Nations in Transit - Belarus (2004)

Capital: Minsk
Population: 9,900,000
Status: Not Free
PPP: $1,290
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 69
Religious Groups: Eastern Orthodox (80 percent), other (20 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Byelorussian (81.2 percent), Russian (11.4 percent), other including [Polish and Ukrainian] (7.4 percent)

NIT Ratings	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Electoral Process	6.00	6.25	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Civil Society	5.25	5.75	6.00	6.50	6.25	6.50	6.75
Independent Media	6.25	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Governance	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Corruption	N/A	N/A	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.50	5.75
Democracy Rating	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Executive Summary

The prospects for democratization faded in Belarus with the election in 1994 of Alexander Lukashenka as the country's first president. Since then, the president has consolidated his rule and established a system of unlimited presidential authority. Amendments to the Constitution, adopted in a highly controversial referendum in 1996, fully institutionalized the president's control over all branches of government. International criticism of Lukashenka's antidemocratic policies was ignored, largely because of the continuous economic and political support offered Lukashenka by Russia. The Belarusian economy remains unreformed and extensively bureaucratized. However, macroeconomic stabilization was introduced in 2000-2001 with relative success, and a large-scale economic crisis does not seem imminent. The government preserves social stability through welfare policies that provide the population with minimally acceptable living standards.

Local elections in March 2003 were conducted as a largely ceremonial event and predictably confirmed the political hegemony of the president. The opposition managed to secure only token representation in the local councils. In this atmosphere of political stagnation and social apathy, the government intensified its attacks on civil society and the independent press. Introduction of a new "state ideology" had a particularly negative impact on academic freedoms. The growing repressiveness of the political regime can be seen as cleansing the political and social field in advance of a referendum that would grant the president the right to run for a third term, currently barred by the Constitution.

The ongoing crisis in Belarus-Russia relations has resulted in the failure or postponement of most planned integration projects, including opening the privatization of Belarus's industry to Russian monopolies and the introduction of the Russian ruble. Many observers consider Lukashenka's reluctance to allow Russian influence into Belarus as a sign that he suspects the Kremlin – and President Vladimir Putin personally – of opposing his plans to extend his reign in office. However powerful Russia's leverage on Lukashenka may be, the conflict has not caused immediate damage to his internal position. Moreover, the Belarusian leader consciously (albeit cautiously) agitated pro-independence attitudes in the society and in 2003 presented the public with his new image as a defender of Belarusian independence, rapidly developing a rationale for staying in office beyond his second term.

Electoral Process. The 2003 local elections made no progress toward democratization and transparency in the electoral process. Pro-governmental candidates won the overwhelming majority of seats in local council elections, while opposition parties took less than 1 percent and failed to make significant progress in extending their popular base through campaigning. Observers reported massive violations of electoral law. The opposition remains politically and socially isolated, and chances for its unification are slim. Thus, political life is at a standstill, since growing public dissatisfaction with the president has yet to be converted into political strength for the opposition. Belarus's rating for electoral process remains unchanged at 6.75.

Civil Society. In 2003, Belarusian civil society continued to withstand a systematic attack from government agencies. Several high-profile nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were shut down for technical and essentially arbitrary reasons; others received official warnings that could lead to their closure in the near future. Independent trade unions are being squeezed out of existence by the repression of their leadership and forceful replacement by state-controlled unions. Political control over the educational system was strengthened alongside the introduction of a new "state ideology," an eclectic mix of ideas inherited from the Communist past and Lukashenka's own version of "Soviet Belarusian" patriotism and anti-Western rhetoric. This ideology serves as a formal pretext for cleansing public institutions of unwanted elements. Government-organized NGOs receive budget support and are actively promoted as mouthpieces for official propaganda. Belarus's rating for civil society is lowered from 6.50 to 6.75 owing to the systematic destruction of the NGO sector, arbitrary closures of important organizations, and suppression of academic freedoms.

Independent Media. Attacks on independent media intensified in 2003. Warnings from the Ministry of Information resulted in the closure or suspension of newspapers, including the three-month interruption in printing of the leading independent, Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta. Criminal libel suits were used by government officials as a tool of repression and to settle personal scores. Cessation of Russian TV and radio broadcasts deprived a part of the population of the last remaining alternatives in electronic media. A new Law on Mass Media drafted by the presidential administration may introduce Internet censorship, create new pretexts for persecution of independent journalists, and bring another round of reregistration of mass media outlets in 2004. While the law has yet to be adopted, the move may lead to yet another campaign to close down the independent press. Belarus's rating for independent media remains unchanged at 6.75.

Governance. The government is stable to the extent that all power is concentrated in the hands of the president and there is little immediate threat to his position. The removal of the prime minister and top cabinet officials in July 2003 had no consequences for political life or the policies of the cabinet. The Parliament and local governments are effectively powerless. Civil service is cumbersome and needs reform to increase its efficiency. The new Law on State Service is not likely to bring radical changes in the government apparatus. State bureaucracy lacks efficient and professional personnel, and most of the new appointees to top government jobs come from the old nomenklatura. Belarus's rating for governance remains unchanged at 6.50.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework. Abrupt replacement in 2003 of the Speaker of the upper house – recalled from the Parliament by presidential decree – underscored the powerlessness of the legislature and the abundance of institutional mechanisms to control dissent in the Parliament. The court system is subordinate to executive authorities. The constitutional rights of citizens are compromised in politically sensitive cases. Opposition activists continue to face arbitrary arrests and receive harsh treatment in jail. The impotence of the Constitutional Court was demonstrated by the refusal of the Central Election Commission to respect the Court's decision to grant parliamentary members access to voting results. Property disputes, especially when challenging the interests of the state, are subject to administrative pressure from the highest levels, including the president. Belarus's rating for constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework remains unchanged at 6.75.

Corruption. Although some independent surveys award Belarus the status of least corrupt country of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic States, the perception of corruption increased considerably over the last year, possibly because of the increase in low-level corruption. Cumbersome business regulations create a nourishing environment for bribery in the public sector and state bureaucracy. Anticorruption campaigns remain a principal instrument of political propaganda, and the government continues its tactics of silencing political opponents through allegations of corruption. New legislation was proposed, but its effectiveness may be limited in a system of government that discourages transparency. Belarus's rating for corruption is lowered from 5.50 to 5.75 owing to the government's failure to effectively address the spread of corruption in the public sector.

Outlook for 2004. Parliamentary elections and the possible referendum on lifting presidential term limits will be the main political events of 2004. The existing electoral rules and current state of political life do not promise any meaningful political change after the parliamentary elections. As for the referendum, Lukashenka will not have a significant problem getting the result he wants, but it will be much harder for him to convince the domestic public and the outside world that his victory was attained fairly if his popularity continues to decline. Moreover, recent deterioration of relations with Russia may finally create problems for both the economy and Belarus's social stability if Lukashenka fails to maintain secure access to cheap raw materials from the country's eastern neighbor. The president is likely to respond to the challenge by intensifying the crackdown on his opponents and emaciating the opposition to the point where it poses only a ceremonial challenge to his authority. In this environment, the institutionalization of his infinite rule could be carried out smoothly.

