El Salvador: Impact of the 1992 Peace Accords

 

GLOSSARY

ANSP     National Public Security Academy

ARENA National Republican Alliance

CD          Democratic Convergence

CDHES   Commission for Human Rights (non-governmental)

CIDH      Criminal Investigations Commission

COPAZ  Commission for the Consolidation of Peace

FAES      Armed Forces of El Salvador

FMLN    Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front

GN          National Guard

MNR      National Revolutionary Movement

MU         Unity Movement

ONUSAL               United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

PCN        National Conciliation Party

PDC        Christian Democratic Party

PH           Treasury Police

PPDH     Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman

PN           National Police

PNC        National Civilian Police

TSE         Supreme Electoral Tribunal

UEA       Anti-Narcotics Unit

1.                INTRODUCTION

El Salvador's 12-year civil war between the government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) came to an end in January 1992, when the two sides signed a set of peace accords negotiated by the United Nations. In addition to establishing a timetable for reform of a number of the country's structures and institutions, the accords established two commissions the Truth Commission and the Ad Hoc Commission to investigate past human rights abuses and propose corrective measures to prevent future abuses (Country Reports 1993 1994, 433; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 94).

According to the United Nations secretary-general, implementation of the accords "has on the whole progressed well" (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 19), yet two years after the accords were signed, a number of recommendations still require implementation (ibid., 2; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 95-96). With reference to reform of the police force in particular, the secretary-general states that the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which is monitoring implementation of the accords, has indicated that "at some levels in the Government there may be a lack of commitment to the objective enshrined in the Peace Accords" (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 20). The UN has also expressed concern about the lack of progress on land transfers to former government soldiers and FMLN combatants, as well as on their reintegration into civilian society (ibid.). Further, Truth Commission recommendations regarding impunity for crimes committed by both army and FMLN members were disregarded when the government granted a general amnesty in March 1993 (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 95).

Although the country's elections, which took place on 20 March 1994, were to be the "culminating point" in the peace process (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 19), observers have expressed concern that implementation of important aspects of the accords have not been completed (Latinamerica Press 31 Mar. 1994, 4). In anticipation of the elections Hemisphere Initiatives, a research organization monitoring the peace process, wrote that the "transition from war to peace and to the establishment of institutions that guarantee an enduring democracy will be far from complete when national elections are held. ... There remain conflicting visions about how areas of the Peace Accords should be implemented and about the future of civil-military relations" (Hemisphere Initiatives Nov. 1993, 3).

Of particular concern to human rights monitors in the last year has been the escalation of human rights violations (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 94), including "politically motivated arbitrary executions and torture" (United Nations 15 Sept. 1993, 2) and the possible re-emergence of "death squads" (ibid. 23 Nov. 1993, 19).

2.             IMPACT OF THE PEACE ACCORDS

2.1   Conformity with International Human Rights Law

One of the Truth Commission recommendations is that El Salvador ratify and implement all major international human rights instruments to which it is not already party (United Nations May 1993, 8). The El Salvador government has ratified a number of instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ibid. 1993, 4). The government has stated that it will ratify others as well, including the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Torture (ibid. 14 Oct. 1993, 18). Although the Truth Commission has urged the government to accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ibid. May 1993, 8), the government has publicly stated that it will not do so (ibid. 14 Oct. 1993, 18).

2.2   Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PPDH)

The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PPDH) is to fulfil many of ONUSAL's monitoring and advocacy functions after it leaves (LCHR July 1993, 111). The PPDH is El Salvador's official human rights monitor and it has the power to investigate and lodge complaints against government officials accused of human rights abuses (Country Reports 1993 1994, 440).

The PPDH has been investigating reports of abuse since July 1992 (Country Reports 1993 1994, 440) and has noted increases in human rights violations (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 96), but human rights organizations contend that the office needs to improve its capacity (ibid., 98; ICCHRLA July 1993, 16; LCHR July 1993, 111). Part of the problem has been attributed to PPDH staff, many of whom lack human rights experience (ibid.). Further, a July 1992 attack by gunmen on a PPDH attorney, Eduardo Pineda Valenzuela, apparently had a "chilling effect on the Ombudsman's fledgling human rights efforts" (ibid.). Valenzuela, who died in early 1993, had been the leading prosecutor in the 1991 Jesuit murder case (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 98). As well, the office does not have sufficient funding to conduct its present affairs (Central America Update Mar.-Apr. 1993, 94; La Jornada 17 Feb. 1994), a real problem if it is to eventually replace ONUSAL's monitoring work (Country Reports 1993 1994, 440).

2.3            The Judicial System

The Truth Commission report recommended a number of reforms to the justice system, which it found had permitted human rights abuses during the civil war (United Nations May 1993, 7). In its April 1993 report, ONUSAL gave a clearer picture of the enormity of the task ahead:

The non-fulfilment of the duty to provide guarantees; the slow pace of justice; the negligence of certain judicial officials; the failure to respect the right to legal counsel; the large number of unconvicted prisoners; the lack of forensic impartiality; the difficulties and obstacles encountered in the effective investigation of crimes; the persistence of obsolete administrative and trial structures; the lack of technical training of members of the judiciary, especially magistrates; the ineffectiveness of constitutional justice (particularly of habeas corpus); the absence of proper resources for speedy and effective justice; the lack of independence and autonomy with which the judiciary acts; and the continuing clear signs of corruption in many cases all indicate that a radical reform of the judiciary is urgently needed (United Nations 5 Apr. 1993, 44).

Progress has been made on some of the reforms recommended by the Truth Commission and ONUSAL, and these efforts are in various stages of implementation (Country Reports 1993 1994, 436; United Nations 14 Oct. 1993, 12). Since the peace accords were signed the human rights division of ONUSAL has been providing support to Salvadoran institutions concerned with human rights and justice. For example, it has worked with the Supreme Court to train judges and magistrates (ibid. 23 Nov. 1993, 10). Appointments to the newly created National Council of the Judiciary, which oversees the screening and nomination of judicial candidates, were once a Supreme Court responsibility but are now made by the Legislative Assembly, although the Supreme Court retains control over removal of judges (Country Reports 1993 1994, 438).

ONUSAL indicates that both the number of courts and the budgets allocated to the judiciary have increased since the peace accords were signed (United Nations 14 Oct. 1993, 13). It further reports that "neither mayors nor judges have faced political obstacles in the exercise of their functions, and relations between them and local communities have on the whole been positive" (ibid. 23 Nov. 1993, 16). However, because a number of mayors and judges still do not reside in the municipalities in which they have jurisdiction, the public's access to their services is somewhat limited in these cases (ibid.).

