

AL-QAEDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASE OF THE “NGRUKI NETWORK” IN INDONESIA

I. OVERVIEW

One network of militant Muslims has produced all the Indonesian nationals so far suspected of links to al-Qaeda. This briefing paper explains how that network emerged, its historical antecedents, and the political dynamics over the last two decades that led some of its members from Indonesia to Malaysia to Afghanistan. It is part of an occasional series that ICG intends to issue on the nature of radical Islam in Southeast Asia.¹

The network has as its hub a religious boarding school (*pesantren* or *pondok*) near Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, after the village where the school is located. The “Ngruki network” began to coalesce in the late 1970s as Indonesian intelligence operatives embarked on an operation to expose potential political enemies of then President Soeharto from the Muslim right. It drew in additional members in the early 1980s, many of whom had served time in prison for anti-government activities. An inner core of the network, led by the two founders of Pondok Ngruki – Abdullah Sungkar (now dead) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir – and radicalised by repression at home, fled to Malaysia in 1985. Some associated with the Ngruki network returned to Indonesia after Soeharto’s resignation in 1998; others stayed in Malaysia but continued to be in close contact with those who went back.

Most members of the network share common characteristics: loyalty to Pondok Ngruki or its founders; commitment to carrying on the struggle of Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s; desire to create an Islamic state by first establishing an Islamic

community or *jemaah islamiyah*, and shared experiences of political detention in the 1980s. Many are on the executive committee of an organisation formed in Yogyakarta in 2000 called the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council).

The problem is that the Ngruki network is far wider than the handful of people who have been accused of ties to al-Qaeda and includes individuals with well-established political legitimacy for having defied the Soeharto government and gone to prison as a result. Many Indonesians have expressed concern that pressure from the U.S. and Southeast Asian governments on Indonesian authorities to carry out preventive arrests of suspects without hard evidence could be seriously counterproductive. It could easily turn the targets of that pressure into heroes within the Muslim community – as has happened with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir – to the point that they become the beneficiaries of substantial political and financial support. And with a combination of a highly politicised national intelligence agency and law enforcement institutions and courts that are both weak and corrupt, such pressure could lead to a recurrence of the arbitrary arrests and detentions that characterised the Soeharto years.

Indonesia is not a terrorist hotbed. Proponents of radical Islam remain a small minority, and most of those are devout practitioners who would never dream of using violence.² But even a tiny group of people can cause an immense amount of damage. The challenge, both for the Indonesian government and the international community, is to be alert to the possibility of individuals making common cause with international criminals, without taking steps that will undermine Indonesia’s fragile democratic institutions.

¹ For the first publication in this occasional series, see ICG Asia Briefing, *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, 10 October 2001.

² See *Ibid.*

II. AL-QAEDA LINKS: THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE

Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, authorities in Singapore, Malaysia, and the United States became convinced that a terror network linked to al-Qaeda was operating in the region. In December 2001, Singapore authorities arrested fifteen Muslim militants suspected of working with al-Qaeda. Later, a videotape found in Afghanistan confirmed the Singapore connection. Thirteen of the Singapore detainees were said to be members of a cell of an organisation that authorities identified as Jemaah Islamiyah. Eight of the thirteen reportedly had training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. They were believed to be planning to bomb a shuttle bus service carrying U.S. military personnel, as well as U.S. naval vessels in Singapore.³ Singapore authorities said at the time that the arrested men reported to an Indonesian based in Malaysia known as Hambali.⁴

With the naming of Hambali, and with related arrests of alleged Jemaah Islamiyah members in Malaysia, including several Indonesian nationals, attention shifted to an Indonesian preacher named Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. In a speech in Singapore in May 2002, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated:

Interrogation [of the suspects detained in Singapore] disclosed that Abu Bakar Baasyir, the leader of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council in Indonesia, was the overall leader of the JI organisation, which covered both Malaysia and Singapore. He was a member of Darul Islam, which aimed at the violent establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia since the late 1940s. He was in Malaysia for 14 years to avoid detention by the Soeharto government and returned in 1999 after Soeharto fell from power.⁵

Ba'asyir, the founder of a religious school in Ngruki, outside Solo, Central Java, tried unsuccessfully to sue the Singapore government for defamation after similar statements from Minister Lee in February 2002. He is teaching openly at his school and has gained many admirers both for defying attempts to connect him to al-Qaeda and questioning U.S. motives in the war against terrorism. For the last two decades, he has been associated with small groups called *jemaah islamiyah* whose teachings had both religious and political content.

Through a complex network described in this report, Ba'asyir also is linked to the small handful of Indonesians who have been accused of having direct or indirect ties to al-Qaeda. Five men in particular stand out among those arrested or currently being sought:

- Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, detained in Manila since January 2002 on the charges of illegal possession of explosives and falsification of documents. He reportedly confessed to having taken part in a series of bombings in Manila in December 2000, and Philippines authorities have said he took part in the plans to attack American assets in Singapore. Al-Gozi, 30, is from Madiun, East Java, and is a former Ngruki student.
- Hambali, alias Riduan Isamuddin, alias Nurjaman, who is thought to be al-Qaeda's main Indonesian contact. From Cianjur, West Java, he remains at large but may be in Indonesia. He has been linked by Southeast Asian intelligence sources and the Indonesian police to a wave of bombings in Indonesia in December 2000; the Manila bombings in which al-Gozi reportedly participated; and plans to attack American navy personnel at a Singapore train station.⁶ Minister Lee referred to Hambali as "Ba'asyir's right-hand man."
- Abu Jibril, alias Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti, alias Mohamed Iqbal bin Abdurrahman, in detention in Malaysia under the Internal Security Act since January 2002. Jibril appears on a videotape recruiting fighters for the Moluccan conflict, but Southeast Asian intelligence sources also claim he was a

³ Singapore Government Press Release, "Address by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the 1st International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia Security Conference on Friday, 31 May 2002 at Shangrila Hotel", p. 3.

⁴ Jeremy Zakis and Steve Macko, "Major Terrorist Plot in Singapore Discovered; al-Qaeda Believed Well Established in the Asian Region",

www.emergency.com/2002Singapore_terror02.com.

⁵ Singapore Government Press Release, op. cit.

⁶ Dan Murphy, "Man 'most wanted' in Indonesia", *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 April 2002.

financial conduit for al-Qaeda in the region.⁷ He is from Lombok, east of Bali.

- Agus Dwikarna, detained in Manila since March 2002 on charges of illegal possession of explosives. The evidence appears to have been planted in Dwikarna’s suitcase. Philippine authorities have said that based on information from al-Gozi and some of the men detained as terrorist suspects in Singapore, Dwikarna is thought to have been involved in bombings in Manila and Jakarta and to have had communication with Fathur Rohman al-Gozi.⁸ The precise nature of any suspected links to al-Qaeda have never been made public.

It is important to underscore that with the exception of Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, who has been sentenced by a Philippines court to two terms of twelve and six years respectively, and Hambali, who has not been apprehended, no convincing evidence of involvement in terrorist activities has been made public against these suspects. Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril, is detained under the Internal Security Act in Malaysia on charges of having undergone military training in Afghanistan a number of years ago, working to establish a “Nusantara Islamic State” (*Daulah Islamiah Nusantara*), endangering the safety of Malaysia by preaching jihad and the desirability of dying as a martyr (*mati syahid*), and giving lectures to members of a Malaysia militant group, three members of which subsequently underwent military training in Maluku.⁹ The official indictment contains no reference to al-Qaeda.

All the men named above are linked in one way or another to the group of Indonesian exiles in Malaysia throughout the late 1980s and most of the 1990s under the spiritual guidance of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. Ba’asyir was not involved in the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s but those rebellions constitute a crucial element of the Ngruki network’s heritage.

III. THE ORIGINS: DARUL ISLAM

The Ngruki network’s interest in establishing an Islamic state draws heavily on the experience of the Darul Islam rebellions. These rebellions, in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and West Java, were only three of numerous regional political movements that broke out in the aftermath of Indonesia’s successful guerrilla war against the Dutch. In each case, they were led by charismatic militia commanders from “modernist”¹⁰ Muslim backgrounds who controlled significant territory during the revolution and were reluctant to surrender their authority to the new central government. In each case, whatever the original cause of the rebellion, they ended up demanding an Islamic state.

The leader in West Java, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, remains the primary political inspiration for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, his associates, and the thousands of others – but still a minority – in Indonesia who desire implementation of Islamic law. Kartosuwirjo had been active in Muslim nationalist politics in the Dutch East Indies before the Second World War. He had helped organise Hizbullah, a volunteer militia set up under the auspices of Masjumi (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*, All-Indonesia Muslim Council), during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, and helped turn Masjumi into a political party after the war’s end. But he became deeply disillusioned with the pre-independence political manoeuvring of Masjumi’s components, and in 1947 began gathering his militia members together in West Java.¹¹

In January 1948, after the Indonesian nationalists were forced to reach a much-hated agreement with the Dutch to withdraw forces from parts of Java, Kartosuwirjo announced the establishment of the Islamic Army of Indonesia (*Tentara Islam Indonesia*, TII). At that point, he regarded the Dutch government, not the newly declared Indonesian

⁷ Dan Murphy, “Al Qaeda’s new frontier: Indonesia”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 May, 2002.

⁸ “Dwikarna terlibat dua peledakan bomb”, *Media Indonesia*, 6 July 2002.

⁹ Fauzan al-Anshari, *Saya Teroris?*, Republika Publishers, May 2002, pp. 5-8.

¹⁰ For much of Indonesia’s modern history, the great divide in the Islamic community was between the “modernists”, represented by the *Mohammadiyah* organization, and the “traditionalists”, represented by the *Nahdlatul Ulama* organization. The modernists, largely from an urban trading background, believed in going back to the *Quran* and *hadith* and ridding Islam of accumulated impurities. The traditionalists, whose base was rural East Java, practised an Islam influenced by Javanese culture.

¹¹ C. Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague, 1981), pp. 85-87.

republic, as the enemy and had not yet declared a separate state.¹² But, as he consolidated his authority in West Java and began to set up political and administrative structures, clashes with the new republican army were inevitable. On 7 August 1949, Kartosuwirjo officially proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia* or NII), and proceeded to fight the Indonesian republic for the next thirteen years.¹³ The areas of West Java under NII control were called Darul Islam, “Abode of Islam”, hence the name of the movement. Kartosuwirjo was finally arrested in 1962.

