The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

February 2016

This document provides information about the situation of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, including non-registered Palestinian refugees, undocumented (“non-ID”) Palestinians, and Palestine refugees from Syria, including the human rights and humanitarian situation and limitations in relation to refugees’ access to basic services and livelihoods, based on information provided by UNRWA and other available sources. This document is based on information available up to 23 February 2016.

I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................2

II. PALESTINE REFUGEES .....................................................4
   1. Legal Status.........................................................................4
   2. Freedom of Movement.......................................................4
   3. Travelling in and out of Lebanon ........................................5
   4. Access to Services .............................................................5
      a. Access to Employment and Livelihoods.............................5
      b. Property and Housing....................................................6
      c. Access to Healthcare........................................................8
      d. Access to Education........................................................9
      e. Women and Children.....................................................9
      f. Palestine Refugees with Specific Vulnerabilities...............10

III. NON-REGISTERED PALESTINIANS........................................10

IV. “NON-ID” PALESTINIANS....................................................10

V. PALESTINE REFUGEES FROM SYRIA IN LEBANON..................12
   1. Access to Territory ..........................................................12
   2. Legal Status ......................................................................13
   3. Civil Registration and Access to Documentation ..................14
   4. Restrictions on Freedom of Movement, Risk of Detention and Deportation ..........................15
   5. Access to Services .............................................................15
      a. Overview ......................................................................15
      b. Access to Employment and Livelihoods.............................16
      c. Housing .......................................................................16
      d. Access to Healthcare......................................................17
      e. Access to Education.......................................................17

VI. PALESTINE REFUGEE CAMPS.............................................17
   1. Security Conditions ..........................................................17
   2. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention ............................................18
   3. Palestinian Individuals in Conflict with Armed Factions ........19
   4. Nahr El-Bared Camp .........................................................19
   5. Rashidieh Camp ................................................................21
   6. Shatila Camp ....................................................................21
   7. Ein El-Hilweh Camp..........................................................22
I. INTRODUCTION

Based on their legal status and registration with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Palestinian refugees in Lebanon can be categorized into four groups:

- “Registered” refugees (“Palestine refugees”), which are registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities;
- “Non-registered” Palestinian refugees, which are not registered with UNRWA, but are registered with the Lebanese authorities;
- “Non-ID” Palestinian refugees, who are neither registered with UNRWA nor with the Lebanese authorities; and
- Palestine refugees from Syria, who have arrived in Lebanon since 2011.2

There are currently over 504,000 Palestinian Refugees registered by UNRWA in Lebanon.3 However, it is estimated that many are no longer present in the country. According to a (yet unpublished) study conducted by the American University in Beirut in 2015, between 260,000 and 280,000 Palestine refugees currently remain in Lebanon.4 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon reportedly continue to face acute socioeconomic deprivation and legal barriers to their full enjoyment of a broad range of human rights. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are reported to have historically been marginalized and excluded from key aspects of social, political and economic life with no right to own immovable property; severely curtailed access to public services (other than those provided by UNRWA), such as health and education; and restrictions regarding specific professions and limited job opportunities.5

Despite the 1987 abrogation of the 1969 Cairo Agreement6 between the Palestinian leadership and the Lebanese government, which stipulated that the Lebanese army would refrain from entering the Palestinian refugee camps, the army generally does not exercise control in the camps. Palestine refugee camps are thus controlled by Palestinian factions, with different camps often ruled by competing factions.7 The camps are reported to be generally

---

2 For information on the situation of Palestinian/Palestinian refugees in Syria, see UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Protection Considerations with regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update IV, November 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/5641e894.html, paras 21-22.
3 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), registration numbers as at January 2016.
6 The 1969 Cairo Accord is available at: ICG, Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps, 19 February 2009, Appendix C.
characterized by a climate of instability, physical threats, sporadic fighting and limited access to safety and justice.8

Palestine refugees are dependent on UNRWA services and relief due to the restricted access to public education, public health care and social services, as well as employment.9 These services as well as camp infrastructure were reportedly already overstretched prior to the arrival of tens of thousands of Palestine refugees from Syria.10 The influx of Syrian and Palestine refugees from Syria into Lebanon are reported to have further compromised already limited living space, resources, services and job opportunities available to Palestine refugees in Lebanon and contributed to heightened community tensions.11

The situation of an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 undocumented (“non-ID”) Palestinians in Lebanon is reported to be particularly precarious, as their family history means that they are not registered as Palestine refugees with UNRWA, nor are they recognized by the Government of Lebanon.12 “Non-ID” Palestinians, as well as the majority of Palestine refugees from Syria13 are reported to lack legal status in Lebanon, with wide-reaching implications for their ability to exercise their human rights and access basic services.

In August 2013, new entry restrictions were introduced for Palestine refugees from Syria seeking to access safety in Lebanon.14 Those Palestine refugees from Syria who were already in the country prior to the issuance of the new regulations (around 42,000 as of August 2015)15 reportedly face restrictions on their ability to exercise their basic human rights, due to their precarious legal status.16

This document provides information about the situation of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, including non-registered Palestinian refugees, undocumented (“non-ID”) Palestinians, and Palestine refugees from Syria, including the human rights and humanitarian situation and limitations in relation to refugees’ access to basic services and livelihoods. The final section provides an overview of the security situation and potential human rights issues in the camps, as well as specific information on four of the 12 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, namely Nahr El-Bared, Rashidieh, Shatila and Ein El-Hilweh.17

---

8 See below Section VI.
9 “Palestinian refugees were prohibited from accessing public health and education services or owning land, and were barred from employment in many fields, making refugees dependent upon UNRWA as the sole provider of education, health care, and social services”, US Department of State, 2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon, 25 June 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html. See also Section I.4.
12 See below Section IV.
13 See below Section V.
14 See below Section V.1
17 See below Section VI.
II. PALESTINE REFUGEES

1. Legal Status

Lebanon’s regulation of Palestine refugees’ status reportedly dates back to 1959, when the Department of Palestinian Refugees Affairs (DPRA) was created. This department is in charge of registering and issuing civil documentation, including travel documents, to Palestine refugees in Lebanon. The Minister of Interior’s Ordinance No. 319 of 2 August 1962 details the process for the regularization of residency for Palestinian refugees, in which they are considered to be “foreigners who do not carry documentation from their countries of origin, and reside in Lebanon on the basis of [residency] cards issued by the Directorate of Public Security, or identity cards issued by the [DPRA]”. However, while the possession of a valid residency or identity card is required to regularize their residency status, there is no clear provision defining what categories of Palestinian refugees are entitled to such a card. Palestine refugees are reportedly denied citizenship in Lebanon.

The Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees (DPAR), which is part of the Ministry of Interior, reportedly maintains the records of Palestinian refugees registered in Lebanon. Newborns are reportedly registered with the family’s original place of registration, regardless of where in Lebanon they were born. Those registered with DPAR and UNRWA are issued a personal ID card which states that s/he is a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon.

A refugee’s registration with DPAR is reportedly only cancelled in three specific events, namely, (i) in the case of a refugee’s death and upon request of the General Security to DPAR to cancel the person’s registration following their death, or (ii) if the refugee obtains the nationality of a third country, or (iii) if the refugee has submitted an application to the General Security to have his/her registration cancelled.

2. Freedom of Movement

According to UNRWA, Palestinian refugees registered with DPAR enjoy freedom of movement within the country. The directorate, however, has to approve the transfer of registration of residence for refugees who reside in camps. According to UNRWA, the directorate generally approves such transfers.