On some recommendations for the judiciary, however, there has been little or no progress (Country Reports 1993 1994, 436). For example, although the Truth Commission called for the removal of all Supreme Court members (United Nations May 1993, 7), they have refused to resign and will remain in office until their terms expire in June 1994 (ibid. 14 Oct. 1993, 7). Similarly, in its October 1993 progress report ONUSAL noted that two judges, one forensic doctor, eight military officers and a civilian representing the government at the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), continued to hold their positions despite being named in the Truth Commission report for covering up or failing to investigate serious acts of violence (ibid., 6).

Another obstacle to judicial reform is that several Truth Commission recommendations require constitutional amendments (ibid. 14 Oct. 1993, 12). The Salvadoran constitution states that such amendments can only be initiated by the legislature, not the executive, and must be approved by two successive legislatures; nevertheless, the president has referred a number of constitutional recommendations to the Legislative Assembly for consideration (ibid., 4; Country Reports 1993 1994, 436).

Concerns have also been expressed about the working relationship between the judiciary and the new National Civilian Police (PNC). According to Hemisphere Initiatives, the not-yet-reformed judiciary has not kept up with the PNC in terms of carrying out new investigations and issuing arrest warrants (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 14). "In some cases, local judges have failed to respond to PNC requests for arrest or search warrants, despite carefully prepared documentation" (ibid.).

In 1993 ONUSAL continued to receive complaints of arbitrary or unlawful detention, although fewer than in the previous year (Country Reports 1993 1994, 437). Country Reports 1993 attributes the drop to the 1992 Public Defender Law, which guarantees counsel to defendants immediately upon detention (ibid., 438). However, the same report indicates that the National Police (PN) "frequently" arrested people, without warrants, on the mere suspicion of a crime (ibid., 437). In September 1993 the Supreme Court reportedly encouraged police to use the previously unused law of "dangerous state," which allows police to detain individuals who appear dangerous; ONUSAL's police division later received complaints that the law was in fact being "sporadically" enforced (ibid.). Another concern is that in most cases habeas corpus petitions are either ignored or denied (ibid., 438; LCHR July 1993, 110).

In October 1993 the Ministry of Justice presented the legislative assembly with draft laws to improve criminal law guarantees of due process, to invalidate confessions obtained extrajudicially, and to repeal the law of "dangerous state" (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 11). According to Country Reports 1993, "public defenders are now regularly called by the police to provide representation to detained suspects" (Country Reports 1993 1994, 438). Although the government did present for public debate a draft law to amend existing legislation governing the right to habeas corpus, ONUSAL stated that the draft could have been more effective, although this would have required constitutional reform (United Nations 14 Oct. 1993, 15). With regard to amparo, the right to appeal to the courts for protection of constitutional guarantees, the government has reportedly not made progress on Truth Commission recommendations (ibid.).

2.4              The National Civilian Police Force (PNC)

The 1992 peace accords called for the elimination of El Salvador's old public security forces the PN, the National Guard (GN) and the Treasury Police (PH) and their replacement with a civilian-controlled National Civilian Police (PNC) (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 1). Although government officials, representatives from various political parties and UN officials have been encouraged by the PNC's work so far, it has faced a number of serious problems since its creation (ibid., ii, 2-3). According to the UN secretary-general, inadequate government logistical and technical support for the PNC has "compromis[ed] the new force's ability to perform its functions" (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 9).

By the end of 1993 the PNC was to have been deployed in ten of the country's 14 departments (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 7); however, to date it has been deployed in only seven departments and in parts of San Salvador (ONUSAL 3 Feb. 1994b; Country Reports 1993 1994, 433). According to the July 1993 report of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, foreign diplomats were concerned that the government was "purposely delaying deployment of the new PNC in order to secure the presence of the National Police in as much of the country as possible during the coming electoral period and perhaps to ensure its future existence" (LCHR July 1993, 106). A detailed September 1993 report on the PNC produced by Hemisphere Initiatives and the Washington Office on Latin America notes that the government "has incentives to retain the National Police which they view as more politically reliable [than the PNC] as long as possible" (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 19). As an example of government delaying tactics, diplomats have pointed to its failure to use money provided by the United States to retrain National Police officers who left the force (The New York Times 11 Nov. 1993). In response the Salvadoran government has blamed donors for not providing funds sufficient to support the PNC (ibid.); the force is reportedly lacking in personnel, training, equipment and infrastructure (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 95; ICCHRLA July 1993, 10; United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 9; Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 3), the funds for which are being provided in an ad hoc fashion (ibid., 18).

According to the non-governmental Commission for Human Rights (CDHES), the "majority" of new PNC administrative personnel were formerly with the country's security forces (La Voz Oct. 1993a, 4). As well, former military personnel have reportedly moved into the PNC's executive ranks without having fulfilled the procedures or requirements established for other candidates (ibid., 4). Perhaps the most notable example would be the appointment of Oscar Peña Dur n to the position of PNC sub-director of operations. Peña Dur n had previously served with both the Treasury Police and the intelligence unit of the National Police, and as director of the anti-narcotics unit of the National Police (ibid., 5; Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 15; ICCHRLA July 1993, 10). Concern over his appointment, which has been expressed by human rights monitors such as Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 95) and CDHES (La Voz Oct. 1993a, 5), as well as the political opposition FMLN (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 15), stems from fear that such government appointments undermine the PNC's legal status as a civilian-controlled police force (ibid., 15). In its defence, the government has pointed to Peña Dur n's extensive training and the fact that he resigned from the army before the appointment was made (United Nations 14 Oct. 1993, 11).

For certain PNC divisions such as the Territorial Traffic Division and Finance Division, deployment has already taken place and will continue throughout 1994 (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 7), but controversy continues over the PNC's absorption of the Anti-Narcotics Unit (UEA) and the Criminal Investigations Commission (CIDH), also referred to as the Special Investigative Unit (El Rescate 13-20 Dec. 1993, 2; El Salvador Information Project 15 Jan. 1994a, 2; News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 14-15). Although the complementary agreements of 22 December 1992 set the terms under which absorption of UEA and CIDH personnel was to take place, ONUSAL has been unable to verify whether the criteria have been met (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 8). The UEA, which originally numbered 200 agents, has reportedly grown to more than 350 after absorption of former security forces personnel, including from the National Guard, the Treasury Police and the elite military battalions (El Salvador Information Project 15 Jan. 1994a, 2).

