Taraba
Konshisha	21,070	Taraba
Buruku	18,111	Taraba
Gwer	13,500	Taraba and Nasarawa
Gwer West	12,356	Nasarawa
Gboko	16,572	Taraba
Makurdi	26,192	Taraba and Nasarawa
Ushongo	13,113	Taraba
Tarka	3,750	Taraba
TOTAL:	374,952	"

Initial reports indicated that the majority of the IDPs in Benue camps were women and children (July 2001):

UN-OCHA, 14 August 2001

"Population of actual persons residing at both Daudu and Uikpam camps was given by NEMA [National Emergency Management Agency] as follows:

Children 2291

Female 2098

Male 2373

TOTAL 6762

[...]

No male adults are in [Lafia] camp except camp administrators. On questioning response was that some of the men are dead & others are keeping vigil in the villages/communities to ensure that what is left does not get burnt down."

Remaining IDPs inside Benue by mid-2002

UN-OCHA, 15 July 2002

"Three official camps (Dauda, Ukpam and Agasha) plus seven other temporary camps. Only Dauda and Ukpam camps are still officially open.

[...]Other reports suggest that:

July 2002 - there remain 1,800 IDPs in Dauda and Ukpam camps (Catholic diocese, PFD, Red Cross) from 3 LGAs in Plateau State and 4 LGAs in Nasarawa State. In addition, several hundred remain in the surrounding areas. An estimated 1,000 IDPs from Plateau State remain in the Agasha area.

July 2002 - there are an estimated 5,000 IDPs from Nasarawa who have integrated into host communities (PFD

Nov 2001 - there were 8,000 IDPs in seven camps.

End of July 2001 - there were estimated 86,000 IDPs in camps and host communities.

End of June 2001 - there were 26,000 IDPs in Dauda and Ukpam camps

Agasha camp had about 4,000 IDPs from Taraba State. This camp received very little assistance. It is now closed."

Daily Times, 31 October 2002

"Barely one year after the attack on civilian in Benue State by the Nigerian Soldier in 2001, the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) and the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) have revealed that the International Commission of Red Cross (ICRC) and Benue State Government registered no fewer than 35,000 internally-displaced persons, mostly women and children as a result of the crisis.

[...]

They noted that the unsavoury situation in the camps have continued to lead to more deaths adding that over 10,000 of these internally displaced persons were still trapped at the Agasha camp with nowhere to go."

Information on IDPs in Taraba State, 2001-2002

UN-OCHA, 15 July 2002

Timeframe	Main cause	Who involved	[...]	Where displaced	Comments
Oct 2001 - Jan 2002	Ethnic Land/boundary Escalation of July crisis between Tiv and Fulani In August, Tivs attacked Jukun village in Wukari LGA -	Tiv and Jukun/ Fulani		<u>Benue</u> - 186,000 (Sept 2001) - camps and host communities <u>Taraba</u> - Mutum Biyu and Wukari camps - host communities - 80,000 Jukuns displaced within four districts (Kente	Reports estimate that only 10-15% of Tivs have returned while most of Jukuns have returned (Catholic diocese)

	Jukuns join conflict			district head) - Jukuns displaced to: Nasarawa (Lafia) Wukari, Ibi LGAs Benue Kano - Tivs displaced to Bali, Jalingo, Zing, Lamma, Yakoko LGAs - Other groups: Ibo - east Yoruba - south east	
	Oct 12th, conflict escalates beyond Wukari and Ibi LGAs to other LGAs				

UNDP Nigeria 20 May 2002; right column on ethnic groups added from a table sent to NRC Geneva by UNDP Nigeria, 18 June 2002

S/N	Location/ Town/ Village	Year	LGA.	Number Displaced (approx.)	Causes of displacement	Remarks	Ethnic Group
[...]							
4.	Akwana	2001	Wukari	1,936	Communal clashes	In the process of being resettled by the State Government and relief materials donated	Jukun
5.	Arufu	2001	Wukari	3,116	„	„	Jukun
6.	Sondi	2001	Wukari	1,021	„	„	Jukun
7.	Other Villages	2001	Wukari	4,650	„	„	Jukun
8.	Doorshima I & II	2001	Ibi	1,720	„	„	Tiv
9.	Ibua	2001	Ibi	852	„	„	Tiv
10.	Sarkin Kudu	2001	Ibi	1,630	„	„	Jukun
11.	Other Villages	2001	Ibi	3,980	„	„	Tiv/Jukun
12.	Tor Damisa	2001	Donga	2,775	„	„	Tiv
13.	Akate	2001	Donga	630	„	„	Jukun
14.	Chanchanji	2001	Takum	3,720	„	„	Jukun
15.	Mayo- Ndaga	2001	Sardauna	1,111	„	„	Fulani/ Mambilla
16.	Nguroje	2001	Sardauna	1,092	„	„	Fulani/ Mambilla
17.	Tunga Damari	2001	Sardauna	891	„	„	Fulani/ Mambilla

18.	Likitaba	2002	Sardauna	2,100	"	"	Fulani/ Mambilla
19.	Leme	2002	Sardauna	1,200	"	"	Fulani/ Mambilla
20.	Mbar	2002	Sardauna	1,295	"	"	Fulani/ Mambilla
21.	Mbaso	2002	Sardauna	977	"	"	Fulani/ Mambilla
22.	Kente	2001	Wukari	2,600	"	"	Jukun
23.	Dali	2001	Bali	1,022	"	"	
24.	Shomo	2001	Lau	1,055	"	"	Shomo
25.	Jole	2001	Lau	685	"	"	Jole
[...]					"	"	
28.	Dan Anacha	2001	Gassol	3,230	"	"	
29.	Yerima	2001	Gassol	912	"	"	Tiv/Jukun
30.	Mararaba Gassol,	2001	Gassol	640	"	"	Tiv/Jukun
31.	Other Villages	2001	Gassol	3,011	"	"	Tiv/Jukun
32.	Jatau	2001	Bali	914	"	"	Tiv/Jukun
33.	Kungana	2001	Bali	580	"	"	Tiv/Jukun
34.	Takalafiya	2001	Bali	1,200	"	"	Tiv/Jukun

Total Figure: 51,745 IDPs

In January 2002 as many as 17,000 people fled land clashes in Mambilla Plateau -- most were soon able to return

ICRC, 18 March 2002

"On 04.01.02 clashes broke out in the highlands of Mambilla between Mambilla (farmers) and Peuhls (nomads). According to new agencies more than fifty people have been killed and several hundreds fled their home out of fear for reprisal attacks. Today the situation in the highlands of Mambilla is quite. Yet the last precise information dates from mid-January when the Taraba Branch of the Nigerian Red Cross visited the sites. By then the number of displaced persons has considerably reduced, according to the branch secretary of the NRCS Taraba. The few remaining families were staying within the chiefs palace of Gashaka (95 families) and the police compound of Gembu (123 families)."

UN-OCHA, 15 July 2002

Timeframe	Main cause	Who involved	Number IDPs	Where displaced	Comments
Jan 2002	Land Started with dispute over land in Papa village, Mayondaga district, crisis	Mambilla and Fulani (Mambilla Plateau)	1,791 F/H (approx 17,000 IDPs)	Fulani Jalingo, Bali, Gashaka, Maisamari LGAs Some to Cameroon Mambilla	Reports estimate that about 80% of IDPs have returned.

	then erupted all over Mambilla Plateau			Within Mambilla Plateau	
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Over 50,000 people were reported to have been displaced in the Jos crisis, September 2001

- Reported by US DOS that Approximately 80 percent of the victims in Jos were Hausa Muslims; the remaining from the Christian part of the population
- Thousands of Hausa fled Plateau for Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, and Bauchi
- Statistics compiled by the Government of Plateau State in May 2002 showed that an estimated total of 36,378 remained displaced inside the Plateau State; while an estimated 146 families were displaced within the Foron villages areas

OMCT, 2002, p. 118

"Authoritative figures of internal displacement in the Jos crisis are difficult to locate. Over 50,000 people were displaced in the Jos crisis, most of them to military Barracks, Police buildings or school buildings. The ICRC reported that 'thousands of people fled the violence, including 6,000 people who sought refuge in Police stations and Army barracks.' By September 18, it had begun 'distribution of non-food items (blankets, sleeping mats, plastic sheeting, soap and kitchen utensils) to 15,000 people who had lost all their possessions.' These numbers exclude persons who may have re-located or escaped from Jos to reside with relatives in other parts of Nigeria. Also thousands of homes, buildings and other property were destroyed."

US DOS, 31 March 2003, sect. 5

"In September and October 2001, ethno-religious unrest in Jos resulted in the deaths of 2,300 persons and the internal displacement of approximately 15,000 persons. Approximately 80 percent of the victims in Jos were Hausa Muslims, who constituted a significant minority in Jos. The military was able to restore order, but thousands of Hausa fled Plateau for Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, and Bauchi. This conflict appeared to have been primarily ethnic and secondarily religious. Christians of different ethnic groups reportedly attacked each other, and Yoruba Muslims joined in targeting their Hausa co-religionists. There were reports of some IDPs returning to Plateau, but numbers cannot be confirmed and by most credible estimates the majority of the IDPs have not returned."

