Countries at the Crossroads 2006 - Zimbabwe

  • Author: Robert B. Lloyd
  • Document source:
  • Date:
    3 August 2006

(Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance.)

Introduction

President Robert Mugabe presides over a country torn by deep political fissures, a freefalling economy, and international condemnation for human rights abuses. Despite these challenges, Mugabe's power has become more entrenched. His political resiliency has been surprising given the growing chorus of international and domestic opposition to his rule. In the past five years, the Commonwealth, the European Union, and the United States have all imposed limited sanctions against Zimbabwe. These actions were taken due to Mugabe's controversial policies of seizing commercial farmland; government-sponsored intimidation, beatings, detention, and torture of opposition supporters; and manipulation of elections. As Zimbabwe's economic crisis has deepened, the government has found it difficult to clear its debt arrears with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF, frustrated at continued nonpayment of loans, has threatened to expel Zimbabwe.

Domestic opposition, which since 2000 had posed a serious challenge to Mugabe, has experienced severe setbacks. The March 2005 legislative elections increased the control of Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) political party over the legislature. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai, began to split over how best to challenge the president. Other avenues to contest the government have been closed. The government uses restrictive legislation to clamp down on prominent critics using restrictive legislation. State-owned radio, television, and newspapers dominate the country. The erosion of the independence of the judiciary continues through judicial resignations, politically compliant appointments, and paychecks battered by spiraling inflation.

Condemnation of Mugabe has not, however, been universal. South Africa, the state with the most leverage against Zimbabwe, is generally pro-Mugabe. South Africa's positive attitude is shared by many African states and organizations, which see Mugabe as a hero of Zimbabwe's war for independence, achieved in 1980. Furthermore, his land seizure policies targeting white-owned farms are viewed sympathetically by a number of other southern African states. This reservoir of goodwill has helped Mugabe weather domestic and international criticism. Within Zimbabwe, the president derives support from a tightly woven web of party elites, government positions, and private enterprises held together by a system of patronage with Mugabe at its apex.

Thus, these sources of domestic and international support have enabled Mugabe to use state power to impose his will over Zimbabweans, further strengthening his grip on the country. Force used against citizens intensified in the government acquisition of private property. Over several months in mid-2005, for example, police and security forces implemented Operation Clear the Filth, using violence to demolish a number of urban townships. It is estimated that more than 700,000 individuals lost their homes. The government also demolished thousands of informal businesses through Operation No Going Back. A new citizenship law meant many of those displaced who were of mixed national heritage found that they were no longer citizens.

Zimbabwe's political isolation and economic decline will remain for the foreseeable future. Given Mugabe's advanced age (approximately 80 years) the task of addressing the country's structural problems should come fairly soon. A post-Mugabe Zimbabwe will be a failed state marked by economic collapse, a population ravaged by HIV/AIDS, turmoil over political succession, and continued disputes over property rights.

Accountability and Public Voice – 1.07

Zimbabwe is essentially a single-party state with a strong executive president. Party and presidential loyalties undermine effective checks and balances. While the legislature is legally autonomous from the executive, it is highly unlikely that the executive will be held accountable for any excessive exercise of power. The executive does indict party leaders on corruption charges, but these are related primarily to feuds within the ZANU-PF.

Zimbabwe has a unicameral legislature with regularly scheduled elections. ZANU-PF has held power since independence in 1980. In the March 2005 parliamentary elections five parties fielded candidates for the 120 elected seats. The elections were generally peaceful. All registered voters were able to vote irrespective of race, color, political affiliation, or sex. In the two weeks prior to the elections the government allowed opposition parties to campaign and permitted limited – but biased – media coverage.

Compared to the 2003 vote, political violence and intimidation decreased markedly prior to the March 2005 elections. Nevertheless, there were still reports of violence against opposition party members and their supporters. One survey of opposition MDC MPs and candidates found that most claimed to have personally experienced intimidation and violence from security services and ZANU-PF partisans.

