The Human Rights Situation

MAP

See original

Source: Cuba: A Country Study 1985. p. xviii.

PREFACE

As this document was being prepared for publication in late February 1996, two incidents took place in Cuba which, according to Amnesty International, "could accentuate repression against Cuban dissidents" (AFP 1 Mar. 1996): the shooting down by Cuba of two planes flown by the United States-based group, Brothers to the Rescue, on 24 February (Reuters 25 Feb. 1996; Rocky Mountain News 27 Feb. 1996; South China Morning Post 27 Feb. 1996) and the earlier detention and/or harassment of "several dozen members of a human rights and opposition group" (ABC 26 Feb. 1996; AFP 10 Mar. 1996; ibid. 1 Mar. 1996; Chicago Tribune 1 Mar. 1996; Dallas Morning News 1 Mar. 1996; Newsday 1 Mar. 1996; Time 11 Mar. 1996, 38).

The group, Concilio Cubano, a "loose alliance of 130 small groups representing about 1,300 people" (AFP 10 Mar. 1996) "whose acitivites are endorsed by Brothers to the Rescue" (Dallas Morning News 1 Mar. 1996), had planned a nationwide conference for the weekend of 24 February (AFP 10 Mar. 1996; Newsday 1 Mar. 1996). According to Concilio Cubano, approximately 150 people were "detained, put under house arrest or harassed" (ibid.; AFP 10 Mar. 1996). The United States government put the figure at 45 (ibid.). Most of the dissidents "were released within days or hours" although, according to a 1 March report "about 20 remain in jail without being charged" (Chicago Tribune 1 Mar. 1996). Two leaders were convicted of resisting arrest and sentenced to 15 months (after appealing a six-month sentence) and 14 months in prison (ibid.; AFP 10 Mar. 1996). The home of Mercedes Parada Antunez was searched and she was charged with "illegal association, dispensing false information ... and spreading enemy propaganda" (Newsday 1 Mar. 1996; Chicago Tribune 1 Mar. 1996). Antunez was sent to hospital, rather than to prison, because of her poor health (ibid.). Elizardo Sanchez [Santa Cruz], the president of the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation and a "major figure" in Concilio Cubano, was put under house arrest on the morning of 24 February (Chicago Tribune 1 Mar. 1996; Newsday 1 Mar. 1996).

In an interview with Time, President Fidel Castro claimed that the United States Interests Section in Havana "were giving money and paying the bills of dissidents. They were visiting the provinces and promoting opposition to the government under the pretext of checking on rafters returned from the U.S." (11 Mar. 1996, 38; AFP 10 Mar. 1996).

According to a 1 March report quoting Amnesty International, "judging from past experience at similar moments of high tension, the possibility of violent reprisals against known government opponents by pro-government mobs cannot be ruled out" (AFP 1 Mar. 1996). The DIRB has no further information on the treatment of dissidents within Cuba at the present time.

1. INTRODUCTION

In an unprecedented move, the Cuban government invited exiles to meet with government officials in Havana in 1994. The purpose of the 22-24 April meeting was to discuss migration and citizenship issues (IPS 25 Apr. 1994; Keesing's Apr. 1994, 39952). On 1 June 1995, the Cuban government released six well-known political prisoners after the intervention of international human rights groups (Index on Censorship July-Aug. 1995c, 174; La lettre de Reporters sans frontières July-Aug. 1995, 24; Keesing's June 1995, 40591). On 14 June 1995, President Fidel Castro met for three hours with Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, the exiled opposition leader he had jailed in 1964 for leading rebels against his government. It was the first visit to Cuba for Gutiérrez Menoyo, the leader of the Miami-based group, Cambio Cubana, since his release into exile in 1986 (ibid.; AFP 11 July 1995; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 5n5). In July, United States deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, Anne Patterson, visited human rights activists and church leaders on the island. She was the highest-ranking US official to visit Cuba in more than a decade (Reuters 20 July 1995).

Some observers suggest these and other developments indicate the government may be relaxing its restrictions on human rights (Index On Censorship July-Aug. 1995a, 122). In June 1995, Marcelo Lopez of the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation said "The repression continues but it has decreased in intensity" (AFP 3 June 1995). Amnesty International suggested "there had been signs that the authorities were intending to take a more tolerant line" towards some of these groups (14 July 1995). In October 1995, Human Rights Watch/Americas noted "to a limited extent ... some concrete improvements" (2). There are indications that Cuba is trying to "improve its human rights image" (ibid.).

Yet in a telephone interview, Ricardo Bofill of the Miami office of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights pointed to Amnesty International's own figures of 600 prisoners of conscience in Cuba as proof "there isn't more tolerance in the country today" (20 Sept. 1995). Cuban specialist and University of Notre Dame professor, Martin Murphy, says releases of high-profile dissidents and meetings with well-known opponents of the regime are primarily public-relations ploys, "mostly for external consumption" (25 Sept. 1995). The government is not really interested in improving human rights, he added in a telephone interview, because that is "not a high priority among the Cuban people" (ibid.).

 It has been hypothesized that Cuban citizens, crushed by economic poverty, are beginning to demand more freedoms and democratic reforms as a possible route to economic revival (Americas Watch 25 Feb. 1993, 5). According to Robert Whitney, Associate Fellow of the Centre for Developing Area Studies at Montréal's McGill University, the country's evolving relationship with the international community in economic and other matters is expected to effect notable changes in human rights conditions (20 Feb. 1995; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 24 Jan. 1994, 28). While acknowledging the positive developments which have occurred as a result of international pressure, Human Rights Watch/Americas cautions that "they do not indicate that the human rights situation in Cuba has fundamentally altered, nor that the necessary structural reforms have been initiated" (Oct. 1995, 2).

Cuba's complex relationship with the United States also contributes to the context of its human rights situation (LCHR July 1994, 74-75). Cuba's economy has deteriorated under increasingly tough measures introduced by the United States to bolster its extant embargo against Cuba (Americas Watch, 25 Feb. 1993, 5; HRW 1995, 88; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 20). The dynamics between these two countries were further complicated by events surrounding the August 1994 exodus of 35,000 Cubans bound for the United States coast. (See section 4.2.1)

1.1 Political Context

Cuba is a one-party state, headed by President Fidel Castro, who is also "president of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council of State, commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the first secretary of the PCC [Communist Party of Cuba]" (Freedom in the World 1992-1993 1993, 192). Articles 45 to 66 of the Constitution of Cuba detail the rights, duties and fundamental guarantees of Cuba's citizens, although Article 62 clearly limits these provisions:

... none of the freedoms which are recognized for citizens can be exercised contrary to what is established in the Constitution and the law, or contrary to the existence and objectives of the socialist State, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and communism. Violations of this principle are punishable (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 24 Jan. 1994, 5; Constitución 1992, Art. 62).

The Communist Party, constitutionally defined as the vanguard of the Cuban State (Constitución 1992, Art. 5), is the only political party recognized as legal in Cuba (Country Reports 1993 1994, 414; AI 1994, 111). Although the country remains a one-party state and candidates were screened (Le Monde 14 Mar. 1995), the elections were deemed significant because Cubans voted by secret ballot for the first time, and to an extent availed themselves of the opportunity to register a protest vote (LCHR July 1994, 72). Official estimates of voter turnout stand at 98.8 per cent, 88.4 per cent of whom are said to have cast what Castro called a "united" ballot (Latin American Regional Reports 1 Apr. 1993, 4). However, some critics estimate that almost 19 per cent of the Cuban population did not support the government's candidates and let it be known by refusing to vote for them, spoiling their ballots, or staying at home (ibid.).

1.1.1. Security Forces

Little information is available on Cuba's security forces. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for security matters (AI 25 Sept. 1995; Country Reports 1994 1995, 365). It regulates migration, controls the border guard and police forces and investigates all dissent against the government (ibid.). The regular police force, the National Revolutionary Police, is reportedly becoming "more visible and may be getting more involved in political cases" (AI 25 Sept. 1995). According to a researcher from Amnesty International, all the country's security forces were amalgamated two years ago in the Unified System of Vigilance and Protection, under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior (ibid.). No further information on this amalgamation is available to the DIRB.

According to one source during the August 1994 altercations (see section 4.2.1), the government was forced to call on special units loyal to President Castro to maintain control, because the army would not intervene (Freedom Review July-Aug. 1995, 14). Granma, the Communist Party newspaper, reported in March 1994 that the government had cut spending on the armed forces in half as an austerity measure (Keesing's Mar. 1994, 39905).

According to an official of the embassy of Cuba in Ottawa, males in Cuba must register for military service at 16, but an alternative to active military duty could be performed by equivalent time served in a social service program (DIRB 7 Jan. 1994). The regular three-year term can be replaced by two years if the male leaves to study a profession (ibid.). The official also stated that penalties for evading military service vary depending on the case (ibid.).