Electoral Process (Score: 6.75)

Since the consolidation of nearly unlimited authority in the presidency, representative institutions in Belarus have become largely ceremonial bodies and elections have turned into mere exercises that validate Lukashenka's political dominance. For the rest of the political field, including opposition parties, elections are considered a tool for political organizing rather than an opportunity to win access to power and the decision-making process.

The present electoral code was adopted in February 2000 and, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), "fails to provide for democratic elections." Several of its articles contradict the conditions set forth by the OSCE and the standards of the Council of Europe. The existing code fails to provide election commissions with pluralistic and multiparty representation or independence. Neither does it provide for a sufficient level of transparency in electoral processes at all stages, including registration of candidates and vote tabulation. Likewise, the code fails to provide guarantees against vote rigging during early voting and lacks a uniform appeals process for the decisions of the election commissions. Last, it excessively regulates campaign activities to the point of stifling campaigning and freedom of speech.

The 2000 elections to the House of Representatives were deemed undemocratic by international observers. The majority of the opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary elections on the grounds that the authorities failed to meet the conditions set up by the OSCE for free and democratic elections. Most of the opposition candidates who nevertheless opted to run were disqualified during the registration process. Even though the election was essentially an internal battle among representatives of the ruling establishment, independent observers registered more than 3,000 violations of the electoral law in the first round of voting.

The only opposition group that emerged in the new Parliament is the Respublika faction. It is completely marginalized and has no impact on the decision-making process. Respublika members are ostracized by the regime and official media, and several members were forced to quit. As a result, the leadership of the House of Representatives called for disbanding Respublika on October 22,2003. In spite of the pressure against it, Respublika did manage to attract public attention by monitoring elections, demanding changes in the electoral code, criticizing the regime's economic policies, and offering alternative legislative proposals.

The last presidential elections, held in September 2001, resulted in a resounding victory for incumbent president Alexander Lukashenka. According to official results, Lukashenka won 75 percent of the vote against 15 percent cast for the opposition candidate, Uladzimir Hancharyk, and 2 percent for the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Siarhej Hajdukevich. Official voter turnout was 83 percent. The opposition refused to accept the official results as accurate. Independent observers documented more than 5,000 violations during election day and early voting. The numerous complaints concerned the absence of opposition representation on election commissions, extremely biased coverage of the campaign in the official media, the lack of balanced conditions for campaigning, harassment of opposition activists, and numerous tabulation violations.

The OSCE's Limited Election Observation Mission in Belarus declared that the "2001 presidential election process failed to meet OSCE commitment for democratic elections as formulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document and Council of Europe standards." The United States declared the vote "stolen from the Belarusian people." At the same time, Lukashenka's victory was accepted officially since no convincing evidence emerged to prove that he might have lost otherwise. (A poll conducted the day before the election by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies found that 46 percent of the total population would vote for Lukashenka and 27 percent for Hancharyk; with an 83 percent turnout, these figures would have converted into 56 percent for Lukashenka and 33 percent for Hancharyk.)

The direct consequence of the 2001 presidential election was the expulsion of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) from Belarus. Under pressure from the European Union (EU) and the United States, the AMG was established in Minsk in 1998 to monitor the actions of the government and to give advice on the liberalization of the country's political climate. With Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck's leadership, the office served as a watchdog on the actions of the government and motivated opposition forces to coordinate their efforts. The AMG was accused of acting as a think tank for the opposition, and its employees were expelled from Belarus in 2001-2002 when their visas expired. A new OSCE mission was established in Belarus in February 2003 with a limited mandate, and it generally keeps a low profile, refraining from open disputes with the authorities.

The 2003 local elections made no progress toward democratization and transparency in the electoral process. Although representatives of opposition parties were admitted to election commissions, their total number of 38 out of 13,000 members in 1,673 commissions countrywide had no effect on the work of commissions. The elections were largely alternative-free. For 24,000 seats on local councils, only 26,500 candidates were nominated. Only 1,033 initial nominees represented political parties, and these were reduced to 693 after registration.

While just 3 percent of candidates who applied for registration were barred from running countrywide, opposition parties lost the bulk of their candidates at the registration stage. Thus, the Belarusian Social Democratic Party People's Assembly (BSDP NH) lost 101 out of 220 initial nominees, the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) lost 47 of 154, the United Civic Party (UCP) lost 81 of 201, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost 978 of 1,413, reported the Belarusian Association of Resource Centers. One opposition candidate was disqualified for failing to declare an honorarium equivalent to US$12 on his income declaration.

Article 45 of the electoral code reduced financial resources for each candidate to less than US$50, barely sufficient to publish one black-and-white leaflet for a few voters. Media coverage was limited to five minutes per candidate on local radio or TV or to a short address in the press. The Central Election Commission further reduced the campaigning opportunities by issuing a sublegal regulation explaining that candidates' meetings with voters held outside official buildings were considered mass rallies that would be subject to authorization by local executive authorities.

As only a few constituencies had a choice of candidates, voting on election day was generally problem-free for the authorities. According to official sources, 73.4 percent of the voters took part in the first round of the elections and early voting combined. One-fifth of the electorate voted ahead of time (up from 10 percent in 2000 parliamentary elections and 17 percent in the 2001 presidential vote). Although opposition parties accused the authorities of rigging the vote, they had little success collecting evidence for the charges. The only complaint of vote rigging that reached a court hearing concerned Alexander Melnikau, an independent candidate in Minsk who defeated the pro-governmental candidate and won the seat in the city council, according to the count at polling stations. However, the constituency commission's official release reduced Melnikau's votes by an amount sufficient to block his election. Although a recount was ordered by the court, it confirmed the official data.

Altogether, the 2003 local elections proved to be yet another unsuccessful attempt by the opposition to break out of political oblivion. Out of 23,275 deputies elected to councils on all levels, only 257 (or slightly more than 1 percent) represented political parties. Of this number, only 107 were representatives of opposition parties and the remaining represented pro-government parties. Only one political party representative was elected in Minsk, a traditional center of party activism in Belarus.

