The Police and Judiciary

 

1.   INTRODUCTION

Argentina's defeat in the 1982 Falkland Islands conflict ended the military junta's rule and led to a return to democratic government and the election of Raúl Alfonsín in 1983. The massive human rights abuses common under military rule gave way to a rebuilding of democratic structures and a renewed interest in the protection of human rights. In 1984 Argentina signed and ratified the Inter-American Human Rights Convention and approved the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992, 68), and in 1986 Argentina signed and ratified the UN Convention Against Torture (Garro 5 Oct. 1993). The country's constitution also prohibits the use of torture (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 24; Gracer 1 Oct. 1993). In September 1992 Argentina amended its criminal code to, among other things, provide for oral and public trials at the federal level (Country Reports 1992 1993, 324), in order to make the criminal process more open and expedient (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 43; Financial Times 9 Sept. 1992).

In recent years, according to two human rights groups in Argentina, the Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights (Movimiento Ecumenico Por Los Derechos Humanos/MEDH) and the Center for Legal and Social Studies (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales/CELS), Argentines have been developing an increased awareness of and sensitivity to questions of individual rights and guarantees; they were both more ready to denounce human rights violations and to stand up for their own rights (Movimiento Ecumenico Jan. 1993, 3; Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 4). At the same time, however, Argentines were demanding that police use a "strong hand" in dealing with crime (ibid., 7), and there has been concern that police have committed abuses and the judiciary has been unable to act independently (Inter Press Service 4 Jan. 1992; Mignone 19 May 1993; LCHR 1993, 19-23).

2.       THE POLICE

2.1              The Structure of the Police

There are two levels of police forces in Argentina-the federal force which is responsible to the minister of the interior and the provincial forces which report to the provincial governors (Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992, 79-80). The federal force is responsible for dealing with crimes such as drug-trafficking that are under federal jurisdiction, as well as for the federal district of Tierra del Fuego (the southernmost territory in Argentina) and certain territories within the provinces (Garro 5 Oct. 1993). While statistics on the size of police forces are not readily available, one report puts the federal force in Buenos Aires at about 28,000 (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 8), while another puts it at 35,000 (UPI 30 Nov. 1991). One source indicates that the size of the federal force did not change between 1970 and 1991 (La Nación 29 Nov. 1992, 30). Each provincial force is headed by a chief or an inspector general, and is usually divided into rural and urban forces. Sizes of the provincial forces vary widely (Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992, 80), but Buenos Aires province, with a population of more than 13 million, has approximately 36,000 officers (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 8).

2.2              The Issue of Abuses by Police

[ In general the sources do not identify or distinguish between the various police forces; however, where possible the force being referred to is identified. ]            Police violence and impunity have a long history that is founded on authoritarianism and recurrent military coups (Country Reports 1993 1994, 348; Notisur 22 Jan. 1992). During the last military dictatorship, the police forces in Argentina acted under the direction of and according to the wishes of the junta. The police carried out activities with impunity, at times contravening the country's constitution which prohibits the use of torture (Gracer 1 Oct. 1993; Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 24). Between 1976 and 1983, the military regime employed both the army and police in the "dirty war." Thousands of Argentines were kidnapped, tortured and murdered in this period by the security forces (ibid., 7).

In 1986 and 1987 the Alfonsín government halted the prosecutions of military and police personnel charged with having committed human rights abuses during the military dictatorship (Amnesty International Oct. 1992, 3; Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 4), and in 1989 and 1990, Carlos Menem, Alfonsín's successor, pardoned those previously convicted (ibid., 3; Human Rights Watch Apr. 1991, 67). Human rights and opposition groups charged that instead of assisting the process of national reconciliation, these events sent a signal to police that they could continue to act with impunity (LCHR 1993, 20; Amnesty International Oct. 1992, 3-4).

In its 1993 Critique, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) stated that there was "continued use by the police in 1992 of methods which are indistinguishable from those utilized by security forces during the prior military dictatorship ..." (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 20). Such methods included torture, beatings, kidnapping and detention (ibid., 19; Country Reports 1992 1993, 322-23). The fact that many people involved in human rights abuses under the dictatorship have remained in positions of power is considered one of the most important reasons for the continuation of this problem (Latinamerica Press 4 Mar. 1993, 5; Fairburn 1 Oct. 1993; Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 5). A 1991 Americas Watch and CELS report states that the police had been using torture and violence routinely for many years, and changing these tendencies would take time (ibid., 20). While the scale of such abuses has been dramatically reduced since the "dirty war" (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 26), Maria Adela Antokoletz, the assistant to the general coordinator of the Ecumenical Human Rights Movement, stated in March 1993 that violent arrests and arbitrary punishment of suspects for common crimes continued in Argentina (Latinamerica Press 4 Mar. 1993, 5). Country Reports 1992 states that even though the penal code explicitly protects individual rights and limits police powers of arrest and investigation, these limits were not always observed nor were violators seriously disciplined (1993, 323). The 1993 report on human rights practices states, however, that the number of police abuses reportedly declined in 1993 and that there are instances of officers having been held accountable for abuses (Country Reports 1993 1994, 348). The same report states, however, that "the efficacy of legal actions of this nature varies widely, however, depending on the court within whose jurisdiction the case falls, the attitude of the local authorities, and the efficacy of police internal review mechanisms" (ibid.).

