Twenty-five Applications v. United Kingdom

East African Asians

Twenty-five applications against the United Kingdom

Decision of 10 October 1970

THE FACTS

Whereas the facts relating to the twenty-five applications may be summarised as follows:

Of thirty-five applications pending before the Commission, six were adjourned and four cases were struck off the Commission's list before the hearing began. A full note on the proceedings before the Commission on all the thirty-five cases is included in an appendix.

All twenty-five applicants are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or British protected persons. They are all holders of United Kingdom passports. They were resident in Kenya or Uganda but, being Asian and not being citizens of Kenya or Uganda, their continued residence there became increasingly difficult, and, in some cases, illegal.

They therefore sought to settle in Britain, but, under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, they were refused admission to the United Kingdom or, if admitted, were not granted permission to remain permanently.

Twenty-two of the applicants (all applications except Nos 4423/70, 4478/70 and 4486/70) who had attempted to enter the United Kingdom from Kenya stated in applications to the Commission that they were in detention in England, and expected to be expelled from the country soon; the Kenyan authorities, however, would not allow them back into Kenya. The applicants invoked Articles 3 and 14 and in some cases Article 8 of the Convention. All the applicants were subsequently released from detention and were admitted to the United Kingdom for three months, and in most cases this period was subsequently extended.

In Application No. 4423/70, the first applicant, having been admitted from Uganda as a visitor to the United Kingdom, married the second applicant who was entitled to remain there, but was himself refused permission to remain permanently in the United Kingdom. He stated that he would be unable to establish his family life in Uganda, and alleged violations inter alia, of Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the Convention. Subsequently, he was given permission to stay permanently in the United Kingdom, but pursued his claim for damages.

In Applications Nos. 4478/70, and 4486/70, two applicants resident in Uganda alleged that they were not being allowed to join their families in the United Kingdom and invoked Article 8 of the Convention. Both applicants subsequently entered the United Kingdom.

The detailed complaints of the applicants, as amended in the course of written observations and submissions by their representatives at the hearing, are set out below.

Whereas, in regard to each individual application, the facts which are apparently not disputed may be summarised as follows:

Application No. 4403/70: the applicant, Mr. S. M. L. Patel, was born in Kenya on 24 July 1951 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 24 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 9 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 9 June 1970. On 1 May 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a further period of three months, which expired on 9 September 1970.

Application No. 4404/70: the applicant, Mr. S. L. Vara, was born in Kenya on 25 November 1951 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 24 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and on 6 February 1970 was put on board a ship at Dover and was returned to France. On arrival at Calais he was refused admission into France and was sent back to Dover. He was again detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 10 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months,. which expired on 10 June 1970. On 18 June 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a further period of three months, which expired on 10 September 1970. On 8 September he applied for a further extension which was granted until 10 March 1971.

Application No. 4405/70: the applicant, Mr. C. M. Patel, was born in Kenya on 5 January 1935 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 27 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 11 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 11 June 1970. On 1 June 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a further period of three months, which expired on 11 September 1970.

Application No. 4406/70: the applicant, Mr. K. C. Fatania, was born in Kenya on 4 January 1950 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 24 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 9 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 9 June 1970. On 27 April 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a further period of three months, which expired on 9 September 1970.

Application No. 4407/70: the applicant, Mr. N. M. Pandit, was born in Tanganyika on 10 October 1952, is the holder of a United Kingdom passport, and is accepted as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 24 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and on 6 February 1970 was put on board a ship at Dover and returned to France. On arrival at Calais he was refused admission into France, and was sent back to Dover. He was again detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 10 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 10 June 1970. On 18 June 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of nine months, which is due to expire on 10 March 1971.

Application No. 4408/70: the applicant, Mr. V. K. Patel, was born in Kenya on 27 January 1952 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 24 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 6 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 6 June 1970. On 3 June 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of none months, which is due to expire on 6 March 1971.

Application No. 4409/70: the applicant, Mr. H. V. Shah, was born in Kenya on 18 December 1954 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at London Airport on 24 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 9 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 9 June 1970. On 10 July 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of nine months, which is due to expire on 9 March 1971.

Application No. 4410/70: the applicant, Mr. N. D. Shah, was born in Kenya on 23 October 1949, and is a British protected person (having been born in that part of Kenya which was a British protectorate) and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 27 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 10 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 10 June 1970.

Application No. 4411/70: the applicant, Mr. L. Rawal, was born in Kenya on 1:6 February 1948, and is a British protected person (having been born in that part of Kenya which was a British protectorate) and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 8 February 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 13 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 13 June 1970. On 12 June 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of three months, which expired on 13 September 1970. On 11 September he applied for a further extension, which was granted until 13 March 1971.

Application No. 4412/70: the applicant, Mr. M. W. K. Shah, was born in Kenya on 22 February 1951 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 27 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 11 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 11 June 1970. On 5 May 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of nine months, which is due to expire on 11 March 1971.

Application No. 4413/70: the applicant, Mr. A. N. M. Shah, was born in Kenya on 29 June 1951 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 24 January 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 6 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 6 June 1970. On 26 June 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of nine months, which is due to expire on 6 March 1971.

Application No. 4414/70: the applicant, Mr. H. K. Gurjar, was born in Kenya on 26 December 1950 and is a British protected person (having been born in that part of Kenya which was a British protectorate) and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 3 February 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 12 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 12 June 1970. On 10 June 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of three months, which expired on 12 September 1970.

Application No. 4415/70: the applicant, Mr. L. N. Crovind, was born in Kenya on 9 July 1949 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 3 February 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1:962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and was released on 12 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months which expired on 12 June 1970. On 14 May 1970 he applied for an extension, and this was granted for a period of three months which expired on 12 September 1970.

Application No. 4416/70: the applicant, Mr. R. M. Shah, was born in Kenya on 17 May 1943 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Heathrow Airport on 14 February 1970, accompanied by his wife, and also by two, brothers (Applications Nos. 4417/70 and 4418/70). He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1:968 on the ground that the immigration officer was not satisfied, after questioning him, that he was a genuine visitor. He was detained in the detention suite at Heathrow Airport and released on 23 February 1970. On that date he and his wife were admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 23 May 1970, on condition that he should not engage in any business, profession or occupation for reward.

Application No. 4417/70: the applicant, Mr. J. M. Shah, was born in Kenya on 1 May 1954, and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Heathrow Airport on 14 February 1970 accompanied by two brothers (Applications Nos. 4416/70 and 4418/ 70) and a sister-in-law. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the grounds that he was not in possession of a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act and that, although he was under the age of sixteen, both his parents were residing outside the United Kingdom. He was detained in the detention suite at Heathrow Airport and released on 23 February 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 23 May 1970, on condition that he should not engage in any business, profession or occupation for reward.

Application No. 4418/70: the applicant, Mr. A. M. Shah, was born in Kenya on 3 May 1951 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Heathrow Airport on 14 February 1970, accompanied by two brothers (Applications Nos. 4416/70 and 4417/70) and a sister-in-law. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that the immigration officer was not satisfied, after questioning him, that his primary purpose in seeking admission was to attend a course of studies, and he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in the detention suite at Heathrow Airport and released on 23 February 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 23 May 1970, on condition that he should not engage in any business, profession or occupation for reward. On 4 August 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of six months which is due to expire on 4 February 1971, subject to the same condition.

Application No. 4419/70: the applicant, Mr. J. G. S. Thakar, was born in Kenya on 15 November 1950 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Heathrow Airport on 8 February 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Ashford Remand Centre and released 19 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months which expired on 19 June 1970. On 9 June 1970 he applied for an extension but his application was still outstanding pending receipt of his passport.

Application No. 4422/70: the applicant, Mr. D. S. N. Bhuta, was born in Kenya on 25 June 1949 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 27 January 1970. He was refused admission under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in Canterbury Prison and released on 11 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months which expired on 11 June 1970. On 14 May 1970 he applied for an extension and this granted for a period of three months which expired on 11 September 1970.

Application No. 4423/70: the applicants, Mr. And Mrs. R.K. Dhunna, were born in Kenya on 13 March 1947 and 4 December 1947 respectively, and are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and holders of United Kingdom passports.