1.2 Economic Considerations

Between 1989 and 1993, following the cessation of Soviet support for the economy and the imposition of intensified US trade restrictions, Cuba's gross domestic product and national income were cut in half (Latinamerica Press 19 Jan. 1995, 4; Freedom in the World 1992-1993 1993, 192). In May 1994, the government approved austerity measures including: freezing savings accounts; cutting subsidies on some foods and medicines; and increasing prices for bus fares, water, electricity and fuel for private vehicles (Keesing's May 1994, 40001). Cuban economist Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello, vice-president of the National Association of Independent Economists of Cuba, estimates shortages of fuel and raw materials mean the country is operating at 20 per cent of its industrial capacity (Index on Censorship July-Aug. 1995d, 128). In 1994, the country imported $2.7 billion worth of goods and services, less than one-third the value of goods brought into the country in 1989 (NACLA Report on the Americas Sept./Oct. 1995, 11).

The Cuban government turned to new economic endeavours and relationships in an attempt to reverse the economic deterioration (ibid.; The Christian Science Monitor 6 June 1995). Some of the reforms expected to contribute to Cuba's economic growth include more open markets for foreign goods (DFAIT Dec. 1994, 1) and increased foreign investment in almost all sectors (Latinamerica Press 19 Jan. 1995, 4; The Christian Science Monitor 6 June 1995). The government has legalized some self-employment, permitting farmers to sell their produce for personal profit (ibid.). Beatriz Roque says 250,000 Cubans are self-employed or "economically attached" to someone who is (ibid).

But the government hesitates to introduce the deep-reaching economic reforms some are suggesting may be required for the economy to recover, including a suggestion to lay off 800,000 people (one-fifth of the work force) (The Christian Science Monitor 6 June 1995). Officials fear citizens would no longer be dependent on the state and the government would ultimately lose political control (ibid.; The Orlando Sentinel 23 July 1995). A number of ordinary Cubans worry that the reforms could also erase many of what they consider to be positive aspects of their society (ibid.; Murphy 25 Sept. 1995).

Human rights observers have drawn causal linkages between the deterioration of the Cuban economy and changing human rights conditions in Cuba (Americas Watch 25 Feb. 1993, 4; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 20). According to Whitney, the economic crisis has precipitated a partial breakdown in most structures of the Communist Party and the Cuban state (20 Feb. 1995). "Very rarely can you say the source of [changes] is state policy" (ibid. 22 Sept. 1995). While mechanisms of state control over the citizenry disintegrate, the beginnings of autonomous, community-based activity are visible. This is evident in the creation of independent unions (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 10), the emergence of the Church as a focal point for community meeting and discussion (Latinamerica Press 18 June 1992, 4), and the activities of illegal, although tolerated, non-governmental organizations, some of which have an audience with the government (Whitney 20 Feb. 1995). Murphy suggests "new social ties are developing because of the economic crisis;" specifically, that extended family networks have become stronger (25 Sept. 1995).

2. OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Estimates of the number of political prisoners in Cuban jails range from Amnesty International's "at least 1,000" (25 Sept. 1995), to the 2,000-5,000 suggested by Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz of the illegal Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation (AFP 3 June 1995). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) reports that 918 people were convicted "of offenses with political connotations or for having exercised their right to freedom of expression" in 1994 (17 Feb. 1995, 145). However, as noted in the introduction, on 1 June 1995, the government released six political prisoners following a fact-finding visit by representatives of France Libertés, the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Médecins du Monde and Human Rights Watch/Americas (La lettre de Reporters sans frontières July-Aug. 1995, 24; Index on Censorship July-Aug. 1995c, 174).

It is reported that independent organizations of journalists, lawyers and economists are being permitted to operate unofficially, although not without the threat of government control and instances of harassment (The Globe and Mail 31 July 1995; AI 14 July 1995; Index on Censorship July-Aug. 1995a, 122). In July 1995, officials refused to let Sanchez Santa Cruz leave Cuba to meet a group of intellectuals in Mexico (EFE 12 July 1995). Also that month, a number of independent journalists were harassed by state security agents (AI 14 July 1995). It has been suggested that the clampdown might have been prompted by government concerns that activists were planning activities to commemorate the 1994 drowning deaths of 40 people confronted by a government boat as they left for the United States (ibid.; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 21-23) (see sections 3.2 and 4.2.1). The largest commemorative mass was cancelled by authorities although smaller masses reportedly were held (ibid.). A flotilla of boats from Miami sailed to Cuba to commemorate the event was met by Cuban vessels which rammed the lead boat, causing damage and reportedly injuring three people (ibid.).

Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz said in June 1995, "Repression always had its ups and downs, and the current situation can change tomorrow, because we have no guarantee of human rights here" (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 2n1; AFP 3 June 1995). Whitney surmises that the ongoing economic instability and breakdown of state institutions has led to greater freedoms in some communities and "unchecked repression" in others, as relationships between citizens and the state and decision-making by local authorities become increasingly subjective and informal — "Because not a lot is working, it's hard to find any kind of pattern ... You can get some powerful people who can decide to toss some people in jail" (22 Sept. 1995). Conflicting reports on human rights conditions, he says, may be explained by differing responses by local party members and organizations to citizens' activities (ibid. 20 Feb. 1995).

Cuban officials have consistently refused to cooperate with the United Nations Special Rapporteur Carl-Johan Groth (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 2), whose mandate has been renewed three times since his original appointment in March 1992 ( HRW/A Feb. 1994, 3; Reuters 7 March 1995). In November 1994, however, on invitation from the Cuban government, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso, visited Cuba. The Cuban government has also agreed that it will cooperate with thematic UN Rapporteurs (DFAIT Dec. 1994, 2).

Although it is illegal for groups in Cuba to monitor human rights (AI 14 July 1995; HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 15; Country Reports 1994 1995, 372; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 9), according to Human Rights Watch Cuba researcher, Joanne Mariner, human rights activists are at times permitted to leave the country and return (25 April 1995). On 16 March 1995, Fidel Castro announced that international human rights groups would be permitted to visit Cuba (AI 17 Mar. 1995). Until then the Cuban government had refused requests by these organizations to conduct official visits to Cuba (ibid. 1994, 111; HRW 1995, 89). As noted earlier, in April/May 1995, a human rights mission led by France-Libertés, and including Human Rights Watch/Americas, visited Cuba (La lettre de Reporters sans frontières July-Aug. 1995, 24; Index on Censorship July-Aug. 1995c, 174; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 10n27). However, the Cuban government's reaction to early findings was to complain of the delegation's "flagrant violation of the country's sovereignty and clear interference in affairs solely within the competence of the government and the people" (ibid.). In September 1995, a researcher with Amnesty International said that the group was hoping to visit Cuba soon (25 Sept. 1995).

 On 17 May 1995, Cuba ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 16). Human Rights Watch/Americas reports that President Castro told the France-Libertés delegation that "he would introduce a bill in the National Assembly to abolish the death penalty ... [however,] his commitment ... was greatly reduced by his qualification of it ... [as it would depend] on developments in the economy and vis-à-vis the U.S. economic embargo" (ibid. Oct. 1995, 17).

Historically, formal state-backed organizations at local, regional and national levels have been the primary mechanism for exercising control over Cuba's citizens on a daily basis (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 24 Jan. 1994, 7; Country Reports 1994 1995, 365). These range from the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution at the grassroots level to security forces and more formal institutions. According to Country Reports 1994, this system is "one of the most pervasive and repressive features of Cuban life," although the report also says Communist Party control of these organizations has lessened (ibid., 369).

The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution "maintain a network of informants to report on the public activities of private citizens, especially activists" (LCHR 1993, 73; AI 25 Sept. 1995). In 1992, there were frequent encounters between citizens and the Destacamentos Populares de Respuesta Rápida (Peoples' Rapid Response Detachments) (AI 1993, 108), also known as "Rapid Response Brigades" and "Rapid-Action Brigades" (ibid. 11 Aug. 1994a, 2; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 January 1995, 6; HRW 1994, 89). Although less frequent than in 1993, reports continued in 1994 of the use of Rapid Response Brigades and other civilian groups to intimidate political dissidents and human rights activists (ibid.).

These brigades, supposedly composed of volunteers and sometimes accompanied by police and community members, often converge on the homes of government opponents and frequently assault them (Americas Watch 25 Feb. 1993, 13; HRW/A Feb. 1994, 4; AI 1994, 112; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 6). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reports that the actions of brigade members go unpunished (17 Feb. 1995, 147). Ricardo Bofill of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights says the brigades are "assault groups for punitive measures, working outside of the law yet completely under government control" (20 Sept. 1995).

Both teachers and students are evaluated to some degree on their ideological commitment to the state (AAAS Sept. 1994, 570). The US Department of State says "Children of dissidents and children who are dissidents themselves usually have their education ended at the ninth grade" (March 1995, 4). The United Nations reports that "Often individuals are expelled from educational institutions, dismissed from their jobs or subjected to some form of discrimination for expressing, in some way, views inconsistent with the official ideology" (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 24 Jan. 1994, 7).

2.1 Legal Context

2.1.1. Right to a Fair Trial

The criminal code stipulates a number of penalties for the expression of ideas which do not conform to the aims of the communist state: Article 103 provides punishment of from one to eight years for anyone who "incites against the social order, international solidarity or the communist State, by means of oral or written propaganda or in any other way" (IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 144). According to The Recorder, published by American Lawyer Media, "Cuba has the elaborate framework of a fair and impartial judicial system" but "courts serve as the chief venue for political control of the population" (19 June 1995, 5). In general, criticism of the government and its activities is not permitted, and is punishable with one to three years in prison (Country Reports 1993 1994, 411). A researcher with the Americas regional program of the international secretariat of Amnesty International has stated that political prisoners in Cuba "are definitely treated differently" by the judicial system than are other prisoners. Ordinary criminal cases are usually "much faster ... more open" (25 Sept. 1995).

