Countries at the Crossroads 2004 - Yemen

(Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance.)

Executive Summary

Author

Brian Katulis is a research consultant who has worked on Freedom House's projects in the Middle East, including a series of focus groups for Freedom House's Survey of Women's Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa.

Since the unification of North and South in 1990, Yemen has taken steps toward establishing a more democratic system of government in a complex and challenging environment. In the face of widespread poverty and illiteracy, tribal influences that limit the central government's authority in certain parts of the country, a heavily armed citizenry, continuing internal tensions and challenges to the state's unity exemplified by the 1994 civil war, and the threat of radical Islamist terrorism, Yemen has succeeded in expanding democratic freedoms and increasing respect for human rights, becoming an example for the rest of the Arabian Peninsula.

In combining the different political and legal systems of two formerly independent countries, Yemen has developed a significant, though still incomplete, body of legislation guaranteeing many internationally accepted political rights and civil liberties. Although Yemen's record on human rights and the rule of law remains imperfect, it has developed legal safeguards and new institutions intended to prevent human rights abuses, torture, and arbitrary detention. Yemeni citizens enjoy a degree of freedom of expression and speech not present in many other Arab countries, although the government continues to control and censor key aspects of the media. Yemen is one of the few countries in the Arab world to organize regular elections at the national and local levels, with competition among the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) party; the two main opposition parties, the Islamist Yemeni Assembly for Reform (or Islah Party) and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP); and a handful of other parties.

Yemen is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, among other international human rights and democracy conventions and treaties. Article 6 of Yemen's constitution confirms its adherence to the United Nations Charter, the International Declaration of Human Rights, and the general principles of international law. In 2003, Yemen established the first ministry of human rights in the Arab world.

Despite these positive signs and efforts, Yemen has a long road of reform ahead. In some areas where legal safeguards are present, such as protections against human rights abuses, the government's implementation and execution of the law is uneven because of lack of funding, poor training, and corruption. In other areas, particularly transparency, accountability, anticorruption, and the independence of the judiciary, Yemen has much work to do to improve both the legal framework and government implementation.

The judiciary is nominally independent but in practice is weak and susceptible to interference from the executive branch. Government authorities have a spotty record of enforcing judicial rulings, particularly those issued against prominent tribal or political leaders. The lack of a truly independent judiciary impedes progress in all areas of democracy and good governance; without an independent arbiter for disputes, people often resort to tribal forms of justice or direct appeals to the executive branch of government.

Corruption is an endemic problem at all levels of Yemeni government and society. Despite recent efforts by the government to fight corruption and institute a civil service reform program, Yemen lacks most legal safeguards against conflicts of interest. In addition, the chief auditing and investigation bodies charged with fighting corruption are not sufficiently independent from the executive authorities.

Although Yemen's government faces a daunting environment with numerous challenges – terrorism, poverty, and lack of public awareness – there is much that it can do to build on the modest successes it has achieved in creating a more democratic society. The overriding problem in Yemen's system of government is its over-reliance on the executive branch. President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his political party, the GPC, enjoy a monopoly on virtually all forms of meaningful political power. Yemen's government suffers from the absence of any real system of checks and balances and limits on the executive's authority. Rather than opening the door for increased political pluralism, Yemen's parliamentary election of April 2003 was a missed opportunity, marred by cheating and reports of intimidation, misuse of state resources, and control of certain media outlets by the ruling party. Political rights in Yemen, therefore, are weakened by the fact that the ruling GPC uses its significant advantages of incumbency, administrative resources, and media influence to preserve its dominance and restrict political competition.

Civil Liberties – 3.63

Yemen's constitution offers protections against arbitrary arrest and detention without trial, but it is ambiguous regarding the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.¹ Yemen's government has stepped up efforts to reduce the incidence of torture, but violations continue, in part due to a lack of adequate training and awareness among law enforcement officials.