UN-OCHA, 15 July 2002

Where displaced:

- Most in public and private buildings and institutions in Jos and its environs (estimated
- Kanam and Sanga LGAs (estimated 16,320 IDPs)
- Foron villages areas (estimated 146 families)
- Benue, Kano and Kaduna States
- 600 to Nasarawa"

Location of IDPs in the Plateau State as of May 2002 (Source Government of Plateau State, 21 May 2002)

S/N	The Existing Camps/Locations	No. of Displaced Persons	Causes
1.	Eze Igbo's Place (Apata)	1,191 Persons	Religious, Ethnic and Political
2.	COCIN Church Sarkin Mangu	120	"
3.	Jos Central Mosque	1,592 Persons	"
4.	Vom Vet	200 Persons	"
5.	Bukuru Central Mosque	at individual homes	"
6.	Vom Christian Hospital	57 Persons	"
7.	Mounted Troops, Bukuru	1,356 Persons	"
8.	NDLEA Training Centre Lamingo	131 Persons	"
9.	Federal School of Forestry	162 Persons	"
10.	University of Jos Staff Club	649 Persons	"
11.	Nasarawa Gwong Police Barracks	80 Persons	"
12.	Nasarawa Gwong Police Station	43 Persons	"
13.	St. Michael's Church N. Gwong	326 Persons	"
14.	COCIN Church, Jos Jarawa	18 Persons	"
15.	COCIN Church, Chwelnyap	732 Persons	"
16.	University of Jos Perm. Site	150 Persons	"
17.	Primary School Gangare	2,000 Persons	"
18.	Police Headquarters	120 Persons	"
19.	Gbong Gwom's Palace	30 Persons	"
20.	Riyom Police Station	5 Persons	"
21.	Hardo's Residence, Ganawuri	50 Persons	"
22.	Nomadic School, Jos	100 Persons	"
23.	Teacher's College, Toro	2,160 Persons	"
24.	Primary School Gyamso	831 Persons	"
25.	Qur'anic Recitation Centre, Toro	1,103 Persons	"
26.	Nabardo Village	200 Persons	"
27.	Tilden Fulani	100 Persons	"
28.	Kanam LGA	10,000 as reported by the L.G.C.	"
29.	Sanga LGC	6,320 Persons	"
	a. Angwan Nungu	1,520 Persons	"
	b. Aboro	2,000 Persons	"
	c. Ajangwa	2,800 Persons	"
30.	Lutheran compound Dogon Dutse	30 Persons	"
31.	Jol Village Vom	<u>Yet to be ascertained</u>	"
	Total	<u>36,378 Persons</u>	"
1.	Foron Village Areas		"
	a. Bakin Kogi	30 Families	"
	b. Bisichi	40 Families	"
	c. Patiko	30 Families	"
	d. Mai Idon Toro	19 Families	"
	e. Sabon Gidan Foron	20 Families	"
	f. Foron Town	<u>7 Families</u>	"
	Total	146 Families	"

As many as 5,000 could have been displaced by violence in Lagos, February 2002

- 578 families (more than 2,000 people) registered as displaced and evacuated to camps set up in the city
- Many northerners left Lagos for their home regions
- In March 2002, about 1,000 IDPs were still at a camp set up at the Police College
- People displaced after Lagos clashes were apparently all resettled by June 2002

IRIN-WA, 8 February 2002

"About 100 people were killed in about four days of fighting, which broke out on Saturday between Hausa-speakers from the north and members of the local Yoruba ethnic group following a dispute between individuals. A statement by the Nigerian Red Cross said 578 families (more than 2,000 people) displaced by the clashes had been registered. They were evacuated to camps set up in the city by the Red Cross and the National Emergency Management Agency."

ICRC Geneva, 18 March 2002

"On 02.02.02 an ethnic clash broke out between a faction of the Yoruba ethnic militant troop, Oodua People's Congress (OPC) and a section of the Hausa community in Idi-Araba area of Lagos. Although there have been conflicting reports on the real cause of the crisis, it is reported to have left over 100 people dead and over 400 wounded. More than 1000 houses were burnt and a number of cars were destroyed. Residents fled their homes resulting on about 5,000 displaced persons. Some of the residents took refuge in the Lagos University Teaching Hospital in Idi-Araba while others were evacuated to a nearby army barracks. By the third day of the crisis, the ethnic disturbances spread to some other parts of Lagos creating tension in the lives of Lagos inhabitants. Soldiers were then drafted to the area to assist the police to bring the situation back to normal."

IRIN, 5 February 2002

"Residents of the affected areas fled in their thousands with the few belongings they could carry to police stations, military barracks or the homes of relatives in more peaceful areas of the city. Many northerners left Lagos on Monday for their home regions, raising fears that there might be reprisal attacks when they relate their experiences to relatives back home."

UNHCR, 7 February 2002

"At least 100 others died in three days of ethnic fighting that erupted on Saturday between Hausa and Yoruba communities in Mushin and Idi-Araba districts of the metropolis.

Thousands of people displaced as a result of the two tragic events [the explosions and the ethnic clashes] are currently camped at different locations in Lagos.

The Red Cross said in a statement Thursday that more than 1,800 affected families have been registered at the camps.

More than 2,500 other individuals are sheltered at a camp at the Police College in Ikeja, the statement said."

Situation as of March 2002:

IRIN, 15 March 2002

"Some 3,000 people were displaced in these clashes. About 1,000 are still at a camp set up at the Police College, Lagos, where they joined about 2,000 others displaced by explosions at the munitions dump of a military base in Lagos in late January."

Reported IDPs in Lagos as of June 2002:

UNDP Nigeria, 13 June 2002

1.	Ikeja Cantonment Bomb Blast	
	<u>Category of Victims</u>	<u>Number</u>
	Military Officers	544
	Civilians	1,088
	Children re-united with their parents	30
2.	Idi-Araba Riot Victims	981

ICRC, 18 June 2002

"The last 1000 displaced have been resettled with the help of the government and the army."

Religious clashes in Kano displaced some 8,000 people, October 2001

- Clashes following a demonstration against US action in Afghanistan led to the displacement of 8,000 people, who fled to military barracks, police stations and other public buildings

ICRC, 15 November 2001

"During October, violent clashes were reported in the town of Kano following a peaceful demonstration against the American strikes in Afghanistan. The violence spread to the Christian district of the city and continued for two days. The authorities reported that 32 people had been killed, while other sources indicated a total of 200. Some 8,000 people sought refuge in military barracks, police stations, churches, schools and at the city airport."

Clashes in Ebonyi State displaced more than 1,000 people, July 2001

- Fighting between the neighbouring communities of Akaeze in Iro local council and Osso Edda in Afikpo South displaced more than 1,000 people

IRIN, 24 July 2001

"Renewed fighting between two communities in southeastern Nigeria's Ebonyi State has claimed at least 27 lives, local officials and residents said on Tuesday [24 July 2001].

The fighting between the neighbouring communities of Akaeze in Iro local council and Osso Edda in Afikpo South displaced more than 1,000 people, while several homes, two schools and a community health centre were destroyed, Samson Agwuocha, a resident of Afikpo, told IRIN.

Many of the displaced people have taken refuge in Afikpo town and neighbouring communities."

UNDP, 21 August 2001

Figure given by UNHCR: 643 IDPs

Ethno-religious violence in north-eastern Bauchi State created some 22,000 IDPs, June-August 2001

- Thousands displaced after Christians rebelled against the imposition of Islamic law in Tafawa-Balewa
- Number of displaced after renewed fighting in Bauchi State not clear (August 2001)

Economist.com, 5 July 2001

"Reports from Bauchi state in the north of the country tell of hundreds killed, and thousands displaced, after Christians rebelled against the imposition of Islamic law in Tafawa-Balewa."

Vanguard, 3 July 2001

"About 22,000 of this number fled the fighting between the Hawa and Jarawa near Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State, acting Secretary-General of the Red Cross, Mr. Abiodun Orebiyi said.

"We have over 22,000 people representing 4,000 families displaced," he said."

UNDP, 21 August 2001

Figure given by UNHCR: 22,866 IDPs

Number of displaced after renewed fighting in Bauchi State not clear (August 2001)

IRIN-WA, 29 August 2001

"Humanitarian workers said full details of casualties and displaced people were not easily available because the area was still unsafe."

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

People fleeing ethnic clashes in central region seek shelter in areas dominated by their own ethnic group, 2001-2002

- After the Jos clashes in September 2001 some Tivs fleeing clashes with Hausa-speaking Azaras fled to camps and communities in Benue State while Hausa IDPs moved to the North (e.g. Benue, Kano and Kaduna States)
- Reports that some Tiv IDPs who fled fighting in Plateau State first sought shelter inside the Nasarawa State but had to move on to Benue State as they were not welcome in Nasarawa
- Most Tivs fled from the Taraba State to Benue State, while most of the Jukun stayed within Taraba State
- Most of the displaced in Benue State are Tiv, and fled to this state because of an ethnic affinity with the Tiv population there

NASARAWA STATE

UN-OCHA, 18 June 2002

"In 2001, the Tivs fleeing clashes with Hausa-speaking Azaras fled to camps and communities in Benue State. Indigenous communities from four local ethnic groups were also displaced to various locations, including Egon, Wamba and Akwanga, where they had relations. A few of them were accommodated in a transit camp in Lafia where they stayed approximately two months.

Some Muslims from the southern part of Kaduna State fled to a camp in an abandoned primary school in Keffi, Nasarawa State. These IDPs stayed for about six months in the camp, where they were assisted with food and cooking utensils. Dialogue was held between the two state governments and the IDPs were encouraged to return to Kaduna State. Some of the IDPs eventually left while others took up employment and are now residing in communities around Keffi.

Following the clashes in Jos in September 2001, about 600 of the Nasarawa indigenes who are resident in Plateau State fled to Nasarawa State. Some stayed with extended family members/communities who provided them with needed assistance. Others fled to their respective LGA areas of origin where the LGA provided food, shelter and some cash. Most of these IDPs have now returned to Plateau State although some still remain in Nasarawa State."

PFD, 17 June 2002

"June 2001: Violent ethnic conflict arises in Nasarawa state. Thousands of Tivs are targeted and flee to Benue state for safety. Many Tivs walk in the bush for days to reach Benue state. They are assisted by local Benue state Tiv communities. However the conflict spreads across the northwestern border and the Nasarawa Tiv's flee deeper into Benue. Camps are set up by the Benue state government and food aid arrives.

[...]

Sept. 2001: Another violent outbreak occurs between Tiv and Junkun tribes in neighboring Taraba State located to the northwest of Benue. Tiv are forced to flee and thousands enter Benue

State. Three official camp areas are set up by the State government. DFID, Catholic Diocese of Makurdi, Catholic Relief Services and Partners for Development, all assist in the camps. "

BENUE STATE

UN-OCHA, 18 June 2002

"Most of the IDPs in Benue State are from the Tiv ethnic group in neighboring states. Although most of them do not have any extended family ties in Benue State, they fled to this state because of an ethnic infinity [sic!] with the Tiv population there. It has been reported that the majority of the IDPs from Taraba and Nasarawa States have returned. However, IDPs from Plateau State still remain in Benue State. A meeting has recently been convened between the state governments of Benue, Taraba and Plateau to agree on the return of IDPs.

Five camps were established by the State Government for the displaced. Many of the displaced settled in school buildings and 22 satellite camps. Others were absorbed into communities which provided them with needed assistance.