---

19 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
23 Formerly known as Department of Palestinian Refugees Affairs (DPRA), which was established by Legislative Decree No. 42 of 1959, with Article 1 stipulating the establishment of a “department within the Lebanese Ministry of Interior to manage Palestinian affairs”. In 2010, the Lebanese government passed Decree No. 4082, which renamed the DPRA as “Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees” (DPAR); Aidoun, Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon, 2014, p. 3.
25 In all cases, the name of the deregistered person reportedly remains in DPAR’s records but it will be crossed out in the records with a pencil or pen, and the reason for deletion will be mentioned in the notes field; DIS, Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, October 2014, pp. 40-41.
Many Palestine refugee camps reportedly face entry and exit controls that are prone to be tightened, in particular during periods of heightened security measures, and which result in restrictions on movement in and out of camps. These restrictions on movement can reportedly limit access to employment and essential services and can also expose Palestine refugees to increased risk of arrest and detention.

3. Travelling in and out of Lebanon

Palestine refugees in Lebanon who are registered with the Lebanese authorities and who wish to travel from and to Lebanon need to acquire Palestinian travel documents issued by the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security, or General Security Office (GSO). While such documents allow them to leave and re-enter the country, Palestine refugees from Lebanon are, however, reported to be confronted with various limitations in applying for visas to third countries due to their status as Palestine refugees. Those who leave Lebanon without Palestinian travel documents are reportedly readmitted to the country but would be considered to have left the country illegally and would be subjected to detention (between one week to three months) and/or fines (1,250 to 7,500 Lebanese Pounds) upon return, in line with applicable legislation.

Palestine refugees who are registered with both UNRWA and DPAR can reportedly obtain travel documents valid for one, three or five years.

4. Access to Services

a. Access to Employment and Livelihoods

Changes to Lebanese law in 2005 and 2010 gave Palestine refugees in Lebanon legal access to some formal employment in the private sector that had previously been limited to Lebanese nationals. Nevertheless, legal prohibitions reportedly persist on access for Palestine refugees to 36 liberal or syndicated professions (including in medicine, farming and fishery, and public transportation). Moreover, Palestine refugees in Lebanon have reportedly only partial access to the National Social Security Fund. In order to work, Palestine refugees in Lebanon are

---


28 General Directorate of General Security (GSO), Pour les Palestiniens / Documents de Voyage et Laissez-Passer (in French), accessed 23 February 2016, http://bit.ly/1PvXU2z3. Furthermore, unlike the Lebanese passport, the travel documents issued to Palestine refugees are reportedly not machine-readable and do not conform to international standards. As a result, they are not recognized by most countries.


30 Law Regulating Entry to, Stay in and Exit from Lebanon, 10 July 1962 and last amendment (Law No. 173 of 14 February 2000, Article 33); International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.


34 "A 2010 amendment to the social security law created a special account to provide end-of-service indemnities or severance pay to Palestinian refugees who retired or resigned. These benefits were available only to Palestinians working in the legal labor market. Palestinians did not benefit from national sickness and maternity funds or the family allowances fund. UNRWA continued to bear the cost of any medical, maternity, or family health-care expenses (excluding worker's compensation). The law provides for benefits only from 2010 onward"; US Department of State, 2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon, 25 June 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bdf5f12.html. See also, UN Development Group (UNDG), UPR Submission of the
required to obtain an annual work permit at no cost. However, obtaining a work permit reportedly involves a lengthy administrative process, for which the refugees depend on the goodwill of their employers, thus limiting the effectiveness of these legal changes. According to ILO, the number of Palestine refugees holding a work permit is very low. Most Palestine refugees in Lebanon are reported to work in menial, low-paying jobs in the informal sector. Sources indicate that Palestine refugees regularly receive a lower salary than Lebanese nationals for the same job. Child labour is reported to be common in and around refugee camps, with some children working as armed guards.

According to a 2010 survey by the American University in Beirut, Palestine refugees in Lebanon are highly marginalized, with two-thirds considered poor or extremely poor. As of 31 December 2010, 56 per cent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon were unemployed. It is generally considered likely that poverty and unemployment among Palestine refugees in Lebanon has increased, along with the overall rise in the number of poor and unemployed persons in the country, as a result of socioeconomic challenges created by the arrival of over one million refugees from Syria since 2011. Young men with limited work opportunities are reported to be likely to join militant groups.

b. Property and Housing

Around 53 per cent of the Palestine refugees registered in Lebanon are reported to live in one of the 12 recognized Palestine refugee camps, all of which suffer from serious overcrowding, poor housing conditions and insufficient infrastructure (in particular sewage, water and

---

38 DIS, Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, October 2014, pp. 33-34, 36.
40 In 2010, 66.4 per cent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon were poor in 2010, and 6.6 per cent were extremely poor. The occurrence of extreme poverty among Palestine refugees was four times higher compared to the Lebanese population. General and extreme poverty was higher for refugees living inside the camps than those in gatherings. Poverty rates among Palestine refugees vary considerably among geographic locations. Poverty incidence was found highest in Tyre (79 per cent) and lowest in Central Lebanon Area (53 per cent), with the Tyre region alone accounting for more than 34 per cent of all the poor. Extreme poverty was found to be significantly higher in Saida and Tyre than in other regions (reaching almost 10 per cent), and Saida and Tyre together hosted more than 81 per cent of all extremely poor refugees; AUB, Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 31 December 2010, http://bit.ly/1PDxESC, pp. xi, xii, 27, 29, 30. “Salvatore Lombardo, the [then] Director of UNRWA in Lebanon, told MAP [Medical Aid for Palestinians] that: ‘more than 60% of the refugee population live below the poverty line of $6 a day, and within this there are pockets [of people who] live on less than $2 a day’”. Earlier in 2010, Lombardo told Now Lebanon online forum that in comparison with other [branches of UNRWA] “we have in Lebanon the highest number of what we call ‘special hardship cases’, which is the poorest of the poor. We have 50,000 people in this situation, 20-30% of the [Palestinian refugee] population, who live in deplorable poverty conditions. This is the highest percentage compared to all other areas [in which we operate]”.”; MAP, Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon, 2011, http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7, p. 4.
42 “The number of poor in country is believed to have increased by 66% compared to pre-2011 figures. Similarly, there has been a significant increase in unemployment rates, with a third of Lebanon’s youth not able to find work”; UNDG, UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon, November 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfa4.html, para. 3. See also, World Bank, Overview - Lebanon, last updated 16 September 2015, http://bit.ly/1Q8NfL0. For the number of refugees from Syria registered with UNHCR in Lebanon, see UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response – Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, accessed 23 February 2016, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?d=122.
electricity).\textsuperscript{44} The area of land allocated to the refugee camps has reportedly remained largely unchanged since 1948, despite significant population growth and the arrival of thousands of refugees from Syria.\textsuperscript{45} This is reportedly further exacerbated by some restrictions enforced by the Lebanese authorities on the movement of building materials into Palestine refugee camps.\textsuperscript{46} This reportedly severely limits the ability of Palestine refugees in Lebanon to improve their housing conditions, in an environment that is considered extremely congested and unhealthy environment.\textsuperscript{47} UNRWA’s Camp Improvement Initiative is reportedly affected by chronic underfunding.\textsuperscript{48}

In addition, following a change in the law in 2001,\textsuperscript{49} Palestine refugees are reported prevented from legally acquiring, transferring or inheriting real property in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{50}

Housing opportunities for Palestine refugees are thus limited to (i) Palestine refugee camps where living conditions are reportedly substandard; (ii) renting a residence outside of Palestine refugee camps where rental rates are unaffordable for many;\textsuperscript{51} or (iii) relying on semi-legal, informal and unprotected agreements with Lebanese associates, who reportedly buy property or keep property bought pre-2001 on their behalf.\textsuperscript{52}