ZANU-PF decisively won the elections, gaining the two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution. The MDC, its main rival, charged electoral fraud but attended the swearing-in ceremony. The British government stated that the elections were seriously flawed and thus did not represent the democratic will of the Zimbabwean voters. Independent electoral observers monitored the elections, but the government allowed into the country only groups from Africa that it believed were pro-ZANU-PF. These observers stated the vote reflected the will of the Zimbabwean people.

Of special concern were unexplained discrepancies between announced voting totals and subsequent official results, which may have affected election outcomes in 31 constituencies. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), whose members were appointed by the government, could not provide a ready explanation for the discrepancies. The impression of ZEC partiality toward the government was reinforced after it filed a court application in support of Mugabe following the president's disagreement with a court decision to let an imprisoned opposition MP run for his own seat. The government purports to abide by democratic guidelines established by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a regional grouping of states. Opposition political parties receive public funding. It is legal for all candidates other than the president to be criticized. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) criminalizes false reporting and statements that "incite or promote public disorder or public violence." In addition, it also requires that police be notified in advance of any public gathering of more than two people and prohibits those that police believe could cause public disorder. An individual convicted of this crime is liable for a one-year imprisonment or a fine. The ambiguity of the language means the law essentially criminalizes political speech by the opposition. State ownership of the media makes it more difficult for opposition parties to receive any coverage and in particular favorable coverage during the campaign period.

The rise of the MDC had until recently offered increasing opportunities for rotation of power among different parties. The party's major electoral defeat in the March 2005 elections decreases the likelihood of a successful challenge to ZANU-PF dominance. Deep divisions within the MDC over strategy, tactics, and leadership now threaten its continued existence as a viable political party. The coming period will be critical in assessing whether or not the MDC is able to recover its strength and unity at all.

Regulations to prevent the undue influence of economically privileged interests are inadequate in the face of government efforts to retain power. Political choices through multiple parties, regularly scheduled elections, and opportunities to campaign are reduced by restrictive laws that entrench the power of ZANU-PF elites. ZANU-PF officials have been given land and businesses seized from opposition supporters, the government has faced allegations of using food to buy votes, and government-trained and -supported youth militias intimidate opposition supporters and leaders. Groups opposed to the government, such as religious organizations, white farmers, and trade unions, are actively discriminated against. Individuals who support ZANU-PF are less likely to be subject to political and legal intimidation than those who support the MDC.

Supporters of the ZANU-PF are given preference in employment opportunities and are frequently rewarded with civil service jobs. One ZANU-PF government official reportedly told the heads of government-owned companies, "Make sure you implement party directives.... For as long as ZANU-PF is in power, make sure you serve it."

Parliament does debate legislation, allowing citizens the opportunity to become aware of impending changes. Individuals may walk into parliament to hear the debates, and the parliament's sessions are broadcast. Civic groups are allowed to comment on pending legislation, although the government does not act on views contrary to its policies.

The government has placed increasing legal restrictions on nongovernmental organizations. Both POSA and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) place limits on the abilities of individuals and NGOs to speak, associate, and assemble. In December 2004 the parliament approved the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Bill, which would ban foreign funding of Zimbabwean civic associations that deal with governance issues, require annual registration and the payment of fees, and prohibit foreign NGOs from engaging in the "promotion and protection of human rights and political governance issues." The act immediately drew the attention of domestic and international human rights groups. Individuals who publicly protested this law when it was under consideration were arrested. However, international outcry has apparently delayed President Mugabe's signing it into law.

The government exercises direct control on print and broadcast media. The state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) operates domestic radio and television stations. The government daily, The Herald, is widely seen as a mouthpiece of the Mugabe government. The AIPPA criminalizes the publication of false information. A government-controlled Media and Information Commission (MIC) regulates independent media by requiring the accreditation of journalists and media organizations.

In 2003 the government closed The Daily News, Zimbabwe's only independent daily newspaper, for failing to register with the MIC. Although the closure was overruled by the courts, The Daily News remains closed. Since 2003 the government has also closed The Daily News on Sunday, The Tribune, and The Weekly Times. The country now lacks an independent daily press.

The government uses security forces to enforce restrictive legislation against journalists. Journalists have been beaten, detained, deported, and threatened. In 2004 the Committee to Protect Journalists listed Zimbabwe as third on the list of the worst places in the world to be a journalist, just behind Cuba and Iraq.

