Nations in Transit - Uzbekistan (2005)

Capital: Tashkent
Population: 26,400,000
Status: Not Free
PPP: $310
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 70
Religious Groups: Muslim [mostly Sunni] (88 percent), Eastern Orthodox (9 percent), other (3 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Uzbek (80 percent), Russian (6 percent), Tajik (5 percent), Kazakh (3 percent), other (6 percent)

NIT Ratings	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
National Governance	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.50
Electoral Process	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Civil Society	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.50	6.50	6.50
Independent Media	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Local Governance	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.25
Judicial Framework and Independence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.25
Corruption	N/A	N/A	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00
Democracy Rating	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.43

Executive Summary

Uzbekistan remains one of the strongholds of authoritarianism in the former Soviet bloc. Although the 1992 Uzbek Constitution enshrines a number of fundamental human rights and democratic principles, the heavily centralized political structure of the state places exclusive powers in the hands of the executive. The president makes ultimate decisions on important state matters and appoints the government, regional governors, and judges. Meaningful political debate is absent in the Parliament, which consists entirely of pro-government political parties. Generally, Uzbekistan's legal framework reflects international human rights standards, but in practice the government severely restricts political and civil rights, leaving the opposition out of the political process. The authorities continue to control nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) through tight financial restrictions and arbitrary denial of registration to most human rights groups. Religious persecution against moderate Muslims, who found themselves caught in the government's fight against terrorism and rising radical Islam, is one of the country's major human rights concerns. Local human rights activists reported that police and National Security Services officers, acting under pressure to break up Hizb ut-Tahrir cells, frequently detained family members and close associates of suspected members, even if there was no direct evidence of their involvement. Authorities made little distinction between actual members and those with marginal affiliations, such as persons who had attended Koranic study sessions with the group.

Although censorship has been banned, the media remain largely under government control. The judiciary is not independent, with court proceedings still dominated by prosecutors, though 2004 saw modest progress in addressing some judicial and human rights problems. Corruption gravely impedes the judicial and administrative systems. The central government controls all local governing structures through financial dependence and presidential appointment of regional governors. The state continues to use the traditional mahalla (community self-governing unit) as an instrument of control and a vehicle for regime policy.

In 2004, newly emerged terrorist threats and growing Islamic radicalism hardened government policies against the opposition and further limited space for political pluralism and civic activism. Fears that civil resistance similar to the postelection protests in Georgia and Ukraine could be repeated in Uzbekistan and threaten the power of the authorities prompted Uzbek officials to introduce more restrictions for domestic and international civic organizations. The parliamentary elections in December 2004 failed to offer real political contest because the government denied registration to all opposition political parties. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) suspended loans to Uzbekistan for failing to fulfill commitments to human rights. The U.S. government also withdrew assistance to the central government of Uzbekistan for lack of "continuous and substantial progress" in implementing democratic reforms. On the positive side, Uzbekistan made its first steps in addressing the systematic use of torture by introducing stricter internal mechanisms for oversight of law enforcement agencies and the penitentiary system, instigating provisions for inadmissibility of coerced evidence and opening a dialogue with human rights activists to map out concrete measures for the prevention of human rights abuses.

National Democratic Governance. The governing system of Uzbekistan is authoritarian and highly centralized. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches lack transparency and public accountability. The executive branch dominates and directs the Parliament and the judicial system. All important decisions are made by the president, who has excessive control over all spheres of public life in the country. Although civilian oversight of the military and security services is in place, these sectors remain largely nontransparent. The government has difficulty controlling the country's borders and resorts to placing mines along the borders of neighboring countries to prevent the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and goods. Rampant corruption, however, helps militant Islamists and terrorists import weapons and explosives. In March-April and July 2004, a series of suicide bombings by militant Islamists shocked the country, threatening Uzbekistan with internal destabilization. Although the population feared a massive crackdown on opposition leaders and Muslims who practice outside of the state-supported Islam, the government focused its investigation on a narrow circle of suspects and generally avoided widespread repressions. By the end of the year, the government had made some progress in combating torture. However, the EBRD decided in April to limit investment to the private sector owing to the lack of progress in political and economic conditions in Uzbekistan. The U.S. government also withdrew assistance to the central government for the lack of "continuous and substantial progress" in implementing democratic reforms. Protests against the newly imposed restrictions on small traders erupted in several cities, and the government failed to respond to the public's demands. Although the Uzbek Constitution provides for separation of power among the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, in practice the government dominates the other two institutions. Uzbekistan's rating for national democratic governance is set at 6.50 owing to the lack of consensus among political groups and citizens on democracy, the absence of democratic mechanisms for meaningful citizen participation in political processes, and the ineffective system of checks and balances among legislative, executive, and judicial authority.

Electoral Process. Parliamentary elections were held on December 26,2004. These were the first elections since Uzbekistan adopted a two-chamber Parliament in the January 27,2002, referendum. The new legislative (lower) chamber includes 120 seats elected in single-mandate districts, reduced from the previous 250 seats. The new upper chamber includes 100 senators – 84 elected indirectly by regional councils and 16 appointed by the president. Although the electoral campaign was more vibrant than in previous elections and the electoral debate received wider coverage by the media, opposition parties were denied participation. Two unregistered political parties, Erk Democratic Party and Free Farmers' Party, called on voters to boycott the election. By restricting the electoral contest, the Uzbek government missed a chance to establish a record of promoting free and fair elections. Uzbekistan's rating for electoral process stays the same at 6.75.

Civil Society. Civil society in Uzbekistan remains weak and undeveloped. Political parties are not fulfilling their role as the main pillar of civil society because the government stifles political pluralism. Uzbek legislation permits independent civic groups to operate in the country, but the Ministry of Justice limits freedom of association through the registration process of local NGOs and political parties. During 2004, there were no registrations of human rights groups, and since independence only two human rights organizations have been registered (following international pressure). International organizations faced difficulty renewing their registrations in Uzbekistan in compliance with new government regulations imposed at the end of 2003. The Open Society Institute was denied registration and subsequently expelled from Uzbekistan. Following the postelectoral protests in Georgia, which served as a warning to the governments of Central Asia about the power of well-organized civil societies, Uzbek authorities created obstacles for local NGOs that receive grants from international donors, effectively stifling their work. In 2004, however, there have been noteworthy developments that demonstrated a relative willingness on the part of the government to interact with civil society on some of the gravest human rights issues in the country. Uzbekistan's rating for civil society remains 6.50.

Independent Media. Media in Uzbekistan operate under tight government restrictions. Freedom of the press is severely limited by an unofficial censorship regime, and journalists are pressured not to write critically. No independent local media outlets exist. The Uzbek government has closed or threatened to close key media and civil society institutions that engage in reporting on political, economic, and security issues in Uzbekistan. The London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting has not been able to reopen its office in Tashkent since 2003. The government has refused to register the Brussels-based International Crisis Group and denied visas to its staff. In September 2004, the Uzbek government suspended the work of the locally registered Internews-Uzbekistan and audited the Tashkent office of the U.S.-based Internews-International. Uzbek media are severely underdeveloped and lag far behind those of most of the countries in the former Soviet Union. Professional standards are unchanged from the Soviet era, and journalistic ethics are largely disregarded. Uzbekistan's rating for independent media remains at 6.75.

