U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1998 - Russian Federation

  At the end of 1997, the Russian Federation hosted about 325,000 refugees and asylum seekers in need of protection. These included some 235,000 recognized refugees, more than 60,000 asylum seekers whose cases were pending a decision, and about 29,000 asylum seekers from outside the former Soviet Union who registered with UNHCR but not with the Russian authorities. In October 1997, USCR made a site visit to the Russian Federation to investigate conditions for asylum seekers and refugees living in Moscow. In 1997, the Federal Migration Service (FMS), the Russian government agency responsible for refugee and migration affairs, recognized 5,751 refugees and 125,379 forced migrants. There were 956,874 individuals holding forced migrant status at the end of 1997. The FMS distinction between "refugee" and "forced migrant" is based primarily on citizenship. The term "refugee" applies to noncitizens of the Russian Federation, while "forced migrant" applies to those who are citizens of the Russian Federation or citizens of the former Soviet Union who are expected to assume Russian Federation citizenship. The FMS also distinguishes between asylum seekers from inside the former Soviet Union (referred to as the "near abroad") and from outside (the "far abroad"). Although Russia's law on refugees does not distinguish between the two, in practice the migration authorities refuse to consider most applications from "far abroad" asylum seekers. Some 5,641 refugees granted status during the year came from the near abroad, mostly from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. In contrast, only 110 persons from the far abroad, mostly Afghan nationals, received refugee status in 1997. Since the Russian Federation began registering refugees in 1992, only 240 persons from the far abroad have received refugee status. Some 77 percent (96,206 individuals) of those granted the status of forced migrant during 1997 were ethnic Russians, mostly from Chechnya and other republics in the northern Caucasus. Ethnic Tatars accounted for 6 percent (7,277 persons) of forced-migrant registrants, followed by ethnic Ukrainians with 5 percent (6,725 persons). CIS Conference Follow-Up Implementation of the "Program of Action" adopted at the May 1996 conference on refugees and migration in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) moved sluggishly in 1997. The conference's main goal, along with simply gaining a better understanding of refugee and migration movements within the CIS, had been to devise a common strategy to manage the problems associated with such movements. The conference adopted a nonbinding "Program of Action," affirming the right to leave and return to one's country, to move freely within a country, and to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries. It also affirmed the principle of nonrefoulement from the UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The program also called for equal rights for internally displaced persons, the right to a nationality, the right of citizenship for anyone who was a member of a predecessor state, and the right to return for formerly displaced people (the term given to people forcibly moved during the Soviet era). NGOs have criticized the CIS Conference, arguing that it squandered an important opportunity by producing a broad and nonbinding document. In May 1997, one year after the conference, the Open Society Institute remarked that most of the ideals put forth in the Program of Action remained unimplemented in practice because participating states were not required to fulfill any specific legal obligations and because international donors had responded coolly to funding projects related to the program. Funding for Program-of-Action projects had improved little by the first full meeting of the Steering Group of the CIS Conference, held on July 2. As the meeting convened, donors had contributed only $25.5 million of the 1997 UNHCR/International Organization for Migration (IOM) joint appeal for $88 million, leading Steering Group members to remark that the Program of Action was seriously endangered. NGO representatives present at the Steering Group meeting highlighted barriers to the development of civil society in many CIS countries, a key aspect of the Program of Action. Burdensome registration procedures and tax laws reportedly have stifled NGO development in many CIS countries and hampered their ability to participate in the conference follow-up process. Nevertheless, UNHCR reported that it has initiated projects in areas traditionally outside of its mandate as a result of the CIS Conference. Such projects include assisting peoples such as the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks (who were deported en masse during Stalin's rule and who now wish to relocate to their place of historical residence), helping CIS governments to strengthen their capacity to manage refugee and migration problems, and helping NGOs to assist refugees and migrants. Scope of Displacement UNHCR reported in 1997 that the Soviet Union's demise has resulted in the displacement of 9 million people throughout Central Asia and Eastern Europe. (This figure does not include people emigrating to non-CIS countries or people moving within the CIS for economic reasons.) Most were people living outside their country of ethnic origin when the Soviet Union collapsed. At that time, there were 54 million to 65 million such people, about 25 million of whom were ethnic Russians. Since many people remain outside their country of ethnic origin, the potential for large-scale dislocation remains. Migration Restrictions About 30 regions out of 89 in the Russian Federation currently restrict migration. The restrictions often take the form