Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1087 (1996) of 11 December 1996. It covers major developments since my last report dated 2 December 1996 (S/1996/1000) and includes my recommendations regarding the role of the United Nations in Angola after the expiration of the current mandate of UNAVEM III on 28 February 1997.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. During the period under review, intensive consultations continued with a view to accelerating the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex). My Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, met on several occasions with President José Eduardo dos Santos and the leader of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), Mr. Jonas Savimbi. Mr. Beye also met with a number of visiting foreign dignitaries and travelled to South Africa on 16 January 1997, where he held talks with the Deputy President, Mr. Thabo Mbeki.

3. On 19 December 1996, the Joint Commission approved a new timetable for the implementation of key provisions of pending tasks which, in particular, envisaged that the incorporation of UNITA military personnel into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) would commence on 20 December 1996 with the integration of UNITA Generals into the FAA General Staff. The incorporation of other UNITA senior and military staff officers was scheduled for 23 December, and that of other selected troops for 6 January 1997. According to the revised timetable, UNITA members of the National Assembly were to arrive in Luanda by 10 January and to have assumed their duties on 17 January. The Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, which would include UNITA representatives, was to have been inaugurated on 25 January 1997.

4. Notwithstanding its agreement to the above calendar, UNITA announced on 6 January 1997 that the issue of the special status for Mr. Savimbi would have to be resolved before the implementation of other political aspects of the Lusaka Protocol could proceed. Thus, neither the UNITA deputies nor its officials nominated for the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation arrived in Luanda on the agreed dates, and the formation of the new Government had to be postponed. Additional efforts were then undertaken by my Special Representative, who has continued to act in close cooperation with the three Observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), to once again review the implementation timetable and to reach an agreement on the special status for the President of UNITA. After consultations between the two Angolan parties on 23 January, it was announced that the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation would be postponed until after 12 February. UNITA agreed to ensure that all its deputies to the National Assembly and its members of the future Government would arrive in Luanda by that day. In the meantime, the Government of Angola agreed to set a date for the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation following the arrival of UNITA deputies. In its Presidential statement dated 30 January 1997 (S/PRST/1997/3), the Security Council called upon the parties to implement these agreements strictly and to form the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation without any linkages and without further delay.

5. Regarding the future status of the leader of UNITA as the President of the largest opposition party, Mr. Savimbi, shortly after his return from South Africa on 8 January 1997, proposed that he be granted the status of principal adviser to the President of the Republic, with a substantive coordinating role in the spheres of rural development and national reconciliation, as well as supervisory powers over several ministries. Active negotiations on the matter are continuing, and I very much hope that the parties will demonstrate the necessary flexibility and statesmanship in order to achieve the earliest possible resolution of this crucial issue.

6. After protracted discussions, the Joint Commission approved, on 30 January 1997, a comprehensive document defining the methodology, procedures and mechanisms under which the extension of State administration throughout Angola would be implemented.

7. UNITA has submitted to Government authorities the documents and application necessary for the transformation of Radio "Vorgan" into a non-partisan radio station. Agreement has been reached on the name and other particulars of the station, but the allocation of frequencies has yet to be agreed upon. Advice and clarifications on this matter have been received from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It is hoped that these clarifications will help to accelerate the resolution of this long-standing issue.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

8. As of 1 February 1997, 5,699 United Nations troops, 376 military observers and 255 police observers were deployed to almost 80 sites throughout the country to verify various military and police aspects of the Lusaka Protocol, including the quartering of UNITA troops and the rapid reaction police, demobilization and formation of the joint Angolan Armed Forces, conducting patrols and performing other essential tasks. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1087 (1996), four UNAVEM III military companies (a total of 650 all ranks) were repatriated from Angola at the end of December 1996. Preparations are under way to resume the drawdown of formed units by the end of February 1997 and to undertake thereafter a gradual and progressive downsizing of the military units of UNAVEM III, within the timeframe indicated in my last report to the Council (S/1996/1000).