The above-mentioned sources do not specify whether the police act on their own in or in accordance with the wishes of higher authorities. According to Arturo Bregaglio, the director of the Cordoba-based human rights organization Centre for Popular Communication and Legal Advice (Centro de Comunicacion Popular y Asesoramiento Legal/CECOPAL), the police act as the "effective arm of the government in power" (Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993) while Emilio Mignone, the director of the Centre for Legal and Social Studies in Buenos Aires, on the other hand, claims that the police are basically apolitical and are concerned with promoting their own power and interests (Mignone 19 May 1993).

2.2.1                Groups at Potential Risk

Although in theory police forces are required to report to higher government authorities, Alejandro Garro, a professor of law at Columbia University, states that no section of Argentine society is exempt from abuses because the police operate without oversight (Garro 5 Oct. 1993). Nevertheless, Garro points out that certain sectors of society are more at risk because they have more contact with police (Garro 5 Oct. 1993). Such groups include the poor, the young and suspected criminals (Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993; Country Reports 1992, 1993, 323). A recent Amnesty International study noted that in Corrientes and Chaco provinces, the victims of human rights abuses by police were often from the poorest sectors of society, and included minors and people with records for petty crimes (Amnesty International Nov. 1993, 1).

In the past several years there have been many accusations that police in Argentina use extreme measures in their treatment of petty criminals. A 1992 CELS report claims that in the greater Buenos Aires area between January 1991 and June 1992, police killed 126 criminal suspects in "shootouts" (CELS Sept. 1992). The report identified most of the victims as young males, a majority of them minors (LCHR 1993, 19).

According to a recent UNICEF study, the percentage of Argentines living below the poverty line grew from 20.6 per cent to 34.5 per cent between 1980 and 1992 (Alerta May-June 1993, 5). Mignone claims that anyone living in a shanty town who is accused of a crime may be systematically tortured by police to extract a confession (Mignone 19 May 1993). In recent years CELS has been attempting to bring to trial police officers accused of such activities, sometimes successfully (ibid.).

In their 1991 report, Americas Watch and CELS state that an "experienced human rights lawyer" told them that torture was used in cases where the suspect was poor and charged with crimes such as robbery, rape or some other serious crime against an individual, especially in cases where the victim was middle class or there was some other reason for community concern (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 20). In 1993, Mignone expressed the opinion that the poor may be subject to such treatment because they are unaware of their options for redress, whereas middle-class persons, being better informed, are unlikely to be subjected to such abuses (Mignone 19 May 1993).

Argentine youths, especially males, are often victimized by the police (Country Reports 1992 1993, 323; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1991, 141). Youths, who have been most affected by economic hardships such as unemployment and poverty, are perceived to be a threat to law and order (NACLA Dec. 1992, 13). In addition to arbitrary arrest (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1991, 141), the young are especially at risk of torture, which some police in Argentina regard as an "accept[able] mode of interrogation and repression" (LCHR 1993, 20; Gracer 1 Oct. 1993).

According to Mignone, young males are sometimes beaten by police after leaving rock concerts, often because they are suspected of using drugs (Mignone 19 May 1993). Several human rights groups have described the case of Pablo Guardati, a young man who was beaten by police after a concert in Mendoza province and later died of his injuries (ibid.). While the Guardati case forced some senior police officers to resign and almost forced a minister's resignation (Mignone 19 May 1993), the four officers most directly involved in the case were "detained for questioning" (Country Reports 1993 1994, 348-49). Ten officers implicated in covering up the case were later reassigned and four officers were charged with "attempting to pay bribes for false testimony" (ibid.).

Incidents of police brutality against young men declined in 1993 over 1992, and accused officers are reportedly facing disciplinary and legal actions (ibid., 349). However, Maria Teresa Schnack, president of the Commission of Parents and Relatives of Innocent Victims of Police Violence, stated in November 1993 that her organization has files on 100 young people killed by police over the previous two years (The Dallas Morning News 20 Nov. 1993). Another report states that the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo reported 37 "unclarified disappearances" in 1993, and claimed that security forces were responsible for more than 100 killings (Inter Press Service 9 Dec. 1993).

Bregaglio states that people who oppose government policies may be at risk of abuse by police (Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993). A scandal made public in June 1993, highlights the issue of abuse of power by the police. It was discovered that police in Buenos Aires province had asked school authorities to determine the ideological leanings of students (AFP 25 June 1993; Latin American Weekly Report 15 July 1993, 315). The scope of the scandal broadened when it was discovered that police in at least four other provinces had been undertaking similar activities (ibid.). Not only were students under surveillance, so were their teachers and parents, journalists, trade unionists and leaders of a movement for higher pensions (ibid.; Inter Press Service 2 July 1993; Buenos Aires Herald 27 June 1993). The scandal struck many Argentines as being reminiscent of the types of activities they had been subjected to under the dictatorship (AFP 25 June 1993; Gracer 1 Oct. 1993; Chicago Tribune 1 July 1993).