Opposition Membership in Local Councils After 2003 Elections

	Regional Councils	District Councils	City Councils, Cities Subordinated to Regional Authorities	Town Councils, Towns Subordinated to District Authorities	Settlement Councils	Village Councils	Minsk City Council	Total
Total Number of Councils	6	117	20	11	77	1,440	1	1,672
Total Number of Deputies Elected	344	4,112	607	183	977	17,192	54	23,469
Total Representatives of Political Parties	19	119	28	5	14	71	1	257
Total Representatives of Opposition Parties	4	56	7	3	6	31	0	107
Communist Party of Byelorussia **	6	55	19	0	6	21	0	107
Party of Communists of Belarus (PCB)*	4	40	2	1	3	28	0	78
Liberal Democratic Party*	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	5
United Civic Party*	0	5	2	0	1	0	0	8
Belarusian Patriotic Party**	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	3
Agrarian Party**	8	9	1	1	2	18	0	39
Belarusian Women's Party "Hope"*	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Belarusian Popular Front*	0	4	1	0	2	1	0	8
Belarusian Social Democratic Party "Narodnaja Hramada"*	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	6
Belarusian Labor Party*	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Belarusian Social and Sports Party**	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

*Opposition parties.

**Pro-government parties.

Source: Choice Through Elections (analysis of regional party chapters and NGO participation at local elections in 2003), Minsk: BARC, 2003, p. 5

Parties have lost their influence on the political system and likewise have little impact on the society. The party scene in Belarus flourished in the early 1990s, even though most were marginal groups with limited membership and resources. Two in particular, the Party of Communists of Belarus (PCB) and the BPF, did have a stable following in the first years of independence and formed the prototype of a party system. The Supreme Council of the 13th convocation elected in 1995 was the only legislature in Belarus history organized on the basis of party factions. Those included the PCB, the Agrarian Party, the UCP – a new liberal party formed out of several smaller groups – and the social democratic faction. No BPF candidates were elected, although it claimed that several victories were stolen through vote rigging. Pro-presidential deputies were organized into the nonpartisan Accord faction.

With the adoption of a sharply amended Constitution in 1996, party development came to a standstill. Ideological differences became irrelevant, and the attitude toward the president and his politics determined the stance and fate of any party. Pro-presidential parties continued as puppet groups whose only mission was to provide a pluralistic facade for the regime. Opposition parties were completely marginalized. Both, however, lacked influence in decision-making processes. There are no party factions in the House of Representatives, a new legislature formed after the referendum to replace the Supreme Council. The 110-member House of Representatives elected in 2000 has only 17 members with party affiliation.

The president does not have his own political party, and his insistence on staying aloof from party politics may be explained by several factors. The first is Lukashenka's conscious choice to draw a distinct line between himself and political organizations that he describes as power-hungry and corrupt – a nod to his populist claim to represent "the people, not the parties." The second is Lukashenka's rejection of the democratic facade of party list elections (also witnessed in recent parliamentary elections in Russia) and his readiness to be treated straightforwardly as a dictator by the outside world. The third factor is Lukashenka's unwillingness to promote political figures whose allegiance he may not be able to control in a more pluralistic political context.

The president's disinclination to associate with any political party further decreases the importance of party politics and, consequently, further isolates opposition groups. In municipal and parliamentary elections, held through a single-member constituency system, party affiliation is secondary to the more important role of voters. As a result, political alternatives centered on opposition parties are not articulated during campaigns. Meanwhile, pro-government candidates are recruited at the suggestion of local bureaucracies and run as independents. They have an immediate advantage over opposition candidates since voters generally prefer nonparty candidates.

After the reregistration of political parties in 1999, only 18 remained out of the 43 that existed prior to reregistration. Eleven of the surviving parties are in the opposition, 6 support the regime, and 1 is neutral. Party membership is low in Belarus since it doesn't increase the chances for winning elections. In fact, affiliation with an opposition party may incur various problems for those who work in the government, education, or private business sectors. Membership in the leading opposition parties ranges from 1,260 (BPF) to 4,000 (BSDP NH), and the number of active members is even lower.

The LDP claims a sizable membership of 17,000, but its actual membership is estimated at only 2,000-3,000. The LDP nearly ceased to exist in 2003 after its longtime chairman, Siarhej Hajdukevich, was removed by the party congress. Hajdukevich and his supporters walked out and started criminal proceedings against the majority faction on the grounds that the local election of congress delegates was rigged. The Ministry of Justice suspended the party, as the preliminary investigation showed that the congress was elected on the basis of false voter membership rolls.

The weakness of opposition parties is a consequence of the repressiveness of the political regime and, ironically, the parties' success in certain arenas. For example, in the period following the 1996 referendum, the opposition engaged in street politics in large cities rather than grassroots political organizing, gaining sympathy from the international community instead of building public support at home. Opposition parties successfully challenged Lukashenka's legitimacy in important international forums such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. However, the regime rarely responded to Western criticism and even used it for propaganda purposes.

Meanwhile, the opposition's mass rallies attracted only small crowds of hard-core supporters and fizzled by 2003. The single political demonstration of the year, the march For a Better Life, was carried out on March 12 by the Charter-97 movement and attracted 2,000-3,000 participants, ending in the arrest of its organizers. Other attempts to organize protest rallies, such as on the anniversary of the Belarusian Democratic Republic Proclamation of March 25,1918, attracted only a few dozen participants who were brutally dispersed by the police.

The lack of popular and authoritative personalities in the Belarusian opposition further reduced its chance of connecting with the public. Since Lukashenka's first election in 1994, there has been little change at the helm of the democratic elite. The approval ratings of veteran party leaders rarely overcome the margin of error in opinion polls. The concentration of authority in the hands of many party leaders and the inability to properly change leadership enforces a standstill within opposition parties.

Likewise, divisions and leadership battles within the opposition enforce its internal polarization. The umbrella Coordinating Council of Democratic Forces was created in 1999, but it collapsed soon after the 2000 parliamentary elections in a conflict between those who boycotted and those who participated in the elections. Unity was finally achieved during the 2001 presidential election, when the opposition united into a broad civic coalition. The coalition, however, was formed only three weeks before the election, which left little time to carry out an efficient campaign. The defeat in the presidential elections brought opposition parties to another round of internal battles. The last remaining umbrella opposition body – the Coordinating Council of the Opposition Political Parties, formed in 2000 to represent the opposition in international organizations – disintegrated after unsuccessful attempts to form a joint list of candidates for the 2003 local elections.

The only promising development is the declining popularity of President Lukashenka. His approval rating has fallen by more than one-third since the last presidential elections, from 48 percent in November 2001 to 26 percent in April 2003. However, a new climb to 31 percent in September 2003 shows that the president is still capable of winning back the electorate with a mixture of propaganda and wage increases. Still, the society demonstrates a growing demand for political opposition, and together the existing opposition parties attract approximately a quarter of the electorate.