Prosecution of state officers accused of torturing and abusing prisoners is uneven. All public employees are immune from prosecution for crimes allegedly committed while on duty. The attorney general must provide special permission to prosecutors to investigate allegations against members of the security forces, and the head of the appeals court must lift the immunity before the accused is tried.²

By law, detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of arrest or be released. However, arbitrary detention occurs, sometimes because law-enforcement officials lack proper training and at other times because political will is absent at the most senior levels of government. One prominent example of the latter from 2003 was the arrest inside the presidential building and detention without charge of members of the Jahm tribe. The Jahm tribal leaders reportedly had a dispute with officials while in the presidential office, and they were detained, initially in a military prison. These leaders were ultimately released after mediation by another tribal leader, not because of any procedure related to the courts or the rule of law.³

The global war on terror has created pressures on Yemen to exploit all means available to counteract the threat posed by suspected terrorists. After the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and amid evidence of significant al-Qaeda links in the country, Yemen's internal security forces conducted a series of mass arrests, incommunicado detentions, and deportations of foreigners, using methods that sometimes violated international human rights conventions and basic rule-of-law standards. In the summer of 2003, international human rights groups and Yemeni government officials estimated that approximately 200 individuals continue to be detained indefinitely without trial or access to lawyers or judicial authorities to challenge the legality of their detention.⁴ The minister of interior of Yemen, in an address to parliament on July 16, 2003, said that 95 people accused of belonging to al-Qaeda were released because they "had changed their ideas" and that 195 others remained in detention because they "persist in holding on to the ideas they believe in."⁵ Some of these releases were part of an Islamically oriented approach to rehabilitation, begun when President Saleh asked Judge Hamood Al-Hitar to form a "Dialogue Committee" to persuade fundamentalist Islamist Yemenis to renounce violence and their fanatical views.⁶

On December 28, 2002, Jarallah Omar, the deputy director of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) was assassinated shortly after concluding a speech at a party conference of Islah. Omar had been a key figure in efforts to combine the campaigns of the two main opposition parties leading up to the 2003 elections. Although government authorities arrested and prosecuted a radical Islamist and member of Islah for the murder, officials in the YSP continued to demand a more thorough investigation, maintaining that too many questions about the murderer and his previous ties to government security agencies remained unanswered.⁷

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the government has taken steps to limit this freedom in practice. The state has generally refrained from excessive force in dealing with demonstrations and public protests and usually opts for more sophisticated measures, like placing personnel from security forces within demonstrations as a means to control them. In the spring of 2003, one prominent protest against the war in Iraq in front of the U.S. embassy in Sanaa resulted in the deaths of several Yemeni citizens and security forces.

By law, women are afforded protections against discrimination and provided with guarantees of equality under the Sharia (Islamic law). In practice, however, women continue to face pervasive discrimination in several aspects of life. For example, the Labor Law of 1995 provides safeguards for preventing discrimination against women in the workplace, but in practice discrimination is common and women remain vastly under-represented in the workforce. Women constitute only one-fifth of the workforce, and their participation in government jobs is much lower. Yemen's Education Act ensures equality of access to education, but Yemen has one of the largest gaps in the world between boys' and girls' net primary school attendance rates. The law provides for protection of women against violence, but in practice such provisions are rarely enforced. The penal code allows for leniency for persons guilty of violent assault or killing of women for alleged immodest behavior or "crimes of honor."⁸

Women who seek to go abroad must obtain permission from their husbands or fathers to receive a passport and travel. Women – unlike men – do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born spouses, and the process for conferring citizenship on children born in the country of foreign-born fathers is in practice more difficult than for children born of Yemeni fathers and foreign-born mothers.⁹ Civil-society organizations and human rights monitors report that female prisoners are not released at the end of their sentences unless a male relative is present.¹⁰

Yemen is relatively homogeneous ethnically and racially. The Akhdam (Arabic for servants), a small minority group that claims to be descended from ancient Ethiopian occupiers, live in poverty and face social discrimination. The government, however, does not discriminate against this group, and in fact has social and economic development programs to support them.¹¹

Article 2 of the constitution states that Islam is the religion of the state, and Article 3 declares that Islamic Sharia is the source of all legislation. Although the constitution guarantees the freedom of religion, based on Islamic Sharia, a Muslim converting to another religion is guilty of the crime of apostasy, which is de jure punishable by death. Nevertheless, there have been no reported instances of the government prosecuting citizens for this crime.

Overall, the state refrains from excessive interference in the appointment of religious and spiritual leaders, although it has taken some steps to prevent politicization of mosques and Islamic religious schools for extremist purposes.¹² Although it offers no special protections to nonbelievers, it also does not institute policies to discriminate against them and generally respects their rights.