Local Democratic Governance. Local self-governance remained superficial in 2004, with the central authorities controlling economic and social development. The president, who appoints the regional governors, exercised his exclusive power to dismiss two governors for failing to improve the local economy, which included not fulfilling the state quota for cotton production. The regions of Uzbekistan are expected to be better represented in the national bicameral Parliament with 84 indirectly elected members of the lower chamber. Mahalla (self-governing community) committees were used by the government to control political dissent and religious Muslims practicing outside mainstream Islam through community policing, reporting to the authorities, and extrajudicial trials. Uzbekistan's rating for local democratic governance is set at 6.25 owing to the insufficient decentralization of substantial government powers and responsibilities and the inability of local authorities to exercise their powers freely and autonomously apart from the central government.

Judicial Framework and Independence. The judiciary is not independent, and the executive branch dominates the court system through the Office of the Prosecutor-General. The president appoints all judges, including those on the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and Higher Economic Court. The judicial system is undergoing reforms at a very slow pace. The human rights record of Uzbekistan remained poor, although the government took some important steps to address the issue of torture. The Ministry of the Interior, the National Security Services, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Prosecutor-General, and the ombudsman started to cooperate with one another and with international organizations to establish an independent investigation commission of serious human rights abuses. With international help, monthly coordination meetings on individual human rights cases were instituted among these agencies. Preparations began on amending the legislation to introduce habeas corpus and transfer issuing arrest and search warrants from the prosecution to the court. According to the Uzbek government, 57 officials were criminally prosecuted in 2004, and 18 of them were charged with committing torture. The right to freedom of assembly was still severely restricted, particularly on the eve of the national elections in December 2004. Uzbekistan's rating for judicial framework and independence is raised from 6.50 to 6.25 in 2004 to recognize the government's first steps toward addressing some of the country's gravest human rights concerns.

Corruption. Corruption in Uzbekistan is endemic and affects all levels of the society. Important government positions continue to be traded or distributed among family members and clans. The complex Uzbek regulations code provides numerous opportunities for officials at all levels of government to profit from their public responsibilities as gatekeepers to various services and licenses. The educational system is seriously affected by corruption, lowering the quality of education. The media also suffer from corruption, and many journalists are paid bribes to write particular stories. The media are practically unable to provide objective coverage on this social phenomenon. Uzbekistan's rating in the area of corruption remains unchanged at 6.00.

Outlook for 2005. Uzbekistan is likely to make small steps toward democratization in 2005, but the president's approach to building a "regulated democracy" and "regulated market economy" will not produce significant results that impact public life. Poverty and corruption will remain top problems for the vast majority of the Uzbek population. Authorities have started making progress in the area of human rights, which is likely to be enhanced and expanded in 2005. Some of the recommendations of the special rapporteur on torture might be implemented (most probably introducing habeas corpus, allowing detained persons access to defense lawyers and family members, and abolishing the death penalty). However, unless the political opposition is allowed to operate legally in the country, radical Islamic groups will remain the only outlet for public discontent. If the government is to prevent further terrorist acts or popular upheaval, it must ease its grip on the opposition, the media, and civic groups. The government has already expressed the desire to address religious freedom in the dangerous political context of growing radical Islam and existent terrorist threats. A more vigorous debate on this issue is expected with both civil society and the international community. The government must permit freedom of the media so that Uzbek citizens may receive information on political, security, and economic issues. The country needs genuine decentralization that would give more authority to local governments. The amendment to the Constitution reducing the role of the president as the head of state should be fully implemented.

National Governance (Score: 6.50)

Uzbekistan is a republic under authoritarian presidential rule. Excessive power is concentrated in the hands of the executive branch, which is largely unaccountable to the country's citizens. The system of checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judiciary is for the most part superficial. The highly centralized government is incapable of communicating effectively with the public or facilitating public participation in the decision-making process. This trend is particularly dangerous during national crises, which Uzbekistan twice faced in 2004.

Uzbekistan is not a stable state. Although the government's tight grip on the political opposition and criminal groups creates a false sense of stability, serious internal security challenges and the growing influence of radical Islam threaten the country with internal destabilization. Terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, shook the country in late March early April and July. The first spate of violence, in Tashkent and Bukhara, claimed 47 lives by official count – 33 alleged terrorists, 10 police, and 4 civilian bystanders. The suicide bombers, including young females, specifically targeted the police, the Office of the Prosecutor-General, and the U.S. and Israeli embassies. The attacks in late July killed the 3 bombers and 4 Uzbek police and security officials.

Uzbek prosecutor-general Rashid Kadyrov announced at a press conference in Tashkent on August 9: "The investigation can state on the basis of irrefutable evidence that behind these terrorist acts stand international radical and extremist organizations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir." In November 2004, Kazakhstan's National Security Committee announced that it had broken up a terrorist group with links to Al-Qaeda. Its leader, a former fighter of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, stated that the group managed to recruit 50 Uzbek and 20 Kazakh citizens over the last two years and was involved in terror attacks in Uzbekistan during the spring and summer. Later in November, the Uzbek authorities announced that the three suicide bombers in the second series of attacks were citizens of Kazakhstan.

Some analysts believe that the government's repressive policies against political dissent have resulted in increased public support for radical Islamic movements, a number of which use violent tactics. Some blame the government for its failure to prevent the penetration of Middle Eastern interpretations of Islam that advocate the use of violence. In addition, growing poverty and the public's dissatisfaction with the country's lack of economic progress threaten to lead to spontaneous unrest, particularly in the Ferghana Valley. The complete suppression of political opposition eliminates the opportunity for legitimate representation of public discontent before official institutions. Endemic corruption affecting all levels of life in Uzbekistan is another potentially destabilizing factor.

Uzbekistan emerged as an independent state from the former Soviet Union on September 1,1991. The president is the head of state and is granted supreme executive power by the Constitution. Islom Karimov, former first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, has controlled the presidency since March 1990, when the Uzbek Soviet Republic's Parliament first elected him president. He has officially committed to democratic reforms but has largely failed to take steps to transform the stifled Soviet-type system into a democracy.

The postindependence Constitution, adopted in December 1992, officially creates a separation of powers among the presidency, the Oliy Majlis (Parliament), and the judiciary. In practice, the principle of separation of powers is not respected. Although the language of the new Constitution includes many democratic features, it can be superseded by executive decrees and legislation.

The president has the exclusive right to appoint members of the government, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Higher Economic Court (subject to approval by the Parliament), as well as all judges in the lower courts. He also appoints the chairman of the Central Election Commission and the governors of each of the 12 regions of Uzbekistan.

The republic's unicameral Parliament consisting of 250 members changed to a bicameral formation in January 2005. A 2002 amendment to the Constitution created a second chamber, which was established through elections in December 2004. The new legislative (lower) chamber consists of 120 members elected in single-mandate districts by popular vote. The new upper chamber, the Senate, comprises 100 seats – 84 elected indirectly by regional councils and 16 appointed by the president. Both chambers are elected for a five-year term. The president has the power to dismiss the legislative body with the concurrence of the Constitutional Court.