44 UNRWA, Where We Work – Lebanon, accessed 23 February 2016, http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon; UN Human Rights Council, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with Paragraph 15 (b) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 and Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Council Resolution 16/21, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Twenty-Third Session 2-13 November 2015, Lebanon, A/HRC/WG.6/23/LBN/231, August 2015, http://bit.ly/1SPMSL7 [hereafter: UN Human Rights Council, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lebanon, 31 August 2015], para. 67; IRIN, Palestinians in Lebanon - Death by Neglect, 1 June 2015, http://bit.ly/1WX9Z99. There are also 42 Palestinian informal gatherings or settlements, which were established by refugees in the early years of their displacement to Lebanon (1948-1950), or as a result of renewed displacement during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990). In the wake of the Syria conflict since 2011, some 35,000 Palestinian and Syrian refugees from Syria have also taken shelter in these gatherings. These gatherings are not administered by UNRWA, but fall under the domain of the concerned municipalities. The latter, however, do not provide basic urban services, often due to a lack of resources. Dwellers in these gatherings are not entitled to UNRWA basic urban services. The 42 Palestinian refugee gatherings are considered to be among the most vulnerable host communities in Lebanon; UNDP/UN Habitat, Improving Living Conditions in Palestinian Gatherings in Lebanon, 2015, http://bit.ly/1QbwwDh; UN Habitat, Profiling Deprivation: An Analysis of the Rapid Needs Assessment in Palestinian Gatherings Host Communities in Lebanon, May 2014, http://bit.ly/1WGiz5Rc [the document provides a profile of each of the 42 gatherings at pp. 74-114].


47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.


50 Law No. 296/2001, “Palestinians who owned property prior to the law entering into force were unable to bequeath it to their heirs; and individuals who were in the process of purchasing property in installments were unable to register the latter on their behalf.” US Department of State, 2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon, 25 June 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/590bd55a12.html. See also Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon Submission to the Human Rights Council by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 2015, http://bit.ly/1OnsYVP, para. 3.2; AUB, Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 31 December 2010, http://bit.ly/1PDaJSC, p. 15.

51 “Lebanon was experiencing a shortage of affordable housing before the Syrian crisis. However, the situation has been aggravated by large numbers of refugees looking for accommodation and pushing up rents”; Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, Palestinians Refugees Suffer wherever They Go, 1 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1WdWvRS. “Outside the camps, rents have risen at an astronomical rate since early 2012 after the massive influx of Syrians and Palestinian-Syrians into Lebanon. A house that was rented for $100 is now rented for at least $350 according to real estate experts”; Al-Monitor, Palestinian-Syrian Refugees Face Hardship in Lebanon, 7 November 2014, http://almon.co/29Jo.

52 “Thousands of Palestinians have tried to circumvent the law [of 2001] by registering their deeds in the name of a Lebanese friend or a Palestinian relative who holds a foreign citizenship, however a law was issued punishing with imprisonment for six months, and fining ten times the price of the property for the notary who registers properties for Palestinians, whatever the situation”; Occupied Palestine (Blog), Law Preventing Palestinians from Owning Property
c. Access to Healthcare

Palestinian refugees reportedly do not have access to Lebanese public health services and rely mostly on UNRWA for health services,\(^5\) as well as on non-profit organizations and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS).\(^6\)

UNRWA reportedly provides comprehensive primary health care such as general medical checks, preventative maternal and child care, radiology and dental care, free of charge. However, not all medical services are available at all UNRWA health clinics and as a result refugees may have to visit other clinics outside the camps, e.g. for dental treatment or laboratory tests.\(^5\)

In addition, UNRWA financially assists refugees with partial cost coverage for treatment in secondary and tertiary health care in UNRWA-contracted hospitals.\(^5\) In light of high levels of unemployment and poverty,\(^7\) refugees, especially those suffering from chronic diseases\(^8\) and those in need of complex medical procedures, may be unable to bear the high costs of treatment.\(^9\) Many refugees reportedly have to rely on assistance from relatives, friends, NGOs, or charities, sometimes running up debts.\(^6\)

Health services available to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are reported to be chronically underfunded and insufficient to cover existing and growing health needs.\(^6\) Furthermore, living conditions in the camps are reportedly linked to a multitude of physical and mental health problems among refugees.\(^6\) The situation of elderly persons and persons with disabilities is reportedly of particular concern.\(^6\)


\(^6\) See also Section II.4.a).

\(^7\) A 2010 survey found that a third of the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon (31 per cent) had a chronic illness, while 72 per cent of households reported having one or more chronic illness. The prevalence of chronic illnesses was most pronounced among older populations, with 83 per cent of individuals aged 55 and above reporting that they suffered from at least one chronic illness. Refugee households that were classified as “extremely poor” were found to suffer more chronic illnesses per household than other refugee households; AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, http://bit.ly/1PDaESC, pp. xiv, 70.

\(^8\) See also Section II.4.a).

\(^9\) “As Salvatore Lombardo [former Director of UNRWA in Lebanon] acknowledged, ‘one of the most critical factors is that our doctors are not [physically] able to cope with the numbers of patients’. Over 1,400 Palestinian refugees were asked their opinion on UNRWA services. Almost seven out of 10 viewed the agency’s relief work as ‘insufficient’”; MAP, *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2011, http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7, p. 7. See also, DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 31-32.
d. Access to Education

Palestine refugees are reportedly denied access to Lebanese public schools, leaving them to pursue their education either in one of the 69 UNRWA schools (both primary and secondary) or in private schools, which are, however, beyond the financial means of most.\textsuperscript{64} UNRWA schools are reportedly often dilapidated and face severe overcrowding.\textsuperscript{65} Drop-out rates are reportedly high for a variety of reasons,\textsuperscript{66} including the need to work in order to earn an income.\textsuperscript{67} Access to higher education is reportedly limited for Palestine refugees because many cannot afford the high costs; some refugees do not see any purpose in completing an education which does not grant access to employment.\textsuperscript{68} For Palestinians without legal status (i.e. “non-ID” Palestinians and many Palestine refugees from Syria), secondary school education is reportedly inaccessible due to their inability to take the intermediate schooling exam.\textsuperscript{69}

\textit{e. Women and Children}

Difficult social conditions as a result of overcrowding, unemployment and poverty reportedly contribute to the prevalence of gender-based violence (GBV)\textsuperscript{70} and the use of violence against children in the Palestine refugee community. Women participating in GBV sensitization sessions with UNRWA largely consider GBV to be a problem within their community.\textsuperscript{71} Nevertheless, many forms of GBV and violence against children, particularly domestic violence and corporal punishment against children, are reported to typically remain unchallenged culturally, nor are they spoken about widely; consequently, the implementation of prevention and response programmes has proven to be challenging.\textsuperscript{72}

Specialized service providers for responding to incidents of GBV or child abuse are reportedly to be scarce and their capacity limited, particularly within the camps. The lack of awareness about available services, in addition to safety concerns and fear of stigmatization, reportedly hinder access to existing services for survivors or persons at risk of abuse.\textsuperscript{73} Safe shelters for survivors of or persons at risk of GBV are reportedly not available; and confidentiality is challenging, given the crowded conditions of the camps and lack of privacy within the community. Accessing services outside the camps is reportedly hampered both due to limited awareness and the strain on available services in the country.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{64} UNRWA is the main provider of education for Palestinian refugees. Overall enrolment rates have reportedly declined as a result of “the worsening socio-economic conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon, as well as to the fact that Palestinians, remarkably for a people once renowned for their hunger for education, no longer see the benefits of an education, given the work restrictions the Lebanese government had imposed for so long”; UNICEF, \textit{The Situation of Palestinian Children in The Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon}, 2010, \url{http://uni.cf/1OnvsgZ}, p. 83.


\textsuperscript{68} DIS, \textit{Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon}, October 2014, p. 30. See also above Section II.4.a).

\textsuperscript{69} Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, Palestinians Refugees Suffer Wherever They Go, 1 April 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1WdWvRS}.