Dauda IDP Camp

The camp comprises seven large buildings and some temporary huts that were constructed to accommodate additional IDPs at the height of the displacement. There were reportedly 9,500 initially displaced in the camp, although many have since returned. The current figure given for the population of the camp was 2000. Most of the displaced in the camp are from the Tiv ethnic group who fled fighting in Plateau State. These IDPs explained that they were attacked, their houses destroyed and their property looted. Some of them were also killed. As a result, they fled, first to Nasarawa State in temporary settlements, and then, because they were not welcome in Nasarawa, they moved to Benue State. The IDPs stated that they were attacked because of their growing population, which threatened the other ethnic groups."

TARABA STATE

UN-OCHA, 18 June 2002

"Most of the Tiv population were displaced in neighboring communities and then into neighboring states, particularly Benue State. Two camps were set in Mutum Biyu and Bali in Taraba State to accommodate the displaced Tiv population who remained in Taraba State. These camps are now empty. The Jukuns were displaced mainly within the state. Many of them have returned.
[...]

PLATEAU STATE

[...]

Some of the affected population fled into neighboring states, including Benue, Kano and Kaduna, whilst the majority were displaced within Plateau State. A number of camps were set up to accommodate some of the IDPs. There are no updated figures of how many displaced remain within and outside the state. However, it is reported that most of the camps are now empty.

Displaced camp - Gangare public school

The IDPs residing in Gangare public school are Hausa from Dilini village. The entire village fled following an attack by the Christians in the community who destroyed all the buildings in the village. The IDPs initially moved into Gangare public school, with an initial population of 1370. These IDPs later moved out of the school into surrounding areas where they had extended families. There are 40 IDPs who remained in the school. They are now living in a house adjacent to the school. The state government provided them with some food assistance every two-three months. All the IDPs would like to return to their village, however, they would first like to see a meeting held between themselves and the Christians in the village to agree on living together in

peace without further clashes. The IDPs would also require assistance to rebuild their houses given that all buildings were destroyed."

Northerners fleeing Lagos clashes leave for home regions, raising fears of reprisal attacks, February 2002

- Displaced fleeing the Lagos clashes headed for local safehavens, while many northerners went to their home regions
- This pattern raised the fear for reprisal attacks in the North against Yorubas

IRIN, 5 February 2002

"Residents of the affected areas fled in their thousands with the few belongings they could carry to police stations, military barracks or the homes of relatives in more peaceful areas of the city. Many northerners left Lagos on Monday for their home regions, raising fears that there might be reprisal attacks when they relate their experiences to relatives back home."

IRIN-WA, 8 February 2002

"In the northern city of Kano, where Hausas are in the majority, troops and policemen patrolled the streets in anticipation of reprisal attacks against Yorubas. Many people were reported to have taken refuge in police and military barracks in the city.

Fears of imminent reprisal attacks heightened after the Arewa Consulative Forum (ACF), a group of influential northern leaders, issued a statement on Thursday accusing President Olusegun Obasanjo's government of not making any significant effort to enforce a ban issued last year on the Oodua People's Congress, a Yoruba militia accused of spearheading attacks on northerners in southwest Nigeria."

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

General

Nigerian government and security forces accused of failing to provide security during violence in Plateau State and Kano, 2004

- Human Rights Watch (HRW) denounces the failure of the Nigerian government and security forces to provide security to the population of Plateau State from as early as 2001
- Local residents of Yelwa town accuse police and army of assisting the attackers, according to a Nigerian newspaper
- During the violence in Kano in May 2004, Nigerian police used excessive force to restore law and order, contributing to the high death toll, according to HRW

HRW, 11 May 2004

"Plateau State has been ravaged by interethnic conflict since an unprecedented outbreak of violence in the state capital, Jos, claimed as many as one thousand lives in September 2001. The government set up a commission of inquiry into the violence in Jos, but has still not published its findings. Hundreds of people—both Taroks and Fulanis—have been killed in different parts of the state since 2002. The fighting around Yelwa has intensified since February 2004, when scores of people died, including around 50 Taroks reportedly killed by Fulanis in Yelwa at the end of February.

'In light of the pattern of violence in Plateau State over recent months, with each community seeking to avenge attacks by their opponents, the latest outbreak should have come as no surprise to federal and state authorities,' said Takirambudde. 'Yet the Nigerian government took no action to preempt the massacre.'

Human Rights Watch denounced the failure of the Nigerian government and the security forces to provide security to the population of Plateau State. In the latest incident, police and army reinforcements were only sent to Yelwa after hundreds of people had already been killed.

'The government's neglect of the situation in Plateau over the last three years has resulted in an endless cycle of revenge,' Takirambudde said. 'Not only have the police been unwilling or unable to stop the fighting, but the government has not taken responsibility for finding a lasting solution to the crisis.'

Vanguard, 8 May 2004

"Some residents [of Yelwa] accused the police and army of assisting the attackers -- some of whom were armed with military-issue assault rifles -- and dark rumours are swirling around Yelwa of the kidnap and rape of young women.

Such stories could not immediately be confirmed and, for their part, the police deny any involvement in the atrocities. Officers did, however, admit that the ferocity of the attack had left them powerless to protect the innocent.

'The truth is that the policemen and soldiers were overpowered by the attackers. The various interest groups are better equipped than the security forces,' said an officer in the town, playing down the larger casualty estimates. 'It is a war situation where propaganda also plays a role.'

It's a prospect that daunts the townsfolk here. Lawal Abdullahi, a 35-year-old farmer, is pessimistic: 'When we can, we defend ourselves with bows and arrows, spears and machetes, but this time we were overpowered'.

Community elder Mohammed Babayaro echoed him: 'This time they meant to finish us all off.' "

HRW, 17 May 2004

"Nigerian police deployed to quell violence between Muslims and Christians in the northern city of Kano have used excessive force and may have committed dozens of unlawful killings in the name of restoring law and order, Human Rights Watch said today.

Police fired into a crowd on May 13, killing around 40 people and wounding numerous others, according to credible local sources. These sources also reported that police used lethal force in several other incidents.

[...]

Police reinforcements were sent to Kano after two days of rioting on May 11 and 12, when scores of people were killed as Muslims attacked Christians in reprisal for an attack by Christians against Muslims in Yelwa, Plateau State, on May 2. Several hundred people were killed in the Yelwa attack.

The attackers in Kano used a range of weapons—including machetes, knives, daggers, arrows and stones—as they targeted Christian residents of the city. Witnesses reported that they did not use firearms. Yet many of the dead and injured had gunshot wounds, which local sources believe must have been inflicted by the police. In several cases, eyewitnesses confirmed that the victims had been shot by the police.

Police officials have confirmed in public statements that the police shot a number of people, but claimed that this was in self-defense.

Over the last three years, Human Rights Watch has documented a similar pattern of unlawful, arbitrary and extrajudicial killings by the police following outbreaks of intercommunal violence in Plateau, Kaduna and other states. Some of the victims were not even participating in the rioting or the violence.

In past incidents, none of the police officers responsible for unlawful or extrajudicial killings have been brought to justice."

IDPs from Ogu/Bolo in the River State harassed because of political affiliation, February 2003

HRW, April 2003, p. 13

"Some of the former ANPP [All Nigeria People's Party] supporters have moved with Chief Ada George into the UNPP [United Nigeria Peoples Party]. They claimed that the PDP [People's Democratic Party] in Ogu continues to threaten all non-PDP supporters who return to Ogu. Nonetheless, women from the community have returned to Ogu on several market days to assess the level of tension in Ogu. A leader at one of the sites for displaced persons explained, "more than seven times [since August 6] we've sent women to market. Each times they're molested, their things are taken, their clothes are torn, or they're beaten [by Agaba boys]." A twenty-seven-year-old woman at the same site explained that, several weeks after fleeing Ogu on

August 6, she and five other women had wanted to return to Ogu to check on their property in the market. "The Agaba boys sent their girlfriends to apprehend us or chase us away. They took one of us away and a group of them raped her. Both the men and women beat the rest of us. I recognized by name and face several of the boys who attacked us. I suffered bruises and some pain." Both she and her husband were UNPP members, and her husband had wanted to run for a councillorship position in Ogu/Bolo. Several of the displaced UNPP members staying at the UNPP headquarters in Port Harcourt reported that they felt unable to go into town even in Port Harcourt because they had been threatened there by thugs from the Okrika area supporting the PDP."

Government security forces criticized for not protecting civilians during Jos disturbances, September 2001

- HRW reported government authorities failed to take action to stop the violence, even if foreseen
- The police did not deploy sufficient efforts to either prevent or limit the violence
- When the police were present, they were inadequately equipped, unarmed or outnumbered by rioters

HRW, December 2001, pp. 2, 16, 17

"From September 7 to 13, 2001, Jos, the capital of Plateau State in central Nigeria, became the scene of mass killing and destruction for the first time in its recent history. Hundreds of people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in less than one week.

[...]

Opinions about who was primarily to blame for the outbreak of violence varied and were sometimes highly polarized. However, all those interviewed by Human Rights Watch agreed on one conclusion: that the violence could have been foreseen but that government authorities failed to take action to prevent it. The state government adopted a passive attitude and appeared not to take seriously the numerous, explicit threats issued by both "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" groups in Jos in the weeks leading up to the crisis. All those interviewed also deplored the lack of police presence and intervention during the crisis and the failure of the police to ensure protection and security for the population.

[...]

Christians and Muslims alike-community leaders as well as ordinary residents of Jos-all deplored the conspicuous absence of the security forces in the early days of the crisis. On the basis of information collected in Jos, Human Rights Watch shares their belief that some of the violence could have been prevented or at least contained had the police intervened earlier. Quite apart from the question of whether the violence could have been foreseen and therefore preempted by security force action on the basis of the warning signs described above, many questions are raised by the absence and apparent ineffectiveness of the police to restore law and order once the violence started on September 7, as well as by the fact that it was only the intervention of the military from September 8 which eventually put a stop to the fighting.

[...]

Despite numerous attempts to contact the commissioner of police, he was unavailable to meet Human Rights Watch researchers during their visit to Jos, and we were told by a staff member in his office that no one else could talk to us in his place. However, on the basis of information available from local human rights organizations and other sources, we can conclude that the police did not deploy sufficient efforts to either prevent or limit the violence. For example, it is not clear why police based at a station less than one kilometer away from the mosque at Congo Junction where the violence began failed to come to the scene once they were alerted; they reportedly stated that they had not received instructions to intervene. The absence of the police was also noticeable at the university of Jos, where the fighting was particularly fierce. One

student said: "The police never came to the university at all. Only the military came. They appeared on Friday at about 11 p.m. They were just patrolling. At one point the military even left during an attack." Another student said: "We lost total confidence in the police. They were not here. Until today, they are not here."