Yemenis have the right to form associations in "scientific, cultural, social, and national unions in a way that serves the goals of the Constitution," according to Article 58 of that document.¹³ Although it is a small country, Yemen has several thousand nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), according to estimates from the government. However, several observers question how independent many of these NGOs are from the ruling party.

The government respects the right to form and join trade unions, and the General Federation of Trade Unions of Yemen – the main union organization, with an estimated 350,000 members in 14 unions – dominates the landscape.¹⁴ Critics claim that several syndicates are ineffective in protecting the interests of their members and that the government and ruling party elements have recently stepped up efforts to control the affairs of these organizations.¹⁵

Recommendations

The Yemeni government should implement a comprehensive program to train law-enforcement, security, and prison officials in the proper procedures for arresting, detaining, and interrogating accused individuals. The government should also lift the immunity of public officials for crimes committed while on duty. National laws, particularly personal status laws on obtaining citizenship, need to be amended to ensure that women enjoy full equality under the law.

The clause in the penal code that allows for leniency for persons guilty of so-called crimes of honor must be eliminated. The state should institute and implement a national legal requirement making school attendance mandatory for all students, both male and female, until the age of 15.

Rule of Law – 3.45

Despite efforts in recent years by the Yemeni government to reform the judiciary and enhance its capacity, the court system remains the weakest link of the three branches of government, susceptible to interference from the executive branch and unable to implement its rulings in many parts of the country.

In theory, Yemen's judiciary is independent. Article 149 of Yemen's constitution states that "the judicial authority is an autonomous authority in its judicial, financial, and administrative aspects, and the General Prosecution is one of its sub-bodies. The courts shall judge all disputes and crimes. Judges are independent and not subject to any authority, except the law." In practice, however, Yemen's Judicial Authority Law, which provides further definition of how the judiciary is managed, includes provisions that some legal analysts and civil-society leaders argue contradict the constitutional safeguards of the judiciary's independence. Article 104 of this law assigns the president of the republic to the supreme judicial council (SJC), which manages the affairs of the judiciary. In addition to the president, the minister of justice, the deputy minister of justice, and the head of the judicial inspection board, who reports to the minister of justice, all serve on the SJC. These provisions legally enable the executive to maintain a strong degree of control over the judicial branch.

More specifically, under the judicial authority law, the ministry of justice has a number of powers that constrain the judiciary's independence – supervising the finances, administration, and organization of the courts; reassigning judges and authorizing them to take non-judicial jobs; selecting the number of members in the Supreme Court and courts of appeal; and defining the location and selecting the jurisdiction limits of primary courts.¹⁶

One prominent example cited by current and former members of parliament of the judiciary not playing a role as independent arbiter of legal matters is its refusal to offer a judgment in a case regarding a disputed election for the leadership of the house of representatives. Five members of parliament, representing the ruling GPC and two main opposition parties, the YSP and Islah, took a case to court arguing that the executive branch had interfered with the leadership elections and asking for a re-vote in mid-2003. The Supreme Court justice in this case, Zeid bin Zeid Al-Jumra, initially took the case but then refused to issue a ruling.¹⁷

In addition to this most basic issue of limits on judicial independence, the judiciary suffers from a lack of adequate resources, which hinders its ability to hire and train qualified judges and implement its rulings. In rural areas, Yemenis frequently rely on traditional tribal forms of justice. A judicial reform move increased the salaries of judges as a measure to eliminate corruption, but this has not proven to be a panacea for the problem of judges taking bribes. According to Ismail Al-Wazir, the former justice minister who started the judicial reform process, "even the corrupt will not be satisfied by millions."¹⁸

Yemen's law provides citizens with the opportunity for a fair and public trial and guarantees of access to independent counsel. Article 47 of the constitution states that the accused is innocent until proven guilty by final judicial ruling, and no law may be enacted to put a person on trial retroactively for acts committed. Article 48 of the constitution prohibits arrests made without warrant issued by a judge or prosecutor.

