Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 - Afghanistan

Overview: Although responsibility for security in Afghanistan transitioned from U.S. and international forces to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) on January 1, 2015, the United States remains committed to sustained political, diplomatic, and economic engagement in Afghanistan. U.S. forces will continue to have the capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, but the majority of these operations were being carried out in conjunction with, or solely by, Afghan units at year's end. The United States supports Afghan efforts to professionalize and modernize their security forces. The military component of U.S. assistance to the ANSF transitioned to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) on January 1, 2015. RSM primarily focuses on train, advise, and assist functions, but will retain some U.S. counterterrorism functions as outlined in the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA).

Insider attacks and force protection challenges remained problematic throughout 2014. During the 2014 spring to fall fighting season, the Taliban sought unsuccessfully to disrupt the two rounds of national elections that occurred in April and June, and attempted to expand their territorial control in western Kandahar, northern Helmand, and Kunduz Province, among other areas. Insurgents increased attacks on government forces and installations during the three-month long stalemate that followed the elections as the two presidential candidates contested the results, placing greater pressure on the Afghan police and army as they closed out the fighting season. The Taliban and other insurgent groups focused on high-profile terrorist attacks as well as attacks on government officials, particularly in Kabul, to maintain their profile and undermine the central government.

The Government of Afghanistan takes the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seriously. There were some reports of ISIL engaging Afghan insurgent groups to obtain allegiance in exchange for resources. In the following instances of ISIL-affiliated activity, the Afghan government responded with police and intelligence services investigations:

• In September, an ISIL newspaper in Dari and Pashto was reportedly distributed in Kabul and Nangarhar provinces promoting extremist ideology.

• In late October, pro-ISIL graffiti was discovered at Kabul University, sparking fear that extremist youth groups may latch onto ISIL messaging.

• On November 15, a suspected ISIL agent who had allegedly posted pamphlets at the Blue Mosque in Herat City was detained in Herat.

ISIL ideology may resonate with fringe elements of insurgent/terrorist groups in Afghanistan, but for the most part Afghanistan-based militants were resistant to fully aligning themselves with the group. ISIL will likely continue to engage Afghan insurgent and terrorist groups. Small numbers of independent actors that are loosely-affiliated with ISIL may continue to use ISIL's name to gain public and media attention in Afghanistan.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: In 2014, insurgents across Afghanistan used a variety of tactics against ANSF personnel and Coalition Forces (CF). They aimed to expand their territorial influence, disrupt civil governance, and create a public perception of instability, as CF transitioned to RSM and Afghan forces fully engaged in the security of their country. Attacks followed a seasonal pattern, shifting from more guerilla military-style engagements in the spring and summer to high profile and harassing attacks during the fall and winter. In Kabul, there was a significant increase in attacks against Western and U.S. interests over the same time period in 2013.

Insurgents continued to use large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and complex attacks involving multiple attackers laden with suicide vests working in teams. These incidents increasingly targeted ANSF, Afghan government buildings, soft foreign civilian targets, and Western interests in Kabul, as the overall number of potential targets, particularly in the provinces, decreased due to a shrinking international military footprint. Terrorist activity expanded from historically high level areas in the south and east of Afghanistan to include some areas further north; Kabul was an insurgent focus at the end of the year. Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Herat, Kunar, and Kunduz were the most violent provinces for attacks against ANSF, CF, and civilians.

Afghanistan remained an area of armed hostilities in 2014 and a variety of insurgent groups used terrorist tactics to pursue their goals. A sampling of high-profile incidents include:

• On January 17, three Taliban insurgents launched a complex attack on a restaurant frequented by foreigners in Kabul. One wore a suicide vest and detonated at the restaurant's gate, allowing the other two to enter the establishment. They killed 21 people, including 13 foreigners and high-level officials from the UN and the International Monetary Fund. The gunmen were later killed in a standoff with the Afghan police.

• On March 20, four terrorists smuggled pistols past the heavy security of the Serena Hotel in Kabul, opening fire on foreign and Afghan guests dining for the Persian New Year. They killed nine people, including two children, before being gunned down by the ANSF. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

• On July 15, a VBIED detonated in a public market in Paktika Province, killing 89 civilians and wounding 42 others. No group claimed responsibility and the Taliban issued a statement disavowing any connection with the attack.

• On August 5, in an insider attack, a lone gunman opened fire upon a high-level CF delegation visiting the Marshal Fahim National Defense University, killing U.S. Major General Harold Greene and wounding 15 others according to media accounts. Major General Greene was the highest level U.S. military official killed by hostile action since September 11, 2001.