After the case was made public, the government demanded that all security forces desist from conducting "actions to collect information which might damage individual rights" (Buenos Aires Herald 2 July 1993). At least five police officials were suspended because of the operation (ibid.; AFP 25 June 1993). The suspended officers stated that their orders had come from above, prompting then Interior Minister Gustavo Beliz to admit that the country's security organization, the Consejo de Seguridad Interna (CSI), had planned the operation (Latin American Weekly Report 15 July 1993, 315). Three of the suspended officers were reinstated shortly after the replacement of the police commander who had been dismissed (Noticias 28 June 1993).

2.2.2   Corruption and Extortion Within the Police Forces

According to Bregaglio, corruption such as bribery and extortion within the police forces is a problem in Argentina (Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993). High-ranking former and active federal police officers were implicated in a kidnapping ring in November 1991 (The New York Times 8 Dec. 1991). The Menem government undertook a "rigorous" investigation of the ring and the interior minister predicted that 500 police officers from the city of Buenos Aires would be dismissed (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1991, 144; UPI 30 Nov. 1991). In October 1993, Bregaglio stated that no police officers had been dismissed as a result of this case (Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993); however, despite references to dismissals of Buenos Aires police officers in 1992 and 1993 (see section 2.5), it is not clear from other sources whether any officers were fired as a result of this investigation.

In April 1993, allegations of misappropriation of funds, bribery, extortion, telephone bugging and other offences were levelled against the head of the anti-drug campaign, Alberto Lestelle, and his anti-drug-trafficking organization (Clarín 18 Feb. 1993). Reports from mid-1993 indicate that Lestelle's personal wealth had increased by $500,000 after only two years in office (Latin American Weekly Report 2 Sept. 1993, 399; Latin America Regional Reports 5 Aug. 1993).

2.3              Police and the Media

According to Mignone, the Argentine media is making important advances in investigating and reporting on human rights abuses committed by police and on the ineffectiveness of the judiciary in dealing with such problems (Mignone 19 May 1993). Print journalists have also become more involved in uncovering corruption and criticizing government policies (Hemisfile Sept. 1992, 5; Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 96). However, there are risks to this type of activity, and there have been numerous reports of attacks on and threats to both journalists and newspapers (LCHR 1993, 19; CPJ 1992, 95-97). One human rights activist contends that the media has effectively become the political opposition in Argentina, and that this has contributed to the increase in attacks on the press (Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993). Although Menem has condemned attacks and threats against journalists, he has also added that attacks are "always against those who are notorious critics of the government" (ibid.), and that such threats and attacks should be regarded as an occupational hazard of journalism (Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993; Los Angeles Times 2 Oct. 1993; Amnesty International Jan. 1994, 4). In September 1993, Menem nominated a special attorney to investigate and bring to justice those responsible for attacks on journalists (ibid., 5).

While it is not always clear who is responsible for such threats and attacks (Gracer 1 Oct. 1993), some cases directly implicate the police. Amnesty International has documented three such cases of attacks on and threats to journalists between September 1992 and November 1993 (Amnesty International Jan. 1994, 10, 13, 21). In one series of incidents, journalists were reportedly attacked by police while covering demonstrations in September and October 1992 (CPJ 1992, 98). On 14 August 1993, six journalists covering anti-Menem demonstrators during a presidential address in Buenos Aires were assaulted by thugs believed to be working for the police and some members of the government (Latinamerica Press 19 Aug. 1993, 1; Los Angeles Times 2 Oct. 1993; The New York Times 1 Sept. 1993). The government appointed Luis Patti [ See also Section 2.5, p. 11.], a police official previously accused of human rights abuses, to run the central market where the thugs were reportedly recruited (The Independent 18 Sept. 1993; Latin American Weekly Report 23 Sept. 1993, 434; Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993). Despite these allegations of police involvement in attacks, there have also been reports of the police protecting threatened journalists, as was the case when Enrique Sdrech, a reporter with Clarín, had his home attacked by unknown assailants (CPJ 1992, 98).

2.4     Police Forces and the Public

The recession has contributed to both an increase in crime in Argentina and pressure on the police to maintain law and order. For this reason many Argentines reportedly applaud the heavy-handed and abusive tactics sometimes used by police (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 25; Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 7).

In early 1992 Mignone claimed that the middle class in particular supported the use of police violence to stem the increase in robberies and other crimes resulting from Argentina's economic problems (Inter Press Service 4 Jan. 1992). That development would appear to parallel a "basic apathy on the part of the population at large, whose attitude towards law enforcement is bred of cynicism, despair, a long history of bad experiences with police abuses, and an inefficient judiciary" (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 33).

