Crisis Briefing, Tirana

Summary Of Events

The sudden resignation of Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano earlier this week has broken the political impasse that has paralysed Albania over the last two weeks following an attempted coup d'etat by opposition forces on Monday 14 September 1998. Since the arrests at the end of August of six opposition deputies, and the killing of Azem Hajdari, a founder member of Sali Berisha's Democratic Party two weeks later, a wave of violence and street protests in the capital Tirana plunged the country once more to the brink of civil chaos. The murder of the popular opposition leader Azem Hajdari, who led the 1990/1991 student demonstrations against the Communist government of Ramiz Alia. Hajdari's death angered not only his Democratic Party supporters but also many northerners from Hajdari's Tropoja region, which is close to the Kosovo border. The latest developments in Albania are the culmination of a year of political polarisation and a long-running campaign by the opposition Democratic Party to undermine the government and block moves to agree and introduce a new constitution. Indeed, ever since the government of Fatnos Nano came to power a year ago, the Democratic Party has been holding the government virtual hostage. Apart from organising street protests, the Democratic Party has boycotted virtually all parliamentary institutions, claiming that the present government is illegal having been born out of "illegitimate elections" supported by commmunist-led mafia gangs. Despite calls from Premier Nano, and the international community, for the Democratic Party to assist in the general reconstruction of the country, there has been virtually no parliamentary opposition functioning in the country. The prime minister's departure, which was announced on television late on the evening of 28 September, came as a complete surprise to all observers. Although the opposition had been calling for Nano's resignation virtually since the inauguration of his Socialist-led coalition government in August 1997, as late as the morning of 28 September Fatos Nano ruled out any possibility of resignation. The resignation can therefore be interpreted as a sign of despair as Nano failed to gain any credible support from either his Socialist Party or its coalition partners for an intended government reshuffle. The announcement followed the resignation of Interior Minister Perikli Teta, who stepped down in protest against the corruption of some members of the leadership of the Socialist Party and of the government's coalition partner the Democratic Alliance. Albania's new Prime Minister is 31 year-old Pandeli Majko, who despite his youth and lack of ministerial experience, is generally regarded as untainted by a communist past and thus more acceptable to a population weary of older politicians burdened by a "communist" mentality. Majko, who played a significant role in the student demonstrations that eventually brought down the Communist government in 1992, represents the new generation of Albanian politicians and intent on bringing a fresh approach to the country's political life.

