U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1999 - Thailand

At the end of 1998, Thailand hosted nearly 188,000 refugees, including 140,000 from Burma, 36,000 from Cambodia, 11,300 from Laos, and more than 400 from other countries. An estimated 350,000 or more Burmese were living in Thailand in refugee-like circumstances.

In 1998, some 16,555 Cambodians entered Thailand. During the year, as many as 40,000 Cambodians repatriated, either spontaneously or through organized voluntary repatriations.

Only eight Vietnamese refugees remained in Thailand at year's end, along with 45 non-refugees from Vietnam.

Thailand's record as a refugee-hosting country remained mixed and controversial. Thailand is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, but it permitted more than 16,000 Cambodian refugees and an uncertain number of Burmese refugees to enter in 1998. At year's end, it hosted the second largest number of refugees in East Asia (China continued to host more than 280,000 Vietnamese). Yet, Thailand initially denied admission to many of those new refugees, permitting them to enter only when their lives were at immediate risk. It initially refused entry to the large group of Cambodians fleeing government offenses. It refused entry to some Burmese, forcibly repatriated others, and failed to protect refugee camps from attacks by Burmese troops and allied fighters. In 1998, Thailand finally granted UNHCR a formal protection role at the Burma border, although even that seemingly positive development was not without controversy.

Refugees from Burma

USCR visited Thailand and Burma in May 1998 to assess conditions for Burmese refugees and internally displaced persons. USCR called on Thailand to treat Burmese asylum seekers according to internationally accepted refugee protection principles. Tens of thousands of ethnic minority Burmese refugees have lived in camps just inside the Thai border since the mid-1980s. Although Thailand does not officially regard them as refugees, it does permit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to assist them. At the end of the year, 112,000 ethnic minority Burmese – mostly Karen – lived in camps just over the Thai border. Another 7,000 were living unofficially outside of the camps. An estimated 20,000 ethnic Shan refugees from Burma were living in northern Thailand.

Some 9,000 ethnic Mon who had been living in refugee camps in Thailand but whom the Thai authorities forcibly relocated to three "resettlement sites" inside Burma in recent years continued to receive assistance from NGOs based in Thailand. Near the end of the 1998, the Mon reported increased camp arrivals.

Until the early 1990s, the Burmese refugees in Thailand lived relatively quietly in small camps assisted by NGOs. Although the Thai authorities did not permit UNHCR access to the camps, there were no significant security concerns. Since the mid-1990s, however, Thailand has toughened its attitude toward Burmese refugees, while improving its relations with Burma's ruling State Peace and Democracy Council (SPDC), formerly the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).

In recent years, Thailand has barred Burmese refugees from entering, forcibly repatriated them, temporarily blocked aid to them, refused to permit them to build adequate shelters, harassed them, and failed to protect them from cross-border attacks by the Burmese military and allied forces.

Despite SLORC/SPDC human rights abuses such as forced relocation, forced porterage, and forced labor, Thailand has allowed entry only to Burmese who were "fleeing fighting." During its May site visit, USCR issued a press statement saying the Thai standard could exclude many genuine refugees and could encourage premature repatriation. USCR noted, "It is clear that Burmese refugees are not only fleeing fighting but also widespread human rights abuses, including massive forced relocations."

In 1998, Thailand said it would expand the standard to include persons fleeing "the effects of civil war." According to UNHCR and NGOs, however, at the end of 1998 there was no coherent application of any one standard.

Since 1996, Burmese troops and insurgents associated with the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), a group that broke away in 1995 from the predominantly Christian Karen National Union (KNA), have attacked Burmese refugee camps in Thailand. The attackers have killed several refugees, burned down hundreds of homes, and abducted and forcibly returned dozens of refugees to Burma. The DKBA claimed the camps were bases for armed resistance and therefore legitimate targets.

Camp security remained a major problem in 1998. In March, Wangkha camp, housing more than 8,000 Karen, was attacked and almost completely burned down for the second time in two years. The armed attackers killed a woman and three children. USCR wrote to the Thai government and issued a press statement condemning Thailand's repeated failure to protect the refugees and urging immediate action to ensure their future safety.

The same month, another Karen camp, Mawker, suffered a major attack. For the rest of the year, NGO and Thai officials discussed plans to relocate these and other vulnerable camps to a safer distance from the border. At the end of the year, the relocations had not yet occurred. Many refugees remained in temporary shelters, often no more than plastic sheeting.

