Tajikistan: Freedom of Expression Still Threatened

Document source:

Human Rights Watch
Date:
1 November 1999

SUMMARY

Despite legislation protecting freedom of speech and the press in Tajikistan, in practice freedom of expression is severely limited. For six years major opposition parties and their newspapers were banned. The government of Tajikistan continues to employ a variety of tactics to limit political content in the remaining media. It intimidates journalists and editors through threats and "guidance" sessions. Government-run printers often refuse to print newspapers that run controversial material. Foreign journalists whose reporting displeases the government have lost their accreditation. A burdensome licensing process has kept independent radio stations off the airwaves. As this report went to press, on the eve of Tajikistan's November 6 presidential elections, the government had quashed all but one independent newspaper in the capital covering political affairs.

Tajikistan has been considered one of the world's most dangerous countries for journalists. At least fifty and perhaps up to eighty journalists have been murdered in connection with Tajikistan's civil war and its aftermath, yet not a single investigation has resulted in prosecution for these killings. The general absence of law and order in Tajikistan is exacerbated for journalists given the heightened risks associated with their professional duties. This is one of the most important factors that contributes to self-censorship there.

Tajikistan's civil war officially ended with the General Agreement for the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, signed by the government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). As envisaged in the peace agreement, the ban on UTO parties and their media was lifted in August 1999. However, the current political climate provides little hope that independent political views will be easily incorporated into the Tajik media. In reality, the peace agreement's slow implementation has meant freedom of expression has continued to be significantly curtailed. The formal ban on UTO parties and their newspapers was only lifted two years after the peace accord was signed. Furthermore, attempts to promote government-UTO efforts to implement the peace process have been minimal and have enjoyed limited success, at least until the summer of 1999, when scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections drew nearer, and the government and UTO each made concessions to allow for the holding of these elections. UTO members have in practice had little access to the state-controlled television and radio. Their efforts to express their views through the independent press have met with obstructions and other difficulties. The political opposition not belonging to the UTO enjoys no access whatsoever to the state media, and has in recent months been subjected to increasing press curbs.

As this report went to press, restrictions on freedom of expression had reached crisis proportions. On October 18, 1999, to protest the government's obstruction of the presidential candidate registration process, the UTO suspended its participation in the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR), the body responsible for overseeing the implementation of the peace accord-thereby halting the peace process-and withdrew from the Central Electoral Commission. They called for, among other things, equal access to state media for presidential candidates. The one Dushanbe-based newspaper which had published the views of the UTO and other opposition parties, Junbish, ceased publication in mid-October 1999, following threats and harassment from authorities, and after its regular state printer refused to print it. Finally, the presidential race was limited to one candidate, President Rakhmonov, a bare two weeks before the elections. Two of the candidates were denied registration by the Supreme Court, and the third, from the Islamic Renaissance Party, although his candidacy was registered at the last moment, withdrew, claiming the late acceptance was only a face-saving measure designed to make the election look more democratic. As this report went to press, the Islamic Renaissance Party had called for a boycott of the elections, and there were fears that their candidate's name would appear on the ballot paper, despite his request to have his registration annulled.

As of this writing, only one independent newspaper in Dushanbe with significant political coverage, Biznes i politika, (Business and Politics), is in print. Its content, however, is largely pro-governmental. No independent radio stations have been licensed to operate, and the newspapers of most opposition political parties are unable to publish. Independent television and television production stations continue to experience administrative and legal harassment, and access by opposition political figures to the state media is close to nonexistent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Tajikistan:

Immediately conduct full and thorough investigations into ongoing attacks on and killings of journalists since 1992, take steps to bring those responsible to justice, and make public all findings;

Halt immediately state agents' harassment of and threats against journalists, and ensure they are not penalized for the exercise of freedom of expression;

Ensure that government printing houses do not refuse to publish newspapers on political grounds;

Cease the practice of censorship in any form and halt post-publication censorship through the confiscation of publications, the denial of access to state printers, or any other means;

Issue implementing regulations for the issue of broadcasting licenses, and amend article 15 of the Law on the Press and other Media to eliminate the overly broad grounds for which television and radio licenses may be revoked. Revise the current licensing process to eliminate excessive fees and delays;

Immediately issue licenses to those television and radio stations that have submitted registration documents in accordance with existing procedures;

In light of upcoming parliamentary elections, establish an equitable formula to ensure that all candidates gain reasonable and equal access to print and electronic media; and

Cease the practice of revoking the accreditation of journalists whose reporting consists of expression that is protected by international law.

To the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE):

High-level OSCE officials visiting Tajikistan should raise in a public manner concerns about violations of freedom of expression;

The OSCE Mission to Tajikistan should make public statements on violations of media freedom and convey to the Permanent Council information on violations of freedom of expression; and

The OSCE High Representative on Freedom of Media should travel to Tajikistan to follow up on recommendations developed from his advisor's April 1999 trip.

To the International Community:

Condemn harassment of and violence against journalists and insist that the authorities investigate and hold those responsible accountable;

International bodies active in Tajikistan should call for equitable and transparent licensing of the private broadcast media, with decision-making power to be in the hands of independent regulators in order to ensure the dissemination of a diversity of information and ideas;

The international community should provide needed technical assistance and advice for regulatory and legal reform and should assist in its implementation;

In administering or considering assistance programs to the Tajik government that promote freedom of expression, the international community should publicize at the outset concerns about government control over the media in Tajikistan, and set and keep strict deadlines for government compliance with benchmarks for improvement;

Support initiatives to create alternatives to state-controlled printing presses, distribution firms, and broadcast signal transmitters;

Continue and increase training opportunities for Tajik journalists, particularly investigative reporting, through courses, internships, and exchanges.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In 1997, the government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) signed the General Agreement for the Establishment of Peace and National Accord (hereinafter the General Agreement), formally ending the civil war that had begun in May 1992 and taken as many as 50,000 lives. One year after the war broke out, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan banned the country's four major opposition political parties and their publications: the Islamic Revival Party, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and the Rastokhez and Lali Badakhshan movements, all of which are part of the UTO.¹ The General Agreement contains the conditions for the lifting of this ban; however, persistent delays in its implementation have meant continued restrictions on freedom of expression, and particularly as it relates to political parties.² These restrictions have come into sharp focus as the November 6, 1999 presidential elections approach.

The lifting of bans on political parties (including those belonging to the UTO) and mass media was contingent on the completion of the second stage of the military protocol, contained in the General Agreement, under which UTO fighters were to be integrated into government forces. The UTO fighters were grouped together in units of the regular armed forces, took a military oath, and were issued national military uniforms. In addition, the UTO announced that it had disbanded all its independent armed units.³ The second stage of the Military Protocol was announced completed on August 3, 1999, and the ban was lifted on opposition parties and their media on August 12, 1999.⁴

Even with the ban lifted, the current political climate and that which has prevailed since the General Agreement was signed provide little hope that a wide range of political views will be easily incorporated into the Tajik media. The two years since the signing of the peace accord have seen serious political and military clashes between the government and the UTO, as well as political violence perpetrated by groups opposed to the accord. Today ongoing suspicion and unwillingness to compromise continue to characterize relations between the government and the UTO. As the peace accord envisaged, opposition members have been integrated into high-level government cabinet positions. ⁵ However, unlike their non-UTO colleagues in government and due to tight government control, their views are not heard in the media, a source of bitter discontent.

Major political crises have resulted in the UTO's repeated withdrawal from the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR),⁶ most recently on October 18, 1999. At that time, less than three weeks before the presidential elections scheduled for November 6, the UTO withdrew from both the Central Electoral Commission and the CNR, in protest of the government's alleged obstruction of the presidential candidates' registration.

Moreover, attempts to have balanced coverage in the state media of the peace process have enjoyed limited success. For example, the weekly television program Vahdat, in principle devoted exclusively to the work of the CNR, was led by only government members of the CNR, and reported on developments in the peace process in general terms only; it did not, for example, hold discussions between government and UTO members on ideological or other specific issues.⁷ Neglect of a UTO viewpoint and the one-sidedness of Vahdat, according to UTO member Sulton Hamad, were among the reasons behind the establishment of the UTO's own press center in April 1998 to put across UTO views of the peace process, although their output and impact has been limited due to financial and technical constraints.⁸

On September 26, 1999 the Constitution was amended through a public referendum. The adoption of the amendments heightened the stakes for the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. As a result of the amendments, the presidential term of office was extended from five to seven years, and a two-chamber parliament was established in which 75 percent of the upper chamber will now be elected by indirect vote through local parliaments (already led by presidential appointees), with the remaining 25 percent to be appointed by the president.

According to official reports, the referendum was approved by an overwhelming 92 percent majority. Unofficially, however, it was marked by widespread proxy and open voting, overt falsification of voter registration lists, and other numerous technical and procedural flaws, all of which were witnessed by a Human Rights Watch researcher and OSCE and UNMOT staff present in an unofficial capacity at approximately 200 polling stations on referendum day.

Non-UTO Political Parties

Non-UTO opposition parties have also been subjected to strict media restrictions, if not prevented from functioning altogether. The government has actively blocked the publications of the Communist Party of Tajikistan and of the Congress of National Unity (see "Unofficial bans") and, during the past several months, the Supreme Court denied registration to the National Movement Party of Tajikistan, banned the Agrarian Party, suspended the activities of the Party of Economic and Political Revival of Tajikistan, and annulled the registration of the Party of Justice and Progress. In almost all of these cases, the court claimed that party membership lists were fabricated. Party leaders claim, however, that prior to the court decisions, law enforcement agents consistently intimidated party members, who consequently did not want to reveal their party affiliation.