The new National Public Security Academy (ANSP), which was established to train new police recruits, has also faced some problems. A September 1993 report from Hemisphere Initiatives and the Washington Office on Latin America asserts that while the ANSP has provided basic-training to PNC personnel, the new personnel "lacked practical training in how to deal with common policing scenarios and basic investigatory techniques" (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 8). Although international donors stepped in to provide additional training and equipment to PNC personnel, concern has been expressed about the ANSP's ability to provide adequate training programmes of its own (ibid., 8).

Controversy over the ANSP erupted when it was discovered that some senior positions in the new police academy were staffed by former security forces personnel (LCHR July 1993, 105; United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 6-7). Reports indicate, however, that the officers have adapted "successfully" to their new role in a civilian police force, and that "those who have been assigned as provisional commanders have conducted themselves in a manner consistent with the PNC" (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 8). The government has ignored ONUSAL's requests for information on whether individuals from the PH, GN or armed forces (FAES) were admitted to the academy as civilians, which would contravene the peace accords (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 6). Although the government is not bound by the accords to submit such a list, the FMLN has reportedly provided ONUSAL with a list of PNC members who formerly belonged to the FAES (El Salvador Information Project 15 Jan. 1994a, 3).

The PNC also had at least one brush with controversy when one of its inspectors, formerly with the National Police, was charged with abusing detainees under his authority. The inspector was transferred to another post rather than being dismissed or disciplined (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 14).

In a mid-February 1994 communiqué, the UN secretary-general expressed his continuing concern over the slow pace of progress with regard to the PNC (Inter Press Service 21 Feb. 1994).

2.5      The National Police (PN)

The National Police was removed from the jurisdiction of the Defense Ministry and the National Guard, Treasury Police and Civil Defense Forces were abolished in 1992 [The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has cautioned that National Guard and Treasury Police forces were only "technically" abolished in 1992; instead "the Cristiani government recast them as 'Military Police' and 'National Border Guards'" (July 1993, 104).] (Country Reports 1992 1993, 396). The peace accords established that the National Police would come under the direction of the presidency and be supervised by approximately 300 ONUSAL police division officers (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 16), yet in 1993 the largest number of human rights complaints received by the Human Rights Ombudsman involved the PN (Country Reports 1993 1994, 433).

The peace accords did not specify how demobilization of the PN was to be implemented (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 18), but the government presented a plan in October 1993 (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 9). The task is to be carried out in two phases: the first, from October 1993 to May 1994, will see 2,400 PN officers demobilized, and the second, from May to October 1994, will phase out an additional 6,850 officers. The plan also calls for the elimination of the Customs Police, consisting of 1,211 officers, once the PNC's Finance Division is fully operational (ibid.). ONUSAL has asked that the demobilization process be speeded up (ibid., 10).

The PN continues to operate and human rights monitors have expressed concerns about its personnel. In 1992 the government transferred over 1,000 former Treasury Police and National Guard personnel into National Police ranks, a move which violated the accords (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 17). The government agreed to stop this practice in May 1992, but ONUSAL later discovered that several complete former counterinsurgency army units had been absorbed into the National Police (ibid.). Further, not only did GN, PH and elite army battalion personnel swell the ranks of the PN, but its funding reportedly increased as well (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 95).

Human rights monitors were particularly alarmed by PN actions during a peaceful May 1993 demonstration by FAES and FMLN veterans. An FMLN veteran and amputee, José Santos Martínez Pérez, was killed when police fired into the crowd of demonstrators. Although a judge subsequently ordered the detention of a PN agent, the force refused to turn him over to civilian authorities (Country Reports 1993 1994, 434; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 97).

2.6        The Armed Forces (FAES)

ONUSAL's October 1993 progress report states that FAES reforms have been implemented "in compliance with the peace agreements and following constitutional amendments, whose basic purpose has been to ensure their subordination to civilian power within the rule of law " (United Nations 14 Oct. 1993, 8). These changes include troop reductions, disbandment of the National Intelligence Department and removal of police functions from military jurisdiction (ibid). After having failed to meet the original November 1992 deadline, on 30 June 1993 the government finally complied with the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendation to purge all 103 officers named by the commission (Country Reports 1993 1994, 437; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 95).

In July 1993, 3,000 soldiers were deployed by the government along the country's highways, purportedly to fight a rising crime wave (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 95-96). Reports indicate that there has been a widespread increase in crime and violence, including robberies, assaults, kidnapping and drug trafficking (Central America Report 21 Jan. 1994, 3; Country Reports 1993 1994, 433; Inter Press Service 20 Sept. 1993; Los Angeles Times 23 Nov. 1993). Except for individuals caught in the act, the army patrols reportedly do not have powers of arrest and are not authorized to stop vehicles or search homes. They have also been excluded from areas that were conflict zones during the civil war. The government has referred to the deployment as "training exercises" (United Nations 15 Sept. 1993, 12; Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 17). An ONUSAL official has stated that there are no indications that the deployed troops have "acted" or arrested anyone to date; so far, the "deployment has worked in a controlled manner" (ONUSAL 3 Feb. 1994b). However, a recent Americas Watch report indicates that in November 1993, deployed troops shot and killed the passenger of a car involved in a hit-and-run incident (News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 10). Further, the wife of the OAS director for agricultural sciences recently accused army personnel of killing her husband during a botched highway robbery attempt. The PNC is reportedly conducting an investigation into the matter (UPI 24 Jan. 1994). No information is available on whether the soldiers involved had been deployed to one of the crime fighting units.

Although the peace accords give the government the right to deploy the military for public security purposes in exceptional circumstances, the UN secretary-general has stated that the government "should" report such cases to the legislative assembly (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 3). However, government actions in this regard "cannot be challenged by the legislature," and there is "no time limit or reporting requirements" (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 18). Concerned observers note that the deployment of soldiers to fight crime contravenes peace accord provisions for the separation of army and police functions, which were intended limit the army's role to external defence (ibid.; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 96). According to Human Rights Watch, government use of the crime issue was "intended to play on public fears, thereby generating support for a continued military role in strictly police matters" (ibid., 96).

Observers have also noted that many citizens, some of them former soldiers, continue to bear arms that should be restricted to armed forces use (La Voz Aug.-Sept. 1993, 6), a situation which is said to contribute to the "climate of increased crime and insecurity" (ICCHRLA July 1993, 9-10). One report describes the situation this way:

armed robbery ... is astonishingly frequent and often carried out with weapons of war, including fully automatic assault rifles, sub-machine guns and grenades. Robbers are not hesitant to shoot anyone who resists, and shootings, knifings, and detonation of grenades occur on a daily basis (Hemisphere Initiatives Sept. 1993, 17).