Only state-controlled media are allowed to broadcast in Zimbabwe. An independent radio station was immediately shut down by police after it opened in 2000. The station then relocated to Britain and began beaming to Zimbabwe as SW Radio Africa in 2002. Shortly before the March 2005 parliamentarian elections, the Zimbabwean government allegedly began jamming the broadcast frequencies.

Zimbabweans use the internet to circumvent restrictions, but the government has attempted to hinder access. In November 2003, 14 people were arrested for circulating an e-mail message criticizing President Mugabe's economic policies and urging violent demonstrations and strikes to force him from power. The e-mail had not been intercepted electronically, but a paper copy had reportedly been given to police. In March 2004 the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional an intercept provision of a law that allowed government monitoring of telephone and internet communications. The state-owned telecommunications company subsequently began requiring internet service providers to monitor the content of customers' e-mails.

Cultural expression is protected provided it is not seen as antigovernment. A prominent musician known for his outspokenness against President Mugabe, Thomas Mapfumo, is banned from state-controlled media. He distributes his music by cassette. Artists also self-censor so as to avoid antagonizing the government, and many have left the country. The government verbally attacked an American film, The Interpreter, that many saw as anti-Mugabe. Nevertheless, the Zimbabwe Board of Censors approved the film, and it ran for two weeks in early July at Harare cinemas and is available on video.

Recommendations

  • The Public Order and Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act provisions must be amended to allow freedom of speech and association.
  • Mugabe should refuse to sign into law the restrictive Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Bill, approved in December 2004 by the parliament.
  • The government must take steps to ensure that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is completely politically independent by requiring that representation reflect a range of political parties, civic groups, and business leaders.
  • Voting procedures must be reformed to allow independent and unhampered verification of polling stations.
  • The government should allow private ownership of print and broadcast media and repeal all restrictive legislation against the media.

Civil Liberties – 2.45

Zimbabwe's constitution states that everyone in the country is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, "whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, colour, creed, or sex." Zimbabwe has also ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Constitutional provisions include sections that prohibit torture and inhuman or degrading punishment and guarantee protection from arbitrary search or entry. Later amendments, however, qualify these rights subject to "the interests of defense, public safety, public order, and public morality." In addition, "state of emergency" laws dating from the struggle for independence have been retained and employed to limit civil rights and liberties.

Zimbabwe has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This imposes a responsibility on Zimbabwe to enforce constitutional provisions that prohibit arbitrary arrest or detention even during times of domestic strife. Nevertheless, Amnesty International reports that members of the Central Intelligence Organization and the Zimbabwe Republic Police have tortured individuals seen as opposed to the government. On October 14, 2004, Philani Zamchiya, president of the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), stated that he had been kidnapped and assaulted by police. He escaped from a moving car. In February 2004, Lovemore Madhuku, Chairman of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), was beaten by police with batons and dumped on the outskirts of Harare during a peaceful demonstration near the parliament. Both individuals required hospitalization but no arrests for assault or kidnapping were made.

Government security forces and politically supported youth wings are responsible for most of these attacks. Training centers for ZANU-PF militia youth have been expanded. After graduation they are deployed to various parts of the country where they set up roadblocks, harass suspected MDC supporters (at times violently), and enforce government price controls. The police have not intervened in cases where they have observed attacks by the youth militia against civilians.

There are no protections against arbitrary arrest. High-profile individuals such as Morgan Tsvangirai have some due process, but less well-known political opponents are simply arrested and detained. Once arrested, they have no effective protection against long-term detention. In 2004 the government approved the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Bill, extending detention of those arrested for corruption or violating security laws from 48 hours to 21 days.

For those who are incarcerated, the conditions are poor. Former MDC MP Roy Bennett, who was convicted by the parliament and jailed for eight months for physically pushing Justice Minister Patrick Chimasa, described jail conditions as "hellish." He claims inmates were beaten on a daily basis and were not properly clothed. Bennett himself reported that he had to stand naked in front of prison guards, was given a prison uniform covered in human excrement, and lost over 60 pounds while in jail. He was never given the right to appeal the sentence.