9. The ceasefire continued to hold throughout Angola, although tensions persisted in the provinces of Benguela and Lunda Sul. Government armed forces still have not withdrawn from several locations, mostly in the province of Bié, which they occupied in October 1996, while UNITA re-occupied one location in Lunda Norte province. Small-scale incidents persist, involving pillaging of villages and highway ambushes by armed elements of both UNITA and the Government. Many such incidents have also been attributed to the Civil Defence Corps and unidentified elements. Both parties, in particular the Angolan National Police, continue to maintain illegal checkpoints in various parts of the country, thus impeding the free circulation of people and goods.

10. On 11 December 1996, UNITA announced that it had concluded the quartering of all its troops and the handover of all its weapons to the United Nations. As of 1 February 1997, 70,660 UNITA troops were registered in the 15 quartering areas maintained by the United Nations. Of this number, 22,686 have deserted or were temporarily absent from the camps. The growing number of deserters is a source of serious concern to UNAVEM III, which is encouraging UNITA to reverse the present trend. The United Nations is also urging UNITA to dismantle its four remaining command centres and to provide information on the strength and military equipment of the security detachment of the UNITA President. The last phase of the withdrawal of FAA from forward positions was completed in December 1996, but in some locations, Government troops are still deployed relatively close to UNITA quartering areas.

11. The incorporation of UNITA troops into FAA commenced on 20 December 1996 with the induction of the nine UNITA Generals, but the process is still well behind schedule: as of 1 February 1997, 5,895 officers and soldiers had actually been incorporated. While UNAVEM continues to coordinate transportation of UNITA personnel to their new units, this exercise is proceeding slowly because of interference by UNITA commanders in the selection and incorporation procedures, poor planning and the logistical difficulties experienced by FAA. At the present pace, it appears increasingly unlikely that the target dates for the induction of UNITA troops into FAA will be met or that it will be possible to select 26,300 UNITA troops for incorporation into FAA as originally planned.

12. The activities of UNAVEM III engineer units - bridge reconstruction, demining and road rehabilitation - have had a significant impact on fostering a climate of security and building confidence in Angola. As of 1 February 1997, United Nations troops had built or restored 38 bridges and demined 4,505 kilometres of road. At the same time, the United Nations terminated its contract with the demining company, MECHEM, upon the clearance of the approximately 4,500 kilometres of road required for the Mission's operational purposes.

13. With regard to the Angolan demining brigades being trained and supported by the United Nations, three of them are now fully operational, but another three are still only partially functional owing to a lack of supervisors; training of the seventh demining brigade commenced in January 1997. The mine awareness programme, conducted by the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE) and the United Nations Children's Fund, in collaboration with several international non-governmental organizations, has been instrumental in sensitizing more than half a million Angolans to the danger of mines.

14. A transition period, during which UNAVEM III will continue to provide logistic support on a reimburseable basis, as well as military personnel to the above-mentioned training programme, commenced on 1 January 1997. It is expected that this arrangement will terminate on 1 April, but given the importance of the project and the need to ensure continuity, I recommend that 38 United Nations military demining specialists continue to assist the activities of the demining school and to provide support to the Angolan demining brigades until June 1997. Subject to the agreement of the Government, responsibility for support to INAROE will be transferred as of 1 March from UNAVEM and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), under a two-year project which will be funded primarily through voluntary contributions from international donors. The cost of this programme is currently estimated at $25 million. As agreed in the 1997 National Mine Action Plan, non-governmental organizations will continue to undertake vital humanitarian demining operations in eight provinces; however, these operations will gradually be brought under the direction of INAROE. With UNDP assuming overall responsibility for the demining programme in Angola, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, through the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, will continue to provide strategic and policy guidance for the overall programme. The demining specialists mentioned above would remain under the military command of the follow-on Mission.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

15. The civilian police component continued to monitor and verify the quartering of UNITA police personnel and their selection for the incorporation into the Angolan National Police (ANP) and the rapid reaction police. As of 1 February 1997, 4,891 UNITA policemen had been registered in 15 quartering areas. Of the 5,011 personnel declared by UNITA to be the total strength of its police, 120 have yet to be quartered; of the 4,891 registered, 743 had deserted or were temporarily absent from the quartering areas. Some 2,100 weapons of various types and more than 4,000 rounds of ammunition were handed over to UNAVEM III by the quartered personnel.