• On September 4, Taliban attackers detonated two significant VBIEDs outside the National Directorate of Security (NDS) Headquarters in Ghazni Province. Following the explosion, an armed assault team engaged the compound. In the final assessment of the attack, 14 security personnel and 19 Taliban were killed, with 154 others wounded.

• On November 9, a lone suicide bomber infiltrated Kabul Police Headquarters in an attempt to kill the Chief of Police. Instead, the suicide vest explosion killed the Chief of Staff and wounded six others. The Taliban later claimed responsibility for the attack.

• On November 16, a suicide bomber in southern Kabul killed three civilians, and wounded approximately 10 others, included a pro-BSA Member of Parliament. The Parliamentary member was believed to be the target as a warning against voting to approve the agreement with the United States.

• On November 23, a suicide bomber exploded his vest in a crowd of spectators at a volleyball match in Paktika Province, leaving 45 civilians dead and 50 wounded. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

• On November 29, three attackers with suicide vests and automatic weapons attacked a Kabul guest house for South African NGO workers, killing three foreigners and one Afghan staff member. One insurgent died when he detonated his vest. The other two were killed by police during the rescue of six Afghan hostages. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

• On December 17, a teenager entered an auditorium at the French Cultural Center in Kabul where a play was taking place and detonated his suicide vest. He killed one German man and wounded 16 others. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Afghan Attorney General's Office (AGO) investigates and prosecutes violations of the laws on Crimes against the Internal and External Security of the State (1976 and 1987), the Law on Combat Against Terrorist Offences (2008), and the Law of Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives (2005), including laws that prohibit membership in terrorist or insurgent groups as well as laws that forbid violent acts committed against the state, hostage taking, murder, and the use of explosives against military forces and state infrastructure. The Law on the Structure and Jurisdiction of the Attorney General's Office was enacted in October 2013. It codifies the structure and funding of the existing Anti-Terrorism Protection Directorate (ATPD) in the AGO and permits the investigation and prosecution of terrorist and national security cases using internationally accepted methods and evidentiary rules. The ATPD handled a total of 8,619 cases in 2014, an average of 2,500 cases per quarter on the primary and appellate levels.

In early 2014, the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP) at Bagram Air Field began adjudicating cases of individuals detained by Afghan security forces and never held in Coalition Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) detention. Originally established by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to try the cases of former CF LOAC detainees and staffed with Afghan public security judges and ATPD prosecutors, the JCIP is the only counterterrorism court in Afghanistan that has, in effect, nationwide jurisdiction. Its docket regularly includes cases against those implicated in terrorist attacks on U.S. military personnel and U.S. military and civilian installations in Afghanistan. Through early December, the JCIP had adjudicated 533 primary court trials in 2014, and 1,153 appellate court trials (to include appellate trials of primary court cases that had been adjudicated in 2013). Among notable cases tried at the JCIP during 2014 were:

• Aynuddin, perpetrator of an August 2012 insider attack that killed three Marines and ultimately determined by the JCIP primary court to be a juvenile, was sentenced to seven- and-one-half years (the maximum sentence authorized under Afghan law for a juvenile convicted of any crime).

• Mohammad Nazeer, the lone surviving attacker from a September 2012 assault on Camp Bastion, was sentenced to death.

The Governments of Afghanistan and the United States investigated a variety of criminal acts, including kidnappings and conspiracies to commit terrorist acts. On several occasions, U.S. law enforcement bodies assisted the Ministry of Interior, the NDS, and other Afghan authorities to take action to disrupt and dismantle terrorist operations and prosecute terrorist suspects.

Afghanistan continued to process traveler arrivals and departures at major points of entry using the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES). In addition, Afghan security forces continued to participate in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, receiving training and equipment in counterterrorism-related crisis response and dignitary and infrastructure protection. ATA assistance also included an intensive instructor development component to build Afghan security force capacity to institutionalize counterterrorism skill sets and regenerate training within Afghanistan's law enforcement structure.

Despite advances in capability, the ANSF faces large challenges in successfully protecting the country's land borders, particularly those with Pakistan and Iran. The ABP, which is part of the policing wing of the ANSF, has over 23,000 officers and has the lead on border security. Its leaders openly say their numbers and weaponry are insufficient to successfully execute their mission, particularly in the aforementioned border areas where they face difficult terrain, resupply, and coordination problems with the military, and a heavily-armed, determined insurgency that attacks them in force.