While there continues to be strong support among Argentines for forceful measures by police in fighting crime, there is also a growing political movement which condemns police impunity (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 27; Gracer 1 Oct. 1993). A number of human rights and advocacy groups focusing on groups perceived to be at risk have been formed in Argentina. For example, the Commission of Relatives of Victims of Institutional Violence was formed to monitor and denounce instances of police violence, especially against young people (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 4; Country Reports 1992 1993, 323). The Communidad Homosexual Argentina has been outspoken in promoting the rights of homosexuals (Garro 5 Oct. 1993), and groups advocating women's rights have also been formed (Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993).

2.5      Efforts to Control the Police Forces

In September 1992 the federal code of criminal procedure was amended to "restrict police powers and to protect individual rights," but at year's end the new code "remained largely unenforced" (LCHR 1993, 21). The amended code places limits on police power to arrest and interview suspects; a court order must be obtained to detain any suspect not caught in the act; a judge must be informed of the arrest within six hours; and police may not take a statement from a suspect unless an attorney is present (AP 9 Nov. 1992; ibid. 3 Oct. 1992).

Country Reports 1993 states that the interior ministry has created a sub-secretariat for human rights and, in December 1993, created a national ombudsman or "people's defender" (Country Reports 1993 1994, 352). The ministry is reportedly implementing human rights education to help control abuses by police and to improve their image (ibid.).

While emphasizing its concerns respecting the impunity of police in practice, Americas Watch and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales also indicated in its 1991 report that sources of redress for police violence do exist, including criminal process, administrative sanctions, internal management controls and civil liability (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 9). Criminal prosecution of police officers is reportedly becoming more frequent (Country Reports 1992 1993, 323; Country Reports 1993 1994, 349). In a July 1993 effort to improve the image of the Buenos Aires provincial police force, the secretary for security announced broad new measures which resulted in the dismissal of at least 1000 police officers from the force (Country Reports 1993 1994, 349). There have also been a number of reports of police officers being reprimanded, charged and imprisoned for alleged instances of abuse. In September 1992 a judge in San Juan sentenced three police officers to life in prison for torturing and killing a witness in a homicide case (Country Reports 1992 1993, 323). In September 1992, the Buenos Aires provincial government announced the firing of 800 provincial police officers charged with various crimes and misconduct (ibid.).

Despite these indications that efforts are being made to control the police, Garro, writing for Columbia Journal of Transnational Law in 1993 states that the police bureaucracy often fails to institute serious internal controls (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 32). Both Garro and Jeffrey Gracer indicated in telephone interviews that, in general, the federal and provincial governments do not appear to be using administrative methods or criminal processes to control police in a systematic and effective manner (Garro 5 Oct. 1993; Gracer 1 Oct. 1993). In some cases police officers have been convicted and imprisoned, but in many they have been absolved (Gracer 1 Oct. 1993) even when the evidence overwhelmingly points toward their guilt (LCHR 1993, 19; Bregaglio 12 Oct. 1993).

Americas Watch and CELS claimed that in the cases studied in their 1991 report, prosecutions of police accused of abuses were most successful in cases where the trials were open and public, where the public supported the trial and pushed for conviction, and where the victims' lawyers mobilized the neighbourhood in support of witnesses (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 16). CELS has attempted to bring to trial police officers allegedly involved in human rights violations, and to have Congress impeach judges who will not convict officers charged with abuses (Mignone 19 May 1993).

There have been instances, such as the Luis Patti case, when political forces have vocally condoned police violence (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 14). This case highlights the contradictions surrounding protection issues in Argentina. Patti, a police official, was accused of involvement in the deaths of two Peronist militants during the final days of the dictatorship, as well as in the killings of two teenagers accused of assault who later were discovered to have been innocent. When a judge ordered Patti to trial there was a public demonstration in support of him, and the judicial system was manipulated to replace the judge who initiated the investigation. Patti was praised for his hardline approach by two provincial governors, Antonio Cafiero and Eduardo Duhalde (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1991, 139; Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 7, 22-23). Even President Menem voiced his support for Patti, stating "he does everything well" (ibid., 23).

A January 1992 Inter Press Service report stated that 18 cases of killing and torture had been "recently committed" by police in outlying areas of Buenos Aires, and cited a report on police violence stating that none of these cases had been or were being adequately investigated, and that no punishment had been meted out to those responsible (Inter Press Service 4 Jan. 1992).

In two February 1993 cases in Sante Fé, police officers were held accountable for abuses. In the first case, four officers were sentenced for raping and corrupting two minors (Clarín 7 Feb. 1993), and in the second, 12 officers were detained pending investigation into the beating death of a man while in police custody (P gina 12 10 Feb. 1993).

