Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 - Indonesia and East Timor

  Indonesia had one of the most tumultuous years in its modern history: economic collapse spurred student-led demands for political reform, bringing President Soeharto's three-decade rule to an end in May. His successor and protegé, Vice-President B.J. Habibie, tried to distance himself from his patron by releasing political prisoners, lifting political controls, and setting a timetable for free elections, but these measures won him little legitimacy from a skeptical populace. The army, traditionally the country's most powerful institution next to the president, appeared weaker than any time in recent memory as more and more evidence of past abuses came to light. Rising prices, food shortages, and massive unemployment led to outbreaks of violence throughout the year, much of it directed against the small ethnic Chinese minority, widely resented for their disproportionate control of the retail economy. Poor but resource-rich provinces used the newly open political atmosphere to demand more economic autonomy. These demands, together with major progress in negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia over political autonomy for East Timor and renewed pro-independence activity in Irian Jaya, led to the renewal of a long dormant debate about federalism as well as widely expressed fears for the country's disintegration. By year's end, there was no sign of economic recovery, and it was impossible to know whether Indonesia was on its way to pluralist democracy, prolonged upheaval, or both.

Human Rights Developments

The year began with the free fall of the Indonesian currency, an outbreak of anti-Chinese riots, and the beginning of student protests with a view to influencing the outcome of the planned session in March of the unopposed "re-selection" of President Soeharto by Indonesia's version of an electoral college. The economic decline and political unrest were both exacerbated by Soeharto's announcement on January 21 that B.J. Habibie, an unpopular Cabinet minister with a penchant for expensive showcase projects such as a national airline industry, was his choice for vice-president. Soeharto's son-in-law, Gen. Prabowo Subiyanto, helped fuel anti-Chinese sentiment by making veiled references to "traitors" who took their money abroad. As campus protests escalated and security tightened in February, well-known political activists began to "disappear," abducted from their homes or workplaces in what was clearly an organized operation. On March 10, Soeharto was duly reappointed to a seventh five-year term, and the consensus among political observers at home and abroad was that only violence in the streets followed by army intervention, or Soeharto's death, could prevent him serving out the full term. Discontent escalated with the announcement on March 14 of a new Cabinet that included Soeharto's daughter and several cronies; it was seen as a clear sign that Soeharto had no interest in reform of any kind. Student protest became a lightning rod for demands for change, gaining widespread support from the middle class and among the political elite, including parts of the military. International outrage over the "disappearance" of activists and pressure for clarification of their whereabouts led to the led to the creation of a new organization, Kontras, to work on behalf of the families of the "disappeared," and to the eventual resurfacing of several young men in April and early May. Pius Lustrilanang, the first to give a public account of his abduction, torture, and detention, set an example for others; the evidence they produced pointed directly to the involvement of the army special forces, Kopassus, and to General Prabowo, former Kopassus commander. On May 4, the government announced a gasoline price hike, fulfilling strictures set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Riots erupted immedately, with the worst violence in Medan, North Sumatra, much of it anti-Chinese. On May 9, Soeharto left the country for a meeting in Egypt. On May 12, four students were shot dead, apparently by army or police snipers, following a demonstration at Trisakti University in Jakarta. The next day, the worst violence Jakarta had seen in decades broke out and continued for three days, with security forces standing by as mobs torched Chinese shops and homes. Over 1,000 died, many of them non-Chinese shoppers or would-be looters trapped in burning shopping malls. Foreign embassies and companies evacuated staff and dependents, and thousands of Chinese-Indonesians fled the country. President Soeharto cut short his visit to Cairo and returned home, but it was too late. Political support among those closest to him had evaporated, and by May 19, student protestors had occupied the national parliament building, with tacit military endorsement. Promising at first to step down after new laws were drafted and an election held at some indeterminate time in the future, Soeharto then bowed to public pressure (and the resignation of half his Cabinet); on May 21, he turned over power to Vice-President Habibie. In a development of almost equal import, General Wiranto, commander of the armed forces and defense minister, emerged the victor in a power struggle with General Prabowo, whose allies were suspected not only of the "disappearances" but also of shooting the Trisakti students and organizing the Jakarta riots. (In August, Prabowo admitted his role in the "disappearances" to a military investigating board and was dismissed from the army; in September, it was announced that he would be court-martialled, even though he was now a civilian.) President Habibie formed a new Cabinet that dropped the most notorious cronies and political hardliners, but his efforts to include opposition figures failed; such was his association with Soeharto that none agreed to serve. Within days, he announced a series of steps designed to demonstrate his reformist credentials, including the release of two of the country's best-known political prisoners, labor leader Muchtar Pakpahan and former opposition parliamentarian Sri Bintang Pamungkas. By late August, more than one hundred other prisoners had been freed, with the notable exception of East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao; Budiman Soejatmiko, Dita Sari, and other political organizers associated with the leftist People's Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik or PRD); and several men linked to a coup attempt in 1965. In June, Habibie announced an "action plan" for human rights that included ratification of key human rights treaties. By the end of the year, the government had ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the International Labour Organization's Convention 87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. Ordering the Justice Ministry to draft new laws on political parties and elections to be presented to the People's Consultative Assembly in late 1998, Habibie also lifted controls on political party formation, including a Soeharto-era ban on the PRD. By September, more than seventy parties had registered with the Home Ministry, most of which were likely to lack the mass base necessary under a new draft law to compete in parliamentary elections. The print and broadcast media