The Party of the National Movement of Tajikistan has claimed that after it submitted its party registration documents to the Ministry of Justice in April 1999, law enforcement agents, judges, and procurators, began tointerrogate party members. In some kishlaks (villages) representatives of the judiciary, together with village administration chairmen and village council elders, led special meetings at which they allegedly issued threats to party members. According to the party president, Hokim Muhabbatov, some members out of fear denied their membership, and the Ministry of Justice subsequently refused the party leadership's request to conduct on-the-ground verification of the party's members together with ministry representatives. In addition, as of August 1999 the party has been denied registration by the Ministry of Justice, allegedly for having published in its newspaper, Junbish (The Movement), statements by the Agrarian Party of Tajikistan protesting its suspension, and by the Consultative Council of Political Parties, that raised concerns about the September 26 referendum (see "Intimidation and Threats Against Journalists").⁹

In mid-March 1999, the Ministry of Justice opened a criminal investigation against the chairman of the Agrarian Party, Hikmatullo Nasriddinov, alleging that party membership lists were fabricated and consequently illegal. According to Nasriddinov, however, many people may well have concealed their membership out of fear, when questioned by members of law enforcement forces -both on their own initiative and as part of the membership verification process-and he claims the case is politically motivated.¹⁰ The party's activities were subsequently suspended for six months, and in September 1999, the Supreme Court banned the party's activities altogether, on the grounds that it had acted illegally in participating in the Consultative Council of Political Parties while under a six-month suspension order. Also in September 1999, the Supreme Court invalidated the registration of the Party of Justice and Progress. In this case, too, the party was held to have violated membership rules.¹¹ As with the Party of the National Movement of Tajikistan and the Agrarian Party, Party of Justice and Progress leader Rahmatullo Zoirov claimed that law enforcement officials had visited party members' residences, posed threatening questions, and that subsequently, many members had out of fear denied their association with the party.¹²

The activities of the Party of Economic and Political Revival of Tajikistan, northern-based and lead by Vali Boboev, were suspended by the Supreme Court for six months in early April 1999, also for allegedly possessing fabricated membership lists. Significantly, the party has experienced difficulty with authorities from the outset. It overcame registration difficulties and joined the ranks of the UTO in April 1998, however, in June 1998 it issued an appeal claiming that its members were suffering from persecution and harassment, including threats from members of security forces and break-ins at the homes of several members of its executive committee by unidentified persons who accused them, among other things, of "collaborating with the opposition."¹³

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDIA IN TAJIKISTAN

Print Media

In numbers alone, Tajikistan has an impressive array of publications. In August 1999, the Ministry of Culture had registered 255 publications, including 199 newspapers. Four of the newspapers belong to the government, twenty-one to political parties and movements, and sixty-four to enterprises ("mnogotirazhniye"). There are alsosixty-four regional, city, and district papers spread throughout the country,¹⁴ and three independent papers in Dushanbe. Very few of these are currently in print, however-according to the Ministry of Culture some 30 percent¹⁵-and although print media has expanded since the signing of the General Agreement, not one daily newspaper exists in the country, and few are published on a regular basis, in part due to financial constraints. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that all printing presses in Tajikistan continue to be state-owned and run, which means that the independent print media is vulnerable to arbitrary refusals to print their materials.¹⁶

Newspapers that appear more or less regularly number seventeen. Government-owned newspapers all containing "official" news include Sadoi Mardum (The Voice of the People), Jumhuriat (The Republic), Narodnaia gazeta (The People's Newspaper), Khalk Ovozi (The Voice of the People).¹⁷ The Union of Writers publishes Adabiot va san'at (Literature and Culture), and the Ministry of Culture the cultural review Bahori Ajam (The Spring of Ajam). The Ministries of Defense and Security publish a paper focusing on crime, Tojikiston. Those belonging to political parties are Junbish (The Movement, produced by the National Movement of Tajikistan), and Ittihod (Unity, produced by the Socialist Party of Tajikistan). Javononi Tojikiston (The Youth of Tajikistan) is produced by the Union of Youth of Tajikistan and the State Committee on Youth Affairs. Privately owned newspapers are Biznes i Politika (Business and Politics), Vecherniye Dushanbe (Evening Dushanbe), the cultural paper Charkhi gardun (The Wheel of Fortune), the medical paper Avicenne, and the business papers Digest Press, Vostochnii Express (Eastern Express), and Kurier Tajkistana (Tajikistan Courier). The independent political and cultural papers Istiqlol (Independence), and Surush (The Voice), and the newspaper of the Congress of National Unity, Haft ganj (Seven Heavenly Treasures), together with the Communist Party of Tajikistan's newspapers, Nidoi Ranjbar (The Voice of the Laborer) and Golos Tajikistana (The Voice of Tajikistan), have been out of print for six months or more, due both to financial difficulties and publishing obstacles.¹⁸ In Khorog, the informational bulletin Chatri Simin (The Silver Umbrella) is published bi-weekly or monthly.¹⁹

There have been few publications linked directly to the UTO within the country, apart from Sadoi mujohid (Voice of the Mujaheddin) and Muzhda (Good News).²⁰ The former, a two-page broadsheet, was founded in Garm in 1993, a region of Tajikistan that was often outside government control since the civil war, and saw close to fifty issues published through November 1998. Published under the editorship of the Armed Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, it featured many interviews with UTO field commanders and mujaheddin, although next to no direct criticism of government figures or policy. Sadoi mujohid was not officially registered, and was distributed only in the Garm region and to select opposition figures. Muzhda, a publication of the UTO press center, was first issuedin May 1998, but issues have been sporadic since that time and distribution extremely limited, mostly due to a dearth of financial and technical resources. The independent opposition newspaper Charogi Ruz (The Light of Day), which is intensely critical of the current government, was published in Moscow from 1992 to 1997, and re-started in Moscow in April 1999. At that time a limited number of copies of the first issue of 1999 appeared in Dushanbe kiosks. Additional issues have since been distributed clandestinely.

Although at present there are no daily newspapers in the country, the private news agency Asia-Plus publishes Russian and English-language print and electronic bulletins on politics, social and economic issues, and business. Its bulletin Asia-Plus Blits is published five days a week, while the Tajikistan Economic Review appears twice monthly. The news agency serves as a resource for other newspapers and some independent television stations; while its content continues to expand in scope, it provides very little analysis. Asia-Plus' publications are popular among international organizations, the diplomatic community, and governmental ministries, but high subscription prices keep them well out of reach of the local population. Other private press agencies include Infokon and Mizon, while Khovar (Novosti Tajikistana) is the governmental news agency.

Although extremely cheap by Western standards, local newspapers are very expensive for most residents of Tajikistan.²¹ Foreign publications, aside from Russian-language ones, are only sporadically available in Dushanbe at exorbitant prices, and are often three-to-five-month-old issues. In August 1999, for example, The Economist was available at one Dushanbe hotel frequented by very few locals, at the price of U.S. $7.00 per issue.²² Russian newspapers that contain critical material on Tajikistan, such as Nezavisimaia gazeta (The Independent Newspaper), Izvestia (The News), Novaia gazeta (The New Gazette), or Obshchaia gazeta (Everyone's Newspaper), are not regularly available, but on rare occasions make a surprise appearance in Dushanbe kiosks.

Subscriptions to local and foreign publications are impractical due to the poor postal system. Both government and nongovernmental newspapers and magazines are sold at newsstands or by hawkers on the street. Distribution of Dushanbe newspapers in the regions and regional papers in the capital is limited.

Broadcast and Electronic Media

State television has regional branches throughout most of the country. Between twelve and fifteen independent television stations broadcast at present, although more have received broadcast licenses; the number of those functioning at any given time fluctuates, due to financial and technical difficulties.²³ The majority of the independent television stations produce news programs at least three times a week.²⁴

Russian television channels include ORT (Russian Public Television), RTR (Russian Television and Radio), and the Moscow-based TV-6.²⁵ In Russian, ORT is broadcast throughout the country, RTR in several regions, and TV-6 in Dushanbe. Uzbek television from Tashkent, in Uzbek , ceased broadcasting in Tajikistan in early 1996, ostensiblydue to financial difficulties, though worsening Tajik-Uzbek relations almost certainly played an important role in the decision.

State radio is broadcast in Tajik and Russian throughout the country. Foreign programming includes the United States' Radio Liberty (Tajik, Uzbek, and Russian services) and Voice of America (Dari, English, and Russian services), the BBC (Tajik and Uzbek services), Voice of America (Dari, English, and Russian services), Sadoi Khuroson (Voice of Khuroson, the Iranian international service, Uzbek, Tajik and Russian services), and the Iranian governmental radio, Radio Iran (Tajik, Russian and Uzbek services). There are, in addition, several Russian radio stations, including the Moscow-based Radio Mayak and Mir, which broadcast only in Russian. At present no independent radio stations exist in Tajikistan, although at least two have received sponsors and equipment, and for almost a year have been awaiting operating licences in order to begin broadcasting. There is little expectation, however, that these stations will receive licenses before the upcoming presidential elections.²⁶

Electronic mail has been available to local users in Dushanbe through the U.S.-based Central Asian Development Agency (CADA) for several years, and service providers have been set up in Khujand, Kurgan-Teppa, Kuliab, and Khorog. It was only in January 1999, however, that full access to the Internet first became available in the country. Because subscription rates and user fees are firmly out of reach for the large majority of Tajik citizens (minimum user fees are U.S. $6.00 per hour), foreign residents constitute the bulk of the clientele.

Beyond prohibitive subscription and user rates, it is unlikely that Internet access will become widespread; although until June 1999 the law did not require a license or permit for providing Internet services, permission was consistently denied for two years to at least one international organization, and to more than one local educational institution. In a recent addendum to the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting of 1996, Internet radio broadcasting now requires a permit from the State Committee on Radio and Television.²⁷

Economic Conditions

The almost continual deterioration of Tajikistan's economy since independence in 1991 has not spared its media.²⁸ The fact that not one daily publication currently exists is almost certainly due to the high price and short supply of newsprint, next to non-existent subscriber pools, and the additional weighty economic and political constraints described elsewhere in this report. Many publications surface only to close down weeks or months later, unable to stay afloat. Very low salaries have forced many experienced professionals to quit the field in order to gain a more lucrative salary elsewhere, while worries about job security also add to the prevailing atmosphere of self-censorship. The dire economic straits, coupled with an unstable political environment and its consequent restrictions on the media, provide little incentive for experienced journalists-who fled the civil war and who have developed their journalistic careers abroad-to return to the country.

Professional Standards

Many local observers believe that low professional standards, such as weak analysis, poor investigative techniques, and a failure to tap available sources, lower the quality of media output. Some claim that the Soviet tradition of control and censorship left a legacy of caution and a lack of curiosity. Others argue that the exodus of many experienced and talented journalists from their profession, whether for economic or political reasons, has degraded professional standards. In the opinion of many journalists, the general level of journalism teaching andtraining has also declined, as has the decline in professionalism in many other fields, and publication and advertising techniques remain underdeveloped.²⁹

Many media professionals and observers also claim that journalists rarely protest government restrictions on the media. The Union of Journalists, a leftover from the Soviet era, rarely makes public statements, and today it appears either unable or unwilling to represent journalists' interests. The Glasnost Defense Foundation, a Moscow-based independent nongovernmental organization working to defend media and journalists' rights in the Russian Federation and other countries of the CIS, publishes its materials in Moscow, and they are not openly distributed in Tajikistan.³⁰ A welcome arrival, however, is the nongovernmental Fund in Memory and Defense of the Journalists of Tajikistan, founded in April 1998 by Mukhtor Bokizoda. The organization seeks to promote journalists' rights and provide material and moral support to the families of journalists who perished during the civil war. Although the Fund is still fledgling and without sufficient funds, Bokizoda has been vocal in several fora about restrictions on the media and recently helped to secure the release of five journalists illegally detained by a member of parliament on charges of libel.³¹

The Role of International Actors

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Tajikistan has increased its support to the media since the fall of 1998. The Mission has helped to resurrect two regional newspapers in the south, Sharaf (Honor) in the Kabodian district and Sadokat (Trust) in the Shaartuz district, and is planning to rehabilitate more in the coming months. More recently, the OSCE mission has organized monthly meetings in Dushanbe to bring together local journalists, members of local nongovernmental organizations, and members of international organizations, with an aim to improving information exchange among them. The mission has also conducted training seminars for journalists and attempted to help establish an independent radio station in southern Dusti, albeit without success. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, in a February 25, 1999 report to the Permanent Council, noted that Tajikistan had had only two years since the signature of the June 1997 peace accord to implement media reforms, and emphasized the economic constraints suffered by the print media. The report neglected to mention the wide scope of official and unofficial constraints, which are discussed in this report.