Citizens lack effective means of petition and redress when their rights are violated. For example, a recent change in the Zimbabwe Citizenship Act requires dual citizens to renounce their foreign citizenship or lose their Zimbabwean citizenship. Zimbabweans who are not resident in the country for five years also lose their citizenship. This act clearly targets white Zimbabweans who hold British citizenship or South African residency status. This has also stripped the citizenship of black Zimbabweans who have historical roots in neighboring African countries. Black Africans now face deportation. Importantly, there are no legal means to appeal the changes in citizenship.

No widespread trafficking of women and children has been reported, although women may be transported to South Africa to work as prostitutes. In rural areas there are reports of girls being offered in compensation for interfamily disputes in accordance with traditional customs. Traditional practices such as polygamy and lobola, which is a mutual agreement of the price that the groom has to pay in order to marry the bride, remain legal.

Women hold seats in parliament, as government ministers, and at the local level. The ZANU-PF congress allots 30 percent of party positions and a fixed quota of the party's powerful Central Committee to women. In December 2004 President Mugabe appointed a woman, Joice Mujuru, as second vice-president. There is some speculation that she may succeed Mugabe when he eventually passes from the political scene.

Zimbabwe's official language is English, but the inhabitants speak approximately 20 languages. The majority speaks Shona, and the largest minority speaks Ndebele. Multilingualism is common. Although President Mugabe is a Shona speaker, legal discrimination against minority languages does not appear to occur. All major ethnic groups are represented in the government, although most belong to the Shona group. Mugabe's inner circle is increasingly drawn from the Zezeru subgroup of the Shonas.

Shortly after independence in 1980, tensions flared between the Shona and Ndebele speakers, leading to a low-level civil war in which thousands of Ndebeles were killed by government forces. Mugabe cited this conflict as a reason to keep in place a state of emergency, which allowed his government to detain people (in practice mostly Ndebele) without charge. Many Ndebeles in Matabeleland, which is an area of strong MDC support, argue that the government also discriminates against them in law and employment.

The issue of who is a Zimbabwean is contentious due to the country's colonial history. The constitution devotes an entire chapter to the topic. In the early years of independence Mugabe was careful to promote reconciliation among black and white Zimbabweans, but the government now discriminates against white Zimbabweans. Justifications for land seizures are made on explicitly racist grounds. White Zimbabweans have no right to their farms because they are white, the government argues, and therefore gained the land illegally. Black Zimbabweans whose origins were in neighboring African countries have likewise been politically disenfranchised without due process.

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the government generally protects this right. The majority of the Zimbabwean population is Christian, primarily Protestant. Many Christians also practice traditional African religious rites. Muslims make up less than 2 percent of the population. The Witchcraft Suppression Act provides criminal penalties for those who practice witchcraft. This law has been supported by human rights groups because it protects women accused of employing sorcery to cause harm, a serious charge in Africa. Relations have become increasingly strained between the government and churches, which the government believes are supporting the opposition MDC. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo Pius Ncube, a prominent critic of the government, denies that he supports the opposition. Ncube has received death threats but has not been arrested. There is little evidence of systematic and severe government interference in the appointment of religious leaders or the internal organization of churches, but religious leaders who do not hold Zimbabwean citizenship and are deemed opponents of the Mugabe government have been expelled.

The government allows religious instruction. One-third of the schools in the country are Christian. In addition, Christian hospitals are a major source of affordable medical care for many Zimbabweans. The government permits limited religious broadcasting over state-owned television and advertising in the government-controlled press. Public religious gatherings, however, may be restricted under POSA. For example, on 29 September 2004, nine members of a women's organization, Women of Zimbabwe Arise, were arrested and detained for two days for praying in public at Harare's Africa Unity Square. Three of the women claim that they were assaulted at the Harare Central Police Station by plain-clothes officers. When the women later appeared in court, no charges were presented by the government, and they were released.

There is strong social and religious disapproval of homosexuality in Zimbabwe. In the past President Mugabe has publicly called homosexuality "un-African" and essentially a European import. Thus, practicing homosexual relations is illegal and a punishable offense.