3. THE JUDICIARY

Many judges in Argentina were appointed during the dictatorship and have a long history of condoning extralegal police tactics (LCHR 1993, 20-21). Although some police officers accused of committing abuses have been investigated, tried and convicted, some sources indicate that the judiciary's failure to prosecute seriously has been a major reason for continuing police violence (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 32-33; Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 21). Another problem is that the judiciary has insufficient resources to investigate independently allegations of police torture, and therefore must accept the results of police investigations (LCHR 1993, 21). Furthermore, there have been instances where judges who attempted their own investigations were threatened and subjected to other forms of intimidation (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 32-33).

3.1    Structure of the Judiciary

The court system in Argentina is divided into federal and provincial systems. At the top of the federal system is the Supreme Court, which consists of nine justices appointed by the executive. There are federal appeals courts in nine provinces, each with three justices. Each province has a single-judge district court, and there are also single-judge territorial courts (Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992, 79).

In the provincial court system, each province has a supreme court and courts of appeal and courts of first instance. Provincial court judges are appointed in accordance with provincial constitutions, most of which mirror the federal constitution, meaning that judges are generally appointed by provincial governors (Garro 5 Oct. 1993). The provincial and federal courts are independent of each other, but some measure of centralized control is exerted by the interior ministry's secretary of state for justice. There are also minor courts such as juvenile courts and courts of justices of the peace (Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992, 79).

3.2              Factors Affecting Judicial Independence

The independence of the judiciary is a hotly debated topic in Argentina. President Menem claims that the judiciary is independent (La Prensa 13 July 1993; Noticias Argentinas 10 June 1993). Mignone agrees that it is independent in principle, but explains that there are some operational deficiencies (Mignone 19 May 1993). Hebe de Bonafini, president of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, contends that the judiciary is under the control of the executive (Inter Press Service 9 Dec. 1993). In practice, the judiciary is slow and cumbersome (Country Reports 1992 1993, 323; Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 72), although the introduction of oral trials at the federal court level and plans to appoint an additional 220 judges may help resolve the intense pressure on the judicial system (La Nación 29 Nov. 1992, 30). Oral public trials reportedly functioned on a "partial basis" in 1993 (Country Reports 1993 1994, 349).

3.2.1                Intimidation and Harassment

Several cases of judges being threatened and harassed have been documented in Argentina in the past several years (Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers 1992, 19-20; ibid. 1991, 12-15). Often the judges were involved in politically sensitive cases or cases involving police officers (ibid.; LCHR 1993, 21; Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 15). While it is not always clear who is making such threats, according to Country Reports 1993, "there is credible reason to believe that such attacks were sometimes perpetrated by the police or the military" (Country Reports 1993 1994, 350). In late 1991, Americas Watch and CELS claimed that such threats were part of "the pattern of authoritarian menace ... that has been part of Argentine life since before the military dictatorship of the seventies" (Americas Watch and CELS Dec. 1991, 15). As Garro has pointed out, "judges, lawyers, victims, and witnesses are not encouraged to cooperate in a criminal investigation when their lives, and those of their family members, are threatened" (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 32-33).

In a 1993 case, a judge in Rosario who was investigating six police officers for their involvement in Rosario's largest drug-trafficking organization (Clarín 27 May 1993a) was offered police protection during the investigation (Country Reports 1993 1994, 350). She claimed, however, that she had not required special protection until her investigation implicated police officers in the case (Clarín 27 May 1993b).

3.2.2 Corruption Within the Judiciary

Although Garro states that "the Argentine judiciary has been comparatively and relatively free of the endemic problem of corruption affecting the administration of justice in other Latin American countries" (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 73), financial compensation for judges has been declared unacceptably low, thus "the incentive to bribe is present in virtually every case ..." (ibid., n.233). Judicial bodies have frequently argued for increased compensation. The Supreme Court and the executive branch clashed on the subject of judges' salaries before agreeing to a compromise amount late in 1991 (ibid., n.235).

Judges have been subject to impeachment charges of corruption or political favouritism. At least four federal judges had impeachment charges brought against them between November 1991 and November 1992 (ibid., 98, n.316). However, Judge Maria Servini de Cubria (see below) reportedly received death threats shortly after having reported another judge to the Supreme Court for a possible violation of "professional responsibilities" in a case over which he was presiding (Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers 1991, 15). More recently she accused a former justice minister of attempting to bribe her to stop an investigation into the involvement of former government officials in a drug-money-laundering scheme (Buenos Aires Herald 30 May 1993).

3.2.3     Interference by the Executive Branch

Judges, journalists and human rights activists such as Hebe de Bonafini have charged that the government interferes with the independence of the judiciary (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1991, 142; LCHR 1993, 22; Country Reports 1993 1994, 349; Inter Press Service 9 Dec. 1993). For example, it was widely considered that Menem stacked the Supreme Court in 1991 (Latin American Weekly Report 26 Aug. 1993, 386; Human Rights Watch Apr. 1991, 83; Freedom Review Feb. 1993, 28), when despite the protestations of the court itself, he increased the number of justices from five to nine (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 74-75). The candidates-all Peronists and all supported by the executive-were quickly confirmed (Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers 1991, 12). Menem also nominated 13 judges to the federal appeals court, which was created in September 1992. Seven of Menem's 13 nominees had supported the military dictatorship, and despite protests from human rights organizations and opposition parties, all but one of the nominees was confirmed. Menem subsequently appointed the failed nominee as the new court's chief prosecutor (LCHR 1993, 23). Menem's minister of justice resigned in protest over his actions (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 77; Financial Times 9 Sept. 1992). According to Mignone, a movement to change the process by which judges are appointed was underway in 1993 (Mignone 19 May 1993).

