Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 - Bosnia and Hercegovina

Human Rights Developments

1998, the third year of implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), brought significant progress on several key human rights issues. Freedom of movement improved, eleven indictees were transferred to the Hague (the location of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY) during 1998, and the restructuring of the police forces was well under way. These positive developments, however, were often imposed by or the result of intense pressure from the international community. Several serious human rights concerns persisted, including the inability of refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes and the ongoing influence of those indicted, but not apprehended, for war crimes. Other lingering concerns included ethnically motivated violence and the absence of redress for the victims of abuse. Despite the hard-won reform of the property law and the criminal justice codes in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ordinary citizens had experienced little concrete benefit to date.

Political developments

In December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) strengthened High Representative Carlos Westendorp's authority to dismiss public officials who obstruct implementation of the DPA and to impose decisions when authorities failed to come to agreement on key issues. While not without controversy (relating to the degree of international control being exerted in Bosnia), several decisions by Westendorp resulted in immediate and dramatic improvements, for example, the law on citizenship and the extension of the deadline to reclaim socially owned property. Moreover, Westendorp finally addressed ongoing and active obstruction of the DPA by local officials. The process of change in the Republika Srpska (RS) began with the election of Milorad Dodik as RS prime minister in January 1998, but despite changes in the RS parliament after the November 1997 elections, and significant international political and financial support, Dodik was unable to deliver on his promise to ensure the return of 70,000 refugees and displaced persons to the Republika Srpksa in 1998 and to reform RS property laws by September 1998. Dodik's ability to effect change was hampered by the weakness of his coalition, making it necessary for him to make compromises with hardliners. Eastern RS remained under the control of hardline nationalists, creating serious problems with police reform and cooperation with the federation.

War Criminals

In January 1998, American SFOR troops arrested Goran Jelisic, nicknamed "Serb Adolf," in Bijeljina. Further arrests were made by German, American, and British troops in Prijedor, Banja Luka, Bosanski Samac, and Foca. Moreover, five indictees surrendered themselves to the ICTY. No indictees, however, were arrested and turned over to the ICTY by the Bosnian authorities. As of this writing, more than twenty indictees continued to live freely in the RS and Bosnian Croat territory. Major figures indicted for war crimes, such as Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, Milan Martic and Ivica Rajic, remained at large, and there seemed little international pressure to arrest them or obtain their arrest.

Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons

1998, dubbed "the year of return" by the international community, fell fall short of expectations. While 475,000 refugees and displaced persons (out of more than two million) had returned since the signing of the DPA, only about 15,000 were so-called "minority returns" (returns to an entity where the post-war majority is of a different ethnicity). Between the signing of the DPA and July 1998, only 1,920 non-Serbs had returned to the RS, and the RS had failed to revoke discriminatory housing legislation as requested by the PIC. Federation authorities also continued to obstruct return, despite new property legislation. Despite a 1998 target of 20,000 so-called "minority returns,"only around 2,500 "minorities" had returned to Sarajevo by the end of September 1998. During the three years since the signing of the DPA, many more minorities have fled Sarajevo than have returned.

Ethnically Motivated Violence and Evictions

Ethnically motivated violence, often related to minority returns, continued to occur throughout Bosnia. In Drvar, a Bosnian Croat area, a protracted series of violent incidents (including arson, assault, and murder) ultimately forced hundreds of Bosnian Serbreturnees to flee again in April. Local authorities repeatedly failed to take adequate measures to protect Bosnian Serbs from violence and were sometimes themselves complicit in the violent incidents. Ultimately, several public officials were dismissed by the U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), but to date, only minor criminal charges had been brought. In Travnik, at least five Bosnian Croats were slain since the beginning of 1998, but no perpetrators arrested. In Stolac and Capljina, approximately one hundred Bosniak houses were damaged in 1998, a pattern of violence similar to that in 1996 and 1997, and Bosniak returnees were often victims of physical assaults and intimidation. After refusing to address these crimes for more than two years, the Stolac chief of police was removed in February at the request of IPTF, and the mayor of Stolac was dismissed by the High Representative in March. Similarly, the chief of police in Capljina was decertified by IPTF following violence against returnees there in the fall. The situation improved somewhat thereafter, but local police continued to fail to protect citizens and property, or to hold the perpetrators accountable.

