Mexico: Procedures and practices involved in obtaining a taxi license for the taxi corporation of the Federal District in Mexico City in 1994, and whether license holders were compelled to become members of the PRI party (1994-1999)
| Publisher | Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada |
| Author | Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada |
| Publication Date | 1 February 1999 |
| Citation / Document Symbol | MEX31135.E |
| Cite as | Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mexico: Procedures and practices involved in obtaining a taxi license for the taxi corporation of the Federal District in Mexico City in 1994, and whether license holders were compelled to become members of the PRI party (1994-1999), 1 February 1999, MEX31135.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac1510.html [accessed 17 September 2023] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
The most detailed analysis of taxi operations in Mexico City currently available to the Research Directorate is a 15 June 1995 article from the daily La Jornada. It should be noted that a variety of reports on public transport in Mexico City refer to both taxis without a fixed itinerary (taxis sin itinerario fijo) or taxis for hire, and taxis with a fixed itinerary, which include cars that follow a determined route and pick up more than one passenger (colectivos), buses and minibuses. Nevertheless, some reports indicate that taxi or public transport lines in Mexico City group both kinds of taxis. Please note that the information provided in this Response does not refer to the "pirate taxis" (taxis piratas) mentioned in various news articles, which apparently do not belong to established lines nor are properly registered for providing taxi services.
The 15 June 1995 article from La Jornada provides the information that follows.
Of the 101 public transport lines of the capital city, only 15 were considered highly profitable and were controlled by "fiefdoms" (cacicazgos) linked to the governing Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The main lines have leaders that have occupied political posts, including three secretaries of the Coalition of Taxi Drivers Groups (Coalición de Agrupaciones Taxistas) and the main leader of the transport sector of the union umbrella group CTM (see references to this union in previous Responses), all four of whom had been federal deputies.
The largest lines of the capital city were, in descending order of size and importance: Line 1, or Collective Transport Coalition (Coalición de Transporte Colectivo), with 90 routes (derivaciones) and 157 stands (bases); Line 2, which included the Unión de Taxistas de Reforma (Ave.) and Ramales, headed by Gustavo Roldán Avila, with 47 routes and 74 stands; Line 9, the Unión de Concesionarios del Transporte Colectivo, headed by Gabriel Gonzalez Zamora, with 32 routes; The Asociación de Taxistas Zócalo-La Villa-Gustavo A. Madero and branches, with 27 routes and 42 stands; routes 3 and 104, headed by Hilario Ramirez and Dagoberto Aquino respectively, operating in the main areas of the eastern side of the city.
The "structure of fiefdoms" is reported to have been directly linked to the PRI, mostly through membership in the CTM and CROC union umbrella groups and other popular sector organizations (organizaciones del sector popular) linked to the PRI. The report states that political links between transport group leaders and the authorities were key to maintaining political and economic control over the transport lines; thus, it follows that transport groups would seek as soon as possible acknowledgement by, and affiliation with, the PRI. However, the report does not state whether the non-leading members of the groups were individually affiliated with the PRI.
The links with authorities reportedly enabled the leaders of transport groups to have exclusive control of the processes for operating in their organizations. Their granting of operating permits, franchises and other operating requirements were the key to their political and economic control over the members of the groups they led. The article states that in 1994 Route No. 2 leaders charged 85,000 new pesos to a driver who wanted to operate in the Insurgentes Avenue corridor, with an additional 25,000 for the special license plates. In general, leaders of the transport lines exerted a strict control over the granting of operating permits, charging in 1994 between 2,000 and 10,000 pesos from applicants, depending on the route, and the licence plates could be up to 35,000 pesos. Payment of these quotas were an "indispensable requirement for operating a transport" (requisito indispensable para operar).
The article concludes that the strength of the public transport groups was due to the close links with PRI organizations, and that this allowed operation of vehicles without meeting norms, which was until recently a hallmark of the city's public transport vehicles. The public transport system of the capital reportedly began undergoing a modernization in 1995; leaders of the lines, whose indiscriminate sale of membership (venta indiscriminada de espacios en las rutas del transporte concesionado) for profit had saturated the lines and decreased their profitability, were later pressing the city government for allowances in the modernization process that would make the lines more profitable.
Another article from La Jornada reported that by mid-1995 there were approximately 117,000 properly licensed public transport vehicles operating in routes or franchises (concesiones) in Mexico City (20 June 1995). The number of vehicles operating with illegal duplicates of route or franchise license plates, allegedly bought through corrupt route leaders and authorities, was estimated at 10,000 (ibid.).
In November 1996 a news article reported that a number of public transport leaders of the capital were dealing with the authorities to allow higher taxi fares (El Universal 14 Nov. 1996). The taxi groups leaders present at negotiations included: Francisco Guadarrama, secretary general of the Coalición de Agrupaciones de taxistas en el Distrito Federal; Gabriel González Zamora, secretary general of the Federación de Transportistas del DF (Distrito Federal) y Area Metropolitana; Gustavo Roldán Avila, president of the Consejo Directivo de Reforma y Ramales, Ruta 2; Ernesto Torices Salas, president of the Organización 13 de Setiembre; and Juan García Laguna, secretary general of the Federación Nacional de Representantes de Taxis Sin Itinerario Fijo (ibid.).
The new Government of the City of Mexico has a system to process applications and grant licences for operating taxis that includes presentation of a variety of documents, payments, and some preconditions, and must be carried out in person (21 Jan. 1999). The advertisement of this system includes a warning against intermediaries, recommends applicants to make no payments other than the scheduled fees, and contains no reference to party affiliation.
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.
References
El Universal [Mexico City]. 14 November 1996. Manuel Ponce. "Piden aumento a taxis y micros." [Internet]
Gobierno de la Ciudad de México. 21 January 1999. "La Dirección General de Servicios al Transporte (DGST) informa." [Internet]
La Jornada [Mexico City]. 20 June 1995. Alonso Urrutia. "Alto grado de ingobernabilidad en el autotransporte capitalino: DGAU." [Internet]
_____. 15 June 1995. Alonso Urrutia and Victor Ballinas. "Bajo control de cacicazgos, 15 rutas 'altamente rentables'." [Internet]