The first applicant came to the United Kingdom on 18 January 1969 and was admitted as a visitor for six months in order to visit his younger brother and mother who were already resident in United Kingdom. The first applicant's younger brother had emigrated to the United Kingdom on 11 February 1968, before the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 came into force on 1 March 1968; his widowed mother arrived in the United Kingdom on 27 July 1968, when she was admitted to live there as his brother's dependant.

On 16 June 1969 the first applicant married the second applicant, Miss Rajinder Kumari Karwal; she had entered the United Kingdom on 27 February 1968 and was entitled to permanent residence there. A child of the marriage was expected in May 1970.

On 1 July 1969 the first applicant applied for permission to remain permanently in the United Kingdom. Permission was at refused, on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher, but the period of stay was extended until 30 August and subsequently to 31 October 1969, 30 November 1969, and 1 July 1970. Finally, by a letter dated 24 April 1970, the applicant's solicitors were informed that he was now free to remain permanently in the United Kingdom.

Application No. 4434/70: the applicant, Mr. M. R. Patel, was born in India in 1914 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (having been registered as such in 1953) and the holder of a Unit Kingdom passport (issued in Nairobi in 1964). He arrived in the United Kingdom at Dover on 8 February 1970, accompanied by his adult son. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. On 9 February 1970 he was put on board a ship and was returned to Ostend. On 14 February 1970, he sought to enter the United Kingdom at Heathrow Airport, again accompanied by his son. He was again refused admission on the same grounds as before. He was detained in the detention suite at Heathrow Airport and on 18 February 1970 was removed to Pentonville Prison. He was released on 23 February 1970 and on that date admitted into the Unit Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 23 May 1970, on condition that he should not engage in any employment in any business, profession or occupation for reward. On 6 August 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period which is due to expire on 31 March 1971.

Application No. 4443/70: the applicant, Mr. P. J. Shah, was born in India on 9 November 1945 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (having been registered as such in Kenya in 1954) and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the Unit Kingdom at Heathrow Airport on 28 February 1970. He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that the immigration officer was not satisfied, after questioning him, that his primary purpose in seeking admission was to attend a course of studies, and he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He detained in the detention suite at Heathrow Airport and released 3 March 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 3 June 1970, condition that he should not engage in any business, profession occupation for reward. On 3 April 1970 he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of three months, which expired 3 September 1970, subject to the same condition. On 28 July 1970 he applied for a further extension which was granted for a further period, due to expire on 3 April 1971, again subject to the same condition.

Application No. 4476/70: the applicant, Miss C. S. S. Barot, was born in Kenya on 16 September 1951 and is a British protected person (having been born in that part of Kenya which was a British protectorate) and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. She arrived in the United Kingdom at Heathrow Airport at 00.30 hours on 20 February 1970, accompanied by her cousin (Application No. 4477/70). She was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that she was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. She was detained in the detention suite at Heathrow Airport and released later the same day. She was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 20 May 1970, on condition that she should not engage in any employment or in any business, profession or occupation for reward. On 1 May 1970, she applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of three months, which expired on 20 August 1970, and the condition prohibiting her from taking employment was revoked.

Application No. 4477/70: the applicant, Mr. B. M. Barot, was born in Kenya on 2 June 1950 and is a British protected person (having been born in that part of Kenya which was a British protectorate) and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. He arrived in the United Kingdom at Heathrow Airport at 00. 30 hours on 20 February 1970, accompanied by his cousin (Application No. 4476/70). He was refused admission to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in the detention suite at Heathrow Airport and released later the same day. He was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 20 May 1970, on condition that he should not engage in any employment or in any business, profession or occupation for reward. On 1 May 1970, he applied for an extension and this was granted for a period of three months, which expired on 20 August 1970, and the condition prohibiting him from taking employment was revoked.

Application No. 4486/70: the applicant, Mr. C. P. Patel, was born in India on 5 March 1922 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (having been registered as such in Kenya in 1953) and the holder of a United Kingdom passport. His wife, who is exempt from control under the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, entered the United Kingdom on 1 February 1969 and is resident, with their six children, in the United Kingdom. He applied to the British High Commission in Kampala, Uganda, for a special voucher and was interviewed on 11 July 1969. It was not found possible to issue him with a special voucher at that time, and he was accordingly placed on the waiting list. On 14 April 1970 he applied to the British High Commission in Kampala for an entry certificate for the purpose of visiting the United Kingdom. This application was refused on the ground that the Entry Certificate Officer was not satisfied that the applicant was intending to enter the United Kingdom Solely for the purpose of a visit. Subsequently to making his application to the Commission, he left Uganda and on 4 June 1970 he sought to enter the United Kingdom at Newhaven. He was refused admission under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 on the ground that he was not in possession of an employment voucher or a special voucher which may be issued to persons subject to control by the amended Act. He was detained in police cells at Newhaven from 23.59 hours on 4 June until 18.00 hours on 5 June when he was sent back to Dieppe. On 11 June he sought to enter the United Kingdom at Folkestone. He Was refused admission into the United Kingdom on the same grounds as before. He was detained in Canterbury Prison until 14 June when he was sent back by air to Entebbe, Uganda. The Ugandan authorities refused to re-admit him to Uganda and he was therefore returned to the United Kingdom. He arrived at Heathrow Airport on 16 June and was again refused admission into the United Kingdom on the same grounds as before. He was detained in Pentonville Prison and released on 26 June 1970. On that date he was admitted into the United Kingdom for a period of three months, which expired on 26 September 1970.

COMPLAINTS OF THE APPLICANTS

I.          The complaints of all the applicants except Mr. and Mrs. R. K. Dhunna (Application No. 4423/70) were set out in the supplementary observations in reply as follows:

1.         The applicants, being citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or British protected persons, and holders of United Kingdom passports, were refused admission to the United Kingdom, although, as the British authorities were aware, they would not have been allowed to return to the country which they had left and there was no other country in the world which they were entitled to enter. It was alleged that, in these circumstances, the refusal of admission to the United Kingdom amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and contravened that Article.

2.         By this refusal, the applicants were denied the right to carry on their family life and maintain their homes in the only country which they were citizens. It was alleged that this refusal of admission constituted a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

3.         It was further alleged that the effect of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 is to discriminate against certain citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies on the ground of race or colour, and that the Act therefore contravenes Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8.

At the hearing in October it was further submitted on behalf of the applicants that their treatment under the 1968 Act infringed their right to security of the person under Article 5 of the Convention.

II.

1.         The representatives of the applicants Mr. and Mrs. R.K. Dhunna (Application No. 4423/70) alleged in their application to the Commission:

(i)            Violation of the applicants' right under Article 8 to respect their family life;

(ii)            Violation of the applicants' right under Article 12 to marry and to found a family.

(iii)            Violation of the applicants' right under Article 14 to be secured without discrimination on the ground of race, colour, national origin, association with a national minority, birth or other status, in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention;

(iv)            Violation of their right under Article 13 to an effective remedy before a national authority in respect of the aforesaid violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention;

(v)            Violation of their right under Article 1 to have secured to them within the United Kingdom the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Convention.

2.         The objects of the claim as stated in Application No. 4423/70 were:

(a)            to obtain permission for the applicants to live together as husband and wife and to found a family in the United Kingdom;

(b)            to obtain an effective remedy before a national authority in respect of the violations of the Convention set forth above including any necessary amendment of existing English law; and

(c)            to obtain damages.

3.         In their observations dated 8 June 1970 in reply to the observations of the respondent Government, the applicants accepted that the object of the claim with regard to Paragraph (a) had been achieved as a result of the decision taken by the United Kingdom Government, and communicated to the applicants' solicitors on 24 April 1970, to revoke the condition limiting the first applicant's stay in the United Kingdom. The applicants therefore amended their claim so as to limit it to paragraphs (b) and (c) above, together with payment of all costs and expenses incurred by the applicants in securing permission from the United Kingdom Government to live together as husband and wife and to found a family in the United Kingdom.

4.         At the hearing the representatives of these applicants adopted the submissions made on behalf of the other applicants in respect of the allegations of degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

I

The respondent Government first set out the background and the law and practice relating to the immigration into the United Kingdom of Commonwealth citizens.