Information on forced returns to Burma was sketchy. UNHCR did not promote or facilitate repatriation to Burma, as UNHCR believed conditions were not conducive to return. UNHCR said it also was not aware of the forced return to Burma of any mandate refugees (those individually determined by UNHCR to be refugees, mostly in Bangkok) or prima facie refugees (the camp population). However, Thai immigration officials routinely transferred Burmese nationals (including Shan asylum seekers and Burmese pro-democracy activists) to the border, although they reportedly did not hand them over to Burma authorities.

In May, UNHCR and the Thai government reached a preliminary agreement on a formal protection role for UNHCR at the Burma border. Until this time, UNHCR had been officially on the sidelines, albeit with a growing unofficial monitoring presence. In its May press release, USCR welcomed the Thai decision to permit UNHCR to extend its protection mandate to refugees at the border. USCR noted, however, that the details of the arrangement were critical, stating, "Burmese seeking asylum should have unrestricted access to UNHCR and to the camps. They should be protected from violence and not forcibly returned."

NGOs expressed some concerns about the agreement, fearing it could be a precursor to a major repatriation. However, they generally supported a protection role for UNHCR.

The agreement was formalized during June and July. In its new capacity, UNHCR would: (1) act as an observer to ensure that "groups of asylum seekers fleeing conflict, or the effects of conflict, will be admitted to asylum in Thailand"; (2) assist with the relocation of camps at risk of incursion, and monitor the civilian character of the camps; (3) conduct a comprehensive registration exercise (together with the Thai Ministry of Interior); and (4) if needed, assist refugees in areas where gaps in assistance are identified, and provide limited assistance to Thai villages affected by refugees.

At the end of 1998, the agreement had not been fully implemented, and its impact was uncertain.

The situation for Shan refugees from Burma, who are ethnically related to northern Thais, remained particularly difficult during the year. With one exception, Thailand did not permit the Shan to live in camps. (In March, at the urging of UNHCR and others, Thailand permitted a group of about 200 Shan asylum seekers to live in one of the Karenni camps; they remained there at the end of the year.) This policy forced the Shan to join the ranks of the hundreds of thousands of undocumented and therefore "illegal" migrants in Thailand. While no reliable estimates exist of the number of Shan in Thailand, about 20,000 Shan who are clearly refugees have entered Thailand in recent years.

Some 1,800 Burmese refugees were in Bangkok and other urban areas of Thailand at year's end. Most were former students and pro-democracy activists who fled to Thailand after SLORC crushed Burma's fledgling democracy movement in 1988. All were receiving UNHCR assistance. Nearly 600 of them were legally residing in the Maneeloy Burmese Center (formerly called the "safe area") outside of Bangkok. Many of these were awaiting third-country resettlement. While ethnic Burmans constituted the majority of residents in the center, other ethnic groups were represented, namely Mon (28 percent), Karen (10 percent), and various lowland or highland groups (19 percent). Near the end of the year, the Thai government had authorized the UNHCR-recommended admission of another 890 Burmese refugees into the center.

According to UNHCR, conditions at the center were generally satisfactory. The Thai government provided food, medical care, and access to education and training. UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee planned to launch a new medical program in early 1999.

Hundreds of thousands of other Burmese lived and worked in Thailand without documentation in 1998. Many may have gone to Thailand for reasons similar to those of the Burmese who are considered refugees. USCR estimates that 350,000 Burmese were in refugee-like circumstances in Thailand at the end of the year.

Refugees from Cambodia

At the end of the year, more than 36,000 Cambodian refugees remained in Thailand. These consisted primarily of two groups – supporters of Prince Ranariddh (and smaller numbers of Khmer Rouge family members) who fled Cambodia in 1997 after the July coup and subsequent violence, and Khmer Rouge guerrillas and their dependents who fled in 1998.

Although about 9,000 Cambodians repatriated in late 1997, 62,000 remained in Thailand at the beginning of 1998. They were joined by some 16,555 Cambodians who entered Thailand in May 1998. The camp population increased during the year by more than 3,700 due to births, returning refugees, and more accurate camp registrations. An additional 189 Cambodians in Thailand (mostly Bangkok) were individually recognized as refugees by UNHCR during the year.

More than 7,000 Cambodians repatriated during 1998 with UNHCR assistance. A much larger number – as many as 40,000 – repatriated by their own means. According to UNHCR, 36,075 Cambodian refugees and asylum seekers remained in Thailand at the end of 1998. All but a few hundred were in camps near the Thai-Cambodia border, in Surin and Trat provinces.