The U.S. embassy in Dushanbe has from time to time organized round tables on freedom of speech in Dushanbe in which both local journalists and those working for foreign services, government and nongovernment representatives, and members of international organizations have participated.

The non-profit international organization Internews supports independent media in emerging democracies, and in Tajikistan, it is the only international organization entirely devoted to supporting the media.³² Internews has supported independent television stations, conducted seminars on media law and numerous training sessions for television employees, published training manuals in Tajik and Russian, and helps to produce weekly and monthly news exchange and social analysis programs. The organization also retained a local lawyer to study new laws and keep independent television stations informed of their rights. In this regard, Internews was instrumental in resolving disputes surrounding the issuance of licenses for independent television stations in 1997 and 1998.

VIOLENCE IN TAJIKISTAN

No discussion of freedom of expression in Tajikistan would be complete without a description of the violence and chaos that has wracked the country since 1992. Years of civil conflict, a weak central government, and easy availability of arms have bred a culture of violence. High levels of political and criminal violence, including hostage-taking, murder, rape, and gang warfare, persist. An accompanying climate of fear reigns among the general population, exacerbated by corruption and incompetence within the law enforcement agencies. In this environment, journalists, despite the heightened risks associated with their professional duties, cannot rely on the protection of state authorities any more than can ordinary citizens. This lack of recourse contributes to self-censorship, which constitutes one of the most important restrictions on the media. A cursory glance at incidents of threats and violent acts committed against journalists, as documented in the Glasnost Defense Foundation's monthly Monitor (Moscow), and in this report, shows that journalists are frequently the victims of violence.

In addition, the legacy of loss suffered by journalists throughout the civil conflict still weighs heavy: at least fifty journalists were killed from 1992 to 1997, and some journalists' defense organizations reported seventy or eighty killed, and more than thirty publications closed.³³ All sources concur, however, that not one perpetrator of these killings has been held accountable to date. This failure on the part of the government to investigate the murders or prosecute those responsible only reinforces the sense that journalists lack protection altogether and that "they must try their best not to cross the line between what is acceptable and what will cause consternation."³⁴ Journalists also fear for members of their families, who may be subject to reprisals should they offend those who wield power. A former reporter for state television summed up the situation as follows:

It is self-evident that true freedom and democracy must be hospitable to criticism. Undeniably, however, one of the unanswerable questions in Tajikistan today is how to criticize, and how much. For example, can you criticize the president or the leader of the opposition? That can be fatal. Can you criticize Russia or Uzbekistan? That can be fatal to your career. Can you criticize a neighbour? That depends on who it is.³⁵

Violence Against Journalists

Journalists have fallen victim to the high levels of violence that beset Tajik society today, particularly in Dushanbe. Although in many cases it is difficult to distinguish whether violence perpetrated against journalists is state-sponsored, the professional profile of journalists, the investigative nature of their work, and their actions or even perceived actions can put them at deadly risk. Extrajudicial executions of journalists have greatly decreased in the past two to three years, nonetheless, the high-profile assassinations of ORT correspondent Viktor Nikulin in 1996 and BBC journalist Muhiddin Olimpur in 1995, in addition to between fifty and eighty journalists murdered in connection with the civil war and its aftermath, have left a great legacy of fear. Further, incidents of violence against journalists are rarely reported in the press, and efforts by law enforcement members to provide protection or legal remedies have to date been inadequate. Some recent cases include the following:

Jumakhon Hotami

On July 4, 1999, forty-two year-old Ministry of Interior press center chief Jumakhon Hotami was gunned down in a suburb of Dushanbe, according to family members, during an organized attack. Hotami had since 1993 led aweekly "fight against crime" television program, and was widely held in high regard for his hard-hitting investigations into and revelations of the drug trade. He had also, according to family members, at least on one occasion fallen out of favor with government figures for going too far in his research, which resulted in the temporary suspension of the television program.³⁶

Maksudjon Husseinov

Journalist and human rights activist Maksudjon Husseinov has on more than one occasion been the victim of violent attacks and other harassment. Husseinov, a correspondent for the independent Dushanbe-based newspaper Charkhi Gardun, is also employed by the Glasnost Defense Foundation. On October 1, 1998, when he was away, two masked men entered his Dushanbe home in the mid-afternoon, one carrying a pistol. They asked Husseinov's wife where her husband was, delivered blows to her chest and knee, and wounded her in the head. They subsequently searched the apartment, stole money, and warned Husseinov's wife that he should "stop writing about candidates."³⁷ Husseinov had just returned on September 30 from a human rights course given at the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Warsaw.

Husseinov told Human Rights Watch that throughout 1998 he had received several anonymous phone calls threatening him with beatings. And in 1995, Tajik authorities arrested and detained him for possession of copies of the independent newspaper Charogi Ruz.³⁸

Following international protests about the October 1 attack, an investigation was begun and law enforcement authorities on more than one occasion visited and consulted with Mr. Husseinov;³⁹ nonetheless, in April 1999 he was once again attacked by unidentified assailants. He related the following:

microraion

I may have been attacked for two reasons. The first, because I work for the Glasnost Defense Foundation, and it's not the first time I've been attacked in this way. The second may have been in order to rob me. However, it's interesting that law enforcement elements themselves are carrying out such robberies.⁴⁰

At the time of his interview with Human Rights Watch, Mr. Husseinov's left hand was visibly wounded, blue in color, and he was unable to move it. Police investigations have thus far yielded no results, nor have the perpretators of theOctober 1 attack been identified.

Meirkhaim Gavrielov

In some cases, it is unclear whether violence against journalists was perpetrated in retaliation for their work or whether it was simply part of widespread random violence. For example, on June 8, 1998, unidentified persons entered seventy-year-old Meirkhaim Gavrielov's home in Dushanbe, beat him, then strangled him to death with metal wire.⁴¹ Gavrielov had worked as a journalist in Dushanbe for over fifty years, and was equally well-known as the Chairman of the Bukharan Jews' Cultural Society. According to the Glasnost Defense Foundation, Gavrielov at the time of his murder was editor-in-chief of the Tajik Agrarian University newspaper, Donish (Knowledge), a position he had held since 1979. He was also the author of several books. Local law enforcement agencies and the Ministry of InternalAffairs reported the death as a suicide, stating that Gavrielov had suffocated himself with a pillow in the presence of his adolescent daughter; according to official statements, Gavrielov's wife confirmed this information.⁴²

A forensic medical affidavit obtained by Human Rights Watch, however, indicates that the cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation.⁴³ And an eyewitness who entered Gavrielov's apartment soon after he was killed told Human Rights Watch, "It was clear that he was strangled, I saw the marks on his throat. Also, he was beaten. I could see the welts on his body. If he had suffocated himself with a pillow, then why the welts on his body?"⁴⁴

Abductions

Hostage-taking of both Tajiks and foreign residents over the past years has become an established method of lodging political and financial demands in Tajikistan, underscoring an almost total lack of government control and authority. Journalists were among those abducted in two hostage episodes. The government of Tajikistan's agents were not directly responsible for abductions in the incidents described below; nonetheless, the government must bear responsibility for the overall climate of lawlessness in which abductions have become part of political life in the country.

In February 1997, a rogue rebel group led by the warlord brothers Bahrom and Rizvon Sodirov took seventeen people hostage in Obigarm, about eighty kilometers east of the capital, and in downtown Dushanbe.⁴⁵ Among those kidnapped were international humanitarian aid staff and five Russian journalists: Itar-Tass correspondent Galina Gridneva, Interfax correspondent Suraiyo Sobirova, NTV Tajik staff members Odiljon Ashurov and Bobojon Tuganov, and their driver. The Sodirovs demanded arms and the transfer to Tajikistan of forty of their supporters from a Tajik refugee camp in northern Afghanistan.

En route to interview the hostage-takers and "break" the story, the journalists themselves were seized; later on, the Tajik Minister of Security, in an attempt to negotiate the release of the hostages, was also abducted. Ironically, the hostage-takers explained the kidnapping of the journalists in the following way: "They are our guests, [and are here] in order that the events be objectively covered."⁴⁶ The capture of the journalists resulted in a unique situation in which the Sodirovs used the journalists' equipment, including satellite telephones, to deliver information and communicate their demands, and the journalists themselves broadcast several reports from their place of captivity.

The hostages were released after two weeks; some had been beaten and abused.⁴⁷ NTV correspondent Odiljon Ashurov made the following comments:

You know, this had never happened before February 1997. We weren't afraid, that's why we drove up there in a car, just like that. And who knows, maybe the other hostages were treated better because we were taken, we were used for informational purposes...now, however, a precedent has been set, and we take precautions in dangerous spots that we didn't take before, for example, sometimes we travel with armed guards, we warn those in the area that we're coming, etc.⁴⁸

Ashurov also recounted that four NTV staff members were taken hostage by four men in camouflage in Kofarnihon in April 1998, in the wake of fighting and a prolonged military standoff in the region between government security forces and armed groups allegedly loyal to the UTO. "They were held for a few hours, and taken to a kishlak. They finally got off by paying some money," said Ashurov. "What do you want? There's no more respect."⁴⁹

On August 20, 1997, four unidentified armed men arrived at the home of Tuhfa Ahmedova, in Khatlon oblast. Ahmedova, a correspondent for the Dushanbe-based newspaper Charkhi Gardun, had conducted an interview with Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, commander of the Rapid Reaction Brigade, published in an April 1997 issue of Samar (The Fruit). On August 20, further to his failed rebellion led against the central government earlier that month, Khudoiberdiev was fired. The gunmen took Ahmedova's husband hostage for two days, and released him when the requested ransom of U.S. $1,000.00 was paid.⁵⁰ Although Human Rights Watch was unable to interview Tuhfa Ahmedova, credible sources alleged that the hostage-taking was linked to her article on Khudoiberdiev.⁵¹

VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Introduction

Even given the confusing, chaotic, and sometimes lawless context of Tajikistan, the state exerts direct and indirect pressure on journalists, editors, and media outlets to curtail freedom of expression. It does so through straightforward intimidation, politically motivated libel suits, and informal "counselling" to editors as to media content. It also manipulates licensing procedures, controls printing contracts between independent outlets and the state-run printing press, and uses accreditation for foreign journalists as a lever of control. These methods have been successful in sowing fear in many; four journalists declined speaking with Human Rights Watch because they said they feared the consequences, and others spoke with us only on condition of strict anonymity.

Although Tajikistan's obligations under international and domestic law would preclude state censorship, international covenants ratified by Tajikistan and the constitution unequivocally forbid state censorship, and although it is not a systematic practice, in reality pre-publication censorship occurs, as documented in this report. As in general journalists choose not to use the courts to defend themselves and stay away from issues sensitive to the authorities, self-censorship prevents large-scale pre-publication censorship from occurring, while those incidents which do occur most often go unreported.

Tajikistan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998. The ICCPR's article 19 states: Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference; Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. The Constitution of Tajikistan upholds freedom of expression and bans censorship: Every person is guaranteed freedom of speech, publishing, and the right to use means of mass information. State censorship and prosecution for criticism is prohibited. The list of information constituting a state secret is specified by law.