All lawyers practising in the country, said the researcher, must belong to "bufetes colectivos," (lawyers' collectives), which are controlled by the government (ibid.). Because of that relationship, those charged with political offences have only a "fairly remote" chance of getting an "adequate defence," the researcher said (AI 25 Sept. 1995). In its 1994 Directory of Persecuted Scientists, Health Professionals and Engineers, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) notes that defence attorneys in Cuba are often reluctant to represent those charged with political crimes because of state control over lawyers (Sept. 1994, 57).

Despite the assertion that there are no independent lawyers in Cuba (AI 25 Sept. 1995; Bofill 20 Sept. 1995), Human Rights Watch/Americas reports that a group of lawyers has formed an independent collective, the Corriente Agramontista (Agramontist Current) and "have been noted for their active and outspoken defense of political cases" (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 18). However, "all of these lawyers have been penalized for their activities" (ibid.). Repercussions include effective disbarment, constant surveillance, disruption of meetings, and the refusal of legal recognition by the government "despite numerous requests" (ibid.).

Members of the international human rights delegation which visited Cuba in the spring of 1995 reported that all of the political prisoners they spoke with (see section 3.1) complained of having had unfair trials (La Lettre Hebdomadaire de la FIDH 18-25 May 1995, 10). They had been given no opportunity to present an effective defence and were subjected to periods of solitary confinement in "cruel and inhuman" conditions (ibid.). Delegation members were struck by the long sentences imposed for relatively minor offences which involved no violence (ibid.). The AAAS says, "There is no concept of a fair and public trial, as almost all cases are tried in less than one day, and often the only admissible evidence is the defendant's confession" (Sept. 1994, 57). Dissident lawyer René Gómez Manzano, who has spent nine of the last fourteen years in jail for political offences, says, "In reality there are no guarantees of due process" (The Recorder 19 June 1995, 7).

Although Cuban law permits anyone accused of a crime the right to name a lawyer after a period of about 10 days following arrest (Latinamerica Press 19 May 1994, 5), both the Amnesty International researcher and a researcher with the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in Geneva said lawyers representing political prisoners have little access to their clients, and may not meet them until days before their trial. "This is a serious difficulty to the right to defense," said the ICJ's Alejandro Artucio (25 Sept. 1995; AI 25 Sept. 1995).

On 7 March 1994, Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez, the leader of the Cuban National Civil Rights Council (CNDCC), whose activities had been "closely monitored", was attacked in his home by four men (AI 11 May 1994). According to Amnesty International, "The nature of the assault and the history of harassment against him and the group indicate that there may have been official involvement" (ibid.). Two months later, Chaviano González was arrested by state security agents shortly after signing a petition calling on President Castro to ease restrictions on human rights activists (The New York Times 15 May 1995). He was also organizing a campaign proposing amnesty for political prisoners (IACHR 1995, 146).

Chaviano González was held incommunicado in solitary confinement, without access to a lawyer (IAHCR 1995, 146; Notimex 29 May 1995; The New York Times 15 May 1995) and without charges having been laid, until 12 April 1995 when he was "told that he would be tried just 72 hours later by a secret military tribunal," despite his status as a civilian (The Recorder 19 June 1995). According to one report, Chaviano González met his military lawyer just two hours before the trial (ibid.). None of the defence witnesses were permitted to testify and Chaviano González was denied access to the evidence against him (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 19). The trial was closed (ibid.).

Chaviano González was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on charges of falsifying official documents in order to assist persons to leave Cuba illegally, of receiving state secrets, and of "illicit enrichment" (Notimex 29 May 1995; The Recorder 19 June 1995; The New York Times 15 May 1995). At the same trial, an official from the Interior Ministry was sentenced to eighteen years in prison; two other officials and three human rights activists, also charged in the same case, received prison terms of from two to twelve years (Notimex 29 May 1995; The New York Times 15 May 1995). Chaviano González' appeal was denied and his sentence upheld by the Western Regional Military Tribunal in July 1995, although "it reduced the sentences of at least two of his co-defendants" (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 19).

2.1.2 The "Dangerous State" Provision

It was reported in May 1994 that a special government committee investigating Cuba's judicial and security systems had concluded that the state must do a better job of protecting individual rights, including citizens' right to redress in cases of constitutional abuse or discrimination (Latinamerica Press 19 May 1994, 5). The committee was reported to be reviewing legal procedures and individual rights but Amnesty International reports that nothing further was heard in 1994 (1994, 110). Non-governmental organizations and members of the legal community singled out the penal code's "dangerous state provisions" for criticism when they spoke to the committee (Latinamerica Press 19 May 1994, 5; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 8, 11; Country Reports 1993 1994, 410).

The United Nations "Report on the situation of human rights in Cuba, prepared by the Special Rapporteur" describes these provisions:

As noted in earlier reports, article 72 of the Penal Code deals with the concept of the "dangerous state", which it defines as "a person's special proclivity to commit offenses as demonstrated by conduct that is manifestly contrary to the norms of socialist morality". Article 74 provides that "'a dangerous state' exists when the subject displays any of the following indicators of 'dangerousness': (a) habitual inebriation and dipsomania; (b) drug addiction; (c) antisocial behaviour". Furthermore, "any person who, through antisocial behaviour, habitually transgresses the norms of social coexistence by committing acts of violence, or other acts of provocation, or who violates the rights of others, or whose general behaviour imperils the rules of coexistence or disturbs the order of the community, or who lives as a social parasite off the work of others or exploits or practices socially reprehensible vices, shall be considered to be in a dangerous state (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 11).

The articles provide for sentences of from one to four years for offenders found to be in a dangerous state (AFP 3 June 1995; IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 153). Security measures may be applied against individuals demonstrating one of the above indicators, after or prior to an offence being committed. If it is prior to an offence, individuals may be required to undergo therapy or reeducation measures or may be placed under surveillance by the National Revolutionary Police, according to article 78 of the penal code (ibid.; HRW/A Feb. 1994, 5). Article 75 of the penal code states that a person not in a dangerous state but with links to individuals who are, "will be warned by the competent police authority with a view to preventing him from carrying out socially dangerous or criminal activities" (ibid.; IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 153).

In September 1993, Héctor Eduardo Pedrera Miranda, who had previously served a prison sentence for having left the country illegally, was prosecuted in a summary trial for being in a state of dangerousness (IACHR 1995, 154). Although the accused had reportedly committed no additional crime, the evidence of his previous illegal exit was used as proof that he was not in sympathy with the revolution and thus was dangerous (ibid.). Pedrera Miranda was sentenced to four years in prison. His defence attorney was not permitted to see his file, and was able to talk to his client for only a few minutes prior to sentencing (ibid.; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 13).

Human Rights Watch (1995, 87), the United Nations Commission for Human Rights (11 Jan. 1995, 12, 13), Amnesty International (1995, 111) and the IACHR (1995, 154, 155) reported use of the dangerous provisions in 1993 and 1994 against other human rights activists and dissidents. These reports are available at IRB Regional Documentation Centres.

3. SELECTED ISSUES

3.1 Treatment of Prisoners

Human-rights activist Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz says there are nearly 300 detention centres in Cuba, including two dozen maximum-security institutions (The Globe and Mail 31 July 1995). Reports on conditions in Cuban prisons detail lack or denial of medical care, overcrowding, extremely unhygienic conditions and other problems (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 16-17; Country Reports 1993 1994, 409; HRW 1995, 87).

The April/May 1995 international delegation led by France Libertés visited Cuban prisons and spoke "freely and at length" with 24 political prisoners (La Lettre Hebdomadaire de la FIDH 18-25 May 1995, 10). While none of the prisoners said they were victims of physical violence, all complained of receiving inadequate food (ibid.; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 26). The majority of the prisoners appeared to have lost a substantial amount of weight (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 26).

However, other sources detail numerous reports of severe beatings and other mistreatment of prisoners in 1994 (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 6, 17; HRW 1995, 86). Human Rights Watch reports that Gloria Bravo of the Association of Mothers for Dignity and Carlos Ríos of Cambio 2000 were "severely beaten" while in detention (ibid.; AI 1995, 111; Country Reports 1994 1995, 367). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights identifies three "political prisoners," Joel Alfonso Matos, Omar del Pozo Marrero and Reidel de la Torre Calero, who were held incommunicado in punishment cells at Quivicán prison for three months in 1994. During that time they were denied drinking water, mattresses and a balanced diet and subsequently, their physical condition worsened (17 Feb. 1995, 159).