In early April, many defecting Khmer Rouge guerrillas and their families fled their northern base at Anlong Veng, where fighting was still heavy, and headed south. The defectors sought refuge at a Cambodian military camp at O Bai Tap.

On May 1, some 25,000 of the Cambodians who had fled Anglong Veng – largely dependents of the Khmer Rouge guerrillas – crossed into northeastern Thailand, which had initially blocked their entry. On the same day, Cambodian government forces seized control of Anglong Veng, resulting in the surrender of two Khmer Rouge leaders. Thailand said it would disarm combatants who entered and would not provide sanctuary to Khmer Rouge leaders who were wanted by the United States to stand trial by an international tribunal.

Reports indicated that nearly half of the Cambodians entering Thailand during this period were children and that many civilians had been killed or injured by Cambodian government soldiers while fleeing.

Thai troops manning a gate at Sa-ngam Pass allowed the Cambodians to enter. The government later relocated the refugees to a site at Ban Sae Prai in Phu Sing District. Thailand initially said it would allow the Cambodians to stay only a few days and then return them across the border to the care of UNHCR.

During the May site visit, USCR wrote to the Thai government commending their decision to permit entry to the Cambodians. While noting that many of the asylum seekers, particularly armed combatants, might be ineligible for refugee status (because they had committed a serious crime or posed a security risk), USCR said, "It is essential that civilians and other potential refugees not be denied asylum on a blanket basis." The letter added, "We urge you to work closely with UNHCR in making this assessment and to ensure that fundamental principles of refugee protection are upheld."

In April, Thailand, Cambodia, and UNHCR held talks on the repatriation of the 64,000 Cambodians who fled to Thailand in 1997. The goal was to repatriate the refugees in time to register for the July 26 general elections.

Since October 1997, when UNHCR began assisting with the post-coup returns, voluntary repatriations had decreased because of political violence in Cambodia and the prevalence of landmines in nearby areas. Nevertheless, 3,596 Cambodians repatriated by land with UNHCR assistance between October 1997 and February 1998. Another 229 Cambodians, mainly members of Ranariddh's party and their relatives, returned by air between December 1997 and April 1998.

As for the more than 16,000 Cambodians – mostly Khmer Rouge dependents – who entered Thailand in 1998, many feared returning because of the risk of government reprisals. Therefore, they were not to be included in the first phase of the new repatriation effort.

By July 20, six days before the Cambodian election, the number of UNHCR-assisted returnees reached just 6,000 – far short of the 64,000 goal. However, UNHCR estimated that thousands more had returned without its assistance. At that point, the official repatriation was halted. Thailand and UNHCR had agreed to stop the returns one week before and after the voting, because of concerns about violence. By that time, voter registration had already closed.

Repatriations resumed August 4. At the end of 1998, 7,143 Cambodians had repatriated during the year – and nearly 10,000 since October 1997 – with UNHCR assistance. As many as 40,000 Cambodians returned by their own means.

According to UNHCR, monitoring of returnees had not revealed any specific complaints of persecution or harassment. Despite reports that some remaining Khmer Rouge rebels were coercing returnees to return to unsafe areas, including the former Khmer Rouge stronghold of Anlong Veng, UNHCR said all returnees had the freedom to choose their final destination in Cambodia. The agency also said the Cambodian government "is very cooperative with UNHCR on the issues of repatriation" and that the government's policy is "to allow all refugees to come back in order to avoid further conflict in the border, and the returnees have equal rights as other Cambodians."

UNHCR expected to facilitate the repatriation of the remaining Cambodians in Thailand by the end of March 1999.

(In early February 1999, UN officials began investigating whether 11,000 Cambodian returnees from Thailand were coerced by remaining Khmer Rouge leaders to return to their former base at Anlong Veng despite their wishes to go elsewhere. A UNHCR official noted, "We doubt the 'voluntariness' of their final destination....A lot of these families don't want to follow the people they have been following for the last 25 years." The results of the investigation were mixed, with UNHCR concluding that some coercion had likely taken place. On March 24, the UNHCR-assisted repatriation of Cambodians from Thailand was completed. As of that date, 300 to 500 Cambodians remained in urban areas of Thailand, but all camps had been closed.)

Refugees from Laos

UNHCR reported that 1,351 persons from Laos (954 highland Lao and 397 lowland Lao) remained in Thailand at the end of 1998. Of these, UNHCR had determined that 196 were refugees. An additional 10,000 Laotians, mostly Hmong, who had fled from the refugee camps in recent years to avoid repatriation, remained in Thailand. USCR continued to count them as refugees but will assess their status in the upcoming year.