enjoyed virtually full freedom after Soeharto's fall for the first time in thirty years, and well over one hundred licenses for new publications were issued by the Ministry of Information between June and August. The news magazine Tempo, banned in 1994, reopened in October. A controversial draft law on demonstrations was tabled in July, designed to place curbs on any demonstrations of more than one hundred persons. The National Human Rights Commission and rights activists denounced the bill as a curb on internationally recognized rights, and by October, it had become the first piece of legislation in years defeated by popular protest. (A less restrictive version was passed in its place.) July saw a number of issues come to the fore that remained unresolved by the end of the year. Violence against the ethnic Chinese, and ethnic Chinese women in particular, was one. Soon after the May riots in the cities of Jakarta, Solo, and Surabaya, reports began to emerge of mass rapes and other forms of sexual assault against ethnic Chinese women in a systematic, organizedfashion. The reports were followed by graphic descriptions and photographs that appeared on the Internet and that became the basis for public protests from Beijing to Los Angeles. General Wiranto announced in June that an army investigation had uncovered no evidence of rape; rights organizations said victims were too frightened or traumatized to come forward or had fled the country. The government appointed a fact-finding team to look into the May violence, including rape, on July 24. (As of late October, the team had not issued its final report.) In August, the Internet photos were conclusively proven false, and questions had arisen about some of the rape data initially collected. Advocacy groups reporting the rapes meanwhile were subjected to harassment and theats from unidentified callers, while racist groups emerging in the new climate of free speech played on the fear of ethnic Chinese by warning of new assaults on the community. The murder in October of Ita Martadinata, a Jakarta woman whose mother was deeply involved in the rapes investigation, only increased that fear. Also in July, a series of pro-independence demonstrations broke out in towns across Irian Jaya on the anniversary of a 1961 proclamation of independence by an armed nationalist group, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM). In Jayapura and Biak, the army opened fire after attacks on local security personnel. One student and one policeman died in Jayapura; the death toll in Biak was at least one demonstrators and perhaps more, as the military tried to suppress information on casualties. Rights groups said the demonstrations had been inspired in part by a letter sent on May 22 by members of the U.S. Congress, urging, among other things, a political dialogue on Irian Jaya. The deaths fueled separatist sentiment, coming as they did after revelations in May of grave human rights abuses in the area around Mapnduma, Jayawijaya district, during military operations there in 1996-97 following the army's rescue of hostages taken by the OPM. These revelations, as well as new evidence on the widespread atrocities in Aceh, a region on the northern tip of Sumatra, during counterinsurgency operations there in 1990-91, generated pressure on the government to look more systematically into past abuses. (The deportation of hundreds of Acehnese "migrants" from Malaysia in late March caused an international outcry, as some of those sent back were clearly refugees who had fled Aceh in the early 1990s and had good reason to fear persecution in Indonesia. (See entry on Malaysia.) In August, as the National Commission on Human Rights was looking into the possiblity of setting up a "truth commission" for Indonesia, a respected Muslim leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, announced the establishment of a non-governmental Commission on Truth and National Reconciliation to look into past abuses in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor. Not to be outdone, the government in early September announced the formation of a National Reconciliation Commission, a body whose mandate did not appear to include exposing the truth or seeking justice. Attention to past military abuses also led to demands for troop withdrawals in special security zones called "military operation areas" (daerah operasi militer or DOM). Most of Aceh was considered such an area, as were parts of Jayawijaya district in Irian Jaya. In August, General Wiranto apologized to the people of Aceh for the abuses they had suffered and declared the "DOM" status revoked. But on September 2, as troops began to leave from the city of Lhokseumawe, popular anger boiled over. Violence directed against the departing soldiers soon turned into a more general riot, amid accusations that the rioting had been sparked by the military elements themselves to ensure their continued presence in Aceh (where some had lucrative commercial operations). On East Timor, the U.N. brokered an agreement between the Habibie government and Portugal on August 5 in which both sides committed themselves work toward an agreement on "wide-ranging autonomy" for the former Portuguese colony considered by Indonesia to be its twenty-seventh province and by the U.N. to be under Portuguese administration. Indonesia agreed to drop its insistence that a precondition of negotiations must be acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty, although it continued to reject the idea, widely supported inside East Timor, of a referendum on independence. Pro-independence demonstrations took place before and after the agreement, without interference from the army. Shortly before the agreement was signed, Indonesia announced it was pulling combat troops out of the territory, but days after the first 398 were pulled out, another 263 "army health personnel and police" were sent in. By August, some 1,000 soldiers had been sent home, but East Timorese leaders did not consider the withdrawals significant, as thousands of troops, not considered "combat" forces, remained in place. In September, fresh violence broke out across the country as the impact of the economic collapse became increasingly felt. Riots in Medan and Bagan siapi-api in North Sumatra and in Kebumen and Cilacap, Central Java were particularly violent, with Chinese shops and homes again targeted. The government's response included allegations that the unrest was due to "communist" forces. Beginning in July, murders began of suspected practitioners of black magic in East Java by mysterious groups of men called ninjas. By October, over 140 people had been killed, and over ninety of those belonged to one Muslim organization, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU). The NU had aligned itself with popular opposition leaders Megawati Soekarnoputri against President Habibie, and its leaders and the East Java police were among many suggesting the ninjas were linked to the army. By late October, revenge killings against suspected ninjas had begun. The reform process continued to lurch forward, with a major debate shaping up on the role of the armed forces and the announcement in September of the repeal of the hated Anti-Subversion Law that had been used repeatedly by Soeharto to detain political opponents.