The ministry of the interior oversees the criminal investigative department of the police, which conducts most criminal investigations and arrests. The ministry of interior also maintains oversight of prison conditions for the 10,348 inmates detained in Yemen as of September 2003.¹⁹ Unlike many other countries in the Arab world, Yemen does not have state security courts. However, the political security office (PSO), Yemen's primary internal security force, operates under the control of the president, with little or no oversight from other parts of the executive branch, the parliament, or judicial authorities.

Yemen's constitution and overall legal framework afford all citizens equal treatment under the law. In practice, the legal system remains highly informal, with personal connections and networks frequently trumping the dictates of the law. The government's record on respecting and enforcing property rights is weak, particularly in parts of the country where tribal forces are strong and government authority is limited.

Recommendations

The Yemeni government should take steps to decrease the potential for the executive branch's interference in the judiciary, such as removing the president from the supreme judicial council. It should also create tighter linkages and better coordination mechanisms between the judicial authorities and the police to ensure that judicial rulings are fully implemented and respected.

All police and security authorities should be subject to oversight and investigation from the legislative branch of government and the judiciary, in addition to the executive branch. Suspects allegedly involved with terrorist organizations should be charged with a crime and tried or, if insufficient evidence exists, released. In addition, the government should seek to continue to rehabilitate extremists using religious or traditional means, as with the efforts of Judge Hamood Al-Hitar.

Anticorruption and Transparency – 1.85

Corruption is a major problem in Yemen, a fact recognized not only by the political opposition but also by senior members of the current government, including the head of Yemen's primary audit agency and numerous ministers. Yemen ranked 88th out of 133 countries on Transparency International's 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index. Fighting corruption is a main feature of the current government's agenda.

Yemen's civil service and public administration suffer from overall underdeveloped institutional capacity, inefficient management systems, burdensome procedures, underpaid civil servants who sometimes resort to corruption to supplement their incomes, and an unnecessarily large number of personnel. Hamoud Khalid Al-Sufi, the minister of civil service and procurement, stated publicly in October 2003 that the Yemeni government did not have an accurate count of Yemen's civil servants, but that such a count should be completed in 2004. Al-Sufi estimates job redundancies at 30,000, but a final determination will be made after Yemen's current review.²⁰ Yemen has embarked on a reform process to eradicate bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption in the civil service, but the efforts have been impeded in part by low salaries and widespread poverty throughout the country. The government's patronage system involves "employing" thousands of Yemenis in government positions, with many collecting salaries for which they perform no duties.

Privatization has been one of the slowest components of the economic reform program, in part because of lack of proper laws and rules governing the privatization process.²¹ In September 2003, 40 information technology and computer companies operating in Yemen sent a letter to President Saleh opposing a decision by the Yemeni government to offer the Al-Basair company a monopoly on all information technology-related services, machinery, and training for 25 years.²² The publication of this letter demonstrates that a degree of political space exists to question government decisions, but at the same time offers signs that the government is slow to privatize and open Yemen's economy to more competition.

Articles 118 and 136 of the constitution prohibit the president and ministers from engaging in private business of any kind. However, because Yemen currently does not require income or financial assets disclosure by government officials, enforcement relies on an honor system dependent on truthful self-reporting and self-monitoring.

The central organization for control and auditing (COCA) serves as the supreme audit institution in the country. COCA conducts a series of regular audits of government ministries and organizations. Even though COCA officials claim that it is fully independent from the executive branch of government, current COCA chairman Abdullah Abdullah Al-Sanafani acknowledged in September 2003 that it conducts special audits requested by "higher authorities," the catch phrase often used to describe the office of President Saleh.²³

When sufficient evidence is gathered pointing to prosecutable cases of corruption, COCA refers them to the public funds prosecution office, as well as President Saleh's office.²⁴ COCA's chairman estimates that in the six months before September 2003, 45 cases had been presented to the public funds prosecutor.²⁵

Although Yemen's laws require a degree of transparency and public access to information, in practice detailed accounting of expenditures rarely occurs in a timely fashion. The state offers few procedures to ensure transparency, open bidding, and effective competition in awarding government contracts.

Recommendations

Yemen's government should introduce requirements of public disclosure of personal finances, including income, assets, and all business interests, from all senior public officials such as the president, senior staff to the president, government ministers, top ministry officials, judges and other senior judicial authorities, and members of parliament. The state should establish formal mechanisms, such as an anonymous telephone tip line, by which government employees and individuals can report instances of alleged corruption and misuse of public resources. A body that is fully independent of the president and the executive branch should be established to investigate and prosecute alleged instances of corruption, and reports of investigations should be made publicly available.