16. The pace of the selection process of UNITA personnel for ANP has been disappointingly slow, with only 625 UNITA elements having been selected as of 1 February, and the list of UNITA senior officers nominated for induction has not yet been made available. Following the intervention of my Special Representative, President dos Santos promised to issue instructions that the educational requirements for UNITA officers be lowered. At the same time, the selection of security personnel for the protection of UNITA leaders has been completed, and the first two groups of recruits have finished their training.

17. ANP continued to carry out the disarmament of the civilian population in various areas of the country. As of 1 February 1997, 102 crew-served weapons and 2,642 different types of firearms had been collected. The storage and custody of those weapons are verified by United Nations police observers. The disarmament exercise has now entered its second phase, during which the civilian population is expected to surrender their weapons voluntarily; however, the overall results of the campaign have been far from satisfactory, underscoring the need to introduce incentives either in cash or in kind. I urge the Government and the international community to provide the necessary assistance to that end. I also call once again on the Government to begin collecting weapons from the Civil Defence Corps without delay. In the meantime, civilian police observers continued to verify the quartering of the rapid reaction police in 13 locations. Although the United Nations has provided some material assistance to upgrade their living conditions, the Government should make an additional effort to improve conditions in those quartering areas.

18. On 12 December 1996, the Joint Commission held its second special session devoted to human rights and decided to establish a working group to examine numerous complaints about alleged violations of human rights. At the session, which was attended by the Minister of Justice, UNAVEM III was requested to intensify its efforts to reinforce the Angolan judicial system. At the initiative of the Ministry of Justice and with the support of UNAVEM, a seminar on the status of human rights in the central provinces was organized in Huambo in mid-December 1996. Another human rights seminar was organized at Luanda University. CIVPOL observers continued to visit prisons and detention centres and to assist the Human Rights Unit in the investigation of alleged human rights violations. However, the overall human rights situation remains difficult, with widespread reports of disappearance, arbitrary arrest, denial of fair trial, forced conscription and other violations of humanitarian law. Moreover, the period during which the State administration will be expanded to areas formerly controlled by UNITA is one when the United Nations police and human rights monitors will have a particularly important role to play in confidence-building and investigation of alleged violations.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

19. Under the coordination of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, United Nations programmes and agencies in Angola are preparing the 1997 consolidated inter-agency appeal, which will focus on the continuation of relief activities aimed at meeting the needs of approximately 100,000 ex-combatants and 340,000 of their dependents, as well as one million internally displaced persons and 30,000 returning refugees. Special attention will be given to the completion of the demobilization of ex-combatants, which, in turn, is expected to give an impetus to the return of the displaced persons and refugees to their places of origin. The appeal will also reiterate the importance of retention by the United Nations system of a rapid response capacity to meet unforeseen emergency humanitarian requirements in Angola.

A. Relief and rehabilitation

20. During the reporting period, humanitarian activities have focused primarily on agricultural services, following the delivery of seeds and tools late last year. Preliminary reports indicate that Angola may have a successful harvest this year. In the meantime, special medical programmes were launched in the southern region, where UNICEF, the Government, and UNITA joined forces in delivering basic health services to and vaccinating previously inaccessible populations.