[...]

Witnesses also commented that in the few cases where police were present, they were ineffective, inadequately equipped, unarmed or outnumbered by rioters. In Pankshin, on the outskirts of Jos, some residents fleeing the violence took refuge in the police station, but there were no police there. In another case, near Angwan Rogo, on September 7, a Hausa man tried to save a Christian indigene by taking him to the police for protection. The police said they could not do anything and told him to go to the university. On the way there, they reached a roadblock, where a group of armed Muslims killed the Christian, despite the Hausa man's efforts to save him.

Members of the security forces-particularly the police-were also responsible for human rights violations themselves during the crisis, including shootings and ill-treatment, even though they are not known to have participated in widespread killings and destruction alongside armed civilians."

Low confidence in the protection offered by the army among IDPs from Nassarawa, 2001-2002

- Police forced people to return from IDP camp in Nassarawa (July 2001)
- Reported that IDPs fleeing Nassarawa were harassed at Army and Police checkpoints; including extortion money

Ibeanu, 1998, pp.51-52

"Quite often, displaced people are victims of the physical violence of the state. This is especially the case where displacement occurs as a result of conflicts among groups. The partisanship of the state ensures that some of the displaced will become the targets of state violence."

NGO (anonymous) 14 August 2001

"Human rights abuses occur sometimes. In Nassarawa last month [July 2001] there was an IDP camp of 3,000 people in the primary school in the center of town that was attacked by police using tear gas in order to make the residents leave. The state government hoped that IDPs would return home but when they faced resistance, the state simply resorted to force. Nevertheless, this action simply scattered the IDPs but did not send them home again."

OMCT, 2002, p.161

"The displaced persons were unanimous in their insistence that government should intervene to make peace between the Tiv, their Jukun neighbours and the Army. Confidence in the Army as guarantor of security is almost non-existent among the displaced persons. Many claim that "the Army and the Jukun" were waging war against them. The trek to the camps is said to have been characterised by checkpoints where the Army and Police systematically extorted money from the displaced persons: 10 Naira here, 20 Naira there, small sums that mean the world to the dispossessed.."

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

General

Plateau State IDPs in Bauchi and Nassarawa have wide-ranging needs, 2004

- During the violence in the Yelwa area in May 2004 most houses were burnt down or looted, displacing many thousands of residents
- Some 48,000 people were estimated to have fled to Bauchi and Nassarawa states, some taking refuge in congested camps with urgent needs for medicine, food and other supplies
- A UN OCHA mission to the affected areas in June 2004 reported that while immediate needs, especially in the camps, were being addressed, specialist support such as trauma counselling was required
- With some IDP camps in school buildings, education was disrupted for both local communities and displaced children

IFRC, 17 May 2004

"Ethnic-religious hostilities broke out on 1 and 2 May 2004 in Shimkar and Yelwa in Plateau State. The conflict rapidly spread to the neighbouring communities of Zomo, Doka and Lupidi, Laraba and Unguwar Adamu. Many people were wounded and many houses were burnt. Many others, including women and children, were reportedly abducted from Yelwa and taken to Langtan-south and Mikan Local Government those who escaped fled to Nasarawa and Bauchi States for refuge.

On 13 May 2004, a total of 735 internally-displaced families were sheltered in school compounds, markets and mosques in Lafia town of Nassarawa State. This figure includes 1,543 displaced children.

About 2,770 internally displaced persons are also taking refuge in five camps in Bauchi State. Of the 33 people hospitalized in Bauchi, 22 died. Approximately 2,000 persons are also reported displaced in various parts of Plateau State. Despite the relative calm in Yelwa, thousands of its inhabitants have not yet returned; approximately 8,000 displaced people are taking refuge in the remaining un-burnt houses.

[...]

Most of the houses in Yelwa and neighbouring villages were either burnt down or looted and will also be required to be rehabilitated for the displaced persons to return to their villages and towns. A rehabilitation assistance to complement government efforts to return the displaced persons is also required. About 1,000 families in Yelwa need long term support in food and non-food items when they return. The Nigerian Red Cross disaster preparedness stocks (pre-positioned materials), used in response to this emergency last week, need to be replenished."

UN OCHA, 26 May 2004

"The recent crisis started in February 2004 with the killing of about 100 persons from one of the major ethnic groups. This group retaliated in May 2004 resulting in the killing of over 250 persons and the destruction of property. This escalation of the conflict resulted in population movements and another influx of people to Bauchi and Nassarawa. It is estimated that the population of IDPs in Bauchi is about 39,000 while those in Nassarawa State are about 9000. Most of the IDPs in Bauchi are currently camped in various centres within and around Bauchi. The camps are

congested and toilet facilities, water supplies and a supportive social infrastructure are inadequate. The use of schools as temporary shelters has resulted in the halting of teaching. The overcrowded conditions are likely to lead to outbreaks of infection, social vices, and other psychological problems. The influx of IDPs has continued unabated. There is an urgent need to provide material for temporary shelters, medicines, food and other supplies to alleviate the current situation. In the longer term, resources are required for resettlement and the resumption of economic activities.”

GIDPP, 30 June 2004

“Briefing the IASC on a recent mission to Nigeria, UN OCHA reported that the humanitarian needs of the affected populations, both in IDP camps and affected villages, have in general been adequately addressed through combinations of national and state governments, Red Cross, NGOs and UN agencies. There are no immediate or obvious nutritional and health problems that are commonplace especially in camp settings. Shelter and non-food items are provided with no overcrowding seen. Nassarawa state government addressed over crowding in the Dunama school IDP camp, through building Shingo camp with temporary shelter with water and electricity supplies for over 500 people.

However, UN OCHA stressed that specialist support needs to be more readily available in the camps. For example, in Lafia camp in Nassarawa state, MSF reported that there are a number of cases of rape having occurred while people were fleeing. Some 6 weeks after the incident MSF have had to organise trauma counsellors from overseas. MSF also report that in Bauchi camps there is an increase in the levels of depression, especially among men, as the period of displacement and inactivity increases. This is also the main farming season in the home areas of Plateau. Perhaps because of the semi-permanent nature of current displacement, there is a growing dependency effect shown by certain IDPs, who have started to complain about the quality and quantity of assistance provided.

Some of the IDP camps in Bauchi and Nassarawa are in school buildings. Children from these schools have been decanted elsewhere. As there are no educational facilities in these camps, two sets of children are now having their education disrupted. Water, sanitation and waste disposal problems are being slowly addressed. However, if care is not taken, the onset of the rainy season might exacerbate the current health of the population in camps.”

People fleeing violence in Kano require medical, food and shelter assistance, May 2004

- Hostilities in Kano State in May 2004 displaced more than 17,000 people, many of whom sought refuge in police and military barracks
- About 500 people required emergency medical treatment
- Red Cross reported that IDPs required emergency assistance in terms of medical, food and nonfood items

IFRC, 17 May 2004

“Following the Yelwa hostilities, the conflict in Kano State began on 10 May 2004; it escalated on 12 May 2004 in the Sharada area of Kano city resulting in more deaths. The Kano State Branch of the Nigerian Red Cross Society reported that 36 persons were killed and 598 injured, with a lot property destroyed. As a result, 17,087 people fled their homes; about 8,000 are seeking refuge in various police and military barracks. The situation is tense in spite of heavy police and military presence in some parts of the city.

The Nigerian Red Cross Emergency Team reported that about 500 people with bullet, machetes and arrow wounds requiring immediate evacuation and medical assistance were attended to and

evacuated nearby hospitals (Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital, Murtala Mohammed Specialist Hospital, Mohammed Wase Specialist Hospital and Mohammed Sanusi Hospital).

[...]

The first field assessment by the Red Cross showed that emergency assistance in terms of medical, food and nonfood items are required for the displaced persons. The hospitals in Kano are congested with victims; more dressing materials will be needed to treat them. The Kano Branch report indicates that IDP staying in various military and police barracks need food assistance i.e. rice, sugar, beans, salt and drinking water. Non-food items are also urgently needed i.e. mats, blankets, cooking pots, feeding utensils and toiletries."

Health

Plateau State IDPs in need of trauma counselling (August 2004)

- In the wake of the mass killings and displacement from the Yelwa area of Plateau state, MSF highlighted the need for trauma counselling and basic health support for returning IDPs

MSF, 31 August 2004

"From the self-report of the IDP population and from interviews with community leaders and individuals in authority, it was evident that the massacres happened suddenly and exposed the population to severe stress. The brutality and extent of the killings, the loss of family members (sometimes several losses in the same family), abduction of women and children, rape, loss of homes and all possessions brought about intense emotional reactions such as panic, terror and grief. At present, several months after the attacks and displacement, many of the IDPs that were seen were exhibiting clear symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Some are stuck in time and are experiencing continuous flashbacks to the events of the trauma. Many, especially the children, suffer from terrifying nightmares. Any reminder of the trauma triggers intense fears, anxiety, guilt, rape or disgust. In a few patients seen, the trauma triggered psychotic episodes where reality completely dissolved and they are plunged back into the reality of the traumatic event (e.g. young woman who returned from fetching water and saw four of her neighbours dead in front of her. Her intense fear that her children were also killed caused a psychotic breakdown). Many people reported avoidant-numbing symptoms to ward off the intolerable emotions and memories stirred by these intrusive recollections. Most reported symptoms of autonomic hyperarousal including heart palpitations, insomnia, irritability, agitation, hypervigilance that may approach paranoid proportions.

As many of the IDPs are returning or hoping soon to return to their destroyed town of Yelwa, ongoing support will be especially important to assist the people in picking up their lives and being able to go forward, otherwise trauma that is stuck may either debilitate people's progress or cause intense rage that could easily result in more revenge killings.

It is also very important for the women who were victims of mass rape to receive counselling in order to prevent the adverse effect of rapes on themselves and on their families.

[...]

The problems and suffering of the IDPs is far from over.

Yelwa:

- People are returning to a town that is almost completely destroyed and that does not provide basic services such as health care. Return is voluntary but also linked to the fact that government support to the IDP camps is decreasing.