In South Sulawesi, the rebellion broke out as a result of the new Indonesian army’s refusal to incorporate local militia units en bloc as a separate brigade. The commander of those militias was Kahar Muzakkar (also spelled Qahhar Mudzakkar), from Luwu, in the northern part of South Sulawesi. Like Kartosuwirjo, he came from the modernist stream of Indonesian Islam and was educated in Muhammadiyah schools, first in Sulawesi, then in Solo, Central Java; he was also active in the wartime Hizbullah. But the rebellion he led only took on a distinctly Islamic cast in 1952, after Kartosuwirjo made contact, and the two movements joined forces, at least on paper.¹⁴

Kahar Muzakkar had impeccable nationalist credentials. He had been one of Sukarno’s bodyguards in 1945. From Java, he helped recruit guerrillas from among Sulawesi youths studying there and infiltrated them back into Sulawesi. Despite a noteworthy clash in 1947 with a young Javanese lieutenant colonel named Soeharto that led to a temporary demotion, he remained an important figure in the revolution. He was sent back to South Sulawesi in 1950 and worked to establish the authority of the young republic. For this, he expected his forces to be rewarded with positions in the newly established *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI). Instead, the army leadership, determined to

demobilise as many of the militia fighters as possible, not only rejected a separate brigade led by Muzakkar but also seemed to treat the Sulawesi fighters as poor cousins to their counterparts in Java and Sumatra. As a result, Kahar Muzakkar broke with the new republic and led a rebellion that lasted until he was tracked down and shot by the military in February 1965.

Kahar Muzakkar never really articulated a vision of an Islamic state; he was always more focused on Sulawesi, and on South and Southeast Sulawesi in particular. At different times, however, he did reach out to other parts of Indonesia. In 1953, he proclaimed Sulawesi part of the “*Negara Republik Islam Indonesia*” (NRII, Indonesian Islamic Republic).¹⁵

Meanwhile regional dissatisfaction with Jakarta resulted in rebellions in several parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi and the formation of a rebel government – PRRI – in 1958. The PRRI and a related rebellion in Sulawesi were soon brought under control by the central government but not fully defeated. In February 1960, the Republic of the Union of Indonesia was announced, comprising Kahar Muzakkar’s NRII and the remnant forces of the PRRI.¹⁶ But these efforts were always largely more against the central government than in support of an Islamic state.

The third of the rebellions known as Darul Islam, in Aceh, has less direct relevance to the Ngruki network, although it is noteworthy that the Free Aceh rebel movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or GAM) emerged in 1976, at exactly the same time that *Komando Jihad* operations were underway, and initially drew many of its recruits from the families of former Darul Islam fighters.

Following the defeat of the regional rebellions by the mid-sixties, the key figures disappeared from public view. Many surrendered to the government and were given amnesty; some were even incorporated into the army. Some fled to Malaysia. And some remained quietly out of sight in Indonesia, including Kahar Muzakkar’s defence minister, Sanusi Daris, who in the mid-1980s

¹² Ibid.

¹³ According to some sources, he had actually proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia* or NII) in 1945 but was persuaded to withdraw the proclamation and work with the secular nationalists, led by Sukarno, instead.

¹⁴ In fact, there was little actual cooperation or coordination between the two movements. When, in January 1952, Kahar Muzakkar accepted an offer from Kartosuwirjo to become commander of the South Sulawesi division of the “Islamic Army of Indonesia”, it was more of an expression of solidarity than a commitment to join forces or coordinate planning and tactics.

¹⁵ Kartosuwirjo, his ostensible ally, never used the word “republic”.

¹⁶ In between, Muzakkar had made an unsuccessful attempt to link his forces with those of the related Permesta rebellion in largely Christian North Sulawesi.

reappeared as a link between the South Sulawesi radicals and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s group.

IV. EMERGING IN THE 1970S

A little over a decade later after they were crushed, the Darul Islam movements came back into focus. President Soeharto – Kahar Muzakkar’s old enemy – had been in power since 1966.¹⁷ As elections were approaching in 1977, the one permitted Muslim party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP) was gathering strength as the loyal opposition. A vote for the PPP (or the nationalist PDI) was the only way ordinary Indonesians in the tightly controlled state could express dissatisfaction with the government. To pre-empt the possibility of a large PPP vote, Gen. Ali Moertopo, in charge of covert operations for Soeharto, reactivated Darul Islam, although some people close to old Darul Islam leaders say that he merely moved in to manipulate a movement that had already shown signs of revival.¹⁸

Through the intelligence agency, BAKIN, former Darul Islam fighters, primarily but not exclusively from Java, who had been incorporated into the Indonesian army and government, were persuaded to contact their old comrades.¹⁹ The argument provided by BAKIN was that, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in danger of Communist infiltration across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo, and that only the reactivation of Darul Islam could protect Indonesia. Whether through coercion or money or a combination of both, a number of DI leaders rose to the bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested 185 people whom it accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown organisation called *Komando Jihad*, committed to following the ideals of Kartosuwirjo and establishing the Islamic state of

Indonesia (NII).²⁰ In reality, the *Komando Jihad* was Ali Moertopo’s creation.

Two men accused of being leading *Komando Jihad* figures were Haji Ismail Pranoto, more commonly known by the acronym Hispran, and Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan. Both had been close associates of Kartosuwirjo. In 1983, Haji Danu told a court trying him on subversion charges that he had been recruited by BAKIN as early as 1971, and that under instructions from the West Java (Siliwangi) division of the army, he had called his former comrades-in-arms together to discuss how to counter the communist threat. One such meeting, he said, had taken place at the Siliwangi headquarters in Bandung. The prosecutor said that between 1970 and 1977, Haji Danu and six others, including Kartosuwirjo’s son, had set up an elaborate administrative structure which paralleled that of the old Darul Islam movement. Even though their activities apparently ceased in 1977, the seven were not arrested until 1981 when a new government-sponsored campaign against political Islam was beginning as the 1982 general election approached.²¹

Hispran, who became linked to Abu Bakar Bas’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, was a native of Brebes in Central Java, near the border of West and Central Java. He had been a commander under Kartosuwirjo. Arrested on 8 January 1977 and put on trial in September 1978, he was charged with having tried since 1970 to regroup the old Darul Islam forces to overthrow the government. His lawyers tried unsuccessfully to have Ali Moertopo called as a witness.²²

From the beginning, *Komando Jihad* and what government prosecutors called *Jemaah Islamiyah* (Islamic community) intersected, although it was never clear whether the government was attributing more structure to the latter than was in fact the case. *Komando Jihad* was the label applied by the government and the Indonesian media to the former Darul Islam fighters, who never used it themselves. The term “Jemaah Islamiyah” appears in court documents from the 1980s to refer to the new organisation that the Darul Islam men thought they

¹⁷ He did not become president in name until 1968 but Sukarno effectively transferred power to him in 1966.

¹⁸ ICG interview, Yogyakarta, 28 June 2002. Moertopo may have believed that if widespread publicity were given to the re-emergence of radical Islam, Indonesians would be more reluctant to identify themselves with any form of political Islam, including a political party. That reluctance would have been enhanced by the way in which Indonesian security forces used the *Komando Jihad* scare as a dragnet to haul in suspected critics of the government.

¹⁹ ICG interview, Makassar, 10 June 2002.

²⁰ According to *Tempo*, 30 June 1979, 105 people had been arrested in Jakarta, 38 in West Java, nineteen in Yogyakarta-Central Java, and 23 in East Java.

²¹ *Tempo*, 24 December 1983.

²² “Pecahnya Sesepuh DI”, *Tempo*, 30 September 1978.

were setting up. But while the Darul Islam members certainly talked in terms of establishing Islamic communities in a generic sense, government prosecutors offered little hard evidence that *Jemaah Islamiyah* was in fact an organisation with an identifiable leadership.

It was a premise of the Darul Islam movement, later adopted by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and his followers, that setting up a *Jemaah Islamiyah* was a necessary precursor to the establishment of an Islamic state. The various incarnations of Darul Islam through the 1970s and 1980s, as will be seen below, saw the establishment of small *jemaah* committed to living under Islamic law as an essential part of their overall strategy. When suspects “confessed” to being members of *Jemaah Islamiyah*, they may have been referring to this phenomenon.

The government’s case that *Komando Jihad* and *Jemaah Islamiyah* were linked surfaced early on in the case of Gaos Taufik in Medan, North Sumatra. Gaos was allegedly a *Komando Jihad* leader for Medan. Once a fighter in the West Java Darul Islam, he had moved with other ex-DI members to a village in North Sumatra after DI’s defeat in the early 1960s. In 1975, according to one indictment, Gaos Taufik invited a young Muslim teacher from eastern Flores named Abdullah Umar to attend a meeting at the home of a well-known community leader in Medan.

At the meeting, according to the prosecution, Taufiq discussed how the Soeharto government had violated Islamic law, suggested that those in attendance join an organisation called *Jemaah Islamiyah* committed to the strict implementation of Islamic law, and invited them to swear an oath. The meeting was reported to Indonesian authorities, and in July 1977, Taufik and the man at whose house the meeting was held were arrested. Abdullah Umar, the teacher, was arrested in 1979.²³

²³Born in Lamahala, East Flores, Nusa Tenggara Timur on 27 December 1949, Abdullah Umar spent two years at Pondok Gontor, a famous “modernist” Muslim boarding school (*pesantren*) in central Java from 1967 to 1968. From 1969 to 1972 he studied at the Islamic University in Medan, North Sumatra, and from 1973 to 1975 was a religious teacher at a *pesantren* in Pinang Lambang, Labuhan Batu, North Sumatra. He apparently worked as an itinerant teacher for a while, then returned to Flores around the time of the 1977 elections. Abdullah Umar was later tried for subversion and murder in a series of incidents that involved both alleged *Komando Jihad* members and personnel at Pondok Ngruki,

A. ABU BAKAR BAS’ASYIR AND ABDULLAH SUNGKAR

The *Komando Jihad* - *Jemaah Islamiyah* link appears most prominently in the trial of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar.

Ba’asyir and Sungkar came from strikingly similar backgrounds. Both of Yemeni descent, they were born a year apart, Sungkar in 1937 in Solo, Central Java, Bas’asyir a year later in Jombang, East Java. In the mid-fifties, both became leaders of *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia* (GPII, Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement), an independent and activist student group that had close ties to the Masjumi, the main ‘modernist’ Islamic political party that was banned in 1960. In 1963, after two years at Pondok Gontor, a *pesantren* that pioneered the blending of a modern curriculum with standard religious teachings, the younger man moved to Solo where he met Sungkar.

Both men were deeply involved in *dakwah* (proselytisation) activities, Sungkar with Masjumi, Ba’asyir with the al-Irsyad organisation. In 1967, they joined forces, together with a man named Hasan Basri, to found a radio station called *Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta*, the Islamic Proselytisation Radio of Surakarta (Solo). Four years later, in 1971, they founded Pesantren al-Mu’min, which moved to its current home in the

the *pesantren* run by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. See Sleman District court, *Berkas Perkara Tersangka Abdullah Sungkar*, February 1983. He told the court during his trial that when he read in the newspapers there that members of *Jemaah Islamiyah* had been arrested in Medan, he decided to go to Pondok Ngruki for safety because he knew many alumni of Gontor were teaching there (Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is also an alumnus of Gontor.) It was while he was at Ngruki that he became involved in a series of violent crimes carried out in the name of *Jemaah Islamiyah*. He was executed by firing squad in 1989.