The respondent Government stated that the entry into the United Kingdom of Commonwealth citizens was first regulated by Part I of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. Part I of the 1962 Act, however, did not apply to, inter alia, persons born in the United Kingdom or persons who held a United Kingdom passport and were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies^[1] and accordingly the entry into the United Kingdom of persons in those categories was not subject to any restriction as a consequence of the enactment of that Act.

There are large numbers of persons overseas who acquired the status of citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies through connection (birth, registration or naturalisation there) with a territory which was formerly a British Dependency, and who retained that connection when the Dependency became independent. This most commonly occurred when the newly independent country did not automatically extend its citizenship to all those ordinarily resident or even born in its territory, but - as was the case in both Kenya and Uganda - confined automatic citizenship to those citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies resident in the territory who were born there and had a parent born there. A substantial body of persons who were born and resident in Kenya and Uganda were, prior to independence, citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of their connection with those former Dependencies, but their local connection was, at the most, a first generation connection: in many cases their parents had been born in what is now India or Pakistan. Such persons did not therefore automatically acquire local citizenship at independence. Moreover, although these persons were entitled under Kenya and Uganda law to obtain local citizenship within a limited period following independence, the majority of them chose not to exercise that right. They therefore remain citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Prior to independence such persons Would ordinarily have held passports issued by, or on behalf of, the Dependency (not United Kingdom passports); they were therefore persons to whom Part I of the 1962 Act applied and were subject to immigration control. Such passports could, ex hypothesi, no longer be issued after a Dependency became independent and accordingly such persons became eligible for United Kingdom passports; if they obtained a United Kingdom passport from a British High Commission, they were entitled to enter the United Kingdom free of any restriction imposed by the 1962 Act.

The introduction by the East African Governments of policies of Africanisation - which were designed to give preference to their citizens in certain areas of trade and employment and, in due course, to require the departure of people who were not local citizens and whose right to work or trade there had, consequently, been withdrawn - resulted in a considerable increase in the numbers entering the United Kingdom for permanent settlement of persons whose citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies arose through their connection with former East African Dependencies. From 1965, when the number of such entrants from East Africa was approximately 6,150 passport holders, the number rose in 1967 to 13,600.

It was outside the capacity of the United Kingdom to absorb immediately this sharply increased number of immigrants, most of whom had no previous connection with the United Kingdom such as might have facilitated their integration into the life of the community, and, indeed, whose only connection with the United Kingdom was a citizenship derived from an association with a former Dependency. In 1968, therefore, it became necessary to regulate the rate at which such immigrants entered the United Kingdom.

The method which the United Kingdom adopted for this purpose was the adaptation of the machinery of the 1962 Act to cover citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who had no previous substantial connection with the United Kingdom, and the re-imposing of immigration control on citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who, by reason of former Dependency passports, had been persons to whom Part I of the 1962 Act applied. The 1962 Act was amended accordingly by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968.

Under section 1 of the 1962 Act (following its amendment in 1968) Part I of the 1962 Act applies to a Commonwealth citizen (including a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies) who is not:

(a)        a person born in the United Kingdom;

(b)        a person who holds a United Kingdom passport and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and fulfils one of the "specified" conditions (described in the following paragraph) or who holds such a passport issued in the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland; or

(c)        a person included in the passport of another person who is excepted under (a) and (b) above.

The "specified" conditions are those which indicate a substantial connection with the United Kingdom and, as set out in section 1 (2A) of the 1962 Act (as amended), they require that the person concerned or at least one of his parents or grandparents:

(a)        was born in the United Kingdom, or

(b)        was naturalised in the United Kingdom, or

(c)        became a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of being adopted in the United Kingdom, or

(d)        became such a citizen by being registered under Part II of the British Nationality Act 1948 or under the British Nationality Act 1964, either in the United Kingdom or in a country which, on the date on which he was so registered, was one of the countries mentioned in section 1 (3) of the said Act of 1948 as it had effect on that date. The reference to the last mentioned country would exclude, e.g. persons who became citizens by such registration in Kenya, Tanganyika or Uganda before those countries became independent.

Under sections 2 and 3 of the 1962 Act, as amended by the 1968 Act and by section 20 (2) of the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, an immigration officer may, on the examination of a person to whom Part I of the Act applies and who seeks to enter the United Kingdom, refuse him admission into the United Kingdom unless he satisfies the immigration officer that he belongs to one of the following categories of persons:

(a)        a person who is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom or was so resident at any time within the past two years;

(b)        a person who wishes to enter the United Kingdom for the purposes of employment there and holds a current employment voucher issued by the Department of Employment and Productivity;

(c)        a person who wishes to enter the United Kingdom for the purpose of attending a course of study at any university, college, school or other institution in the United Kingdom, being a course which will occupy the whole or a substantial part of his time;

(d)        a person who is in a position to support himself and his dependants, if any, in the United Kingdom otherwise than by taking employment or engaging for reward in any business, profession or other occupation;

(e)        a person under the age of sixteen:

(i)         who has at least one parent who is a Commonwealth citizen; and

(ii)      both of whose parents are resident in the United Kingdom, or both are entering or seeking to enter the United Kingdom with him, or one of whom is resident in the United Kingdom and the other is entering or seeking to enter the United Kingdom with him; and

(iii)        who holds a current entry certificate issued under section 20 (3) of the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, i.e. a certificate which evidences fulfilment by the person concerned of the requirements of the 1962 Act (as amended).

Those who satisfy the immigration officer that they fall within one of these categories have a legal right to enter the United Kingdom.

In addition there are certain other specified categories of persons (referred to in the following paragraph) with regard to whom the Home Secretary has issued instructions to immigration officers concerning their admission to the United Kingdom. These various categories, and the action to be taken by immigration officers, are described in a document issued in February 1970 by the Home Office, and laid before Parliament, entitled "Instructions to Immigration Officers" (Cmnd. 4298). Although these instructions were not in all cases those in force at the material time, they are substantially the same as those which were then in force.

The respondent Government submit that they did not intend nor do they intend that those citizens whose citizenship arose through this connection with former East African Dependencies should be permanently prevented from entering into and settling in the United Kingdom. The purpose of the 1968 Act was, and continues to be, to regulate the flow of entry into the United Kingdom of this category of persons at a level which the United Kingdom is capable of absorbing at any one time. In order to implement this policy a system was established, when the 1968 Act came into force, whereby a special allocation of vouchers was made available to those citizens brought under immigration control by that Act. These special vouchers are separate from, and additional to the employment vouchers referred to above. The total annual allocation of special vouchers is 1,500. The holder of a special voucher is included in the Instructions to Immigration Officers as one of the categories of persons which immigration officials are instructed by the Home Secretary to admit into the United Kingdom. Where a special voucher is issued to the head of a family, it entitles him, with his wife and dependent children, to enter the United Kingdom for permanent settlement.

Application by a United Kingdom passport holder in East Africa for a special voucher may be made at the appropriate British High Commission and vouchers are issued, in accordance with a system of priorities, to those applicants who are in the greatest immediate need of them. No application by an eligible applicant, for a special voucher is refused, but, because at present the number of applications for special vouchers exceeds the number available, the issue of a voucher to a particular person may be delayed. Every application is, however, reviewed at regular intervals to ensure that any change in personal circumstances is taken into account in assessing priorities.

In relation to Application No. 4423/70, the respondent Government further stated that a Commonwealth citizen who is admitted to the United Kingdom as a visitor for a specified period may apply, under paragraph 2 (5) of the First Schedule to the 1962 Act, for the condition governing the period of his stay in the United Kingdom to be varied so as to extend the period of stay, or to be revoked so as to permit him to remain permanently. The Home Secretary has made rules governing the control of Commonwealth immigrants after entry into the United Kingdom. These rules are embodied in a document issued in February 1970 by the Home Office and laid before Parliament, entitled "Commonwealth Citizens: Control after Entry - Immigration Rules". Paragraph 24 of those Rules provides, so far as is relevant to this application, as follows:

"If a man who was admitted as a visitor or student, or in some other temporary capacity, marries a woman who is resident in the United Kingdom, he is not on that account to be granted an extension of stay or any other variation of conditions to enable him to settle here unless refusal would be undesirable because of the degree of hardship which, in the particular circumstances of the case, would be caused if the woman had to live outside the United Kingdom in order to be with her husband after marriage."