- Most people are severely traumatised by what they witnessed during the massacre and /or the cruelties they experienced themselves.
- Yelwa falls under the administration (Local Government Area) of Shendam which has been accused of instigating the May massacre against muslims. People are afraid to go to Shendam and there would be little trust in receiving reconstruction support from Shendam - if forthcoming at all.
- There are no serious attempts to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of the massacres. Reconciliation is encouraged by roadside posters, saying "give peace a chance, stop the killing". There is a risk that the events and the plight of the people are too easily forgotten.
- Security is currently good due to a large army presence. The protection situation is less clear for when the state of emergency will expire in November.
- The governor of Plateau state committed assistance to Yelwa but the extent of the support is not clear and there will be time delays. Advocacy is needed to ensure that support is not all channelled through Shendam.

Remaining IDP sites:

- Those remaining in the camps are often those that have least of their property left and least ability to move forward in their lives. Mental health assistance is of particular importance to this population.
- Access to basic health care is problematic as services by other actors in the camps rapidly deteriorated without MSF presence; accessing health services of the host community (although officially free for IDPs) is not affordable for the IDPs
- Continuous advocacy is needed to guarantee a minimum of basic health care (health workers and drugs) to the remaining IDPs in the different sites."

High death rates in Benue IDP camps related to poor hygiene conditions and lack of health care facilities, 2002

- Overstretched sanitation facilities because of overpopulation
- Outbreaks of cholera reported

OMCT, 2002, pp. 160-161

" At Daudu camp, researchers were informed that the camps had registered 4,027 internally displaced persons. Deaths in the camps as a result of the poor conditions in which the IDPs were living as well as voluntary departures, and the departure of orphaned children or some others who departed to join their relatives reduced the occupancy of the camps to 2,623. The death rate in the camps was reportedly high as a result of poor hygienic conditions and lack of health care facilities and personnel.

The authors visited Agasha camp, located in a primary school about 45-minutes from Makurdi the Benue State Capital. The misery is unspeakable. Most of the displaced persons in Agasha are originally from the Ibi L.G.A, Wukari, Dooshima, Donga, Gasau and parts of Nassarawa State. The conditions on the camp are unsanitary owing mainly to the dense population. There have been outbreaks of cholera. Medical supplies are lacking, critical for about a dozen women including one Dorcas Terfa (displaced from Jangwa, Nassarawa State) who gave birth in the camp. Dorcas, like most women in the camp, lost her husband and male relatives in the killings. Having been displaced from their farms, these women cannot earn a livelihood. The Benue State Government, charitable individuals and organisations (particularly the churches and the Red Cross) provide food. For the teeming population of the displaced, this amounts to one meal a day. Resettlement efforts are non-existent, with the consequence that children are increasingly released to outsiders on adoption or to serve as domestic servants."

IRIN, 22 November 2001

"[November 2001] Situation in Daudu IDP Camp:

The camp comprises seven large buildings and some temporary huts that were constructed to accommodate additional IDPs at the height of the displacement. There were reportedly 9,500 initially displaced in the camp, although many have since returned. The current figure given for the population of the camp was 2000. Most of the displaced in the camp are from the Tiv ethnic group who fled fighting in Plateau State. These IDPs explained that they were attacked, their houses destroyed and their property looted. Some of them were also killed. As a result, they fled, first to Nasarawa State in temporary settlements, and then, because they were not welcome in Nasarawa, they moved to Benue State. The IDPs stated that they were attacked because of their growing population, which threatened the other ethnic groups. The government provided assistance to the IDPs in terms of food, mattresses, blankets, medication, although this assistance was not regular. In addition, food was provided by the Catholic Diocese. Outstanding needs of the IDPs include food and medical care, the local government clinic nearby does not have adequate drugs. The IDPs desire to return home, however, before they go back they need guarantees for their security as they still fear further attacks. They also need assistance to rebuild their homes. In addition, they want to be given recognition as indigenes of the State.

[...]

Most of the immediate needs of the displaced were met by the state government and other actors, including the Red Cross and the Catholic Diocese. There is still need for medical supplies in some of the clinics serving the IDP camps. Outstanding needs include the reconstruction of houses and re-establishment of farms in areas of return."

Food and nutrition

Ongoing violence in Plateau State may undermine food security, May 2004

- Food security in Plateau State - one of Nigeria's main food baskets - may be undermined due to the flight of farmers and herdsmen from their land

IRIN, 25 May 2004

"Concern is growing that the continuing violence in Plateau will severely hurt this year's harvest in a region that is one of Nigeria's main food baskets and undermine food security.

Large tracts of farmland have been left uncultivated by farmers who have fled for fear of attack. Many herds of livestock have also been lost by herdsmen who have been forced to abandon them and seek refuge in one of the various camps in neighbouring states.

According to the Red Cross, there are an estimated 50,000 people in camps bordering Plateau State."

IDP children in Gombe State malnourished due to irregular and poor feeding (May 2003)

IFRC, 9 May 2003

"3-1 The situation of the displaced persons in Dadiya and Maitukun communities, Bambam Local Government of Gombe State is far from resolved as about 3,000 IDPs have left a temporary school shelter to stay with relatives and friends around the shelter area, while about 1,500 IDPs are still staying at the school shelter. The condition of the people is very pathetic and the children

are getting malnourished due to irregular and poor feeding. Children are developing fever and diarrhea at the camp.

3-2 Government Action

The Local authority in Bambam provided 62 bags grain and 15 pieces of mats to the IDPs on 14th April.

3-3 Red Cross Action

The Red Cross Branch Health Adviser has mobilized some volunteer doctors to provide medical assistance while some other volunteers carried out health education and provided oral dehydration therapy to the sick. The local branch of the Red Cross mobilized local community to provide bread and sachet water for the IDPs at the Camps.

4- Outstanding needs and Red Cross Action

The unmet needs of the vulnerable persons, as stated in the Information Bulletin 1 on 7th April 2003, are not yet covered as the present conditions for the vulnerable persons in the two States have not improved.

4-1 The Red Cross is seeking CHF 53,661 to procure and distribute nonfood items to 1,300 most vulnerable IDP families to resettle them in their villages. These nonfood items include mats, kitchen wares, farming tools and seeds for planting. The community is ready to start preparing their farm lands as the rainy season starts soon

The IDPs also requested for seven milling machines which were destroyed during the attack by the armed cattle herders. A milling machine costs about USD 500/unit.

[...]

The Red Cross branches will be responsible for the implementation of the distribution supported by Disaster Management officers of the NRCS. The Federation's Regional office in Lagos will assist the NRCS in monitoring and reporting."

Food security of host communities in Benue undermined by the IDP influx (June 2002)

- Government appears to have only provided food assistance during the early phase of displacement
- Food reserves of host communities depleted

PFD, 17 June 2002, p7

"One major fault of the State government is that they relied on local communities to host the IDPs which many did willingly, however the impact on the communities will be felt for at least another year or two. The communities dipped into their food reserves to feed the IDPs and as a result many of the border communities are currently without food. This year's planting season has so far been slow since the rains have not come, and in fact the government is predicting a possible drought for the central part of Nigeria, which effects all the areas hit by the crisis. Nicknamed the "Bread Basket" of Nigeria this area has yet to produce any crops. Upon one trip to Abida, one of the most Northwest areas neighboring Taraba state, an IDP spoke out that the community has been very giving in has helped the IDPs, however he is concerned about the local citizens since all food reserves have been used up. The local parish priest has already addressed this problem with CDM and requested food aid for the entire community. However CDM cannot provide assistance in such magnitude since all the IDP funds have been exhausted. This presents a real crisis and not only will the small towns be affected but it can already be seen with high market prices and little food in the Makurdi markets. The state government only initially delivered food to these areas that was almost one year ago"

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Public Participation

Uncertainty about voting rights of IDPs (January 2003)

ThisDay News, 24 January 2003

"Eligible voters displaced by inter-tribal and religious clashes in Kaduna and Plateau states are to forfeit their voting rights since they will not be registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) at the on-going make-up registration exercise.

Niger state resident electoral commissioner (REC), Alhaji Ismaila Abdulkareem disclosed this to THISDAY in Minna on Monday after a close door meeting with leaders of all the political parties in the state.

According to him, victims of ethnic or religious riots that fled from Kaduna and Plateau States to Niger State are not eligible for the make-up exercise, saying "any attempt by the victims of these riots to re-register will tantamount to multiple registration and it is illegal."

The INEC boss said all displaced eligible voters are to hold on to their temporary voters slip until the completion of the compilation and release of final voters cards.

Abdulkareem, who was particular about those who fled from Kaduna State to Muan and Tafa local government, Niger State at the wake of the last religious riot, advised such people not to present themselves for the make-up exercise.

According to him, such persons who can not say where they were initially cannot present himself or herself for re-registration, as this will be a double registration."

The commissioner, who had earlier educated the political leaders on those eligible to register said that the make-up exercise was designed primarily for those who could not be registered during last year exercise.

"These categories of Nigerians include those who were out of the country, those who were hospitalised and those genuinely left out for being below 18 years when the voters registration exercise was conducted in September 2002," Abdulkareem explained.

He then advised the affected people to hold on until the permanent voter's card is released before they can apply for transfer of card from the affected state to their new state.

Abdulkareem maintained that the interest of such victims is taken care of by the Electoral Act, which approves transfer of voter's name from one state to another. "Not until we (INEC) is about to do that victims of ethnic or religious clashes will have to wait," he concluded. "

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

More than 1000 houses burned during Lagos clashes, February 2002

ICRC Geneva, 18 March 2002

"On 02.02.02 an ethnic clash broke out between a faction of the Yoruba ethnic militant troop, Oodua People's Congress (OPC) and a section of the Hausa community in Idi-Araba area of Lagos. Although there have been conflicting reports on the real cause of the crisis, it is reported to have left over 100 people dead and over 400 wounded. More than 1000 houses were burnt and a number of cars were destroyed. Residents fled their homes resulting on about 5,000 displaced persons. Some of the residents took refuge in the Lagos University Teaching Hospital in Idi-Araba while others were evacuated to a nearby army barracks. By the third day of the crisis, the ethnic disturbances spread to some other parts of Lagos creating tension in the lives of Lagos inhabitants. Soldiers were then drafted to the area to assist the police to bring the situation back to normal."