of policies based on the old Soviet system of internal passports known as propiskas, even though such policies violate the 1993 post Soviet Russian Constitution guaranteeing freedom of movement and choice of residence location. Although the Russian government claims that the registration requirement is a system of simple notification rather than control, migrants report that they must often surmount enormous barriers to register. Russian Federation rules allow visitors three days to register for stays of three days or longer. Moscow's laws are more stringent, requiring newcomers to register within 24 hours of their arrival. Other barriers to registration include exorbitant registration fees (despite Constitutional Court rulings declaring such fees unconstitutional), proof of ownership of a residence, a rental contract, or written consent of relatives who agree to house the newcomer. Asylum seekers and refugees from outside the CIS and Baltic states find it difficult to obtain a written rental contract because their landlords, to avoid paying taxes on rent, prefer not to register their tenants. In some cities, official refugee status is required for a residence permit, while at the same time refugee status cannot be obtained without a residence permit. A new Russian law on refugees effective in July 1997 provides for an asylum seeker's registration for a residence permit, but the law does not clarify the procedures and documentation required for registration. As such, the authorities reportedly continue to refuse to register many asylum seekers and other foreigners. The system is quite difficult for refugees and asylum seekers who cannot afford the high fees and do not have relatives with whom to live. Without a residence permit, it is impossible to find legal employment or gain access to social services (except emergency medical care). During a USCR site visit to Moscow in September 1997, the Moscow office of Human Rights Watch (HRW) told USCR that Russian police systematically harass refugees and asylum seekers without residence permits. Harassment includes fines (often pocketed by the policemen themselves), destruction of documents, beatings, and detention. Officials inconsistently apply registration requirements, according to HRW, often using them as a tool of discrimination against dark-skinned people. Refugees in Moscow Moscow hosts the largest number of refugees and forced migrants in Russia. The Moscow Migration Service (MMS) estimated the number of unregistered residents in Moscow at 1.5 million in 1997, although how the MMS arrived at this estimate is unclear. A Moscow research institute places the number of unregistered migrants at a more conservative 280,000 to 300,000 persons. During USCR's Moscow site visit in September, Civic Assistance, a leading Russian NGO that advocates on behalf of refugees, remarked that both figures were exaggerated, saying that probably no more than 100,000 undocumented asylum seekers and migrants are in Moscow. Moscow is also one of Russia's most openly hostile regions toward newcomers. In a September 1997 report, HRW said that police abuse of asylum seekers reached an intolerable level during 1997, especially during the summer months leading up to Moscow's 850th anniversary celebration in September. In May, Mayor Yuri Luzhkov of Moscow directed the MMS to "remove refugees and displaced persons" illegally residing in Moscow. HRW commented in its report that undocumented asylum seekers "have no institution to turn to for protection; for them, living in Moscow is running a daily gauntlet of police demanding money, and the real prospect of police beatings, detention and deportation." Moscow police do not recognize identification documents that UNHCR and MMS issue to asylum seekers and regularly seize or destroy such documents. Mayor Luzhkov's call to crack down on Moscow's unregistered residents in May 1997 was but the latest campaign in an effort dating back several years in which Moscow police have periodically raided dormitories and hotels housing refugees and asylum seekers. Police have fined, and often beaten, detained, or evicted the residents. Many of these hotels, established by the government as free housing for refugees, are now owned by private landlords anxious to clear out low-paying refugee tenants in order to prepare their properties for sale. Vigorous enforcement of the registration rules "peaks at times of public holidays and crisis," the HRW report said. Moscow police on occasion detain and deport asylum seekers for violating Moscow's registration requirements despite their having filed applications for refugee status with the MMS or having registered with UNHCR. HRW reported that during the summer of 1997 some 45 people from the "far abroad" were detained in Severny, a detention center in northern Moscow, in connection with registration violations. One refugee advocate commented that attempts to prevent the deportation of such individuals often failed. Living conditions at the Severny detention center were reported to be extremely poor. On April 4, 1996, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Moscow city government's exorbitant residence registration fee, 500 times the monthly minimum wage (40 million rubles, or about $7,500), was unconstitutional. After the ruling, Moscow's regional government adopted a registration fee of 300 times the monthly minimum wage (22.5 million rubles, or $3,900), which the court also declared unconstitutional on June 2, 1997. Although Moscow's city government officially canceled its fee in December 1996, Civic Assistance reported that the authorities continue in practice to demand large registration fees. Moscow authorities justify their draconian approach to asylum seekers, refugees, and other unregistered foreigners by claiming that immigrants