Defending Human Rights

Indonesian human rights groups proved to be a critical force for political change, if only through their repeated demands for accountability. The efforts of a nongovernmental group called the Volunteer Team for Humanity to document rapes of ethnic Chinese women in May led directly to the creation of a Commission on Violence Against Women in October. Evidence compiled by Kontras, the coalition set up to investigate "disappearances" of activists, was directly responsible for the investigation of senior officers from the army special forces, Kopassus, which in turn fueled public debate about the role of the armed forces. Human rights defendersin Aceh and Irian Jaya used their evidence of abuses during counterinsurgency operations to help secure promises of troop withdrawals from both regions. During the critical months of March, April, and May as student protests escalated, human rights defenders were on the front line, using cell phones to keep international human rights organizations and the media informed of day-to-day developments. Every time another protestor was arrested or a political meeting broken up, human rights lawyers would draw attention to the arbitrariness of state actions in a way that ratcheted up the demands for political reform. Their actions, together with the very powerful statements from the National Human Rights Commission on the need to check abuses of power, also helped ensure that human rights would have to be a high priority for any post-Soeharto government desirous of public support. Human rights defenders were also crucial in securing a role for the nongovernmental community in the World Bank's efforts to establish a social safety net for Indonesia but also in demanding that the bank be more accountable for past "slippage" in loans due to corruption. Even after Soeharto's resignation, some human rights defenders faced serious harassment. The head of Kontras, Munir, received almost constant threats as he was compiling information on the "disappeared." Father Sandyawan Sumardi, head of the Volunteer Team for Humanity, and Ita Nadia of the women's rights group Kalyanamitra were targeted in particular in July, August, and September for their work on behalf of ethnic Chinese rape victims. Some harassment came from the conservative Muslim organization, KISDI, which earlier in the year had been linked to Soeharto's son-in-law, Prabowo. Indonesians played an increasingly high-profile role in defending rights abuses abroad. In August, three Indonesians from Jakarta-based advocacy groups were arrested with eighteen others in Burma as they tried to distribute leaflets to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the crushing of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. After Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was arrested in Malaysia in September, Indonesian human rights lawyers organized a delegation to go to Kuala Lumpur to make representations on his behalf.