Dr. Sebastián Arcos Bergnes, vice-president of the Cuban Human Rights Committee, was sentenced to more than four years in prison after being found guilty of "disseminating enemy propaganda" in 1992 (AAAS Sept. 1994, 59; Country Reports 1994 1995, 367). He was detained after the broadcast of a trial of three men, one of whom mentioned the names of Arcos Bergnes and two others who were to be contacted in case of trouble (AAAS Sept. 1994, 60). Authorities reportedly took no action after he was beaten by other prisoners (Country Reports 1994 1995, 367). He was placed in solitary confinement at Ariza Prison, Cienfuegos province, on 2 March 1994. Arcos Bergnes was said to be in ill health and to have been denied medical treatment (AAAS Sept. 1994, 60; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 17). He was one of the six political prisoners freed from jail on 1 June 1995 (see section 2) (La lettre de Reporters sans frontières July-Aug. 1995, 24; Index on Censorship July-Aug. 1995c, 174).

In 1993, the UN Special Rapporteur "received material complaining of the use of psychiatry for other than strictly medical purposes," although there was insufficient evidence to conclude this was occurring (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 24 Jan. 1994, 19). Further information on this subject is not available among the sources consulted by the DIRB.

3.2 Extrajudicial Executions

                Country Reports 1994 says "authorities were responsible for the extrajudicial killing of dozens of people;" included in that number are 40 people who drowned after an encounter with authorities while trying to flee to the United States aboard a stolen boat (1995, 366). Other sources do not conclude that Cuban authorities were responsible for the deaths (AI 1995, 112; HRW 1995, 86), although the UN's special rapporteur on Cuba does say that authorities used "excessive force" to stop the boat (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 16).

                Country Reports 1993 uses the term "extrajudicial executions" to describe several deaths at the hands of law enforcement officers (1994, 409). None of the victims were reported to have been political dissidents, and the motive for the killings is not clear from the source (ibid.).

In its 1994 annual report, Amnesty International said that in 1993, "At least four people died in circumstances suggesting they may have been victims of extrajudicial executions" (1994, 113).

3.3. Arrest and Detention

According to the IAHCR, a number of political prisoners await trial for months or years (17 Feb. 1995, 159). Rodolfo González González, spokesman of the Cuban Human Rights Committee, was jailed on 10 December 1992 and tried in March 1994 (ibid., 160; AI 1994, 111; see section 3.4). Renato Rodríguez Sánchez and Jorge Luis Sánchez Marrero have been held since November 1992 when they were arrested for "piracy" for trying to leave Cuba from the port of Mariel (IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 159). José Miranda Acosta, a human rights activist, has "reportedly been detained for about a year without even being permitted any contact with his family" (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 25).

As noted earlier, on 1 June 1995 the government unconditionally released six political prisoners, including Yndamiro Restano Díaz, a former journalist of Radio Rebelde who was permanently banned from working as a journalist in 1986 (Keesing's June 1995, 40591; Libération 25 May 1995). Founder of the Cuban Association of Independent Journalists, he was arrested in 1991 just prior to the release of the first edition of La Opinión, the publication of his clandestine group, Movement for Harmony (IFEX 29 May 1995; La lettre de Reporters sans frontières July-Aug. 1995, 24). In 1992 he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for "rebellion" (ibid.; La Presse 17 Mar. 1995). The government offered him freedom a number of times if he agreed to go into exile but Restano Díaz refused (ibid.).

Reports of harassment, prosecution and detention of dissidents persisted throughout 1994. These included arrests and confinement of members of human rights groups, political opponents, union members and others (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 3; AI Oct. 1994, 6; HRW 1994, 88). These reports continued throughout the first seven months of 1995 (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 19-20, 23-25).

There are reports that known dissidents have been arrested for "economic crimes" (IAHCR 17 Feb. 1995, 145; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 3). These crimes are often related to obtaining basic necessities from the black market, an activity, according to the United Nations, resorted to by the majority of Cubans (ibid.). In July 1994, Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz was placed under house arrest for six months for possession of an amount of fuel that exceeded the legal limit (ibid.; Keesing's July 1994, 40095). Sanchez Santa Cruz claimed 20 to 30 other activists had previously been arrested on similar charges (ibid.). Another prominent human rights activist, Rene del Pozo Pozo, was charged with illegal possession of goods (beer), which were subsequently returned to him (HRW 1995, 87).

3.4 Freedom of Expression

Article 53 of the Cuban constitution states that the press, radio, television and all other media of "[translation] massive diffusion" are the sole property of the state or a social group [such as a trade union] (Constitución, 1992). According to Reporters sans Frontières, in practice, "printing works" also belong to the state and "undercover publications come under Article 210 of the criminal code and their production may be punishable by prison" (Jan. 1995, 4). The official press includes one daily, two weekly, one monthly and fourteen regional papers. There are 54 radio and 2 television stations (Reporters sans Frontières Jan. 1995, 4). Members of the media who are found guilty of "spreading false news or malicious predictions that tend to cause alarm or discontent or public disorder" may be imprisoned from seven to fifteen years (HRW/A Feb. 1994, 13). Agence France Presse reports that owners of fax machines are permitted only to send documents within Cuba and then only with the intervention of an operator; direct access to overseas lines is reserved for foreign residents (3 June 1995).

In 1994, the Committee to Protect Journalists stated that "scores" of journalists were banned from practising their craft (68). However, a 31 July 1995 report describes "several" groups of independent journalists now operating in the country — their members sell stories to media outlets around the world, including Radio Marti, the US-financed anti-Castro station which broadcasts into Cuba from Miami (The Globe and Mail 31 July 1995). In September 1995, the Bureau of Independent Journalists (BPIC) was founded by Yndamiro Restano Diaz (see sec. 3.3), who was released from prison in June 1995 (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 18).

On 8 July 1995, three members of the Association of Independent Cuban Journalists (APIC) — Orestes Sondevila, Luis López Prendes and Lázaro Lazo — were arrested by State Security officers following the publication of an APIC story about a retired military officer who criticized the government (Index on Censorship July-Aug. 1995c, 174). The men were released after being told authorities would permit APIC to operate but that some stories were off-limits (ibid.). Amnesty International reports that on 12 July 1995, six journalists were detained in Havana, "as part of an apparent crackdown on independent journalists" (14 July 1995). One of them, Rafael Solano, is head of the unofficial press agency, Havana Press. He was questioned by State Security officials and reportedly accused of writing "articles damaging to the system" and of spreading "enemy propaganda" (ibid.; The Globe and Mail 31 July 1995; Index on Censorship July-Aug. 1995c, 175). Eleven hours later he was taken home and instructed not to leave. The next morning, Solano was taken back to the police station and issued an official warning (ibid.). There were indications he might still be charged with spreading "enemy propaganda" (AI 24 July 1995). The DIRB had no further information on Solano at the time of writing.

 In June 1995, state security agents searched the home of Néstor Baguer, a veteran journalist and president of the Association of Independent Journalists of Cuba who has worked with the state-run Radio Havana, removing a fax machine and documents (AI 14 July 1995). Amnesty International reports that his telephone was subsequently cut off (ibid.). According to Reporters sans frontières, in February 1994 Baguer was attacked by a man on a bicycle, assaulted by strangers a few days later, then placed under house arrest (1994, 104). On 2 March 1995, Baguer was attacked on the street by an unknown assailant, suffering a fractured wrist and severe bruising (La lettre de Reporters sans frontières May 1995, 8).

In March 1994, authorities sentenced Rodolfo González González, a member of the Cuban Human Rights Committee and a special correspondent for Radio Marti, to seven years in prison for spreading "enemy propaganda" and false information about Cuba (HRW 1994, 88; La Presse 17 Mar. 1995; AI 1994, 111; Country Reports 1994 1995, 368; CPJ 1994, 69; La lettre de Reporters sans frontières, Nov. 1994, 24). He was arrested on 10 December 1992 for providing anti-government information to foreign media (IACHR, 146). After refusing his freedom in exchange for exile a number of times, González was freed on 12 February 1995 after agreeing to leave the country, and was granted political exile in Spain (La Presse 17 Mar. 1995; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 13).

Others were prosecuted in 1993 and 1994 for activities such as making critical written and oral remarks about Cuba's leaders, writing anti-government graffiti and distributing anti-government pamphlets (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 4-5). Some convictions for these offences, such as "enemy propaganda, contempt, unlawful association," have led to sentences of seven years or more (ibid., 3).

In the Appendix to its October 1995 report on Cuba, Human Rights Watch/Americas provides the names of thirty Cubans "among those currently imprisoned for the crime of enemy propaganda" (32-33; See also Section 3.8).

3.5 Women

Cuba has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (United Nations 1987, 140). Article 44 of the constitution guarantees women social, political, economic, cultural and familial equality, and guarantees paid maternity leave and child care (Constitucion 1992, Art. 44).

According to Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Cuba's record of promoting women's rights is positive (Dec. 1994, 2; see also Vanity Fair Mar. 1994, 167), although it is "rare" to find women in senior posts in the Cuban government (DFAIT Dec. 1994, 2; Country Reports 1993 1994, 414). Three women sit on the 26-member Politburo, the governing body of the Communist Party (Country Reports 1994 1995, 372). According to one report, "Cuba is still the regional leader in terms of employment opportunities for women. ... 51 percent of scientists ... under the age of 30 are women ... 63 percent of ... technicians and 65 percent of university students" (Latinamerica Press 2 Feb. 1995, 7).