Other laws governing the media in Tajikistan protect media freedoms. These include the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic on December 14, 1990, and the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting, adopted on December 14, 1996. The environment in which journalists operate-an overall lack of law and order- renders the legislation ineffectual. Media workers in general consider it disadvantageous or even dangerous to use the courts to defend their rights, as the judiciary is not independent. Under the terms of the 1997 General Agreement, amendments are to be made to current media legislation to bring them into greater conformity with international protections, although at the time of writing there were no signs that such steps had been initiated.

The government of Tajikistan maintains that certain restrictions on freedom of expression are necessary to protect development, security, and other interests. Many state officials and even Tajik journalists themselves hold the view that unrestricted freedom of expression in part spurred the civil war in 1992,⁵² and that coverage of sensitive topics, such as the negative consequences of the war, must necessarily be limited in order to preserve national security interests and stability.⁵³ Although this view is not strictly state policy, in practice, due to the various curbs on the media described in this report, including censorship and an uncontrolled culture of violence and impunity, little serious discussion of the negative impact of the civil war appears in the press.

The government's top leadership is also very sensitive to its domestic image: insulting or slandering the president can result in prison sentences of two to five years.⁵⁴ In May 1998, the Majlisi Oli unanimously adopted a law "on the defense of the honor and dignity of the president," which allowed only President Rakhmonov to use the title "president"; heads of enterprises and organizations were required to employ another designation. The law also set out high fines and prison sentences for those convicted of insulting or slandering the president, including terms of up to three years, and stipulated that those agencies guilty of repeatedly publishing or distributing slanderous material about the president were subject to closure.⁵⁵ Following international protest, nonetheless, President Rakhmonov vetoed the law, stating that "sufficient provisions were contained under the criminal code."⁵⁶ Journalists, while expressing outrage at the proposed law, also pointed out ironically that in practice criticism of the president is taboo given stringent self-censorship and "the law of the automatic," as opposed to civic law and order. "We haven't been able to criticize the president for the past six years," said one journalist, "what's the big deal, now they've just put it on paper."⁵⁷

The government is also concerned about its reputation abroad, and regularly claims that the international press reflects a point of view that is either inflammatory or damaging to the country's image.⁵⁸ The Russian press, for example, is regularly criticized by the government for biased reporting and disinformation, and several Russian journalists have had their accreditation revoked as a consequence. At the same time, despite widespread skepticism among the general population about Moscow's ultimate political and strategic goals in the country and region, the Russian and other foreign media are generally considered to be the most informative and comprehensive in Tajikistan.⁵⁹

Moral standards are also a preoccupation of the state: on August 19, 1999, for example, the editors-in-chief of more than ten newspapers were summoned to a meeting convened by the head of the parliamentary committee on international relations and culture. Committee Chairman Ibrohim Usmonov told the editors that the content of their newspapers did not meet the needs of their readership, and expressed regret that the content focused on violence, cruelty, and war. The editors, he noted, had forgotten their duty to cultivate higher human values and promote the national dignity of Tajiks.⁶⁰ And in March 1998, the Dushanbe papers Kurier Tajikistan and Digest Press were severely criticized by President Rakhmonov during a Majlisi Oli (parliament) session for "often publishing pornographic photographs and other material," content that does not "correspond to the Tajik mentality."⁶¹

INTIMIDATION OF AND THREATS AGAINST JOURNALISTS

Intimidation is one of the most powerful constraints on press freedom in Tajikistan today. In some cases, the government at some level perpetrated threats, aiming to silence journalists or their newspapers. Other cases resulted from the government's tolerance of misuse of public office, desire for private gain, and the use of physical force by those affiliated with it. In recent months, for example, a news agency that caters largely to the international community was approached by a wealthy and powerful government military general, the owner of several prominent businesses in Dushanbe. The general "offered" to buy out the news agency. Although the general has not yet succeeded in his effort, the move has not encouraged the agency to become more bold in its reporting.⁶²

Junbish (Hokim Muhabbatov, editor)

In July 1999, Junbish, the National Movement of Tajikistan's newspaper, published the "Position of the Consultative Council of Political Parties of Tajikistan on the Additions and Changes to the Constitution." In particular, the Council took issue with the extension of the term of the president from five to seven years; the expansion of his powers to include direct influence over the upper chamber of a two-chamber parliament (the president directly appoints 25 percent of the membership of the upper chamber, while the remaining 75 percent are appointed by provincial assemblies, already led by presidential appointees); and, again through the upper chamber of parliament, near-direct control of the appointment of judges. The Council also argued that the wording of article 28, which expressly permits religion-based parties, encroached on the secular nature of the state.⁶³

Since then, government authorities have attempted to interfere with the paper's content, principally by harassing its editor-in-chief, Hokim Muhabbatov, who is also the head of The National Movement Party of Tajikistan. This process culminated in October 1999 with the state-owned printing press refusing to print Junbish. In July, Muhabbatov was summoned to the office of the procurator general. He told Human Rights Watch:

I was called to the Procurator General's Office for an explanation [of who was behind the "Position," what were the ultimate aims, etc.], as were the leaders of the other political parties [of the Consultative Council].

On July 27, the Chairman of the Council of Elders, Nodir Odilov, came to the Junbish office and told me that "high up" there was great dissatisfaction with the fact that I had published the "Position" of the Consultative Council. He told me that printing such material put not only my own life at risk, but also that of my relatives. And he pleaded with me to be very careful in publishing such material, as one can always resurrect a newspaper, but not a person.

On August 4, I spoke at a round table discussion between political party members and journalists, organized during a U.S. Department of State representative's visit to the country.

This past Wednesday, August 11, when we went to the Sharqi Ozod printing press to print the paper, the deputy director told me that he had received a phone call from a high-ranking government official, ordering him not to print Junbish. "This time around," the deputy director told me, "I'll take the risk [of printing] on myself, but next time you're on your own."⁶⁴

In early October 1999, Junbish ceased publication after it was refused permission to print at its regular state printing press. According to the paper's editor and members of the Consultative Council on Political Parties, the director of the printing press claimed that he had received instructions from highly-placed authorities to no longer print the paper.⁶⁵

Istiqlol and Samar (Abdufattoh Vohidov, Saifiddin Dostiev editors, and U. Faizullaev, Kh. Sodikov and A. Abdullaev, correspondents)

In January 1999, the procurator of Vose district launched a criminal libel case against journalists Abdufattoh Vohidov and Saifiddin Dostiev, former editors-in-chief of two independent newspapers-Samar and Istiqlol, respectively.⁶⁶

In November 1997, Vohidov and Dostiev published in Samar and Istiqlol an article entitled "Mojaroi du rais" (A Scandal of Two Chairmen). The article described in detail the questionable political and business tactics employed by Chairman of the Executive Committee of Vose Kurbonali Mirzoaliev against Samariddin Fazliddinov, chairman of the joint-stock company Samar. The article's authors claimed that when Mirzoaliev was chairman of the executive committee of the region in 1994, he harassed Fazliddinov by intentionally shutting off Samar's electricity, selling the cotton of the Vose region to factories outside the region instead of to Samar, accusing Fazliddinov of non-payment of taxes, and requesting that central authorities dismiss Fazliddinov from the post of editor-in-chief of the newspaper Samar.⁶⁷ Fazliddinov also financed Samar. The authors also accused Mirzoaliev of misuse of government funds and of closing down the independent television station Mavji Ozod, founded by Samar-as a result of which twelve journalists and employees of Mavji Ozod lost their jobs.⁶⁸

In 1997, U. Faizullaev, Kh. Sodikov and A. Abdullaev, the authors of "Mojaroi du rais," subsequently won the libel case launched against them by Mirzoaliev. At the time, no case was brought against the editors of the newspapers in which the article was published.

On January 9, 1999, however, reportedly on the orders of Mirzoaliev, three armed policemen from the Vose Department of Internal Affairs traveled to Dushanbe to bring Vohidov by force to Vose for interrogation. Vohidov refused to cooperate when police went to his house in Dushanbe, and was not arrested. Vohidov and Dostiev then approached Mukhtor Bokizoda, director of the newly-formed Memorial Fund in Memory and Defense of the Journalists of Tajikistan for assistance, and the three traveled to Vose to meet with the procurator's office. There, the deputy procurator claimed that the editors had been sent three written notices in 1998 to report to Vose law enforcement agents. Upon the request of the three journalists to produce evidence of these summons, however, he was unable to comply. At the end of the meeting the deputy procurator acknowledged that he was at fault and that he was only obeying the orders of Kurbonali Mirzoaliev.⁶⁹

Despite appeals to and by international organizations, on January 29 editors Vohidov and Dostiev were forcibly brought by law enforcement agents to Vose district, interrogated, and released after one day.⁷⁰ On January 25, 1999, the three authors of the article, U. Faizullaev, Kh. Sodikov and A. Abdullaev, who were acquitted of libel over a year before, were charged with slander under article 138 of the criminal code. They were convicted and sentenced to two years in prison. Both were held in the correctional labor colony in Kuliab from January 25 until mid-February 1999. According to Mukhtor Bokizoda, the three were released following a written protest from the Fund in Memory and Defence of the Journalists of Tajikistan, submitted to the presidential administration.⁷¹ The sentence has not been quashed, however, leaving the journalists vulnerable to further legal problems.

TV SM-1

In July 1998, the president gave a speech on the political, social and economic situation in the country, which was recorded during the ninth session of the Majlisi Oli. As it was being aired on state television, TV SM-1, an independent television station in Khujand, continued with its regular programming. The television station received at that time two phone calls from the Khujand city administration (hukumat) warning that they were to either interrupt their regular programming and broadcast the presidential speech or halt their broadcast altogether. The employee on duty replied that in the absence of the station's director or chief writer he did not have the authority to alter the programming, and the regular programming continued. According to a senior employee of the station:

hukumat

⁷²

Current laws governing the media do not contain a provision requiring independent television stations to carry presidential speeches when they are broadcast on state television.

Surush

On April 3, 1998, two unidentified armed men arrived at mid-day at the office of the director of Surush, in the Tajikpress building in Khatlon province, and protested that copies of "the opposition paper" Surush were being distributed in Khatlon province. They reportedly said "Khatlon residents didn't need this paper" and "insistently requested" that the director no longer distribute copies of Surush in the province.⁷³ Following the incident, Surush ceased distribution in the region.

Following the publication of an article entitled "Goodbye typhus, hello syphilis," which was critical of an unidentified policeman who was reported to frequent prostitutes, editor-in-chief Rahmatkarim Davlat and the author of the article, Rajabi Mirzo, were summoned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs on March 31, 1998, for "a conversation." Officials remonstrated with them for having criticized the policeman and advised them not to publish such "slanderous articles."⁷⁴

Journalists Outside of Tajikistan

Many of Tajikistan's most experienced journalists fled the country during the civil war and continue to cover the country from abroad. They are among the most vehement critics of the Rakhmonov government. Yet even at a distance, Tajik authorities attempt to threaten, intimidate, or discredit them.