The Role of the International Community

United Nations

The primary concerns of the U.N. and its agencies were the conflict in East Timor and the impact of the economic crisis. The above-mentioned August 5 agreement between Indonesia and Portugal, brokered by the U.N. secretary-general, represented a major advance in the long stalemated talks on resolution of the East Timor conflict. Indonesia promised to release political prisoners and reduce its troops in East Timor, promises it had only partially fulfilled by November. Interests sections were to be established in each other's capitals, and an agreement on "wide-ranging autonomy" to be worked out if possible by the end of 1998. On August 13, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed in Geneva between the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Indonesian government. The MOU provides for a program officer from the high commissioner's office to be assigned to the office of the United Nations Development Program in Jakarta. The officer was to have full access to Indonesia and East Timor and was to assist among other things in implementation of Indonesia's national action plan on human rights, human rights education and training, and provision of information needed for ratification of international human rights instruments. The weakness of the MOU reflected the fact that it had been negotiated while Soeharto was still in power; at that point, even access to East Timor seemed a major advance. The usefulness of the program officer, who had no explicit monitoring functions, would depend on the person appointed; as of late September, no appointment had been made. The MOU was an outgrowth in part of the chairman's statement on East Timor at the fifty-fourth session of United Nations Human Rights Commission in March, a weaker critique of Indonesia's human rights practices there than the previous year's resolution. Indonesia also agreed, as part of that statement, to invite the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to East Timor, although the visit itself was not expected to take place until early 1999. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. special rapporteur on violence against women, made a formal request to the Indonesian government to visit to investigate the rapes of ethnic Chinese women. The economic crisis and its impact on ordinary Indonesians were major preoccupations of the ILO and UNICEF. On May 26, the ILO issued a statement welcoming the release of detained labor union leader Muchtar Pakpahan and urging the release of others. (Dita Sari, a student labor leader, remained in prison in Surabaya as of mid-September.)

Donors

In the first part of the year, international emphasis was almost entirely on Indonesia's economic straits, with pressure from most of the G-8 countries on President Soeharto to meet the terms of a January 15 accord with the IMF. Personal telephone calls or visits by world leaders and their representatives, including U.S. President Clinton and former Vice President Mondale, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto, and German Chancellor Kohl, had no noticeable impact. At a meeting on May 16-17, in the immediate aftermath of the Jakarta riots, the G-8 came as close as it ever had to calling for political reform. At the annual donors' meeting in Paris in late June, members of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) pressed for economic reforms, and several governments pledged assistance with social safety net programs. Japan pledged the most, some 187 billion yen. Corruption was also a key point of discussion. The U.S. raised concerns about East Timor, both in its public statement and in private discussions with Indonesian officials. The reaction to the "disappearances" of political activists in January and February was strong. Many governments, includingkey donors and trading partners such as Japan and Australia, urged investigations and prosecution of those responsible.