The Parliament adopts and amends the Constitution, schedules elections, and enacts legislation initiated by the executive branch, the high courts, the prosecutor-general, or the government of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan. Although the Constitution gives broad powers to the legislature, most of its work during the two regular annual sessions is focused on passing draft laws prepared by the executive branch and ratifying presidential decrees. Genuine political debate is absent in the Parliament.

All political parties represented in the Parliament are pro-government establishments that do not present real political alternatives. The parliamentary parties neither question nor criticize governmental or presidential decisions. Two of the most influential political parties, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the Self-Sacrifice (Fidokorlar) National Democratic Party (SNDP) are considered to be personal vehicles that enhance the president's influence over the legislature. Two other political parties, the Justice (Adolat) Social Democratic Party (JSDP) and the National Revival (Milliy Tiklanish) Democratic Party (NRDP), are smaller but equally silent with respect to criticizing government policies. In the December 2004 elections, the newly established Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (LDP), formed in the fall of 2003 with the blessing of the president, gained 41 seats and became the biggest political party represented in the Uzbek Parliament.

Uzbek legislation provides for civil oversight of the military. The minister of defense is a civilian. Since 2001, the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Staff of Armed Forces have had separate functions and responsibilities. The joint staff is responsible for operational and strategic planning and combat use of forces, while the Ministry of Defense carries out administrative supervision and management of its subordinate troops and ensures the pursuit of state policy in the sphere of defense and military construction. The president is commander in chief of the armed forces and may declare a state of emergency or war. Analysts have testified before the Helsinki Commission that as a result of cooperation within NATO's Partnership for Peace, the Uzbek military has made a successful transition to professional civil oversight, human rights violations have sharply diminished, and officers are training young recruits in their proper role in an open civil society.

The Ministry of the Interior, notorious for police brutality and corruption, took important steps to address torture and improve police accountability during the year. The ministry established preliminary procedures for investigating and disciplining officers for human rights abuses and started training policemen and prison guards in human rights. The government is currently examining the possibility of transferring the penitentiary system to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of the Interior has cooperated with human rights groups to eliminate torture, but in many cases police beat, abused, and harassed persons. There were credible reports of confessions extracted by torture from persons accused of participating in the terrorist bombings.

The media and civil society groups lack information about military and security matters and are unable to provide oversight of the military and security services. This fact was clearly demonstrated during the terrorist attacks in the spring when the delivery of information to the media was significantly delayed, allowing for the spread of rumors. The authorities handled media relations in a better way during the second wave of attacks in the summer and provided timely information to the public.

Experts and the public alike expected the terrorist attacks to result in massive arrests and imprisonment similar to what took place following the bombings in Tashkent in 1999, when over 7,000 political activists and religious leaders were imprisoned. The fact that these fears did not materialize gives hope that the authorities might have realized the need for public support in the fight against terrorism. In addition, a dialogue between government agencies (Ministry of the Interior, National Security Services, and the Office of the Prosecutor-General) and human rights defenders, which started shortly before the first wave of bombings, contributed to reducing cases of human rights abuse in the aftermath of the attacks.

Electoral Process (Score: 6.75)

The authority of the Uzbek government is not based on universal and equal suffrage. Although the country has held regular parliamentary and presidential elections since independence, the will of the people has not been expressed in a free and fair manner. Parliamentary and presidential elections have been marred by irregularities and violations of domestic electoral laws. International observers have characterized the elections as falling short of international standards. Uzbekistan is nominally a presidential democratic republic, but in effect the political opposition does not have a fair chance in elections. Opposition parties are denied registration by the government and have not been allowed to participate in elections since the first postindependence presidential ballot in 1991. Most prominent opposition leaders have been in exile for the last 10 years. The signs of a slight political opening in 2003 – when opposition parties Erk (Freedom) Democratic Party and Birlik (Unity) Movement were allowed to hold their assemblies, which had been banned for 10 years – did not evolve into genuine democratic progress. In fact, the regime became more stringent regarding political rights, prompted in part by two major events: the series of terrorist bombings in Uzbekistan in March and July 2004; and the peaceful postelection protests in Georgia that ousted President Eduard Shevardnadze in November 2003.

The new Uzbek Constitution, adopted in December 1992, enshrines broad provisions for the representative election of the president and members of Parliament. However, the highly centralized government system (intact after the Soviet era) paired with a lack of political competition stalled Uzbekistan's transition to an electoral democracy. In the first postindependence presidential election, Karimov allegedly gained 86 percent of the vote against Erk leader Muhammad Solih. The Uzbek opposition and the international community viewed Karimov's high electoral result with suspicion. Regardless of the oppressive policies of his government, Karimov managed to retain domestic popular support in the following few years by projecting an image of stability and emphasizing public fears of Islamic revival. Under the terms of a 1995 referendum, Karimov's mandate was extended until the year 2000. Following the tendency of Central Asian autocrats to avoid direct election, Karimov called for another referendum in 2002 that further prolonged his term of office from five to seven years, with the prospect of another seven-year tenure after 2007.

The presidential election in January 2000 was another fiasco in Uzbekistan's attempts to appear democratic. Karimov claimed support of 91.9 percent of the electorate over his token rival, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) leader Abdulhafiz Dzhalalov, who reportedly admitted that he himself had voted for Karimov. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) refused to send observers because of the absence of a credible choice available to voters. The U.S. government declared the election "neither free nor fair" and said it "offered Uzbekistan's voters no true choice."

The legal framework governing elections has been improved since 1994 but still falls short of international standards. One of the improvements in the electoral legislation was establishing a permanent Central Election Commission in 1999. However, since the president has the exclusive right to nominate the commission's chairman, the body is not impartial and remains highly dependent on the executive.

The Law on the Parliament was amended in 1998 to allow citizen initiative groups to nominate independent candidates. However, most of the candidates registered under this category in 1999 and 2004 were in fact supported by one of the pro-government political parties or were linked to the local governing bodies. An amendment to the law in August 2004 increased the requirement for an initiative group from 100 to 300 voters, which further complicated the registration of independent candidates. In addition, independent candidates were required to collect signatures from at least 8 percent of voters, proportionally distributed, in the constituency where they wanted to run. According to the amended election law for the parliamentary election in December 2004, political parties seeking to nominate candidates had to be registered by the Ministry of Justice six months prior to election day. Each political party was required to collect 50,000 signatures, with no more than 8 percent from any 1 of the 12 regions, the city of Tashkent, and the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan. The registration of political party lists and independent initiative groups as well as their candidates remained highly controlled by the Central Election Commission. A positive amendment of the Law on Elections in 2004 instituted a 30 percent quota for women on the party candidate lists for the 2004 elections. Legislation for the 2004 parliamentary elections also limited the influence of regional governors on the electoral process by taking away the provision permitting the regional councils of representatives to directly nominate candidates for the lower chamber. In 2004, governors and mayors sought office in the upper chamber instead. Although the amended Law on Financing of Political Parties permitted them to receive state finances for the election campaign, only pro-government parties and candidates benefited from this provision because real political competition was absent.