Dodojon Atovullo, former editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Charogi Ruz, has been based in Moscow since he fled Tajikistan in 1993.⁷⁵ He returned to the country in March 1998, after an absence of five years, for a week-long visit, during which a security official warned him to lower his profile. Atovullo told Human Rights Watch:

⁷⁶

⁷⁷

In November 1998, during the attempted rebellion led by Mahmud Khudoiberdiev in Leninabad province, Atovullo made several Russian television and radio appearances. In one of the television interviews he severely criticized the peace process, asserting that it was an agreement reached only "between Kuliab and the Karategin."⁷⁸ Atovullo also wrote an article entitled "What everybody knows, but is afraid to talk about," published in a late November 1998 edition of Novaia gazeta. The article starkly described high levels of corruption, criminality, an absence of law of order in Tajikistan, and argued that fair elections were impossible under these conditions. Soon afterwards, by his account, high-ranking government, UTO, and CNR officials phoned Atovullo in Moscow, threatening that, among other things, he would be included on the list of suspected participants in the attempted rebellion.⁷⁹ Atovullo told Human Rights Watch that in the late fall of 1998, when a high-level delegation of Ministry of the Interior officials from Tajikistan visited Moscow, he hid on the outskirts of the city for a week after receiving a "kind-hearted" warning from an official at the Tajik embassy in Moscow.⁸⁰

A citizen of Tajikistan, Oleg Panfilov was a correspondent for Nezavisimaia gazeta until he fled the country in 1992 to establish himself in Moscow. There, he variously worked as the Moscow director of the U.S.-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), as correspondent on Tajik affairs for Nezavisimaia gazeta, and as a staffmember of the Glasnost Defence Foundation, a Moscow-based human rights group. A high-profile opposition member, Panfilov participated as a special advisor in the 1994-1997 inter-Tajik talks, until the signing of the June 1997 peace accord between the government and UTO. Panfilov is currently preparing a book on the situation of journalists in Tajikistan from 1992 until the present.

Panfilov's dismissal from Nezavisimaia gazeta in September 1997, he claimed, followed repeated phone calls from the Tajik embassy to the editor-in-chief, asserting that Panfilov was dishonest, and an enemy of the people. Notably, Panfilov enjoys a controversial reputation both inside and outside Tajikistan as one of the most vocal and unsparing critics of the Tajik government. He said that he was later questioned on several occasions by the Russian FSB (Federal Security Service), and told they would not explain officially why they were questioning him. In September 1997, as the CNR set to work in Dushanbe and as UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri returned from Iran to Tajikistan, CNR deputy chairman Abdumajid Dostiev stated that it was undesirable that Panfilov and deputy UTO leader Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda return to the country. Panfilov claims that he continues to be labelled an enemy of the people in high government circles.⁸¹

CENSORSHIP AND OTHER INFORMATION CONTROL

Censorship

Direct censorship, such as the systematic vetting by a censorship office of all articles prior to publication, is not standard practice in Tajikistan. Nonetheless, authorities do on occasion prevent certain material or publications from being printed. More often than not, journalists receive a warning in the form of a telephone call from a governmental ministry, offering "guidance"; or printers receive instructions from authorities not to print the publication or article in question. In addition, journalists exercise significant self-censorship, a skill they honed in the Soviet era, because they are acutely aware that criticizing or publishing sensitive information on government figures or policy, controversial political players, or powerful war lords or drug bosses could result in reprisals. This in itself is so effective that information on these subjects rarely reaches the Tajik media.

Biznes i politika (Business and Politics)⁸²

On November 5, 1998, the day after an abortive armed rebellion broke out in Leninabad,⁸³ the independent Russian-language, Dushanbe-based Biznes i Politika carried a breaking story on the unfolding events entitled, "Is it Mahmud Khudoiverdiev again and again in an armed rebellion?" The article described in detail three previous armed rebellions led by Khudoiberdiev, and arguing that Khudoiberdiev and his supporters could only have entered Leninabad province from neighboring Uzbekistan.⁸⁴ The article also accused the government of Uzbekistan of violating a May 1998 agreement between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia to fight "fundamentalism" in the region. The penultimate paragraph reportedly contained an accusation of Uzbekistan's interference in Tajikistan's internal affairs and of allegedparticipation in the rebellion of Abdumalik Abdullajonov.⁸⁵ It was removed, such that all copies of the issue bore a glaring white gap between two paragraphs; the final paragraph described a joint government-UTO statement condeming Khudoiberdiev's action. Biznes i Politika staffers would not, however, discuss the deletion with Human Rights Watch. Other journalists who reported that they had spoken with staff members who were willing to disclose more information, however, stated that authorities had threatened to prevent publication of the issue altogether should the offending article not be removed in its entirety.

Broadcast media

The broadcast media also suffered censorship during the failed November 1998 revolt. From November 5-9, 1998, ORT and RTV news broadcasts were systematically interrupted, as were the Russian Radio Mayak and Uzbek radio (Tashkent). During this period, television news broadcasts were sometimes replaced by concerts, sometimes interrupted for up to twenty minutes, while Radio Mayak news programs were at times shut off for up to thirty-six hours.⁸⁶

Surush

The Tajik-language newspaper Surush, which began publishing in March 1998, has suffered several incidents of censorship when government printing presses refused to print various articles. In issue no. 5 of April 29, 1998, an article on recently discovered mass graves from the civil war in Shakhrinav was censored. Surush's editor-in-chief, Rahmatkarim Davlat, recounted:

⁸⁷

Davlat also described the use of other means to delay or prevent publication of his newspaper at state printing houses, including explanations that there was a shortage of paper or ink, that the machines were broken, that private newspapers cannot be printed at certain printing houses or only books can be printed, and warnings by printing press staff not to write critical material. The first time a photograph of President Rakhmonov together with UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri appeared in the newspaper, Davlat said, "We were paid a visit by the police, and told `Enough of the photos of the president with the guy with the beard.' Of course officially you'll never hear that."⁸⁸

Monitoring and "Counselling" by Authorities

One form of control over the media is through the monitoring and "counselling" by authorities of media representatives on what news should and shouldn't be covered. Guidance from the government is delivered either openly in official fora, such as when the president publicly comments on the lack of objectivity of various agencies. In another example, on August 19, 1999, the Tajik parliamentary committee for international affairs, international relations, and culture summoned the editors of the country's leading newspapers to a meeting at which they were advised that their newspapers were "full of information on violence, cruelty, and wars" and in general ignore the promotion of "high human values" and "protecting the national dignity of the Tajik people."⁸⁹ Or, journalists receive phone calls from the ministries of security or foreign affairs warning that it would be advisable not to print such and such, or are directly summoned to ministry. Testimony compiled by Human Rights Watch from local journalists and those working for international agencies bore out the frequency of such "guidance" from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental departments, particularly prior to or following the publication of sensitive material.

The following recent examples are illustrative. On May 4, 1999, Maksudjon Husseinov was summoned to the Ministry of Security. He told Human Rights Watch the following:

⁹⁰

On May 10, 1999, Kanibadam-based television journalist Zainiddin Orifov was summoned to the Ministry of Security when he arrived in Dushanbe to collect his exit visa, just prior to a scheduled visit to Sweden. Ministry officials reportedly warned him not to criticize the Tajik government abroad, and instructed him to convey the message that "all is well here in Tajikistan, there is only one presidential candidate in the country-Rakhmonov-and if you are asked about Turaev, you are to decline commentary." He was also told that it had been "noted" that he had received the opposition newspaper Charogi Ruz, and frequently listened to Radio Liberty.⁹¹

Physical Removal of Papers from Distribution

Attempts to limit information content and its dissemination can extend beyond surveillance and "counselling," to include the physical removal from newsstands of reporting deemed sensitive. For example, in December 1998 and January 1999, when numerous copies of a December 1998 issue of Novaia gazeta made a spontaneous appearance in Dushanbe kiosks, they soon after disappeared, and not only due to voluminous sales. Towards the end of December, officials in Ministry of Internal Affairs uniforms, traveling in an unmarked car, seized remaining issues from the kiosks without explanation.⁹² The issue contained an extensive interview with Yakub Salimov, who had previously been minister of internal affairs, ambassador to Turkey, and chairman of the customs committee; the government accused him of leading a failed uprising against the central government in August 1997. In the interview, Salimov harshly criticized the Rakhmonov administration, accusing it of, among other things, corruption and involvement in the drug trade.

Arbitrary Denial of Permission to Print

The newspapers of at least two opposition political parties-the Congress of National Unity and the Communist Party of Tajikistan-have been denied permission to print at government printing houses since the summer of 1998. According to members of these political parties, the imminent elections are a major reason for the unofficial ban.

Why, indeed, is there at this time an unofficial ban on various independent media. It's not difficult to explain-the elections! It's not just the consequence of the civil war...everything started in April 1998, when Rakhmonov became leader of the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan...we have to defend our rights on the eve of elections. ⁹³

According to the leadership of the Congress of National Unity, government printing presses in Dushanbe have since July 1998 refused to print the Congress' newspapers Haft ganj and Sorbon.⁹⁴ A member of the executive of the Congress who requested anonymity asserted:

Haft ganj

Sorbon

⁹⁵

At present Sorbon continues to be printed and distributed in Leninabad, but issues do not reach Dushanbe or the southern regions of the country.

Beginning in July 1998, government printing presses also denied the newspaper of the Communist Party of Tajikistan permission to publish. A. Abdullaev, Chairman of the Inspection-Audit Commission of the Communist Party, told Human Rights Watch:

⁹⁶

⁹⁷

⁹⁸

One of the Communist Party's regional newspapers, E'tiqod, continues to be published in Leninabad province. Echoing the comments of the member of the Congress of National Unity, Abdullaev explained that among the reasons its continued publication was allowed were its location in northern Leninabad, far from the capital, and the limited number of copies printed.⁹⁹

On November 13, 1997, the prominent Russian-language Dushanbe-based newspaper Vecherniye vesti was suddenly refused permission by Sharqi Ozod staff to print at the government printing house, and efforts by the newspapers' editors to obtain official explanations were unsuccessful. Vecherniye vesti had one week earlier published a front-page interview with NRM leader Abdullajonov, a former prime minister who led an opposition movement,¹⁰⁰ a broad discussion including his prognosis for the peace process and stating NRM's desire to constructively participate in it; his views on the influence of the NRM in the country; Tajikistan's relations with Russia and Uzbekistan; and Abdullajonov's defense regarding the criminal case pending against him. Vecherniye Vesti for a period continued to be denied permission to publish, and it ultimately closed down and reappeared several weeks later as Vecherniy Dushanbe.

Javohir Kobilov,¹⁰¹ former editor-in-chief of Vecherniye vesti and currently deputy editor-in-chief of Vecherniy Dushanbe, described what happened after the interview with Abdullajanov appeared:

On November 11 the tax police arrived. They searched up and down, looking for anything to incriminate me, and a criminal case was opened. At the end of December 1997 the case was given over to the procurator of the Railway district. I was accused of embezzling pretty substantial sums, under article 96 [of the criminal code], such that three additional articles were added: 196, 188 and 173. At the end of February I was "asked" to sign a paper stating that I would not leave the country, and my passport was seized.