After decades of war and poor or fragmented governance in many rural areas, the ANSF is focused on working with international actors to rebuild its capacity. While the Afghan government has progressed substantially since 2001, complex organizational structures, weak inter-ministerial coordination, corruption, lack of full control over territory (particularly in the border regions with Pakistan), and safe havens for terrorist groups operating on its soil all remain ongoing challenges.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Afghanistan is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In 2014, the Afghan government took initial steps to address deficiencies in its anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. In June, FATF strongly warned Afghanistan to comply with the government's June 2012 commitment to implement an action plan agreed upon with FATF to address the deficiencies by October 2014, or run the risk of being placed on the list of "High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions" (the blacklist). The FATF action plan outlined a number of areas that the government needed to address to bring Afghanistan into compliance with international standards, including enactment of amended AML/CFT legislation. Afghanistan amended its AML and CFT laws in June. Terrorist financing is a criminal offense, and Afghanistan is now able to immediately freeze assets identified by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267 and 1373. Under the updated process, the Afghan National Security Council, following notification of a UNSCR designation, immediately notifies the AGO, which in turn identifies and freezes related assets. As of the end of 2014, FATF was assessing whether the new regulations were fully FATF-compliant.

Terrorist finance investigations in Afghanistan continued to be hampered by a weak legal and regulatory regime, coupled with a lack of capacity. The new administration under President Ashraf Ghani expressed its intent to fulfill the FATF action plan milestones.

Afghan officials indicated that because al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and terrorist organizations from the Central Asian republics transfer their assets from person to person or through informal banking system mechanisms, it is very difficult to track, freeze, and confiscate their assets. However, on those occasions when transactions have come to the Afghan government's attention, either via the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) or reports from the Afghan security agencies, it has acted promptly not to just freeze but also confiscate those assets. In 2014, officials reported some asset seizures, but said it is often difficult to quantify seizures in dollar terms because they confiscate vehicles or other equipment suspected of being used by terrorist organizations.

Money Service Providers in Afghanistan are required to register with and provide currency transaction reports to the FIU at the Central Bank. These reports include monthly data on volumes and numbers of transactions, detailing whether transactions are inbound or outbound, foreign or domestic, and in local or foreign currency. Supervision is weak but improving, with 2014 seeing an increase in the number of on-site inspections of money service providers.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Afghanistan consistently emphasized the need to strengthen joint cooperation to fight terrorism and violent extremism in a variety of bilateral and multilateral fora. Notable among such meetings were the Heart of Asia/Istanbul Process, the UN Regional Center for Preventative Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Afghanistan shares the lead on the Counterterrorism Confidence Building Measure (CBM) of the Istanbul Process, working closely with Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Under the Counterterrorism CBM framework, Afghanistan hosted an international meeting on terrorist financing in Kabul in February, and also hosted an international workshop on countering improvised explosive devices in March.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Government of Afghanistan continued to support activities designed to prevent radicalization. Through increased engagement with religious communities, Afghan government officials promoted religious moderation, encouraged tolerance, and condemned violence. There are approximately 120,000 mosques in Afghanistan, of which 3,600 are registered with the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MoHRA) and the Ministry of Education. Registration is not compulsory, and unregistered mosques, many of which have associated madrassas, operate independent of government oversight. Some religious leaders at these unregistered mosques promote violent extremism. The National Ulema Council is a quasi-governmental body of religious scholars established by former President Karzai in 2002 to counter radicalization and violent extremism. Since taking office on September 29, President Ghani has engaged actively on countering violent extremism efforts, requesting that the Ulema Council both condemn insurgent attacks and issue a call for peace in mosques throughout the country.

President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, purposefully reached out early in their tenure to civil society groups to understand the challenges they face and seek ways to address them. In an effort to stem discontent and prevent possible radicalization, Ghani also visited a number of prisons and detention facilities to address rising inmate complaints about poor prison conditions and inequitable clemency programs. Afghan religious leaders and government officials attended conferences at the Hedayah Center, an International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, where they received training on tolerance programming.

President Ghani has identified the peace process as the priority of his administration, and is actively pursuing engagement with the Taliban. The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) pays for, and provides the institutional mechanism to implement, the full range of the Afghan government's peace activities, which include the reintegration of foot soldiers in the provinces and provincial-level peace outreach, Ulema engagement on countering violent extremism, and national-level reconciliation initiatives with senior Taliban leadership. Individual fighters who join the program make the commitment to renounce violence and sever all ties with the insurgency, and to abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan. Many go on to become peace advocates, conducting outreach on behalf of the Afghan government through the APRP. Since its inception, the APRP has successfully reintegrated over 9,200 former combatants across Afghanistan.