Parliamentary elections were held in 1994,1999, and 2004. In the 1999 election, the former Communist People's Democratic Party (PDP) emerged as the largest single party in the Parliament, winning 48 seats. The Self-Sacrifice (Fidokorlar) National Democratic Party (SNDP) of President Karimov won 34 seats.

The Fatherland Progress Party, which later merged with the SNDP gained 20 seats, JSDP received 11 seats, and the NRDP gained 10 seats. Independent citizen groups won 16 seats. The largest bloc of seats (110) was held by local nominees, who do not belong to any party but were supported either by the registered parties or the regional governors. One seat remained vacant. In May 2000, President Karimov proposed the creation of a bicameral Parliament, subsequently adopted by a referendum on January 27,2002. The legislative (lower) chamber comprises 120 deputies elected in single-mandate districts. The new Senate (upper chamber) has 100 members – 84 elected indirectly by regional councils and 16 prominent citizens appointed by the president.

On December 26,2004,14.5 million voters out of a total population of 26 million were able to elect the 120 parliamentary deputies of the lower chamber as well as members of regional and district councils. A total of 489 candidates ran for the legislative chamber: 62 were elected in the first round on December 26, and 58 gained their seats in the second round on January 9,2005. The 100-seat Senate was created in January 2005.

The newest political party among the competitors, the LDP, gained the largest number of seats (41). It was followed by the biggest political party, the PDP, which won 33 seats, including 3 party members nominated by independent initiative groups. The SNDP gained 19 seats, including 1 party member nominated by a citizen initiative group. The NRDP won 11 seats and the JSDP 10 seats in the Parliament, including 2 party members nominated by initiative groups. The official statement of the Central Election Commission maintained that 14 members of Parliament were elected from initiative groups. Out of 120 members of the lower chamber, 21 are women and 18 served in the former Parliament.

By not permitting genuine opposition parties to compete, the 2004 elections followed the pattern of the previous parliamentary election in Uzbekistan. In October, the unregistered Free Farmers Party and the opposition Erk declared a boycott of the elections. They also called on the international community to ignore the elections completely. The OSCE refused to deploy a full team of observers, stating that by preventing opposition parties from participating, Uzbekistan had failed to honor commitments to make the parliamentary elections free and fair. The OSCE's limited observation mission concluded that the election fell significantly short of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. The implementation of election legislation by the authorities failed to ensure a pluralistic, competitive, and transparent election, according to the OSCE.

None of the five registered political parties that competed in the December 2004 parliamentary election describes itself as opposition. The biggest Uzbek political party is the pro-government PDP, the successor to the Communist Party. The opposition claims that Karimov supported the establishment of loyalist political parties such as the JSDP, the NRDP, Fatherland Progress, and the SNDP.

The newest pro-government party, the LDP, was registered on December 3,2003. It seeks to appeal to professional workers, private entrepreneurs, and farmers. Prominent Tashkent banker Qobiljon Tashmatov became its chairman. The name of the party and its targeted constituency are strikingly similar to those of the opposition Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs. While President Karimov was quick to endorse the LDP (also called "the party of the bankers") on the National TV station immediately after it was founded in October 2003, the opposition Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs was denied registration two times in 2004.

Uzbekistan's democratic political opposition has been effectively silenced over the past decade. The first opposition party, Birlik, was created in 1989 primarily by intellectuals under the leadership of writer Abdurakhim Pulatov. Like most of the first alternative groups in the former Soviet bloc, Birlik split shortly after its establishment. A group of its leaders left to set up another political party, Erk, under the leadership of Muhammad Solih.

In July 1992, the government began to crack down on the political opposition. Citing concerns about maintaining domestic stability while a civil war raged in neighboring Tajikistan, Karimov announced: "It is necessary to straighten out the brains of 100 people in order to preserve the lives of hundreds of thousands," reported Eurasianet. Arrests and the harassment of activists from both political parties forced many of the leaders into exile. Abdurakhim Pulatov now resides in the United States; Muhammad Solih was exiled to Norway before being sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison for an alleged assassination attempt on the president in 1999. The government continuously presents Erk as having links with Islamic terrorists. The crackdown on political and religious leaders after the bombings in Tashkent in 1999 resulted in the imprisonment of many opposition activists.

In April 2002, Karimov unexpectedly stated that he was prepared to meet with exiled opposition members who wanted to return to Uzbekistan, provided they did not engage in activities to violently overthrow the government. Birlik was permitted to hold a number of meetings and even seven regional congresses, which raised expectations that the party might be allowed to register. In May 2003, the party held its national congress without interference from the government.

In October 2003, following international pressure for the detention of two Erk activists, the party was permitted to hold its first congress in nearly a decade. International observers viewed the event as a sign of a fresh political opening on the part of the government. However, the fall of 2003 saw a sharp negative turn in government policies triggered by the Georgian "Rose Revolution." Restriction of the right to assembly and new decrees increasing government control over the activities and funding of domestic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) affected opposition parties as well.

Although the series of terrorist attacks in Tashkent and Bukhara in March and July 2004 did not lead to an onslaught against political activists, the events appeared to harden the government resolution to block opposition parties from competing in the December parliamentary elections. The attempts of Birlik, the Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs, and the Free Farmers Party to obtain registration were obstructed and eventually rebuffed.

Unlike the oldest opposition parties, Erk and Birlik, which are perceived mainly as establishments of Uzbek dissident intellectuals, the two newer opposition parties, Free Farmers and Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs, target much larger social groups – farmers and small-business owners. With poverty and social discontent growing in Uzbekistan, these parties could potentially challenge the regime by attracting millions of disenchanted voters in a democratic election. The unrest in Kokand in November 2004, when angry merchants attacked police cars and tax offices over the government's limitations on trade in the popular open markets, demonstrated that the population is quickly reaching the point of revolt.

By suppressing any legitimate political movements that are outspoken against policies of the regime, however, the government is practically opening the door for radical Islamic groups to become the only outlet for social discontent and antigovernment sentiment. Islamic organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir are becoming more popular, particularly in the Ferghana Valley. Hizb ut-Tahrir advocates the nonviolent overthrow of the Karimov government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. It is banned by several governments in Central Asia and operates underground by disseminating literature and recruiting members. Internationally, Hizb ut-Tahrir is considered a radical Islamic organization that is nondemocratic and intolerant because of the openly anti-Semitic statements of its leaders.

In contrast with Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), formerly Adolat (not to be confused with Adolat Social Democratic Party) – an Islamist party with a strong position in the Ferghana Valley – is openly associated with terrorist actions and allegedly connected to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. The IMU was suppressed in 1992, and its leaders fled to Iran and Afghanistan. Most of its leaders were jailed, but the organization later regrouped and consolidated its forces in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. It conducted armed incursions into Uzbekistani territory in late 1999 and 2000. The group was suspected of organizing the suicide bombings in Tashkent and Bukhara in 2004. In the fall of 2004, an IMU terrorist cell that was training suicide bombers, among them females, was discovered in southern Kazakhstan by the Kazak security services.