21. The murder in December 1996 of the senior official of the World Food Programme (WFP) in N'Dalatando, the capital of Kwanza Norte province, who was assisting in tracing the families of under-age soldiers, dealt a serious blow to the confidence of humanitarian personnel about their safety in Angola. During a meeting with President dos Santos, my Special Representative underscored the need for a thorough investigation of the incident. The free movement of people and goods throughout the country has shown improvement, although some restrictions remain in several provinces. In addition, persistent acts of banditry in Huíla and Benguela provinces continue to impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Progress in the return of internally displaced persons has been limited owing to continuing security concerns. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that in December 1996, 3,122 refugees returned to Moxico province and an additional 1,692 returned to the provinces of Uíge and Zaire.

B. Quartering and demobilization

22. Owing to the extension of the quartering process of UNITA troops well beyond the original time-frame, there is a critical shortfall of financing necessary to maintain the 15 quartering areas for UNITA troops. Various humanitarian organizations involved in the quartering exercise generally agree that assistance to the quartered personnel must continue until the demobilization process is completed and that the interruption of the support programmes at this stage could jeopardize the success of the peace process. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit has appealed to donors for approximately $18 million to sustain humanitarian programmes in the quartering areas until the end of March 1997.

23. The demobilization of under-age UNITA soldiers continued throughout the reporting period. As of 1 February 1997, 1,645 troops had been demobilized from eight quartering areas, which have now been re-designated as selection and demobilization centres. The Technical Working Group on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of the Joint Commission seems to have resolved most of the problems encountered at the beginning of this process (see para. 18 of S/1996/1000). However, the non-governmental organizations involved in tracing the family members of former combatants, which is an essential element of the successful demobilization, continue to experience difficulties in accessing some areas in Huambo and Bié provinces under UNITA control.

24. The Technical Working Group on Demobilization is currently considering a challenging rapid demobilization plan in accordance with which all selection and demobilization centres would be vacated before the withdrawal of UNAVEM III military units as currently scheduled. If approved and provided proper logistic support, such a procedure could eliminate the need for UNAVEM III to perform the complex tasks involved in the transfer of security, administrative and logistical responsibility for the selection and demobilization centres to the Angolan Government. According to this plan, all former UNITA troops not selected for incorporation into the national army would be demobilized by July 1997. The Government, however, has expressed some reservations regarding the proposed scenario.

25. It is planned that reintegration support to ex-combatants will be provided through a Counselling and Referral Service (SECOR) established by UNDP in cooperation with the National Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. To date, the SECOR network has expanded its activities to 14 provinces, while national and international non-governmental organizations are also preparing for the rapid initiation of reintegration projects.

VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

26. Preliminary data for 1996 seem to indicate improvements in certain areas of the economy, although they were achieved on the basis of unsustainable policy measures. Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) slowed to 8.6 per cent from 12.0 per cent in 1995. While petroleum output continued to grow at around 12 per cent, the growth of the non-oil sector slowed to about 4 per cent from 12 per cent in 1995. Inflation declined from 3,800 per cent in 1995 to about 1,700 per cent in 1996. This decrease was concentrated in the second half of the year. The depreciation of the parallel exchange rate also ceased during the second half of 1996, and the currency exchange rate stabilized.

27. Economic stabilization measures introduced in mid-1996 included controls on prices and on access to import licenses, limits on the cash financing of fiscal expenditure and the transfer of the commercial operations of the Central Bank to a subsidiary. While the success of these measures in arresting hyperinflation and stabilizing exchange markets is impressive, it is likely to be temporary, unless reinforced promptly with more fundamental measures. Financing of fiscal expenditures through the accrual of domestic arrears still grew rapidly during the second half of 1996, as did misallocations of resources in response to price controls. The parallel exchange rate also began to depreciate again late in the year.

28. During the period under review, a joint International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank team visited the country to initiate discussions with the Government on an emergency economic programme. Some of the critical issues raised included the reduction of domestic arrears and outstanding payments to creditors; reducing loans guaranteed with oil production; assistance to the Central Bank in reducing credit to the banking system; and attaining transparency in the budget and other areas of the public sector. The IMF/World Bank team agreed to resume negotiations with the Government in early 1997.