Immediate Implications

Albania's government is thrown into turmoil As a result of the recent unrest, the already weak Socialist-led coalition has been thrown into a state of turmoil. With daily attacks on government personnel and the killings and arrests of opposition supporters a climate of fear has gripped the country in recent weeks. Albania has been locked in a state of limbo, with complete paralysis of parliamentary institutions and the scaling down of international aid projects, as foreign personnel refuse to return to Albania until the situation has stabilised. Ordinary citizens have imposed their own nightly curfew with few people on the streets after 10 pm. Beleaguered Premier Nano put the blame for the recent violence squarely on Democratic Party leader, Sali Berisha, calling him the "chief organiser of the attempted coup d'etat"2 and ordering the Interior Ministry to help prosecutors bring to justice all those involved. Under Albanian law, the charge of armed uprising carries a sentence of life imprisonment and even the death penalty. An Albanian parliamentary commission, at the request of the state prosecutor, has striped Berisha of his parliamentary immunity in order to prosecute him for staging a coup. Given the volatility of the present situation, however, it is hard to see how arresting Berisha will do anything other than fuel a further escalation of the crisis. ...Opposition forces are formidable Meanwhile the opposition forces ranged against the government look increasingly formidable. Alliances between the various parties further reinforced the opposition's strength and unity. Apart from the Democratic Party-led Union for Democracy, the opposition includes the United Right, which involves the Republican Party, the Movement for Democracy, the Right Democratic Party and the Conservative Party.3 In response to the present crisis, 12 right-wing parties and several nationalist and anti-Communist associations have formed a Dictatorship Refusal Front against the government. Meanwhile, the government is also coming under pressure from the left. The newly formed Communist Party is also ready to join the anti-government fray. In April this year the Albanian parliament lifted the 1992 ban on the foundation of communist parties, thus legalising the new Communist Party which is led by Hysni Milloshi and independent MP Maksim Hasani, (both ardent followers of the late dictator Enver Hoxha). The new Communist Party has an estimated 25,000 members. ...Berisha's call for nation-wide revolt unlikely to strike a chord with a weary population Former president Sali Berisha feels an overwhelming sense of bitterness and betrayal resulting from his forced dismissal from power last year. He is unlikely, therefore, to ever accept the legitimacy of the present government, regardless of who leads it, and will consequently continue, along with the numerous disaffected members of the opposition, to try and disrupt the political process. On the other hand, however, Berisha's support base is relatively small and ideologically fickle. Even in the last elections the majority of voters in his home district of Tropoja voted for the Socialist Party, albeit in the hope of getting back the money they lost in the pyramid collapse. In his frequent anti-government demonstrations before the present crisis, Berisha was never able to muster more than 3,000 people at most. This rent-a-mob largely represent a loose alliance of thugs and former SHIK (National Intelligence agents) personnel, who are implicated in various criminal activities, and face an uncertain future should they disassociate themselves from the "protection" of their former president. Since the murder of Azem Hajdari, Berisha,s support has grown considerably as people wish to show their anger at the attack on such a broadly popular figure. Nevertheless, it remains extremely doubtful as to how far Berisha can rely on such supporters to back him in a call for civil war. The Albanian people generally have no stomach for a repeat of last year's horrific violence, and although they were undeniably dissatisfied with the performance of Fato's Nano's administration, the overriding attention of the population is focused on finding means for survival amidst the country's continued economic ruin. Although this translates into a chronic apathy towards politicians and political debate, which is unhealthy in such an emerging and immature democracy as Albania, it also means there is very little appetite for yet another popular uprising. The only event that could provoke further real destabilisation is the arrest of Berisha. If this were to happen, there will almost certainly be some violent civil unrest possibly only halted by international intervention. ...Crucial constitutional reform process is de-railed The arrests of the opposition leaders and the murder of Hajdari not only raised tensions between the two main political camps, but also ended any hope of a dialogue between the government and opposition, seriously jeopardising the crucial constitutional reform process. Agreeing a new constitution is an essential precondition of rebuilding political stability in Albania. The country has remained without a constitution since the first multiparty parliament abrogated in 1991 the old Communist constitution and approved a package of constitutional laws to govern the country in the meantime. A draft constitution proposed by the Democratic Party failed in a popular referendum in 1994 following a successful campaign of the then opposition parties against the draft, which was presumed to give too much power to the then President, Sali Berisha. A commission made up of representatives of the main political forces, as well as Albanian and foreign legal experts, has been working for the past eight months on drafting the specific articles of the fundamental law, which was expected to be approved by parliament before final endorsement by a popular referendum. ...State of limbo looks set to continue Nano's resignation has certainly taken the wind out of the sails of the opposition, whose daily calls for his departure were seen by many as a power struggle between Nano and Berisha. Somewhat predictably, however, since the Democratic Party and much of the opposition still refuse to recognise the legitimacy of this government, irrespective of who leads it, the opposition is calling for a technical interim government until early elections can be held. The potential therefore for further unrest remains high. It must be hoped that the disappearance of the bitter personal animosity between Berisha and Nano4 will encourage a more tolerant political clmate, and that the Albanian people will abandon their political loyalties to certain personalities in favour of loyalties to democratic political institutions.