This time around I was fined three million rubles. Now, in accordance with a presidential decree the minimum wage is 1,000 rubles, thus, 10,000-50,000 rubles is considered a big fine. It was only when a change in the circumstances of the "crime" occurred that the fine fell to 19,000 rubles. But they appropriated the computers, took everything. After Vecherniye vesti was closed we started to publish Vecherniy Dushanbe, which we had registered earlier in 1997 in case of such an incident.¹⁰²

The current paper is headed by a new editor-in-chief and continues to publish only uncontroversial material. Kobilov has since left the country to pursue career opportunities abroad.

In August 1997, the weekly Istiqlol, published by the nongovernmental Oli Somon Fund, was informed by the government printing house management that it had received an order not to print the paper. No precise explanations were given. According to Abduqodir Kholiqzoda, Chairman of the Oli Solomon Fund,

We never received any official documentation or notice. The Ministry of Information and Culture never once said anything to us, they never did anything official, but simply used other methods to blocks our efforts. We had to print the paper at various printing houses from September to December 1997 ... then we printed it on our own, then in January 1998 permission was once again given to print at our regular printing house.¹⁰³

Kholiqzoda asserted that the order was designed to punish the newspaper for having published, in August and September 1997, an appeal to the nation by CNR chairman Said Abdullo Nuri and an interview with then UTO military head Davlat Usmonov.¹⁰⁴ Nuri's address stressed Islam as a fundamental factor for national unity, while Usmonov criticized the current government for not having included all political forces in the peace process. As of this writing, Istiqlol is not in print and has not been so since April 1998, due to lack of funds.

Undue Burdens on Licensing

Regulations governing the issuance of licenses for private radio and television stations are restrictive. A broadcast license is issued by the State Committee on Radio and Television, while technical permission is given by the Ministry of Communications. Not only does the State Committee on Radio and Television thus exercise complete control over the licensing procedure, but it also reserves the right to suspend the activities of the stations for reasons which are broad-ranging. For example, article 12 of the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media stipulates that the activities of independent radio and television stations can be halted for up to six months "in the event that there is sufficient reason to believe that the ownership is in abuse of its rights" (unofficial translation). This vague wording opens the door toabuse by the government, allowing it to use licenses as a lever to control broadcast media content.¹⁰⁵ Under article 15 of the Law of the Press and Other Mass Media, media outlets may appeal to the courts to challenge the denial of a licence or the decision to revoke a licence. However, the ineffectual court system in Tajikistan, combined with pointed state repression, may cause journalists or owners to fear that making use of legal remedies will only trigger unpleasant reprisals.

Throughout 1998 and 1999, the licensing process for independent television stations continued to be both time-consuming and expensive, requiring high official fees and bribes at almost every stage.¹⁰⁶

In recent months there have been attempts to impose licensing requirements on production companies, although at present, they do not require such licenses, as they do not themselves broadcast. In April 1999, for example, the State Committee on Radio and Television ordered the Khurshed-Production company, which produces video and musical clips, concert programs, and other musical-entertainment programs, to cease activities until they had submitted documentation for an operating license. A legal rebuttal arguing that, according to the law, Khurshed-Production does not utilize the airwaves and therefore doesn't require an operating license, met with success, and the demand was dropped. Nonetheless, indirect threats from authorities regarding a possible order to halt activities have continued against an international organization involved in television production.¹⁰⁷

In July 1997, a ruling issued by the Ministry of Culture ordered the temporary closing of independent television stations that did not possess an operating license, although at that time no government body had established the procedure necessary to obtain such a license. Further, it appeared that the government had delayed issuing regulations governing licensing as a tactic to deny independent operators access to the airwaves.

To date there are no independent radio stations operating in Tajikistan, although one, affiliated with the Asia-Plus news agency, was due to start broadcasting as of January 1999. The State Committee on Radio and Television, however, refused to issue a registration license in January 1999, claiming, "As the legislation regarding the emission of private radio licenses is not yet ready and requires further adjustments, the Committee is not yet able to issue you the license in question."¹⁰⁸ A staff member of the Asia-Plus radio station stated that they had applied to the Majlisi Oli for further clarification and added that they were not willing to make a fuss for the time being as the tax police had, "coincidentally," just recently visited the Asia-Plus news agency office for an inspection.¹⁰⁹ At the time of writing, another independent Dushanbe-based radio station, Radio Nik, was also experiencing difficulties obtaining a license. To date neither station has yet received a license, despite requests by international organizations, including the OSCE, to speed up their registration process

Revocation of Accreditation

In the past two years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revoked the accreditation of, or refused to issue accreditation to, at least three foreign correspondents-two of whom were from Russia. Their reporting on national affairs, the authorities claimed, was biased and misguided, or had discredited the leadership and its policies. Under Tajik law, journalists who visit Tajikistan must receive accreditation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On July 27, 1998, Yelena Masyuk, a veteran war correspondent for Russia's NTV, was declared persona non grata in Tajikistan for having broadcast reports "discrediting the country's leadership and its policies." The governmentrevoked her accreditation after NTV broadcast two of Masyuk's reports, on July 22 and July 23, 1998. Masyuk filed the reports from the Karategin Valley, just after the murder of four members of the United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT) by unidentified assailants. According to Odiljon Ashurov, a journalist in NTV's Dushanbe office:

¹¹⁰

Three days after Masyuk was stripped of her accreditation, NTV issued an apology to the government, but maintained that all facts contained in Masyuk's reports were accurate. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also warned NTV that should they "whip up the so-called 'Masyuk case', the Ministry [would] suspend the activities or close the representative office in Tajikistan."¹¹¹ As of this writing, Masyuk remains without accreditation and persona non grata in Tajikistan.

In February 1997, Nezavisimaia gazeta correspondent Igor Rotar saw his accreditation withdrawn following general accusations of being "unscrupulous and biased."¹¹² In May 1997 Pravda-V correspondent Irada Gusseynova, who currently resides in Azerbaijan, was unable to obtain an extension of her accreditation following the publication of articles written by her, which were said to have offended the dignity and honor of the president.¹¹³

At the time of writing, no signs had been received from the government indicating that they were ready to renew or grant accreditation to the journalists named above.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Human Rights Watch gratefully acknowledges the help of all individuals who gave generously of their time in the research and preparation of this report, in particular journalists and others in Dushanbe, and also thanks Oleg Panfilov of the Glasnost Defense Fund in Moscow for providing access to his unpublished manuscript on journalism in Tajikistan.

1 In 1998 and 1999, after the peace agreement was signed, the Supreme Court deregistered, refused to register, or suspended the activities of non-UTO parties. See "Non-UTO Parties."

2 On June 17, 1993, the Supreme Court banned the Islamic Renaissance Party, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and the Lali Badakhshan and Rastokhez movements, as well as their publications.

3 Protocol on Military Issues, "General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan: What Does it Say?," United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, September 1997.

4 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 3, no. 150, part I, August 4, 1999; RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 3, no. 156, part I, August 12, 1999. Given enormous difficulties encountered in registering both UTO fighters and their weapons, and given the limited control the UTO exerts over certain of its commanders, however, there is sufficient evidence to doubt the accuracy of the announcement. In late July 1999, for instance, immediately following the announcement, Uzbek nationals formerly allied with the UTO entered Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan armed with grenade-launchers and submachine guns, taking several people hostage and demanding safe passage to Uzbekistan or elsewhere. International organizations working in Tajikistan and locals reported that former UTO field commanders and fighters took up arms to join them in Kyrgyzstan, once again underscoring the failures in the demobilization of UTO fighters.

5 At the time of writing, thirty-three UTO members had been appointed to national government posts, and eleven to regional and district posts, of which they are to occupy twenty-two. "Interim Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," August 12, 1999, U.N. Document S/1999/872.

6 The Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) is the body responsible for implementing the General Agreement. It is made up of twenty-six members, thirteen government and thirteen UTO, and has four sub-commissions: military, refugees, political, and legal.

7 In mid-January 1998, following months of laborious negotiations, the UTO withdrew temporarily for the first time from the peace process, claiming that the government was reneging on many of its pledges. Vahdat started up when the UTO rejoined the CNR, but ceased about six months later, in the summer of 1998. Under the terms of the General Agreement, the CNR is to keep the population regularly informed about its work through bulletins, press releases, and press conferences, but all of these have been very scarce to date.

8 Round table on freedom of expression, Dushanbe, July 15, 1998; Human Rights Watch interview with Sulton Hamad, June 26, 1998.

9 Human Rights Watch interview with Hokim Muhabbatov, Dushanbe, August 13, 1999; Junbish (Dushanbe), no. 15, August 1999.

10 Hikmatullo Nasriddinov, speech at a meeting of the Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, March 1999.

11 Asia-Plus Blits, no. 167 (331), September 3, 1999.

12 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahmatullo Zoirov, Dushanbe, September 6, 1999.

13 Human Rights Watch interview with member of executive committee, Dushanbe, May 26, 1999; Radio Free Liberty, Tajik service, April 4, 1999; "Zaiavlenie rukovodstva partii politicheskogo i ekonomicheskogo obnovleniya" (Statement of the Leadership of the Political and Economic Revival Party), June 6, 1998, in Muzhda (Dushanbe), no. 1.

14 These newspapers are produced and financed by a wide variety of sponsors ranging from governmental departments to public associations to commercial firms.

15 "List of Periodic Publications, Registered by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Tajikistan," Tajik Ministry of Culture, August 1, 1999.

16 Severe financial difficulties and bureaucratic obstruction make founding a private printing press difficult. See also "Censorship" and "Arbitrary Denial of Permission to Print."

17 Further to a January 1999 decision of the presidential apparatus to "make it easier to inform the public about state policy," Jumhuriat, Narodnaia gazeta, Khalk Ovozi now appear twice weekly, and are under the direct control of the presidential executive. Tajik State Radio, Dushanbe, January 13, 1999.

18 For further details, see "Censorship" and "Unofficial Bans."

19 Chatri Simin is financed by the Eurasia Foundation, and does not contain political analysis, in accordance with the funder's conditions. Human Rights Watch interview with staff member of Chatri Simin, Dushanbe, September 21, 1999.

20 This situation was expected to substantially shift, given the August 1999 lifting of the ban on UTO parties and their media outlets. The Democratic Party of Tajikistan had at the time of writing issued a very small number of the first issue of its newspaper, while the Islamic Renaissance Party was reportedly still preparing its first issue.

UTO media continued to operate in exile until the signature of the General Agreement in June 1997. These media included, among others, a radio station that broadcast from refugee camps in northern Afghanistan, and at least two bulletins published in Pakistan. Oleg Panfilov, unpublished manuscript.

21 In August 1999, for example, the average price of Dushanbe newspapers was between 150 and 200 Tajik rubles. During that month, one U.S. dollar purchased about 1500 Tajik rubles; non (a flat loaf of bread) cost about 200 Tajik rubles.

22 According to Radio Liberty in Dushanbe, the average monthly wage in August 1999 was between 12,000 and 12,500 rubles, about U.S. $11. The United Nations provides a figure of $8.60 from 1998. Tajikistan Human Development Report 1998, United Nations Development Programme.

23 Human Rights Watch interviews with Internews staff member, Dushanbe, August 19 and September 1, 1999.

24 The international non-profit organization Internews helps produce weekly and monthly news exchange and social analysis programs for independent television stations. See "The Role of International Organizations."