29. In the meantime, the Government prepared its economic programme for 1997 with the objective of further reducing the inflation rate and the budget deficit. The Government also maintained an active dialogue with its creditors, especially those outside the Paris Club. External debt remains very high, amounting to $12.5 billion. It is hoped that crucial decisions on the economy will be taken after the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is in place. An inter-ministerial working group has been set up to assist the Government in economic management and further reform. It is expected that this group will operate as a think tank for the new Government in the formulation of future economic policies and in negotiations with international financial institutions.

VII. TRANSITION TOWARDS A FOLLOW-ON MISSION

30. In paragraph 20 of resolution 1087 (1996), the Security Council requested me to continue planning for a follow-on United Nations presence in Angola and to report thereon no later than 10 February 1997. Following consultations between my Special Representative and the parties, it is estimated that, in order to complete the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and to consolidate the gains made so far in the peace process, a continued, although reduced, presence of the United Nations in Angola will be required until the end of 1997. The main activities of the mission, in addition to carrying out residual military tasks, should focus on political, police and human rights aspects, humanitarian activities and public information programmes. This transition phase will require a substantial reconfiguration of the activities of the United Nations in Angola, as UNAVEM III is progressively withdrawn and transformed into an observer mission. The main emphasis of the mission should be on peace consolidation, confidence-building and national reconciliation, with a view to creating an environment conducive to long-term stability in the country.

31. In preparing the transition towards a follow-on mission, particular consideration needs to be given to the continuing lack of trust between the parties and the history behind one of the longest fratricidal conflicts in Africa, which has resulted in deep political, psychological and regional divisions in the country. This deeply rooted conflict calls for the continuing provision of good offices and mediation to the parties, as well as assistance and guidance in the peace process.

A. Political aspects

32. The progress achieved during the two years that have elapsed since the establishment of UNAVEM III clearly demonstrates the vital role played by the United Nations, in close collaboration with the three Observer States. As the peace process enters a new phase, the good offices, mediation and verification functions of my Special Representative remain essential, given the difficulties that may arise during the national reconciliation stage, especially at the regional, provincial and municipal levels, and during the actual integration of UNITA into FAA and ANP.

33. I therefore feel that my Special Representative, assisted by a Deputy Special Representative, should continue to maintain headquarters in Luanda, albeit at a reduced level, with essential substantive and support staff. The Special Representative would continue to coordinate all United Nations activities related to the peace process and national reconciliation. The Special Representative would also continue to chair the Joint Commission, which would be assisted by a small secretariat provided by the United Nations. At the same time, the Public Information and the Interpretation/Translation Sections of the Mission would remain at their present levels, at least during the initial stages of the transition period. A continued information dissemination capacity will be necessary for the consolidation of peace and the promotion of national reconciliation, respect for human rights and multi-party pluralism. I appeal to Member States and non-governmental organizations to lend the United Nations additional voluntary support in these important areas.

34. The United Nations would be called upon to assist in the extension of the central administration at all levels by providing good offices in resolving difficulties which may arise in this complex exercise. It would also participate in joint bodies established to resolve the above questions, as well as to verify and promote the implementation of other national reconciliation provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, foster political tolerance, principles and practices of good governance, and to promote stability generally. In order to carry out these tasks as efficiently as possible, there would be a need to maintain and enhance the Political Affairs Division of the Mission, which would be headed by a Director, assisted by a team of professionals in Luanda, supplemented by senior political officers deployed in each of the six regions. These officers would serve as regional coordinators for all United Nations activities related to the peace process. At the same time, United Nations political officers would be deployed to all 18 provinces of Angola, thus bringing the overall strength of the Division to 30 professionals, assisted by necessary support staff.