At the same time, however, most parties attract less than 5 percent on their own, which implies that the opposition needs to unite to have any chance for electoral success. Yet the prospects for building a coalition for the 2004 parliamentary elections look bleak. Although five parties (including the BPF, the PCB, and the UCP) signed a preliminary agreement to put forward a joint list of candidates, at least two more opposition initiatives may create alternative blocks (namely, the European Coalition-Free Belarus of BSDP NH and Charter-97 human rights initiative, and the Young Belarus coalition formed by youth opposition activists in January 2004). The opposition's internal disunity is perpetuated by personal rivalries among its political leaders, memories of conflicts and past score settling, and disagreements over ideology and political strategy. If the opposition once again chooses internal fighting over coalition unity, the 2004 parliamentary elections may bring yet another validation of Lukashenka's political hegemony.

The main political intrigue expected in 2004 is whether Lukashenka will carry out the referendum on granting himself the right to be elected for a third term or do away with term limits altogether (the Constitution currently prohibits the president from running for another term). Few observers seriously believe the president will surrender power voluntarily. The referendum was not carried out in 2003 as expected, even though Lukashenka's behavior throughout the year gave little reason to doubt he was actively preparing for the vote. The president was reluctant to comment on the issue in public, quoting the need to concentrate on his day-to-day duties and accomplish what he promised the electorate. He nevertheless declared in July that he would run for the third time if the opposition destabilizes the political and social situation in the country.

The real reason for postponing the referendum appears to be the regime's domestic problems and dealings with Russia. Lukashenka's popularity hit an all-time low in April in 2003, and even when it climbed again in September, more than 60 percent of respondents to a public opinion poll declared they would prefer a different president in 2006. The third-term idea appeared to be even less popular than Lukashenka himself. Only slightly more than 20 percent approved of lifting term limits, while 53 percent opposed it throughout the year. Moreover, a referendum may face opposition not only from the West, but also from the Kremlin, which reportedly disapproves of the president's intention to stay beyond his constitutional term.

There are several reasons for the Kremlin's possible opposition to Lukashenka. His reluctance to go forward with approved integration projects (such as the introduction of a single currency and privatization of the petrochemical sector) that would give Russia an even greater influence in Belarus may be particularly irritating to the Russian elite. The improving relationship between Russia and the West, particularly the United States, may also be a reason, as Lukashenka turns into a troublemaking ally for the Kremlin in this regard. It became clear in 2003 that Russia would not be helpful to Lukashenka's reelection effort when the Kremlin declined to participate in the referendum on the unified Constitution that had to be carried out simultaneously in both countries. This was a lost opportunity for Lukashenka to slip in a vote on his third term and also capitalize on the still high support for union with Russia in Belarus.

Although Russia possesses a great deal of economic leverage over Belarus, the Kremlin is unlikely to openly discourage Lukashenka from pressing on with the referendum. The president is in full control of the state apparatus, and there is little doubt that he will prevail. Likewise, economic pressure may not be sufficient in the short run, as Lukashenka can accuse Russia of bringing down the Belarusian economy as well as encroaching on the country's independence – as he did successfully in 2003, winning the sympathy of independence-minded citizens and boosting his public image as defender of Belarusian sovereignty.

However, when declaring the term-limit referendum, Lukashenka will need to gauge the risks of simultaneously antagonizing the public, the West, and Russia. If he finds the risks too high, he may postpone the vote until his approval ratings have at least partially recovered to reduce accusations of illegitimacy or until he manages to minimize tensions with the Kremlin to secure international backing.

Civil Society (Score: 6.75)

The nongovernmental sector in Belarus is composed of three distinct forms: (1) a network of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) run by opposition individuals who are effectively denied or abstain from active participation in political life; (2) nonpartisan NGOs such as humanitarian aid organizations; and (3) puppet NGOs that act as mouthpieces for official propaganda and are subsidized directly by the state. More than 2,000 NGOs are officially registered with the Ministry of Justice; half of these are located in the capital. It is hard to determine how many are actually active. Overall, volunteerism is low owing to Belarus's declining standard of living, lack of traditions of public participation, extremely low level of awareness about NGO work, and fear of problems that might accompany membership in an "opposition" NGO.

The existing Law on Public Associations does not provide adequate protection for civil society rights. Rules for NGO registration are complicated, and a variety of pretexts (often mere technicalities) can be used to issue official warnings. Two warnings can result in the closure of an organization. For most NGOs, foreign grants remain the only source of financial support. Donations are not tax-exempt, and NGOs must pay heavy taxes if they choose to operate legally. Domestic sponsorship is almost nonexistent since the private sector is small and businesses may tend to avoid an association with the opposition. Government-controlled organizations attract financial aid from domestic and foreign-owned businesses to confirm their positive stance toward the authorities.

Since activists establish NGOs to sidestep regulations prohibiting outside funding of political parties, many NGOs have a definite political agenda, and their underground activities attract only hard-core opposition supporters. Consequently, the "opposition" NGO sector finds itself as socially isolated as most political parties. Only a few organizations interact with the government on policy-related projects. Most of the existing research-oriented NGOs and think tanks supply information primarily to foreign audiences; the political community inside the country often views the findings of independent studies and policy recommendations with suspicion.

Since many organizations have implicit political identities and seek limited funds from external donors, relations among different groups are far from friendly. Although the OSCE 2001 presidential election evaluation acknowledged the maturation of civil society in Belarus, the NGO sector was paralyzed in the postelection period. This can be attributed to growing pressure from the authorities but is also due partly to a sharp reduction in donor support from the democracy assistance community, which questioned the sector's strategic goals after the presidential elections.

Though already weak, the nongovernmental sector is nonetheless subject to systematic attacks by the government. In the first 10 months of 2003, nine NGOs were liquidated by court decisions and two others received official warnings that could lead to liquidation at any time, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. High-profile NGOs, such as human rights organizations or election-monitoring groups, are subject to arbitrary inspections. Thus, the Viasna human rights group was raided five times in the first half of 2003 before being closed in October. The Belarusian Helsinki Committee received a warning for failing to put the organization's name in quotation marks on its official documents. Among the closed organizations, the most important are Ratusha, a resource center for NGOs in the Hrodna region; Civic Initiatives, the Homel regional resource center; the Independent Society for Legal Studies; and the Minsk-based human rights group Legal Assistance to the Population.

In most instances, reasons for liquidation were purely technical. Thus, one of the pretexts for persecuting Viasna was that in rendering legal assistance to individuals who were not members of the human rights organization, it had violated the law. In a statement on the Viasna closure, Amnesty International declared that "it would be impossible to conceive of more trivial reasons to justify the suppression of Belarus' human rights community than those used by the Belarusian authorities. In light of these repeated attacks any claims that Belarus is committed to human rights and the rule of law is farcical." New organizations have registration problems for the same technical reasons. For example, founders of a Belarusian chapter of the European Youth Parliament were told that their papers were not in order since the letterhead on the various documents did not match – the original letterhead was colored, whereas the necessary photocopied duplicates were in black and white.