Freedom of Movement

Despite the recalcitrance of some authorities, freedom of movement significantly increased in 1998 due to an agreement on uniform license plates. Previously, the ethnicity of drivers could be discerned by the license plate, thereby blocking many displaced persons from visiting their prewar residences to assess the possibilities for return. Freedom of movement was at times obstructed by citizens who organized physically to prevent return or visits by ethnic minorities.

Media

The main political parties continued to control primary media outlets. During elections, for example, the Croatian Television station (HRT) clearly favored the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ). In the RS, Dodik replaced sixteen directors of state-owned radio stations due to their allegiance to his opponents, raising concern about his commitment to freedom of expression. In January, the editor-in-chief of the independent Sarajevo-based Dani ("Days") magazine was convicted of libel in flawed proceedings. The case was brought by a newspaper closely connected to the leading Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA) and was believed to be politically motivated. In May, Dani's offices were attacked by armed criminals, allegedly for publishing an article on the Bosnian mafia in which the son of the Bosnian president was implicated. Although a journalist was kidnapped, and weapons used, the court fined the defendants only DM60 (U.S.$37.00) each. On July 29, a grenade exploded only meters from Dani's office. As of September, no suspects had been arrested.

Elections

Implementation of the 1997 municipal election results proved difficult. Only ten municipalities met the December 31 deadline for final certification. In many municipalities, nationalists blocked implementation by refusing to accept duly elected representatives from other ethnic groups. Ultimately, agreements were reached in most municipalities, but many councils barely functioned, and minority councilors were repeatedly obstructed in their work, harassed, and on several occasions, physically attacked. No agreement could be reached in Srebrenica, resulting in the installation by OHR/OSCE of an interim executive board led by an OSCE representative. In Gornji Vakuf, a village highly contested by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, final certification was revoked on July 20 and all aid suspended until the implementation of election results. In September, elections were held for the presidency, parliament, entity parliaments, and the RS presidency. While conditions for free and fair elections, such as freedom of movement and freedom of the press, had improved since the 1997 election, the elections were marred by technical difficulties and political interference. Bosnian Croats who switched allegience from the HDZ to the newly formed New Croatian Initiative (Novi Hrvatska Inicijativa, NHI) were threatened and in some cases physically attacked. The Election Appeals Sub-Commission reacted by striking several HDZ candidates from the ballot, and removed several other HDZ candidates when the state-controlled television station from Croatia, despite several warnings, continued to favor HDZ in its reporting. The elections generally continued the strong hold on power of the ruling ethnic, nationalist parties. Moreover, Nikola Poplasen, a close comrade-in-arms of Serbian fascist leader (and paramilitary) Vojislav Seselj during the war, and a known advocate of "ethnic cleansing" and the partition of Bosnia, was surprisingly elected as the new president of RS, replacing president Plavsic, who was considered more moderate.

Law enforcement

Law enforcement authorities continued to serve the interests of the main nationalist parties. Cases of ethnically motivated crimes were rarely properly investigated or prosecuted. Court proceedings were often flawed. In January, Bosnian Serb Veselin Cancar was convicted for war crimes and sentenced to eleven years in prison (later reduced to nine), despite the fact that the arrest and courtproceedings were not in accordance with the "Rules of the Road" agreed in Rome in 1996. After repeated demands from the international community, the Bijeljina District court agreed to retry the Zvornik 7. These Bosniak former residents of Srebrenica were detained and tried without due process in 1996. Flawed criminal proceedings resulted in convictions for murder and illegal possession of weapons, drawing severe criticism from the international human rights community. The new trial was postponed several times, however, due to the failure of some defendants to appear in court, and is still ongoing. Detainees were frequently mistreated by local police throughout the country. In January, federation authorities arrested a Bosnian Serb suspected of the 1993 assassination of Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Turajlic. An IPTF investigation concluded that illegal weapons and unnecessary force were involved during the arrest. In September, the IPTF dismissed Ljubisa "Mauser" Savic, chief of the RS uniformed police, for involvement in torturing suspects in the murder of a high-ranking police official. Human Rights Watch previously reported allegations of war crimes involving Ljubisa Savic. Savic's post-war behavior illustrates the danger of overlooking allegations of wartime abuses by current officials. Allegations relating to Savic were overlooked by the international community in its zeal to support the government of Milorad Dodik. On the positive side, RS authorities finally investigated the pattern of abuse by local police of non-Serbs in Teslic and initiated criminal and/or disciplinary proceedings against thirty-two police officers.