Communal violence in and around Jos causes major destruction, September-October 2001

- Dilimi village on the outskirts of Jos town suffered the most intense destruction
- In the Angwan Rogo suburb of Jos houses belonging to Christians were all burnt and their property destroyed

OMCT, 2002, p. 119

"Dilimi village on the outskirts of Jos town suffered the most intense destruction. Inhabited mostly by Muslims, virtually the entire village was razed to the ground. The only buildings left standing were those belonging to Christians and "indigenes". In all, about four thousand houses, eleven Mosques, and two schools all belonging to Muslims were systematically destroyed in Dilimi. Some residents of Dilimi are still living in a displaced person's camp in Gangare Primary School in Jos. The entire Muslim population of the village had to be relocated there. In Angwan Rogo on the other hand houses belonging to Christians were all burnt and their property destroyed. Churches in the area were also destroyed."

Soldiers plunder abandoned farms in Benue State, October-December 2001

- After the October violence in Benue State, the deployed army forces allegedly were involved in extortion, harassment and looting
- Soldiers also regularly plundered farms which were abandoned by frightened farmers, harvesting the crops and selling the produce
- As a consequence of this conduct, people were displaced and fled into the bush to hide

HRW, April 2002, p14

"While the majority of rape cases reported to Human Rights Watch took place between the end of October and the end of November, other forms of abuse by the military continued into December. The most common complaints by residents were of systematic extortion and harassment, especially at roadblocks, and looting. Soldiers regularly plundered farms which had been abandoned by frightened farmers, harvesting the crops and selling the produce. A source in Makurdi reported that in mid-November, more than fifteen military trucks were seen passing through the town carrying yams and other goods, and that soldiers in Abako town were harassing farmers and preventing them from returning to their fields to harvest their crops. In mid-December, there was still a military presence at Vaase, despite the fact that the village was almost empty. Local residents complained that the soldiers were harassing the few people who were still there, harvesting their crops and stealing machinery and vehicles. Residents of Gbeji also complained of looting and extortion by soldiers. One man told Human Rights Watch that soldiers had come on four consecutive days in mid-November and asked the residents of Gbeji to give them yams or money. "They said that if we didn't give them what they wanted, they would not cooperate with us. People were afraid, so we ran into the bush to hide [...] Soldiers are still taking our yams and beating people."

Property of IDPs destroyed by fighting in Nasarawa and Taraba States, July-August 2001

- Many displaced believe that their homes have been destroyed by the fighting
- Destruction of crops
- No male adults in Lafia camp, since they keep vigil over their property (July 2001)

CRS, August 2001

"The fighting has taken its toll on the lives of the displaced. Some have lost family and many believe that their homes have probably been destroyed by the fighting."

NGO (anonymous), 14 August 2001

"Food needs are always great for IDPs in Nigeria and particularly this year when many IDPs are themselves subsistence farmers whose crops have been ruined."

UN-OCHA, 14 August 2001

"No male adults are in [Lafia] camp except camp administrators. On questioning response was that some of the men are dead & others are keeping vigil in the villages/communities to ensure that what is left does not get burnt down."

Houses of as many as 60,000 IDPs destroyed in reprisal attack on Odi in the Bayelsa State in 1999

- Most houses destroyed and 60,000 inhabitants forced to flee
- Reported in October 2002 that at least 90% of the population still lived in temporary structures

OMCT, 2002, pp. 71, 76, 78, 80

"On December 14 1999 Abdul Oroh, Executive Director of the Civil Liberties Organisation, in a press conference summed up his impression of Odi after the invasion [i.e. reprisal attack by the Nigerian army] as thus: "we saw no single livestock, poultry or domestic animals except a stray cat.

[...]

Over 95% of the Odi population were displaced by the invasion and to date at least 90% of the population live in temporary structures. Some lucky ones have been able to rebuild or live as squatters in some rooms in primary school buildings and partially completed buildings built by the Bayelsa State government to house some of the displaced individuals in Odi. Many inhabitants of Odi who managed to escape the invasion spent the fourteen days of invasion and its immediate aftermath hiding in the bush and living under the elements. Others managed to flee to neighboring towns and villages for the entire period. On their return home most of them found themselves homeless and had to live under open canopies for weeks until they were able to relocate into classrooms, uncompleted houses or makeshift shelter made of wood, roofing sheets or mud depending on the availability of the building materials."

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

Villagers in Plateau State have used looting and vandalism of property to deter IDP return (2004)

- In some areas of Plateau State, vandalism, looting and burning of property took place well after the original attacks in order to discourage returning IDPs
- Government 'peace committees' and religious 'interfaith' groups were targeting these areas with reconciliation work
- According to UN OCHA, the government must do more to establish a safe and enabling environment for IDPs who want to return

GIDPP, 30 June 2004

"Briefing the IASC on a recent mission to Nigeria, UN OCHA reported that areas of conflict visited were Shendam local government area – Yamina/ Yelwa and Kadarko in Wase local government area. Both local government areas are in Plateau state, from where the IDPs in Bauchi and Nassarawa originate.

IDPs normally return to their homes after the violence and other dangers have been removed. In the areas visited clearly much of the vandalism, burning and looting took place well after the original attacks. People in the villages and have used looting and destruction of property as a tool to discourage returning IDPs e.g. in Yelwa and Yamina. Weeks after the violence erupted, there was evidence of fresh burning of property and vandalism. Perhaps these symbols would also impact visiting authorities and others for receiving relief items.

As in the case of IDP camps visited, interlocutors in these town and villages were not very willing to attempt compromise or accommodation for those former residents who fled. However, the government has established peace committees to target these areas. In addition, reconciliation work is being undertaken by an 'Interfaith' group that includes representatives of Muslim and Christian faiths.

More effort has to be made by the Government to establish a safe and enabling environment for IDPS who want to return. Security must be assured, as well as an obligation to protect freedom of movement. IDPs will only return when these conditions are met and police and other security forces are seen to be impartial and respect laws and conventions that govern their behaviour."

IDPs in Nigeria appear to return after major threats recede (2003)

- Unknown number of IDPs apparently also resettle elsewhere or get assimilated into the communities that had given them shelter
- Return must be analyzed in the context of general movement patterns between the different Nigerian states and ethnic groups

Global IDP Project, April 2003, p8

"In Nigeria it seems to be a pattern that displaced people are able to return to their homes after the violence and other dangers that forced them to flee no longer represents a major threat. However, an unknown number of IDPs apparently also resettle elsewhere or get assimilated into the communities that had given them shelter during their displacement. The latter must also be seen in the context of general movement patterns between the different Nigerian states and ethnic groups. In some cases, former neighbors have used looting and destruction of property as a tool to discourage return, while in other areas there are examples of local authorities actively guarding property until the IDPs return. Unfortunately, several participants indicated that such solidarity is on the decline.

The discussions indicated that Guiding Principles 28-30 would be a relevant basis for a future official policy on return/resettlement of IDPs in Nigeria. Several participants underscored in particular the need to involve IDPs more actively in the return process, and to inform better both IDPs and the communities where IDPs return or resettle about the approach taken and the role of national and international humanitarian actors. Those providing assistance in the return phase should pay attention to the potential tensions that access to humanitarian assistance can create between beneficiaries and their neighbors. International actors should thus acquire a better understanding of local conditions and practices before initiating humanitarian assistance activities."

People who fled armed raids in Gombe State lack support to reintegrate (May 2003)

IFRC, 9 May 2003

"The situation of the displaced persons in Dadiya and Maitukun communities, Bamam Local Government of Gombe State is far from resolved as about 3,000 IDPs have left a temporary school shelter to stay with relatives and friends around the shelter area, while about 1,500 IDPs are still staying at the school shelter. The condition of the people is very pathetic and the children are getting malnourished due to irregular and poor feeding. Children are developing fever and diarrhea at the camp.

[...]

Although the displaced persons have made all efforts to return to their communities, their attempt for the restoration of their normal life and farming have not been achieved due to lack of supports. The Red Cross branch offices and volunteers in Adamawa and Gombe States have continued to mobilize local resources to help the vulnerable persons.

The Red Cross branches will be responsible for the implementation of the distribution supported by Disaster Management officers of the NRCS. The Federation's Regional office in Lagos will assist the NRCS in monitoring and reporting."

IDPs from Ogu/Bolo in the River State unable to return because of continuous harassment by political thugs (2003)

- "Hundreds" of IDPs from Ogu still sheltered in Post Harcourt in February 2003
- Difficult for IDPs seen as non-PDP supporters to return
- Women trying to return temporarily to the local market experiences harassment

HRW, April 2003, pp. 10, 12-13

"On August 6, 2002, about one month before the national voter registration process was due to begin, fighting broke out between the ANPP and PDP factions in Ogu, the headquarters of Ogu/Bolo local government area, during a personnel audit of the local government's staff. At least

one person was reported killed, several people were injured, and significant property was destroyed. Hundreds and perhaps thousands of members of the ANPP and other residents fled Ogu, some of them moving into sites for groups of displaced persons in the state capital, Port Harcourt. Since that date, there have been several killings linked to the political conflict between the two parties, and political opponents of the PDP are still unwilling to return home.

[...]

Human Rights Watch visited two sites set up in Port Harcourt for displaced persons from Ogu; each was still hosting hundreds of people in February 2003. These sites were not set up by the government but rather were supported by private individuals. One was set up through Chief Ada George in the Rivers State UNPP headquarters and the other was at the premises of a church. We were unable to confirm the claim by ANPP and UNPP members from Ogu that tens of thousands of persons had been displaced. Some of the people we spoke with reported they had lost their means of livelihood and had received no support from the state or federal government.

Some of the former ANPP supporters have moved with Chief Ada George into the UNPP. They claimed that the PDP in Ogu continues to threaten all non-PDP supporters who return to Ogu. Nonetheless, women from the community have returned to Ogu on several market days to assess the level of tension in Ogu. A leader at one of the sites for displaced persons explained, "more than seven times [since August 6] we've sent women to market. Each times they're molested, their things are taken, their clothes are torn, or they're beaten [by Agaba boys]." A twenty-seven-year-old woman at the same site explained that, several weeks after fleeing Ogu on August 6, she and five other women had wanted to return to Ogu to check on their property in the market. "The Agaba boys sent their girlfriends to apprehend us or chase us away. They took one of us away and a group of them raped her. Both the men and women beat the rest of us. I recognized by name and face several of the boys who attacked us. I suffered bruises and some pain." Both she and her husband were UNPP members, and her husband had wanted to run for a councillorship position in Ogu/Bolo. Several of the displaced UNPP members staying at the UNPP headquarters in Port Harcourt reported that they felt unable to go into town even in Port Harcourt because they had been threatened there by thugs from the Okrika area supporting the PDP."