Other alleged members of *Jemaah Islamiyah* in Medan, all arrested in 1977, apparently through contact with Gaos Taufik, were Timsar Zubil, Anwar Jali, Azis Simorangkir, and Ahmad Mahfaid. Timsar Zubil, sentenced to death in 1978 (later commuted) for bombing a Methodist church and a movie theatre in Medan, was an example of a young man inspired by the older Darul Islam struggles. After being recruited by Gaos Taufik while he was president of a local Muslim student organization, he developed contacts on his own with former Darul Islam members both in Aceh and South Sulawesi. In August 2000, a free man, he appeared (as did many other former Muslim political prisoners) at the first congress of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*.

village of Ngruki, outside Solo, in 1973 and became known as Pondok Ngruki.²⁴

From his Masjumi involvement onward, Sungkar was always the more overtly political of the two men. In 1975, the radio station was shut down by the internal security apparatus for its political content and anti-government tone. Two years later, Sungkar was arrested and detained for about six weeks for urging his followers not to vote in the 1977 elections. He publicly lamented at the time that Muslim political aspirations in Indonesia had never been met because of pressure from civil authorities.

While Sungkar and Ba’asyir were never part of the original Darul Islam, they were deeply sympathetic to its aims. They were arrested on 10 November 1978 in connection with meetings they had with Haji Ismail Pranoto, and at their trial, four years later, the government made an explicit link between *Komando Jihad* and *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

The government charged that in 1976, Hispran inducted them into Darul Islam by having them swear an oath used in 1948 by Kartosuwirjo. The alleged induction took place at Sungkar’s house in Sukoharjo district, Central Java.²⁵ After a second visit in February 1977, the prosecutors said, Sungkar was installed as military governor of NII for Central Java and made head of a group called *Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah*. The indictment stated that from that point on, Sungkar and Ba’asyir began recruiting and inducting others into *Jemaah Islamiyah*. It is not clear how *Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah* metamorphosed into *Jemaah Islamiyah*, but the indictment suggests that in the government’s estimation, the two names were interchangeable.

At the trial, Sungkar admitted having Hispran as a guest in 1976 and that they agreed to form a *jemaah* as a way of confronting the new communist threat arising from the fall of Vietnam. He and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir denied ever taking the oath used by Kartosuwirjo, however, and the only evidence to the contrary is the written testimony of Hispran, who never appeared in court and thus could not be cross-

examined.²⁶ (During his trial, Sungkar said one intelligence agent told him, “My task is to make you admit you swore an oath to Hispran – if you don’t, you’ll be in prison for the rest of your life”).²⁷

The government’s case against the two men rests far more on the content of statements urging disobedience to secular authority than on any evidence of an underground organisation. Sungkar, for example, is accused of urging people not to acknowledge the validity of the Indonesian constitution because it was made by man, not by God.

Both men were accused of circulating a book called *Jihad and Hijrah*, by Pondok Ngruki lecturer Abdul Qadir Baraja, to fellow members of *Jemaah Islamiyah* in Solo. The book reportedly urged Muslims to go to war against enemies of Islam who resisted the application of Islamic law.²⁸ They refused to fly the Indonesian flag at their *pesantren*. They rejected *Pancasila* as the state ideology. The charges were standard fare for the time, broadly worded accusations against two men who dared to criticise the Soeharto government, with nothing to suggest that they advocated violence or were engaged in criminal activity. Their arrests served only to heighten their reputation within the growing Muslim political opposition.

B. “TEROR WARMAN”

After they were detained, however, a series of violent crimes took place, all tied in one way or another to people from Pondok Ngruki – and to what the government was calling *Jemaah Islamiyah*. The first of these was the murder in January 1979 of the assistant rector of Sebelas Maret University in Solo. According to court documents, the victim was accused of revealing the existence of *Jemaah Islamiyah* to the authorities and therefore being directly responsible for the arrest of Sungkar and Ba’asyir.

The murder was carried out by a shadowy underworld figure, known for extortion of Chinese shopkeepers, named Musa Warman, who reportedly had ties to the army; a Muslim Papuan named

²⁴ Irfan Suryahardy, (ed.), *Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia: Sebuah Gugatan*, ar-Risalah Publishers (Yogyakarta, 1982). The book is a compilation of all the court documents in Abdullah Sungkar’s and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s 1982 trial, including indictments, petitions to dismiss, and defence pleas.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ “Khilafah Made in Yogya”, *Hidayatullah*, Balikpapan, September 2000, www.hidayatullah.com/2000/09/nasional.shtml.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 96.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 23.

Hasan Bauw;²⁹ Abdullah Umar, the Ngruki teacher drawn into the *Komando Jihad* network (see above); and a man named Farid Ghozali. Warman was also reportedly planning to kill the judge and prosecutor responsible for the conviction of Hispran, who was sentenced to life in prison for his *Komando Jihad* activities in 1978.³⁰ If, in 1977-1978, the Indonesian government used the terms *Komando Jihad* and *Jemaah Islamiyah* interchangeably, by 1979 the same people were also being referred to as “Teror Warman” or Warman’s terrorists.

On 15 January 1979, Farid Ghozali was killed by Indonesian authorities, allegedly while trying to flee. Two days later, Hasan Bauw was shot and killed by a group led by Warman, who accused Bauw of having informed the military of Ghozali’s impending departure. Information from Bauw, according to Warman, also was responsible for the arrest of Abdul Qadir Baraja, the author of the book on jihad who resurfaces repeatedly as a member of the Ngruki inner circle.³¹

Two robbery attempts followed, both led by Warman and both involving Abdullah Umar, the Ngruki teacher. The first was successful. On 1 March 1979, a team led by Warman robbed a car transporting salaries of teachers at the State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta. Warman reportedly promised his accomplices 20 per cent of the Rp.3.9 million haul (U.S.\$5,570 at the then exchange rate),

with the rest to be turned over to the heads of *Jemaah Islamiyah*. The second attempt, on 21 March 1979, at a teacher training institute (IKIP) in Malang, East Java, failed. The noteworthy aspect of these two attempts, however, was that the perpetrators justified them in terms of the Islamic concept *fa’i*, raising funds by attacking enemies of Islam.³²

At the end of 1979, it remained unclear whether *Jemaah Islamiyah* was a construct of the government, a revival of Darul Islam, an amorphous gathering of like-minded Muslims, or a structured organisation led by Sungkar and Ba’asyir. To some extent, it was all of the above, and the name seems to have meant different things to different people.³³

There is some evidence that the Central Java *jemaah* was being more systematically organised than groups elsewhere. One witness in the trial of suspects in the assistant rector’s murder told the court that in 1979, *Jemaah Islamiyah* had about 100 members in the Yogyakarta area, many from the State Islamic Institute. The organisation was divided into district (*kabupaten*), regional (*daerah*) and provincial (*wilayah*) commands and focused on collection of funds and arms. The five districts, he said, in which *Jemaah Islamiyah* had representatives were the city of Yogyakarta itself, Kolon Progo, Sleman, Bantul, and Gunung Kidul.³⁴

The operation set in motion by Ali Moertopo and Indonesian intelligence in the 1970s had several unintended consequences. It renewed or forged bonds among Muslim radicals in South Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Java. It promoted the idea of an Islamic state in a way that the original Darul Islam leaders had perhaps not intended, and in doing so, tapped into an intellectual ferment that was particularly pronounced in university-based mosques. That ferment was only beginning when *Komando Jihad* was created, but through the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was fuelled by the

²⁹ Hasan Bauw came from a Mohammadiyah family in Fakfak, the only indigenous Muslim area of Papua (then Irian Jaya). He reportedly swore an oath of allegiance to Warman in 1975 after his scholarship from the provincial government of Irian Jaya was cut, but was suspected of being an informer.

³⁰ *Tempo*, 30 June 1979.

³¹ Baraja was born in Sumbawa and allegedly inducted as a member of *Jemaah Islamiyah* in December 1978. He served three years in prison beginning in January 1979. After his release, he went to Lampung, where he lived as a cloth trader and itinerant preacher (*muballigh*). In May 1985, he was rearrested for having purchased the explosives that were used in the bombing of a church in Malang in December 1984, the Borobodur temple on 21 January 1985, and a bus in East Java. The bombings were said to be the result of anger within a circle of radical Muslims over the marginalisation of Muslims, the expansion of places of vice, and growing “Christianisation”. See *Tempo*, 25 January 1986. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison in July 1986 but was released in the late 1990s. After his release, he was drawn back into the Ngruki circle – he is believed to be related by marriage to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir – and surfaced as a participant in the first congress of the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* in August 2000.

³² Five years later, the concept of *fa’i* would be used by thugs in Jakarta to justify engaging in crimes and violence in order to raise funds for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in Malaysia.

³³ A group of Darul Islam leaders in West Java with connections to Hispran but not to the two Ngruki leaders were arrested in the early 1980s for allegedly organising a *Jemaah Islam*, not *Islamiyah*, in West Java.

³⁴ Testimony of Yusuf Latief in trial of Abdullah Umar, 1983. Yusuf Latief, a student from Southeast Sulawesi, was himself implicated in the murder of Hasan Bauw.

Iranian revolution, the availability of Indonesian translations of writings on political Islam from the Middle East and Pakistan; and anger over Soeharto government policies.

To university students at the time, the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s seemed like an authentically Indonesian effort to fight repression while upholding Islamic values. These ideas, combined with anger generated by arrests made in the name of *Komando Jihad* and relationships made among prisoners, helped radicalise a new generation. It is worth noting that the father of Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, currently detained in Manila, was imprisoned in the late 1970s for alleged membership in *Komando Jihad*.

V. EXILE IN THE 1980S

A. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH AND USROH, 1983-1985

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were tried in 1982 and sentenced to nine years in prison for subversion. They had been in detention since November 1978. When in late 1982, their sentences were reduced on appeal to three years and ten months, equivalent to their pre-trial detention, both men were released, and they returned to Pondok Ngruki, while the prosecution appealed the reduced sentence.

The Ngruki founders had two years of freedom in Central Java before fleeing in 1985 to Malaysia, and those two years saw an extraordinary degree of organising and network building. The foundations for what in 2002 would be called the *Jemaah Islamiyah* in Malaysia were laid during this period. It was a time of heightened opposition across Indonesia to the Soeharto government, especially after the policy of *azas tunggal* or “sole basis” was announced, requiring all organizations to adopt *Pancasila* as their sole ideological basis – as opposed to, say, Islam or Christianity.³⁵

Muslim organisations in particular were outraged. In September 1984, a major riot broke out in the Tanjung Priok port area of Jakarta, and army troops opened fire on Muslim protestors, killing

dozens. The riot led to an intensified government crackdown on the Muslim opposition, and to intensified anti-government activity on the part of militant Muslim groups, including some bombings and other acts of violence, in which men linked to Ngruki were involved.

B. STUDENT ACTIVISM

By the time Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were freed, the university town of Yogyakarta in Central Java had become the centre of an Islamic resurgence. The Iranian revolution was a source of inspiration to many of the thousands of college students in the area; Islamic discussion groups grew up on many campuses. Mesjid Sudirman, or Mesjid Colombo, in the Sleman area of the city, became known for its militant preachers (*muballigh*), as devoted to opposition to the Soeharto government as they were to the strict implementation of Islamic law. Among the well-known *muballigh* associated with Mesjid Sudirman were two men who later joined Ba'asyir and Sungkar in Malaysia: Fikiruddin, originally from Lombok, and Muchliansyah.