25 TV-6 programming is similar to that of ORT and RTR, but with a greater emphasis on entertainment. TV-6 is on a UHF frequency, requiring a special antenna for reception. In Dushanbe, it is re-transmitted on TV-201, the channel of the Dushanbe-based 201st Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian Army. The latter's mainly military-oriented content is targeted at members of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division.

26 See "Licensing procedures."

27 Law on the Introduction of Changes and Additions to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On Television and Radio Broadcasting." No. 814, June 30, 1999.

28 The World Bank and the Ministry of Labor in 1998 estimated that 80 to 85 percent of the population could be considered poor. Tajikistan Human Development Report 1998, United Nations Development Programme. And according to a 1997 World Bank study, two-thirds of the nation's households have incomes insufficient to meet basic food needs, an additional 12 percent are able to survive only by selling assets, stealing or begging, and unemployment is between 30 and 40 percent. United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Tajikistan, December 1998.

29 Human Rights Watch interviews with local journalists, Dushanbe, 1998 and 1999.

30 The Glasnost Defense Foundation's representative in Dushanbe has been harassed and attacked. See "Violence against Journalists."

31 See "Intimidation of and Threats Against Journalists."

32 In Tajikistan, Internews is also registered as a local non-profit organization.

33 Human Rights Watch interview with Oleg Panfilov, Glasnost Defense Foundation, Moscow, June 3, 1998; round table on freedom of expression, Dushanbe, June 16, 1998. Figures of those killed in connection with the conflict remain a subject of dispute, however, and the following publications name lower figures. Attacks on the Press in 1997, Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ; Leonid Zagalsky, "26 Journalists Killed in Tajikistan Amid Campaign of Terror," Dangerous Assignments, Summer/Fall 1994, no. 46; Rapport annuel 1997, Reporters sans Frontières; Report of Human Rights Needs-Assessment Mission to Tajikistan, The UN High Commissioner/Centre for Human Rights, August 11, 1997.

34 Human Rights Watch interview with Abduqodir Kholiqzoda, editor-in-chief of Istiqlol, Dushanbe, April 15, 1998.

35 Mouhabbat Khodjibaeva, "Television and the Tajik Conflict," Central Asia Monitor, no. 1, 1999.

36 Human Rights Watch interview with family members, Dushanbe, July 20, 1999. Asia-Plus Blits, no. 124, July 5, 1999.

37 Husseinov explained to Human Rights Watch that he had not written articles of a political nature, and that he himself had no idea who the "candidates" might be. Interview with Maksudjon Husseinov, Dushanbe, October 13, 1998.

38 Ibid.

39 Human Rights Watch interview with Maksudjon Husseinov, Dushanbe, November 24, 1998.

40 Human Rights Watch interview with Maksudjon Husseinov, Dushanbe, April 7, 1999.

41 Letter of Glasnost Defense Foundation to President Rakhmonov, June 21, 1998.

42 Asia-Plus Blits, no. 106, June 10-12, 1998.

43 Forensic Medical Expertise No. 208, June 9, 1998, Dr. Egamberdiev, Republican Bureau of Forensic Expertises of the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan.

44 Human Rights Watch interview, Dushanbe, August 6, 1998. Identity withheld.

45 A failure to prosecute hostage-takers in a timely fashion only reinforces their impunity. For instance, Bahrom Sodirov together with his brother Rizvon was responsible for the abduction of several UNMOT officials in December 1996. Less than two months later, he led the February 1997 hostage-taking. Although Bahrom Sodirov was captured by government forces at the end of March 1997, the government did not publicly confirm his whereabouts or status for a full year and a half. The Sodirov group at later intervals took Tajik citizens hostage, including the country's chief mufti and members of his family. In November 1997, Rizvon Sodirov kidnapped two French nationals, demanding the release of his brother Bahrom; one of the hostages, Kareen Mane, was fatally wounded during the rescue operation. Reuters and ITAR-TASS, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline vol. 2, no. 197, part I, October 12, 1998.

Bahrom Sodirov was sentenced to death in October 1998, one-and-a-half years after his capture by government security forces. He had reportedly been executed by the end of 1998. Rizvon Sodirov was allegedly killed by government forces in early December 1997.

46 Oleg Panfilov, unpublished manuscript; Human Rights Watch interview with Odiljon Ashurov, Dushanbe, August 13, 1998.

47 The reaction of the Russian embassy in Dushanbe toward the kidnapping was also representative of its ambiguous attitude towards Russian journalists in Tajikistan. During an interview on NTV, the ambassador claimed that the journalists should not have traveled to the region at that particular time. Ekho Moskviy (Moscow Echo) , February 6, 1997; Oleg Panfilov, unpublished manuscript.

48 Human Rights Watch interview with Odiljon Ashurov, Dushanbe, August 13, 1998.

49 Ibid.

50 Monitor (Moscow), August 1997; Human Rights Watch interview with Maksudjon Husseinov, May 11, 1998.

51 Mahmud Khodoberdiev is an ethnic Uzbek. In the wake of the uprising he led, ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan suffered reprisals-some were killed, and many fled Dushanbe for Leninabad or Uzbekistan. Khudoberdiev and many of his supporters allegedly found refuge in Uzbekistan.

52 A description of how both government and opposition use of the television airwaves contributed to hostilities at the outset of civil conflict is contained in Muhabbat Khodjibaeva, "Television and the Tajik Conflict," Central Asia Monitor, no. 1, 1999.

53 As an example, Saiohat Ne'matova, an official from the presidential administration, stated at a round table on freedom of expression sponsored by the U.S. Information Service: "In some ways too much freedom of expression led to the war. We witnessed the war, and now we must be careful not to return to that. For example, we reported on state television about the deaths of journalists in connection with the conflict, but then we received phone calls stating that this information was negative and too depressing, thus, we stopped." The round table was held in Dushanbe on June 16, 1998.

54 Article 137, Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan.

55 Law on the Dignity and Honor of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, May 21, 1998.

56 Human Rights Watch interviews with local journalists, Dushanbe, June 1998; "The President of Tajikistan Inviolable," Victoria Panfilova, Nezavisimaia gazeta (Moscow), May 29, 1998.

57 Human Rights Watch interviews with local journalists, Dushanbe, June 1998.

58 At the May 1999 parliament session, for example, President Rakhmanov remonstrated Radio Liberty, the BBC, and the Iranian Sadoi Khuroson for unobjective and overly negative coverage and warned that this type of reporting represented a tendency to "sell out to outside powers." Local journalists are also vulnerable in this regard. For example, Abufattokh Vokhidov, in 1995 editor-in-chief of Posukh (The Answer), was in that year fired soon after he made unflattering comments about the government in an interview with Voice of America (VOA).

59 There are currently between 8,000 and 9,000 Russian Border Force guards in addition to the Russian army's 201st Motorized Rifle Division in Tajikistan, ample reason, according to many observers, to conclude that the Russian media is not entirely objective. As recently as April 1999, the Tajik and Russian governments signed a treaty allowing Russia to establish a military base in Tajikistan on the sites where its units are currently stationed. The two governments also signed a Declaration on Allied Interaction, and seven intergovernmental cooperation agreements. Russian news agencies, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 3, no. 75, part I, April 19, 1999; ITAR-TASS, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline vol. 2, no. 62, part I, March 31, 1998.

Certain Russian media do on occasion overdramatize the military situation in Tajikistan. As an example, in May 1998, when government and UTO troops clashed on the eastern outskirts of Dushanbe, some Russian agencies reported that the television tower had been occupied by opposition forces, and that there was full-scale fighting in downtown Dushanbe. The first allegation was patently false, while the second was a misrepresentation. See also "Censorship."

60 Asia-Plus Blits, no. 158, August 20, 1999.

61 Asia-Plus Blits, no. 85, March 28-31, 1998. A typical Digest issue may contain articles on intimate relationships - these often accompanied by mildly provocative photographs-television listings, advertisements, poetry, and some news briefs capted from a local news agency. The Russian bul'varnaia pressa (yellow or tabloid press) can be easily found throughout Dushanbe.

62 Human Rights Watch interview, Dushanbe, May 1999. Name withheld.

63 Various issues of Junbish (The Movement), Dushanbe, July-September 1999; "Position of the Consultative Council of Political Parties of Tajikistan on the Additions and Changes to the Constitution," July 1999. Unofficial translation. Article 28 reads as follows: "Citizens have the right of association. Each citizen has the right to participate in the formation of political parties, including political parties with religious, democratic, and atheistic character, of trade unions and other social associations, as well as voluntarily to join them or resign from them."

64 Human Rights Watch interview with Khokhim Mukhabbatov, August 13, 1999; Junbish, no. 15, August 1999.

65 Human Rights Watch interviews, Dushanbe, October 25, 1999.

66 Until April 1998, Abdufattoh Vohidov was the editor-in-chief of Istiqlol, published by the nongovernmental Oli Somon Fund. Vokhidov had suffered incidents of media repression on previous occasions: in 1995 he was dismissed as editor-in-chief of Posukh (The Answer) after he made unflattering comments about the government to a foreign news service. From August 1997 until January 1998 his newspaper was arbitrarily denied permission to print at government printing houses, following the publication of articles underscoring Islam as a factor for national unity and criticizing the government for not having included all political forces in the peace agreement. Although it is unclear whether Vohidov was specifically targeted, in May 1998 his home and belongings were torched during government-UTO fighting in the Karatenginskii area of eastern Dushanbe; the latter area is perceived as a UTO stronghold. Vohidov told a Human Rights Watch representative a few days after the hostilities that government security forces systematically pillaged and burned dwellings in the area. Istiqlol has not appeared since April 1998, ostensibly due to lack of funds, and Vohidov currently works for the newspaper of the State Tax Committee, Paiomi Andoz.

Saifiddin Dostiev was the editor-in-chief of the Tajik-language weekly Samar until it ceased publication in December 1997, ostensibly due to financial difficulties. Notably, it too had suffered harassment from authorities. In 1997 Samar was occasionally prevented from publishing articles critical of the government, and frequently denied permission to publish at government printing houses. Dostiev is at present deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper Javononi Tojikiston (The Youth of Tajikistan).

67 "Mojaroi du rais," Samar (Dushanbe), no. 1, November 6-18, 1997.

68 Mavji Ozod is currently operating on a skeletal basis, with four journalists only.

69 Human Rights Watch interview with Mukhtor Bokizoda, Dushanbe, January 10, 1999; letter from Vohidov and Dostiev addressed to OSCE Head of Mission Marin Buhoara, January 11, 1999. Vohidov and Dostiev declined interviews with Human Rights Watch.

70 Radio Free Liberty, January 29, 1999. Human Rights Watch interview with Mukhtor Bokizoda, Dushanbe, January 25, 1999.

71 Human Rights Watch interview with Mukhtor Bokizoda, Dushanbe, May 19, 1999.

72 Human Rights Watch interview with senior employee of TV SM-1, Dushanbe, October 26, 1998. Name withheld.

73 Monitor (Moscow), April 1998.

74 "Goodbye typhus, hello syphilis," Surush, no. 1, March 1998; Monitor (Moscow), March 1998.