In relation to Applications Nos. 4478/70 and 4486/70, the respondent Government further stated that, in addition to the vouchers or entry certificates for which a Commonwealth citizen may make application, a Commonwealth citizen whose wife is resident in the United Kingdom, may apply to the appropriate High Commission for an entry certificate entitling him to enter the United Kingdom for the purpose of joining his wife. Paragraph 41 of the Instructions to Immigration Officers provides, so far as is relevant to these applications, as follows:

"The fact that his wife was born or is resident in the United Kingdom does not in itself give a man a claim to settlement without an employment voucher. A Commonwealth citizen whose sole claim to settlement is in right of his wife should be admitted only if he has an entry certificate endorsed 'Joining wife". The Secretary of State will authorise the issue of an entry certificate for this purpose only if he is satisfied that there are special considerations, whether of a family nature or otherwise, which render exclusion undesirable; for example, because of a degree of hardship which, in the particular circumstances of the case, would be caused if the wife had to live outside the United Kingdom in order to be with her husband."

The submissions made on behalf of the applicants in reply to the above observations of the respondent Government can be summarised as follows:

When Kenya and Uganda became independent, on 12 December 1963 and 9 October 1962, respectively, provision had to be made for minorities, in particular, for Europeans and Asians born in those countries who did not automatically acquire citizenship of the newly independent States. In each country they were given a choice: either to apply for local citizenship within two years of independence; or to remain citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies; if they did not acquire local citizenship, they retained their citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies.

One reason why a large number of those entitled to do so did not apply for local citizenship was that, by retaining their citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies after independence, they also had the right to enter the United Kingdom at any time, free of the restrictions imposed by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. They regarded this unrestricted right of entry into the United. Kingdom as an important safeguard of their future position, and they regarded the United Kingdom Government as committed to preserve that right. It was submitted on behalf of the applicants that the United Kingdom Government also considered themselves to be so committed; a number of former Ministers had made statements to this effect shortly before the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, which took away this right.

As late as 15 February 1968, a week before the 1968 legislation was introduced in Parliament by the Government, the Minister of State at the Home Office, in resisting proposals for such legislation, stated in Parliament that legislation to remove from these people the freedom from operation of the 1962 Act would make them stateless, and might well mean that they would have a British passport but that the only place they could not come to on that passport would be Britain.

II.          As to the applicants' complaints that they were refused admission to the United Kingdom, or permission to remain there permanently

The submissions of the respondent Government can be summarised as follows:

1.            Generally

The respondent Government submitted that the Convention does not accord any right for an individual to enter or reside within the territory of a State of which he is a national. In support of this submission they referred the Commission to its decision in the case of De Becker, Application No. 214/56, where the Commission said (at p. 32 of its Report):

''… whereas the right of an individual to reside within the territory of his own State is not as such guaranteed under any of the provisions of the Convention".

The absence of such a right in the Convention is also attested by the existence of the Fourth Protocol to the Convention, which has not been ratified by the United Kingdom.

The preamble to the Fourth Protocol states its object as being "to ensure the collective enforcement of certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in Section I of the Convention and in Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol."

Article 3 (2) of the Fourth Protocol provides that "No-one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national".

The Convention cannot be so construed as to guarantee a right against a particular State which not only is not included in terms in the Convention but is specifically provided for in a Protocol to which that State is not a party. So to construe the Convention would have the effect of seeking to impose upon the United Kingdom an obligation which it had not assumed.

2.         Under Article 3

The respondent Government submitted, with regard to certain of the applications, that the refusal to admit, and the removal from the United Kingdom of, a person who presented himself for entry (well knowing that according to the law of the United Kingdom he had no right of immediate entry and that he would probably be refused admission) could not constitute a violation of Article 3.

Article 3 is directed at the prevention of physical or mental maltreatment and suffering, and it cannot reasonably be extended to a refusal of entry in the exercise of powers conferred for the purpose of controlling immigration. No such treatment as is contemplated by the plain meaning of Article 3 is alleged either to be implicit in, or to be a possible consequence (whether within the United Kingdom or elsewhere) of, a refusal of entry into, or a requirement of removal from, the United Kingdom.

With regard to the four cases where the applicants had been removed from the United Kingdom (Nos. 4404/70, 4407/70, 4434/70 and 4486/70), it could not be said that to send a person to a country where it was uncertain that he had a right to stay could amount, in these circumstances, to inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3. The Commission had considered under Article 3 cases of deportation where there was a possibility of an applicant being subjected to inhuman treatment in the country to which he was to be deported. In the present applications, however, there was nothing to show any danger of inhuman treatment; the worst that the applicants faced, in being sent back to France or to Belgium, was the possibility of being refused admission.

Admittedly, if a person were sent repeatedly backwards and forwards between different countries, so that he became like a shuttlecock between their immigration authorities, that might ultimately raise a question under Article 3; but no such question arose in any of the present applications, in three of which (4404/70, 4407/70 and 4434/70) there had been one refusal of entry and admission after the second attempt and, in the fourth, the applicant had been sent first back to Dieppe and then by air to Uganda.

Further, it could not amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 to deprive persons of the right to enter the State of which they were nationals. If the right of entry was in this way already covered by the Convention, Article 3 (2) of the Fourth Protocol would have been wholly unnecessary. Nor could it be degrading treatment if the result was to render them stateless or virtually stateless. If that were the case, the only purpose of Article 3 (2) of the Fourth Protocol would be to protect persons with dual nationality, since all other persons would be protected by Article 3 of the Convention.

3.         Under Article 5

With regard to the right to security of the person guaranteed by Article 5 of the Convention, the respondent Government submitted that the term "security" must be taken to refer solely to physical security of the person. The word must be interpreted in the context of Article 5 taken as a whole, which is limited to protection from physical interference. The purpose of adding "security" was to show that actual imprisonment was not necessary, but there must be interference with the physical security of the person.

The submissions made on behalf of the applicants maybe summarised as follows:

1.            Generally

The applicants as citizens of the United Kingdom an Colonies owed allegiance to, and enjoyed protection from, the Crown. There was a continuous legal bond between them and the United Kingdom.

The applicants were not aliens, nor did they have a separate nationality within the Commonwealth. They were citizens and had both the privileges and the obligations of a citizen. These obligations applied not merely to someone born in the Commonwealth but to anyone who applied for and obtained a British passport.

In the case of Joyce versus the Director of Public Prosecutions ([1946] Appeal Cases 347), it was held that an alien abroad holding a British passport enjoys the protection of the Crown and, if he adheres to the King's enemies, he. is guilty of treason, so long as he has not renounced that protection.

The effect of the decision was that someone who was not a British subject, but who had applied for and had obtained a British passport, assumed the rights and undertook the obligations of a British citizen. The effect of the 1968 Act on the East African Asians was to preserve their obligations as citizens since, if any of them were to commit an act of treason anywhere in the world, he would be liable to prosecution in precisely the same way as Willian Joyce and would still be liable to the same penalty; on the other hand, the Act had taken away their rights as citizens. In the result, the applicants had been treated as second-class citizens.

2.         Under Article 3

The Commission had never yet attempted to define what was meant by the word "degrading". It had considered torture and inhuman treatment but not degrading treatment. "Degrading" had been defined, in a similar context, as "lowering in rank, position, reputation or character"; degrading treatment was treatment which is lowering in the eyes of other people or yourself. If not only the Act of 1968, and the various actions taken under it, were considered, but also the history and the circumstances in which the Act came to be passed, the treatment of the applicants clearly came within the definition of "degrading". To take away the rights of citizens and to make them stateless amounted to degradation. All the applicants had been allowed to remain in the United Kingdom only on a temporary basis, for a limited period, in most cases having been imprisoned or detained, in four cases having been shuttled to and fro. None of the applicants knew what would happen to them when their period expired and, except No. 4423/70, they did not know even now. They were left throughout in a state of complete uncertainty as to where they might live, and where they might go. In this respect also, they were analogous to stateless persons.