Former FAES members have been implicated in acts of organized crime and violence (United Nations 15 Sept. 1993, 13-14). Referring to the level of violence in the country, in its eighth report ONUSAL noted that "if military weapons were not so readily available, it could not have reached its current serious level" (ibid., 13). According to a report by the UN secretary-general, recovery of these weapons has been "seriously delayed and cannot be fully implemented" until two laws governing the possession and use of weapons have been enacted (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 4).

Although the peace accords required the FMLN to turn over its weapons stockpiles to the UN (LCHR July 1993, 107), in 1993 the FMLN admitted to having more than 100 arms caches both inside and outside El Salvador (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 96; United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 1). One of these arsenals exploded in Managua in May 1993 (ibid., 3). Verification and destruction of the arsenals is to be carried out by ONUSAL (ibid.) and COPAZ (El Salvador Information Project 15 Jan. 1994a, 3). Destruction of FMLN arms captured by the FAES also requires verification (ibid.).

2.7                Land Reform

In October 1992 the FMLN and El Salvador government accepted the UN secretary-general's proposal on the transfer of land Chapter 5 of the peace accords in three phases to 47,500 potential beneficiaries, including 7,500 FMLN ex-combatants, 15,000 former FAES soldiers and 25,000 tenant farmers (Central America Report 6 Nov. 1992; La Voz Oct. 1993b, 11-12). The three phases were later replaced by two; one ended on 31 December 1993 and the second will end 31 May 1994 (El Salvador Information Project 15 Jan. 1994a, 6).

Progress in the program of land transfers has been much slower than expected. Although this lack of progress has been blamed on the government's lack of political will (La Voz Oct. 1993b, 12; ICCHRLA July 1993, 12; El Salvador Information Project 16 Sept. 1993, 2), the process has been complicated by a number of legal and technical problems including faulty land registers (ibid., 2; ONUSAL 3 Feb. 1994a) and laws that make the transfer of titles slow and difficult (ibid.). Further obstacles to the transfer process include inadequate international funding for land purchases, land market speculation and a volatile agricultural economy (ICCHRLA July 1993, 12). According to an official with ONUSAL's land transfer program, "the original dates set for the transfer of titles were too ambitious ... and the existing laws governing the transfer were not modified to meet the needs of the present situation" (ONUSAL 3 Feb. 1994a).

Although the government believes the FMLN has been politicizing the land transfer process by not complying with commitments to provide accurate lists of potential beneficiaries (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 12), the FMLN has faced several obstacles, including that the lists are often difficult to compile, many people have either died or moved away, and the documents required were destroyed during the civil war (ONUSAL 3 Feb. 1994a).

Reports indicate that some progress has been made in land transfers since the November 1993 creation of a working group representing the government, COPAZ, the FMLN and ONUSAL (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 12; El Salvador Information Project 15 Jan. 1994a, 5-6). According to one estimate, approximately 16 per cent of the 32,500 potential beneficiaries comprising former FMLN combatants and tenant farmers had benefited from legal land transfers by the end of 1993 (ibid.). Nevertheless, in mid-February 1994 the UN secretary-general expressed his continuing concern about the delays and lack of progress with regard to land transfers and the re-integration of former combatants into civilian life (Inter Press Service 21 Feb. 1994).

The FMLN land commission reportedly suggested that the land transfer process was delayed pending the outcome of the March 1994 election (El Salvador Information Project 15 Jan. 1994a, 6). The source stated that if ARENA won the election, "it is feared that the transfer process will become even more difficult than with the present ARENA administration" (ibid.). An ONUSAL official, however, is more optimistic and suggests that the government cannot afford to take such risks: "the beginning of the war was rooted in problems of an economic nature which will only be resolved as long as the land transfer program proceeds" (ONUSAL 3 Feb. 1994a).

According to the Toronto-based Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, disputes over land have resulted in human rights violations in El Salvador (ICCHRLA July 1993, 18-19). ICCHRLA cites the example of Mauricio García, a member of the Mixed Farm Workers Association of El Salvador, who was detained by the PN in January 1993 following a land dispute. Allegedly the judge who ordered the arrest was also acting as the lawyer for the owner of the land in question (ibid.).

2.8               The Electoral Process

The 20 March 1994 elections, which represent a major step in the implementation of the peace accords, saw a large number of offices contested, including those of the president and vice-president, 84 legislative assembly representatives, 262 mayors and 20 delegates to the Central American Parliament (Mesoamerica Dec. 1993, 4). In the presidential race, ARENA's Armando Calderón Sol received 49.2 per cent of the vote as compared to 25.6 per cent for Rubén Zamora, the CD-FMLN-MNR candidate [ On 20 December 1993, the CD-FMLN coalition joined forces with the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) to run common candidates in the elections for president and vice-president (Radio Cadena 20 Dec. 1993). ] (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 1; Latinamerica Press 31 Mar. 1994, 4). Because an absolute majority is required to win on the first ballot, a second round has been scheduled for the end of April (ibid.). In elections for the legislative assembly, 39 seats were won by ARENA, 21 by the FMLN, 18 by the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), four by the National Conciliation Party (PCN), and one each by the Democratic Convergence (CD) and the Unity Movement (MU) (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 1; Reuters 6 Apr. 1994). According to the Latin America Institute of the University of New Mexico, the results give ARENA and their PCN allies enough seats to enact "ordinary" legislation, but not enough for "special" legislation such as constitutional reforms (Notisur 8 Apr. 1994). Although unofficial results indicate that ARENA won in more than 200 of the country's municipalities (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 1), because of "irregularities" the final results have not yet been released (ibid.; NotiSur 8 Apr. 1994). Voter turnout was estimated at between 45 and 60 per cent of the electorate (Los Angeles Times 28 Mar. 1994; ibid. 21 Mar. 1994). Although the final voter registration list contained 2.7 million names, only 2.3 million people had the necessary documentation to vote on election day (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 1).

According to an article in The Independent, there were no reports of violence on election day (The Independent 21 Mar. 1994); another article in the Los Angeles Times states that "no significant violence was reported" (Los Angeles Times 21 Mar. 1994). Reports indicate that army troops were present in and around the northern province of Chalatenango (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 4; The New York Times 13 Apr. 1994), an area controlled by FMLN forces during the civil war (ibid. 20 Mar. 1994).