Kosovo Dimention To The Crisis

Northern Albania is turned into a staging area for Kosovo conflict While the departure of Fatos Nano is not expected to cause any major change in Albanian policy towards Kosovo, the latest bout of unrest in Tirana has only increased Albania's susceptibility to the destabilising effects of the war in neighbouring Kosovo. Deterioration of the political situation in Albania has only compounded compounded the government's lack of control in the north of Albania. In recent months, northern Albania has become a vital staging area for the war in Kosovo, posing severe challenges to the country's control over its borders. For the local Albanians, the Kosovo conflict has come as an economic lifeline. While few locals themselves ever venture over the precarious mountain trails into Kosovo, entrepeneurs have been making a good living by selling weapons, equipment and supplies - some of them looted from army depots during last spring's uprising, others imported. Albanian-made AK-47s have been selling at around DM350, Chinese ones at about DM550 and imported 9mm pistols at around DM1,000. One of the prime beneficiaries of the government's loss of control in the north of Albania has been the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), which is active in that part of the country. The recent unrest in the capital has concentrated internal police and military attention on protecting Tirana and its surroundings, leaving the UCK greater room for manoeuvre in the north. ...Humanitarian crisis looms as new wave of refugees streams across Albania's northern borders and winter approaches Unfortunately, the crisis in Tirana has also deflected attention away from the new wave of refugees from Kosovo that have just arrived in the northern town of Shkoder following their expulsion from Montenegro. On 12 September, Montenegro closed its borders to ethnic Albanians fleeing the fighting in Kosovo, and sent some 3,000 refugees across the border into Albania. Montenegro has an estimated 40-50,000 refugees from Kosovo and officials say no more can be admitted as reception facilities are severely overstretched. Facilities for the refugees in Albania, however, are virtually non-existant, and as winter fast approaches the humanitarian situation could become critical. ...Second Kosovar guerrilla force emerges In a development that could further destabilise north eastern Albania, a second Kosovar guerrilla army rivalling the UCK has sprung up. Like the UCK, the three-month old group, known as the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo or FARK, advocates independence for Kosovo. FARK is funded by the Kosovo Albanian "prime minister" in exile, Bujar Bukoshi, and is the official armed forces of the self-styled Kosovo government. FARK is led by former ethnic Albanian Yugoslav officers who fought against the Serbs as volunteers in Bosnia. These men are far more knowledgeable about contemporary Yugoslav military tactics than the older Yugoslav Army officers from the Kosovar Diaspora who are more idealistic than realistic in the eyes of FARK.5 ...Albania's territorial integrity in danger The emergence of a second ethnic Albanian army based in northern Albania seriously endangers the territorial integrity of Albania. If FARK launches similar actions to the UCK it will become impossible to determine who is responsible for military actions. Since both groups are by necessity now forced to launch most of their offensives from northern Albania, there is an increasing risk of direct military intervention in Albania by Belgrade's forces. The emergence of FARK, which has an estimated 100 members, is an indication that the UCK itself and its legitimacy are coming under question, thus raising the possibility of an interethnic Albanian conflict that could be conducted on Albanian soil. ...Allegations of Kosovar involvement in Albania's political crisis There have been several allegations that FARK members played a role in the attempted coup in Tirana on 14 September 1998. Two armed ethnic Albanians from Kosovo were arrested when security forces recaptured Tirana's state-run Television station from anti-government protestors, although there is no proof that they are members of either the UCK or FARK. The following week a leading Socialist MP claimed that Kosovar leaders were involved in the failed coup attempt by supplying Democratic Party supporters with weapons. According to Spartak Braho, chairman of the mandates and immunities committee, "Some Kosovo leaders like Bujar Bukoshi were involved in the coup."6 In a further development, the FARK commander, Colonel Ahmet Krasniqi, who lived in Tirana, was shot dead by masked gunmen in the capital on 21 September. There is no indication as yet as to who was responsible for the killing, but the incident has served to focus attention on the activities of Kosovars involved in the separatist movement in Kosovo who are co-ordinating their activities increasingly from Tirana.