While Uzbekistan is predominantly Uzbek in ethnic composition, the country is home to many minority groups. Of these, only the minority Karakalpakstan population enjoys formal guarantees of representation in the political system. Other minorities, including Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Russians, enjoy representation in nationwide political institutions but do not have separate party representation based on nationality or ethnicity. All ethnic groups are entitled to cultural self-identification, the use of their native language, and the right of association, but political organizations based on ethnic criteria are discouraged, and none are registered as political parties.

Civil Society (Score: 6.50)

Civil society in Uzbekistan is weak, undeveloped, and lacking in major components such as political pluralism and free media. Since political parties are considered the main pillar of civil society, the stifled political party system has effectively handicapped Uzbek civil society. The democratic opposition has been pushed entirely out of the political process, while pro-government parties fail to offer meaningful political alternatives, leading to a government that is practically unaccountable to the public.

While the Uzbek government is vigorously suppressing any political opposition and free media, its record with civil society groups was mixed in 2004. On the one hand, tightened control over domestic and international NGOs presented a setback for the country's democratic progress. On the other hand, a newly started dialogue and cooperation with human rights activists gave hope for establishing a mechanism to address some of the country's most serious social problems.

Although the Constitution guarantees freedom of thought, speech, and religion and protects the rights of political participation and freedom of association, in practice the authorities often violate these fundamental rights. Additional legislation introduced in January 2003 severely restricted freedom of assembly. Public gatherings of more than 100 people must be authorized in advance by the local administration, which often bans them arbitrarily. The police are authorized to disperse peaceful assemblies in which citizens express their political views. In the summer of 2004, the authorities broke up several peaceful demonstrations, arbitrarily detained political activists, and stopped demonstrators from reaching protest sites by preventing them from leaving their homes.

According to the Uzbek Parliamentary Committee for Civil Society and NGOs, over 4,000 nongovernmental, noncommercial entities are registered in Uzbekistan. International monitors have also noticed an increased number of NGOs established in the country in the last few years. Uzbek legislation permits independent civic groups to operate, but the Ministry of Justice limits freedom of association through the registration process of local NGOs and political parties.

After the November 2003 events in Georgia, the government of Uzbekistan consciously moved to halt progress on democratic reform. In December 2003, the government adopted two internal decrees increasing control over the activities of international NGOs and asserting excessive control over financial assistance to local groups. The U.S. government insisted that registration of U.S. NGOs be carried out in compliance with the bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan. This approach was successful for most U.S. organizations except the Open Society Institute, which was practically expelled from Uzbekistan. Although registered, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and Freedom House received warnings that if they continued working with unregistered political parties and organizations, they would lose their status. The National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute received such letters for the second time on the eve of the December 2004 election.

According to some NGO leaders, in December 2003 the National Security Services established a separate department to monitor and control NGOs, particularly their contacts with international organizations. Similarly, the tax inspectorate is reported to have set up a new department in January 2004 to monitor grants and other NGO funding. The government forced all grant-making and grant-receiving organizations to conduct financial transactions through the Central Bank. Some local groups, which rely entirely on foreign donations, complained that the banks withheld their funding.

Only two human rights NGOs are officially registered, the result of strong international pressure on Uzbek authorities. During 2004, there have been no further registrations of human rights groups. The Independent Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan gained its registration on the eve of Karimov's official visit to Washington, D.C., in March 2002. Ezgulik (Goodness) was registered in March 2003, before the annual meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Tashkent. The Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU), led by Tolib Yakubov, remains unregistered (despite several applications), as do a number of other small groups. The Mazlum human rights group was denied registration twice in 2003. The registration of Mothers Against the Death Penalty and Torture was also declined, as was that of Democracy and Law. According to national legislation, unregistered organizations are considered illegitimate groups and can be brought before the court.

The government considers human rights activities to be highly political and has placed human rights defenders in the same category with opposition activists and banned religious movements. In addition, the chief human rights activists and groups have strong links with the Uzbek political opposition, and often their leaders also serve as political party leaders: Erk is associated with Mazlum, Birlik with Ezgulik human rights organization, and the Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs with the Independent Human Rights Society.

In 2004, however, there were a number of noteworthy developments that demonstrated a willingness on the part of the government to conduct dialogue with civil society on some of the critical human rights issues facing the country. With international facilitation, human rights activists started regular talks with law enforcement agencies, including the three most responsible for human rights abuses in pretrial detention: the Office of the Prosecutor-General, the National Security Services, and the Ministry of the Interior. As a result, the two sides established a rapid response mechanism to prevent torture. The penitentiary department of the Ministry of the Interior and human rights defenders reached an agreement for public prison monitoring.

Evolving relations between officials and human rights activists have resulted in more efficient remedies in several concrete cases, particularly during the investigation of the terrorist attacks in March and July 2004. By the end of the year, participants in the dialogue from both sides were pointing out concrete results in their attempt to reduce cases of police brutality and torture; these include responsiveness from the investigation department of the Ministry of the Interior (the MVD) to concerns of human rights defenders; notification of independent defense lawyers immediately after detentions by the regional MVD investigators in Andijan and Namangan (lawyers were called from legal associations supported by the American Bar Association); relative improvement of conditions in prisons; and reduction in the number of religious trials in the Samarkand region (particularly in the second half of the year).

An encouraging result of the dialogue with civil society is the decision by the intergovernment antitorture commission to establish a permanent independent commission on cases of death in custody and grave abuses of human rights. It is critical that such a commission include qualified Uzbek citizens who are actively engaged in human rights issues. These developments seem to demonstrate that the government of Uzbekistan is becoming more aware of the importance of addressing human rights abuses and undertaking confidence-building measures with its own citizens. It is important to note, however, that these examples have not yet translated into systemic change. While the government appeared to be ready to address the issue of physical abuse, the situation with civil and political rights worsened during the year.

The media are generally not receptive to civil society groups as independent sources of information and infrequently cover civic initiatives carried out by independent groups. The mainstream media rarely cover human rights and never cite human rights defenders. However, since the number of government-supported NGOs is high, their activities are often noted by the state-controlled media. Some Internet-based media and numerous Web sites of independent NGOs and political parties provide substantial information based on reports from civic groups.

There are three policy institutes in Uzbekistan, but none of them is independent: the Institute for Strategic and Inter-Regional Studies (ISIS), the Academy of State and Society Building, and the Center for Studying Public Opinion. These institutions provide studies serving state ideology, promoting government policies, or training government officials. The ISIS operates under the Office of the President as a purely research institution, but its analysis is not available to the public; it is the most closed institution of the three. The ISIS coordinates its activities with the Office of the President and the National Security Services.

The Academy of State and Society Building also operate under the president's office. It succeeded the well-known Communist Party schools for training and educating Communist leaders during the Soviet era. After the fall of Communism, the academy became the main training venue for middle-level officials, including senior-level staff from the local government, heads of public associations and economic units, middle-level managers, and selected entrepreneurs. Its courses run from 1 to 12 months and include topics such as international law, national ideology, and foreign policy.