Reviews of the fairness of the electoral process have been mixed. An official with ONUSAL declared the elections "acceptable" but pointed to "logistical problems" in the electoral process; the head of the US Agency for International Development said that his monitoring group saw "no visible signs of intimidation or evidence of fraud," and that any anomalies were a result of the "complex registration and voting process" (NotiSur 25 Mar. 1994). However, accounts from various other sourcesÄincluding journalists and international monitorsÄindicate that the elections displayed numerous irregularities (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 1; Latinamerica Press 31 Mar. 1994, 4; Inter Press Service 23 Mar. 1994; Los Angeles Times 24 Mar. 1994; ibid. 21 Mar. 1994). While one report suggests that the irregularities "did not necessarily follow political lines" (ibid.), an article in Latinamerica Press points to "a deliberate attempt to skew the results in ARENA's favor" (Latinamerica Press 31 Mar. 1994, 4). Several observers have suggested that there may have been instances of fraud (Agencia Latinoamericana de Información 25 Mar. 1994, 3; Central America Report Apr. 1994, 1; The New York Times 23 Mar. 1994; NotiSur 25 Mar. 1994). Irregularities reported on voting day included inaccuracies in voter lists (Latinamerica Press 31 Mar. 1994, 4; Los Angeles Times 21 Mar. 1994; Central America Report Apr. 1994, 4), the buying of votes (ibid.; Agencia Latinoamericana de Información 25 Mar. 1994, 3), double voting (Los Angeles Times 21 Mar. 1994), the mysterious temporary disappearance of several ballot boxes (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 4), as well as the attempted closing of polls in several towns of Chalatenango (Agencia Latinoamericana de Información 25 Mar. 1994, 3; The New York Times 20 Mar. 1994). There may also have been an oversupply of voting cards (CARECEN 1993, 8; CLAIHR n.d., 5-6). As many as 15 per cent of voters with voting cards may have been turned away at the polls as a result of mistakes on voter lists (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 4), and between 70,000 and 80,000 people who had just turned 18 were not in possession of the necessary voting card (Agencia Latinoamericana de Información 25 Mar. 1994, 3; Inter Press Service 23 Mar. 1994).

The voter registration process, which officially ended 19 November 1993, was marked by problems and controversy. Prior to the deadline, a number of fact-finding delegations, including the Los Angeles-based Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN), the Boston-based Hemisphere Initiatives and the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights (CLAIHR), visited the country to study the process. All three delegations alluded to problems with the main electoral body, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE); most were of a technical, administrative and financial nature (CARECEN Sept. 1993, 6-8; CLAIHR n.d., 3-7; Hemisphere Initiatives Nov. 1993, 1-2). According to CARECEN, at the root of these problems was "the TSE's lack of political will to reform the election process and to broaden voter participation" (CARECEN Sept. 1993, 6). Because staff positions are picked by the political parties (ibid.), observers charge that the body has become too politicized (ibid.; Latinamerica Press 31 Mar. 1994, 4). A majority of the positions are filled by ARENA (ibid.).

Political interference may have been a factor in some municipalities' failure to comply with TSE requirements. Referring to one of ONUSAL's periodic reports, the UN secretary-general noted that municipalities were slow to forward copies of birth certificates to the TSE for application purposes (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 17). On the same matter, Hemisphere Initiatives observes that "sitting mayor[s] may have little interest in expanding voter numbers and possibly diluting the support that elected them" (Hemisphere Initiatives Nov. 1993, 9). Further, CLAIHR heard allegations that TSE officials sympathetic to ARENA were not forwarding applications from areas with strong opposition support (CLAIHR n.d., 7). Following the elections, an editorial in The New York Times noted that "[i]t is at the local level that bungling and fraud may have really skewed the resultsÄmostly, it seems, in favor of ARENA candidates" (The New York Times 23 Mar. 1994). One observer points out that several municipal races were won by fewer than 100 votes (ibid. 13 Apr. 1994).

Hemisphere Initiatives concedes that municipalities often lack the resources needed to copy "voluminous" municipal records for the TSE (Hemisphere Initiatives Nov. 1993, 9); CLAIHR has also alluded to a shortage of supplies and administrative support in rural areas (CLAIHR n.d., 7). Furthermore, many birth certificates, a requirement for TSE approval of a voter card application, were destroyed during the civil war; TSE data indicates that a disproportionate number of individuals in former conflict zones lacked birth certificates (Hemisphere Initiatives Nov. 1993, 9). Central America Report notes that an estimated 80,000 people, "many" from the former conflict zones, lacked birth certificates (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 1). According to an article in the Los Angeles Times, "the highest incidence of frustrated voters occurred in former war zones" (Los Angeles Times 21 Mar. 1994).

2.9 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Although the peace accords have encouraged several non-governmental organizations to obtain legal recognition and to operate in an open manner, official recognition of such organizations, which include trade unions, associations and communities, is "routinely delayed or indefinitely postponed" (LCHR July 1993, 110). In its October progress report, ONUSAL noted that the cases of NGOs seeking legal recognition were still pending (United Nations 14 Oct. 1993, 17). According to Country Reports 1993, however, these delays "did not appear directed at any one group" (Country Reports 1993 1994, 439).

3.       HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Referring to the period covered by ONUSAL's October 1993 progress report, the UN secretary-general noted that the human rights situation has evolved in a somewhat ambivalent fashion, showing in some areas signs of improvement and in others an increase in serious violations. Problems relating to the right to life, individual liberty, personal integrity and due process have intensified. There has been a troubling 34 per cent rise in complaints of arbitrary executions: 43 in the current quarter [May-July], as compared with 32 in the preceding one [February-April] (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 10).

For example, of 94 violations of the right to lifeÄincluding arbitrary executions, attempted executions and death threatsÄdeclared "admissible" [ According to ONUSAL, "complaints and statistics on complaints declared admissible, while indicative of the existence of violations and the starting point for verification procedures, do not necessarily presuppose the existence of a violation" (United Nations 5 Apr. 1993, 11).] by ONUSAL for the period May-July 1993, 33 were "presumed" committed by unknown persons, 22 by irregular groups such as death squads, 11 by PN members, 7 by FAES members, 7 by FMLN members, two by PNC members, one by a member of the judiciary, and another by members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit (ibid. 15 Sept. 1993; 28, 32). Although ONUSAL could not verify any cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances during a 13-month period, it has pointed to the continuing incidence of abductions and an "unusual increase" in complaints of arbitrary detention (ibid., 7).