\textsuperscript{71} International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

\textsuperscript{72} UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, GBV Information Sensitization Sessions, conducted in 2015 across Lebanon.


\textsuperscript{74} Information provided by UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, January 2016.
f. Palestine Refugees with Specific Vulnerabilities

One in ten Palestinian households in Lebanon is reported to have at least one family member with a disability. According to reports, there is a strong correlation between disability and poverty in Palestinian communities in Lebanon. Their reported social marginalization is reportedly further exacerbated by the limited access to and limited availability of specialized rehabilitation services, as well as the general lack of awareness in relation to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities in Lebanon. Women, children and elderly persons with disabilities are reported to be particularly vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation and violence. Furthermore, Palestine refugees and other non-nationals are not granted access to specialized services on the same basis as Lebanese nationals.

III. NON-REGISTERED PALESTINIANS

An estimated 35,000 Palestinian refugees are registered with the DPAR, but not with UNRWA. These persons fall outside UNRWA’s mandate because they left Palestine after 1948; because they took refuge outside UNRWA areas of operations prior to coming to Lebanon; because they left after 1948; or because they did not otherwise meet UNRWA’s eligibility criteria. UNRWA started assisting this non-registered refugee population as of January 2004.

Non-registered Palestinians are reportedly granted the same residency permissions afforded to those who are registered with UNRWA; however, they are issued a different travel document (Laissez Passer), valid for one year and renewable three times.

IV. “NON-ID” PALESTINIANS

There are an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 “non-ID” Palestinians in Lebanon. They arrived in Lebanon starting in the 1960s and do not hold any valid formal identification documents. As

75 UNRWA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, http://bit.ly/1PBn8zh, p. 32. Furthermore, 9.2 per cent of special hardship cases are households with disabled family members; UNRWA, RSSD Identification, Verification and Targeting of Persons with Disability Report, December 2013, unpublished.
80 AIDOUN, Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon, 2014, p. 2; DRC, Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon, September 2007, p. 16.
81 “The explanation for this extension of services was that non-registered refugees are also Palestinians who fled their homeland and are not offered any assistance by the Lebanese government”; DRC, Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon, September 2007, p. 17. On access and availability of services, see Section II.4.
82 See Section II.1.
84 “(…) the Non-ID refugees' category does not constitute a homogenous group. The majority of this category members can be classified into several sub-categories, including:
they are neither registered with UNRWA in Lebanon nor with the Lebanese authorities, they reportedly do not have a valid legal status in the country. Children born to “non-ID” Palestinian fathers are reportedly often not registered with UNRWA nor do they receive any identity documents from the Lebanese government: they become “non-IDs” as well. Without valid documentation and legal status, “non-ID” Palestinians reportedly face severe restrictions on their right to freedom of movement and access to services, risk being arrested and detained, and are unable to complete civil registration procedures for vital events such as birth, marriage, divorce and death. UNRWA provides primary health care, education, and vocational training services to undocumented Palestinians, despite the fact that they are not registered with the agency.

The GSO has, according to reports, intermittently issued temporary identity cards to “non-ID” Palestinians since 2008. However, these Special Identification Cards (SICs) only serve as

1. Palestinians holding identity cards, valid or expired, issued by Jordanian authorities, but they are unable for various reasons to return to the Hashemite Kingdom.
2. Palestinians from the Gaza Strip with identity documents issued by the Egyptian authorities, who are not allowed to stay in Egypt, as well as they cannot return to the Gaza Strip.
3. Palestinians carry identification documents issued by the Iraqi authorities have left Iraq because of the violence and persecution they had suffered there.
4. Palestinians expelled by Israel from the occupied Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza) and does not allow them to return thereto.
5. and others…”

UNRWA’s consolidated eligibility and registration instructions define Palestine refugees as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period of 17 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. (…) descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, are [also] eligible for registration”; UNRWA, Consolidated Eligibility and Registration Instructions (CERI), 2009, http://bit.ly/1NZmXZi, p. 3.

DRC, Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon, September 2007, p. 17.


“(…) non-ID Palestinians (…) become prisoners inside the camp, fearing they would be arrested upon leaving it, or would be unable to return to it once they leave”; Mariam A. Itani and Mo’in Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2010, ISBN 978-9953-500-54-6, p. 63. “In practice, non-ID refugees exit the camps, but may be stopped and arrested. Several families reported that one of the members (father/son – usually a male) had been arrested or was currently under arrest because he lacked valid documentation. According to interviewed non-ID refugees, those who are arrested are imprisoned in their region or sent to the Remand jails in Lebanon (in Moukhtara) for up to three months”;


“The [UN] country team noted that an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Palestinian refugees continued to live in Lebanon without formal valid identity, resulting in restrictions of movement, risk of arrest and difficulties completing civil registration”; UN Human Rights Council, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lebanon, 31 August 2015, para. 52. “They are considered to be illegal residents and lack identity documents, which puts severe restrictions on their freedom of movement because documentation is needed at the checkpoints in and out of the camps and around the country. Consequently, many fear they will be arrested upon leaving the camps and cannot work. Lack of documentation also means that having marriages registered by the government is extremely difficult”;


“The Lebanese authorities have issued special ID cards to more than 1,800 such persons since 2008, however relatively few of these remain valid. The failure permits to renew or apply for these ID cards, attributed to the limited validity, the lack of its widespread formal recognition by Lebanese authorities, the complex application process and the high rate of rejections”; UNDG, UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon, November 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabf4f.html, para. 61. See also, Amnesty International, Lebanon: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review Ninth Session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council: November-December 2010, 12 April 2010, MDE 18/002/2010, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c7f82a62.html, p. 5.
proof of identity and the holder cannot register vital events such as births, deaths, marriages and divorces, nor be recognized as a refugee in Lebanon. Moreover, very few “non-ID” Palestinians are reportedly able to obtain and maintain a valid card, which further hinders its effectiveness. The GSO reportedly does not issue SICs to Palestinian refugees who are holding passports issued by the Palestinian Authority, or Egyptian travel documents or Jordanian passports, regardless of whether these documents are still valid, and without taking into account whether the holder might be able to renew those documents and/or enter the country that issued the travel document. Individuals who are in the possession of such documents are reportedly asked to apply for a residency permit on the same basis as other foreigners living in Lebanon, which incurs annual costs. However, many “non-ID” Palestinians reportedly face difficulties in renewing expired Palestinian Authority or Egyptian travel documents, further preventing them from applying for regular residency permits with the Lebanese authorities. Furthermore, it has been reported that not all members of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) are familiar with SICs, which can be problematic at checkpoints and thus hinder freedom of movement within Lebanon.

V. PALESTINE REFUGEES FROM SYRIA IN LEBANON

The on-going conflict in Syria has forced many Palestine refugees to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, including in Lebanon. UNRWA is working to address their humanitarian needs, including by providing education, health care, shelter and other assistance. As of December 2015, approximately half of the more than 42,000 Palestine refugees from Syria present in Lebanon were living in one of the 12 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, with the other half living outside of camps. Palestine refugees from Syria are reportedly at risk of detention and fines, and/or forcible return to Syria due to their lack of legal status in Lebanon.

1. Access to Territory

At the onset of the conflict in Syria, it was reported that Palestine refugees from Syria were initially allowed entry into Lebanon using their ID cards or travel documents issued by the relevant Syrian authorities, provided they had obtained a Syrian exit visa in advance. However, since August 2013, entry restrictions were reportedly introduced for Palestinian refugees from Syria and individuals started being screened for entry at the border. The restrictions reportedly resulted in the denial of entry of some Palestine refugees from Syria between August 2013 and April 2014.

94 “An unknown number of Palestinian refugees continued to reside in Lebanon without an official ID card, leaving them with even fewer rights. They remained, for example, unable to register marriages, births and deaths”; Amnesty International, Amnesty International Annual Report 2012 - Lebanon, 24 May 2012, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fbc392c3.html. See also, Aïdoun, Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon, 2014, p. 6.