The Center for Studying Public Opinion was created under the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers. The objectivity of the opinion research provided by the center is dubious, because respondents are often afraid to express their views. Manipulation of the research data and studies conducted by the country's think tanks leaves little space for modern education that is free from government propaganda.

Independent Media (Score: 6.75)

Despite the official abolition of censorship (that is, mandatory prepublication review by the State Press Agency) in 2002, the media in Uzbekistan remain highly controlled by the government and serve the ideology of the regime. The three national daily newspapers, Pravda Vostoka, Halq Sozi, and Narodnoe Slovo, are owned and controlled by the government. Some of the major newspapers are issued by pro-government political parties represented in the Parliament. Private independent media outlets hardly exist because of strictly controlled licensing requirements by the state board of publishing. Control of information is even tighter in broadcast media, which are dominated by 4 state-run television channels. Cable television offering independent international news is not affordable for most citizens. There are 30 to 40 private television stations and 7 radio stations, which despite the practice of self-censorship have more freedom to report critically on local government. However, regional journalists have limited access to official sources of information, which impedes the quality of reporting.

Journalists cannot criticize government policies, local officials, or the president because the law holds editors and publishers responsible for the content of articles that appear in their publications. The media cover only official events and provide little information on ordinary people's lives. Reports on human rights abuses, political opposition, corruption of government officials, problems with economic reforms, domestic violence, and child labor are taboo subjects. The media are profoundly undeveloped, professional standards are unchanged from the Soviet era, and journalistic ethics are largely disregarded.

Uzbekistan is ranked 142 out of 167 countries worldwide in the Reporters Without Borders annual Index of Press for 2004. The year saw increasing restriction of free speech and media freedom owing to stricter government controls on the dissemination of information on the eve of the December elections. Some international media organizations such as the Institute for War and Peace Reporting were not permitted to operate officially in the country. The government also refused to register and denied visas to the staff of the International Crisis Group after briefly detaining one of its researchers in 2003. In September 2004, the government suspended the work of Internews-Uzbekistan and audited the Tashkent office of Internews-International. The Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Uzbek Service and the BBC have faced accusations of biased reporting in Uzbekistan.

There were no reports of arrested journalists, and three imprisoned journalists were freed during the year. International pressure contributed to the release and subsequent departure from the country of Ruslan Sharipov, a critic of the regime who was jailed in 2003 on charges of homosexuality, which is officially a crime in Uzbekistan. Hurriyat correspondent Gayarat Mahliboyev, sentenced in 2002 for alleged membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir, was freed in June. Madzhid Abduraimov was released in April. However, journalists Tuhtamurad Toshev and Boimamat Jumaev remained in prison.

Although sufficient legislation regulating the media has been developed, contradictions among various provisions lead to the effective restriction of freedom of speech. The Constitution of Uzbekistan guarantees freedom of speech, but the criminal code provides penalties for insulting the dignity of the president, thus preventing any criticism of his policies. Another legal provision bars journalists from interfering in the private lives of politicians and government officials. This makes it impossible for journalists to cover corruption. In addition, libel is a criminal offense in a judicial system ridden with corruption.

There are numerous media-related laws, including the Law on Mass Media adopted in June 1991 and amended in December 1997. Other legislation relevant to the media deals with protection of state secrets (1993), protection of copyright (1996), protection of journalists (1997), and access to information (1997). Although there is no law governing electronic media, the government often adopts decrees to regulate radio and television broadcasts. The Agency for Communications and Telecommunications controls licensing so that only media outlets loyal to the government are on the air. The process of licensing is perceived as severely corrupt. Access to international media is also limited by the licensing agency. The government quickly revoked the license of a radio station that attempted to broadcast the BBC and RFE/RL.

There were practically no opportunities for citizens to receive independent viewpoints through broadcast or print media during the election year, and the authorities closed several newspapers before the December 2004 election. Editors and publishers still exercise self-censorship and are afraid to publish articles that could be construed as contrary to the government's official position. In addition, Article 15 of the Law on Elections states that media coverage "should not violate the rights and interests of the candidates, political parties, and initiative groups" – a provision that is believed to serve the government in accusing critical journalists of libel.

Despite these limitations, the OSCE assessment mission to Uzbekistan in September 2004 noticed that the "media blockade" previously enforced during elections had been lifted and that for the first time information about the candidates and political parties had been published in print media and broadcast on television. However, coverage included only government-supported candidates, while the major problem of the election – the fact that no opposition party was allowed to compete – was completely ignored. Citizens could find independent information about the elections only on the Internet, although the authorities occasionally blocked some Web sites carrying such information. Internet access is still expensive, and few ordinary people can afford it.

The level of professionalism in print and broadcast media is extremely low. Suffocated by strict government control, editors and publishers fail to understand the concept of serving the public and continue to direct their attention to the authorities. Reporting is often one-sided, presenting only the official viewpoint; the style of writing has not changed since the Soviet era, with journalists using dry, formal language and totalitarian clichés. Censorship by editors and publishers is stricter in the capital city than in the regions, but local journalists lack resources and skills to deliver objective, accurate, and impartial reporting. They also experience problems obtaining information from local government officials. The Law on Freedom of Information adopted in 2002 is used by journalists to obtain information from the government; however, some of its provisions allow for banning information that is critical of societal values or that advocates for social change. The law is used mostly to strengthen Uzbek national consciousness and tradition.

The media work mainly in Uzbek and Russian, but the Russian-language media have been in decline since the breakup of the Soviet Union. However, the poor quality of all media operating in Uzbekistan prompts more people to watch Russian television because of its timely coverage of events in Central Asia. Tightly controlled by the government, the Uzbek media were extremely slow to report on the terrorist attacks in March, April and July 2004.

Local Governance (Score: 6.25)

The government of Uzbekistan has made a flagrant effort to promote local self-governance without relinquishing the exclusive authority of the president to appoint and dismiss the 12 regional governors (hokims). Although the local legislative bodies, which are elected by popular vote, must confirm these decisions, the power of the president is indisputable. The state's attempt to decentralize power has failed. Over the last few years, many traditional mahallas (neighborhood units) were effectively made into instruments of political control and repression by the government.

The country is divided into 12 provinces, 1 autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, 156 regions, and 123 cities. The city of Tashkent has special status, as its local government operates independently of the regional authority. According to Uzbekistan's Constitution, Karakalpakstan is a self-governing autonomous republic and thus has its own legislature and local government bodies. However, the central government exercises a large degree of control over the republic. Karakalpak officials are often excluded from meetings of heads of state to discuss the ecological problems of the Aral Sea, which is located within Karakalpakstan.

The regional hokims are extremely important to the central government because they wield significant control over the local economy and regional clans. For example, if the regional governor sides with the local clans, the cotton produced by the region is not sold to the state but exported illegally, with profits benefiting shadow regional structures. This is the reason Karimov appoints individuals who are close to him or were formerly with the government. The central authority deals in a Soviet-era style with local hokims who have fallen out with the government. For example, at a session of the Syrdarya Regional Council that dismissed the local governor in November, Karimov openly criticized the region's failure to improve the economy and fulfill state quota for the supply of cotton, making clear why the hokim was fired. The hokim of Namangan region was dismissed earlier in 2004 for failing to mobilize enough citizens (mostly schoolchildren) to collect the cotton harvest. In the case of the dismissal of the hokim of Andijan, formal reports indicated that he had distanced himself from the people and their grievances.