Interference with the judiciary has been blamed for Judge Maria Servini de Cubria's removal from the "Yomagate" case, a drug-money-laundering case involving Menem's sister-in-law (Buenos Aires Herald 30 May 1993). In removing her, the Supreme Court reportedly cited improper behaviour (Garro 5 Oct. 1993). She was accused of having deliberately obstructed her own investigation and admitted to having discussed the case with Menem on two occasions, which is illegal under Argentine law (UPI 14 Aug. 1991).

In another instance of executive interference, Menem fired the heads of the Tribunal de Cuentas (a fiscal monitoring tribunal), the Fiscalía de Investigaciones (office of investigative prosecutors) and the Procuración Fiscal (which oversees the justice system). Although all three organizations are formally dependent on the executive branch, they have assumed a quasi-judicial watchdog function (LCHR 1993, 22-23). According to Garro, a legitimate reason for the dismissals was not given, and Menem reportedly stated that because the three were Alfonsín appointees, he was within his rights as president to dismiss them and appoint his own people (Garro 5 Oct. 1993). Controversy followed as opponents argued that while the president does have the power to make appointments to these positions, he does not have the right to dismiss (ibid.).

Promotions and transfers are sometimes used by the executive to exert control over the judiciary. Promotions may be used to reward judges who conform to the government point of view, or may be denied to judges considered to be too independent (La Nación 28 Feb. 1993). In the "Yamogate" case, two of the three judges who were about to confirm an order of preventive detention on Menem's sister-in-law, Amira Yoma were suddenly transferred (Latin American Weekly Report 8 July 1993, 312; Buenos Aires Herald 30 May 1993). With two new judges in place, the appeals court subsequently lifted the order (Latin American Weekly Report 8 July 1993, 312). In another case, a judge who took action when journalists received threats was promoted, allegedly in order to remove him from the case (ibid. 2 Sept. 1993, 399). While judges, unlike lawyers, are not forced to accept promotions or transfers, they seldom refuse such offers because of the limited opportunities for advancement (La Nación 28 Feb. 1993). Transfers and promotions are a responsibility of the executive branch, and a judge who rejects a promotion runs a risk of being marginalized or branded an outcast (ibid.).

The perception that judges were being influenced by forces both inside and outside government prompted a "crisis of faith in the judiciary during 1992" (LCHR 1993, 22). This sense of crisis was evident at an April 1992 national judicial conference where "numerous judges expressed concern over the increasing subordination of the judiciary to the executive branch and the resulting erosion of public faith in court decisions" (ibid.).

The Argentine public appears to view interference in judicial independence with disapprobation (Financial Times 9 Sept. 1992). According to one source, polls showed that public opinion of the judiciary was lower than that of the three traditional "whipping boys" of government, Congress and business (Hemisfile Sept. 1992, 5). A May 1992 poll indicated that 77 per cent of Argentines believed the Supreme Court was corrupt (LCHR 1993, 22). Garro states that in general Argentines believe the Supreme Court will side with the government in any case in which the government has a "high stake," and that this has "severely affected" the credibility of the entire judicial system (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1993, 76-77).

4.      FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Menem's Peronist Party was overwhelmingly endorsed in the 3 October 1993 congressional elections, winning 18 of 24 districts (The Globe and Mail 5 Oct. 1993). This was the first time a sitting government had won the final congressional election of its mandate (Latin American Weekly Report 7 Oct. 1993, 458). The October 1993 election is seen as a precursor to the 1995 presidential election, in which Menem reportedly hopes to run. On 14 November 1993 Menem and Alfonsín signed a "Democratic Pact," which allows the legislature to make amendments to the constitution and also allows the head of state to be reelected for one four-year term (BBC Summary 16 Nov. 1993; Noticias Argentinas 2 Dec. 1993). Although Supreme Court judges are appointed for life, Alfonsín has contended that replacing some of the justices will help repair the court's reputation, which has been damaged by allegations of corruption and bowing to executive pressure (Financial Times 2 Dec. 1993). Three judges have reportedly agreed to resign from the court to comply with this stipulation (Reuters 4 Dec. 1993).

Although the perception of corruption in the Menem government is widespread, the October election results appear to indicate that Argentines consider this issue to be of less importance than continuing those economic policies which have, among other things, brought rampant inflation under control (UPI 4 Oct. 1993; The Guardian 2 Oct. 1993). A survey conducted by the Carlos Fara y Asociados polling agency in early 1993 showed that 64 per cent of respondents felt economic stability would be jeopardized if Menem were not reelected in 1995 (Buenos Aires Herald 2 Apr. 1993).