The Disabled Persons Act was passed in 1994 for the purpose of "enhancing the educational, social and occupational interests of Zimbabweans with disabilities." In 2004, the government allocated a supplemental US$1.1 million to the National Disability Board (NDB), an advisory government policy body, to better meet the needs of the disabled. Problems have been reported concerning delivery of funds and services to the intended beneficiaries. In September 2005 the parliament approved an amendment to the Zimbabwean constitution that makes discrimination impermissible based on physical disability.

The constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and association, but specific clauses abrogate these rights in the interest of safety, order, and morality. Rights are further limited by legislation such as POSA. The MDC claims that police may refuse to allow a meeting on the basis that they do not have sufficient manpower to provide security. The government selectively applies this restriction to the MDC, not to ZANU-PF.

The Labor Relations Act allows private-sector workers to form and operate unions. Unions register with the ministry of public services, labor, and social welfare. An umbrella organization, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), comprises approximately 30 individual unions. Morgan Tsvangirai began his political activism as secretary-general of the ZCTU, and the government views that organization as being aligned with the MDC. The government has attempted to suppress the ZCTU through harassment, intimidation, and violence. In November 2005, the entire ZCTU leadership was arrested ahead of a planned march and protest in favor of better working conditions and on belhalf of people living with HIV/AID. The government started a rival and progovernment union, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), to undermine the ZCTU.

Zimbabweans are not directly compelled by the state to belong to any association. There are, however, widespread reports that a member of the ZANU-PF will get food while opposition supporters will not. Zimbabwe is currently facing food shortages due to the seizure of farms and drought. Emergency food aid is controlled by the government.

Since 2002, the government has not used excessive force against meetings provided they meet POSA regulations. The government often uses a catch-and-release policy for public protests that do not comply with POSA regulations. In October 2005, for example, opposition MDC MP Gilbert Shoko and 16 of his supporters protested Zimbabwe's fuel shortage by walking to work. The police arrested them under POSA, but all were later released.

Recommendations

  • The government must repeal the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Bill, which extends detention of those arrested for corruption or violating security laws from 48 hours to 21 days.
  • The citizenship law should be amended to reinstate citizenship for Zimbabweans who have lived in the country for a relatively long period of time and to allow citizens to keep dual nationality.
  • The government must cease using war veterans, youth militia, police, and security services to intimidate, beat, and detain civilians.
  • Independent groups must have unfettered access to jails and prisoners to verify that conditions are consistent with constitutional provisions against torture and inhuman or degrading punishment.

Rule of Law – 1.26

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary and authorizes the president to appoint judges to the courts. Senior judges must have legal training, be experienced with Roman-Dutch law, and be fluent in English.

President Mugabe has increased executive control over the judiciary, which has nevertheless retained some independence. In 2004, for example, Zimbabwean judge Sandra Mungwira acquitted six MDC activists accused of murdering Cain Nkala, a ZANU-PF party official. After a nine-month trial, the judge called police evidence unreliable. Furthermore, the judge stated that police had assaulted the accused, denied them medical treatment for the resultant injuries, deprived them of food, and refused them proper legal assistance.

Judges have resigned after the government stated it could not guarantee their security; newly appointed judges show greater deference. An accused citizen may receive a fair trial, but judicial vacancies means that trials lack timeliness. Of the nearly 40 cases filed by the Movement for Democratic Change after the 2002 elections, none has been heard. Enias Magate, the head of the Magistrates Association of Zimbabwe, stated in October 2005 that many judges were experiencing financial distress due to relatively low pay. A number of judges have been charged with corruption.

Under the constitution every person charged with a criminal offense is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. Citizens have a right to independent counsel. In practice, however, the government has not allowed access to counsel for some individuals detained. In high-profile cases, like the two treason trials of Morgan Tsvangirai from February 2003 through August 2005, the accused did have access to counsel. He was defended by George Bizos, who defended Nelson Mandela in his treason trial in the 1960s. In criminal cases, an indigent defendant may request legal assistance, but this is rarely granted. Zimbabweans are, however, provided an interpreter at state expense.