The possibility of a referendum to extend President Lukashenka's term in office may be encouraging preemptive strikes by the government against NGOs that monitor elections (in other words, most human rights NGOs in Belarus). Attacks on NGOs are perhaps also being prompted by the prospective adoption of the Belarus Democracy Act by the U.S. Congress. The act, which promises substantial financial injections (over US$40 million) to the Belarusian opposition, was approved by the U.S. House of Representatives in May 2003, and although it still remains with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chances for its adoption remained high throughout the year. Since the opposition is intrinsically connected to the nongovernmental sector, destruction of NGOs may be seen as an attempt to block support to political parties that may challenge Lukashenka in the future.

Amendments to the Law on Meetings, Rallies, Street Processions, and Pickets (converted from a presidential decree signed in 2001) broadened the rights of the Ministry of Justice to liquidate public associations, political parties, and trade unions. According to the new version of the law adopted on August 7,2003, organizations have the right to organize only those rallies and demonstrations that will have an attendance of more than 1,000 members. Failure to comply with the regulations concerning the conduct of rallies may lead to immediate closure of a party after the first warning.

Political control over the educational system was increased in 2003 with the introduction of a new "state ideology." The campaign was officially launched March 27-28 at a seminar of government officials organized by the presidential administration. Lukashenka called for the creation of an "immune system" for the state, protecting it from internal and external subversion. The foundations of the new state ideology are vague and contradictory, simultaneously incorporating Marxist, liberal, and conservative values. According to the president, the new teaching should be based on the "ability to work not just for the sake of profiteering, but for the good of the society, the collective, and other people. Our other values are the need for ideals and great goals, collectivism and opposition to Western individualism, social protection and respectful relations between the state and the people." Lukashenka's state ideology has yet to be codified in an official text, but even if it is, it will not be an ideology in the conventional sense. What it represents is a typical authoritarian regime's "practical philosophy," an eclectic mix of ad hoc slogans and common cultural stereotypes aimed at justifying the status quo, not a grand project of political and social engineering. It appears that the major purpose of Lukashenka's state ideology is to use its very existence as a pretext for cleansing public institutions, including government and education, of elements not sharing the political doctrine.

Although the introduction of the state ideology directly contradicts Article 6 of the Belarus Constitution – which states that pluralism is the foundation of the political system – Lukashenka declared that state officials and university professors who do not share the ideology will lose their jobs. The educational system was singled out as a principal object of ideological control. Classes in state ideology were introduced in the curriculums of all public and private universities. According to newspaper reports, political science textbooks that describe the regime as authoritarian were removed from the libraries at some schools. The minister of education established control over the ideological content of lectures and ordered that dissertation topics in the social sciences be reconsidered to correspond to the new official ideology.

The Belarusian National Jakub Kolas Humanitarian Lyceum, the only specialized high school in Minsk offering Belarusian-language education, was closed by the Ministry of Education on June 25,2003. The closure was preceded by the replacement of director Uladzimir Kolas (an opposition activist) with a state-appointed bureaucrat who is not even fluent in Belarusian. The appointment sparked protests among students and parents. After the school was closed, students were offered a switch to regular secondary schools, most of which have no Belarusian-language classes (less than 8 percent of secondary school pupils in Minsk are educated in Belarusian).

The Jakub Kolas Lyceum continues underground, carrying out classes in the offices of NGOs; some of these have already received warnings for unauthorized activities. The school's closure was just one instance of Russification policies pursued by the government in 2003 in spite of increasingly pro-independence, official rhetoric. Also worth mentioning is the almost complete cessation of broadcasting in Belarusian by the major national TV channel; according to the monitoring of the Belarusian Language Society, only 3 percent of its programming is broadcast in Belarusian.

Following the overall strategy to suppress the independent civil sector, government-organized NGOs serve the state as a subordinate arm actively re-created from the ashes of Soviet-era puppet associations. The most notorious case is the recently founded Belarusian Republican Union of Youth (BRSM) – a replica of Komsomol – whose activities are financed from the state budget. University students are pressed to join BRSM with a combination of intimidation and promises of career promotion and social benefits.

Government control over trade unions was consolidated in 2003. The transformation of the Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions (FPB) into a puppet union was completed with the appointment in 2002 of Leanid Kozik, a former deputy head of the presidential administration, as FPB leader. Under Kozik, the FPB reversed its critical stance toward the government's economic and social policies, and Kozik himself publicly suggested that the FPB would initiate the referendum on granting Lukashenka a third term in office.

Two FPB-member unions (the Union of Automobile and Agricultural Machinery Engineering Workers and the Union of Radio-Electronic Industry Workers) refused to accept the new leadership and insisted on their independence. In response, the government organized a new industry workers union. The minister of industry issued an order demanding that all local branches of dissident unions join the new association, and company administration pressured local union leaders to obey.

In November 2003, Alexander Buchvostau, head of the Union of Automobile and Agricultural Machinery Engineering Workers, was sentenced to 10 days in jail for staging a one-man picket protesting the destruction of his union. Earlier in September, another union leader, Alexander Jarashuk (head of the Belarusian Confederation of Free Trade Unions), was sentenced to 10 days after an article in Narodnaja Volia reported he had criticized the court decision to liquidate the Belarusian union of air traffic controllers. Jarashuk's statement that the court proceeding was "a play with the finale known beforehand" was interpreted as an insult to the court.

Independent Media (Score: 6.75)

In 2003, Freedom House ranked Belarus among the countries with the lowest respect for freedom of speech. Only Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan received a lower ranking among the former USSR countries. Although Article 33 of the Constitution provides guarantees for freedom of speech, this civil right is subject to systematic violations. The state press dominates the information market, and alternative sources of information are not available. The Ministry of Information controls the licensing of media and effectively acts as a tool of repression against independent press that are critical of the government.

Licenses can be withheld or revoked at the whim of the committee or on direct orders from the president. Two warnings received from the ministry within a year are sufficient to close down a newspaper. State companies heavily dominate the publishing and distribution of newspapers. State-run presses routinely refuse to publish materials critical of the authorities, and Belsajuzdruk, the state press distribution network, can refuse distribution of the independent press.

State-owned media are extensively subsidized, whereas independent media are forced to shoulder high taxes and fees on printing and distribution. Nevertheless, the fall of circulation recently affected both government and independent press. For example, the leading official newspaper, Sovetskaya Belorussiya, saw its daily print quota decline from 430,000 copies in September 2001 to 270,000 in September 2003. In comparison, the largest independent newspaper, Narodnaja Volja, publishes only 30,000 copies (down from 80,000 in the mid-1990s), and all other independent papers have even smaller circulation.

The overall decrease in subscriptions and readership can be attributed to a growing public indifference to politics. High printing costs may be a factor in the decline of independent newspapers, while the fall in official press circulation may be explained by declining public support for the government and its propaganda outlets. Local editions of several Russian newspapers dedicate four to eight pages per issue to Belarusian affairs and sometimes offer alternative views, though frequently avoiding candid discussion of hot political issues.