Another member of the Ngruki inner circle, Irfan Suryahardy, now known as Irfan S. Awwas, came to national attention at this time. The brother of the above-mentioned Fikiriddin, he is at present the chair of the executive committee of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*. In 1981 he began publishing a militant Muslim newsletter, *ar-Risalah* (The Bulletin), that was distributed at the Sudirman mosque and contained everything from quotations from Ayatollah Khomeini to interviews with former leaders of Darul Islam and criticism of particular policies of the Jakarta government.

In 1982, Irfan became head of the Yogyakarta office of a Muslim activist organisation called Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Mesjid (BKPM, Coordinating Body of Mosque Youth). As head of BKPM, he published and circulated in 1982 the full court documents of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's and Abdullah Sungkar's trial, with commentary from leading human rights activists. Because these publishing activities were such a daring challenge to government attempts to suppress freedom of expression, Irfan became a hero among student activists – even more so after the BKPM office was raided in 1983 and he was arrested. He was sentenced in February 1986 to thirteen years in

³⁵ The *azas tunggal* policy was announced by President Soeharto in August 1982, submitted to the Indonesian parliament in the form of a draft law in 1983, and finally passed by the parliament in February 1985.

prison on subversion charges, a heavy sentence even by Soeharto-era standards.³⁶

At his trial, the prosecution claimed among other things that Irfan wanted to establish an Islamic state and was using ar-Risalah to "invite Muslims throughout the world to bring the Islamic revolution to fruition" using the Iranian revolution as a model. Authorities had confiscated copies of the Iranian embassy's newsletter, *Yaum al-Quds*, and they accused Irfan of receiving funding from the Middle East.³⁷ Prosecutors also accused Irfan of having been *Komando Jihad's* deputy commander for the Yogyakarta area in 1979, when he was sixteen years old. No serious evidence was produced to substantiate that claim.

Before he was arrested, Irfan developed close associations with many other like-minded students through the BKPM, which had an equivalent on many Indonesian college campuses. Among the student leaders he met and became close friends with was Agus Dwikarna, the man from Makassar who has been in detention in Manila since March 2002.³⁸

C. USROH

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir used his new-found freedom to set up a new network of small cells devoted to the implementation of Islamic teaching. He began in 1983 by bringing former detainees to Ngruki in monthly meetings, saying that his aim was "to collect the members of *Jamaah Islamiyah* who had been scattered by the arrests of the previous years."³⁹

Again, information about what came to be known as the *usroh* movement comes primarily from the court documents prepared for the trials of *usroh* members who eventually were arrested on charges of trying to establish an Islamic state. The defendants said they were required to swear an oath of obedience to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as long as his orders did not conflict with the will of God and his Prophet.⁴⁰ They received instructions from Ba'asyir during meetings

at Ngruki about how to form small groups of between eight and fifteen members in their villages or neighbourhoods, with the aim to enforce Islamic law and uphold an Islamic way of life.

The groups do not appear to have been particularly secretive. Members were required to follow Islamic law as outlined in a manual written by Ba'asyir called *Usroh*, derived from the teachings of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. A key teaching was that *usroh* members should avoid any non-Islamic institutions, such as schools or courts, and that all laws other than sharia were heathen and should thus be disobeyed.⁴¹ The groups were also supposed to collect money (*infaq*) to help fellow members who were sick or otherwise in need, but 30 per cent of the collection was to be turned over to Ba'asyir for the movement. The funds collected were insignificant. When Ba'asyir fled to Malaysia in early 1985, the *usroh* movement collapsed, and most members were arrested.

D. THE CONNECTION TO SOUTH SULAWESI

One other development during this period is worth noting, because it provides one of several links between the Ngruki circle and men linked to the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi. In 1982, after decades living a clandestine life, Sanusi Daris, one of Kahar Muzakkar's deputies in that rebellion, came out of hiding. He was arrested almost immediately and put on trial in Makassar in 1984. He served only a few months before he was released, reportedly after an intervention of Gen. Mohamad Yusuf, a former defence minister.⁴²

Sanusi then travelled almost immediately to Java in the company of a Ngruki student named Andi Mohamed Taqwa. Taqwa reportedly brought Sanusi to meet Abdullah Sungkar, and the two agreed to work to reinstate the Republic Persatuan Indonesia, the old fusion of the West Java, South Sulawesi, and South Sumatra rebellions. Some time later Sanusi stayed briefly with Sungkar in Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia, and eventually moved to Sabah where he

³⁶ Amnesty International, "The Imprisonment of Irfan Suryahadi", in Indonesia Reports, Human Rights Supplement N°18, October 1986, pp. 5-9.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ ICG interview, Makassar, June 2002.

³⁹ Amnesty International, "Indonesia: The Imprisonment of Usroh Activists in Central Java", ASA 21/15/88, October 1988, p. 4.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 6.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 7.

⁴² Gen. Yusuf, himself an ethnic Bugis from Bone, South Sulawesi, had played a major role as a young officer in the crushing of Kahar Muzakkar's Darul Islam.

reportedly maintained ties to the Ngruki network. He died there in 1988.⁴³

Taqwa himself was a link to other strands of the Ngruki network. After introducing Sanusi Daris to Sungkar, Taqwa apparently joined his uncle, a former explosives expert for the original South Sulawesi Darul Islam rebellion, in travelling through Java and Sumatra making quiet contact with Darul Islam leaders who had not been rearrested. In 1985, they met with Daud Beureueh, the leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh, a meeting that reportedly had a profound effect on Taqwa.⁴⁴ (The uncle, Mohamad Jabir, was arrested in late 1985 in Makassar on charges of plotting to kill Soeharto; he was brought to Jakarta where he died in custody, possibly as a result of torture, in January 1986.)⁴⁵

Taqwa then joined Sungkar and Ba'asyir in Malaysia, and in 1986 was put in charge of recruiting Indonesians to fight in Afghanistan as a way of strengthening the military capacity of *Jemaah Islamiyah*.⁴⁶ He reportedly was able to find only six volunteers. (The goal was 30.) He spent some time in Afghanistan himself, according to ICG sources in Makassar. In 1988, he left Malaysia for Sweden, where he was granted political asylum. He apparently went back and forth to Malaysia; an ICG contact reported meeting him there in 1993. Apparently inspired by the Acehnese struggle for independence, he was later reported to have proclaimed the state of independent Sulawesi

(*Negara Sulawesi Raya*) although there is no indication that he ever gained any followers.

E. THE HIJRAH TO MALAYSIA

In February 1985, the Indonesian Supreme Court heard the prosecution's appeal against the reduced sentence of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. The court ruled in the prosecution's favour and issued a summons to the two men. As their rearrest appeared imminent, they decided to leave for Malaysia, in their view not in flight from justice, but on a religiously-inspired *hijrah* (emigration) to escape from the enemies of Islam, similar to the Prophet's *hijrah* from Mecca to Medina.

Most information on the first years of the Ngruki network in Malaysia comes from the trial documents of a young man named Muzahar Muhtar, who accompanied the two Ngruki founders there in April 1985 and subsequently served as their courier between Indonesia and their new home. Muzahar himself embodied some of the elements of the Ngruki network outlined above. In 1982, he was a high school student who belonged to a youth group (*remaja mesjid*) at the Sudirman mosque in Yogyakarta; the head of the youth group was the Ngruki-linked preacher, Fikiruddin. Muzahar enrolled in the State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta in 1983 but later that year dropped out and in September enrolled as a student at Pondok Ngruki. He told prosecutors that shortly thereafter, he took an oath at Pondok Ngruki to support the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII). He also became a member of an *usroh* group.

In April 1985, he said, he was ordered by Muchliansyah – the other Ngruki-linked preacher associated with the Sudirman mosque – to accompany a group of the Ngruki circle to Malaysia. All were going illegally; that is, without full documentation or with false passports. The group included Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Fikiruddin, Agus Sunarto, Ahmad Fallah, Rusli Aryus, Mubin Bustami, Fajar Sidiq⁴⁷ and

⁴³ This episode was recounted to ICG in an interview in Makassar in June 2002 but ICG has not been able to corroborate the information with a second source.

⁴⁴ Personal communication, October 1988.

⁴⁵ Jabir had been a fighter with Kahar Muzakkar's forces. He moved to Java from Sulawesi after one faction of Muzakkar's movement surrendered in 1962 and made contact with some of the key West Java Darul Islam figures later reactivated by BAKIN, including Adah Jaelani and Aceng Kurnia. He married the daughter of one such leader and settled in Tanjung Priok, where he traded in timber and became a well-known preacher at a local mosque. Jabir escaped the first crackdown on *Komando Jihad* in the late 1970s but gradually became more and more drawn into Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar's network. His name appears in many of the court documents from the mid-1980s purporting to set out the structure of *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

⁴⁶ Trial documents in the case of Muzahar Muhtar, *Berkas Perkara, Tindak Pidana Subversi, Tersangka Muzahar Muhtar alias Taslim alias Musa*, Kejaksaan Tinggi DKI Jakarta Nomor 13/r.Dik.Sus-5/8/86.

⁴⁷ Fajar Sidiq, also known as Fadjar Shadiq, was on the editorial board of *ar-Risalah*, the student-run newsletter operated under Muchliansyah's direction in Yogyakarta. He was arrested and deported as an illegal immigrant shortly after arrival but returned a year later to join the exiles. Agus Sunarto, Rusli Arus, and Mubin were also staff members of *ar-Risalah*. Sunarto had been imprisoned for a year in 1979 and later became overall coordinator of the *usroh* groups. See Amnesty International, "Indonesia: The Imprisonment

Agung Riyadi. The latter, a brother of Fajar Sidiq, is one of those arrested in Malaysia in January 2002 under the Internal Security Act and charged with being a member of *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

In August 1985, Muzahar reported, the Ngruki exiles held a series of meetings at which they decided that they would get funds for the movement by asking “*jemaah* members” in Solo to recruit fellow members to work in designated companies in Malaysia and turn over 20 per cent of their salaries to the *jemaah*.⁴⁸ Abdullah Sungkar had already identified a number of sympathetic Malaysian businessmen willing to take on Indonesian workers and help the effort to establish an Islamic state at the same time.

The exiles also decided to send Sungkar and Ba’asyir to Saudi Arabia to seek additional funds. At the same time, they decided to strengthen the *jemaah* militarily by sending volunteers from Jakarta to train in Afghanistan. Andi Mohamad Taqwa and a man named Abdullah Anshori, also known as Ibnu Thoyib, were to recruit the volunteers. Anshori, whose brother, Abdur Rohim, was a Ngruki teacher, returned to Indonesia before 1988 and appeared as a witness in Muzahar’s trial. He then returned to Malaysia.