The erosion of the independence of the judiciary also has the effect of strengthening the political control of prosecutors. Welshman Ncube, a former University of Zimbabwe law school professor and MDC leader, argues that prosecutors are intimidated by the government and fear losing their jobs.

From Mugabe on down, the political culture fosters lack of accountability to the electorate. This is reflected in periodic amnesties for government members accused of wrongdoing. The illegal seizure of land has been a ripe opportunity for political leaders to abuse their power in obtaining property. While Mugabe has periodically reiterated his support of the "one man one farm policy," no senior official has returned any land – and many own more than one farm. Public officials and ruling party leaders are not prosecuted for wrongdoing unless they run afoul of Mugabe. In February 2004, for example, James Makamba, a wealthy businessman and senior ZANU-PF member, was accused of contravening foreign exchange laws and charged with corruption under the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Bill. A court dismissed all charges, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on appeal. The Zimbabwean press speculated that Makamba's close personal relationship with Mugabe's wife had become a cause of concern for the president and was the reason for the charges. Makamba reportedly fled the country in 2005.

Overall, security and military forces are accountable to the government but not to civilians. The police and security forces act on the orders of the president. Furthermore, the government has not condemned the harassment, torture, detention, and killing of Zimbabweans by these forces. The government has been careful to provide for the needs of the senior members of the military, as in large measure Mugabe's continued rule depends on their support. Top officials owe their positions to Mugabe and have received land and other benefits for their loyalty. The result of this codependence is an increasingly militaristic regime. Within the military, senior officers support the ruling ZANU-PF.

Zimbabwe allows for the private ownership of property through individual or corporate ownership but does not respect and enforce property rights. Any remaining avenues for seeking legal redress for the seizure of white-owned farms were ended with government approval of a constitutional amendment in 2005 that disallowed all appeals for the return of seized land. In the past two years government officials have sent mixed signals on whether or not land may actually be owned or perhaps leased from the government. Government land minister John Nkomo, in a discussion on land seizures in June 2004, stated that eventually there would be no private land in Zimbabwe. The government soon retreated, stating that no change had taken place in land policies regarding private property. Nevertheless, the government seems to be indicating that mineral resources should be state-owned. In 2004 President Mugabe stated, "we cannot recognize absolute ownership of our resources."

Since 2004 the government has continued seizures of land, particularly commercial farms owned by white Zimbabweans. In December 2003 the government amended the Land Acquisitions Act permitting it to acquire large agribusinesses. Four months later, the large Kondozi farm in eastern Zimbabwe was seized by the government, which evicted more than 1,500 farm workers and their families. In December 2004 the government passed a law prohibiting farmers whose land had been seized from claiming their equipment. This law was aimed at seizing tractors needed for commercial farming. Five individuals were subsequently charged with smuggling farm equipment into neighboring Zambia. A number of white farmers have relocated to that country.

In 2005 land seizures occurred for the first time in urban areas. Between May and July 2005 the government destroyed tens of thousands of shanty dwellings and street stalls in a Harare suburb. The informal settlements had been built on land previously seized from white farmers. The government stated that the purpose of the land clearance was to clean Harare of its slums and reduce crime. The area was not generally considered an opposition stronghold as many ZANU-PF supporters had settled there, so independent observers differ on whether the government actions also had underlying political and economic motivations. Demolitions of township settlements were not limited to Harare but also occurred in Bulawayo, the second-largest city, and throughout the country.

A report compiled by the UN Secretary-General's special envoy Anna Tibaijuka, who conducted a fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe, estimates that the government's Operation Murambatsvina (variously translated Operation Restore Hope or Operation Clear the Filth) left approximately 700,000 people homeless. Around 2.4 million people – some 18 percent of the population – have been affected directly or indirectly by the land clearance. Human rights organizations report that evicted residents were frequently beaten by police and moved to rural areas; some residents were also arbitrarily arrested, detained, and fined during the forced evictions. Human Rights Watch reports that Operation Murambatsvina has disproportionately affected women, children, foreign-born persons, and people with HIV/AIDS, who are the more vulnerable groups in society. The government refused subsequent United Nations offers to erect temporary tents or more permanent homes, claiming they were un-African.