REFERENCES

Agence France Presse (AFP). 25 June 1993. "Argentine Police Pry into Students' Political Beliefs." (NEXIS)

         Alerta [Toronto]. May-June 1993. No. 3. "Visitors: Bishop Pagura Denouncing Violence of Economics."

Americas Watch and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS). December 1991. Police Violence in Argentina: Torture and Police Killings in Buenos Aires. New York: Americas Watch and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales.

Amnesty International. January 1994. Argentina: Journalism, a Dangerous Profession: Physical Attacks, Death Threats and Harassment of Journalists in Argentina (AI Index: AMR 13/02/94). Report and Summary. London: Amnesty International Publications.

Amnesty International. November 1993. Argentina: Human Rights Violations in Corrientes and Chaco Provinces. (AI Index: AMR 13/05/93). London: Amnesty International Publications.

Amnesty International. October 1992. Argentina: The Outstanding Debt: Amnesty International's Continuing Concerns on the Fate of the 'Disappeared'. (AI Index: AMR 13/05/92). London: Amnesty International Publications.

The Associated Press (AP). 9 November 1992. Ed McCullough. "Argentines Now Have the Open Trials Common Elsewhere." (NEXIS)

The Associated Press (AP). 3 October 1992. Ed McCullough. "Judge, Lawyers, Thief Give Thumbs Up to New Criminal Code." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 16 November 1993. "Menem and Alfonsin Sign Pact on Constitutional Changes." (NEXIS)

Bregaglio, Arturo. Director, Centro de Comunicacion Popular y Asesoramiento Legal (CECOPAL), Cordoba, Argentina. 12 October 1993. Personal interview.

         Buenos Aires Herald [Buenos Aires, in English]. 2 July 1993. "Security Council Reaffirms Orders on Information Collection." (FBIS-LAT-93-127 6 July 1993, p. 36)

         Buenos Aires Herald [Buenos Aires, in English]. 27 June 1993. "Interior Minister Denies Efforts to Control Ideology." (FBIS-LAT-93-123 29 June 1993, pp. 26-27)

         Buenos Aires Herald [Buenos Aires, in English]. 30 May 1993. "Menem Answers Corruption Charges Made by Radical Party." (FBIS-LAT-93-104 2 June 1993, p. 25)

         Buenos Aires Herald [Buenos Aires, in English]. 2 April 1993. "26 Percent in Poll Rate Menem's Administration 'Good'." (FBIS-LAT-93-064 6 Apr. 1993, p. 23)

Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Geneva. 1992. Attacks on Justice: The Harrassment and Persecution of Judges and Lawyers, June 1991-May 1992. Edited by Mona A. Rishmawi.

Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Geneva. 1991. Attacks on Justice: The Harrassment and Persecution of Judges and Lawyers, June 1990-May 1991. Edited by Reed Brody.

Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Buenos Aires. September 1992. Police Violence Report.

         Chicago Tribune. 1 July 1993. Gary Marx. "Argentine Leader Vows to Open Security Files." (NEXIS)

         Clarín [Buenos Aires, in Spanish]. 18 February 1993. "Lestelle Accused of 'Abnormalities', Excesses." (FBIS-LAT-93-071 15 Apr. 1993, p. 20)

         Clarín [Buenos Aires, in Spanish]. 27 May 1993a. "Detuvieron a Dos Comisarios en Rosario por Ayudar al Narcotr fico."

         Clarín [Buenos Aires, in Spanish]. 27 May 1993b. "Custodia Para una Jueza."

         Clarín [Buenos Aires, in Spanish]. 7 February 1993. "Condenaron a Cuatro Policías."

         Columbia Journal of Transnational Law [New York]. 1993. Vol. 31, No. 1. Alejandro M. Garro. "Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Success?"

Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). 1992. Attacks on the Press: A Comprehensive Worldwide Survey. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists.

         Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993. 1994. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

         Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992. 1993. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

         The Dallas Morning News. 20 November 1993. Jack Epstein. "Argentina Still Haunted by 'Dirty War' of '76-83; Doctors say Unresolved Trauma Eating at Collective Psyche." (NEXIS)

         Encyclopedia of the Third World. 1992. 4th ed. Vol. 1. Edited by George Thomas Kurian. New York: Facts on File.

Fairburn, Bill. Executive director, Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA). 1 October 1993. Telephone interview.

         Financial Times [Toronto]. 2 December 1993. John Barham. "Argentine Judges Urged to Resign." (NEXIS)

         Financial Times [Toronto]. 9 September 1992. John Barham. "Argentine Justice Minister Dismissed: Hopes for Independent Legal System Set Back." (NEXIS)

         Freedom Review [New York]. February 1993. Vol. 24, No. 1. Douglas W. Payne. "Latin America: Democracy and the Politics of Corruption."