Independent journalists are subject to official harassment and become victims of arbitrary lawsuits under Article 367 (slander against the president), Article 368 (insulting the president), and Article 369 (insulting government officials) of the criminal code. These stipulate large fines and prison sentences for journalists found guilty. Though no journalist was imprisoned in 2003, several reporters were prosecuted on criminal charges in previous years and received sentences of up to two years of internal exile. Fines awarded in libel suits can bankrupt a publication, like the Nasha Svaboda weekly, which in 2002 was hit with a US$55,000 fine. In 2003, the Belarusian Association of Journalists attempted unsuccessfully to question the constitutionality of these articles before the Constitutional Court, which upheld the provisions.

The independent press depends heavily on foreign assistance because of discriminatory pricing at state printing houses and difficulties in attracting advertisements from state-owned companies. While traditionally biased in favor of the opposition, the independent press has begun to offer more balanced reporting and analysis and, after the 2001 presidential elections, frequently criticized the opposition for inaction and inefficiency. This sparked criticism from several opposition groups, which accused the independent press of surrendering to the authorities and helping to destroy the opposition. In response – and perhaps to take advantage of the publicity – many independent media shot back with increased criticism of the opposition.

Official media readily reprint the details of scandals involving opposition politicians and journalists and use them as another opportunity to defame all opponents of the government. The actions of authorities receive predictably negative coverage in the independent press in most cases, although many issues, including corruption charges against major protagonists of the regime, recently received far less coverage than several years ago, which can be seen as self-censorship in the nonstate press.

In 2003, the independent press was subjected to an all-around attack that started with the suspension in May of Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta (BDG). The crackdown was instigated by President Lukashenka, who, angered by its frequent criticism of top officials, publicly called for BDG's closure. From May 20 to May 22, BDG and its appendix, BDG-Dlia Sluzhebnogo Polzovania, received several official warnings from the Ministry of Information and were suspended for three months. One warning was issued for slander against the president after BDG polled the readers on whether the president had the right to use his airplane for private purposes (such as offering his jet to fly a beauty queen home to Russia).

The OSCE issued a harsh statement against the suspension, accusing the government of creating "additional protection" for government officials. A court appeal against the ministry's action was unsuccessful. BDG journalists attempted to continue their work under the aegis of other independent newspapers that offered to print their materials. Those newspapers (Echo, Predprinimatel'skaya Gazeta, and Solidarnost') received warnings and were also suspended.

Several regional newspapers, such as Region-Vesti, Intex-Press, and Shag, lost their contracts with publishing houses. Predprinimatel'skaya Gazeta and Shag were subsequently fined for failing to observe the state-mandated publishing standards. A daily print run of the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta, which also reprinted BDG materials, was confiscated at the border. Other newspapers that were closed down or suspended during 2003 included the satirical newspaper Navinki, accused of violating public morality, and Novaja Hazeta Smarhoni and Mestnoe Vremia-Press for various financial violations.

Libel suits were used in 2003 as a tool of repression and to settle personal scores. BDG journalist Iryna Makavetskaya was fined on October 1 in a criminal libel suit against her coverage of the investigation into the case of Jury Bandazheuski, a Homel University professor and Chernobyl activist sentenced to eight years in jail in 2001. Another libel suit was awarded on September 26,2003, to the National State TV and Radio Company (NDTRK) against Maryna Koktysh, a journalist of Narodnaja Volia, and Eleanora Jazerskaja, a former employee of the First National Channel (BT-1), for accusing NDTRK head Jahor Rybakou of taking Jazerskaja's show off the air and facilitating the overall decay of BT-1. Narodnaja Volia was hit with a fine of 50 million Belarusian rubles (US$24,000), and Jazerskaja and Koktysh were fined 3 million rubles (US$1,400) each. NDTRK appealed the sentence, and the appeal court increased the fines by five times for Narodnaja Volia and three times for Jazerskaja and Koktysh.

Unlike the press, where some independent media are visible, electronic media in Belarus are totally dominated by the state. Belarusian television currently has four national TV channels, all controlled by the state. All-National Television (ONT) and Capital TV fill the bulk of their airtime with rebroadcasts of Russian TV networks. BT-1 does not offer alternative views, reports on the domestic and international affairs in a manner acceptable to the government, and slanders the opposition with impunity. In 2003, BT-1 almost entirely stopped broadcasts in the Belarusian language.

The ONT was launched in 2002 and was initially somewhat more balanced and open to public debate than BT-1. Gradually, however, it was turned into another propaganda outlet. Uladzimir Matskevich, a host of the Vybor (Choice) talk show on ONT, was removed in April immediately after he invited opposition personalities on the show. Since summer 2003, all TV channels broadcast official propaganda movies that extolled the achievements of the regime and accused the opposition of plotting to violently destroy the state system. One such movie, Pautina (The Web), aired June 21, made allegations about illegal activities of the IREX bureau in Minsk. The content of the movie was used as a pretext to close down the IREX office and terminate its operations in Belarus in August 2003.

Russian electronic media broadcasts have been restricted. Three Russian radio stations were pulled off the air in February 2003, and the Kultura TV channel was replaced in October with the newly created nationwide culture and entertainment channel Lad. Other TV networks, such as RTR and NTV, are available mostly in and around large cities. Although Russian stations dedicate little time to Belarus affairs, authorities react sharply to their occasional criticism. The NTV correspondent bureau was closed after its head, Pavel Selin, was accused of reporting false information while covering the funeral of Belarus's foremost contemporary writer, Vasil Bykau, on June 25,2003. Selin's report that the police created obstacles to the funeral procession was deemed slanderous.

The Ministry of Information tightened control over FM radio broadcasting in 2003, and there are plans to censor the Internet as well. FM stations were obliged to submit daily transcripts of their newscasts to the ministry for review. Undeveloped communications and high costs for hardware make Internet access unaffordable for most of the population. However, the Internet does provide an alternative source of information, especially for younger and educated segments of the population. Access to the Internet is monopolized by the state, and the Ministry of Information declared that it might block access to opposition sites and independent news sources in the future. There are at least 100 public Internet outlets in Minsk alone; however, plans for inspections announced in October may lead to closure of all but 10.

Freedom of speech in Belarus may be suppressed even further with the adoption of the new Law on Mass Media, introduced to the Parliament on October 2,2003. Though the draft was worked out in strict secrecy, the Belarusian Association of Journalists obtained a copy from opposition parliamentarians and discovered that it contained several new limitations on press freedom. For example, it forbids foreign support for the Belarusian media, prohibits the quoting of unregistered public associations or parties, and broadens the range of institutions that can initialize closure of mass media outlets and revoke accreditation of foreign journalists.