Sometime in August 1985, Fikiruddin and Muchliansyah ordered Muzahar to go back to Indonesia and accompany their wives to Malaysia. He returned in September with the women. In October 1985, Muzahar went back to Indonesia on orders of Agus Sunarto to pick up four workers recruited from Solo; the second wife of Muchliansyah; and the wife of Mubin Bustami. At the beginning of November, Muzahar brought the new group safely to Malaysia. At the end of November, he was ordered to return to Indonesia to bring back four more workers from Solo, which he did the following month.⁴⁹ Muzahar went back to

Indonesia again to pick up Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s wife. She apparently was not ready to leave, so Muzahar began trading in batik to earn enough money to return to Malaysia. He was arrested in Jakarta on 2 August 1986.

Even though very little hard information about the Ngruki network is available from the 1990s, several points are worth noting from the Muzahar trial documents. The link between the Ngruki network in Indonesia and the exile community in Malaysia remained strong, not only because of teacher-student ties but because many exiles had relatives back in Indonesia who were part of the network’s inner circle. These included the exile Abdullah Anshori, whose brother taught at Ngruki; Fikiruddin, whose brother, Irfan Suryahardi, was released from prison in 1993 and returned to Yogyakarta; Muchliansyah, whose wife was the sister of Fikiruddin and Irfan; and Ba’asyir, whose wife is related to Abdul Qadir Baraja.

Secondly, Ba’asyir and Sungkar continued to give instructions to their followers in Jakarta through couriers. For example, it emerged during the trial that Sungkar, through a message carried by Muzahar and delivered in August 1985, had ordered a leading *usroh* figure to reactivate *usroh* groups in Central Java.

Thirdly, by 1987, the network was already becoming international. At least six Ngruki followers had left for Pakistan and Afghanistan, and more were to follow. Several witnesses in the Muzahar trial testified that the group had decided to send members to “Moro [Philippines], Afghanistan and Pattani [Thailand]”, although there is no reference in the documents to anyone actually having gone to Thailand or the Philippines.⁵⁰

One member of the *ar-Risalah* editorial board, Zakaria Qudah, also known as Zakariya Kuddah, then 27, was in Saudi Arabia. More than a dozen men and women had left for Malaysia. As already noted, Andi Mohamad Taqwa, from Bone, Sulawesi was in Malaysia and later left for Sweden. The son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, a man named Kadungga, based first in Germany, then in Holland, became a key international contact with links to a radical

of Usroh Activists in Central Java”, ASA 21/15/88, October 1988, p. 4.

⁴⁸ *Berkas Perkara Tindak Pidana Subversi Tersangka Muzahar Muhtar alias Taslim alias Musa*, Kejaksaan Tinggi DKI Jakarta, Nomor 13/r/Dik.Sus-5/8/86. It is not clear whether by “*jemaah* members” Muzahar was referring to members of the informal Ngruki network or to members of *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

⁴⁹ The four were Abdul Rachman alias Gunung Windu Sanjaya; Fauzi; Mardjoko, and Mursahid, who was caught and deported in February 1986.

⁵⁰ Witness testimony of Safki in *Berkas Perkara Tindak Pidana Subversi Tersangka Muzahar alias Taslim alias Musa*, Kejaksaan Tinggi DKI Jakarta, Nomor 13/r/Dik.Sus-5/8/86, p. 7.

Egyptian group. He returned periodically to Malaysia.

Given those international connections, it is not surprising that someone like Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, who had been a student at Pondok Ngruki after Ba'asyir fled to Malaysia and is now detained in Manila, could have gone from Ngruki through Malaysia to Lahore, even though he was a generation or two younger than the original exiles.

F. THE JAKARTA CONNECTION

By the time the two Ngruki founders fled to Malaysia, their network extended into several different but connected groups. One was the old Darul Islam circle and the people drawn into it by the activities of the late 1970s. Another was the BKPM network of student activists and preachers centred around the Sudirman mosque in Yogyakarta in the early 1980s that in turn was linked to the *usroh* network. Another was the Ngruki circle of students and alumni. Finally, there were individuals drawn in by the proselytisation efforts of the group's main preachers, including Sungkar, Ba'asyir, Fikiruddin, and Muchliansyah.

Despite the central Java locus of Pondok Ngruki and the Sudirman mosque, the network had a wide geographic reach: the Darul Islam connections extended through West Java, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and to a lesser extent Aceh. Students from South Sulawesi, Lombok, Ambon, West Sumatra, and Lampung were key members of BKPM in Yogyakarta; and the pattern of arrests under the Soeharto government forced many in the network to seek refuge in Jakarta.

It was Jakarta, not central Java, that became the main backup point in Indonesia for the Ngruki exile community in Malaysia in the mid-1980s. Muchliansyah, the Yogyakarta preacher, was instrumental in building up the community in Jakarta from late 1983 until he left for Malaysia in mid-1985. Couriers like Muzahar went back and forth between Malaysia and Jakarta, Jakarta donors were an important source of funds, and a loosely-knit congregation was established there consisting of some of the different elements of the Ngruki network outlined above.⁵¹

The congregation was less a tightly organised underground structure committed to establishment of an Islamic state, as the Indonesian government maintained, than a collection of people who were being hunted for different reasons by the government and therefore had to operate more or less clandestinely. Most were committed to the application of Islamic law in Indonesia, many looked to Darul Islam for inspiration, and all were opposed to the Soeharto government. But the group does not seem to have engaged in any serious discussion, let alone planning, for achieving specific political ends. A main focus of its concerns in 1985, for example, was the possibility that some members were attracted to the Shiite strand of Islam.⁵² It did, however, attract some criminal elements, who committed robbery and murder in the name of *fa'i*, not unlike the Warman group in 1978-79.

Following the raid on the *ar-Risalah* office in late 1983 and arrest of Irfan Suryahardy, many of the young men involved in Irfan's immediate circle, or connected more generally with the BKPM network, fled to Jakarta and shared a house in the Pisangan Lama (East Jakarta) neighbourhood. The house was known as a haven for Darul Islam and *usroh* fugitives – virtually anyone on the run from Soeharto-era charges of trying to establish an Islamic state could find a welcome.⁵³ It became the place where people en route to or returning from visiting the Ngruki exiles in Malaysia would stay.

If Pisangan Lama was the unofficial residence of the Jakarta-based Ngruki group, its unofficial headquarters was the house of a wealthy Jakarta contractor, Hasnul Ahmad, in the elite south Jakarta suburb of Kebayoran Baru. Hasnul Achmad had

Kartosuwirjo's former associates in 1979. He moved to Jakarta after the wave of arrests of alleged *Komando Jihad* leaders began. He settled in the Tanjung Priok area and began going to Friday prayers at the same mosque as a friend also linked to the West Java Darul Islam group. The friend was the brother-in-law of Mohamad Jabir, the Sulawesi preacher whose son was a Ngruki student. Through Jabir, Aos Firdaus met Muchliansyah and joined the Jakarta part of the Ngruki network.

⁵² Testimony of Juremi Adnan, alias Aos Firdaus, in *Berkas Perkara Tindak Pidana Subversi Tersangka Muzahar alias Taslim alias Musa*, Kejaksaan Tinggi DKI Jakarta, Nomor 13/r/Dik.Sus-5/8/86.

⁵³ One resident in 1985, for example, was Aos Firdaus, son of a West Java Darul Islam leader who had been arrested in connection with *Komando Jihad*.

⁵¹ To give one example of how the strands could come together through one individual, Aos Firdaus, from Brebes, Central Java, was inducted into Darul Islam by one of

become a committed anti-Soeharto militant after hearing Muchliansyah preach, and subsequently opened his house, and his chequebook, to anyone associated with Muchliansyah. From at least 1984 onwards, training for *jemaah* members was conducted in Hasnul’s house along the lines of the cadre philosophy that has been a key element of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s teachings since the late 1970s.⁵⁴ The training consisted of religious instruction but with some discussion of politics.

Government prosecutors in the trial of Muzahar Muhtar tried to get witnesses to describe the structure of the Islamic State of Indonesia or *Jemaah Islamiyah* organisation, but no two versions were identical. What they had in common was Muchliansyah as the overall coordinator, and a vague division of tasks that included proselytisation (*dakwah*) and finance. In some versions of the structure, the Tanjung Priok-based preacher from South Sulawesi, Mohamed Jabir, also played a key role.

The group seems to have held regular religious meetings (*pengajian*) in which the main themes were the need to work for the enforcement of Islamic law, rejection of Soeharto government policies such as the *Pancasila*-only doctrine, and establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The participants represented a variety of approaches that ranged from Darul Islam’s commitment to the establishment of an Islamic state through armed struggle to the *usroh* approach of using a cell structure to develop new cadres with a deeper commitment to an Islamic way of life.⁵⁵

A senior member of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* who was familiar with the Jakarta group looked at the various versions of the alleged structure of the Jakarta group at ICG’s request and said there was nothing sinister about it. It was natural for any religious organisation to have a structure and division of labour; there was nothing, he said, to

suggest that the individuals involved at the time were engaged in Islamic rebellion.⁵⁶

But there were several incidents of violence linked directly or indirectly to the Jakarta group. One was the murder of a taxi driver and the theft of his car in June 1985.⁵⁷ The murder was apparently committed on the initiative of a member of the Jakarta group named Syahroni, alias Ahmad Hikmat. Another *jemaah* member, Safki Syahroni, was a gang leader with ties to leading figures in the Jakarta underworld, who began attending the religious meetings at Hasnul Ahmad’s house and claimed he repented of his criminal deeds. He expressed admiration for the Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army and reportedly advocated blowing up the Indonesian parliament. Syahroni and Safki became committed to the idea of raising funds for *jemaah* activities through *fa’i*, or confiscating the property of unbelievers. The idea reportedly was endorsed, if not initiated, by Muchliansyah, but was explicitly condemned by Abdullah Sungkar who took Muchliansyah to task in Malaysia when he realised what had happened.⁵⁸

Syahroni and Safki fled to Malaysia immediately after the murder and joined the Ngruki circle but left in October 1985. They were involved in the murder a year later of Hasnul Ahmad’s driver and another man. The driver had been the go-between in a dispute over a loan made by Hasnul Ahmad to a business associate, and Syahroni killed him because he was afraid he would go to the police and endanger the *jemaah*. Syahroni and Safki were arrested for the murder; Safki later committed suicide.

In addition to Hasnul Ahmad, the other major donor of the Jakarta group (and on whose property the murder of the taxi driver took place) was Dody Ahmad Busubul. Dody was an Indonesian of Arab descent, who had a longstanding business relationship with Mohammed Jabir, the South Sulawesi preacher with Darul Islam connections mentioned above. He also appears to have had a business relationship with a senior army officer

⁵⁴ See Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, “Sistem Kaderisasi Mujahidin Dalam Mewujudkan Masyarakat Islam”, in *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariat Islam* (Yogyakarta, January 2001).

⁵⁵ Testimony of Ais Firdaus in *Berkas Perkara Tindak Pidana Subversi Tersangka Muzahar alias Taslim alias Musa*, Kejaksaan Tinggi DKI Jakarta, Nomor 13/r/Dik.Sus-5/8/86.

⁵⁶ ICG interview, Yogyakarta, 28 June 2002.