Recommendations

Saving Albania from mounting internal chaos will take decisive action at both a local and international level. ICG believes the international community should focus on the twin priorities of helping to restore law and order throughout the country, especially in the north, and creating openings for political dialogue between opposition and government representatives. With this in mind, we make the following recommendations: 1. Dissuade the government from arresting Sali Berisha The international community should use its influence to dissuade the new government from arresting Opposition leader Sali Berisha. At this critical point, with tensions running high and the threat of renewed chaos still hanging over the country, ICG believes that Berisha's arrest would be dangerous, inflammatory and likely trigger widespread unrest. Instead of arresting Berisha, the government should seek to de-escalate tension and renew earlier offers of dialogue with all opposition parties, including the Democratic Party. 2. Exert pressure on Democratic Party leaders to pull back from confrontation and engage in dialogue International pressure should be put on Sali Berisha to deter him from continuing his campaign of destabilisation. Western and regional governments should make it clear that such tactics are unacceptable. Berisha should be encouraged to engage in political dialogue and participate in the democratic process through parliament and all-party talks on a new constitution. International pressure to respect democratic and parliamentary institutions should not only be addressed to Sali Berisha but also to the Democratic Party deputy-chairman Genc Pollo, who provides the "intellectual" and sophisticated face of the Democratic Party in international circles, yet makes no secret of his desire to see the present government be overthrown. In June he declared that: "no government, no matter how bad it is, does not step down on its own, unless we make it do so."7 Without international intervention and assistance, the present Albanian political structures are incapable of instigating any of the above-mentioned tasks or of providing the Albanian people with the belief that the acute and damaging divisions between all sectors of Albanian political life can eventually be overcome. 3. Dispatch police officers to Albania to assist the Interior Ministry state The Albanian police are struggling to maintain control even in those parts of the country where the government still exercises some authority. An international police unit should therefore be dispatched to assist the Interior Ministry in policing the country effectively. This is likely to have the wide support of the general population, who are so fearful of violence that they have themselves imposed an evening curfew with no one on the streets after 9.30pm-10.00pm. The fear of violence and lawlessness is a major factor behind the persistent refusal of ordinary people to hand in the weapons they looted from military arsenals last year. 4. Prepare an International Peacekeeping Operation to restore law and order to those parts of the country beyond state control Large parts of the north, and to a lesser extent parts of the south, of Albania are out of the control of the state authorities. This leaves vast swathes of the country vulnerable to the activities of armed guerrilla forces, weapons traders and mafia gangs. ICG believes urgent consideration should be given to the reintroduction of an international peacekeeping force, along the lines of the Italian-led Operation Alba which oversaw the restoration of law and order following the 1997 uprising. This force could patrol throughout the entire country, including the crime-ridden regions along the border with Greece. Where relevant, such a force could operate in conjunction with border monitoring missions already operating along the Kosovo/Macedonian border. 5. Encourage political dialogue Although the general population has no desire for further confrontation, the polarisation of Albania's politicians is set to continue, despite the resignation of Fatos Nano. Creating dialogue between the government and opposition is therefore essential if the current impasse is to be overcome and progress made towards the agreement of a new constitution and national reconciliation. Without such dialogue and agreement, Albania will remain trapped indefinitely in a cycle of economic disaster and civil chaos. On the one hand, there will naturally be an enormous effort on behalf of the international diplomatic community in Tirana to assist wherever possible in the establishment of dialogue between the new administration of Pandeli Majko and the increasingly united opposition. On the other hand, however, it would be useful if the same degree of effort could be focused on the political divisions at a local level. ICG proposes that an international non-governmental organisation, that is acceptable to all parties, co-ordinate such a process. Local political round-tables could be staged around the country and discussions could be organised between, for example, the youth wings of the various political parties. Achieving progress would certainly be a difficult and protracted task, but from discussions with members of the Tirana diplomatic community, such an initiative would have strong international backing.

Footnotes

1. This briefing paper has been prepared by an International Crisis Group analyst in Tirana. For further information, please contact Alain Destexhe or Charles Radcliffe at ICG's head office in Brussels (tel. +32 2 502 90 38) or George Biddle at ICG's Washington office (tel +1 202 986 9750).

2. Albanian Daily News, no.883, 17 September 1998

3. This grouping is in opposition to both the government and the Democratic Party since the United Right's leaders have personal hostilities towards Berisha. United Right contains former Democratic Party ministers such as Shehi Ruli who stood up against the authoritarian manners of the former president.

4. Nano, a Prime Minister in the first post-communist government in 1991, was imprisoned by Berisha in 1993 for misappropriating state funds. He was freed from prison by supporters during last year's uprising

5. ICG interview with sources close to FARK

6. Albanian Daily News, 24 September 1998

7. Genc Pollo, Albania, 6 June 1998