Women have, however, suffered from loss of independence, reduced access to employment and less government support under the current economic crisis (Latinamerica Press 2 2 Feb. 1995, ;ibid. 16 Mar. 1995, 5; Whitney 20 Feb. 1995). Many women have been forced out of work, and many single women, especially single mothers, have had to return to live with their parents (ibid.). Cuban women are feeling the strain to such a great extent, according to Whitney, that the numbers of women being admitted to psychiatric institutions is increasing significantly (ibid.). Also, the economic crisis, combined with a burgeoning tourist industry, has led to an increase in the number of women turning to prostitution (Vanity Fair Mar. 1994, 167; Country Reports 1993 1994, 415).

No data or other information concerning domestic abuse against women could be found in reports and other sources consulted for this paper. According to Country Reports 1994, the government appears to enforce strict penalties against rape (1995, 373).

3.6 Children

Cuba has been a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child since 20 September 1991. As of 10 July 1995, however, the Cuban government had yet to submit its 1993 report on the status of Cuba's children, as required under article 44 of the Convention (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 19 July 1995, 4).

According to Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Cuba "has a strong record on social rights, including promotion of the rights of women and children" (Dec. 1994, 2). The United Nations Human Development Report 1993 supports this position, and indicates that a number of conditions have been steadily improving for Cuban children over the past three decades. In 1993, infant mortality had dropped significantly from the 1960s (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 24 Jan. 1994, 21) and is the lowest in Latin America (Latinamerica Press 16 Mar. 1995, 5). In 1993, 100 per cent of the population had access to health care, and the enrolment rate for both elementary and high schools was 95 per cent, compared to 75 per cent in 1975 (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 24 Jan. 1994, 21). Concern has been expressed, however, that these accomplishments may be "severely compromised" by the ongoing economic crisis (ibid.; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 5).

3.7 Trade Unions

The Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) is the official and only legal union in Cuba (Country Reports 1993 1994, 415; IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 151), although it is reported that independent trade unions are being formed in increasing numbers (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 10; Whitney 20 Feb. 1995; The Globe and Mail 31 July 1995). Collective bargaining does not exist (Country Reports 1994 1995, 373).

There have been many complaints of harassment and detention of persons who have attempted to create independent trade unions (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 10-11; HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 2). On 2 August 1994, the president of the National Commission of Independent Trade Unions (CONSI), Lazaro Corp Yeras, was beaten on a street in the municipality of Playa in Havana, as was his 17-year-old son (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 11; IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 152). Another member of CONSI was reportedly beaten a few weeks later (ibid.). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that the Yeras' assailants were three state security agents (ibid.) and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights says suspects in these beatings are believed to be connected to security groups (11 Jan. 1995, 11).

Juan Guarino Martínez, president of the Confederation of Democratic Workers of Cuba, was reportedly released from prison in May 1994 because of serious health problems (ibid.). Martínez was originally arrested in May 1993 for organizing a demonstration (ibid.). After four months of house arrest, he was rearrested on 17 September 1993 and imprisoned (ibid.; IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 152). He was allegedly beaten in prison in January 1994 before being transferred to the Combined Eastern Prison where he was later released (ibid.; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 11).

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights also reports that complaints were brought by a number of people linked to independent unions (11 Jan. 1995, 10-11). The complainants stated that the Security Department threatened them with reprisals if they did not cease their union-related activities (ibid.).

In spite of the risks associated with creating or belonging to new trade unions, these organizations gained strength in 1994 (ibid. 10; Whitney 20 Feb. 1995). Sectors of the official CTC are turning their attention to concerns about access to jobs created by foreign investment, and the closure of factories where jobs have traditionally existed (ibid.).[1]

3.8 Freedom of Religion

Generally, the 1990s have witnessed increased religious activity and government tolerance of that activity (Latinamerica Press 18 June 1992, 4; DFAIT Dec. 1994, 2; LCHR July 1994, 71). In 1992, constitutional reform included guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion for the first time since the revolution (Constitución 1992, Art. 8, 55; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 4 Feb. 1993, 23). Cubans belonging to religious groups were permitted to become Communist Party members (ibid.; AI 20 June 1995; Latinamerica Press 6 Apr. 1995, 1).

The number of Baptists has grown from 21,000 in 1989 to 60,000 in 1995 and membership in the Methodist Church has doubled to 20,000 in the past decade (Latinamerica Press 6 Apr. 1995). It is estimated that 250,000 Cubans are practising Catholics, 200,000 are Protestants and 50,000 adhere to other western religions. According to one report, the majority of the remaining 5.5 million citizens are believers of African syncretic religions (ibid.).

In 1990, the Office of Religious Affairs of the Cuban Communist Party reportedly gave the Assembly of God permission to set up churches in private homes (AI 20 June 1995). The church reports its membership has grown to 12,000 since then (ibid.). More moves toward openness have been reported: representatives of the Catholic Church and the Communist Party's religious affairs office are said to communicate regularly (Latinamerica Press 6 Apr. 1995). In July 1995, Catholic and Protestant church leaders were present at a reception held for Anne Patterson, US deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs (Reuters 20 July 1995). Since 1994, the Catholic Church in Cuba has become more critical of the Castro regime. It has also created a Justice and Peace Commission concerned with human rights (Le Monde 14 Mar. 1995). Reporters sans frontières states that the only critical journalism in Cuba can be found in two legal publications of the Catholic Church; Palabra Nueva and Vivarium (La lettre de Reporters sans frontières Jan. 1995, 8).

But Amnesty International reports religious activities "are still in practice severely restricted by law" (20 June 1995). Church members cannot proselytize, all religious meetings must take place in registered church property, or in private homes, and all religious denominations must be registered with the government (ibid.). However, in May 1995, "Cuban authorities ... closed scores of 'casas culto', evangelical meeting places operating out of homes" (HRW/A Oct. 1995, 20). Reverend Orson Vila Santoyo, of the Assembly of God Evangelical Pentecostal Church in Camagüey, was arrested on 25 May 1995 and sentenced the same day, "in blatant disregard for any semblance of due process," to 23 months in prison for "illicit association" (ibid.; The Orlando Sentinel 23 July 1995; AI 20 June 1995). The sentence was reduced to 18 months on appeal (ibid.). Amnesty International reports that two other church members were arrested and released without charge (20 June 1995).

 In October 1994, Amnesty International stated that Jehovah's Witnesses in Cuba were prevented from practising some aspects of their religion (Oct. 1994, 6). One Jehovah's Witness was reportedly detained for six months for activities related to his faith (ibid., 9). The United Nations special rapporteur found Jehovah's Witnesses were being accused of forming illegal associations, contributing to juvenile delinquency and abusing freedom of religion "after refusing to honour the symbols of the Cuban State because of their religious beliefs" (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 22 Dec. 1994, 33). According to Country Reports 1994, Cuban criminal law was used "to persecute Jehovah's Witnesses and, to a lesser extent, Seventh-Day Adventists" (1995, 371). However, Charles Molohan, foreign service secretary of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (Jehovah's Witnesses) says "there seems to be a move toward granting more freedom to our people" (22 Sept. 1995). The church has re-opened its branch office in Havana and Molohan says assemblies are being held regularly throughout the country (ibid.). In February 1995, a lawyer with the Society reported Jehovah's Witnesses were being permitted to print and distribute their publications in Cuba and that kingdom halls were being reopened (DIRB 7 Feb. 1995).

3.9 Sexual Orientation

Homosexual behaviour is illegal in Cuba and in the past, gay men and lesbians have experienced oppression which included banishment to work camps as "undesirables" in the 1960s and mass firings, harassment by the police, public humiliation and imprisonment in the 1970s and 1980s (New York Newsday 3 Oct. 1994; Cuba Update Mar.-May 1994, 12). However, some articles report a new openness towards lesbians and gay men (Knight-Ridder 12 Apr. 1995; New York Newsday 3 Oct. 1994). One source attributes that liberalization partly to the work of the Cuban National Commission on Sex Education, which began discussing issues related to sexual orientation in 1986 (Cuba Update Mar.-May 1994, 12). In addition, Fidel Castro may have contributed to this increasing acceptance of homosexuality when, in a 1992 interview, he said that he had never supported discrimination against lesbians and gay men and that he deemed homosexuality to be "a natural human tendency that simply must be respected" (New York Newsday 3 Oct. 1994).

Evidence of this new attitude can also be seen in the government's tolerance toward the internationally acclaimed Cuban film Fresa y chocolate (Strawberry and Chocolate) which is critical of official Cuban intolerance of homosexuality (Cuba Update Mar.-May 1994, 15; San Francisco Sentinel 31 Aug. 1994). The film was partly financed by the government (Knight-Ridder 12 Apr. 1995). In July 1994, the government permitted six US homosexual-rights groups to visit Cuba and meet with government officials and health professionals (San Francisco Sentinel 31 Aug. 1994; Knight-Ridder 12 Apr. 1995). That same month, 18 gay men and women publicly proclaimed the creation of the Cuban Association of Gays and Lesbians (San Francisco Sentinel 31 Aug. 1994).

In spite of these improvements, New York Newsday notes that homosexuals are still officially prohibited from joining the Communist Party (3 Oct. 1994). However, that discriminatory policy is often ignored by officials (ibid.).