96 International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.


98 International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

99 In addition, the GSO can reportedly refuse to issue a SIC for “reasons often related to security”; Aïdoun, Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon, 2014, p. 8.


101 “Even prior to the May 2014 changes in policy, Palestinian refugees from Syria faced different conditions for entry into Lebanon, including a requirement that they first obtain permission to exit Syria from the Syrian authorities, for which they had to pay”; Amnesty International, Denied Refuge: Palestinians from Syria Seeking Safety in Lebanon, 1 July 2014, MDE 18/002/2014, http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabdd14.html [hereafter: Amnesty International, Denied Refuge, 1 July 2014], p. 7.


103 Amnesty International, Denied Refuge, 1 July 2014, pp. 7, 11.
Since May 2014, additional entry restrictions have reportedly been imposed as the Ministry of Interior announced a stop to the issuance of visas for Palestine refugees from Syria at the border.104 Since then, entry at the border is reportedly only granted with either a verified embassy appointment in Lebanon, or a flight ticket and visa to a third country: conditions that the majority of Palestine refugees from Syria are unable to meet.105 Individuals who are able to meet these conditions are reportedly usually only issued with a 24-hour transit visa.106 In addition, limited numbers of Palestine refugees from Syria are reportedly able to secure a visa to enter Lebanon by obtaining prior approval from GSO. This reportedly requires a sponsor in Lebanon and cannot be processed at border posts, but has to be done in Syria prior to travelling.107 Access to Lebanon for “humanitarian reasons” or in order to seek international protection is reportedly not possible.108 Some Palestine refugees from Syria have reportedly sought to enter Lebanon through irregular border crossings, placing them at risk of exploitation and abuse, in particular due to the fear of arrest and/or deportation.109 Under current regulations, irregular entry into Lebanon is reported to be an obstacle to regularizing one’s legal status at a later time.

2. Legal Status

In February 2013, a circular issued by the Directorate General of General Security stipulated that Palestine refugees from Syria could obtain residency permits valid for three months and renewable for up to 12 months at no cost, upon entry into the country.110 After this 12-month period, a fee of USD 200 per person was required to extend legal residency.111 These costs were reported to be prohibitive and the majority of Palestine refugees from Syria reportedly did not renew their documents. As a consequence, they were considered by the authorities to be present in Lebanon illegally.112 Throughout 2014, the Ministry of Interior reportedly issued

104 “New measures mean Palestinians fleeing Syria will not be given visas at the border, while those who are already in the country will not have their visas renewed. In a statement posted on his Facebook page Thursday, Interior Minister Nohad al-Mashnuq said no visas will be issued at the main Masnaa border crossing. Palestinians living in Syria who wish to enter Lebanon must first request a visa at the Lebanese embassy in Damascus. The request will be processed by the Lebanese General Security agency. Only those with a residence permit in Lebanon will be admitted, the minister said. Mashnuq also announced that the two-week visas previously granted to Palestinians fleeing Syria would no longer be renewable”; AFP, Lebanon All but Bars Palestinians Fleeing Syria, 9 May 2014, https://shar.es/14wJup. See also, BADIL, Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview, Al-Majdal, Issue No. 56, Autumn 2014, http://bit.ly/1Y3kkeM [hereafter: BADIL, Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview, 2014]; Amnesty International, Denied Refugees: Palestinians from Syria Seeking Safety in Lebanon, 1 July 2014; UNRWA, UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, Issue 35, 31 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1SYD53U; Daily Star, Machnouk: New Entry Rules for Palestinians from Syria, 9 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1WezwpV.


107 International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.


several circulars on the conditions for renewing residency permits for Palestine refugees from Syria, including restrictions on the number of renewals and the maximum period of stay, as well as on the issuance of cost-free residency permits during a short period of time.\textsuperscript{113} Such circulars were reportedly applied inconsistently throughout the country and many Palestine refugees from Syria did not approach the GSO for fear of arrest and/or deportation or due to the length and cost of the process.\textsuperscript{114}

Since January 2015, the GSO has reportedly issued several consecutive internal memos enabling Palestine refugees from Syria to renew their legal residency documents for three months\textsuperscript{115} upon payment of outstanding fees of USD 200 per person per year.\textsuperscript{116} The additional terms and conditions for these renewal procedures were not published until late October 2015, and were reportedly applied inconsistently across the country.\textsuperscript{117} Starting in October 2015, successive memos have reportedly been issued publicly, which allowed Palestine refugees to renew their visas, free of charge, within a specified period; however the validity of these visas is reportedly often very limited (between one and three months in practice); by early 2016 it was unclear whether these measures would continue.\textsuperscript{118}

Although only three per cent of Palestine refugees from Syria in Lebanon are reported to have entered the country in an irregular manner, by mid-2014 more than 50 per cent of the Palestine refugees from Syria did reportedly not hold a valid visa in Lebanon. This indicates that most of them are unable to regularize their stay following their arrival.\textsuperscript{119} The lack of legal status is in turn reported to restrict refugees’ access to basic services, employment, civil documentation, and justice.\textsuperscript{120}

### 3. Civil Registration and Access to Documentation

A valid legal status is a prerequisite for most civil registration processes in Lebanon such as the registration of births and marriages. Difficulties in obtaining legal residency documents are reported to have a wide-reaching impact on Palestine refugees from Syria. Of particular concern is the registration of new-borns, marriages and divorces.\textsuperscript{121} According to reports, the majority of children born in Lebanon to parents who are Palestine refugees from Syria will

---


\textsuperscript{114} UNRWA, UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, Issue 42, 1 January – 28 February 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1SaDVMc}.

\textsuperscript{115} NRC/IDMC, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria, June 2015, p. 6 and FN 7.

\textsuperscript{116} UNRWA, UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, Issue 45, 1 July - 30 August 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1SDeezz}.

\textsuperscript{117} “The situation for PRS is even less clear [compared to the situation of Syrian refugees], with some indication that they may renew their residency in theory but, in practice, there are very few instances wherePRS are able to do this. With no officially published regulations regarding the procedures for renewal of their residency visas, it is difficult to understand under what circumstances PRS may renew their residency in Lebanon”; NRC/IDMC, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria, June 2015, p. 15. See also p. 8 of the same report. See also, Amnesty International, Refugee Women from Syria Uprooted and Unprotected in Lebanon, 2 February 2016, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{118} International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

\textsuperscript{119} UNRWA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PB0zjb}, pp. 6, 13. “If Lebanon does not allowPRS to access ways to obtain valid residency, NRC anticipates that most PRS in Lebanon already have or will have limited legal status by the end of June 2015”; NRC, Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon Submission to the Human Rights Council by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/10uxYVP}, para. 1.3.