75 Charogi Ruz, an independent opposition newspaper, was published in exile in Moscow from 1992-1997 and clandestinely distributed in some parts of Tajikistan during the same period. Atovullo fled to Moscow following threats against him, arrests of employees of the newspaper, and harassment of those who were accused of both possessing and distributing it. During the time that it was published in exile, staff members of the newspaper and those who were found to be in possession of copies were arrested, detained and otherwise persecuted for their affiliation with the newspaper. At the end of April 1999, the first issue of Charogi Ruz published since 1997 appeared in some kiosks in Dushanbe, where it was quickly bought up, and later in the summer a second issue was clandestinely distributed.

76 In September 1997, when the CNR took up its work in Dushanbe, Deputy CNR Chairman Abdumajid Dostiev reportedly announced that it was undesirable that two people return to Tajikistan, namely, Oleg Panfilov and Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda. Radio Liberty, September 8, 1999. This statement was transmitted through the state and foreign press services.

77 Human Rights Watch interview with Dodojon Atovullo, Moscow, June 2, 1998.

78 The UTO soon afterwards published a statement indicating that Atovullo had never been a member of the UTO, and that the UTO did not share his point of view. This statement was repeatedly aired on Tajik state television.

79 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dodojon Atovullo, Moscow, November 21, 1998.

80 Ibid.

81 Human Rights Watch interview with Oleg Panfilov, Moscow, June 3, 1998.

82 For additional information on incidents of press violations suffered in recent years by Biznes i Politika (Business and Politics) (Dushanbe), see Human Rights Watch, Leninabad: Crackdown in the North (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1998).

83 During the early hours of November 4, 1998, armed groups allegedly composed of several hundred men entered Leninabad province from neighboring Uzbekistan and occupied key administrative buildings and the airport in Chkalovsk, adjacent to Khujand. The rebels said they deplored the general political and military disorder in Tajikistan and the involvement of security forces and government representatives in the drug trade. Their demands included the inclusion of key regional leaders in the peace process, the liberation and amnesty of political prisoners, parliamentary elections, and the broadcast of their demands on regional television. Negotiations between the rebels and authorities quickly broke down, and Tajik security forces quelled the rebellion during the following week. The events resulted in, according to official data, an estimated 1,000 killed and injured, including at least forty-nine civilian deaths. Tajikistan for the first time since the civil war accused Uzbekistan of interference in its internal affairs and submitted a protest to the United Nations Security Council.

84 After his last attempted rebellion, in late summer 1997, Khudoberdiev allegedly fled to Uzbekistan.

85 Human Rights Watch interviews with local journalists, Dushanbe, December 7, 1998.

Abdumalik Abdullajonov, a former prime minister of Tajikistan and former leader of the northern-based National Revival Movement (NRM), was accused of masterminding the rebellion along with Mahmud Khudoiberdiev and others. His brother Abdugani Abdullajonov, a former mayor of Khujand, was also accused of organizing the rebellion. At the time of writing, Abugani was reportedly in custody either in Dushanbe or southern Tajikistan; another brother, Abdukhafiz Abdullaiev, sentenced to death on charges of having conspired to assassinate President Rakhmonov, was reportedly being detained in southern Tajikistan.

Abdullajonov's NRM had repeatedly attempted to gain access to both the inter-Tajik peace negotations and the CNR, but these requests, the last one being in April 1998, were consistently refused. Soon after the rebellion, in December 1998, the National Unity Party, headed by Abdullajonov, was banned by the Supreme Court.

In November 1997, following the publication of a front-page interview with Abdullajonov in Vecherniye vesti, the newspaper was refused permission to print at its regular government printing house. See "Unofficial bans."

The media in Tajikistan are silent about the whereabouts or situation of members of the Abdullajonov family.

86 Russian media coverage of the events in the northern region, Leninabad, is, nonetheless, also revealing of considerable bias. Its television and radio reported from the early days of the rebellion intense fighting between the rebels and government forces in Aini, 120 kilometers north of Dushanbe, and substantial numbers of displaced persons. When international relief personnel arrived in the area several days after these news reports, however, they noted next to no structural damage, which raised questions about the extent of heavy fighting altogether. In addition, residents of Aini who fled the town for a week or more told Human Rights Watch that they had fled not due to heavy combat but out of fear of the onset of governmental troops, who often plunder the civilian population during such events. Human Rights Watch interviews with residents of Aini, Dushanbe, November 1998.

State media coverage of the events was also widely seen to be one-sided, with next to no information appearing about the demands or aims of the rebel group and with state media unilaterally labeling Khudoiberdiev and his group traitors. According to a journalist employed by the state radio, "We are starving for information. It is wholly one-sided. We know nothing about the demands of the [rebel] group, for example, if it is a group that has a legal basis it should be given the chance to address the people. The people now understand that the authorities don't want the people to rise up against them, that's why they're cracking down so heavily on Leninabad province, so that no candidate from that province runs in the elections. The group should have been given a chance to air their concerns through the media." Human Rights Watch interview, Dushanbe, November 10, 1998. A Dushanbe professor made the following comment on state media coverage of the Leninabad events: "We, the intelligentsia, don't pay attention to the government-run radio or television. I myself just ignore them, they're so one-sided; the news on the Leninabad events was so exaggerated. It was bad; no, it was disinformation." Human Rights Watch interview, Dushanbe, November 23, 1998. Name withheld.

87 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahmatkarim Davlat, Dushanbe, June 16, 1998. Despite repeated requests, Human Rights Watch was unable to obtain a copy of the article in question.

Although of central importance to the peace process in terms of accountability, other information on the discovery of mass graves was never made public. Members of the CNR and UNMOT made a joint trip to the area, but did not disclose the results of their investigation.

88 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahmatkarim Davlat, Dushanbe, June 16, 1998.

89 Asia-Plus, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 3, no. 163, Part I, August 23, 1999.

90 Human Rights Watch interview with Maksudjon Husseinov, Dushanbe, May 11, 1999.

91 Human Rights Watch interview with Mukhtor Bokizoda, Dushanbe, May 19, 1999; Chronicle, May 1999. Orifov declined an interview with Human Rights Watch.

92 Human Rights Watch interviews with kiosk venders, Dushanbe, December 30, 1998.

93 A. Abdullaiev, Chairman of the Inspection-Audit Commission of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, comments at a meeting of the National Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, December 24, 1998.

94 The content of Haft ganj, according to the Congress, is oriented towards the population in the south of Tajikistan, whereas that of Sorbon is aimed at a northern (Leninabad) audience. Originally both papers were distributed in both parts of the country. For a brief period following a combined issue of Haft ganj and Sorbon was printed in Dushanbe, until state printing presses refused to print it.

95 Human Rights Watch interview with member of Congress of National Unity, Dushanbe, January 21, 1999, identity withheld; meeting of the National Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, December 24, 1998.

96 On May 25, 1998, President Rakhmonov issued a Decree on the Property of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, according to which all Communist Party property should be confiscated. The chairman of the Communist Party, Shodi Shabdolov, claimed that the decree amounts to nationalization of the party's property and directly contravenes the constitution. Human Rights Watch interview with A. Abdullaev, Communist Party of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, January 20, 1999; ITAR-TASS, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 2, no. 242, part I, December 17, 1998. As of the end of January 1999, the issue was being studied by the Economic Court of Tajikistan, and on December 31, 1998, the government issued Notice No. 552 concerning the distribution of Communist Party property. Human Rights Watch interview with A. Abdullaev, Dushanbe, January 20, 1999.

97 The Sharqi Ozod printing house prints many newspapers, including, among others, Sadoi Mardum, Jumhuriyat, Biznes i Politika, and Vecherniy Dushanbe.

98 Human Rights Watch interview with A. Abdullaev, Dushanbe, January 20, 1999. Despite the unofficial ban on the newspaper, however, members of the Communist Party are not prevented from voicing their views: Vecherniy Dushanbe published in December 1998 the following comments by Tuigun Karimov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party: "We, the members of the Communist Party, suffered greatly during this year. My colleagues and I bore witness to many violations of the Constitution, in particular, an unofficial ban on our party newspaper. It's annoying..." Vecherniy Dushanbe, no. 56, December 31, 1998.

99 Human Rights Watch interview with A. Abdullaev, Dushanbe, January 20, 1999.

100 See footnote 85.

101 Kobilov had previously been the target of other press violations. In 1993, he hid himself for two days and his family was threatened when he published an article critical of Abdullajonov, who was then prime minister of Tajikistan. In 1995, following the publication of an article critical of the change in national currency from Russian to Tajik rubles, his paper was fined 2,000,000 Tajik rubles (at the time, roughly the equivalent of U.S. $40,000.00). And on June 23, 1997, a Vecherniye Vesti driver was seized and assaulted by unidentified armed men. This attack followed the publication of an interview with rebel commander Mahmud Khudoiberdiev. Human Rights Watch interview with Javokhir Kobilov, April 23, 1998.

102 Human Rights Watch interview with Javohir Kobilov, Dushanbe, April 23, 1998.

103 Human Rights Watch interview with Abduqodir Kholiqzoda, Dushanbe, April 15, 1998.

104 Ibid.

105 Human Rights Watch interview with Internews staff member, Dushanbe, July 13, 1999; Zakoniy I praktika sredstv massovoi informatsii v stranax SNG I Baltii , p. 133; "Mir informatsii bez granits," June 24, 1999.

106 U.S Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998; Human Rights Watch interview with Bahodur Kosimov, journalist, Dushanbe, June 19, 1998.

107 Human Rights Watch interviews with Internews staff members, Dushanbe, June 19 and July 13, 1999.

108 Letter from Saif Rahimov, State Committee on Radio and Television, addressed to Asia-Plus radio station, January 15, 1999.

109 Human Rights Watch interview with staff member of Asia-Plus news agency, February 4, 1999.

110 Human Rights Watch interview with Odiljon Ashurov, Dushanbe, August 13, 1998. Although Ashurov, like other journalists, had found nothing wrong with Masyuk's reports, his comment provides insight into the discrepancy between local and high-profile Russian coverage of Tajik events. He related that he had called up his head office in Moscow to ask that they "stop sending the Yelenas from Moscow, they just cause us problems here."

111 Glasnost Defense Foundation, letter to President Rakhmonov, July 28, 1998.

112 Reporters sans Frontières, Rapport annuel 1997.

113 The articles were entitled "Who was Behind the Assassination Attempt on the President?" and "Fortune has Smiled upon, if Only One, Tajik." Another article that reportedly offended Tajikistan authorities, "Prostitution: The Most Widespread Profession in Tajikistan," argued that prostitution was the only way for women to make a living in Tajikistan. See Human Rights Watch, Leninabad: Crackdown in the North, p. 29.

In this section

Title

Tajikistan: Freedom of Expression Still Threatened

Document source

Human Rights Watch

Date

1 November 1999

Document number

D1114

Document type

Country Reports

Collection

Research & Reports

Country

Tajikistan

Comments:

This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

Tajikistan: Freedom of Expression Still Threatened

SUMMARY

RECOMMENDATIONS

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDIA IN TAJIKISTAN

VIOLENCE IN TAJIKISTAN

VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

INTIMIDATION OF AND THREATS AGAINST JOURNALISTS

CENSORSHIP AND OTHER INFORMATION CONTROL

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In this section

Document details

Profile