Assessment for Malay-Muslims in Thailand

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

The Muslims in Thailand have four of the factors that increase the likelihood of continued rebellion: recent rebellious actions; territorial concentration; government repression of group members; and a history of lost autonomy. Factors that could inhibit future rebellion include Thailand's decade of democratic rule, its enactment of policies to reduce the marginalization of the Muslims, and efforts by neighboring Malaysia to promote growth in the southern Muslim areas of Thailand. Rebellion is likely to continue so long as the current Thai administration continues to reject consensus-building with the Muslim community.

Analytic Summary

The Muslims are primarily concentrated in Thailand's five southern provinces which border Malaysia: Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and Songkhla. There has been no significant group migration across the country's regions since the early 1900s.

The Muslims are a religious minority in a country in which Buddhism, the religion of the majority Thai community, is the official state religion (BELIEF = 3). The social customs of the Muslims differ from those of the Thais and although some Muslims speak Thai, some 80% are Malay-speakers (LANG = 1). Group members who reside in the western Satun province speak Thai and they are fairly integrated into Thai society. Those concentrated in Pattani, which was once a semi-autonomous sultanate of Malaya, have maintained the use of the Malay language (AUTLOST = 2).

Beginning in the 1930s, successive Thai military regimes attempted to instill a common nationalism among the country's population through measures such as a compulsory education program that utilized the Thai language and the celebration of national holidays. Malaysian independence in 1959 brought the attention of Thai authorities to the southern Muslim regions. This was partly due to Pattani's former status as a Malayan sultanate which raised concerns about potential links between Malay kin in the two countries. Government programs in the south were implemented by Thais who often did not speak Malay and/or did not understand the population's Islamic customs and beliefs. Further, the region remained economically underdeveloped in comparison to much of the country.

Muslim resentment against the government's assimilation policies turned from localized resistance to broad support for the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) by the early 1970s. The PULO rebellion began in the late 1960s with the most intense phase emerging in the early to mid 1970s (REB65X = 4; REB70X = 6). The separatist rebels were reported to have been aided by Libya. In the 1980s, the Thai government sought to address some Muslim demands through a combination of programs that promoted their political participation along with policies to further economic development and religious toleration.

Group members face significant demographic stresses. These include declining public health conditions in relation to other groups, high birth rates, environmental decline due to widespread flooding, and migration abroad for economic reasons. The Muslims are substantially underrepresented in the political and economic arenas due to historical neglect or restrictions, but public policies seek to improve the group's status (POLDIS03 = 1; ECDIS03 = 1). While there were 25 Muslim politicians in the 1996 Parliament (around 600 seats), group members remain underrepresented at the local and provincial levels.

Most Muslims are seeking widespread autonomy for the southern provinces where they primarily reside (SEPX = 3). A small minority favors the creation of an independent state. Other group demands include greater political participation in all levels of decision-making, equal civil rights and status, and better economic opportunities including a larger share of public funds. In addition, the Muslims are concerned about protecting their cultural and religious beliefs.

Group members are primarily represented by militant organizations such as the PULO and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) but also by conventional national political parties that represent broader interests. A minority is reported to support the activities of rebel organizations. While the Muslims are a factionalized group, there were no reported violent intragroup incidents during the years 1998 to 2003 (COHESX9 = 3). Also, there was no violence between the Muslims and other ethnic groups for the same time period.

The neighboring state of Malaysia has politically supported the goals of the Thai Muslims, but Kuala Lumpur does not appear to be actively supporting the separatist campaign. In 1999 and 2000, Malaysia sought to further economic development in the southern Thai regions by promoting education programs.

It appears that the separatist campaign lost much of its momentum in the 1980s. Although sporadic violent attacks were attributed to PULO and the BRN during the late 1990s, it is not clear if these rebel groups were responsible or whether the attacks were by bandit organizations. Beginning in 2000, violence has increased and become more frequent (REB00-03 = 4). Muslim actions in the form of demonstrations and strikes first began in the post-WWII period, and in recent years these protests have centered on issues such as the development of an oil pipeline project and political inclusion (PROT45X = 2; PROT00-01 = 3, PROT02 = 2, PROT03 = 4). Repression by state authorities eased during the 1998 to 2000 period although attacks were reported against armed rebels along with the use of widespread force against protestors.

References

Daipi, Hawazi, "Thai Muslims: A Community in Transition," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 24, 1996.

Daipi, Hawazi, "Thai Muslims Take Steps to Preserve Malay Identity," The Straits Times (Singapore), July 1, 1996.

The Europa Yearbook, Far East and Australasia 1993.

Far Eastern Economic Review, 1990-93.

Keesings Record of World Events, 1990-93.

Lexis-Nexis news reports, 1990-2003.

Phase I, Minorities at Risk, overview compiled by Monty G. Marshall, 07/89.

U.S. Dept. of State, Human Rights Report 1993, 1994, 2001-2003.