\textsuperscript{120} Dalia Aranki and Olivia Kalis, Limited Legal Status for Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, September 2014.

unlikely be able to complete all the necessary steps for birth registration with the Lebanese authorities, raising concerns about the emergence of a new undocumented population.\textsuperscript{122}

4. Restrictions on Freedom of Movement, Risk of Detention and Deportation

The lack of legal status and valid documentation reportedly exposes Palestine refugees from Syria to the risk of arrest, temporary detention and departure orders.\textsuperscript{123} Male adults are reported to be particularly at risk of being detained, and to have their documents confiscated at checkpoints within Lebanon or when crossing borders between Lebanon and Syria.\textsuperscript{124} For fear of arrest and deportation, Palestine refugees from Syria reportedly feel compelled to limit their movements.\textsuperscript{125} Movement in and out of camps (notably Nahr El-Bared Camp, Ein El-Hilweh and the camps in Tyre Area) is reportedly particularly restricted without valid documentation.\textsuperscript{126}

In May 2014, around 40 Palestine refugees from Syria were reportedly arrested at Beirut International Airport after they tried to leave the country with allegedly falsified documents; they were reportedly forcibly returned to Syria.\textsuperscript{127}

Palestine refugees from Syria who have left Lebanon are, according to reports, generally not readmitted to Lebanon.\textsuperscript{128}

5. Access to Services

a. Overview

Palestine refugees from Syria have access to UNRWA schools, health clinics and hospitalization through referrals, as well as humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{129} However, their lack of legal status and up-to-date civil registration documents as well as restrictions on movement, reportedly negatively impacts access to services.\textsuperscript{130} A vulnerability assessment conducted by UNRWA in July 2014 showed that 95 per cent of Palestine refugees from Syria were dependent on UNRWA cash assistance to cover expenses related to food and housing.\textsuperscript{131} However, as a result of insufficient funding for UNRWA’s activities in Lebanon, cash assistance for housing reportedly had to be suspended in July 2015, exacerbating refugees’ vulnerability.\textsuperscript{132} Palestine refugees from Syria are reportedly at risk of forcible eviction,

\textsuperscript{122} UNDG, UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon, November 2015, \url{http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabf4a4.html}, para. 66; NRC, The Challenges of Birth Registration in Lebanon for Refugees from Syria, January 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1T899OW}.

\textsuperscript{123} “Many of those without regular status are issued with ‘departure orders’ by the Lebanese authorities and told to leave before certain date. While these are not being actively enforced, detention is a risk and many PRS report fear of deportation or limiting their movement citing fear of detention”; UNDG, UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon, November 2015, \url{http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabf4a4.html}, para. 65. See also, NRC/IDMC, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria, June 2015, pp. 6, 7, 13; UNRWA, Lack of Funds Forces UNRWA to Suspend Cash Assistance for Housing for Palestine Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, 22 May 2014, \url{http://bit.ly/1n5JzZ}.

\textsuperscript{124} NRC/IDMC, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria, June 2015, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{125} NRC/IDMC, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria: An Overview, 2014.

\textsuperscript{126} UNRWA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon - In a State of Uncertainty, 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PaxZNX} [hereafter: UNRWA, In a State of Uncertainty, 2015].


\textsuperscript{128} BADIL, Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview, 2014.


\textsuperscript{131} UNRWA, UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, Issue 43, March - April 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1n5JzZ}.

\textsuperscript{132} Since February 2014, UNRWA has been distributing monthly cash assistance to Palestine refugee families from Syria for food and housing. However, as of July 2015, housing assistance, in the amount of USD 100 per family and per month, had to be suspended due to the funding challenges faced by UNRWA; UNRWA, \textit{Lack of Funds Forces...
dropping out of school, pressure to seek high-risk employment, GBV, reduced ability to maintain legal status and increased likelihood of unsafe return to Syria or dangerous onward movement to Europe.\textsuperscript{135} Palestine refugees from Syria have reportedly repeatedly protested against insufficient access to services.\textsuperscript{134}

b. Access to Employment and Livelihoods

According to an UNRWA report on the vulnerability of Palestine refugees from Syria in Lebanon dated October 2015, they have extremely limited access to work opportunities in the informal sector coupled with high expenditures on food and shelter. More than 90 per cent of Palestine refugees from Syria reportedly lack food or the money needed to feed their family. One in ten families who experienced lack of food (or lack of money for food) reported that at least one member in the family had spent days without eating.\textsuperscript{136} More than three-quarters of Palestine refugees from Syria reported being indebted, with almost one in four having incurred debts exceeding USD 600.\textsuperscript{137} Female-headed Palestine refugee families from Syria are reported to face particularly challenging livelihood conditions. Four out of five female-headed families reported that nobody in the family was working.\textsuperscript{137} For those families where at least one family member was working, roughly nine jobs out of ten were temporary jobs, while only eight per cent of the workers held a permanent job.\textsuperscript{138}

c. Housing

One of the most immediate concerns for Palestine refugees from Syria is reported to be shelter, as they are faced with an acute housing shortage and prohibitively high rental prices.\textsuperscript{139} The average monthly rent for families from Syria amounts to USD 207 inside refugee camps and USD 303 for those living outside camps.\textsuperscript{140} However, more than half of the families surveyed in mid-2014 reported not to have any family members working during the month preceding the assessment.\textsuperscript{141} Nearly 60 per cent of Palestine refugee families from Syria reportedly live in overcrowded conditions with families sharing a room while at least one family member was working.\textsuperscript{142} While at least one in ten families reportedly live in extremely crowded conditions with available living space less than 3.5 m\textsuperscript{2} (the minimum living space required for healthy living) per person.\textsuperscript{143} Three and a half per cent of Palestine refugees from Syria reportedly live in particularly vulnerable conditions in unfinished shelters, tents, huts or barracks.\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{UNRWA to Suspend Cash Assistance for Housing for Palestine Refugees from Syria in Lebanon} UNRWA to Suspend Cash Assistance for Housing for Palestine Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, 22 May 2014, \url{http://bit.ly/1nSjrZ}.
\bibitem{Jerusalem Post, Palestinians in Lebanon Revolt over Reduction of UNRWA Services} Jerusalem Post, Palestinians in Lebanon Revolt over Reduction of UNRWA Services, 14 January 2016, \url{http://bit.ly/1YsQMiB}.
\bibitem{UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon} UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PBt9Z}, p. 20.
\bibitem{UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon} UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PBt9Z}, p. 17.
\bibitem{Ibid.} Ibid.
\bibitem{Ibid.} Ibid.
\bibitem{UNRA, PRS in Lebanon, accessed 23 February 2016} UNRA, PRS in Lebanon, accessed 23 February 2016, \url{http://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon}.
\bibitem{UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon} UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PBt9Z}, pp. 7, 24.
\bibitem{UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon} UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PBt9Z}, p. 15.
\bibitem{UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon} UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PBt9Z}, p. 11.
\bibitem{UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon} UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PBt9Z}, pp. 7, 23.
\bibitem{UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon} UNRA, Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon, October 2015, \url{http://bit.ly/1PBt9Z}, pp. 7, 22.
\end{thebibliography}
d. Access to Healthcare

Camp-based Palestine refugees from Syria in need of secondary and tertiary health-care may reportedly face difficulties in accessing UNRWA-contracted hospitals located outside Palestine refugee camps, due to the lack of valid residency permits, associated restrictions on their freedom of movement and the risk of arrest and detention at checkpoints.\(^{145}\)

\[^{145}\] UNRWA, In a State of Uncertainty, 2015.


\[^{147}\] UNRWA, UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, October 2015, in: Ronit Lentin, Al Jazeera, 27 March 2015, November 2015–.


\[^{150}\] “(... the) the Lebanese army has to abide by an unwritten rule from the Cairo agreement (1969) signed between PLO and Lebanese State, saying that Palestinians are the sole responsible for the security in the camps, where the Lebanese armed forces should be proscribed. This agreement, which was nevertheless abrogated by Lebanese Parliament May, 21, 1987, is still applied tacitly, except for Nahr Bared”; Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, October 2015. See also, AUB, Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 31 December 2010, http://bit.ly/IPDze8FC, pp. 5-6; Issam Fares Center for Lebanon, Palestinian Refugees Camps in Lebanon Summary and Proposals, undated, http://bit.ly/1Ok5F4C, pp. 2-3. On the security arrangements in the Nahr El-Bared camp, see below Section VI.4.


\[^{152}\] Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, October 2015.

e. Access to Education

While Palestine refugee children from Syria have, in principle, access to UNRWA primary and secondary education, the lack of regular legal status reportedly means that they are unable to register for official school exams and thus to obtain official school certificates (Brevet and Baccalaureate certificates).\(^{146}\) Without the prospects of obtaining official school certificates, many reportedly drop out of school.\(^{147}\)