The draft law also foresees licensing of Internet periodicals and establishes procedures for controlling their content. Finally, it calls for reregistration of media in 2004, which can be used as a pretext for silencing most vocal opposition outlets just before the parliamentary elections and the possible referendum. Although voting on the draft law was postponed until the spring session of the Parliament in 2004, opposition deputies commented that its adoption is just a matter of time.

Governance (Score: 6.50)

The Belarus government is stable to the extent that all power is concentrated in the hands of the president and there is little immediate threat to his position. Cabinet reshuffles are frequent, but they do not indicate political instability. The National Assembly has extremely limited powers and virtually no control over the state budget, which can be "amended" in the middle of the year by presidential decree. Article 99 of the Constitution establishes that any bill that impacts the budget must be approved by the president or the government before being voted on. The Presidential Department of Affairs (PDA) is responsible for the financial and material resources of the Parliament, which doesn't even have control over its own internal finances and wages.

Texts of major legislation (including laws, presidential decrees and orders, and resolutions of the Council of Ministers) are available to the public in both printed and free Internet versions through the National Register of Legal Acts of the Republic of Belarus. However, no rules exist for disclosure of central government and local budgets, whose detailed content is kept secret from the public and journalists. Only a small part of lawmaking is carried out in the Parliament. The National Center for Legislative Activities – a state think tank responsible for preparation of the bills – is subordinate to the president. Several political parties and public associations do make efforts to introduce alternative bills. But a comprehensive enactment procedure and the prevalence of pro-regime loyalists in both houses of the Parliament make the adoption of alternative bills highly unrealistic, reducing such initiatives to mere self-advertisement.

Subnational governments have extensive responsibilities, including local development, housing, social services, public security, education, and the like. According to the Constitution, the president appoints the heads of local administrations. Thus, local councils have no control over the executive bodies and are generally window dressing. Belarus has three levels of local government: regional, district, and village and township. Upper-level administrations direct and coordinate the work of lower levels. The total number of local governments is approximately 1,700.

Local governments have little control over their finances, as about one-half of their revenues comes from the central government. Independent revenue sources (such as local taxes and revenues from managing and selling property) account for only one-tenth of local budgets. Only the Minsk government has a substantial local budget due to the concentration of business activity in the capital city. Village and township governments are particularly impotent since the territory they cover is generally smaller than the size of a basic production unit in the countryside; this is usually a collective farm whose head serves as the territory's de facto administrator. The collective farm system thus provides the real foundation of state authority in the countryside.

There are about 100,000 state employers in Belarus (or approximately 1 for every 100 citizens). The Law on State Service establishes only general criteria for hiring officials, such as educational background, experience, and knowledge of the law and official languages. The protocol for filling public service positions is not specified; at their discretion, state agencies may or may not conduct competitions for vacancies. Because of low wages, public service has little attraction for younger and educated professionals; consequently, it is dominated by the old Communist nomenklatura.

A significant percentage of newcomers have positions at the top echelons of state hierarchy, which is stocked with Lukashenka's loyalists elevated from the lower and middle ranks. However, finding professional personnel to staff the state apparatus recently turned into a serious challenge for the president. Striving to maintain high levels of public support, Lukashenka tends to scapegoat all failures inside the administration; thus, potential candidates for top jobs began to decline offers out of fear of becoming victims of yet another populist campaign (although usually only those who dare to openly challenge the president face criminal charges).

It appears that the personnel deficit pushed Lukashenka toward a more peaceful coexistence with the nomenklatura. Remarkably, the widely publicized removal in July 2003 of Prime Minister Henadz Navitski, his deputy Alexander Papkou, and Minister for Agriculture Michal Rusy (who were held responsible for the failure to pay debts to collective farms) did not culminate in criminal charges, as could be expected given Lukashenka's past history with the nomenklatura. The officials in question were appointed to positions of comparable importance, and their replacements came from the same stock of nomenklatura veterans. In the end, this only solidified the existing bureaucratic system, which has thus become a stakeholder in the current political regime.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework (Score: 6.75)

The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, adopted by referendum in 1996, established a system of government based on the near absolute authority of the president. No major institutional checks on presidential power exist de facto or de jure. Thus, the cabinet is under complete control of the president, with only the prime minister presented to the House of Representatives for approval. The Parliament faces dissolution if it rejects the suggested candidate twice. The president also dominates the legislative process. Article 137 of the Constitution gives priority in most cases to presidential decrees over laws adopted by the National Assembly.

The bicameral composition of the National Assembly enforces its subordination to the president. While the lower House of Representatives is elected on a single-member constituency basis, the upper Council of the Republic is appointed by regional assemblies of local councils, with the president appointing 8 of its 64 members. Among current upper house members, 17 hold administrative positions appointed by the president. The president may use his prerogatives to control the legislature and enforce the loyalty of its members.

Alaxandr Vaitovich, the Speaker of the Council of the Republic, was recalled August 1,2003, by presidential decree; the official reason given was that Vaitovich had reached the retirement age established for civil servants (Vaitovich was one of eight deputies directly appointed by the president). Only a week before his dismissal, Vaitovich declared his disapproval of plans to carry out the referendum on lifting term limits for the president. A new deputy appointed by Lukashenka was immediately elected chairman of the Council of the Republic on the same day.

Article 109 of the Constitution gives judicial power to the courts, and Article 110 stipulates that all judges shall be independent and any interference in the administration of justice is unlawful. However, the procedures for appointing judges give the president the upper hand. The president appoints 6 out of 12 members of the Constitutional Court, including its chairman. The remaining 6 are appointed by the Council of the Republic on the president's recommendation. The president also appoints chairmen and the entire composition of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court. In addition, the president has the authority to appoint all military and district judges. The Constitution does not protect judges from voluntary removal during their tenure. The institutional dependence of the judges on the president is matched by their reliance on the executive branch for bonuses, promotion, and housing, which arguably makes them vulnerable to coercion.

Although the Constitution provides for basic human rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of association, religious freedom, and business and property rights, these are not adequately protected in practice. Moreover, many existing laws (including the Law on Public Associations, the Law on Freedom of Religion, and the Law on Meetings, Rallies, Street Processions, and Pickets) significantly restrict the constitutional rights of citizens.

It is not completely impossible to receive a fair trial in Belarus. However, legal procedures can be violated in politically sensitive cases. For example, a district court in Minsk refused to consider the complaint of the wives of Viktar Hanchar and Alexander Krasouski (opposition figures who mysteriously disappeared in 1999 and are believed to have been killed) against the Office of the Prosecutor, which earlier had suspended the investigation. The court responded that it had "no authority" to rule on the actions of the Office of the Prosecutor.