By 2002 many Odi inhabitants had still not reintegrated since being displaced by fighting in Bayelsa State in 1999

- Killings of policemen in November 1999 inside Odi by youth mob triggered major military operation
- Most houses destroyed and 60,000 inhabitants forced to flee
- Reported in October 2002 that at least 90 percent of the population remained in temporary structures.
- Over 95% of the Odi population was displaced by the invasion and to date at least 90% of the population lives in temporary structures

OMCT, 2002, pp. 71, 76, 78, 80

"Odi is a town situated along the Portharcourt/Warri Motorway in Bayelsa State in the South - South zone of Nigeria. Until its invasion on 20 November 1999, Odi was the second largest town in Bayelsa State, one of the states of Nigeria's troubled Niger Delta region. The problem in Odi is reported to have started on or about 2.00 a.m. on November 20, 1999 when the might of the Nigerian armed forces invaded the community and occupied it for fourteen days. At the end of their sojourn the town was utterly destroyed and a lot of people, with their lives and property were laid waste.

[...]

Following the killings of the Policemen [in November 1999 inside Odi by youth mob], the presidency wrote a letter to the Governor of Bayelsa for the arrest of the culprits within fourteen days, failing which a state of emergency would be declared in Bayelsa. But just after a week, while the state government was making efforts to round up the culprits the Army moved in.

[...]

On December 14 1999 Abdul Oroh, Executive Director of the Civil Liberties Organisation, in a press conference summed up his impression of Odi after the invasion as thus: "we saw no single livestock, poultry or domestic animals except a stray cat. The community's 60,000 inhabitants had fled into the forest... been arrested or killed..." As summed up by one of our respondents, "there was no ethnic or religious crisis in Odi. The case of Odi was a case when the government of the country, instead of protecting its own people, went to war against them."

[...]

Over 95% of the Odi population were displaced by the invasion and to date at least 90% of the population live in temporary structures. Some lucky ones have been able to rebuild or live as squatters in some rooms in primary school buildings and partially completed buildings built by the Bayelsa State government to house some of the displaced individuals in Odi. Many inhabitants of Odi who managed to escape the invasion spent the fourteen days of invasion and its immediate aftermath hiding in the bush and living under the elements. Others managed to flee to neighboring towns and villages for the entire period. On their return home most of them found themselves homeless and had to live under open canopies for weeks until they were able to relocate into classrooms, uncompleted houses or makeshift shelter made of wood, roofing sheets or mud depending on the availability of the building materials."

IRIN-WA, 7 January 1999

"Government officials on Tuesday [5 January 1999] justified the deployment of troops and tanks in oil-rich Bayelsa State last week in response to protests by Ijaw youth, news agencies said. Information and Culture Minister John Nwodo told a press conference in Abuja that the troop deployment was aimed at protecting lives and property in the state, where Ijaw youths are demanding more control over local oil resources, the Nigerian daily 'The Guardian' said yesterday. [...]

The unrest in Bayelsa started on 30 December after the passing of an Ijaw deadline for oil companies to cease operations in the area. Up to 26 people were reported killed in ensuing clashes between the youths and security forces. Many civilians fled the state capital Yenagoa and other towns in response to the unrest, news agencies said."

IDPs sheltered in Benue state forced to return or resettle (2002)

- Reports of Tiv attempting to return to their homes in Taraba and Nassarawa being forced to turn back to Benue after non-Tiv residents of these states attacked them
- Security assessment by end March 2002 confirmed that repatriation for the IDPs was not yet safe
- In mid-March the IDPs were given one-week notice to leave (later extended by another week)
- One source claim that returnees apparently not allowed to resume living on their old land, but are given a communal area to share with other returnees
- Another source claims that few of the Tivs stayed in their areas of origin because of insecurity and the fact that their houses and farms were destroyed

US DOS, 31 March 2003

"During periods of ethno-religious violence, numerous persons were displaced from their places of residence. For example, in September and October 2001, several hundred thousand persons

were displaced due to the ethnic conflict in Benue, Taraba, and Nassarawa States [...]. In April media reports stated that three persons were killed and an undisclosed number injured when unknown gunmen assaulted displaced Tivs attempting to return to Taraba State. No arrests were made during the year. Hundreds of Tiv attempting to return to their homes in Taraba and Nassarawa were forced to return to Benue after non-Tiv residents of these states attacked them. Officials in Benue estimated that as many as 6,000 Tiv internally displaced persons (IDPs) were unable to return to their homes in other states. Other observers estimated that fewer than 1,000 persons remained. "

Timeline [from a NGO project document]:

PFD , 17 June 2002

March 2002: PFD [Partners for Development]project funds released to CDM [Catholic Diocese of Makurdi]. March 4, 2002 all government food assistance stops in the camps. PFD/CDM are the only NGOs providing assistance. March 14 repatriation of all IDPs announced. March 28th a visit to the Northwest border areas confirms that repatriation for the IDPs is not yet safe for there were reports of shootings and IDP convoys forced to return back to Benue state.

April 2002: All funds exhausted for food provisions in Daudu, Ukpia and Agasha camps. PFD/CDM are only NGOs providing food aid to the camps. IDPs continue to return home. End of April CDM and PFD announce in the camps that all funding for the feeding programs has stopped. Returnees still face obstacles upon returning to their home areas. Returnees are not allowed to resume living on their land, but are given a communal area to share with other returnees. No food or shelter provided by the state or local Nasarawa and Taraba governments. Returnees return to harsh condition and extreme heat and drought. Contract between PFD and CDM has finished.

May 2002: CDM still in camps, Catholic Relief Services provided a small amount of funding to continue the feeding program until end of June. Most IDPs have returned and face extreme hardship since no assistance is being provided for them upon their return.

June 2002: 1,800 IDPs remain in the camps.

[...]

The biggest challenge faced was the repatriation effort. Clearly, the government was not equipped with the knowledge or resources to facilitate the return. It was announced in the refugee camps on March 14, 2002, by the Tiv chief, that all IDPs were to return to their perspective areas within a week. It was understood that the Benue state government was to provide transport for all returning IDPs. The beginning phase of the repatriation many of the IDPs were cautious about their impending return. After a successful consultation between the IDP government chairman, Father John of CDM and the consultant, was the repatriation effort postponed for a week in order to provide adequate time to facilitate such endeavor and for the IDPs to prepare for their return. The IDPs did repatriate however no assistance was given to them upon arrival to their perspective areas. The IDPs were not allowed to return to their homes, rather an area of land was given to them by the local government. They had no food or shelter upon their arrival. Furthermore some of these areas are so remote that they do not have access to health care or education. "

UN-OCHA, 18 June 2002

" It has been reported that the majority of the IDPs from Taraba and Nasarawa States have returned. However, [as of June 2002] IDPs from Plateau State still remain in Benue State. A meeting has recently been convened between the state governments of Benue, Taraba and Plateau to agree on the return of IDPs.

[...]

In an effort to address the issue of return and resettlement, the State Government held consultations with other relevant state governments and traditional rulers to discuss peace

settlement initiatives. Agreements were reached for the return of the IDPs to their respective states and the state government made transport available. Initially, few of the Tivs stayed in their areas of origin because of insecurity and the fact that their houses and farms were destroyed. However, it was reported that most of the displaced have now returned, although some (ICRC estimate 2,000) still remain in camps in Benue State. Government reports that many of the camps have been closed. Figures were not available on the numbers resettled or the current number of displaced within Benue State. ."

Return and resettlement strategy of the Nassarawa State Government (2002)

- The Nasarawa State Government followed a resettlement strategy, which included transportation to established transit camps and the provision of food, non food items and drugs to the IDPs on their arrival at the transit camps
- Assistance only provided for a short time
- Upon their return to Nasarawa State, the Tivs were encouraged to live in large settlements rather than their original communities

UN-OCHA 18 June 2002

"The Nassarawa State Government appears to have a resettlement strategy of sorts, which includes transportation to established transit camps and the provision of food, non food items and drugs to the IDPs on their arrival at the transit camps. This assistance is only provided for a short time after which it is redirected to the communities to encourage resettlement. Usually, if building materials are provided at all, they will only be provided upon return to communities of origin to encourage the resettlement process. Insufficient attentions seems to have been paid to the issue of security and reconciliation to ensure that returning IDPs would be accepted back into the communities without fear of future attack or conflict.

Toto clashes – In 2000/2001, efforts were made to encourage the Bassa IDPs to return to Toto. A government committee was established and four transit camps were established within the Toto LGA. Many of the IDPs were assisted with transportation to move to the transit camps, where they were also assisted with food (for 5-6 months), non food items, drugs, etc. Roofing materials were promised upon the return of the IDPs to their original communities. However, the IDPs found that the situation was not conducive for their return (they still felt insecure) and returned to their places of displacement, where they had already established farms. The Bassa IDPs are now making a move to return on their own. Most of those who stayed away are farmers whilst those who have returned are mainly government workers. Government continues to make efforts to resolve the issue with the Ibiri community and promote reconciliation so that the Bassa can return and live in peace.

Tiv/Hausa-speaking Azaras and other ethnic groups - Government initiated dialogue with community leaders, opinion leaders, traditional heads in both Nasarawa and Benue States to appeal for peace and reconciliation and encourage the return of Tivs from Benue State. An agreement was eventually reached for the return and resettlement of the displaced Tiv community, which started a few months ago. Upon their return to Nasarawa State, the Tivs were encouraged to live in large settlements rather than their original communities. Around 21,000 returned and were relocated into a large settlement in the middle of town. (This also seems to go against efforts at reintegration). The Federal Government gave the State Government 100 million Naira to develop this settlement area, which was later burnt causing the Tivs to flee again due to insecurity. To date, many of the IDPs have returned to their areas of residence and are trying to rebuild their houses and restart their farming activities. ICRC estimate that 2,000 still remain in camps in Benue State.

IDPs in Lafia camp and other areas were encouraged to return to their communities of origin. The government provided transportation for their return and also assisted with the provision of food and non food items.”

The Emergency Relief Committee in the Nasarawa State reported in May 2002 that:

“Following the restoration of peace and normalcy in areas affected by the communal disturbances, which led to the displacement of the Tiv community in the Nasarawa South Senatorial district in 2001, the Internally Displaced Persons, who were hitherto in Benue State were encouraged to return to their areas of residence, and to carry on with their normal activities in the State.