VI. PALESTINE REFUGEE CAMPS

1. Security Conditions

While Palestinians residing outside refugee camps rely on the Internal Security Forces (ISF) for security, protection or law enforcement issues,\(^{148}\) those living in one of the 12 recognized refugee camps are subject to the exercise of control at the hands of Palestinian factions, with different camps often ruled by different factions.\(^{149}\) Based on a historical and now defunct arrangement between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanon authorities, the latter are reported to generally abstain from exercising government control in refugee camps.\(^{150}\) Lebanese security forces reportedly control the camp entrances, checking vehicles and identities at armed checkpoints.\(^{151}\) It is reported that “[I]n the camps, all the Palestinian factions, including Leftist groups, Islamist factions, or Fatah, have weaponry and militiamen at their disposal, and have their own security apparatus.”\(^{152}\) Political divisions and competition over influence among armed factions in the camps reportedly result in...
political killings\(^{153}\) and sporadic factional fighting among both Palestinian and non-Palestinian groups, with political connections to the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, which has been fighting alongside the Assad government in neighboring Syria. Most recently, in late July [2015], a sniper shot and killed Fatah military leader Talal al-Balawneh (also known as Talal al-Ourdouni) as he drove his car through the [Ein El-Hilweh] camp; Al Jazeera, Refugees Seek Lasting Peace in Lebanon’s Ain Al-Hilweh, 31 August 2015, \[\text{http://aje.io/hpvyn}\]. See also, Electronic Intifada, Double Displacement: Palestinians Flee Violence in Syria, then Lebanon, 3 September 2015, \[\text{http://bit.ly/1WgkArU}\]; Al Monitor, Hamas Working to Lower Tensions in Lebanese Camps, 15 June 2015, \[\text{http://almon.co/2g9u}\].

2. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

According to reports, both state security forces and Palestinian factions subject Palestinian refugees to arbitrary arrest and detention, with the latter reported to be operating their own detention facilities in the refugee camps.\(^{160}\) Palestinian factions in the refugee camps reportedly run their own system of justice which functions outside of state control.\(^{161}\) The Committee against Torture (CAT) found that torture was a pervasive practice that was routinely used by the armed forces and law enforcement agencies, most often in pre-trial detention. Evidence gathered throughout the country indicated a clear pattern of widespread torture and ill-treatment of suspects in custody.\(^{162}\) Human rights and civil society actors

\(^{153}\) “Coordinating with other hardline Salafist groups, such as the Muslim Youths and Fatah al-Isalam, Jund al-Sham over the past year has assassinated dozens of Palestinians - particularly those with political connections to the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, which has been fighting alongside the Assad government in neighboring Syria. Most recently, in late July [2015], a sniper shot and killed Fatah military leader Talal al-Balawneh (also known as Talal al-Ourdouni) as he drove his car through the [Ein El-Hilweh] camp; Al Jazeera, Refugees Seek Lasting Peace in Lebanon’s Ain Al-Hilweh, 31 August 2015, \[\text{http://aje.io/hpvyn}\]. See also, Electronic Intifada, Double Displacement: Palestinians Flee Violence in Syria, then Lebanon, 3 September 2015, \[\text{http://bit.ly/1WgkArU}\]; Al Monitor, Hamas Working to Lower Tensions in Lebanese Camps, 15 June 2015, \[\text{http://almon.co/2g9u}\].


\(^{156}\) “Marwan Issa, a Lebanese member of the Hezbollah-backed Resistance Brigades, was found dead in the boot of a car in Ain al-Hilweh last April. He is believed to have been slain by Salafist groups who were angry about coordination between local groups and Hezbollah, and wanted to dissuade the Palestinian Joint Security Forces from deploying troops in the Jund al-Sham-controlled Tawari neighborhood of the camp”; Al Jazeera, Refugees Seek Lasting Peace in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh, 31 August 2015, \[\text{http://aje.io/hpvyn}\]. See also Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, October 2015; Al Monitor, Hamas Working to Lower Tensions in Lebanese Camps, 15 June 2015, \[\text{http://almon.co/2g9u}\].


\(^{158}\) Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, October 2015.

\(^{159}\) AUB, Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 2015 (to be published). See also, DIS, Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, October 2014, pp. 16-17.


\(^{161}\) "Palestinian groups in refugee camps operated an autonomous and arbitrary system of justice outside the control of the state. For example, local popular committees in the camps attempted to resolve disputes using tribal methods of reconciliation. If the case involved a killing, the committees occasionally transferred the accused to state authorities for trial"; US Department of State, 2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon, 25 June 2015, \[\text{http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html}\].

reported of “persistent reports” of torture and ill-treatment of Palestinians, among others, in pre-trial detention.  

3. Palestinian Individuals in Conflict with Armed Factions

Palestinian individuals may reportedly be at risk of being subjected to harassment, threats or abuse at the hands of militant factions in the camps. As the Lebanese authorities have no access to the camps (with the exception of Nahr El-Bared Camp), those at risk can reportedly not seek protection from the Lebanese authorities. Whether or not the concerned individual could seek protection from political factions or inter-factional popular/security committees in the camp reportedly depends on the individual’s political affiliations and/or connections with influential persons or families.

4. Nahr El-Bared Camp

Nahr El-Bared camp was originally established in 1949 to accommodate Palestine refugees from northern Palestine. It developed into the second largest camp in Lebanon, with a population of about 30,000 residents. The area of the camp is divided into the “old” camp and the “new” camp. The “old” camp is roughly 0.2 km² and UNRWA is responsible for providing services to the population residing there.

An armed confrontation between the Islamist Fatah Al-Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) between May and September 2007 reportedly resulted in the death of dozens of civilians and the displacement of over 27,000 camp residents who fled Nahr El-Bared camp to nearby Beddawi camp. Heavy artillery and aerial bombardments of Nahr El-Bared camp during a three-month siege reportedly resulted in an estimated 95 per cent of all buildings and infrastructure being destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Numerous people were reportedly arrested and, at the time of writing, dozens are said to remain in detention. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted an Opinion in 2014, recognizing the arbitrary character of the detention of 72 persons arrested following the 2007

---


165 DIS, Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, October 2014, pp. 17-23.

166 Jaber Suleiman, Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, April 2006, p. 8.


Nahr El-Bared crisis. Since the Lebanese Army entered the camp in September 2007, Lebanese authorities have exercised a level of control in Nahr El-Bared, unlike in the other refugee camps.

The Government of Lebanon and the international community committed to rebuild the destroyed camp at the 2008 Vienna Donor Conference, with UNRWA leading the relief and reconstruction efforts. In December 2015, more than eight years later, only fifty per cent of the “old” camp was reconstructed due to complex logistical, legal, political and financial challenges. As of May 2015, more than 9,200 residents were able to return to newly reconstructed apartments in the camp. A further 3,100 are set to return by the end of 2016, leaving just under 10,000 still displaced and struggling to cope with their reduced socioeconomic circumstances.

The prolonged displacement from Nahr El-Bared has reportedly resulted in acute humanitarian needs among the affected population. Emergency humanitarian relief provided to the displaced families, including food assistance, additional health care coverage, and rental cash subsidies, was reduced in 2013 and was finally stopped in September 2015 as a result of funding shortages. In particular, the cut in rental subsidies exposed many of the over 1,800 affected families to the risk of eviction. In addition, over 600 displaced families reportedly live in cramped conditions in sub-standard temporary shelters in the “new” area of the camp, which was built as a temporary emergency solution intended for a period of only three to four years.

The arrival of some 5,800 Palestine refugees from Syria to Nahr El-Bared camp and Beddawi camp, in addition to an unknown number of Syrian refugees, since 2011, has reportedly created additional strain on already overstretched infrastructure and resources, and increased competition for housing and jobs. While approximately 600 new shops were constructed, economic activities are reportedly limited due to restrictions on movements in and out of the camps.