The Constitution prohibits torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. In practice, however, police and prison guards beat suspects and convicts. Opposition activists receive especially harsh treatment, and their rights are systematically violated. For example, BPF deputy chairman Jury Khadyka was beaten along with dozens of protesters during the march For a Better Life on March 12,2003. He was delivered to a hospital, where the medical personnel refused to treat him.

On June 18, youth activist Tacciana Jalavaja was arrested for participating in an opposition picket in April. She was sentenced in absentia (which is against the law) to 10 days in prison one month prior to the arrest. When she developed a purulent inflammation in the bridge of her nose, the personnel refused to call a doctor. Jalavaja was taken to a hospital one day later, where it was discovered that surgery was urgently needed to prevent inflammation of the brain and possibly death. The surgery was conducted without anesthesia. While Jalavaja was in the hospital, the prosecutor appealed her sentence and she was sentenced anew, once again in absentia.

Confiscating property or freezing assets may be enforced in cases that have obvious political underpinnings or involve the interests of the bureaucracy. In 2003, real estate belonging to the company of opposition parliamentarian Uladzimir Parfenovich was confiscated. In another case, the government ordered an "enlargement'"of the state share in two mobile communications companies, BelCel and Velcom, because its minority stake "did not allow it to control the market," according to Charter-97. Criminal proceedings launched against Velcom resulted in the arrests of its top management. They were suddenly freed after the president publicly called for their release, arguing that Velcom activities brought more good than harm to the country. The whole episode, however, strengthened the perception that it is executive authority and not the law that metes out justice in sensitive cases.

As the courts are controlled de facto by the executive authority, problems with nonenforcement generally do not occur. However, this may happen in those rare cases when court rulings contradict the interests of the authorities – for example, in the Constitutional Court decision on the appeal of three members of the House of Representatives regarding the constitutionality of election commission activities. When acting as observers for the local elections, the members of Parliament discovered that the commissions refused to familiarize themselves with vote tabulation protocols. Deputies filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which recognized their right to review voting count reports. However, the Central Election Commission refused to provide the documents, declaring the decision of the Constitutional Court "incorrect."

Corruption (Score: 5.75)

Surveys conducted by international agencies indicate a relatively low level of grand corruption in Belarus. Thus, the 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International places Belarus above all former Soviet states and even some of the new members of the EU. This low level of grand corruption can be explained by the absence of powerful business groups and oligarchies, which leaves bureaucrats without a range of corruption opportunities common to distorted capitalist economies. Moreover, corruption-prone institutions – such as the Parliament and political parties – play no serious role in Belarus. Belarus's rating, however, has seriously deteriorated since the 2002 survey, sliding to 51 from 36.

The decline can be partly explained by a continuous spread of low-level corruption. A combination of low wages and lackluster public sector performance makes bribery as ubiquitous in Belarus as anywhere in the region. Another reason is that the state is gradually losing its capacity to provide cradle-to-grave welfare to its citizens. For example, the provision of free higher education is hampered by a rapid increase in the student-age population. The generation born in the last Soviet-era baby boom – just before the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 – has recently entered the university-student-age bracket en masse.

Potential applicants compete for a limited number of free places even at public universities, where up to half of the students pay for their education. Bribes reportedly play a big role in entrance decisions. Likewise, the continuous aging of the population increases the demand for health care services, another underfinanced public sector area. The state largely refuses to acknowledge the problem or introduce market mechanisms that would allow for a more transparent operation of the public sector, whose services are nominally free of charge but in reality often have to be paid for.

Thus, the idea of universal health insurance is not even discussed, while education loans barely exist. Shadow payments and bribes flourish as a consequence. According to a poll conducted by the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies in April 2003,24 percent of Belarusians noted the disappearance of free health care, and 11 percent the elimination of free education, as the country's most pressing problems.

Overregulation of business activities creates pervasive corruption opportunities in small and medium enterprises. Business regulations are unstable and subject to frequent and unpredictable amendments by presidential decrees or other acts. Likewise, the tax system is complicated and cumbersome. According to a World Bank survey, opening a private business in Belarus is an arduous undertaking that requires passing 19 legal procedures (which by itself can take 118 days on average) and spending an equivalent of 27 percent of the annual gross domestic product per capita. Burdensome regulations cultivate a flourishing shadow economy, whose size reaches in some sectors of the economy (such as construction, transportation, or services) to 80 percent. On a positive note, licensing rules were relaxed in 2003 by a presidential decree that canceled required licenses for several dozen kinds of economic activity.

The Law on Public Service, signed on June 14,2003, establishes conflict of interest rules. Civil servants (including members of Parliament) are barred from entrepreneurial activities either directly or indirectly or from taking part in the management of a commercial organization. The recently proposed new anticorruption legislation foresees strengthening the conflict of interest rules and spreads the application of anticorruption legislation to a broader circle of government agencies and officials.

In practice, however, transparency of decision-making processes and business operations under the aegis of government institutions is highly doubtful. Several government agencies, such as the Presidential Department of Affairs, are directly involved in the most lucrative businesses (such as the cigarette trade and exploitation of national parks) and frequently enjoy a monopolistic status conferred by the president or the government. Allegations that these revenues are channeled into a "shadow" presidential budget are continuously mounted by the independent press. Officials do not deny the existence of a shadow budget but refuse to comment on its size. The KGB has recently launched a probe into the PDA's activities, but this may reflect insider battles for more influence in the state hierarchy rather than a genuine anticorruption effort.

Anticorruption policies often have the appearance of propaganda campaigns aimed at boosting the popularity of Lukashenka, who came to power in 1994 as head of the Anticorruption Commission in the Parliament. Lukashenka subsequently used the corruption issue as a tool for providing the public with an easy explanation for economic hardships, and bribery charges supplied him with a fitting pretext to crack down on anyone attempting to oppose him inside the system. Arrests of government officials and heads of public companies have been carried out with remarkable regularity over the past few years, and probes have frequently targeted political opponents of the president. The use of corruption charges as a tool of political reprisal continued in 2003. Criminal proceedings were started against Siarhej Skrabiec, a head of the Respublika group in the House of Representatives, for the illegal acquisition of a bank loan. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly condemned "any attempts to pressure and put forward politically motivated criminal charges against deputies of the Respublika faction and other parliamentarians."

Low-level corruption recently became a focal point of new propaganda campaigns, presumably because this sort of corruption is the most visible to ordinary citizens and contributes to the decline in public approval of the government. For example, the State Control Committee was authorized to monitor university entrance exams, and its activities were widely publicized in official media. Although this effort resulted in several arrests on campuses, it's hard to evaluate its real impact.

Since fighting corruption is the president's pet political issue, independent investigations are not encouraged and are seen in many instances as instruments of political attack against the regime. Journalists and independent media reporting on the issue have faced libel suits in the past, with punishments including huge fines and even closure.

Author

Vitali Silitski is a Minsk-based freelance researcher and political analyst.