ONUSAL has also pointed to acts of "organized violence" perpetrated by "armed groups" or "gangs" of former PN, FAES and FMLN combatants, possibly allied with "common criminals" (ibid., 13-14); some of these groups use the names of former paramilitary organizations or death squads (ibid., 14). CD-FMLN-MNR coalition presidential candidate, Rubén Zamora, has criticized the government for treating organized crime as a simple problem of delinquency (Inter Press Service 20 Sept. 1993). Crime and delinquency were common themes among candidates who ran in the March elections (ibid.; Los Angeles Times 23 Nov. 1993).

The end of the civil war initially led to an improvement in certain aspects of human rights, especially in a reduction in extrajudicial killings by security forces members (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 105; Country Reports 1992 1993, 396). However, several non-governmental human rights monitors, including the non-governmental Commission for Human Rights, agree that the situation has since deteriorated (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 94; Central America Report 22 Oct. 1993; La Voz Oct. 1993c, 13). According to the Human Rights Institute of the José Simeón Cañas University, an average of 78 people a month have died violent deaths since the signing of the peace accords, an increase of almost 20 per cent from the last five months of 1992 to the first five months of 1993 (Latin American Regional Reports 30 Sept. 1993).

What troubles human rights monitors most is that political violence is less obvious than it was during the civil war and is now more likely to be "passed off" as common crime (Central America Report Jan.-Feb. 1994, 6; LCHR July 1993, 104; Los Angeles Times 23 Nov. 1993; News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 4). Part of the problem is that the government has been slow to properly investigate crime; in most cases perpetrators go unidentified and violations unpunished (United Nations 15 Sept. 1993, 3). According to Amnesty International, "since the electoral campaign began, many FMLN activists have been targets of apparently political killings and death threats. ... the vast majority of these killings and death threats remain unclarified, with little or no investigation being carried out" (Amnesty International 6 Jan. 1994). Further, the investigation by police and judicial officials of the August 1993 murder of a former FMLN logistics officer, Oscar Grimaldi, has been described by Americas Watch as a "deliberate attempt to cover the tracks of the killers" (News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 5-6). Tutela Legal, the human rights office of San Salvador's Catholic Church, which in the past has disagreed with ONUSAL over the number of death squad killings (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 97), believes that 82 people were killed by death squads in 1993 (Reuters 14 Jan. 1994). According to Central America Report, the PPDH has expressed "particular concern" about "evidence of human rights violations committed for political reasons" (Central America Report 22 Oct. 1993). ONUSAL's eighth report describes as "grave" the "corroboration of politically motivated arbitrary executions or attempted executions which ... constitute a direct and brutal violation of political rights, with regard to which the State cannot escape liability" (United Nations 15 Sept. 1993, 11). ONUSAL's ninth report, referring to the period August-October 1993, notes a "serious regression" in the human rights situation and an "increase in arbitrary executions and the presence of activities of illegal groups, among them the so-called death squads" (qtd. in News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 5).

As a result of mounting domestic and international pressure, the Salvadoran government and the UN agreed to form a commission in early December 1993 to investigate the resurgence in death squad activity. The new commission is composed of two government representatives, the human rights prosecutor and the director of ONUSAL's human rights division (AFP 8 Dec. 1993; Le Devoir 9 Dec. 1993). The commission will operate until 31 May 1994 and will make public a report on its findings and recommendations (Radio Cadena 8 Dec. 1993). Despite initial reports that the commission's work was being delayed (Radio Cadena 12 Jan. 1994), an official with ONUSAL states that it has already begun its investigatory task (ONUSAL 3 Feb. 1994b).

Opposition leaders denounced the spate of death squad-style murders as an attempt to intimidate political candidates and voters before the 1994 elections (This Week 20 Dec. 1993, 285). In late 1993 CDHES noted that "there has been an increase in political violence in terms of death threats, attempted murder and summary or arbitrary executions against people linked to political parties, particularly on the left" (La Voz Nov.-Dec. 1993, 10), as a direct result of the upcoming elections (ibid. Oct. 1993c, 13). According to Americas Watch, the "strong presumption of the reactivation of death squads comes not only from the style of murder and intimidation but also from the fact that, throughout the 1980s, the Salvadoran government failed to prosecute and punish death squad operatives" (News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 4). Although President Cristiani stated his determination to bring any death squad members to justice, he simultaneously rejected as "premature" suggestions that they exist (La Jornada 17 Feb. 1994).

Some observers have linked the rise in political violence to the strong showing in pre-election polls of the CD-FMLN-MNR coalition's presidential candidate, Rubén Zamora (Central America Report Feb. 1994, 7; Latinamerica Press 23 Dec. 1993, 2). According to Latinamerica Press, "analysts suggest that some rightists may fear this development, seeing selective assassinations as a means to stem the left's increasing support" (ibid.). Although he has denied the allegations, ARENA presidential candidate Calderón Sol himself has been linked to civil war violence by CIA documents [ Documents recently declassified by the US government show that US military personnel trained civilians and members of the Salvadoran armed forces during the civil war (The New York Times 14 Dec. 1993). The documents also link senior military officers and officials, as well as wealthy Salvadorans, to death squad activity (ibid. 25 Nov. 1993). The Salvadoran government has denied the allegations (ibid.).] (Los Angeles Times 19 Dec. 1993), and to death squad activities by a group of imprisoned former army officers (ibid. 26 Oct. 1993). A correspondent for The Economist has speculated that the killing of FMLN members may be an attempt to goad the FMLN into seeking reprisals, although he does not say by whom or why (The Economist 19 Nov. 1993). The PNC offered special protection to approximately 60 FMLN election candidates (Central America Report Feb. 1994, 1; Inter Press Service 11 Jan. 1994).

One of the most conspicuous murders of 1993, and one that has given further credibility to fears of political violence, was the 25 October 1993 murder of Francisco Vélis Castellanos, an FMLN congressional candidate in the March 1994 elections (Los Angeles Times 26 Oct. 1993; United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 11). Vélis was shot at close range while dropping off his daughter at a day care centre (El Rescate 25 Oct.-1 Nov. 1993, 1; Los Angeles Times 26 Oct. 1993). On 9 December 1993, Mario López, an FMLN leader who was to have run in the March 1994 elections, was shot to death (Le Devoir 10 Dec. 1993; Reuters 9 Dec. 1993). Although the government claimed he was killed as a result of his efforts to intervene in a robbery attempt, the FMLN denounced the shooting as being politically motivated (ibid.). Nevertheless, the government promised a full investigation of the incident (ibid. 10 Dec. 1993). López's killing came only 24 hours after he had been installed on the newly established commission to investigate political violence in the country (CODEHUCA 10 Dec. 1993).