are overrunning the city, which must maintain a policy of zero population growth. The rising tide of immigrants, Moscow officials contend, accounts for an increasing crime rate, places undue burdens on the city's infrastructure, and threatens the city with "pollution," "spreading various diseases," and "economic damage." Civic Assistance told USCR that Moscow officials and the media falsely report that foreigners commit the overwhelming majority of Moscow's crimes. The crime rate for registered refugees is actually about half that of Muscovites, Civic Assistance said. Northern Caucasus The Krasnodar and Stavropol districts in southern Russia are second only to Moscow in the number of refugees and forced migrants they host. The two contiguous districts are near several areas of upheaval: Chechnya, North Ossetia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh. UNHCR estimated that about 70,000 ethnic Russians displaced from Chechnya were living in the Stavropol region in June 1997, the overwhelming majority unlikely to return to Chechnya. More than 58,000 refugees and displaced persons have registered with the Stavropol authorities since 1992. Thousands more remain unregistered. North Ossetia continued to host about 35,000 refugees from the Georgian region of South Ossetia in 1997. In June, UNHCR began to offer assistance to Georgian refugees wishing to repatriate. UNHCR assisted 68 families to return to South Ossetia and 4 families to other parts of Georgia in 1997. An additional 150 families spontaneously repatriated to South Ossetia during the year. Stavropol and other regions in the northern Caucasus reportedly acutely lacked funds to assist displaced persons and refugees in 1997. When the Russian federal government imposed budget cuts during the summer, regional authorities threatened to evict refugees and displaced persons from collective centers in Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia), Cherkessk (Karatchay-Cherkessia), and Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria). In several cases, officials temporarily suspended water, gas, and electricity for several shelters where refugees and displaced persons lived. In response to the announced budget cuts, the regional parliament of Kabardino Balkaria announced that it would return all Chechen displaced persons to Chechnya by July 1. However, UNHCR reported that it knew of no forcible evictions or returns during the year. Prigorodnyi Region The peace process between the Russian Federation republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia proceeded in fits and starts during 1997. Competing territorial claims over the Prigorodnyi region, part of North Ossetia but claimed by Ingushetia, sparked a war between ethnic Ingush and Ossetians in 1992. The war and subsequent hostilities caused an estimated 42,000 to 75,000 people to flee the region, approximately 9,000 of whom were ethnic Ossetians. Although most Ossetians have returned home, about 34,000 ethnic Ingush remained displaced at the end of 1997, most living in neighboring Ingushetia. UNHCR reported that 1,165 ethnic Ingush returned to the Prigorodnyi region between March and December. On May 30, parliamentary delegations from North Ossetia and Ingushetia agreed on a framework to discuss peace and repair the damage caused by the 1992 war. The agreement mentioned the need to create favorable conditions for the return of ethnic Ingush to the Prigorodnyi region. On October 15, the presidents of North Ossetia and Ingushetia and Russian federal government representatives signed a second agreement intended to improve relations between the two estranged republics and outline steps to repair damage in war-afflicted areas. The agreement reportedly contained provisions on rehabilitation assistance (the Russian federal government agreed to provide 200 billion rubles in 1997), part to be given directly to displaced persons from the Prigorodnyi region whose homes had been destroyed. It also called for the creation of joint North Ossetian, Ingush, and Russian federal government patrols in the region to provide security for displaced persons returning to their former homes. Despite these agreements, the Prigorodnyi region remained dangerous and tense throughout much of the year. The unwelcome response given to ethnic Ingush seeking to return home culminated in a spate of attacks targeting returnees in July. On July 5, unidentified gunmen fired on several formerly displaced ethnic Ingush who had recently returned to their homes in the village of Kurtat, killing an elderly female returnee. On July 17, assailants seeking to prevent the return of ethnic Ingush to the region fired rocket-propelled grenades at a bus transporting Ingush displaced persons to inspect their homes in the village of Dachnyi, reportedly injuring at least 15 of the passengers. Finally, on July 30, local news sources reported that a large mob attacked and destroyed a temporary housing compound for ethnic Ingush returnees in Tverskoye before police could intervene. With no place for the returnees to stay in the area, the Russian police sent them back to Ingushetia. In November, representatives of Ingushetia's regional government expressed their concern that the October 15 agreement between the presidents of Ingushetia and North Ossetia was not being implemented. An incident in December in which displaced ethnic Ingush traveling by convoy were prevented from returning to their former homes near the Prigorodnyi region's village of Yuzhny lent credence to their concerns. Chechnya On May 12, Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov signed a peace agreement formally ending the war between the Russian Federation and Chechnya. Although the agreement did not define the exact territorial status of Chechnya, the two presidents