35. At this stage, it is difficult to predict when the next presidential and legislative elections, which the United Nations has been asked to support and verify, will be held. In due course, I will submit to the Security Council additional recommendations about the possible involvement of the United Nations in this important exercise.

B. Police aspects

36. With the progressive drawdown of the United Nations military personnel within the next six months (see para. 42 below), it is envisaged that the United Nations civilian police will be entrusted with expanded tasks, including the monitoring of the integration of UNITA elements into ANP. Verifying the neutrality of the unified ANP will also be crucial, as this force is expected to play an important role in the extension of State administration, the disarmament of civilians and the restoration of law and order in many remote areas. With the transformation of UNITA into a political party, particular attention should be given to ensuring respect for civil and political rights and individual freedoms. Civilian police activities in those areas would supplement those of the Political Affairs Division and the Human Rights Unit. I trust that ANP and residual UNITA administrative structures would cooperate with the United Nations in the adoption of confidence-building measures, including joint patrols, prompt access by the United Nations to prisons and other detention centres, and, if need be, in establishing a civilian police presence at police posts/stations. The civilian police component would also continue to monitor and verify the activities of the rapid reaction police and security arrangements for UNITA leaders.

37. It is anticipated that with the extension of State administration, the Government will establish a police presence in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, which in turn will necessitate the establishment of 12 to 14 civilian police teamsites in addition to the 40 existing locations. The performance of the tasks described above will require that the strength of the civilian police be augmented by 96 observers (i.e., from 260 to 356). This increase is deemed necessary, especially since Angola is a country with a total area almost equal to that of France, Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland combined. In order to coordinate the increase in the strength of the civilian police with the downsizing of the military observers, I suggest that the additional United Nations police observers be inducted in three stages (March, May and July 1997).

C. Human rights issues

38. At present, the small Human Rights Unit of UNAVEM III has established its presence in 10 of Angola's 18 provinces. Out of a total of 14 professional staff, this unit has six officers seconded by the European Union with funding from the Association of Western European Parliamentarians.

39. The promotion and protection of human rights in Angola is a long-term task to which the two parties to the Lusaka Protocol and the United Nations must remain committed if national reconciliation is to be achieved. The Human Rights Unit of UNAVEM III has made a significant contribution to opening debate and encouraging action at national and regional levels to promote a culture of human rights. The Joint Commission recommended that the role of the Unit be expanded to the investigation of allegations of human rights abuses. Both the Government and UNITA appreciate that a strengthened human rights presence within the United Nations follow-on activities can further contribute to human rights education and prevention of abuse, in support of the Government's efforts to strengthen the administration of justice throughout the country, to develop the capacity of national institutions and non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights, to investigate human rights violations and to initiate appropriate action through the Joint Commission. I strongly support the appeal of the Joint Commission to the international community to reinforce the human and technical resources of the Mission for these purposes.

40. Having the above in mind, I requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to make available to UNAVEM III a senior human rights expert to develop, in consultation with my Special Representative, recommendations for the human rights activities of the United Nations in the follow-on phase. On the basis of recommendations made by this expert, I propose that the human rights staff be increased to include a total of 32 professionals and 26 United Nations volunteers. The United Nations would thus be in a position to deploy two human rights officers to each of Angola's 18 provinces. The Unit would report to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights through the head of the follow-on mission.

41. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights would select and train qualified human rights personnel in consultation with United Nations Headquarters in New York. He would further ensure that the Human Rights Unit received all necessary guidance to enhance its capacity to carry out effective human rights work. The High Commissioner would further support the Unit by providing assistance in formulating, developing and implementing advisory services and technical cooperation projects aimed at strengthening national human rights institutions and the administration of justice.