3.         Under Article 5

The words "security of person" in Article 5 had apparently not yet been construed by the Commission and the Court but, applying the ordinary rules of construction, they must go further than physical liberty of the person.

If, for example, a person in a country of Eastern Europe was living in perpetual fear of arrest by the secret police, if he had reason to dread what was known as the knock on the door at 3 o'clock in the morning, that person had no security, even though he was not actually deprived of his liberty. Article 5 must therefore be given a wider meaning so as to guarantee the right to some form of assurance as to the future.

If someone was living from month to month not knowing what his future would be, not knowing whether he would be allowed to remain in the United Kingdom at the expiration of his three months' permit, not knowing whether he might be shuttled back either to somewhere in Europe or to the country from which he came which may not re-admit him on his return, then he was effectively deprived of personal security.

III.         As to the complaints of interference with family life

The submissions of the respondent Government can be summarised as follows:

In the first place, a number of applicants had invoked Article 8 of the Convention, and had alleged interference with family life, but had given no particulars of the members of their family concerned in the United Kingdom. In no case could the facts known to the Government, or asserted by the applicant to the immigration authorities, be said to show such a link with a member or members of his family in the United Kingdom as could reasonably be considered to establish family life within the meaning of Article 8.

In relation to Applications Nos. 4416/70, 4417/70 and 4418/70

The respondent Government submitted that in these three cases, where a man arrived in the United Kingdom accompanied by his wife and his two brothers, there could be no suggestion that there had not been respect for family life. They had been detained together in the detention suite at Heathrow Airport, where there was no segregation of the sexes. They were detained at the same time, released at the same time, and had at no time been separated.

In relation to Application No. 4423/70 (Mr. and Mrs. R. K. Dhunna)

The respondent Government submitted that, since Mrs. Dhunna had become qualified by residence for permanent settlement in the United Kingdom, and since Mr. Dhunna has obtained permission to reside permanently in the United Kingdom, the complaints of the applicants under Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention in relation to permission for them to reside permanently as husband and wife, and to found a family, in the United Kingdom have lost whatever pertinence they may have had and the applicants cannot be considered as victims within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention. The respondent Government referred, in support of this proposition, to the decision of the Commission in Application No. 986/61 (X. v. Federal Republic of Germany), Collection of Decisions, Vol. 9, P. 23, in which the Commission said (at p. 26):

''… whereas, in pursuance of Article 25 (1) of the Convention, the Commission may only receive an individual application where the Applicant claims that he is a victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention; whereas, as a result of the decision of the Federal Court, these complaints appear to have lost their pertinence for the purpose of the present Application and whereas in these circumstances the Applicant has failed to show in what manner he may now be considered to be the victim of the alleged misadministration of justice; whereas these complaints are therefore incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, in particular, with the provisions of Article 25 governing the conditions under which the Commission may receive an application from an individual; whereas it follows that this part of the Application must be rejected in accordance with Art. 27 (2) Of the Convention;…"

The respondent Government further submitted that Mr. Dhunna came to the United Kingdom as a single man, unaware of the existence of his future wife, as a visitor on a visitor's pass. Having arrived in the United Kingdom, he married a short time before his pass was due to expire. He knew when he married that he would require permission to stay in England, and he had at that time, and still had at the date of his application to the Commission, a valid reentry pass which would entitle him to return to Uganda.

Moreover, no steps had been taking to remove Mr. Dhunna from the United Kingdom and merely to inform him that he was required to leave the United Kingdom could not amount to a violation of the Convention. Before he could have been removed, he would have had to be convicted and prosecuted, and a deportation order made and carried out. While the right to respect for family life protected by Art. 8 might in certain circumstances be infringed, although where there was no actual separation of husband and wife, that Article could not be extended to include cases where there was merely anxiety at the possibility of a future separation.

With regard to the applicants' claim for damages, the respondent Government reiterate that, at the time when their application was lodged, the applicants had married in, and were residing in, the United Kingdom. Mrs. Dhunna was qualified for permanent residence and the period during which Mr. Dhunna was authorised to stay in the United Kingdom had already been extended. That extended period had not expired when Mr. Dhunna obtained permission to reside permanently in the United Kingdom. Not only did his expected removal from the United Kingdom not take place: there was also, for the reasons already indicated, no violation of the Convention in this case. Since no event had occurred on which any claim to a remedy under the Convention can properly be based, there could be no valid claim to damages.

In relation to Applications Nos. 4478/70 (P. G. Chandarana) and 4486/70 (C. P. Patel)

The respondent Government submitted that there had equally been no breach of Art. 8 in these two cases, in each of which the applicant's wife had entered the United Kingdom as of right but the applicant himself had not at first been permitted to join her. The respondent Government contended, first, that where a. person has no right to enter or remain in a particular country, he cannot obtain such a right by having his wife change her residence to that country and then invoking Art. 8 of the Convention.

The respondent Government further submitted that the place of residence of a family is normally the place of residence of the husband and that, insofar as Art. 8 safeguards a right for husband and wife to live together permanently in any particular place, it does not safeguard such a right at a place other than the place of residence of the husband or at a place where he is entitled to be.

Furthermore, the separation of the applicants from their wives (and of C. P. Patel from his family) had not been brought about by any action of the respondent Government. In application No. 4478/70 (P. G. Chandarana), it took place on the applicant's wife leaving Uganda at a time when the applicant was fully aware that, following his application for a special voucher in November 1969, he had been placed on the waiting list for the issue of vouchers and that his application had not yet been granted. In Application No. 4486/70 (C. P. Patel), the separation took place on the applicant's wife leaving Uganda before her entry into the United Kingdom in February 1969. The respondent Government submitted that, in each case, the separation of the applicant from his wife has been caused by the voluntary action of the applicant or that of his wife. Their separation is, accordingly, not attributable to, nor the responsibility of, the United Kingdom Government. In support of this submission, the respondent Government referred to the Commission's decision in Application No. 1477/62 (X. v. Belgium), Yearbook VI, p. 620 and 628.

The submissions of the applicants can be summarised as follows:

Family life is necessarily based upon the home. Without a home, either temporary or permanent, there could be nothing in the nature of family life. It was impossible for any of the applicants, whether his family was in the United Kingdom or in the country from which he came, to establish a home, and it was thus impossible for him to establish his family life because he had no idea where he was going to be or what was going to happen to him, or what he would be able to do in three months' time.

On Application No. 4423/70 (Mr. and Mrs. R. K. Dhunna)

The rights guaranteed by Art. 8 and 12 of the Convention protect the spiritual, emotional, psychological and physical. integrity of close members of the family, both as regards their relationship and their residence, against unjustifiable interference or disturbance.

Both applicant's rights had been violated at the date of their application to the Commission, and in consequence they have suffered not only material loss but spiritual, emotional and psychological inquiry in their family and married life; the applicants were therefore victims of violations of the Convention, and were entitled to be awarded damages.

During the period between 4 August 1969 and 24 April 1970, the first applicant remained continuously under a threat of expulsion from the United Kingdom and of permanent separation from his wife and family. As a result the applicants both suffered considerable, emotional distress, together with the indignity of being treated less favourably than other citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies solely on the ground of their race, colour, national origin, association with a national minority, birth or other status. The applicants have also incurred various losses, costs and expenses in seeking to secure permission from the United Kingdom Government to live together as husband and wife and to found a family in the United Kingdom. The approximate sum involved could be submitted to the Commission.

Furthermore, every administrative act taken by the authorities and having legal consequences constituted a violation of the Convention. It made no difference, therefore, that the decision that first applicant should leave the country was never in fact enforced.

IV.        As to the complaints of discrimination

The respondent Government first submitted, with regard to allegation of a violation of Art. 14, that that Article is confined its operation to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. The respondent Government referred, in support of this proposition, to the decision of the Commission in Application No. 808/60 (Isop. v. Austria), Yearbook V, p. 108, in which the Commission concluded (p. 124):

"whereas in regard to the complaint that the said refusal constituted a violation of Art. 14 of the Convention, it is to be observed that that Article, by its express terms, forbids discrimination only with regard to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Convention; and whereas the Commission has already held above that such right is not violated in the present case; whereas it follows that Art. 14 of the Convention has no application in the circumstances of the present case."