Defending Human Rights

Local and international human rights organizations were generally able to perform their work, although some local organizations experienced harassment and in isolated cases, threats. The federation Ombudsmen continued their courageous work to demand respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The national Human Rights Commission contributed significantly to respect for human rights through its decisions on employment discrimination, housing issues, and the discriminatory effects of current laws. Unfortunately, cooperation by the authorities with these institutions remained limited, and prosecutors and judges committed to the rule of law continued to experience interference by politicians in carrying out their mandates.

The Role of the International Community

Despite hopes that local officials in Bosnia and Hercegovina would gradually take up the tasks of implementing the DPA, in 1998 hardline officials continued to resist all efforts to implement the civilian provisions of the DPA, forcing the international community, in particular the High Representative, to assume a more prominent role in the country. Due to the persistent obstruction by many local authorities, the international community was faced with the difficult task of trying to move the peace process forward while simultaneously fostering sufficient popular support within Bosnia and Hercegovina for its actions. Several positive developments during the year were due to the more aggressive implementation efforts by the international community. However, on occasion, the international community opted to use undemocratic means—such as the confiscation of television transmitters— to obtain implementation of the DPA, thereby running the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the peace process. In other instances, the international community failed to use the means at its disposal to achieve significant human rights improvements.

The Office of the High Representative

The Office of the High Representative (OHR), established by the DPA to oversee implementation of the civilian provisions of the DPA, used its strengthened mandate to impose a resolution of several key issues: a law on citizenship was passed, a Bosnian flag and new currency adopted, and privatization laws reformed. During the year, High Representative Westendorp dismissed several public officials due to their non-compliance with the DPA, advised international donors to suspend donations to some areas, and called for increased aid for the RS after the election of Milorad Dodik. OHR facilitated cooperation between the main international organizations active in the field of human rights through its Human Rights Coordination Center (HRCC). Unfortunately, the HRCC's findings and activities were not always easily accessible, thereby missing an opportunity to support the work of other NGOs. The HRCC played a major role, however, in the reform of property laws and in pushing for accountability of public officials in several high profile cases such as Teslic, Stolac and Drvar.

NATO/SFOR

In May 1998, NATO extended the Stabilization Force (SFOR) mandate to provide "a secure environment in which the civilian provisions of the DPA can be implemented." Troop strength remained at approximately 32,000 soldiers. The Multi-national Specialized Unit (MSU), consisting of military police with expertise in crowd control, was created to assist the local authorities, SFOR, and IPTF when confronted with violent demonstrations and other security concerns. In a positive display of the potential of the MSU in assisting returnees, it removed a Bosnian Croat roadblock in the Capljina area in early October. In a dramatic departure from previous practice, British, American, German, and Dutch SFOR troops detained eight indictees since December 1997. However, SFOR failed to arrest Karadzic, whose presence and influence continued to undermine the DPA and create an atmosphere of impunity, and Mladic, who was reportedly living in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) underthe protection of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

United Nations/IPTF

In March 1998, the Commission on Human Rights appointed Jiri Dienstbier as Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia. In April 1998, the Commission adopted a resolution on the situation of human rights in, among others, Bosnia and Herzegovina, stressing the crucial role of human rights issues in the peace process, and calling upon the Bosnian authorities to undertake measures to improve the human rights situation. The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as part of its prevention procedure, considered Bosnia and Hercegovina both in March and August 1998, among others calling attention to the plight of Roma population in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) has responsibility under the DPA for, among other things, monitoring the conduct of the local police, as well as restructuring the police and removing human rights abusers from the force. Unfortunately, to date, the screening and vetting of police officers by IPTF has been largely ineffective; many abusive police officers continue to hold positions of responsibility on the force. IPTF continued to be reluctant to carry out its own independent investigations, insisting that allegations of abuses by the police should be investigated by the IPTF only as a last resort. Although it is true that disciplinary measures, including prosecution, should ultimately be taken by local authorities, it is also clear that in some cases, such as in Drvar and Stolac, the local authorities are not willing to undertake serious action. In such cases, it is incumbent upon the IPTF to find another way to address these abuses and to hold those responsible acountable.During the last months of 1998, IPTF seemed to interpret its mandate more broadly, and did engage in several independent investigations. The U.N. Human Rights Office (HRO) continued to raise the profile of human rights by investigating and publicizing allegations of human rights abuses in Drvar, Stolac, Teslic, Sarajevo, and other cities. However, the HRO sometimes neglected to include legal standards and recommendations in its reports, thereby missing important opportunities to raise awareness about human rights and the obligations of the government (local and national). Importantly, the HRO has not been provided with the resources necessary for effective engagement, and was therefore not always able to adequately follow up cases involving serious allegations of human rights abuses.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