agreed to conduct relations in accordance with international law and renounced the use of force or threats to resolve future disputes. Russia insists that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation, while Chechnya demands recognition as an independent sovereign state. The August 1996 cease-fire agreement that ended 21 months of hostilities and resulted in the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Chechnya also stipulates that Chechnya's relationship with Russia would be determined by the year 2001. Chechnya's status remains the thorniest issue between Russia and Chechnya, although a string of hostage-takings and several public executions in Chechnya during 1997 (in defiance of Russian Federation law, which prohibits capital punishment) exacerbated tensions between the two sides. However, the Russian Federation and Chechnya did agree in September to repair an oil pipeline that runs through Chechnya from the Caspian to the Black Sea. However, these modest steps toward reconciliation in 1997 did little to improve living conditions in Chechnya itself, where a lack of funding coupled with generalized lawlessness and insecurity for international relief workers stymied relief and reconstruction efforts. In August, President Yeltsin acknowledged that more than $100 million worth of Russian assistance allocated for reconstruction projects in Chechnya had disappeared during the first seven months of the year because of widespread corruption within the Russian government. Compounding matters, most international relief and development agencies pulled out of Chechnya for security reasons during 1997. On the heals of the murders of six ICRC employees in December 1996, a rash of kidnappings of aid workers took place during 1997. Some 16 aid workers were taken hostage during the second half of the year alone in Chechnya and neighboring republics, leading most aid agencies to close operations. Displacement from Chechnya In an October hearing on displacement from Chechnya, the head of the FMS, Tatiana Regent, reported to the Russian parliament that more than 600,000 people had been forced to flee their homes because of war in the northern Caucasian republic. She said that about 200,000 had returned to their former homes after the hostilities ended in August 1996. About 25,000 displaced persons returned to Chechnya with UNHCR assistance during 1997. Involuntary displacement in Chechnya fell into two categories: ethnic Chechens who often fled localities only to return when the fighting died down, and ethnic Russians who left the region with no intention of returning, mostly seeking resettlement in other areas of Russia. Ethnic Chechens tended to flee either to rural areas of Chechnya or to neighboring Ingushetia and Daghestan, while ethnic Russians were more likely to flee to Stavropol or other parts of the Russian Federation with a majority ethnic Russian population. Ethnic Russians without family connections were often directed to reception centers in other parts of Russia such as the Volga region, the Urals, and Siberia. Persons displaced from Chechnya unable to return have faced bureaucratic obstacles to integrating elsewhere in the Russian Federation. Because many had no proof of ownership of property in Chechnya, they have reportedly been denied financial compensation for their losses due to them under Russian law. Other obstacles have included difficulties in securing permanent residence permits, employment, health care, and pensions in other republics. Asylum The FMS estimates that 700,000 "illegal migrants" live within the Russian Federation, although how the FMS arrived at this figure is not clear. In fact, the actual number is virtually impossible to determine. Much of this population is highly transient, with many third-country nationals transiting through Russia on their way to Western Europe. They are often reluctant to register either with government officials or international refugee organizations. Russia's vastness and porous borders hinder tracking of population movements. According to the FMS, Afghanistan is a main source of migrants from outside the former Soviet Union. Moscow authorities estimated that 150,000 Afghans were living illegally in the Moscow metropolitan area in early 1997, although other sources say that this figure is inflated. Only 240 people from outside the former Soviet Union had received refugee status in the Russian Federation by the end of 1997. The Russian parliament enacted a new refugee law (no. 95/F3), which entered into force on July 3, 1997. During USCR's Moscow site visit, the FMS reported to USCR that the new refugee law was intended to clarify procedures that the "overly general" 1993 refugee law had left unaddressed. The new refugee law divides the first-instance refugee status determination procedure into two steps. First, immigration control officers or a local branch of the FMS determine the applicant's admissibility to the procedure. Arrival from a safe third country or the failure to file an application within 24 hours in the event of "illegal" entry constitute grounds for being declared inadmissible to the procedure. For applicants deemed admissible, the local branch of the FMS then enters into a merits-based determination of the refugee claim. Negative decisions in the first instance may be appealed to the FMS's Appeal Board or a court. While most refugee experts do not dispute the need for a new refugee law, some say that the new law does not meet international standards. UNHCR highlighted several provisions that may result in the denial of protection to genuine refugees. These included: the 24-hour filing deadline for asylum seekers who enter Russia illegally; the wide scope of the safe third country concept found in the law; the absence of a suspension of deportation for