Regional hokims appoint district and city hokims, thus strengthening the chain of central command from Tashkent. After the terrorist bombing in the spring and summer of 2004, there was a new trend to increase the appointments of former police and security service personnel in the local administration, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, where radical Islamic groups are more active.

Under the Constitution, the hokims head both executive and legislative powers at regional, district, and city levels. Hokims and the hokimat (executive apparatus) often serve as political tools of the government, particularly in the electoral process. They exercised overwhelming influence and interfered illegally with the electoral process for the Parliament in 1999. More than 70 hokims, their deputies, and hokimat staff were candidates in the elections. All 14 regional hokims who ran for office were eventually elected, and 44 percent of elected members of Parliament were state employees, according to reports issued by the OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The December 2004 election was characterized with less political interference because the legislative councils were no longer able to nominate candidates for direct election in the lower chamber of the Parliament. Instead, local government representatives ran for the upper chamber in indirect elections by the regional legislative councils.

While hokims at all levels are appointed, the local legislative councils are elected by popular vote for five-year terms. On December 26,2004, Uzbek residents elected 12 regional councils, which subsequently voted for 84 representatives of the upper chamber of the Parliament.

Local government bodies have little power to make and enforce local policies since all decisions must comply with national laws. There is also little financial independence given that the central government establishes uniform tax, lending, and monetary policy. Regions and municipalities are responsible for collecting revenues (taxes and other mandatory payments), but expenditures are decided at the national level. Local authorities are not free to design and adopt institutions and processes of governance that reflect local needs and conditions. However, local officials exercise exceptional oversight powers in issuing government approvals, licenses, and permits needed by local businesses and private parties, which is a flourishing ground for corruption.

Although not officially part of the public administration, the mahalla is considered a form of community self-government. The mahalla is a traditional centuries-old autonomous institution based on family and community values. The Soviet government tried unsuccessfully to eliminate or submit the mahalla to the state. After independence, the Uzbek government began reviving the institution as one of the symbols of national independence. There are now approximately 12,000 mahallas in Uzbekistan, each containing between 150 and 1,500 households, notes Human Rights Watch. They are ruled by mahalla committees elected by citizen assemblies.

The role of the mahalla was identified in the 1992 Constitution as the elementary unit of political power, and the Law on Local Self-Government defines its role in local self-governance. After the 1999 bombings in Tashkent by members of the IMU, the government sought closer insight into, and control over, these traditionally closed family and neighborhood circles by institutionalizing their role in policing. The law was amended to allow tighter government control over the mahallas by bringing them into the state structure. Another law commissioned "neighborhood guardians" (posbon) to work within the mahalla. The posbon serve as civilian police and are paid by the state to work with the mahalla committee and the local police to prevent crime, maintain public order, and strengthen the social and moral environment as defined by the government. Similar institutions existed in the former Soviet Union.

In a controversial report published in 2003, Human Rights Watch concluded that although mahalla committees provide services and strengthen community and cultural life, they serve a critical function in enforcing the government's policies of discrimination and persecution of disfavored groups within Uzbek society.

Judicial Framework and Independence (Score: 6.25)

The Constitution generally provides for an independent judiciary, but the judicial system is still struggling with the early stages of reform. The courts are not independent from the executive power on either the national or the regional level. The procuracy's excessive power creates frictions with judges and law enforcement. Defense lawyers rarely have equal standing with prosecutors in court. Corruption is reported to be rampant. Low salaries, lack of secure tenure, and nontransparent methods of appointing, disciplining, and removing judges contribute to these problems. On the positive side, Uzbekistan has relatively strong procedures in place for training judges and ensuring their competency. The government's human rights record remained poor in 2004, although important first steps were made to address the use of torture and establish police accountability.

Although efforts to modernize the judiciary were more notable in 2004 as compared with previous years, there are still provisions in place that stall the reform process. Under the Constitution, the president appoints all judges for five-year terms and has the power to dismiss them, which solidified executive branch control over the judicial system. Judges rarely decide cases in favor of individual rights or against the interests of the state, although 2004 saw a few cases in which judges ruled out evidence presented by the prosecutors.

There are approximately 1,000 judges in Uzbekistan, divided among the courts of general jurisdiction, the economic courts, and the Constitutional Court. The president has the exclusive right to appoint the judges who sit on the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Higher Economic Court (subject to approval by the Parliament). All judges are selected for a five-year term (subject to reappointment), which is considered an insufficient length of tenure by international standards. Since 2001, a qualification collegium, which is appointed by the president and reports to him, conducts the process of screening potential judges for the lower courts. Although qualification collegiums reduce political influence on the nomination of judges to some extent, the process of appointing and removing judges remains nontransparent.

The prosecutors issue all arrest and search warrants without judicial oversight. Legislation providing for judicial review of detentions (habeas corpus) has not been adopted, regardless of recommendations made two years ago by the UN special rapporteur on torture. Moreover, the courts typically follow the lead of the prosecutor in criminal prosecutions, and "not guilty" verdicts remain extraordinarily rare. This is the chief reason for the overall high rate of completed investigations and subsequent sentences in Uzbekistan.

The procuracy and investigative authorities also wield extensive powers during pretrial detention. Police may detain a person without a warrant or just cause for up to three days, at which time the detainee must be either charged with a crime or released. If a person is declared a suspect, he or she may be held for an additional three days before being brought before the prosecutor. A prosecutor's order is required for arrests but not for detentions. Often police and prosecutors seek to evade restrictions on the length of time a person can be held in custody without charges by detaining the individual as a witness rather than a suspect. In these cases, the detainee is not allowed access to a lawyer and the arrest is not documented according to the internal procedures of the police.

Access to legal counsel is guaranteed by Uzbek legislation. A December 2003 Supreme Court decree stated that a defendant has a right to counsel from the moment of detention, but in practice these provisions are often disregarded. In many cases, the state appoints an attorney instead of the counsel chosen by the defendant. State-appointed lawyers often side with the prosecutors and do not represent their clients in a professional manner. While after the terrorist attacks there were reports, mostly from the city of Tashkent, that persons in custody were often held incommunicado or badly beaten by the police, in some geographic areas such as Andijan and Ferghana city, law enforcers were quick to call independent lawyers immediately to avoid being accused of abusing detainees.

Uzbekistan's judiciary faced serious challenges in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in March-April and July 2004. The government arrested or detained for questioning several hundred people, most of them alleged members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir extremist political movement or connected to splinter groups from the IMU and other so-called Wahhabi groups. The police were consulting a list of about 1,000 individuals previously convicted of extremism and subsequently amnestied, according to the U.S. State Department. Human Rights Watch reported that in many cases the police made arrests without warrants and conducted unsanctioned searches of the individuals' homes. Some of the detainees were held incommunicado for days and even months, and their relatives and attorneys alleged that they had been physically abused.