Since the Convention does not accord to a national any right entry or residence within the territory of his State, it followed that Art. 14 has no relevance in relation to any claim to such a right. If, as the respondent Government submitted, the applicants failed to disclose any semblance of a violation of the rights and freedoms secured by Art. 3, it followed that Art. 14 had no application to any claim based on that Article.

Further, and without prejudice to their above submissions, the respondent Government denied that there was discrimination in the guarantee of the rights secured by Art. 3 of the Convention. In relation to the content of that Article, the applicants had at all times enjoyed the same rights and had been afforded the same protection by law as each and every other person seeking to reside, or residing in the United Kingdom.

The group of three members of the Commission who examined the question of admissibility of certain of the applications had referred to Art. 14 taken in conjunction with Art. 5 (1) (f). The respondent Government assumed that the group of three members of the Commission had here in mind the situation where a person, who is detained to present his effecting an unauthorised entry into a country, may have grounds for alleging a breach of the Convention if he can establish that a person of a different race or colour or national or social origin would not have been detained in similar circumstances. The above submissions applied equally in this respect. Detention the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry into a country forms a necessary and accepted, part of immigration control and in United Kingdom is exercised, without discrimination, with respect to all persons subject to immigration control whatever their colour or racial background. The respondent Government drew the attention of the Commission to paragraph 1 of the Instructions to Immigration Officers which expressly requires immigration officers to carry out their duties without regard to the race, colour or religion of Commonwealth citizens who may seek to enter the country.

The respondent Government accepted that, if the United Kingdom had been bound by the Fourth Protocol, the 1968 Act was Act which had discriminatory effects and which had discriminatory intent, and that, if this issue ever became relevant, the Government would have to justify that discrimination.

It was submitted on behalf of the applicants that the effect the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 was to discriminate against them on the ground of race or colour in their enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, in particular in Art. 3 and 8.

The main object of the 1968 Act, and its main effect, was to exclude from the United Kingdom citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies from East Africa who were of Asian origin. Under that Act, a person was exempt from entry control only if he himself, or one of his parents or grandparents, was born, naturalised, adopted registrated as such a citizen within the United Kingdom; or, in the case of registration, in certain other countries excluding the former East African dependencies. Only in the exceptional case would Asian fall within these categories; and only in the exceptional case would someone of British stock fall outside them. The great majority of Europeans in East Africa either themselves had been born in the United Kingdom, or had parents or grandparents born there.

The legislation meant in effect that all Europeans, at any rate far as they came from the United Kingdom, would be able to return without any difficulty, while it excluded practically the whole of Asian population.

Questions of discrimination of this kind had frequently been considered in the courts of the Commonwealth and of the United States. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had held series of Commonwealth cases that it was necessary to look not just at the words of the statute but at what is called the "pith and substance" of the Act and at the circumstances in which it is passed (see for example Attorney-General for Alberta versus Attorney-General of Canada, [1939] Appeal Cases 117; Ladore v. Bennett [1939] Appeal Cases 468; and Pillai, v. Mudayanake [1953] Appeal Cases 514)

In the United States the courts had considered the so-called "grandfather clause". Under the 15^th Amendment to the United States Constitution States were prohibited from passing legislation to discriminate in the franchise, in particular to disfranchise Negro voters. The "grandfather clause" sought to get round this provision by imposing a literacy test before a person could vote, but exempting from the literary test anyone whose grandfather had been entitled to vote. The effect of this would be that a white voter would be able to vote because his grandfather could vote, while a Negro voter would not be able to vote because his grandfather would have been a slave. The United States Supreme Court had held, in Guinn v. Beal (1915) 238 U.S., that such a clause was contrary to the 15^th Amendment, which guaranteed the right to vote without distinction of race, colour or previous condition of servitude.

V.         As to the exhaustion of domestic remedies

The submissions of the respondent Government can be summarised as follows:

The respondent Government submitted, first, that in the case all applications except 4423/70 no decision had yet been taken as whether or not the applicant was to be permitted to remain permanently in the United Kingdom. It was therefore premature to give consideration to the possible consequences of a decision to the effect that the applicant would not be admitted for permanent settlement in the United Kingdom. The respondent Government accordingly submitted that those applications were, in the absence of a final decision, inadmissible under Art. 26 of the Convention.

By letter Of 2 July 1970 the respondent Government referred certain legislative provisions recently made by the United Kingdom Government. The Government stated that "The Immigration Appeals Act 1969 provides, inter alia, for the establishment of system of appeals against the exercise by the Secretary of State officers subordinate to him of their powers in respect of the admission into the United Kingdom of persons who are subject to control under the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts 1962 and 1968. The 1969 Act is pot yet fully in operation, but the Immigration Appeals Act 1969 (Commencement No. 2) Order 1970, which was made 21 May 1970, provided for the coming into operation of a number provisions of the Act as from 1 July 1970. Among those which a thus now in force is section 3 (1) (c) which provides for a right appeal against a refusal to revoke or vary a condition of admission.

"Accordingly, any person who has been admitted to the United Kingdom subject to a condition can, on and, after 1 July, and so long as the condition remains in force, apply for that condition to be revoked or varied (for example, by an extension of a condition restricting the period for which he may remain in the United Kingdom), and, if his application is refused, can then appeal. The appeal goes to an adjudicator from whom there is the possibility of a further appeal, under section 7 of the Act, to an Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Except as provided for by section 9 (which deals with cases involving national security), section 8 of the Act provides the decision of the adjudicator or, as the case may be, the Tribunal is binding.

"Without prejudice to the submissions which the United Kingdom Government have already made, in their observations on the admissibility of the above cases, concerning the relevance of Art. 13 of the Convention to any of those cases, the existence of this right of appeal could, in the submission of the United Kingdom Government, be regarded as providing an effective remedy before a national authority such as is required by that Article.

"Further, and again without prejudice to the submissions which they have already made, the United Kingdom Government would, if necessary, be prepared to submit that, unless and until this right of appeal has, in any relevant case, been invoked and pursued to its final stage and the appeal is then dismissed, it cannot be said that there has been a final decision in the matter for the purposes of Art. 26 of the Convention or that all domestic remedies have been exhausted as required by the same Article, and they would therefore be prepared to submit that the application concerned should be rejected as inadmissible under Art. 27 (3)."

The respondent Government further submitted that, in the event of an applicant remaining in the United Kingdom after the expiry of the period for which he had been admitted, he could not be removed from the United Kingdom without proceedings being taken before the courts or without the possibility of an appeal to the adjudicators and tribunals established under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969.

First, under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, an immigrant would have to be prosecuted for remaining in the United Kingdom in breach of the condition which was attached to his entry. If he were convicted, the court had the power, under the Act, to recommend that a deportation order be made in respect of him; but the court could not make such a recommendation unless he had been given seven days' notice of the possibility of that recommendation being made. If a recommendation were made, the Home Secretary might make a deportation order; but such an order could not be made until the immigrant had had an opportunity to appeal against the recommendation, or against the conviction upon which it made. If the Home Secretary did make a deportation order, he could always defer or revoke it.

Secondly, under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, if an immigrant was in breach of an entry condition, prosecution was no longer necessary before a deportation order could be made against him; but an order could not be made until he had had an opportunity to appeal to an adjudicator and, in some cases, to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal.

Finally, the Government submitted that, by reason of the system of prerogative orders, the High Court had a supervisory jurisdiction over the immigration officers and, in certain circumstances, over proceedings, brought under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, so that such proceedings could be tested, for example, for breach of the rules of natural justice.

The submissions made on behalf of the applicants can be summarised as follows:

The complaints of the applicants were of degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 3, and also of breaches of Arts. 5, 8 an 14. The various refusals to admit the applicants, and the circumstances in which they occurred, amounted already at that time to degrading treatment. It made no difference, therefore, that at a later stage under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, they had a right of appeal on a different issue. If, for example, a person said that he had been tortured while he was in prison, it would make no difference that at a later date he had been released from prison and had a remedy on some other issue.