⁵⁷ The man was murdered, according to testimony at the trial, because he looked like an ethnic Batak and was therefore likely to be Christian.

⁵⁸ Testimony of Muzahar Muhtar in *Berkas Perkara Tindak Pidana Subversi Tersangka Muzahar Muhtar alias Taslim alias Musa*, Kejaksaan Tinggi DKI Jakarta, Nomor 13/r/Dik.Sus-5/8/86.

then serving as a close personal assistant of President Soeharto.⁵⁹

By 1987, most members of the Jakarta group either had been arrested, fled to Malaysia, or gone underground.

G. BOROBODUR AND LAMPUNG

Two other violent incidents in the 1980s had indirect links to the Ngruki network. In the aftermath of the Tanjung Priok riot of September 1984, Java was wracked by a series of bomb explosions that Jakarta blamed on Muslim extremists. On 21 January 1985, one of these explosions damaged nine stupas at the newly restored Borobodur temple in central Java, the largest Buddhist monument in the world after Angkor Wat. Among the seven men arrested and charged with involvement was a cloth trader and itinerant preacher, Abdul Qadir Baraja. As noted above, Baraja, then a lecturer at Pondok Ngruki, had been arrested in 1979 in connection with the murder and robberies linked to the Warman group, although it is not clear on what evidence. He was sentenced to five years in prison. When Sungkar and Bas'asyir were tried in 1982, one minor charge was that they had circulated Baraja's book, *Jihad and Hijrah*, which then was considered subversive.

After serving his sentence in Java, Baraja, originally from Sumbawa in eastern Indonesia, went to Telukbetung, Lampung, where he was arrested in May 1985. The prosecution charged that in April or May 1984, Baraja met with one of the others accused in the bombing case, a blind preacher named Husein Ali al-Habsyi, and agreed that Islam was in danger from Christianisation and the growth of vice.

He allegedly expressed his willingness to obtain explosives to use to demonstrate Muslim anger against the government. In a letter produced by the prosecutors, Baraja informed the preacher of the price of explosives in Telukbetung. In his defence, Baraja did not deny the letter but said explosives were bought and sold in Lampung for use in fishing, and he was supplying information at the preacher's request, without questioning how the bombs were to be used.⁶⁰ Baraja was sentenced to thirteen years in

prison, increased to fifteen years on the prosecutor's appeal.

After his release, Baraja again became part of the Ngruki inner circle and holds a prominent position as a respected Muslim cleric in the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*. At his speech at the first Mujahidin Congress in August 2000, Baraja spoke of how Kartosuwirjo, in proclaiming the Islamic state of Indonesia in 1949, intended to restore the Muslim caliphate that had been destroyed in 1924 in a Western conspiracy against Islam.⁶¹

In 1989, a bloody shootout at a Muslim school in Way Jepara, Lampung, became, like Tanjung Priok, another entry on the long list of Muslim grievances against the Soeharto government. The linkage to Ngruki was indirect. In 1985, as it became increasingly clear that Sungkar and Bas'asyir might face reimprisonment, the former left Java for Lampung. He stayed briefly in a hamlet called Siderejo, in the subdistrict of Way Jepara. As the result of his teachings, his followers, led by a man named Warsidi, set up a *jemaah islamiyah*, on land donated as *wakf* (endowed for religious use) by Sungkar.

The *jemaah* attracted Muslims from elsewhere in the country, primarily central and east Java.⁶² In a meeting that took place in Cibinong, Jakarta on 12 December 1988, a group of students decided to emigrate (*hijrah*) to Way Jepara to join the *jemaah*. The group had developed close contacts with former Darul Islam members from Aceh and West Java – and through a man called Ridwan, with Abdul Qadir Baraja.⁶³

The *jemaah* attracted the attention of local authorities because of its hardline teachings, including refusal to salute the Indonesian flag and rejection of secular authority. In February 1989,

⁶¹ Abdul Qadir Baraja, “Kebangkitan dan Keruntuhan Khilafatul Muslimin”, in *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariah Islam* (Yogyakarta, January 2001), p. 12.

⁶² “Para Saksi dan Korban Intelijen Peristiwa Talangsari”, in Al-Chaidar, *Bencana Ummat Islam di Indonesia Tahun 1980-2000* (Yogyakarta, April 2000).

⁶³ Ibid. The group included Fauzi Isman, Ridwan, Nurhidayat, and Dede Saifudin. The Darul Islam members whom they considered mentors included Abdul Fatah Wirangapati, Zaenal Arifin, and Ajengan Masduki from West Java and Sulaiman Mahmud from Aceh. After the February attack, Fauzi Isman fled to Jakarta, and another series of arrests was carried out there. Most of those arrested were released in 1998.

⁵⁹ Personal communication, October 1988.

⁶⁰ “Itu Ledakan dan Bom Bikin Malang”, *Tempo*, 25 January 1986.

Warsidi was summoned by the military and refused to respond. The subdistrict military command then detained nine of his followers. Believing the compound around Warsidi’s school would be attacked, his followers prepared homemade weapons and swore to resist.

The subdistrict military commander went to meet Warsidi and was hacked to death. The next day, the military, led by Col. Hendropriyono as head of the Korem 043 regional military command, attacked the compound.⁶⁴ An unknown number, believed to be close to 100, died. Many of those who survived were detained, as were students in Jakarta who had taken part in the 1988 meeting. The Way Jepara *jemaah* was effectively destroyed, and it is unclear whether any members joined the Ngruki exiles in Malaysia.

VI. RETURNING IN THE 1990S.

The Ngruki network became radicalised in the mid-1990s, largely through one of its main international links: Abdul Wahid Kadungga, the son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar.

Kadungga was the man who met Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar upon their arrival in Malaysia and arranged a place for them to stay. Part of the Darul Islam network, he had fled to Europe and by 1971 was a student in Cologne, Germany. There he helped found the Muslim Youth Association of Europe (PPME, *Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa*).⁶⁵ Through that association, he became friendly with Muslim activists from the Middle East and gradually became more radical; he also developed close ties to PAS in Malaysia.

Sometime in the 1980s, Kadungga moved to the Hague, and in 1989, he developed a close friendship with Usama Rushdi, or Rashid, of *Gama Islami*, a breakaway faction of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan ul-Muslimin*) – led by Sheikh Umar Abdul Rahman, later convicted in the U.S. in

the 1993 World Trade Center bombing case.⁶⁶ Kadungga focused on providing religious training to Indonesian students studying in Germany. He also traveled around Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia during this period and stayed in regular contact with Ba’asyir and Sungkar.

In an October 2000 article published in an Indonesian magazine, Kadungga was described as difficult to find because he had no fixed residence. “Occasionally he’s in the Netherlands, then he’s talking with top officials of PAS in Kelantan or Trengganu, and not long after, he’s conversing with Osama bin Laden in the depths of Afghanistan.”⁶⁷

A split occurred among the Ngruki exiles when Sungkar and Bas’asyir became close to *Gama Islami* in 1995. They were reportedly introduced to the movement through Kadungga.⁶⁸ As a result of their new affiliation, they moved beyond their commitment to an Islamic state within Indonesian boundaries and took a more radical stance which promoted the return of an international Islamic caliphate. Fikiruddin and Muchliansyah retained their commitment to the Darul Islam vision of an Islamic Indonesia. Only after Soeharto’s resignation, when Ba’asyir and Sungkar returned to Indonesia, did a reconciliation between the two groups take place, through the efforts of Irfan Suryahardy.⁶⁹

The reconciliation between the two factions of the Ngruki network apparently involved the radicalization of Fikiruddin and those around him. Both Fikiruddin, who adopted the name Abu Jibril, and Abdullah Anshori, who changed his name to Abu Fatih, went to Afghanistan and Pakistan some time in the 1990s. Faiq Hafidz, another member of the network who had been part of the Sudirman mosque group in the early 1980s, was arrested by Malaysian authorities in January 2002; he also spent several years in Afghanistan after leaving Indonesia.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Today Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono is a close confidant of President Megawati as head of the national intelligence agency (BIN) with cabinet status.

⁶⁵ “Abdul Wahid Kadungga: Aktivis Internasional”, *Suara Hidayatullah*, October 2000 (<http://www.hidayatullah.com/2000/10/siapa.shtml>).

⁶⁶ *Gama Islami* is also transcribed as *al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya*, which in Arabic is the same as *Jemaah Islamiyah*. It is one of the core groups of al-Qaeda.

⁶⁷ “Abdul Wahid Kadungga: Aktivis Internasional”, *Suara Hidayatullah*, October 2000, op. cit.

⁶⁸ ICG interview, July 2002.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Irfan Suryahardy told ICG in an interview on 28 June 2002 that members of the Ngruki group went abroad, not to become terrorists but because they needed refuge from

After President Soeharto resigned, not only Ba’asyir and Sungkar, but also Muchliansyah, Agus Sunarto, Nursalim, and several other exiles returned to Indonesia. Sungkar died a month after his return. Ba’asyir went back to Pondok Ngruki. Muchliansyah settled in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan, and Nursalim in Bandung.

On 5-7 August 2000, members of the Ngruki network held an extraordinary gathering in Yogyakarta called the Mujahidin Congress, bringing together representatives of virtually every major group committed to the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia. The Congress gave rise to the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (Indonesian Mujahidin Council or MMI), whose top leadership reads like a who’s who of the Ngruki network.

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was chosen as “commander” or Amir ul-Mujahidin of the governing council, *Ahlul Halli wal ‘Aqdi*. (AHWA) committed, among other things, to laying the foundation for a new international caliphate.⁷¹ Abdul Qadir Baraja was appointed to the *fatwa* division of the AHWA. Muchliansyah and Fikiruddin, under his Malaysian name of Abu Jibril, were appointed to the department of the executive committee in charge of strengthening mujahidin resources (*Departemen Peningkatan Sumber Daya Mujahid*), as was Mahasin Zaini, a former political prisoner arrested for his connections to the *usroh* movement. Aris Rahardjo, arrested in connection with the 1979 “Teror Warman” crimes, was appointed to the department in charge of inter-mujahidin communications. Another former *usroh* prisoner, Shobbarin Syakur, a veteran of the Sudirman mosque days, was made secretary-general of the executive committee, with Irfan Awwas Suryahardy as chair.⁷²

Soeharto-era repression. “Moro, Pakistan, Afghanistan – these were simply places to escape to (*tempat pelarian*),” he said. This may have been true in the 1980s; by the late 1990s, the motivation had changed.

⁷¹ “Khilafah Made in Yogya” in *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariah Islam*, Wihdah Press, Yogyakarta, January 2001, p. 335.

⁷² Shobbarin Syakur and Mahasin Zaini were Amnesty International prisoners of conscience; both student activists in the mid-1980s, their main offense seems to have been to criticize the Soeharto government’s Pancasila-only policy. Shobbarin was sentenced to eight years on subversion charges, Mahasin to twelve.

A. THE SOUTH SULAWESI CONNECTION – AGAIN

Another name that appears on the executive committee of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* is Agus Dwikarna, the man arrested in Manila in March 2002 and charged with having explosive materials in his suitcase. The evidence was almost certainly planted, and he was arrested on suspicion of having links to al-Qaeda, although it is not clear what the concrete evidence against him is.