3.10 AIDS

The situation for people with AIDS in Cuba has improved significantly in the past two years (LCHR July 1994, 71; DFAIT Dec. 1994, 2). Although still actively encouraged to admit themselves to a sanatorium, people with AIDS are now permitted to live within the community (New York Newsday 3 Oct. 1994; LCHR July 1994, 71; DFAIT Dec. 1994, 2). The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights notes, however, that the government still informs employers of the medical condition of people with AIDS, and that many fear that they will risk losing their jobs once their medical condition has been diagnosed (July 1994, 71).

Following 10 years of "massive testing", just over 1,000 people tested positive for HIV up to October 1994 (Cuba Update May 1994, 21; New York Newsday 3 Oct. 1994).

4. EXIT AND RETURN

4.1 Exit Visas

Cuba's exit laws and their application are inconsistent and often contradictory: although there are frequent reports that dissidents and human rights activists are unable to obtain exit visas to leave the country (AI Oct. 1994, 1; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 14), some activists have been forced or coerced to leave (AI 1994, 113), especially during the August 1994 exodus (HRW 1995, 86).

In 1991 the eligibility age for exit visas was dropped to 20 years for both men and women (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 4 Fev. 1993, 25). In a May 1994 telephone interview with a research officer at the Documentation Information and Research Branch of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa, the Cuban Consulate in Montreal stated that in order to obtain either a permanent or temporary exit permit, Cuban citizens need a visa from the country they intend to visit and a notarized "letter of responsibility," demonstrating that the individuals or institution they visit will assume financial responsibility for them while outside the country (10 May 1994, 1). Permanent exiles are considered either to be residing abroad, in which case they retain their rights to property and work in Cuba, or emigrants, who lose all rights to property and employment in Cuba and can only visit the country if authorities grant them a visa (ibid.).

The Consulate official stated that there is no single compilation of pertinent resolutions, decrees, memos, policy statements, etc., to regulate Cuban migration legislation (DIRB 10 May 1994, 1). Temporary exit permits are issued usually for a period of up to six months, although extensions or renewals may be granted by a Cuban Consulate (ibid., 2-3). Those who, without justification, fail to return to Cuba without renewal or extension of their permit may be deemed "emigrants", and lose their jobs and property, as well as any guaranteed right of return to Cuba (ibid., 3). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reports that if authorities deny a request for a visa, no appeal of the decision is permitted (17 Feb. 1995, 156; see also HRW/A Oct. 1995, 23).

According to Human Rights Watch/Americas, on 1 June 1995, the Cuban government increased the fees for medical tests, exits and "other prerequisites to emigration" from a few dollars which could be paid in pesos to approximately US $1,000 which must be paid in dollars or in convertible pesos (Oct. 1995, 23).

Information on the treatment of those who return to Cuba having overstayed exit permits is limited. According to Whitney, the practice of staying outside Cuba past the required date of return is common (20 Feb. 1995). The response of the state, as in circumstances related to illegal exit (see below), has been inconsistent. A person who has overstayed their exit visa and who lives in a community where ties to the Communist Party are strong may be ostracized by the community and could be detained by the local authorities (ibid.). In other communities, where party ties are weak, the infraction may be ignored entirely (ibid.).

A representative of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights in Miami informed the DIRB in a telephone interview in May 1994 that those who have returned after staying abroad for unauthorized reasons are liable to be imprisoned for up to eight years (10 May 1994, 3). According to the representative, the actual consequences for committing this offence vary, depending on the "circumstances of a person and the discretion of the authorities" (ibid).

4.2 Illegal Exit

Article 216 of the Cuban penal code defines illegal exit and the penalties for the crime:

... a person who leaves or commits acts preparatory to leaving the national territory without complying with legal formalities shall be subject to imprisonment for from one to three years or a fine of three hundred to one thousand currency units (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 15).

Additional sentences can be levied for organizing or promoting illegal emigration, or for using violence in an attempt to depart (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 5).

In the past, people who have attempted to leave the country illegally have been imprisoned, sometimes for years, and have been deemed to have committed an "act of betrayal" (AI Oct. 1994, 10). Human Rights Watch reports that authorities appear to be applying the exit laws less strictly than before however, and many people are now fined rather than imprisoned (1995, 86; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 9; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 15). Nevertheless, human rights sources indicate that a significant number of persons held in prisons for political reasons have been charged under Cuba's exit laws (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 6; IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 159).

Incidents of violence against those attempting to emigrate are frequent (AI 1994, 113-114; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 15-16; Country Reports 1993 1994, 413-414; HRW 1995, 86; IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 157). The most notorious of these perhaps is the 13 July 1994 sinking of the 13 de Marzo, a tugboat hijacked and used by emigrating Cubans in an attempt to reach the United States. More than 40 people, including children, drowned after a confrontation with Cuban authorities (see also section 2). Some survivors of the incident reported that authorities trained fire hoses on the vessel and attempted to sink the boat by ramming it (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 16; AI Oct. 1994, 9; Keesing's July 1994, 40095), while other survivors have supported the Cuban government position that it was not responsible for the sinking of the tugboat (ibid.). The UN special rapporteur reports that coastguard patrols often use "excessive force" to prevent departures, resulting in a number of deaths (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 16; AI 1994, 113-114).

4.2.1 The August 1994 Exodus

Cuba's deepening economic crisis and the resultant poverty and uncertainty about the country's future in 1994 contributed to increasing numbers of balseros, or "rafters" who attempted to leave the country illegally in hopes of reaching the South Florida coast (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 8; IACHR 17 Feb. 1995, 156). Other reasons for the increased number of people willing to attempt the dangerous passage were a lessening of the strict enforcement of Cuba's exit laws (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 9), and a decline in the number of Cubans who were permitted by the United States to immigrate legally (AI Oct. 1994, 1).

By August, the number of Cubans taking to the seas was at a level not seen since 1980 (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 9). IACHR reports the total for 1994 was 30,000 (17 Feb. 1995, 156). Those attempting to leave Cuba used increasingly dangerous and violent methods for their departure (Latinamerica Press 25 Aug. 1994, 10; AI Oct. 1994, 2), and some of the emigrés resorted to hijacking boats (Latinamerica Press 18 Aug. 1994, 1; HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 9). On 5 August, in Havana, as the police attempted to prevent a number of people from hijacking a boat, the crowds managed to overcome the officers and seize their weapons; at least one police officer was reported killed (ibid.; Latinamerica Press 18 Aug. 1994, 1). The incident was followed by rioting (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 9).

Approximately 300 people were arrested in Cuba following this rioting (AI 1995 1995, 110; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 7-8). Human Rights Watch reported that as of October 1994, many of those apprehended remained in detention; 162 were reportedly incarcerated in Camagüey Provincial Prison (known as Kilo-7), a maximum security prison (1995, 86; AI 1995, 110). Some were convicted for "creating a public disturbance" (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 11 Jan. 1995, 6). In addition, more than 40 activists were arrested, threatened or harassed by authorities in September and October 1994, although they had not participated in the incident (ibid.; AI 1995, 110). All were released without charges within 15 days (ibid.).

On 6 August 1994, Fidel Castro announced that the government would not oppose the departures (ibid.) and, in the following weeks, more than 35,000 Cubans left the country by sea (ibid.). On 19 August, the US Coast Guard began preventing the Cuban emigrés from reaching the United States, and instead diverted an estimated 32,000 Cubans to camps at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (AI Oct. 1994, 3). About 1,000 chose to flee the mine-encircled camp for Cuban-controlled territory, at least 500 swimming or walking (AFP 2 Feb. 1995; ibid. 14 Apr. 1995). Approximately 9,000 Cubans went voluntarily from the naval base to Panama in the hope of speeding up entry to the United States (ibid. 2 Feb. 1995). During five months in Panama there were five mass escape attempts in which two people are reported to have drowned (AFP 18 Feb. 1995). All were subsequently returned to Guantanamo Bay (ibid.).

                Reports were common that during the August exodus, many Cubans were told to leave the country under threat of reprisal, including imprisonment, if they stayed (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 11; AI 28 Sept. 1994). Many of these people were known dissidents (ibid.; HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 11) who were approached directly or through their families (ibid.).

The mass exodus of August 1994 led to a reversal of US immigration policy, which had for decades given preferred status to Cubans seeking to enter the United States (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994; Latin American Regional Reports 1 Sept. 1994; Keesing's Sept. 1994, 40175). In the wake of the August exodus, the US insisted that the Cuban government prevent additional emigration by sea (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 12) and Cuba agreed to "take effective measures in every way it [could] to prevent unsafe departures, using mainly persuasive methods" (ibid.; Keesing's Sept. 1994, 40175). The Cuban government agreed to facilitate departures for all Cubans who had received visas from any country (AI Oct. 1994, 3). In exchange for assurances by the Cuban government, the United States agreed it would admit 20,000 Cubans annually[2] (Keesing's Sept. 1994, 40175; HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 12; AFP 14 April 1995). The two countries agreed that would-be emigrants would have to return to Cuban soil to initiate any application to leave the country, including bids for political asylum (HRW/A 23 Oct. 1994, 12; The Economist 23 Sept. 1994; AI 28 Sept. 1994). In May 1995, Washington changed this policy and announced it would accept exiles directly from Guantanamo Bay (The Globe and Mail 3 May 1995, A7; IPS 2 May 1995).