As of this writing, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had twenty-eight indictees in custody. Two additional courtrooms, the funds for which were donated by the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the U.S., bolstered the ability of the Tribunal to initiate new trials. In May, the ICTY decided to withdraw the indictments against fourteen Bosnian Serbs in an attempt to balance available resources within the Tribunal and in recognition of the need to prosecute cases fairly and expeditiously. The Tribunal made it clear that the cases were not withdrawn due to lack of evidence. On June 29, 1998, Slavko Dokmanovic, former Serb mayor of Vukovar, committed suicide eight days before the verdict in his case was to have been announced. On August 1, Milan Kovacevic, a Bosnian Serb from Prijedor, died in his cell of a heart attack. Despite the arrival of a large number of indictees at the Hague this year, however, at least thirty indictees remain at large, the vast majority in Republika Srpska and in the FRY.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The September 1998 elections, which were organized and monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), were marked by serious organizational flaws. More than a hundred polling stations did not open as scheduled because they hadn't received the voters' register or sufficient ballots. The names of many voters did not appear on the register, or were spelled incorrectly. These voters were permitted to submit tendered ballots, but many declined to do so because their names would have appeared on the outside of ballot envelopes, creating concerns about secrecy. These and other technical difficulties should have been anticipated as they had occurred in previous elections.

European Union

The European Union (E.U.) and its member states continued to condition assistance on compliance with the DPA. In July, the E.U. suspended an aid program amounting to DM 29 million ($18 million) to Sarajevo due to the failure of the authorities to accept "minority returns." In the RS, the election of Milorad Dodik was followed by an influx of economic and financial aid to the RS (primarily at the urging of the U.S.). Although the E.U. applied general conditionality to its assistance, particular recipients were not adequately vetted. For example, the E.U. provided assistance to the RS police, notwithstanding the fact that the IPTF had not yet completed the vetting process, and numerous police officers with a record of serious human rights abuses and obstruction of the DPA remained on the force. E.U. member states provided 18,000 SFOR troops and contributed significantly to the peace process by detaining personsindicted for war crimes. Throughout the year, Bosnian refugees, mostly Bosniaks, continued to return from Germany. Most returned voluntarily, but several Länder continued forcibly to deport refugees to Bosnia although it remained impossibile for them to return to their pre-war homes (as was promised by the DPA), creating an additional burden on the authorities and exacerbating internal displacement that tended to consolidate "ethnic cleansing."

Council of Europe

In October 1997, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe set conditions for commencing consideration of Bosnia and Hercegovina's application to join the Council. Although they remained substantially unfulfilled, parliamentarians, eager to reward the new Dodik government, decided to start the accession procedure in February. The Council of Europe designated "eminent lawyers" to assess Bosnia's compliance with the council's standards. They visited the country in September, but had not issued their findings as of this writing.

United States

The U.S. SFOR contingent in Bosnia was reduced to approximately 6,900 troops in 1998. American troops arrested two indictees during the year. The U.S. continued to try to influence the peace process through economic incentives, but failed to pay sufficient attention to vetting the recipients of its aid to ensure that those obstructing the DPA did not benefit. The U.S. government repeatedly waived restrictions in the 1998 Appropriations Act prohibiting assistance to communities that failed to apprehend resident indicted war crimes suspects. U.S. officials claimed that although they waived the general prohibition, they took care to ensure that war crimes indictees and those who have obstructed the DPA did not benefit from aid. In March, however, the U.S. provided assistance to the RS police, notwithstanding the fact that IPTF had not completed the vetting of the RS police, which remained riddled with those responsible for human rights abuses and Dayton obstruction. The U.S. failed to anticipate the resurgence of hardline nationalists in the September 1998 elections and, as of this writing, did not appear to have a strategy in place to address this challenge.

Relevant Human Rights Watch reports:

Beyond Restraint: Politics and the Policing Agenda of the United Nations International Police Task Force, 6/98; "A Closed, Dark Place":Past and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca, 7/98