Consequently, a large number of the displaced persons returned to their areas of residence. However, most of their houses had been destroyed in the wake of the crisis and their basic source of livelihood disrupted. They are now engaged in the process of rebuilding their settlements and cultivating their farmlands.

[...]

Preliminary reports indicate that the Internally Displaced Persons are in fifty-two (52) settlements which are located in seven local Government areas of the State. [...]

Detailed Statistics of the returnees in the respective settlements are being compiled. Registers of the returnees have been opened in the various settlement areas. Interim report from seventeen (17) of the settlement areas indicate the following:

S/N	Name of Settlement	Location	Persons
1	Agon	Obi	3954
2	Ibuan Kertyo	Obi	3359
3	Imon (Samgor)	Obi	2960
4	Ihuman	Awe	1062
5	Anuku	Awe	1200
6	Shiika	Azara	475
7	Akondo	Azara	204
8	Igbatim	Obi	2421
9	Ayakeke	Azara	1146
10	Utsuwa	Obi	1256
11	Ukaa (Urvikaa)	Obi	1210
12	Hunki	Awe	350
13	Ikyosun	Awe	400
14	Kwashi	Obi	350
15	Adabu	Obi	300
16	Azongu	Awe	350
17	Kuje	Obi	400
TOTAL			21,397

Source: Fax from The Emergency Relief Committee in the Nasarawa State , 17 May 2002

Some 36,000 IDPs who had sought shelter inside Plateau State had still not returned by May 2002

- Thousands of Hausa IDPs fled Plateau for Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, and Bauchi
- US DOS report suggesting that by end-2002 that majority of IDPs had not returned

UN-OCHA, 18 June 2002

May 2002: Location of approximately 36,000 remaining IDPs in the Plateau State (Source Government of Plateau State, 21 May 2002):

- 20,058 in Jos and environs;
- 16,320 in Kanam and Sanga LGAs;
- 146 families in Foron area

US DOS, 31 March 2003, sect. 5

"Some of the affected population fled into neighboring states, including Benue, Kano and Kaduna, whilst the majority were displaced within Plateau State. A number of camps were set up to accommodate some of the IDPs. There are no updated figures of how many displaced remain within and outside the state. However, it is reported that most of the camps are now empty.

Displaced camp - Gangare public school

The IDPs residing in Gangare public school are Hausa from Dilini village. The entire village fled following an attack by the Christians in the community who destroyed all the buildings in the village. The IDPs initially moved into Gangare public school, with an initial population of 1370. These IDPs later moved out of the school into surrounding areas where they had extended families. There are 40 IDPs who remained in the school. They are now living in a house adjacent to the school. The state government provided them with some food assistance every two-three months. All the IDPs would like to return to their village, however, they would first like to see a meeting held between themselves and the Christians in the village to agree on living together in peace without further clashes. The IDPs would also require assistance to rebuild their houses given that all buildings were destroyed.

[...]

Meetings are being held with relevant state governments and traditional leaders to encourage the return of IDPs still residing in neighboring states. There has been no provision of assistance for returning IDPs due to the lack of funds from government."

"Approximately 80 percent of the victims in Jos were Hausa Muslims, who constituted a significant minority in Jos. The military was able to restore order, but thousands of Hausa fled Plateau for Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, and Bauchi. This conflict appeared to have been primarily ethnic and secondarily religious. Christians of different ethnic groups reportedly attacked each other, and Yoruba Muslims joined in targeting their Hausa co-religionists. There were reports of some IDPs returning to Plateau, but numbers cannot be confirmed and by most credible estimates the majority of the IDPs have not returned."

Over 85,000 IDPs, mostly ethnic Tivs, were resettled inside Taraba State by June 2002

- More than 85,000 displaced have been resettled to Taraba State
- The IDPs, mostly of the Tiv ethnic group, had fled ethnic and communal clashes in Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba and Benue States between June and November 2001
- The Taraba State government provided transport to move most of the displaced who were settled in camps

UN-OCHA, 18 June 2002

"Most of the Tiv population were displaced in neighboring communities and then into neighboring states, particularly Benue State. Two camps were set in Mutum Biyu and Bali in Taraba State to

accommodate the displaced Tiv population who remained in Taraba State. These camps are now empty. The Jukuns were displaced mainly within the state. Many of them have returned."

IRIN, 18 June 2002

"More than 85,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been resettled in their home villages in Nigeria's central region in the past two months, Red Cross officials said on Tuesday.

The IDPs, mostly of the Tiv ethnic group, had fled ethnic and communal clashes that wracked the states of Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba and Benue between June and November 2001.

'Since April at least 85,000 people have returned to Taraba State from Benue State,' Alhaji M.D. Lawan, the Red Cross official overseeing the central region, told IRIN. 'Most of the people in camps set up in Taraba have also left,' he added.

According to Lawan, the Taraba State government provided transport to move most of the displaced who were settled in camps in Ibi, Dan Anache and Gosun local government areas. He said though the IDPs lacked adequate shelter and food, their discomfort was reduced by the Taraba government which provided them transport to their respective places.

'Most are now back in their farms planting with the rainy season now underway,' he added.

During the fighting which pitted Tivs against their Jukun neighbours, four camps were also set up by the Taraba government at Bali, Mutum-Biu, Wukari and Jalingo. But Lawan said all these camps have now been vacated by IDPs."

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Ongoing violence the most common obstacle for humanitarian access (August 2001)

- Ongoing fighting is often the main obstacle

NGO (anonymous), 14 August 2001

"Access to IDPs does not usually seem to be a problem, as long as violence is not ongoing."

ICRC, 16 August 2001

"Access to IDPs was always granted. In a few cases the access was delayed for security reasons."

Violence in Bauchi State impedes access to IDPs (August 2001):

IRIN-WA, 29 August 2001

"Humanitarian workers said full details of casualties and displaced people were not easily available because the area was still unsafe."

The situation is really very tense and our people have not been able to get access to the affected area, Patrick Bawa, spokesman of the Nigerian Red Cross, told IRIN. Until there's some form of normalcy and they enter the area we can't tell much about casualties."

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Overview: Fragmented humanitarian response

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), established in 1999, is responsible for overall disaster management in Nigeria – including the coordination of emergency relief operations as well as assisting in the rehabilitation of the victims where necessary. It has presence in most states and often supports IDPs in the emergency phase of a crisis, but it does not have the necessary resources to assist people displaced for a longer period of time, or to assist returnees to reintegrate. State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMA) also exist in some states, but with varying performance levels.

The national response is generally constrained by lack of experience in dealing with IDP issues, which has resulted in inefficiencies and support gaps to affected populations, but also by competing mandates. Confusion exists at the federal level over who has the mandate to respond to and assist IDPs – especially between NEMA and the National Commission for Refugees (NCR, informally mandated in 2002 to also cover IDPs) – which results in competition for resources.

Such tension and competition has been partly responsible for hindering the drafting of a national IDP policy, which has been in the pipeline since the creation of the Nigerian Presidential Committee on IDPs in January 2004 (Brookings, June 2006, p16).

Coordination between the various humanitarian actors at all levels is at best inconsistent. In the wake of the 2004 Plateau state crisis, international donors criticised the overall national response on various grounds, including: a lack of coordination; the lack of a proper registration system for IDPs; inefficient use of resources despite adequate financial capacity; lack of proper planning, monitoring and evaluation; and the politicisation of humanitarian assistance. At the same time neither the UN nor international donors such as the European Commission's Humanitarian Office regarded the situation in Plateau state as a real humanitarian emergency – with major implications for response and funding. Indeed many donors see Nigeria as well endowed and able to address such situations from its own resources. There is a widely held view that the Nigerian government should focus its efforts on addressing the root causes of the problem – including the equitable distribution of resources – rather than focusing on the symptoms (GIDPP, Special Report, January 2005).

The UN system in Nigeria – headed by a Resident Coordinator who is also Resident Representative of the UN Development Programme – consists of numerous agencies, and has since 2000 been organised around a Development Assistance Framework. So, with a firm focus on development needs, UN assistance to IDPs in Nigeria has been fairly ad hoc. The Red Cross movement as well as a few international NGOs has also been involved in IDP response, albeit in a rather uncoordinated fashion.

Indeed, the overall fragmented response to the 2004 Plateau state crisis in particular demonstrated the need for improved coordination between humanitarian actors at all stages of internal displacement from contingency planning and preparedness right through to post-emergency rehabilitation activities. Although the Nigeria government may have the financial capacity to respond to emergencies, it lacks the necessary institutional capacity and expertise to deal effectively with acute situations of internal displacement. And although the current situation of internal displacement in the country may not amount to an “emergency”, there is clearly potential for increased violence that could quickly spread and cause major population movements.

Known references to the Guiding Principles (as of September 2006)

- References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other references to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation

None

Other references to the Guiding Principles

Draft National IDP Policy (not yet available). Referred to in First Regional Conference on Internal Displacement in West Africa (see below).

First Regional Conference on Internal Displacement in West Africa: Held in the Nigerian capital Abuja, the conference was hosted by the Nigerian government and co-organised by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), UNHCR, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. It brought together a wide variety of representatives of ECOWAS member states, national, regional and international organisations, policy makers and academics. It was acknowledged that while there are currently around one million conflict-induced IDPs in the sub-region, there is a high risk of increased instability and further large-scale displacement. Discussions aimed at finding ways to improve the overall response to IDPs, mainly at a national and regional level. Key recommendations included the development of national laws and policies on internal displacement based on the UN Guiding Principles, and the strengthening of ECOWAS engagement on the issue, for example by developing a regional protocol, declaration or plan of action. The Nigerian government, for its part, presented its own draft National IDP Policy, based largely on the Guiding Principles.

Date: 26-28 April 2006

Document:

[Report of the First Regional Conference on Internal Displacement in West Africa, Brookings, June 2006](#)

Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages

None

Training on the Guiding Principles

NRC training workshop: The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), in collaboration with the National Commission for Refugees (NCR), held a 3-day training workshop on the Guiding Principles in the city of Jos, the state capital of Plateau state. The workshop was part of a global NRC effort to disseminate and explain the Guiding Principles to representatives of governments, NGOs, the UN agencies and the displaced themselves, in order to ensure better protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. A total of 59 participants attended the workshop: 34 participants represented different state emergency agencies, the National Commission for Refugees and regional state authorities from all over Nigeria; national and international non-governmental organizations sent 22 representatives and the UN system was represented by UNICEF and UNHCR (3 participants).

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