D. Military aspects

42. Although much progress has been made in military matters, the incorporation of selected UNITA soldiers and officers into FAA and ANP is proceeding at a very slow pace, while the process of demobilization has yet to commence in earnest. In addition, the overall security environment in the country remains fragile. Under the circumstances, it is envisaged that a maximum of 400 UNAVEM III troops will be repatriated by the end of February 1997, so as not to put at risk the completion of the outstanding tasks. Thereafter, as indicated in paragraphs 31 and 32 of my last report (S/1996/1000), one infantry battalion would be withdrawn from the Mission each month. Military headquarters personnel would be repatriated in stages, with a view to achieving a 45 per cent reduction by June 1997. As currently planned, the rapid reaction groups, together with the most essential medical, air, signals and other support elements, would remain in Angola until August 1997.

43. With regard to the military observers, their presence in Angola during the coming months will continue to be required for the verification of the implementation of the remaining tasks of the Lusaka Protocol, the monitoring of the formation of the unified army and the demobilization of excess UNITA and FAA soldiers, as well as verification and investigation of allegations concerning the residual presence of UNITA armed elements and the existence of weapons caches. The effective performance of these tasks would require full access by the United Nations to both Government and former UNITA military facilities and the establishment of joint conflict prevention groups at five regional headquarters. At the same time, it is proposed that, as of the end of May 1997, the number of military observers would be downsized gradually from the present authorized level of 350 and that the number of their teamsites would be significantly reduced. Should the establishment of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation and the integration of FAA proceed as currently planned, the Mission would retain up to 90 military observers by the end of August 1997. However, in the event of less positive developments, the pace of the withdrawal of the military observers would be reconsidered. In any event, the parties would continue to be responsible for the safety and security of all personnel and property of the United Nations and other international organizations operating in Angola.

E. Humanitarian aspects

44. It is expected that in the post-February 1997 period, the activities of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Angola will be substantially modified to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground. As of 1 March 1997, the Unit will hand over the responsibility for support of the national mine clearance programme to UNDP (see para. 14 above). Moreover, should the demobilization exercise be implemented as planned, the Demobilization and Reintegration Office of the Unit would cease to exist by July/August 1997, resulting in a substantial reduction of professional posts in the Unit. As of March 1997, the Unit's field structure would be reorganized to cover only seven key provinces. A scaled down core staff would remain in Luanda to coordinate emergency humanitarian activities related to the peace process. The Unit would continue to report directly to the Special Representative, and its field advisors would coordinate closely with the structures of the Mission established in the regions and provinces.

F. Administrative aspects

45. Initially, the downsizing of the UNAVEM military component will not permit a significant reduction of the logistical staff of the Mission, since they would be involved simultaneously in the repatriation exercise and the concurrent reshaping and redeployment of the operation in accordance with the recommendations described above. However, once the UNITA quartering areas are closed, some of the available human and material resources would be redirected to support the activities of the political, civilian police and human rights components of the Mission. At the same time, I am fully aware of the pressing need for economy and cost-effectiveness. Accordingly, every effort would be made to achieve a substantial reduction in the number of professional, field service and local staff of the Mission by August 1997.

46. A large amount of UNAVEM III equipment was in prior use in other peacekeeping operations. Some additional acquisitions for the follow-on mission will therefore be essential if minimum standards of safety and service are to be maintained. With the planned departure of the military units that are currently providing communication services to UNAVEM III, some supplemental communications equipment will have to be purchased. Some additional communications personnel will also be required.

47. With regard to United Nations equipment installed in the 15 UNITA quartering areas, only items of significant residual value will be recovered for use in other United Nations peacekeeping operations. The remainder would be offered for acquisition by, or donated to, United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations operating in the country or to the Government, which has already requested that such material be made available to it as an additional contribution of the international community to the socio-economic rehabilitation of Angola. I intend to make the appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly in due course. In the meantime, UNAVEM will initiate negotiations regarding the provision by the Government of Angola of additional premises, which would be needed in the provinces, for the Mission.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

48. By its resolution 51/213 of 18 December 1996, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $137,978,400 gross ($134,980,800 net) for the maintenance of the Verification Mission for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, in addition to the appropriations under the terms of resolution 50/209 B of 7 June 1996, to be assessed on Member States at a monthly rate of $22,996,400 gross ($22,496,800 net), subject to the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM III by the Security Council.

49. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNAVEM, as envisaged in section VII of the present report, and pending the submission to the General Assembly of the related budget, I would seek appropriate commitment authority from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

50. As at 28 January 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAVEM for the period since the inception of the Mission amounted to $150.2 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations was $1,953.6 million.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

51. During the last months of 1996, the Angolan peace process witnessed some encouraging developments. Shortly thereafter, however, new delays and difficulties arose, especially in connection with the future status of Mr. Savimbi, which prompted the Security Council to express its deep concern about the situation in Angola in the presidential statement adopted on 30 January (S/PRST/1997/3). The pace of implementation of the remaining military and political tasks, owing mainly to the lack of cooperation of UNITA, has, once again, been painfully slow and disappointing.

52. Attempts to introduce linkages or conditions for moving the peace process forward will not be supported by the international community and must be abandoned immediately. The expeditious and unequivocal implementation of all remaining aspects of the Lusaka Protocol involves such crucial tasks as the incorporation of UNITA troops into FAA and ANP, demobilization and the extension of State administration throughout Angola. There is also a pressing need to resolve quickly the status of the President of UNITA, while taking other political steps towards genuine national reconciliation. I also urge the President of Angola and Mr. Savimbi to meet inside the country at the earliest opportunity.

53. The earliest assumption by UNITA deputies of their seats in the National Assembly, followed by the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, is of paramount importance. The Security Council has already pronounced itself strongly in this regard.

54. The ultimate responsibility for the restoration of peace in Angola rests with the Angolans themselves. If the international community is to maintain its involvement in Angola, it is imperative for the parties, in particular UNITA, to take urgent and decisive steps. Should the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation be formed before the expiration of the mandate of UNAVEM III on 28 February 1997, I would recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of UNAVEM be extended for a two-month period, with the understanding that it would proceed with the transition towards an observer mission, as described in section VII of the present report.

55. If, however, UNITA National Assembly members and officials designated for the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation fail to arrive in Luanda by 12 February as currently scheduled, and if the new Government is not formed before the end of February, I would recommend that the Council extend the mandate of UNAVEM for a period of one month, that is, until 31 March 1997. If, by that time the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation has not been formed, the Security Council may wish to consider appropriate steps to address the situation.

56. The United Nations has done much over the past two years to stabilize the security situation in Angola, which, however, remains unsettled. For this reason, the pace of the planned withdrawal of United Nations-formed military units should take into account the situation on the ground, including in the formation of FAA, demobilization, closure of quartering areas and extension of State administration. I intend to keep the Security Council informed of any developments that may affect the planned schedule for the downsizing of the military component. At the same time, I shall not hesitate to recommend to the Council any acceleration of the withdrawal process which may become possible, in order to enable UNAVEM to complete its tasks in the most cost-effective manner.

57. As the pace of demobilization of UNITA troops picks up and former soldiers make the difficult transition to civilian life, it is of crucial importance that this process receive the requisite financial support, including from external sources. Among the major outstanding requirements are food items, transport assistance, family resettlement kits, vocational training and quick-impact projects for reintegration of ex-combatants. I appeal once again to the international community for contributions to these essential programmes in support of lasting peace in Angola. At the same time, the importance of viewing the Angolan peace process as a long-term endeavour requiring vital rehabilitation and post-conflict reconstruction elements should not be overlooked.

58. In closing, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative and to all civilian, military and police staff of UNAVEM III, as well as to the personnel of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations for their unflagging efforts in support of the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation in Angola. I also wish to express my appreciation to the three observer States and to other Member States which have so consistently provided assistance to the peace process.