Recommendations

  • The government must strengthen the independence of the judiciary through guarantees of security, increased pay, and appointment of qualified judges who are not politically biased in favor of ZANU-PF.
  • All forced evictions and destruction of lawful enterprises must end.
  • Just and timely legal procedures must be provided for those displaced to seek legal redress for loss of property. This includes the repeal of the 2005 constitutional amendment that permits the confiscation of land without legal recourse.
  • Domestic and international organizations must be allowed access to populations under duress for food assessment, emergency relief, and long-term development.

Anticorruption and Transparency – 0.88

Since independence the government has pursued import-substitution policies, shielding the country from imports through price controls, tariffs, and licensing. These licenses allowed profitable rent-seeking opportunities for ruling-party supporters. The government also purchased private companies as a way to boost black employment prospects. The government borrowed money to finance ailing state-owned corporations, fund social programs, and increase the size of the military. Unable to repay, Zimbabwe was cut off from private capital and sought funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which attached conditions to its loans.

For the past two years the IMF has warned Zimbabwe that its failure to pay past arrears on previous loans would lead to its expulsion from the organization. A last-minute payment in September 2005 averted expulsion, but there was uncertainty over the source of foreign exchange used to make this payment. The IMF subsequently announced it would visit Zimbabwe to investigate the source of the funds.

The IMF reports some recent progress in government reduction of price controls but notes that the Grain Marketing Board has not been dismantled. The Zimbabwean government has been addressing the differences between the official and black market exchange rates in two ways: police crackdown and deregulation. In 2005 Operation No Going Back enforced a ban on street vendors and black marketers in the cities. In Harare, for example, police announced the arrest of 134 people for allegedly dealing in foreign currency. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in October 2005 deregulated the foreign exchange market, which led to rapid depreciation in the value of the Zimbabwean dollar. Official rates were approximately 56,000 to the dollar, as compared to about 5,000 to the dollar in the prior year. Black market rates for the Zimbabwean dollar as of late 2005 were approximately 90,000 to 100,000 to the U.S. dollar. Inflation is increasing rapidly. In September the inflation rate had jumped to 360 percent from an annual rate of 265 percent the previous month.

The seizure of commercial farms has caused farm employment to tumble, throwing hundreds of thousands out of work and leading to food shortages. International donors estimate that up to half the population needs food aid, a figure the government disputes. Foreign exchange earnings, heavily dependent on agricultural exports, have collapsed, leading to shortages of hard currency. In the past year the government also has demolished thousands of informal businesses as part of both Operation No Going Back and Operation Clear the Filth. According to the IMF, these informal businesses arose as a result of excessive state regulation. The government is now considering taking control of the mining industry. As a result of political turmoil and poor economic policies Zimbabwe's economy has contracted in each of the past eight years. Not coincidentally, Zimbabwe has experienced emigration to neighboring states and Britain. Population figures from the 2002 census show an unexplained shortfall of about 2.5 million people out of a population of 11.6 million. While some of the population loss may be attributed to the negative impact of the AIDS pandemic on life expectancies, other countries have confirmed large influxes of Zimbabweans.

The primary interest of the Mugabe government is to retain power through a system of patronage that includes access to both state and private assets. The ruling ZANU-PF party owns a wide range of businesses, allowing party elites to profit personally. ZANU-PF refuses to open the books on these companies. Private farmland confiscated from former owners has been redistributed to party leaders. The government discloses few financial details that would make its operations more transparent and help avoid any possible conflict of interest on the part of public officials. The assets of some public officials – large houses and properties – would suggest income beyond a government salary, but no financial disclosures are available to assess whether the assets were obtained in a lawful or unlawful manner.

The Zimbabwean government does not currently have an effective legislative or administrative process that promotes integrity and punishes corruption. The result is relatively high levels of corruption. Political leaders are occasionally prosecuted for corruption, but this seems related to political intrigues within the ruling circles. In mid-2004, for example, the government began a corruption probe into the commercial operations of ZANU-PF. Former army officer General Solomon Mujuru focused his attention on parliamentary Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa, who as secretary for administration was seen as responsible for ZANU-PF finances. Many political observers, however, speculated that the real reason for the investigation was to sideline Mnangagwa from possible presidential ambitions as a successor to Mugabe. In Transparency International's 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Zimbabwe scored 2.6 out of a possible top score of 10.