Another recent killing is that of Jesús Cartagena, an FMLN candidate who was running for Huizúcar municipal council. He and his daughter were killed at home by unidentified men (Inter Press Service 11 Jan. 1994; UPI 11 Jan. 1994). In early February 1994 Israel Bernardino Sium, an FMLN activist, was shot to death by three masked gunmen in his home in Izalco, 70 kilometres west of the capital (San Antonio Express-News 11 Feb. 1994). His death reportedly brings the number of FMLN members killed since the peace accords were signed to 40 (ibid.). Americas Watch notes that estimates of FMLN members killed for political reasons in 1992-93 range from 15 to 36 (News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 3). In October 1993, the FMLN claimed that 103 human rights violations, including threats, kidnappings and torture, had been committed against its members by members of the police, military and death squads (Central America Report 22 Oct. 1993). Celia Medrano, secretary-general of the non-governmental CDHES, suggests that those targeted have generally been "people at the grassroots who could favour an electoral advantage for the FMLN and the Democratic Convergence" (Central America Report Jan.-Feb. 1994, 7).

Members of other opposition parties have also been targeted. In May 1993, a member of the Democratic Convergence was kidnapped, tortured and then released by unidentified armed men (Le Devoir 16 Dec. 1993). The house of a Christian Democratic Party leader, Arturo Argumendo, was hit by a hand grenade on 17 December 1993. The source states only that Argumendo was unharmed; it did not speculate on who might be responsible or why the attack was carried out (The Dallas Morning News 18 Dec. 1993). On 27 March 1994, unidentified gunmen killed Heriberto Galicia, an MNR candidate who ran unsuccessfully in the March 20 parliamentary elections (Chicago Tribune 29 Mar. 1994; Reuters 28 Mar. 1994).

ARENA members have also been killed. Bodies of three ARENA members were discovered in late 1993 (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 11). Another ARENA member was shot dead on 24 November 1993 by unidentified gunmen in Moraz n Department (ACAN 25 Nov. 1993; Latin American Weekly Report 9 Dec. 1993). According to an article in The Independent, the November killing of an ARENA member may have been the work of "breakaway FMLN militants who have pledged an 'armed campaign' against the death squads" (The Independent 11 Nov. 1993). In mid-February 1994 two members of ARENA's youth wing were killed in separate incidents. One was killed in his car in Ciudad Barrios while the other was shot at point-blank range by two attackers in Cojutepeque (La Jornada 16 Feb. 1994). Attacks were reportedly carried out against two other ARENA members. Although one of the victims implicated the FMLN in the attack, the party denied any involvement (ibid.).

Mistakes may have been made in attributing political motives to certain cases of violence. For example, the UN secretary-general's November report refers to the October murder of FMLN National Council Member Eleno Castro (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 11). The FMLN originally denounced the murder as being politically motivated, but in late December, after conducting its own investigation, the FMLN stated that Castro had been murdered in a traffic dispute (Reuters 20 Dec. 1993). According to a 10 January 1994 Amnesty International Urgent Action, ONUSAL also expressed its satisfaction with a National Police investigation concluding that his murder was not politically motivated(Amnesty International 10 Jan. 1994).

Police personnel and former intelligence officers have also been killed. Two members of the National Police were kidnapped and killed on 1 December 1993, although the motive for these killings was not clear (Boston Globe 2 Dec. 1993; Reuters 1 Dec. 1993). Former military intelligence personnel, some of whom had started to share information with human rights groups on atrocities committed during the civil war, were reportedly killed in 1993 (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 97). According to former defence minister General Emilio Ponce, the military has also been targeted. Ponce, who was named in the Truth Commission report as the intellectual author of the murder of six Jesuit priests in 1989, stated in mid-1993 that 42 attempts had been sustained by the military since the beginning of the year, some from "radical and crazy" former guerrillas (Central America Report 9 July 1993, 198). Americas Watch indicates that 50 to 60 FAES personnel were killed in 1992-93, but notes that there were "few indications of political motivation" (News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 3).

Attacks have also been carried out against union members and human rights monitors. For example, in February 1993 a member of the Workers' Association of the Ministry of Public Works (ATMOP), José Alberto Delgado Noyola, and National Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS) member Freddy Fernando Torres Portillo, were killed in separate incidents (ICCHRLA July 1993, 17). Two active members of the Committee of Mothers and Families of Prisoners, the Disappeared, and Victims of Political Assassinations of El Salvador (CO-MADRES), Juan Carlos García Panameño and Manuel de Jesús Panameño, were killed in 1993. Their hands had been tied behind their backs and their bodies showed signs of torture (ibid.). According to Country Reports 1993, the CIDH and ONUSAL have agreed that the murders were not politically motivated but the result of a robbery attempt (Country Reports 1993 1994, 435). The son and nephew of CO-MADRES leader Alicia de García were also tortured and killed in 1993 (ICCHRLA July 1993, 17).

According to Country Reports 1993, death threats continue to occur (Country Reports 1993 1994, 434). Of 40 cases judged admissible by ONUSAL in its eighth report, "many" were "designed to intimidate persons because of their ideas or party affiliation" (United Nations 15 Sept. 1993, 6). Threats have been made against FMLN members (Amnesty International 6 Jan. 1994; Central America Report 22 Oct. 1993; Mesoamerica Dec. 1993), senior FAES officials (Central America Report 9 July 1993, 198; Country Reports 1993 1994, 435-36; United Nations 15 Sept. 1993, 6), PN and PNC members (Country Reports 1993 1994, 434), foreign and local media, often through ads in local newspapers (LCHR July 1993, 108), candidates and family members of candidates running in the upcoming elections (Mesoamerica Dec. 1993, 4; Central America Report 21 Jan. 1994, 4; El Salvador Information Project 15 Jan. 1994b, 4), a former death squad member who had accused an ex-government minister of death squad involvement (ibid.) and human rights monitors (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1993, 98; ICCHRLA July 1993, 18), including the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (News from Americas Watch Mar. 1994, 11). Of the 1552 complaints received by the PPDH between September 1993 and January 1994, 23.2 per cent involved threats of bodily injury or death (La Jornada 17 Feb. 1994).

Some of these threats have been made by individuals or groups using the methods and names of death squads that operated during the civil war (Country Reports 1993 1994, 434; La Voz Nov.-Dec. 1993, 10; Los Angeles Times 26 Oct. 1993). For example, José María Méndez, a well known attorney and friend of FMLN leader Francisco Lima, fled El Salvador in December 1993 after receiving threats from the Maximiliano Hern ndez Martínez Brigade. The threats indicated that harm would come to his family unless he convinced Lima not to run in the 1994 elections (The Christian Science Monitor 20 Jan. 1994; El Salvador Information Project 15 Dec. 1993, 4).