Accountability and Public Voice – 3.23

Yemen is a republic headed by a popularly elected president, with a bicameral parliament composed of a 301-seat popularly elected house of representatives and a 111-member Shura council appointed by the president. The house of representatives has legislative authority, and the Shura council serves in an advisory capacity.

On the surface, Yemen appears to have a relatively open democratic system. Regular elections have been a key feature of Yemen's political landscape since 1990. With 22 political parties, Yemenis seemingly are free to support a range of political positions. Yet in reality, Yemen's politics are monopolized by the ruling party, the GPC. In 2003 the GPC increased the number of parliament seats it holds from 145 to 240.²⁶ In 1999, President Saleh was elected to a five-year term in the country's first nationwide direct presidential election, winning 96.3 percent of the vote. Saleh's only opponent came from within his ruling GPC party, and his term in office was extended from five to seven years in a 2001 referendum.²⁷

The April 2003 parliamentary elections took place despite concerns that popular unrest resulting from the war in Iraq might lead to a postponement. International election observers noted that Yemen has made substantial improvements in electoral management and administration, using technology to develop an advanced voter registry system.²⁸ In addition, one of the chief achievements of the 2003 parliamentary elections was the relative peacefulness; compared to previous elections, there were fewer incidents of violence. On the surface, the elections were competitive. The opposition Islah party won seats in former GPC strongholds, including parts of the capital city of Sanaa such as President Saleh's home district. However, numerous problems surfaced. Voter registration was characterized by widespread fraud and cheating. The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) estimates that the number of underage voters was in the hundreds of thousands, with the number of voters aged 18 and 19 exceeding the actual number of Yemenis in that age bracket. Yemen's chief election administration body, the supreme commission for elections and referenda (SCER), noted that the number of underage voters was at least 150,000, but even though underage voting violates Article 64 of Yemen's constitution, the commission did nothing to rectify the problem.²⁹

During the campaign, the election administration placed limits on the issues and presentations made by candidates in televised campaign statements. A single member of the SCER was the final decision maker on what candidates could and could not say during televised appearances, offering no opportunity to appeal this decision.³⁰

International and domestic election monitors and Yemeni unions noted that the ruling GPC party used state resources to influence the outcome of the vote. For example, the ministry of education allowed the use of schools for campaign activities.³¹ In certain parts of the country, government officials threatened teachers with transfer or the loss of their jobs if they did not help the GPC in its campaign.³² In addition, international election monitors noted that elements of the ruling GPC employed "heavy-handed and coercive measures" on election day.³³ Although provision exists in the law for public financing for campaigns, parties are also permitted to raise unregulated funds from private donors, a system that numerous analysts believe favors the ruling party. In addition, the GPC reportedly manipulates votes by arranging for military troops to vote in particular constituencies, even if they are not residents there.

Article 62 of the constitution and Sections 24 and 53 of the Election Law require that the populations of all constituencies be equal in size, with a variation of not more than plus or minus 5 percent.³⁴ Nevertheless, as drawn, the boundaries of electoral constituencies do define populations of unequal size. In addition, according to independent domestic election monitors, the judiciary did not thoroughly and carefully review election disputes; it responded to 56 separate complaints in the post-election period, taking only three days to issue its ruling,³⁵ which prompted complaints that the merits of different election disputes were not carefully considered.

Yemen held local government elections in 2001. Although local council members are popularly elected, the 2000 Law on Local Authority allows for the appointment of the chairpersons of local councils by the president. In practice, the chairpersons hold the preponderance of power in the local councils, and the Local Authority Law does not grant substantial decision-making authority to the council members.³⁶

In the 1990s, Yemen embarked on a comprehensive campaign to enhance women's political participation by placing a strong emphasis on registering women to vote. The number of women registered increased nearly seven-fold, from half a million in the 1993 parliamentary elections to over three million in the 2003 parliamentary elections.³⁷ However, women are vastly under-represented in most senior leadership positions in government offices. Yemen's government has attempted to increase women's participation by instituting an informal quota system in government ministries, but women's rights activists in Yemen note that these officials are often marginalized because of societal biases against women in the workplace.