As for the possibility of applying to the High Court under the system of prerogative orders for the purpose of testing the legality of the kind of action which had been taken in the present cases, it was unlikely that such an application would be successful. The only duty of an immigration officer in these cases was to act fairly (see Re K. (H.) (an infant) [1967] 1 All England Reports 226 at p. 231 and 233). So long as the officer listened fairly to the immigrant, he was acting according to his statutory duties, and there was really no way in which his action could be effectively challenged. In the cases, there was no suggestion that the immigration officers had refused to listen to the applicants, or in any way acted improperly. They acted as they were bound to act under the 1968 legislation. The complaint was that the 1968 legislation should not have conferred such powers on the immigration officers; but there was no remedy against the legislation itself.

THE LAW

I.          As to the applicants' complaints that they were refused admission to the United Kingdom, or permission to remain there permanently

Whereas the applicants complained that the United Kingdom authorities refused to admit them to the United Kingdom, or to allow them to remain there permanently, when they were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or of equivalent status, an holders of United Kingdom passports, and at a time when they had no other country to go to; whereas, as the respondent Government have submitted and the applicants have not disputed, no right to enter and reside in a particular country is as such guaranteed by the Convention; whereas Art. 3 (2) of the Fourth Protocol, which has not been ratified by the United Kingdom Government, provides that "No-one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national"; and whereas the aim of the Fourth Protocol, as stated in its preamble, is to ensure the collective enforcement of certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in Section I of the Convention and in Arts. 1 to 3 of the First Protocol; whereas it follows that no right for a person to enter, in particular, the territory of the State of which he is a national is as such guaranteed by the Convention or by the First Protocol;

Whereas, however, the applicants have alleged that their treatment by the United Kingdom authorities amounted, in all the circumstances to "degrading treatment" within the meaning of Art 3 of the Convention; in particular that, in refusing to admit them to the United Kingdom or to allow them to remain there permanently, the actions of the United Kingdom authorities amounted to treating them as "second-class citizens"; and whereas the applicants also alleged, in relation to Art. 14 of the Convention, that the law of the United Kingdom, and the practice of the United Kingdom authorities in the application of the law, discriminated against them, in respect of this treatment, inter alia on grounds of race;

Whereas the respondent Government have denied that the actions of the United Kingdom authorities could amount, in the circumstances, to degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 3 of the Convention; whereas, however, the respondent Government have admitted that the intention, and the effect, of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 were discriminatory; whereas they have not disputed that the object of the Act was to exclude more than a limited number of East African Asians from entering the United Kingdom, and, further, that the Act was directed against citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies resident in East Africa and being of Asian origin;

Whereas the respondent Government have submitted in this connection, first, that the 1968 Act did not amount to discrimination within the meaning of Art. 14 of the Convention, since it did not discriminate against the applicants in their enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, the right to enter and reside in a particular country not being such a right; and whereas the respondent Government have further submitted that, even if the law did constitute discrimination within the meaning of Art. 14, such discrimination could be justified;

Whereas, however, the Commission is of the opinion that, quite apart from any consideration of Article 14, discrimination based on race could, in certain circumstances, of itself amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 3 of the Convention; whereas the Commission considers that it is generally recognised that a special importance should be attached to discrimination based on race, and that publicly to single out a group of persons for differential treatment on the basis of race might, in certain circumstances, constitute a special form of affront to human dignity; whereas, therefore, differential treatment of a group of persons on the basis of race might be capable of constituting degrading treatment in circumstances where differential treatment on some other ground, such as language, would raise no such question;

Whereas the Commission has examined in this light both the provisions of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 in its historical context and the application of those provisions in each case before it, as they appear from the submissions of the parties;

Whereas the Commission notes that at the time of the independence of Kenya and Uganda, the applicants had the option of acquiring local citizenship, an option which had to be exercised within a period of two years, and that it was only after the expiry of this period that the applicants' right to enter the United Kingdom was removed by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968;

Whereas, with regard to the circumstances of each of the individual applicants, it appears not to be disputed by the parties that, in all applications except No. 4423/70, the applicants were, by the application of the above-mentioned legislation, and the administrative regulations and practices thereunder, initially refused admission to the United Kingdom; that all these applicants were subsequently, and in most cases after a period of detention, admitted for a limited period; that this period has in some cases been extended for a further limited period, but that none of the applicants yet knows whether he will be allowed to remain permanently in the United Kingdom;

that, in Application No. 4423/70, the first applicant, who had been permitted to enter the United Kingdom for a limited period, was repeatedly refused permission to remain there permanently; that he was granted further limited extensions to his period of stay, but remained for certain periods illegally in the United Kingdom while his application for permission to stay permanently was being further considered; that he was finally, and subsequently to his application to the Commission, given permission to remain permanently in the United Kingdom, although no additional reasons had been presented to the United Kingdom authorities;

Whereas the Commission has considered the remaining facts of each of the individual applications as these appear from the submissions of the parties; whereas the Commission finds, on the basis of this preliminary examination of the information and arguments submitted by the parties, that the complaints by each of the applicants (excluding the second applicant in Application No. 4423/70 concerning the actions of the United Kingdom authorities, raise issues of law and fact whose determination should depend upon an examination of the merits of the cases;

Whereas the applicants have also alleged that the actions of the United Kingdom authorities infringed. their right to "security of person" guaranteed by Art. 5 of the Convention; whereas the respondent Government contended that the expression "security of person", taken in the context of Art. 5, should be restricted to the notion of physical security; whereas, however, the question arises whether, in the context of Art. 5, the term should be given a wider interpretation so as to protect persons from, such arbitrary action on the part of the authorities as might disturb their daily life and whether Art. 5 thus guarantees, as the applicants have submitted, the right to some form of assurance as to the future; and whereas, in this connection, the applicants made further submissions as to the facts which the Commission has already considered in relation to the allegations of violations of Art. 3 of the Convention;

Whereas the Commission is of the opinion that it is not its function, at the stage of admissibility, finally to determine the issues which may arise on an examination of the merits, whereas the Commission has already found, in relation to Art. 3, that the complaints by each of the applicants (excluding the second applicant in Application No. 4423/70) concerning the actions of the United Kingdom authorities raise issues of law and fact whose determination should depend on an examination of the merits of the cases; whereas those same issues may be found to include questions arising under Art. 5 of the Convention insofar as that Article guarantees the right to security of person; whereas again the determination of any such questions should depend on an examination of the merits of the cases;

Whereas the same reasoning applies to the applicants' complaints that the effect of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 is to discriminate against them on the ground of race or colour, contrary to Art. 14 of the Convention; whereas this Article provides that "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status"; whereas the respondent Government have submitted that Art. 14 is confined in its operation to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, that the Convention does not accord to a national any right of entry or residence within the territory of his State, and that, in consequence, Art. 14 has no relevance in relation to any claim to such a right;

Whereas, however, the Commission has just found that the complaints of the applicants raise issues of law and fact, in relation to the rights and freedoms set forth in Arts. 3 and 5 of the Convention, whose determination should depend on the examination of the merits of the cases; and whereas in arriving at this finding the Commission has had special regard to the allegations of discrimination on grounds expressly included in Art. 14; whereas it follows that these issues may be found to include questions arising under Article 14 of the Convention;

Whereas, consequently, the applicants' complaints insofar as they raise issues under Arts. 3, 5 and 14 of the Convention cannot be declared manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art. 27 (2) of the Convention;

Whereas the Commission, in considering each of the applicants' complaints, also had regard to the question whether the applicants had exhausted all domestic remedies available to them, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, as is required under Art. 26 of the Convention; whereas the complaints are basically directed against the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 as applied to the applicants in accordance with the Act's own provisions; whereas the Commission is of the opinion that the only remedy which falls to be considered in this connection is the right of appeal conferred by the Immigration Appeals Act 1969; whereas, in particular, the Commission observes that there was otherwise no remedy available to the applicants against decisions of the competent administrative authorities lawfully taken under the powers conferred by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968;

Whereas, with regard to the remedies available under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, the respondent Government have submitted that, following the coming into operation of certain provisions of that Act on 1 July 1970, a person who has been admitted to the United Kingdom, subject to a condition restricting the period for which he may remain in the United Kingdom, can apply for that condition to be revoked or varied and, if. his application is refused, can appeal to an adjudicator and subsequently, under certain conditions, to an Immigration Appeal Tribunal;