In the aftermath of the 2004 attacks, 115 people were convicted of terrorism; religious extremism; acquisition of weapons and ammunition by robbery; the manufacture, possession, and storage of explosives; and smuggling under 18 articles of the criminal code of the Republic of Uzbekistan. They were sentenced to up to 18 years in prison. None of the defendants received the death sentence. Another 65 people awaited trials at the end of the year, most of whom are expected to face charges of unconstitutional activities for membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir. Human rights defenders documented limited access to courtrooms during trials and in some cases brutal treatment of defendants by security guards. The trials raised concerns relating to the presumption of innocence and the right to a defense. There was also concern that the prosecution's case was based entirely on defendant confessions, with the state-appointed defense failing to inquire at trial about the conditions under which such confessions were made.

In September 2004, the Supreme Court adopted a resolution that clearly prohibits the use of evidence obtained by illegal investigation. The resolution also ordered judges to respond to allegations of violations and to open criminal cases against alleged perpetrators. However, according to trial monitors and defendants' families, magistrates, judges, and prosecutors have not routinely asked persons brought from custody how they have been treated. In many cases, judges were indifferent to the physical condition of people brought to them and in some instances ignored the defendants' allegations of use of torture in the investigation process.

It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Uzbekistan, and no official data are published by the Uzbek government. The authorities consider extremists all persons who are sentenced for possession of Hizb ut-Tahrir literature or for attending teachings of the Koran outside the mainstream state-supported Islam. According to the U.S. State Department, some 5,000 to 5,500 suspected extremists, members of the secular opposition, and human rights activists are incarcerated in Uzbekistan. This represents a decline from previous years, as hundreds were amnestied by the annual presidential decrees and there were fewer arrests.

Uzbekistan and Belarus are the last two states in Europe and Central Asia that continue to apply the death penalty. However, in December 2004 President Karimov signaled that this might change by announcing that Uzbekistan should stop pronouncing death sentences. On September 13, the UN special rapporteur on torture accused Tashkent of executing two prisoners whose cases were reviewed by the UN Committee on Human Rights. According to the rapporteur, at least nine people were executed since 2002 despite the committee's requests to have their cases reviewed. Authorities commuted the death sentences of three men and gave assurances that Iskander Khudoberganov, convicted of involvement in the 1999 bombings in Tashkent, would not be executed while his case was under consideration by the UN committee. The Uzbek criminal code's provisions on the death penalty have been revised numerous times. Although the code initially included 13 articles providing for capital punishment, the death penalty now may apply only to crimes of first-degree murder and terrorism.

Although many of the laws generally contain human rights provisions, these aspects have rarely been implemented in practice. The past year saw a relative increase in the government's readiness to consider the human rights aspects of the work of law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary. Uzbekistan's human rights record in the past included appalling cases of physical abuse and torture. The UN special rapporteur on torture said in his report in early 2003 that torture in Uzbekistan was systematic. Under international pressure, the government developed an "Action Plan Against Torture" that was published in early 2004. The government established an interagency human rights working group to implement the plan. Although the plan includes numerous studies of other countries, rather than actions to change the situation at home, the international community assessed it as a positive development. The government has begun to enact a number of its provisions, but progress has been slower than expected.

In early 2004, the Ministry of the Interior engaged in regular talks with human rights defenders on pressing human rights issues. The two sides established a mechanism for rapid response in cases of human rights abuses. Communication between them prevented many cases of abuse and harassment, particularly after the terrorist attacks. In May, the Uzbek government agreed to include international observers in the investigation of a case of death in custody where torture was suspected: that of Andrei Shelkovenko, who was imprisoned for robbery and murder. The inquiry was unprecedented in Uzbekistan, where every year several people die in custody under suspicious circumstances. The investigation ruled out violent death and torture, and it became clear that Shelkovenko committed suicide.

A week later, the Ministry of the Interior invited two Uzbek human rights defenders to oversee the investigation of another death in custody: that of Ilkolm Umarov in the Arnasay district of Jizzak. They confirmed eyewitness reports that Umarov died from asphyxiation during seizure. The investigation concluded that the police authorities were negligent in not immediately taking the detained person to a hospital, violating procedures by detaining Umarov as a witness rather than a suspect, and not allowing him access to a defense attorney. As a result of the investigation, the Ministry of the Interior disciplined several police officers, dismissed the district police chief, and brought criminal charges against the investigator.

International experts who participated in the Shelkovenko case suggested that Uzbekistan establish a special protocol on "death in custody." This idea later developed into a plan for establishing an independent investigation commission on serious human rights abuses. Preparations began in 2004, but the commission is likely to be established in 2005. Prosecutors seem to be less open to introducing habeas corpus, transferring the issuance of arrest and search warrants to judges, and establishing an independent investigation commission, but in his speech before the newly elected Parliament, the president outlined these upcoming changes in the judicial system as a priority for the country.

Corruption (Score: 6.00)

Corruption in Uzbekistan should be viewed in light of the state's tight control over the economy, media, education system, and civil society. Since independence, Uzbekistan has not substantially deviated from the Soviet legacy of a closed economy and endemic red tape. In effect, the Uzbek government has developed a shadow revenue system that feeds its bloated bureaucracy while supplementing state employee income and ensnaring the inchoate entrepreneurial class in a web of financial control.

Uzbekistan continues to cling to a closed, state-controlled economy, resisting the move to a functional market that might threaten the power status quo. The administration of President Karimov seems to move backward with every forward step – enacting cosmetic statutes to comply with international financial benchmarks while at the same time obstructing business opportunities for nonstate-affiliated individuals.

Cases in point have been the convoluted banking system and the latest import licensing requirements. While the country has implemented significant accounting reforms and agreed with the International Monetary Fund on currency convertibility in 2003, excessive regulation on bank transactions and arbitrary use of powers by tax officials with unrestrained access have discouraged foreign investors and opened a new, legally dubious source of revenue.

Similarly, the government in Tashkent endorsed the now infamous Regulation No. 387, claiming quality control of imports as one of its goals. As the newest in a series of measures targeting small-scale import traders, the regulation requires anyone selling foreign goods to import them personally. Traders say the law is sure to choke independent market entrepreneurs with exorbitant license prices and impossible bureaucratic hurdles. This regulation creates ground for bribery in exchange for licenses. It also protects businesses connected to political elites. In response, large-scale protests and violence against members of the tax police erupted in Kokand on November 1,2004, and swiftly extended to several Ferghana Valley cities and other parts of Uzbekistan, such as the towns of Karshi, Bukhara, and Khorezm.

The Uzbek regulations code provides numerous opportunities for officials at all levels of the government to profit from their public responsibilities as gatekeepers. Uzbeks report difficulties in obtaining elementary services without bribes. Often cash inflows from corruption are used to maintain elaborate networks of loyalty and paybacks among officials, in part stabilizing the country's government. Three of the most affected areas are the educational system, law enforcement, and border control. For little money, border guards allow people and goods in and out of the country without sufficiently preventing the import of weapons and explosives.

Uzbekistan was ranked 118 out of 146 countries in Transparency International's 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index. The country is not a signatory to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery.

Author

Margarita Assenova is a senior program manager with Freedom House in Washington, D.C.