The under-representation of women is starkest in Yemen's elected offices. Despite the best efforts of women's rights groups to increase the number of women in parliament, only one woman won a seat in the 2003 parliamentary elections, out of a total of 301 seats.³⁸ Few women ran as candidates for the top political parties. Out of a total of 1,400 candidates in the election, only 11 were female.³⁹ At the local government level, women won only 38 seats out of 6,676 in the 2001 elections.⁴⁰ There are no female judges serving in the northern part of the country, and the only four in the south are not currently acting judges.⁴¹

Except for certain positions in Yemen's foreign ministry, no merit-based competitive selection process exists for civil-service positions. Minister of Civil Service and Procurement Khalid Al-Sufi decided in September 2003 to suspend all employment procedures because of corruption and bribes taken by people in charge of the hiring process.

The constitution provides guarantees to protect the rights of an independent civic sector, and for the most part the government allows civic organizations to conduct their work freely. Overall, donors to civic organizations and public policy institutes are free of pressures from the state. However, the government and parliament do not have well-developed procedures for the regular, organized, and meaningful involvement of outside groups in the formulation of laws and policy.

Security forces and other government bodies reportedly continue to threaten and harass journalists,⁴² although the number of arrests of journalists seems to have diminished in the past year. In addition, because of the relative weakness of the state in certain regions of the country, Yemen's government offers few protections to journalists from powerful tribal forces.

Article 103 of the Press and Publications Law outlaws "direct personal criticism of the head of state" and publication of material that "might spread a spirit of dissent and division among the people" or "leads to the spread of ideas contrary to the principles of the Yemeni Revolution, prejudicial to national unity or distorting the image of the Yemeni, Arab, or Islamic heritage." Critics maintain that these vague provisions, combined with the lack of a strong judiciary, create an environment in which the government can use the threat of legal sanction against journalists who are critical of government policies.

The print media do not seem to have a strong impact across much of Yemeni society, which has a rate of illiteracy estimated at 54 percent.⁴³ The state maintains a monopoly over the media that matter most – television and radio. In these media, direct criticism of government policies is rare, and investigative journalism is virtually non-existent.

Minister of Information Hussein Al-Awadi acknowledges the lack of pluralism in the broadcast media. He says that the government hopes to introduce legislation in the coming year that would set procedures enabling people to start private radio and television stations. Al-Awadi also notes that allowing opposition forces and others to set up their own television or radio stations would be tantamount to "giving them the power," acknowledging that television and radio have stronger potential to influence and shape views than the print media.⁴⁴

Recommendations

The Yemeni government should enhance the training, direction, and oversight of local election officials to ensure that they can fulfill their responsibilities. For the long term, the Yemeni government should invest in measures to de-politicize the electoral administration, such as creating an election administration staffed with properly trained civil servants. It should also

redraw the boundaries of the electoral constituencies in accordance with the principles set by the constitution and the Election Law. The state should establish special mechanisms to expedite the dispute-resolution and appeals process at all stages of the election cycle, either by further developing the capacity of the SCER to rule or setting up special and independent electoral courts to arbitrate disputes in a timely, thorough, and cost-effective manner.

The legislature should amend the Law for Press and Publications to either clarify or delete the numerous vaguely worded provisions on outlawed publications in Articles 137 to 153.

The government should develop procedures and regulations to permit the establishment of private and independent broadcast media outlets in order to reduce the state's monopoly over radio and television.

Notes

1 Yemen, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 31 March 2003), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18293.htm .

2 Ibid.

3 Yemen Times, "Jahm Sheikhs Released," Yemen Times Staff, 18-21 September 2003, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=669&p=local&a=1.

4 Interviews with Yemen government officials, Sanaa, 23-30 September, 2003.

5 "Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security" (London: Amnesty International, 24 September 2003).

6 For more background on the Dialogue Committee, see "Youth of the Holy War," Interview of the Week in Yemen Times, 27 January 27-3 February 2004, http://www.yementimes.com/03/iss4/intrview.htm.