4.2.2 Return

On 25 and 26 September 1994, Amnesty International visited the camps at Guantanamo Bay and concluded that a "substantial number" of the Cubans being held there risked human rights violations if returned to Cuba (Oct. 1994, 10). At least 250 people claimed to have "suffered for political reasons in Cuba" (ibid., 5). However, according to Joanne Mariner, a researcher for Human Rights Watch who visited Cuba in March 1995, there had been no reprisals against Cubans who had returned to Cuba from Guantanamo Bay, and they were being well-treated (25 April 1995). A journalist with the Spanish edition of the Miami Herald said, in June 1995, that returned rafters "are usually not jailed or harassed" (DIRB 9 June 1995). However, in the same month, Reuters reported that some of the 40 Cuban nationals who had been returned to the country in May and June had complained of harassment (14 June 1995; HRW/A Oct. 1995, 30-31; see also section 4.2)

According to the Human Rights Watch/Americas report,

... nothing in the [2 May 1995 US-Cuba immigration agreement] prevents the Cuban government from persecuting repatriated Cubans on political grounds. Under the agreement, the Cuban government promised to "ensure that no action is taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their attempt to emigrate illegally" [emphasis added by HRW/A]. The government did not, however, promise to refrain from acting against repatriates for other reasons. ... National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon was careful to point out that the agreement "does not preclude the obligation of the Cuban authorities to act against [repatriates] for reasons or crimes committed before or after the attempt [to leave the country]" (Oct. 1995, 28).

The report concludes, "several cases of reprisals have been reported since the repatriations began" (ibid., 30), including harassment, surveillance, discrimination, and expulsion from school (ibid., 31).

APPENDIX: NOTES ON SOURCES

Bofill, Ricardo:

Ricardo Bofill, president of the Miami office of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights, emigrated to the United States in 1988 after serving 14 years as a prisoner of conscience. The Committee was created in 1976 to promote respect for human rights in Cuba. While its members include former activists from the Communist Party of Cuba, Mr. Bofill says the Committee is apolitical and founded on respect for the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He estimates the group has about 400 members throughout Cuba, 117 of whom are prisoners of conscience. One of these is Gustavo Arcos Bergnes, the secretary general of the Committee.

Murphy, Martin:

Mr. Murphy is associate professor and chairman of the department of anthropology at Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, Indiana. He was recently awarded two grants for research in Cuba, one from the Ford Foundation and the other from the MacArthur Foundation. He visits Cuba a number of times each year. Among his publications on Cuba is Labor Movements in the Hispanic Caribbean: Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.

Whitney, Robert:

Associate Fellow at the Centre for Developing Area Studies at Montreal's McGill University, Mr. Whitney has studied Cuba and has regularly visited the country since the mid-1970s. He is also a consultant on Cuba for governments and non-governmental organizations. His work includes a number of publications on Cuban history. Mr. Whitney will visit Cuba at the end of October 1995.

REFERENCES

Agence France Presse (AFP). 10 March 1996. Michael Langan. "Top Cuban Official Downplays Role of Dissident Assembly, Offers No Opening." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 1 March 1996. "Amnesty Fears Harsher Treatment for Cuban Dissidents." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 11 July 1995. "Cuban Opposition Leader Urges Policy Changes in Havana, Washington." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 3 June 1995. Antonio Raluy. "Relative accalmie pour la dissidence cubaine." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 14 April 1995. Jose Antonio Puertas. "Cuba et les États-Unis negocient sur fond de tension." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 18 February 1995. "US Moves Last of Cuban Refugees From Panama." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 2 February 1995. "First Wave of Cuban Refugees Arrives at Guantanamo." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 17 January 1995. "Cuba, US Resume Immigration Talks." (NEXIS)

American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). September 1994. Directory of Persecuted Scientists, Health Professionals and Engineers. Washington, DC: AAAS.

American Broadcasting Companies Inc. (ABC). "U.S. Response to Cuba's Downing of Private Planes." (NEXIS)

                Americas Watch. 25 February 1993. "Perfecting" the System of Control: Human Rights Violations in Castro's 34th Year, January 1992-February 1993. New York: HRW.

Amnesty International (AI). 25 September 1995. Telephone interview with researcher, Americas Regional Program, International Secretariat, London.

Amnesty International (AI). 24 July 1995. Urgent Action: Cuba: Arbitrary Arrest/Possible Prisoners of Conscience. (AI Index: AMR 25/09/95). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). 14 July 1995. Urgent Action: Cuba: Arbitrary Arrest/Possible Prisoners of Conscience. (AI Index: AMR 25/08/95). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). 20 June 1995. Cuba: Imprisonment of Pentecostal Minister: Reverend Orson Vila Santoyo. (AI Index: AMR 25/06/95). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). 17 March 1995. Cuba: Amnesty International Welcomes Opportunity for Human Rights Visit to Cuba. (AI Index: AMR 25/WU 01/95). London: Amnesty International News Service 57/95.

Amnesty International (AI). 1995. Amnesty International Report 1995. London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). October 1994. United States/Cuba: Cuban "Rafters"-Pawns of Two Governments. (AI Index: AMR 51/86/94). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). 28 September 1994. United States/Cuba. (AI Index: AMR 51/WU 14/94). London: Amnesty International News Service 225/94.

Amnesty International (AI). 17 August 1994. Urgent Action: Cuba: Prisoners of Conscience. (AI Index: AMR 25/11/94). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). 11 August 1994a. Cuba: Amnesty International Concerned for Human Rights of Peaceful Government Opponents and Human Rights Activists. (AI Index: AMR 25/WU 02/94). London: Amnesty International News Service 181/94.

Amnesty International (AI). 11 August 1994b. Urgent Action: Cuba: Prisoners of Conscience. (AI Index: AMR 25/10/94). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). 11 May 1994. Urgent Action: Cuba: Prisoner of Conscience/Legal Concern. (AI Index: AMR 25/05/94). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). 17 February 1994. Urgent Action: Cuba: Fear for Safety. (AI Index: AMR 25/03/94). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). 1994. Amnesty International Report 1994. New York: Amnesty International U.S.A.

Amnesty International (AI). 1993. Amnesty International Report 1993. London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (AI). December 1992. Cuba: Silencing the Voices of Dissent. (AI Index: AMR 25/26/92). London: Amnesty International.

Artucio, Alejandro. Researcher with the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Geneva. 25 September 1995. Telephone interview.

Bofill, Ricardo. President, Office of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights, Miami. 20 September 1995. Telephone interview.

Chicago Tribune. 1 March 1996. Colin McMahon. "Castro's Crackdown." (NEXIS)

The Christian Science Monitor [Boston]. 6 June 1995. Howard LaFranchi. "Rumba of Revolt Felt in Castro's Cuba." (NEXIS)

The Christian Science Monitor [Boston]. 18 January 1995. Clemence Fiagome. "US, Cuba Stanch the Refugee Flow." (NEXIS)

Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) [Toronto]. 1994. "Attacks on the Press in 1994."

Constitución de la Republica de Cuba. 1992. Havana: Editora Politica.

Country Reports on Human Right Practices for 1994. 1995. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Country Reports on Human Right Practices for 1993. 1994. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Country Reports on Human Right Practices for 1992. 1993. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Cuba Update [New York]. March-May, 1994. Vol. XV, No. 2. Sonja de Vries. "Homosexuality, Socialism and the Cuban Revolution."

The Dallas Morning News. 1 March 1996. Tracey Eaton. "Havana Pessimistic About Ties with U.S. Officials Say Punishment Plan is Poisoning Relationship Further." (NEXIS)

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada. December 1994. Consultations in Preparation for the 51st Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, January 17-18, 1995: Human Rights Situation in Cuba. Ottawa: DFAIT.

Documentation, Information and Research Branch (DIRB), Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa. 9 June 1995. Response to Information Request CUB19749.E.

Documentation, Information and Research Branch (DIRB), Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa. 7 February 1995. Response to Information Request CUB19621.E.

Documentation, Information and Research Branch (DIRB), Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa. 10 May 1994. Response to Information Request CUB17171.E.

Documentation, Information and Research Branch (DIRB), Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa. 7 January 1994. Response to Information Request CUB16207.E.

The Economist [London]. 23 September 1994. "Cuba: Beached."

EFE [Madrid, in Spanish]. 12 July 1995. "Mexican Intellectuals Denounce Cuban Repression of Human Rights Activists." (BBC Summary 15 July 1995/NEXIS)

Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties 1992-1993. 1993. Edited by R. Bruce McColm et al. New York. Freedom House.

Freedom Review. [New York]. July-August 1995. Irving Louis Horowitz. "Cuba's Military."

The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 31 July 1995. Paul Knox. "Cuban Journalists See Little Hope for Free Press."

The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 3 May 1995. Graham Fraser. "Clinton reverses Cuba refugee policy."

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1994. Human Rights Watch World Report 1995. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1993. Human Rights Watch World Report 1994. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1992. Human Rights Watch World Report 1993. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch/Americas (HRW/A). October 1995. Vol. 7, No. 10. Cuba: Improvements Without Reform. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch/Americas (HRW/A). 23 October 1994. Vol. 6, No. 12. Cuba: Repression, The Exodus of 1994, and the U.S. Response. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch/Americas (HRW/A). February 1994. Vol. 6, No. 2. Cuba: Stifling Dissent in the Midst of Crisis. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre (IRBDC), Ottawa. 26 January 1990. Response to Information Request CUB3827.