United States

A furor in the U.S. Congress was unleashed in March when a news article revealed that the Pentagon was engaged in joint training exercises under the global J-CET program involving Kopassus units as well as the Jakarta Joint Military Command. The Pentagon suspended the training, and in Congressional hearings in June, U.S. defense officials described a new process of oversight of the entire J-CET program including the State Department, before any training in Indonesia would be reinstituted. Congress voted in October to ban the provision of J-CET training to countries whose security forces violate human rights; it also voted to continue the suspension of IMET (International Military Education and Training) training in Indonesia, citing ongoing abuses in East Timor. Calls for political reform were late in coming. Just hours before Soeharto resigned, U.S. Secretary of State Albright said in a speech that he had "an opportunity for a historic act of statesmanship" that would "preserve his legacy" the remarks were almost universally interpreted as call for him to step down. The Clinton administration fought an uphill battle all year trying to persuade Congress to allocate new credits for the IMF, arguing that IMF support was crucial to continue support for Indonesia and other Asian economies. But the House of Representatives insisted that any funding be accompanied by reform of the IMF itself to provide greater transparency and accountability. The budget for financial year 1999 included the full $18 billion requested by the administration for the IMF, and included IMF reforms, including a report by the Treasury Department on abuses of core worker rights in IMF-recipient countries and whether IMF measures have had a negative effect on worker rights, particularly the right of free association. Under the reforms, the Treasury Department would establish an IMF advisory committee composed of representatives from industry, labor, and environmental and human rights organizations. The rapes of ethnic Chinese sparked a vigorous grass-roots campaign to link bilateral U.S. economic assistance to investigation of the perpetrators and compensation of the rape victims. House and Senate letters to the Administration were accompanied by language inserted into the foreign aid bill in both houses calling for action and urging U.S. technical and funding assistance with the rape investigations.

European Union

On June 18 the European Parliament adopted an urgent resolution expressing its dismany at the limited progress toward greater political openness in Indonesia and called on authorities to unconditionally release all political prisoners. The E.P. also called on the Habibie government to take steps to introduce democracy by setting a date for free elections. It also urged that a peaceful solution to East Timor be found. Ambassadors in Jakarta representing the E.U. troika countries visited East Timor from June 27 to July 30. When the ambassadors reached Baucau, a clash between pro-independence supporters and supporters of the Indonesian government led the Indonesian army to fire on demonstrators, killing one man, Orlando Mercado. The E.U. asked the Indonesian government to conduct an inquiry into the shooting. A report on the visit issued in late July stressed the urgency of involving the East Timorese people in a search for a political solution to the conflict and said that the withdrawal of troops should be a top priority.

Japan

Indonesia was a focus of special attention. During the year Japan gave Indonesia over $1.3 billion in yen loans, plus a $1 billion loan by the Japanese Export-Import Bank, a $30 million grant for medical assistance, and contributions of rice and other in-kind humanitarian aid. Japan also increased its contacts with Indonesian NGOs involved in dealing with the social dimensions of the economic crisis. Members of the Diet continued to be active on East Timor. Parliamentarians in the Diet Members Forum on East Timor called on the Japanese delegation to the U.N. Human Rights Commission to cosponsor an E.U. resolution on East Timor. In meetings with U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson in January, they urged her to set up an office in Jakarta to monitor abuses in East Timor.

International Financial Institutions

The IMF played such a high-profile role in the Indonesian crisis that it was accused inside and outside Indonesia of worsening a bad situation. The letters of intent between the IMF and the Indonesian government signed on October 31, 1997 and January 15 caused major problems, both in terms of the substance of the reforms sought and the unwillingness of then-President Soeharto to implement them. At the same time, the Indonesian crisis helped lead the IMF to focus more than it had before on the impact of its standard program on the poor and vulnerable, meaning food subsidies targeted for removal were eventually restored, and on the need for good governance, a concept that entailed legitimate leadership. The World Bank made a visible effort to consult with nongovernmental groups, including in a highly publicized meeting in Jakarta in February between dozens of highly vocal critics of past bank policy and James Wolfensohn, the bank's president.

Private Sector

The business community also played a critical role during the year, and in some cases, directly addressed human rights concerns. For example, a delegation of leading U.S. companies went to Jakarta in early May, at the height of the crisis, and brought up the "disappearances" in meetings with Habibie and other senior officials. Companies and trade organizations also raised scholarshipfunds for Indonesians studying abroad and donated food and medical supplies to particularly hard-hit rural areas. At year's end, foreign investors remained deeply worried about political stability and continuing food riots.

Relevant Human Rights Watch reports:

The Damaging Debate on Violence Against Ethnic Chinese Women, 9/98 Release Prisoners of Conscience Now!, 8/98 Academic Freedom in Indonesia: Dismantling Soeharto-era Barriers, 8/98