The deteriorating economy has negatively affected education in Zimbabwe. Pay for lecturers has lagged, increasing the opportunities for corruption and graft through the taking of bribes for admission and grades. School enrollment has fallen to less than 60 percent as Zimbabweans are increasingly unable to afford school fees. Private schools that attempted to increase their fees in response to the spiraling inflation rate were branded racist by Mugabe. Many were closed. State schools, however, were allowed to raise their rates between 200 and 2,000 percent.

It is not clear whether the government and the tax administrator operate effective internal audit systems to ensure accountability of expenditure and tax collection. Given the relatively high levels of corruption in the government, lower level officials have ample incentives for both graft and its concealment. Investigative and auditing bodies do exist, but they are hampered by political pressure. Furthermore, the details of the investigative process are not always transparent.

Allegations of corruption are given wide but biased attention in the state-owned news media if it serves government interests. The lack of government transparency and an independent media make it difficult to detect cases of procurement corruption, bribes, and kickbacks. Mugabe's nephew, for example, was accused in October 2005 of illegally smuggling 30 tons of flour to neighboring Mozambique in 2003. Leo Mugabe, a ZANU-PF MP, and his wife were charged with contravening the Grain Marketing Board Act and the Customs and Excise Duty Act. His case, which received prominent coverage in the media, was eventually dropped for lack of evidence.

Although anticorruption legislation and mechanisms exist through the Prevention of Corruption Act, the legal environment is generally not supportive of investigators seeking to report cases of bribery and corruption. Cases of alleged corruption have often not been pursued by the police. A 10 percent reward for whistle-blowers for recovery of funds has been stymied in bureaucracy and has merely made detection of corrupt officials more difficult.

There is a degree of legal, regulatory, and judicial transparency. The budget and other kinds of information are published. The budget is presented to parliament for questioning and approval. However, the executive has, in the past, provided figures on expected revenues and expenses that were inaccurate. No independent parliamentary audit body exists to analyze the executive's budget figures and assumptions. As Mugabe's ZANU-PF party holds a majority in the parliament, approval is normal. AIPPA allows the government to restrict access to information held by public bodies. The Defense Procurement Act allows the government to withhold important financial records from the public. The cost of the purchase of military and related equipment from China in 2004, for example, was not disclosed.

The Procurement Act makes collusion among government contractors and providers of goods or services illegal. The president can, however, limit the act as his discretion. The government's State Procurement Board is required to invite bids from both local and international entities, but foreign firms and governments have complained of an alleged lack of transparency and fairness in the process. In some cases, contracts have been awarded to local suppliers with higher bids than foreign firms.

The European Union, the United States, and Great Britain have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe due to a number of Mugabe's policies, including his controversial land seizures, economic policies, flawed elections, and prior military intervention in Congo-Kinshasa. At this time Zimbabwe receives no foreign assistance from these states and organizations except for emergency food aid. Allegations of bias in the government's distribution of international food aid are widespread; the state denies that it politicizes the aid by giving preference to political supporters. Zimbabwe is facing severe famine due to the collapse of the farming sector through commercial farm land seizures and a drought.

Recommendations

  • The government should disband the Grain Marketing Board so as to allow market forces to boost production without opportunities for rent-seeking behavior by politically well-connected individuals.
  • ZANU-PF must be divested of its corporations, and the government should privatize state-owned companies.
  • Anticorruption protocols of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) must be implemented.
  • All budget items – including defense-related expenditures – must be published and verified by an outside auditor who is free from political influence.
  • Official statements of public income and net worth should be published for all elected and high-level appointed officials. Submitting deliberately inaccurate statements should be a criminal offense.

Author

Robert B. Lloyd is a Professor of International Relations at Pepperdine University in Malibu, California. His primary research interests are international conflict management, international negotiation, and Africa.

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