Agus Dwikarna’s connection to the Ngruki network was initially through Irfan Awwas Suryahardy, a close friend from the days when both were student activists working against the *Pancasila*-only policy. The organisational links, however, are more interesting, because they go back to old Darul Islam associations. Agus Dwikarna is the head of Laskar Jundullah, the security unit associated with a Makassar-based organization called *Komite Pengerak Syariat Islam* (KPSI, Committee for Upholding Islamic Law).⁷³ The head of the organisation, Abdul Aziz Qahhar Muzakkar, is the son of Kahar Muzakkar, the former rebel commander. The secretary general of KPSI told ICG that for many members, KPSI was a way of continuing the Darul Islam struggle through constitutional means.⁷⁴

Much of the leadership of KPSI is from the district of Luwu, where Kahar Muzakkar was born. (Agus Dwikarna is not among them.) The younger Muzakkar, who heads KPSI, runs a religious boarding school (*pesantren*) in Makassar that also serves as the Makassar branch of the Hidayatullah network. This network, which publishes the militant Muslim magazine *Hidayatullah*, is based

⁷³ In its first incarnation, the group was called KPPSI, *Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam* (Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law). It held its first major meeting in Makassar in May 2000. Fihiruddin and Abdul Wahid Kadungga attended (see below), as did the chief minister of the state of Trengganu in Malaysia, one of the two opposition-led states where unsuccessful attempts to implement Islamic law have been made.

⁷⁴ ICG interview, Makassar, 10 June 2002. KPPSI was founded after the regional autonomy laws were passed in 1999 with the aim of trying to get special autonomy for the province of South Sulawesi, similar to that granted Aceh, so that the province could enforce Islamic law. Under the autonomy laws, religious matters remain under the control of the central government, but since Aceh was allowed to adopt Islamic law under special autonomy provisions, KPSI demanded the same treatment for South Sulawesi.

in Balikpapan, Kalimantan. The founder of the Hidayatullah network, Muhsin Qahhar, also known as Abdullah Said, was not directly associated with Kahar Muzakkar but considered himself the rebel leader’s spiritual heir.⁷⁵

The most interesting figure associated with KPSI, however, is Abdul Wahid Kadungga, Kahar Muzakkar’s son-in-law, who assisted Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar when they first reached Malaysia and who is believed to have had direct communication with al-Qaeda through his ties to the Egyptian-led Gama Islami.⁷⁶ At KPSI’s first congress in Makassar in May 2000, Kadungga appeared as an honored guest, bringing with him the deputy head of PAS-Malaysia.

B. ISLAMIC LAW, ISLAMIC STATE OR CALIPHATE

In some ways, the themes of preachers linked to the Ngruki network have been remarkably consistent over two decades. The call for the application of Islamic law, the harkening back to the days of Darul Islam and the pioneering efforts of Kartosuwirjo, the obligation to disobey secular authorities whose policies undermine or conflict with Islamic law – these have all been constants. As long as Soeharto was in power, the focus of speeches by Ba’asyir and Sungkar was overwhelmingly on the iniquities of his government and its efforts to divide and destroy the Indonesian *ummat*.⁷⁷ It was the Soeharto government, according to the Ngruki founders, that was the main obstacle to establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and the achievement of Kartosuwirjo’s aims.

Ba’asyir in particular has also been consistent in his call for establishing Islamic communities (*jemaah islamiyah*) as the necessary precondition of an

Islamic state (*dawlah islamiyah*) and jihad as one of the means toward that end. The speech he gave at the first Mujahidin Congress in August 2000 was no different from themes he had propounded in the late 1970s.

But other members of the Ngruki network began moving away from the notion of an Indonesian Islamic state per se and toward the idea of an international caliphate – a favourite theme of Hizb-ut Tahrir, the Jordan-based militant organisation that has a growing presence in Indonesia. (It was well represented at the Mujahidin Congress.)⁷⁸ The theme of a caliphate was picked up by Irfan Suryahardy and others in their statements to the media at the Congress.

Much has been made by Malaysian and Singaporean authorities of the call for the establishment of a caliphate, either internationally or in Southeast Asia, as evidence of possible links to al-Qaeda. The Malaysian government’s accusations against Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril, for example, are based on his alleged call for a *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara* involving Indonesia, the southern Philippines and Malaysia.⁷⁹ But the call for a caliphate has become such a common theme among militant groups in Indonesia that it is hard to see, how by itself, it indicates much of anything.

VII. CONCLUSION

The Ngruki network, committed to continuing what its members saw as the struggle of the Darul Islam rebellion to establish a state based on Islamic law, was radicalised by Soeharto government policies of the 1980s. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, inspired by Hasan al-Banna, may have been the main architect of the notion of setting up *jemaah islamiyah* as a precursor to an Islamic state, but Abdullah Sungkar was the political driving force of the network, first in Indonesia, and then in exile in Malaysia. He seems to have been succeeded in that role by Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril.

It was determination to get the funds and training to fight the Indonesian government that first led

⁷⁵ Sometime in the late 1970s, according to one source, Abdullah Said left Makassar rather than face arrest for attacking a lottery office considered offensive to Islam. He went first to Jakarta, then settled in Balikpapan, with many followers, almost all from South Sulawesi.

⁷⁶ Communication alone, however, is not evidence of criminal activity.

⁷⁷ See, for example, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, “The Latest Indonesian Crisis: Causes and Solutions”, *Nida ul-Islam*, August 1998. They cite the Soeharto government’s passage of a new marriage law in 1973, the obligatory *Pancasila* training program called P-4, the *Pancasila* only policy, the ban on individual Muslim parties, and the killings of Muslims in Tanjung Priok and Lampung as evidence of government perfidy.

⁷⁸ Abdul Qadir Baraja, “Kebangkitan dan Keruntuhan Khilafatul Muslimin”, in *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariah Islam* (Yogyakarta, January 2001), p. 12.

⁷⁹ The full text of the indictment against Fikiruddin-Jibril is reproduced in Fauzan al-Anshari, *Saya Teroris?* Republika Publishers, May 2002, pp. 5-8.

members of the network to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s. But it was almost certainly the residence of the exiles in Malaysia – in the 1990s, a meeting place for representatives of Muslim guerrilla groups of all kinds – that moved some beyond anti-Soeharto activities to more sinister activities that may have included planning attacks on targets in Singapore and Indonesia.

The dilemma is what to do now. Association with the Ngruki network is not equivalent to terrorism, and yet the possibility remains that some members of the exile group who have since returned to Indonesia may be sources of support for criminal activities. But repression helped give birth to the network, and it would be a major mistake to encourage the Indonesian government, or other governments in the region, to re-institute the kind of arbitrary practices that Soeharto’s resignation was supposed to bring to an end.

The claim by Agus Dwikarna and the other two arrested with him in March 2002 that the evidence in their suitcase in Manila was planted appears to be well-founded, but the U.S. government still wants to reward Indonesian intelligence for working with Philippine authorities to bring off the arrest. Such tactics are likely to backfire – Agus Dwikarna has already become a hero to many in South Sulawesi, to the point that local and national politicians vie to get him released.

Pressure on Indonesia to arrest Ba’asyir led the government to drag out his old case file from 1982 and see if he could still be charged, since he fled the country before the Supreme Court’s decision to re-institute his original nine-year sentence could be implemented. In the intervening years, the anti-subversion law under which he had been charged was repealed, and all Soeharto-era political prisoners released. The Supreme Court decided rightly that it could not pursue the case.

Indonesian officials interviewed by ICG have lamented the lack of an Internal Security Act, similar to those used in Malaysia and Singapore to carry out preventive arrests, claiming they would be better able to fight the war on terror if they had such a tool. The danger is that in Indonesia it could well create more terrorists than it stops, just as the indiscriminate application of the Anti-Subversion Law (revoked after Soeharto’s resignation) hardened the determination of some activists, including some members of the Ngruki network, to bring down the Soeharto government.

The anti-terrorism law now being drafted has raised concerns that an all-powerful internal security agency will be recreated. Many involved in writing the law are determined to avoid this, and the draft produced in June 2002 is less sweeping than the Malaysian or Singaporean laws.⁸⁰ To charges by several non-governmental organisations that U.S. pressure was driving the process, one member of the drafting committee told ICG that Indonesia was going ahead with the legislation in response to its obligations as a member of the United Nations and in response to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373.⁸¹

Defining terrorism, or distinguishing between terrorism and other forms of military, guerrilla, or criminal activity, is highly subjective.⁸² The bombings that took place in Manila and throughout Indonesia that have been attributed to Indonesian nationals, and the plans to attack targets in Singapore and Jakarta, are clearly criminal and punishable under the Indonesian Criminal Code, just as Fathur Rahman al-Gozi was sentenced under the Philippine criminal code, not special terrorism legislation.

In the current climate, with many Indonesian Muslims organisations fearing they will become the target of anti-terrorism legislation, it would lessen the chance of turning criminal suspects into heroes if the label “terrorist” was dropped altogether.

Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002

⁸⁰ Early drafts provided for the creation of an Anti-Terrorism Commission (KAT) that would have included the commander of the armed forces and the head of the National Intelligence Agency. The fifth draft of the bill, produced in June 2002, omits any reference to such a commission, but the provision could be reinserted when the bill is debated in parliament, probably in September 2002.

⁸¹ ICG interview, Jakarta, 8 July 2002.

⁸² See Grenville Byford, “The Wrong War”, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002, pp. 34-43.

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF NAMES

Abdul Aziz Qahhar Mudzakkar: son of former Darul Islam commander Kahar Muzakkar; head of KPSI, *Komite Pengerakan Syariat Islam*, in Makassar; head of Hidayatullah *pesantren* in Makassar; member of the *Suara Hidayatullah* editorial board.

Abdul Qadir Baraja. Former Ngruki lecturer, member of the executive committee of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*. Born in Sumbawa, later lived in Telukbetung, Lampung. Author of *Hijrah dan Jihad*. Arrested in January 1979 in connection with "Terror Warman", served three years, arrested again in connection with bombings in East Java and Borobudur, in 1985.

Abdul Rachman, alias Gunung Windu Sanjaya, recruited by Ngruki group to work in Malaysia, 1986.

Abdullah Anshori, alias Ibnu Thoyib, alias Abu Fatih. Left for Malaysia in June 1986. Reportedly helped Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's *Jemaah Islamiyah* group in exile recruit volunteers for Afghanistan 1985-86. Reported to be important figure in Southeast Asian structure that was planning attacks in Singapore. From Pacitan, East Java, he is the brother of Abdul Rochim, a teacher at Ngruki.

Abdullah Sungkar, co-founder of Pondok Ngruki, born in 1937 to a well-known family of batik traders of Yemeni (Hadramaut) descent in Solo. Detained in 1977, arrested with Ba'asyir in 1978, fled to Malaysia in 1985, died in Indonesia 1999.