4.                FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Much work remains to be done in El Salvador in order for the peace accords to be fully implemented and a lasting peace to be secured. One of the critical challenges facing the government administration is the extent to which former FMLN and FAES combatants can be effectively re-integrated into civilian society; in the case of El Salvador, a large part of the re-integration process involves the transfer of land. Delays in fulfilling promises made to former combatants "has given rise to tension which, as the situation in a neighbouring country has shown, can become a dangerous source of instability" (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 20). Some observers fear that ARENA's victory in the March 20 elections will endanger the implementation of the peace accords (The Irish Times 5 Apr. 1994).

Another potential source of instability is the current state of the Salvadoran economy. According to one report, analysts believe that the structural adjustment policies being pursued by the government in the absence of welfare programmes to cushion the hardship that such policies often impose on the poorer sectors of society, are "creating the potential for future conflicts of unknown scale, and putting in real jeopardy the few advances made towards peace" (La Voz Aug.-Sept. 1993, 7). Ironically, improvements in economic and social infrastructure have been slowest in the former conflict zones, the areas where they are most needed (United Nations 23 Nov. 1993, 16-17).

One of the most threatening sources of instability in the country is the escalating level of organized crime and violence, particularly political violence. It has been observed that this type of violence "seriously affects the stability of the peace process by eroding confidence and security, which are its fundamental bases" (ibid. 23 Nov. 1993, 10). Although it is difficult to determine the extent to which "this climate of violence and impunity acted as an intimidating factor on voters [in the elections], ... it would tend to affirm voters' sense of gloom and discouragement about the impact of the electoral exercise" (Central America Report Apr. 1994, 5).

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Los Angeles Times. 26 October 1993. Home Edition. Tracy Wilkinson. "Leading Leftist Politician Assassinated in El Salvador." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 2-18 Nov. 1993, Vol. 6, No. 19)

Mesoamerica [San Salvador]. December 1993. Vol. 12, No. 12. "El Salvador."

The New York Times. 13 April 1994. Final Edition. Letter to the Editor. "Salvador Election Made Tammany Look Pure." (NEXIS)

The New York Times. 23 March 1994. "El Salvador's Messed-Up Elections." (WEB)

The New York Times. 20 March 1994. Howard W. French. "El Salvador Bars Voting in 3 Towns." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 7-20 Mar. 1994, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 4)

The New York Times. 14 December 1993. Tim Weiner. "Documents Assert U.S. Trained Salvadorans Tied to Death Squads." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 29 Nov.-12 Dec. 1993, Vol. 8, No. 22, p. 5)

The New York Times. 25 November 1993. Final Edition. Clifford Krauss. "A Salvador Denial on Death Squads." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 23-29 Nov. 1993, Vol. 6, No. 22)

The New York Times. 11 November 1993. "Salvador is Said to Renege on Police Pledge." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 1-14 Nov. 1993, Vol. 8, No. 20, pp. 4-5)

News from Americas Watch [New York]. March 1994. Vol. 6, No. 4. "El Salvador: Darkening Horizons: Human Rights on the Eve of the March 1994 Elections."

NotiSur. 8 April 1994. "El Salvador: Official Election Results Give Right Wing Parties Simple Majority in Legislative Assembly." (NEXIS)

NotiSur. 25 March 1994. "El Salvador: General Elections Marred by Irregularities and Fraud." (NEXIS)

ONUSAL. 7 February 1994. Telephone interview with an official of the Electoral Division.

ONUSAL. 3 February 1994a. Telephone interview with an official of the Land Transfer Program.

ONUSAL. 3 February 1994b. Telephone interview with an official of the Human Rights Division.

Radio Cadena [San Salvador, in Spanish]. 12 January 1994. "Cristiani Discusses Peace Accords, Police." (FBIS-LAT-94-010 14 Jan. 1994, pp. 11-12)

Radio Cadena [San Salvador, in Spanish]. 20 December 1993. "Three Left-Wing Parties Form Election Coalition." (FBIS-LAT-93-243 21 Dec. 1993, p. 19)

Radio Cadena [San Salvador, in Spanish].8 December 1993. "Swears In Investigative Commission." (FBIS-LAT-93-235 9 Dec. 1993, p. 26)

Reuters. 6 April 1994. BC Cycle. Alberto Barrera. "Salvador Ruling Party Won March Legislative Elections." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 28 March 1994. BC Cycle. "Leftist Politician Shot Dead in El Salvador." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 14 January 1994. BC Cycle. "Salvador Opposition Says Death Squads Inside Army." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 11-17 Jan. 1994, Vol. 7, No. 3)

Reuters. 20 December 1993. BC Cycle. "Former Salvadoran Rebels Drop Death Squad Charge." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 14-20 Dec. 1993, Vol. 6, No. 25)

Reuters. 10 December 1993. BC Cycle. "Salvador Ex-Rebels Blame Death Squads for Murder." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 7-13 Dec. 1993, Vol. 6, No. 24)

Reuters. 9 December 1993. BC Cycle. "Gunmen Kill Former Rebel Commander in El Salvador." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 7-13 Dec. 1993, Vol. 6, No. 24)

Reuters. 1 December 1993. BC Cycle. "Gunmen Kill Two Salvadoran Policemen." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 30 Nov.-6 Dec. 1993, Vol. 6, No. 23)

San Antonio Express-News. 11 February 1994. "Masked Gunmen Kill Salvadoran Militant." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 7-20 Feb. 1994, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 2)

This Week [Miami Springs]. 20 December 1993. Vol. 16, No. 48. "Salvador Crisis Deepens."

United Nations. 1993. (ST/HR/4/Rev.7). International Instruments: Chart of Ratifications as at 31 January 1993.

United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council. 15 September 1993. (A/47/1012 S/26416). The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development.

United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council. 5 April 1993. (A/47/912 S/25521). The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development.

United Nations, Public Inquiries Unit, Department of Public Information. May 1993. Summary of the Truth Commission Report on El Salvador.

United Nations, Security Council. 23 November 1993. (S/26790). Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador.

United Nations, Security Council. 14 October 1993. (S/26581). Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador.

The United Press International (UPI). 24 January 1994. BC Cycle. "Official's Death Under Investigation in El Salvador." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 18-24 Jan. 1994, Vol. 7, No. 4)

The United Press International (UPI). 11 January 1994. BC Cycle. "Candidate for Former Guerrillas Slain in El Salvador." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 11-17 Jan. 1994, Vol. 7, No. 3)

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