appeals lodged at borders and international airports; the disqualification for refugee status of applicants who commit crimes on Russian Federation territory; and the grant of refugee status for only a three-year period with the possibility of extension on an annual basis. Russia continued to apply its refugee laws discriminatorily during 1997, denying most asylum seekers from outside the former Soviet Union the opportunity to apply for refugee status. The FMS began processing applications of asylum seekers from the "far abroad" in 1995 in the Perm region, where many of the 240 refugee recognitions for far-abroad applicants were recorded. The Rostov region appeared to be the only other place where the FMS made an effort to process the applications of far-abroad asylum seekers. By mid-1997, the Leningrad, Krasnodar, and Stavropol regions reportedly had accepted some applications from far-abroad asylum seekers, but either rejected the applications or had yet to issue decisions. In July, Moscow authorities began to process the cases of some 500 far-abroad asylum seekers living in camps in the Moscow region, but as of October all the decisions were reportedly negative. Commenting on the situation of far-abroad asylum seekers, a UNHCR report issued in June remarked that "considering the small number of asylum seekers having been granted access to the procedure, the low recognition rate at first-instance level, and the mal-functioning of the appeals process, the existing procedure cannot yet be considered fair and efficient." Because the authorities refuse to accept the applications from most asylum seekers from the far abroad, in practice, UNHCR is the only organization that registers such persons. UNHCR had registered 31,888 asylum seekers by September 1997, although UNHCR estimates that nearly one-third of all registrants had left Russia. Because authorities refuse to register most far-abroad asylum seekers, they are not distinguished in any way from other undocumented migrants, even if registered with UNHCR. Without legal status, they are denied most rights, including the right to work, to social services, to non emergency medical care, and even to registration of marriages and births. Most schools do not accept children of far-abroad asylum seekers because of their illegal status. The frustrations of far-abroad asylum seekers exploded in early October when a group of 50 Congolese/Zairian and Angolan asylum seekers rioted, destroying a UNHCR reception center in Moscow. What began as a quiet protest over the killing of one asylum seeker by unidentified Russian assailants soon turned into a full-scale riot, UNHCR reported. UNHCR's director for Europe attributed the incident to the difficult situation of far-abroad asylum seekers in Russia, saying that "for years, these people have been living with no prospect of a better future, in conditions of great hardship, with no security or rights. They are feeling increasingly hopeless and, in the face of growing xenophobia, are turning desperate." In comments one month before the incident, the deputy director of the FMS reportedly said that Russia was incapable of meeting its international obligations to host refugees and suggested that Russia temporarily suspend its obligations under the UN Refugee Convention. Despite their lack of legal status, most far-abroad asylum seekers already living in the Russian Federation appeared to be free of the immediate threat of refoulement because the authorities lacked the financial resources to expel them. However, newly arriving asylum seekers were not protected. Commenting on the situation at Moscow's Sheremetevo-II Airport in April 1997, Amnesty International reported that "asylum seekers are routinely forcibly returned‹without even the most cursory examination of their claims‹from the airport to their countries of origin where they may face persecution, torture, or threats to their lives." No effective refugee screening exists at the airport. UNHCR told USCR during its Moscow site visit that people arriving with invalid travel documents are regularly returned to their country of departure, regardless of whether they wish to apply for asylum. UNHCR roughly estimated the number of asylum seekers denied access to the asylum procedure at Moscow's airport and summarily deported at about 100 per year, but added that UNHCR monitoring at Sheremetevo-II is only intermittent. While acknowledging the difficult situation at the airport, the FMS told USCR that it was developing border procedures to bring them in line with Russia's international commitments. During the past two years, the Russian authorities reportedly refouled at least 10 former politicians from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and other CIS countries who had legitimate claims to refugee status, according to HRW. The former politicians were returned under the terms of a CIS extradition agreement, the Minsk Convention, after authorities in their countries of origin issued warrants for their arrest, reportedly for trumped-up political offenses. The Minsk Convention does not contain safeguards to prevent the extradition of persons for whom an arrest warrant has been issued on political grounds. At least one of the deportees was executed upon return. There were also reports of the forced return of North Korean asylum seekers during 1997. In May, a report by the Korea Institute for National Unification said that the Russian authorities had forcibly repatriated North Korean "escapees." Others, according to the report, faced a precarious situation inside Russia, where many North Koreans worked as street peddlers or day laborers. The report noted that while UNHCR might assist some, Russia's local authorities have dealt with the issue in an "arbitrary" manner and sent some back to North Korea.