Abdullah Umar, born in Lamahala, Flores in 1949, fled Medan after *Komando Jihad* arrests there in 1977, became Ngruki teacher, arrested for involvement in Terror Warman crimes carried out in the name of *Jemaah Islamiyah*, according to Indonesian government. Was detained in Nusakambangan Prison throughout the 1980s, executed by firing squad in 1989.

Abdur Rohim (Rochim), teacher at Ngruki, said to have been inducted into *Jemaah Islamiyah* by Abdullah Umar in Pacitan, East Java. Brother of Abdullah Anshori. Accused of being part of *Jemaah Islamiyah's* *fa'i* division (raising funds by

confiscating property of enemies of Islam) in 1984-85.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, co-founder of Pondok Ngruki, active in *al-Irsyad* organization, born in 1938 in Jombang, East Java. Arrested in 1978, released in 1982, fled to Malaysia in 1985, returned to Indonesia 1998. Currently commander of the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*.

Abu Fatih, *see* Abdullah Anshori

Abu Jibril, *see* Fikiruddin

Agung Riyadi, member of the Ngruki network, fled to Malaysia in April 1985 with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, arrested in January 2002 in Malaysia under the ISA. Brother of Fajar Sidiq.

Agus Dwikarna, arrested in Manila in March 2002. Active in the PAN political party, former member of HMI-MPO, the conservative wing of the Islamic Students' Association, and a businessman, he is also head of *Laskar Jundullah*, the security unit of the Committee to Uphold Islamic Law (KPSI) in Makassar. He serves as secretary of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council. In his role as head of the aid agency KOMPAK, reportedly funded through Muslim Aid in Britain, he went frequently to Poso, Sulawesi. He was arrested once before in Makassar for attacking a karaoke bar at the Country Inn.

Agus Sunarto, a member of the editorial board of the *ar-Risalah* newsletter in the early 1980s, Sunarto fled to Malaysia in 1985. He returned to Indonesia in 1998. He was imprisoned for a year in 1979.

Andi Mohamed Taqwa, from Bone, Sulawesi, studied in Yogyakarta and Pondok Ngruki in the early 1980s. Nephew of Mohamad Jabir. Introduced South Sulawesi Darul Islam figure Sanusi Daris to Abdullah Sungkar in 1984. Part of the Malaysian exile group from Ngruki, reportedly in charge of trying to recruit volunteers for Afghanistan in 1986. Resident in Sweden, from where he tried to declare an independent state of Sulawesi (*Negara Sulawesi Raya*).

Aris Rahardjo, teacher at Pondok Ngruki, arrested in 1978 in connection with *Komando Jihad*. Serves on executive committee of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* in the Inter-Mujahidin Communications Department.

Ba'asyir, See Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

Bauw, Hasan, Papuan from Fakfak linked to Pondok Ngruki, killed in Solo in 1979 for informing on activities of the Warman group.

Danu, See Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan

Fajar Sidiq (Fadjar Shadiq), member of the editorial board of *ar-Risalah* in Yogyakarta in the early 1980s; joined the Ngruki exiles in Malaysia in 1986. Brother of Agung Riyadi, arrested in Malaysia in January 2002 under the Internal Security Act for alleged membership in *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, from Madiun, East Java, arrested in Manila in January 2002 and convicted for illegal possession of explosives, former Ngruki student who studied in Pakistan, spent some time in Malaysia and married a Malaysian woman. His father, Zaenuri, served time in prison for alleged links to *Komando Jihad*.

Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti, alias Mohamed Iqbal bin Abdurrahman, also known as Abu Jibril, born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok. Became well-known preacher (*muballigh*) at the Sudirman Mosque in Yogyakarta in early 1980s. Fled to Malaysia in 1985, later joined by wife. Arrested by Malaysian authorities and charged with membership in *Jemaah Islamiyah* in 2002. Made frequent trips to Indonesia, appears on a tape recruiting volunteers to fight in Maluku conflict. Became a member of executive committee of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* in August 2000.

Gaos Taufik, West Java Darul Islam fighter who settled outside Medan; became caught up in *Komando Jihad*, reportedly inducted Abdullah Umar and Timsar Zubil, among others.

Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan, close associate of Kartosuwirjo in the original West Java Darul Islam, key figure in *Komando Jihad*. Reportedly employed by state intelligence agency, BAKIN, in the mid-1970s and had close ties to the Siliwangi division of the army.

Hambali, alias **Riduan Isamuddin**, alias Nurjaman, accused of being the Indonesian most

closely associated with al-Qaeda. Linked to members of the Ngruki network in exile in Malaysia.

Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, inspired Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to develop his *usroh* groups.

Hasnul Ahmad, businessman at whose house many of the *Jemaah Islamiyah* activities of the mid-1980s were conducted. Close ties to the Ngruki network in Malaysia through Muchliansyah.

Hispran, See Pranoto, Haji Ismail

Irfan Suryahardy (Irfan Awwas S.), born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok, 4 April 1960. Attended Gontor pesantren. Edited *ar-Risalah* newsletter in early 1980s, founded activist Muslim student organization called *Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Mesjid* (BKPM). Arrested on subversion charges, sentenced on 8 February 1984 to 13 years in prison, served nine, the last six of them at one of Indonesia's most notorious prisons, Nusakambangan. Head of executive committee of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*. Brother of Fikiruddin.

Jabir, Mohamad. Former South Sulawesi Darul Islam fighter who died in custody in 1986 after being arrested on charges of plotting to murder Soeharto. A businessman, he was a popular imam in the Tanjung Priok area of Jakarta and was named in trial documents as a key figure in the Jakarta branch of *Jemaah Islamiyah*. The uncle of Andi Mohamed Taqwa, Jabir was married to the daughter of a West Java Darul Islam leader.

Kadungga, Abdul Wahid, son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, founded Islamic students organization called PPME in 1971 while studying in Cologne, Germany. Helped Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar establish themselves in Malaysia in 1985, moved to the Hague in the 1980s, developed close friendship with Usama Rushdi of *Gama Islami*, a split-off of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Involved in the initial meeting setting up the KPSI organization in Makassar in 2000. Has close ties to Malaysian PAS leaders.

Kahar Muzakkar, leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi from 1950 to 1965. Born La Domeng in Luwu, South Sulawesi in 1921, he rebelled after the Indonesian army refused to incorporate his forces as a separate brigade. Died in 1965 after being shot in a raid carried out by Mohamad Jusuf, later Indonesian Defense Minister.

Kartosuwirjo, Sekarmadji Maridjan, leader of the West Java Darul Islam rebellion 1948-62. Born in Cepu, Java in 1905, married a woman from Solo.

Mahasin Zaini, student activist in Yogyakarta, early 1980s, arrested as part of the *usroh* network. Now on the executive committee of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* in the same department (Strengthening Mujahidin Resources) as Muchliansyah.

Mardjoko, sent to Malaysia from Solo in December 1985 as one of the labor recruits for the Ngruki network.

Moertopo Ali, Indonesian army general and personal adviser to Soeharto who led *Komando Jihad* operations to revive Darul Islam as a top official of BAKIN, the state intelligence agency.

Mohamad Yusuf, former Defense Minister, regional military commander in South Sulawesi who led the final assault on Kahar Muzakkar in 1965. Reportedly helped arrange the release of Sanusi Darwis in 1984.

Mubin Bustami, staff member of *ar-Risalah* in Yogya in the early 1980s, fled to Malaysia with the Ngruki network and later brought his wife over.

Muchliansyah, also known as Solihin. Well-known *muballigh* active in Yogyakarta at Sudirman mosque in early 1980s. Helped found the newsletter *ar-Risalah*. Close to Abu Bakar Ba'syir and Abdullah Sungkar, was key member of the Ngruki network in Malaysia, where he lived with his family, including two wives brought over from Indonesia in 1985. Named by Indonesian prosecutors as the coordinator of *Jemaah Islamiyah* operations in Jakarta in 1983-85. Returned to Indonesia with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in November 1999, settled in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan, but travels frequently to Jakarta.

Mursahid, one of the labourers recruited by the Ngruki network to work in Malaysia, 1986.

Muzahar Muhtar, young Ngruki student who accompanied Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar to Malaysia when they first fled in April 1985 and subsequently acted as a courier between Malaysia and Indonesia for the Ngruki network. Tried on subversion charges in 1986.

Pranoto, Haji Ismail, former senior commander of the West Java Darul Islam, used by Ali Moertopo to reactivate Darul Islam as *Komando Jihad* in the mid-1970s. He was arrested in January 1977, tried in

1978 and sentenced to life in prison on subversion charges. He died in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta.

Ridwan, labourer from Solo recruited to work in Malaysia by Ngruki network, 1986.

Rusli Aryus, member of the editorial staff of *ar-Risalah* newsletter in Yogyakarta in early 1980s, accompanied Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar to Malaysia in April 1985.

Safki, member of the *Jemaah Islamiyah* network in Jakarta in 1984-85, involved in several violent crimes, fled to Malaysia briefly in 1985, then returned to Jakarta where he was arrested. He later committed suicide.

Sanusi Daris, "Minister of Defense" for Kahar Muzakkar, arrested in 1982 in South Sulawesi, tried in 1984, joined Abdullah Sungkar in Java after his release through the efforts of Andi Mohamed Taqwa, then moved to Malaysia, first to Negeri Sembilan, then to Sabah.

Shobbarin Syakur, member of the *usroh* network, arrested in the mid-1980s, now secretary-general of the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*.

Solihin, see Muchliansyah

Syahroni, Ahmed, gang leader in South Jakarta in mid-1980s, close to Hasnul Ahmad and Muchliansyah, involved in violent crimes with Safki as a member of what the government alleged were *Jemaah Islamiyah* operations in Jakarta. Fled briefly to Malaysia to join Ngruki exiles in 1985.

Taqwa, See Andi Mohamed Taqwa

Warman, Musa, Involved in a series of violent crimes in 1979 including the murder of the assistant rector of a university in Solo whom Warman held responsible for the 1978 arrests of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. Warman was reportedly captured and killed in 1981.

Warsidi, head of a religious school in Way Jepara, Lampung. Warsidi had established a *Jemaah Islamiyah* in 1985 in accordance with the teaching of Abdullah Sungkar, who had stayed there en route to Malaysia. The school in 1989 became the site of a bloody siege by the army led by then Col. Hendropriyono.

APPENDIX B

MAP OF INDONESIA





International Crisis Group

International Headquarters

149 Avenue Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium • Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38

E-mail: icgbrussels@crisisweb.org

New York Office

400 Madison Avenue, Suite 11C, New York 10017 • Tel: +1 212 813 08 20 • Fax: +1 212 813 08 25

E-mail: icgny@crisisweb.org

Washington Office

1522 K Street, Suite 200, Washington DC 20005 • Tel +1 202 408 80 12 • Fax: +1 202 408 82 58

E-mail: icg washington@crisisweb.org

Paris Office

51 Rue Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 75001 Paris, France • Tel: +33 1 44 88 60 20 • Fax: +33 1 44 88 24 26

E-mail: icgparis@crisisweb.org

All ICG reports are available on our website: www.crisisweb.org