Garro, Alejandro. Professor, School of Law, Columbia University, New York. 5 October 1993. Telephone interview.

         The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 5 October 1993. "Menem Wins."

Gracer, Jeffrey. Volunteer attorney for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), New York. 1 October 1993. Telephone interview.

         The Guardian [London]. 2 October 1993. Malcolm Coad. "Argentina's Flamboyant Reformer Gambles with Plea for Second Term." (NEXIS)

         Hemisfile [La Jolla, Ca.]. September 1992. Vol. 3, No. 5. "The Argentine Mass Media."

Human Rights Watch. December 1991. Human Rights Watch World Report 1992. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch. April 1991. Truth and Partial Justice, An Update. New York: Human Rights Watch.

         The Independent [London]. 18 September 1993. Elizabeth Nash and Luis Graham-Yooll. "Press Terrorised in Argentina." (NEXIS)

Inter Press Service. 9 December 1993. Federico Ferber. "Argentina: Democracy Has Yet to Be Achieved, Rights Groups Say." (NEXIS)

Inter Press Service. 2 July 1993. "Argentina: Pensioners Were Victims of Police 'Espionage'." (NEXIS)

Inter Press Service. 4 January 1992. Roberto Herrscher. "Argentina: Police Impunity Eats Away at Human Rights." (NEXIS)

         Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone Report [London]. 5 August 1993. "Argentina's Nasty Campaign is all About Menem's Re-election Hopes." (NEXIS)

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 7 October 1993. "Ruling Party Likely to Win Elections."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 23 September 1993. "Scandal Over Attack on Journalist."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 2 September 1993. "Wave of Threats Prompts Fight-Back."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 26 August 1993. "'Juridical Security' Needed, Says Envoy."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 15 July 1993. "Menem Hit by Spying Scandal."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 8 July 1993. "Argentina: Politics and Law."

         Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 19 August 1993. Vol. 25, No. 29. "Argentine Government Represses Opposition."

         Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 4 March 1993. Vol. 25, No. 7. "Interview with Argentine Human Rights Activist: 'To Keep the People's Memory Alive'."

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). 1993. Critique: Review of the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

         Los Angeles Times. 2 October 1993. Home Edition. William R. Long. "Media; Threats, Assaults Complicate Argentine Journalists' Jobs." (NEXIS)

Mignone, Emilio. Director, Centre for Legal and Social Studies, Buenos Aires. 19 May 1993. Presentation to Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) Latin American Team, Toronto. (written transcript)

Movimiento Ecumenico por los Derechos Humanos, Buenos Aires. January 1993. Los Derechos Humanos en la Argentina. El Panorama de la Situacion y los Desafios Actuales.

         La Nación [Buenos Aires]. 28 February 1993. "Los Cambios en la Justicia: Premios y Castigos en las Designaciones."

         La Nación [Buenos Aires]. 29 November 1992. "La Justicia y la Seguridad Parecen Olvidadas."

National Action Committee for Latin America (NACLA). December 1992. Vol. 26, No. 3. Report on the Americas. Karen Robert and Rodrigo Gutierrez Hermelo. "Argentina: Where Youth is a Crime."

         The New York Times. 1 September 1993. Late Edition-Final. Nathaniel C. Nash. "Reporters Facing Peril in Argentina." (NEXIS)

         The New York Times. 8 December 1993. Late Edition-Final. Nathaniel C. Nash. "Argentina Finds a Kidnapping Ring of Policemen." (NEXIS)

         Noticias [Buenos Aires, in Spanish]. 28 June 1993. "3 Border Police Commanders Dismissed by Suerz Reinstated." (FBIS-LAT-93-125 1 July 1993, p. 28)

         Noticias Argentinas [Buenos Aires, in Spanish]. 2 December 1993. "Supreme Court Judge Resigns; Others Possible." (FBIS-LAT-93-230 2 Dec. 1993, pp. 23-24)

         Noticias Argentinas [Buenos Aires, in Spanish]. 10 June 1993. "Menem Praises Judicial Branch's 'Independence'." (FBIS-LAT-93-111 11 June 1993, p. 25)

Notisur. 22 January 1992. "Buenos Aires, Argentina: On Human Rights Abuses by Police Officers." (NEXIS)

         P gina 12. 10 February 1993. "Todos Contra los Policías."

         La Prensa [Buenos Aires, in Spanish]. 13 July 1993. "Menem on Political, Social, Economic Issues." (FBIS-LAT-93-142 27 July 1993, pp. 36-37)

Reuters. 4 December 1993. BC Cycle. "Opposition Endorses Pact to Let Menem Run Again." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 4 October 1993. BC Cycle. Joe Goldman. "Menem Victorious in Argentine Legislative Election." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 30 November 1991. BC Cycle. Anne Harrison. "Argentina to Revamp Police Force." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 14 August 1991. BC Cycle. "Argentine President Called to Testify in Drug Case." (NEXIS)