Five Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) checkpoints at the entrances to the camp reportedly control movement into and out of Nahr El-Bared through a permit and access regime covering the area of both the “old” camp and the “new” camp. While initially very strict, restrictions on movement in and out of the camp have reportedly eased considerably since 2012.

---


174 International organization in Lebanon, November 2015.

175 International organization in Lebanon, December 2015.

176 Figures as of November 2015; UNRWA Lebanon Field Office.

177 International organization in Lebanon, January 2016. See also, ICG, Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps, 19 February 2009, p. 74.


179 “UNRWA stated the directorate generally approved such transfers. In 2012 authorities revoked the requirement to obtain an access permit to enter the Nahr el-Bared camp, and Lebanese and Palestinians entering the camps needed only to show their identity cards at LAF checkpoints outside the camp”; US Department of State, 2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon, 25 June 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html; Al Jazeera,
Military vehicles reportedly continue to conduct patrols and firearms are not permitted inside the camp.180 While there is an Internal Security Forces (ISF) police station inside the camp intended to serve camp residents, the military has reportedly retained its role as the sole authority with the role of the ISF largely auxiliary.181

5. Rashidieh Camp

Rashidieh camp was established in 1936 just outside the city of Tyre. Rashidieh was heavily affected during the Lebanese civil war, especially between 1982 and 1987, with more than 5,000 refugees displaced and nearly 600 shelters totally or partially destroyed.182 It is estimated that since 2011, approximately 1,000 refugees from Syria have joined the existing camp population.183 Rashidieh’s residents mainly work as casual labourers in construction and agriculture. There is a high drop-out rate in schools as students are often forced to leave school in order to support their families. Shelters in the camp are reportedly small, cramped and often unsafe, with families adding storeys over the years to already unsound structures; some homes still have metal sheet roofing. Sewerage, drainage and water infrastructure is reported to be problematic, resulting in regular flooding in the winter. In addition, families whose shelters are located on the seafront reportedly experience regular flooding and extensive damages during winter storms.184 In July 2015, tensions related to infrastructure works in the camp reportedly escalated into hostilities between armed elements.185 The security situation in the camp reportedly deteriorated, with schools, shops and other services not able to function.186 One man was reportedly killed and several wounded, with property in the camp damaged by arson and gunfire.187 At the time of writing, the situation is reported to have relatively improved, but remains volatile.188

6. Shatila Camp

Shatila camp is located in southern Beirut and was established in 1949 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to accommodate hundreds of refugees who fled from villages in Galilee in northern Palestine after 1948.189 The camp covers an area of 0.4 km² and has grown to host approximately 18,000 persons, of which the majority, over 11,600, are Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA, including some 1,600 Palestine refugees from Syria.190 Lebanese and foreign residents also live in the camp.191 Shatila has a total of four UNRWA installations, including a school, a health centre,
a camp services office and a relief office. UNRWA also operates two schools in the neighbouring Sabra area.\footnote{Information provided by UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, January 2016.}

From 1975 until 1990, during the Lebanese civil war, the camp was reportedly the scene of frequent clashes, resulting in the large-scale destruction of property and displacement of refugees.\footnote{See, e.g., ICG, Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps, 19 February 2009, p. 2.} During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Shatila and the neighbouring Sabra area were targeted in what the United Nations General Assembly acknowledged as a massacre.\footnote{United Nations General Assembly, The Situation in the Middle East, A/RES/37/123, 16 December 1982, http://bit.ly/1Q4IFCU.}

Following the end of the civil war, Shatila camp reportedly became a refuge for many non-Palestinians, including illegal migrants and domestic workers who had escaped from their Lebanese employers, as well as Iraqi and Syrian refugees.\footnote{See, e.g., Muftah, A Brewing Crisis: Tensions between Palestinian & Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 9 January 2014, http://bit.ly/20onVp6.} The burgeoning population has reportedly resulted in a strain on the already sub-standard infrastructure of the camp. Residents reportedly live in extremely poor and cramped conditions, with frequent cuts to water and electricity. One of the perils of the camp environment is an extensive network of criss-crossing electricity wires, which hang low between the narrow alleys of the camp and intertwine with water pipes. A number of deaths in the camp are reported every year from electrocution.\footnote{The National, Shatila’s Population Unknown as Palestinian Refugee Camp Bursts at Seams, 14 January 2016, http://bit.ly/1PvWDrL; The Guardian, Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Camp Reliant on ‘Hell Water’ that Reduces Metal to Rust, 26 May 2015, http://bit.ly/1cgrY4x.}

### 7. Ein El-Hilweh Camp

Ein El-Hilweh camp for Palestine refugees was established near the city of Sidon in 1948. The camp also received many refugees from other camps within Lebanon, particularly from near Tripoli, who had been displaced during the Lebanese civil war. As a result, Ein El-Hilweh became the biggest Palestine refugee camp in Lebanon with an estimated population of 80,000 people,\footnote{Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). From Syria to Ain el-Hilweh: Alleviating the Suffering of Refugees in Saida, 17 May 2013, http://bit.ly/1QmAdJL.} residing in an area of only 1.5 km². The camp inhabitants were reportedly particularly affected by violence between 1982 and 1991, which resulted in a high number of casualties and the near total destruction of the camp. Today, the camp population includes more than 5,000 Palestine refugees who fled the conflict from Syria.\footnote{UNRWA, Where We Work – Camp Profiles, accessed 23 February 2016, http://bit.ly/1nyu6df.}

Ein El-Hilweh’s inhabitants mainly work as casual labourers in construction sites, orchards and embroidery workshops, or as cleaners. There is a comparatively high drop-out rate in schools as students are often forced to leave school in order to support their families. Shelters in the camp are reportedly small and very close to each other; some still have metal sheet roofing. A number of displaced refugees reportedly continue to live on the edge of the camp in extremely poor conditions.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the 1980s and 1990s, Ein El-Hilweh camp reportedly became the main focus of groups considered jihadist, which sought to take advantage of the security vacuum that followed Israel’s invasion in 1982.\footnote{ICG, Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps, 19 February 2009, p. 24, FN 199.} This situation still reportedly persists today, with not only members of such groups, but also fugitives wanted by Lebanese authorities reportedly residing in the camp.\footnote{See, e.g., Naharnet, Palestinian Rivals ‘Agree Ceasefire’ in Ain el-Hilweh, 26 August 2015, http://bit.ly/1Te2Caf; The Daily Star, Palestinians Reach Cease-Fire Agreement in Ain al-Hilweh, 23 August 2015, http://bit.ly/1POXNCt; Nicolas Dot-Poullard, Between Radicalization and Mediation Processes: a Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee...
Most recently, in late August 2015, tensions between rival groups reportedly resulted in six days of fighting between the Fatah Party and the Salafist Jund Al-Sham and their respective allies, which led to six Palestinians being killed and/or wounded, and some 3,000 Palestinian refugees being displaced. Some houses were reportedly taken over by armed groups, and there was destruction of homes and infrastructure. According to reports, the fighting was triggered by the attempted assassination of a local Fatah member on 21 August 2015. Heavy fighting was reported in the vicinity of a number of UNRWA installations, including schools and health clinics. Despite a ceasefire having been reached, the situation reportedly remains extremely tense in the camp. Newly formed Palestinian Joint Security Forces, composed of multiple Palestinian factions, ranging from secular to Islamic factions, including Fatah, Usbat Al-Ansar, Ansar Allah and the Alliance of Palestinian Forces, are reportedly in charge of law enforcement within the camp, in coordination with the Lebanese authorities, namely the Lebanese Army, which guard the entrances of Ein El-Hilweh Camp. However, recent armed clashes have reportedly hampered the efficiency of this cooperation.

---