Whereas, first, this right of appeal was not open ratione temporis in Application No. 4423/70, since the applicant Raj Kumar Dhunna was finally given permission before 1 July 1970 to remain permanently in the United Kingdom; whereas in all the other cases the applicants had, before 1 July 1970, no possibility of contesting the decisions of the authorities; and whereas, even after that date, the appeals system provided the applicants with no remedy in respect of their complaint that their treatment by the United Kingdom authorities under the legislation and administrative practice which is still in force amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning Art. 3 of the Convention;

Whereas the Commission has repeatedly stated that, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, remedies which do not offer a possibility of redressing the alleged damage cannot be regarded as effective or sufficient and there is therefore no need for them to be exhausted; whereas the Commission refers in this respect to its decision on the admissibility of Application No. 712/60, Retimag S. A. v. Federal Republic of Germany (Yearbook IV, pages 384, 400), and to its decision on the admissibility of Application No. 2614/65, Ringeisen v. Austria (Collection of Decisions, Vol. 27 pages 29, 54); whereas, therefore, insofar as the complaints of the applicants raise issues under Articles 3, 5 and 14 of the Convention, the Commission finds that there were no remedies available to the applicants which required to be exhausted; whereas it follows that the complaints under consideration cannot be rejected as inadmissible under Art. 26 of the Convention;

II.          As to the complaints of interference with family life

Whereas each of the applicants further alleged that the United Kingdom authorities had violated Art. 8 of the Convention which provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private family life, his home and his correspondence; and whereas the applicants also invoked, in this connection, Art. 14 of the Convention; whereas, however, in only six of the applications, viz. Nos. 4416/70 4417/70, 4418/70, 44723/70, 4478/70 and 4486/70, could the facts, as they appear from the submissions of the parties, give rise to question of a relationship constituting family life within the meaning of Art. 8 of the Convention; whereas the complaints of the remainder of the applicants do not disclose any family relationship which might in any way support a violation of Art. 8 of the Convention or of Art. 14 read in conjunction with Art. 8;

Whereas, in Applications Nos. 4416/70, 4417/70 and 4418/70, the treatment of these applicants by the immigration authorities cannot give rise to any question of interference with family life under Art. 8 of the Convention; whereas in these cases the members of a family, including husband and wife, were at no time separated but were detained together and were released together;

Whereas the applicants in Application No. 4423/70 have allege violations of their. right under Art. 8 to respect for their family life, of their right under Art. 12 to marry and to found a family and of their right under Art. 14 to be protected from discrimination in the enjoyment of these rights; whereas the Commission has considered in previous cases the question whether the expulsion of a married man from a State where he is living with his wife might involve violation of Art. 8 of the Convention; whereas the Commission has treated as a relevant factor in such cases the possibility for the wife to follow her husband (see e.g. Applications No. 2535/65 (X. v. Federal Republic of Germany), Collections of Decisions, Vol. 17, P. 28 whereas, however, it is doubtful in the present case whether the applicants would have been effectively able to establish their family life in Uganda;

Whereas, however, it is not necessary in the present case to consider this particular question further, since the decision of the authorities requiring the first applicant to leave the United Kingdom was never actually enforced, both applicants remained together in the United Kingdom throughout, and the said decision of the authorities was finally reversed; whereas, therefore, there was in fact no interference either with the applicants' family life or with their right to marry and to found a family in the United Kingdom; whereas it also follows that there is no question to be considered under Art. 14 of the Convention as regards their enjoyment of these rights; whereas the applicants' complaints do not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, and in particular in Arts. 8 and 12, or in Art. 14 read in conjunction with these Articles;

Whereas the Commission has also examined the submissions of the parties in Applications Nos. 4478/70 and 4486/70 under Arts. 8 and 14 of the Convention; whereas it appears from these submissions that Mr. P. G. Chandarana (4478/70) was refused permission to go to the United Kingdom to join his wife, who had lawfully entered the United Kingdom in March 1970; that he was subsequently admitted for a period of three months, and that this period was later extended but that he has not yet been given permission to remain permanently in the United Kingdom; and that Mr. C. P. Patel. (4486/70) was refused permission to go to the United Kingdom to join his wife, who had entered the United Kingdom lawfully with their six children in February 1969; on arrival in England in June 1970 he was three times refused admission, twice removed from the United Kingdom, and three times detained; he was subsequently admitted for a period of three months, but has not yet been given permission to remain permanently in the United Kingdom;

Whereas the Commission first considered ex officio the question whether all domestic remedies had been exhausted in respect of these complaints, as is required by Art. 26 of the Convention; whereas the Commission again finds that the only remedy which falls to be considered in this connection is the right of appeal conferred by the Immigration Appeals Act 1969; and whereas this right of appeal was not open ratione temporis to the applicants in these two cases, since the relevant provisions of the Act came into operation only on 1 July 1970, that is, after each applicant had been refused permission to join his wife; whereas, therefore, these complaints cannot be rejected as inadmissible under Arts. 26 and 27 (3) of the Convention;

Whereas the Commission has had regard to the submissions of the respondent Government on the substance of these complaints, and, in particular, to the respondent Government's submission that the place of residence of a family is normally the place of residence of the husband, and that Art. 8 does not safeguard any right for husband and wife to live together permanently in any place other than the place of residence of the husband or at a place where he is entitled to be; whereas, however, as the Commission has also observed in relation to Application No. 4423/70, it is doubtful whether these applicants would have been effectively able to establish their family life in Uganda;

Whereas the question therefore arises whether the action of the United Kingdom authorities in refusing the applicants P.G. Chandarana (4478/70) and C.P. Patel (4486/70) permission to enter the United Kingdom, having permitted their respective wives to enter and remain there, might be capable of constituting an interference with the right to respect for family life within the meaning of Art. 8 of the Convention, or raising an issue under Art. 14 in combination with Art. 8;

Whereas the Commission therefore finds, on the basis of its examination of the submissions of the parties, that the allegations by the applicants P.G. Chandarana (4478/70) and C.P. Patel (4486/70) of interference with the right to respect for family life also raise issues of law and fact whose determination should depend upon an examination of the merits of the cases; whereas the complaints of the applicants in these two cases cannot therefore be rejected under Art. 27 (2) of the Convention as being manifestly ill-founded; whereas, however, the complaints of the applicants in all the other cases under Art. 8 of the Convention, and under Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 8, and the complaints of the applicants Mr. And Mrs. Dhunna (No. 4423/70) under Arts. 12 and 14, must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded;

III.         As to the remaining issues

Whereas the Commission has considered ex officio whether any issue may have arisen under Art. 6 (1) of the Convention, in any case where the immigration authorities may have purported to determine a family relationship as the basis of a decision whether or no such issue having arisen on the facts as they have been presented, the Commission does not find in necessary to consider this question further;

Whereas the Commission does not find it necessary to consider, at the present stage of the applications, any issue which may arise under Art. I or under Art. 13 of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission

1.            declares admissible the complaints of all 25 applicants that they were refused admission to the united kingdom, or permission to remain there permanently, insofar as the complaints raise issues under articles 3, 5, and 14 of the convention;

2.            declares admissible the complaints of the applicants in nos. 4478/70 and 4486/70 of interference with family life insofar as the complaints raise issues under article 8 of the convention and under article 14 in conjunction with article 8;

3.            declares inadmissible the complaints of all other applicants of interference with family life made under article 8 or under article 14 in conjunction with article 8, and the complaints in no. 4423/70 under articles 12 and 14.

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^[1] Referring to those applicants, namely Mr. N. D. Shah (4410/70), Mr. L. Rawal (4411/70), Mr. H. K. Gurjar (4414/70), Miss C. S. S. Barot (4476/70) and Mr. B. M. Barot (4477/70), who were not citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies but British protected persons, the respondent Government stated that a British protected person is a person born, or whose father was born, in a British Protectorate, or who is the subject of a British Protected State. A British protected person is not a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies; in order to acquire that status he has to apply for naturalisation. However, by virtue of section 1 (4) of the 1962 Act,Part I of that Act applies to British protected persons as it applies to Commonwealth citizens, and these applicants, even though not citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, fall within a category the members of which are eligible to participate in the special voucher scheme described below.