7 Interview with Abdulgani Abdulqader, Ali Al-Sarari, and Mohammed Al-Meklafi, YSP officials, Sanaa, 28 September 2003.

8 Interview with Rashida Al-Hamdani, Chairperson of the Women's National Committee, and Ramzia Al-Eryani, Yemeni Women's Union, Sanaa, 28 September 2003; "Yemen Country Profile" (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2003); Country Reports (U.S. Dept. of State).

9 Country Reports (U.S. Dept. of State).

10 Jamal Al-Admimi, Human Rights, 48 (Sanaa: Forum for Civil Society [FCS], December 2002).

11 Country Reports (U.S. Dept. of State).

12 Ibid.

13 The Constitution of the Republic of Yemen (Athawabit Journal, A Quarterly Journal of Culture, Development, and Politics, April 2002).

14 Country Reports (U.S. Dept. of State).

15 Interviews with members of the journalists' and teachers' syndicates, 25 and 29 September 2003.

16 Jamal Al-Adimi and Faisal Asswfi, "Justice Report: Yemen 2000," Al-Qistas 7 (FCS, 2000).

17 Interviews with Muhammad Al-Shadadi, current GPC member of parliament, and Saadaldeen Ali Talib, former GPC member of parliament, Sanaa, 24 September 2003; interview with Sakher Al-Wajei, current GPC member of parliament, Sanaa, 27 September 2003.

18 Interview with Ismail Al-Wazir, Sanaa, 28 September 2003.

19 Interview with Rashid Jarhoom, Yemen's Deputy Minister of Interior, Sanaa, 29 September 2003.

20 Mohammed Al-Qadhi, "We Do Not Know Exactly the Number of Yemen's Civil Servants," Yemen Times, 9 October 2003.

21 "Review of the Annual Strategic Report: Yemen 2002-2003" (Sanaa: General Center for Studies, Research, and Publishing, 2003); Saif Al-Asaly, "Privatisation in Yemen" (Sanaa: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [FES], October 2002).

22 Yemen Times staff, "40 Companies Oppose Monopoly of Yemen's IT Sector," Yemen Times, vol. 13, no. 671, 25 September 2003.

23 Interview with Abdullah Abdullah Al-Sanafani, Sanaa, 27 September 2003.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.; 27 April 2003 Parliamentary Elections in Yemen; Final Report, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. The GPC won 230 seats in the election, and 10 candidates who won seats later joined the GPC, increasing the party's number of seats to 240.

26 Electionworld.org; Election Guide, International Foundation for Election System, http://www.ifes.org.

27 Country Reports (U.S. Dept. of State).

28 Interview with representatives from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Sanaa, 27 September 2003.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Interview with Ahmed Al-Sufi and Abdullah Sallam Al-Hakimi of the Yemen Institute for Development of Democracy, Sanaa, 25 September 2003.

33 "Preliminary Statement on the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to Yemen's April 27 Legislative Elections" (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 29 April 2003).

34 Ibid.

35 Interview with Abdul Majed Al-Fahed, Executive Director of the Civic Democratic Initiative Support Foundation (CDF), Sanaa, 26 September 2003.

36 "Yemen's Constitutional Referendum and Local Elections" (New York: Human Rights Watch [HRW], February 2001).

37 Interview with Amat Al-Aleem Al-Soswa, Yemen's Minister of Human Rights, Washington, DC, 10 September 2003.

38 Interviews with Orass Sultan Naji, GPC member of parliament, the only woman elected to serve in Yemen's current parliament, Sanaa, 24 and 26 September 2003.

39 "Review of the Annual Strategic Report: Yemen 2002-2003" (Sanaa: General Center for Studies, Research, and Publishing, 2003).

40 Mujahed Al-Mussa'abi, "National Committee for Women: Challenges & Future," Yemen Times, 18-24 November 2002.

41 Interview with Rashida Al-Hamdani, Chairperson of the Women's National Committee, Sanaa, 28 September 2003.

42 Interview with members of the journalists' syndicate, 25 September 2003; interview with Abdul Rahim Mohsen, opposition journalist imprisoned in 2002 for "undermining national harmony," who alleges continued intimidation by government authorities, Sanaa, 29 September 2003.

43 "Review of the Annual Strategic Report: Yemen 2002-2003" (Sanaa: General Center for Studies, Research, and Publishing, 2003).

44 Interview with Hussein Al-Awadi, Yemen's minister of information, Sanaa, 24 September 2003.