Index on Censorship [London]. July-August 1995a. Vol. 24, No. 4. Adam Newey. "Cuba Redux."

Index on Censorship [London]. July-August 1995b. Néstor Baguer. "In Search of an Ethic."

Index on Censorship [London]. July-August 1995c. "Index."

Index on Censorship [London]. July-August 1995d. Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello. "Let's Talk About the Cuban Economy."

Inter Press Service (IPS). 19 July 1995. Dalia Acosta. "Cuba-U.S.: Progress Made in Immigration Talks, Officials Agree." (NEXIS)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 2 May 1995. Yvette Collymore. "Cuba-U.S.: New Migration Policy Seen as Politically Expedient." (NEXIS)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 25 April 1994. Carlos Batista."Cuba- Exiles: Historic Conference Ends With Modest Agreements." (NEXIS)

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). 17 February 1995. Annual Report 1994. Washington, DC: General Secretariat, Organization of American States.

International Freedom of Exchange Clearing House (IFEX) [Toronto]. 29 May 1995. Communiqué #4-21. "Cuba: CPJ Calls for Unconditional Release of Jailed Journalist." ([email protected].)

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. June 1995. Vol. 41, No. 6. "News Digest for June."

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. May 1995. Vol. 41, No. 5. "News Digest for May."

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. October 1994. Vol. 40, No. 10. "News Digest for October."

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. July 1994. Vol. 40, No. 7. "News Digest for July."

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. May 1994. Vol. 40, No. 5. "News Digest for May."

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. April 1994. Vol. 40, No. 4. "News Digest for April."

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. March 1994. Vol. 40, No. 3. "News Digest for March."

Knight-Ridder. 12 April 1995. Christopher Marquis. "Homosexuals in Cuba Finding Greater Acceptance From Society, Government." (PeaceNet).

La lettre de Reporters sans frontières [Paris]. July-August 1995. No. 71. "Libérés: Cuba: La fin d'une époque?"

La lettre de Reporters sans frontières [Paris]. May 1995. No. 69. "Brèves."

La lettre de Reporters sans frontières [Paris]. November 1994. No. 63. "Arrêtés: Cuba: Sept ans pour des 'calomnies'".

La Lettre Hebdomadaire de la FIDH [Paris]. 18-25 May 1995. "Cuba: Mission d'information sur la situation des prisonniers politiques à Cuba: communiqué."

Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean and Central American Report [London]. 26 January 1995. "Cuba: Could the Crisis be Ending at Last?"

Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean and Central American Report [London]. 10 November 1994. "Cuba: Shortages Prompt Free Market Reforms."

Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean and Central American Report [London]. 1 September 1994. "Surge in Wave of Cuban Boatpeople Prompts Dramatic Change in U.S. Policy."

Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean and Central American Report [London]. 1 April 1993. "New Assembly Holds First Session."

Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 12 January 1995. "Cuba: And Finally, the Convertible Peso."

Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 6 April 1995. Vol. 27, No. 12. Marc Frank. "Cuba's Religious Renaissance."

Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 2 February 1995. Vol. 27, No. 3. "Cuba: Women Return Home."

Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 16 March 1995. Vol. 27, No. 9. "Women in Latin America: Still Fighting after all these Years."

Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 19 January 1995. Vol. 27, No. 1. "Cuba: Hope in the Economic Darkness."

Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 25 August 1994. Vol. 26, No. 30. Karen Lee Wald. "Cuba: Refugees Pawns in Economic Game."

Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 18 August 1994. Vol. 26, No. 29. Ana del Mar. "Tensions Rising in Cuba Over U.S. Policy."

Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 19 May 1994. Vol. 26, No. 18. Mary Murray. "Cuba Reviews its Human Rights Record: `Anti-dissident' Laws Under Fire."

Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 18 June 1992. Vol. 24, No. 23. Paul Jeffrey. "Cuban Church Grows, Becomes More Critical."

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). July 1994. Critique: Review of the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993. New York: LCHR.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). 1994. In Defense of Rights: Attacks on Lawyers and Judges in 1993. New York: LCHR.

Libération [Paris]. 25 May 1995. "Fidel Castro annonce la libération de six prisonniers politiques."

Mariner, Joanne. Orville Schell Fellow and Cuba Researcher for Human Rights Watch, New York. 25 April 1995. Telephone interview.

Molohan, Charles. Foreign Service Secretary, The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (Jehovah's Witnesses). Brooklyn, New York. 22 September 1995. Telephone interview.

Le Monde. [Paris]. 14 March 1995. Jacot Martine. "Les opposants cubains denoncent l'accueil de Fidel Castro à Paris ... ."

Murphy, Martin. Professor, Notre Dame University. Notre Dame, Indiana. 25 September 1995. Telephone interview.

NACLA Report on the Americas [New York]. September/October 1995. Manuel Pastor, Jr. and Andrew Zimbalist. "Cuba's Economic Conundrum."

New York Newsday [New York]. 3 October 1994. John Otis. "Gays, Lesbians Proudly Pink in a Sea of Red."

The New York Times. 15 May 1995. Larry Rohter. "Havana Rights Leader's Trial Causes New Tension Between Cuba and U.S." (NEXIS)

Newsday. 1 March 1996. Ray Sanchez. "Fearful Day for Dissidents." (NEXIS)

Notimex [Mexico City, in Spanish]. 29 May 1995. "Jailed Opposition Activist Sends Letter to Media on 'Irregular Military Trial'." (BBC Summary 31 May 1995/NEXIS)

The Orlando Sentinel. 23 July 1995. Michael McGuire and George de Lama. "Dollars Make Way to Cuba." (NEXIS)

La Presse [Montréal]. 17 March 1995. Antonio Raluy. "Nouvel espoir pour les prisonniers politiques."

The Recorder. 19 June 1995. Patrick Symmes. "In Cuba, Attorney Fights Hard for the Rule of Law ... ." New York: American Lawyer Media, L.P. (NEXIS)

Reporters Sans Frontières [Paris]. January 1995. No. 10. Christina L'Homme. "Cuba: The Press Still Faithful to Fidel."

Reporters Sans Frontières [Paris]. 1994. 1994 Report: Freedom of the Press Throughout the World.

Reuters. 25 February 1996. Pascal Fletcher. "Cuba's Tough Line May Have Diplomatic Price." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 20 July 1995. "Senior U.S. Official met Dissidents in Cuba." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 14 June 1995. "Latest Group of Cubans Repatriated by U.S. Coast Guard." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 23 May 1995. "Cuban Doctors Criticize Psychiatric Torture Probe." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 7 March 1995. "UN Human Rights Body Criticizes Cuba." (NEXIS).

Reuters. 13 December 1994. "UN Condemns Rights Abuses in Cuba but Most Abstain." (NEXIS)

Rocky Mountain News [Denver]. 27 February 1996. Anne-Marie O'Connor. "Cuban Military Felt Pressed to Down Planes, Analysts Say. Action Likely to Bolster Hard Liners on Both Sides." (NEXIS)

San Francisco Sentinel. 31 August 1994. Sidney Brinkley. "Gay Life has Rocky History in Cuba."

TB>South China Morning Post [Hong Kong]. 27 February 1996. "Cuba Defends Shooting Down Planes; Dispute Over Airspace as UN Urged to Condemn Attack." (NEXIS)

Time. 11 March 1996. Reginald K. Brack Jr., Joelle Attinger, Cathy Booth, Fidel Castro. "Interview: Fidel's Defense." (NEXIS)

United Nations. 1987. (ST/HR/5). Human Rights: Status of Instruments. New York : United Nations.

United Nations Commission on Human Rights. 11 January 1995. (E/CN.4/1995/52). Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Carl-Johan Groth, in accordance with Commission Resolution 1994/71.

United Nations Commission on Human Rights. 22 December 1994. (E/CN.4/1995/91). Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.

United Nations Commission on Human Rights. 24 January 1994. (E/CN.4/1994/51). Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Carl-Johan Groth, in accordance with Commission Resolution 1993/63.

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United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. 19 July 1995. (CRC/C/45).

United States Department of State. March 1995. Cuba: Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions. Washington, DC: INS Resource Information Centre, June 1995 (IP/CUB/95.001)

Vanity Fair [New York]. Anne Louise Bardach. March 1994. "Conversations with Castro."

Whitney, Robert. Associate Fellow, Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University; Consultant to government and NGO community on Cuba. 22 September 1995. Telephone interview.

Whitney, Robert. Associate Fellow, Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University; Consultant to government and NGO community on Cuba. 20 February 1995. Personal interview.



[1] Further information on the situation of trade unions in Cuba is available in a number of sources in the DIRB holdings. One source is International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 1994.

[2] According to the Section of US Interests in Cuba (U.S.I.C.), more than 24,000 Cubans received visas between September 1994 and July 1995 — 18,000 of them as part of the special agreement made with the United States after the August exodus (IPS 19 July 1995). In July 1995, the Cuban government warned that if the US government tightens the economic embargo it could expect the numbers of Cubans applying for visas to exceed the 20,000 the countries agreed to (ibid.).

This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.