Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 9 of its resolution 1159 (1998) of 27 March 1998, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), with effect from 15 April 1998.

2. In paragraph 15 of the resolution, the Security Council requested me to keep it regularly informed and to submit a report by 20 June 1998 on the implementation of the mandate of MINURCA, on developments in the Central African Republic, on progress towards the implementation of the commitments expressed in the letter of 8 January 1998 to me from the President of the Central African Republic and on the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the National Reconciliation Pact, including on commitments related to ensuring the country's economic recovery. By paragraph 16, the Council requested me to include in the report information on the progress made by the Government of the Central African Republic in adopting an electoral code, setting a date for legislative elections and developing specific plans for the conduct of legislative elections, and to make recommendations on the future role of the United Nations in the legislative election process.

3. The present report provides the Security Council with an update on developments since my previous report on the situation in the Central African Republic, dated 23 February 1998 (S/1998/148).

II. STATUS OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSION

4. The establishment of MINURCA on 15 April 1998 was marked by a brief military ceremony transferring authority from the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) to MINURCA. On 16 April, my Special Representative, Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji, and the Chairman of the International Monitoring Committee, General Amadou Toumani Touré, jointly presided over a political transfer ceremony. On the same day, the Special Representative met with President Ange-Félix Patassé to explain to him the mandate and concept of MINURCA operations.

5. Despite the unusually tight schedule laid down by resolution 1159 (1998), MINURCA became operational on 15 April thanks to the efforts of a transition team of United Nations military planners, logisticians, communications specialists and administrative staff, who arrived in Bangui on 4 April to set up the integrated headquarters of the new Mission. Since the establishment of the Mission, its operational capacity has continued to improve. As at 15 June 1998, total troop strength stood at over 1,200 personnel, with contingents from Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo, out of the maximum strength of 1,350 personnel authorized by the resolution. A contingent from Egypt is expected to join MINURCA by the end of June. With regard to the civilian personnel, 73 of the approved total of 106 international staff have been deployed, with most of the remaining staff expected to arrive in Bangui shortly. However, of 24 civilian police trainers, only 8 have so far been deployed, owing to the late response of contributing countries.

III. POLITICAL ASPECTS

6. Since the establishment of MINURCA, the overall political situation in Bangui has been generally calm, but volatile. The process of national reconciliation launched by the Bangui Agreements (S/1997/561) received significant impetus from the adoption on 4 March 1998 of the National Reconciliation Pact by all Central African political parties. The Pact banned the use of force as an instrument of achieving political power, emphasizing that power should be attained only through elections, and the signatories pledged to work for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. The Pact made provision for the establishment of a Monitoring and Arbitration Committee (Comité de suivi et d'arbitrage) to follow up on the implementation of the Pact and the Bangui Agreements and to arbitrate in case of disputes. Accordingly, the Committee was set up by a presidential decree on 26 March 1998. While the Committee, which consists of representatives of the Government, the opposition and civil society, is still in the process of organizing itself, it is emerging as an entity that can play a constructive reconciliation role. At the request of my Special Representative, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been providing much-needed administrative and logistical support to the Committee.

7. Another important provision of the Bangui Agreements was implemented with the adoption on 30 April 1998 of the Press Code by the National Assembly and the establishment by a presidential decree dated 27 May 1998 of a commission to oversee the freedom of the press (Haut Conseil de la communication). Those steps towards freedom of the press are significant, in particular in view of the forthcoming legislative elections.

8. In the area of governance, during several meetings with Government representatives the Special Representative stressed the importance the international community attaches to respect for human rights, as well as transparency and accountability of Government. In that context, the Government of the Central African Republic is preparing to hold a conference on good governance in Bangui in the next few months with funding from UNDP. Furthermore, the office of my Special Representative has been providing advice to the authorities of the Central African Republic and facilitating technical assistance in the areas of good governance and the rule of law, pursuant to paragraph 14 (e) of resolution 1159 (1998).

9. In a welcome development, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Gabon, Kenya, Senegal, Togo and the United States of America have constituted themselves as the Group of Friends of the Central African Republic. The Group has developed a number of indicators for necessary reforms, focusing on the need for progress in preparing for the elections, in the restructuring of security forces and in the conclusion of agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions. Similar groups have played a very constructive role in other conflict situations. However, the effectiveness of the Group may be somewhat limited by the fact that only two of its members have diplomatic representatives in the Central African Republic.

10. Late last year, Mr. Charles Massi, then the Minister of Mines, was dismissed from his post for allegedly waiving taxes owed by a diamond purchasing company, and criminal charges were levelled against him. In the meantime, Mr. Massi resigned from the ruling party and registered his own political party. He has been arguing that the charges against him and his subsequent house arrest were politically motivated. My Special Representative met with him twice and urged President Patassé to order the lifting of the house arrest of Mr. Massi. On 12 June, Mr. Massi was acquitted of all charges by the Constitutional Court.

11. Members of the Security Council are aware of the invaluable role played in the Central African Republic by MISAB, as well as by the International Mediation Commission and the International Monitoring Committee, respectively under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Gabon, El Hadj Omar Bongo, and General Touré, former Head of State of Mali. In a letter dated 30 April 1998, General Touré informed me of the end of MISAB and the International Monitoring Committee, but expressed his determination to continue to follow the situation in the Central African Republic. I welcome the continued efforts of regional leaders, who made such crucial contributions to restoring stability in Bangui and to promoting political reforms in the Central African Republic.

12. Notwithstanding those encouraging developments, a number of serious political difficulties remain. Divisions and distrust, including along ethnic and regional lines, continue to persist in Central African society. While the creation in February 1997 of a Government of National Unity, which included several opposition parties, was a major step towards reconciliation, the Government has remained a somewhat uneasy coalition, with recurring accusations from opposition parties that their ministers have been given less important responsibilities. The so-called Group of 11 opposition parties, which currently consists of 9 parties, has continued to threaten to withdraw from the Government. While those threats have not been carried out, they are indicative of a continuing lack of much-needed confidence among various political groups in the country.

Preparation for elections

13. While some progress has been made in preparing for the legislative elections scheduled for August/September 1998, much still remains to be done. On 26 March 1998, an Electoral Code was adopted by the National Assembly, which provided for the creation of an independent and mixed electoral commission (Commission electorale mixte et independante). The Code provided that the Electoral Commission would be created by a decree adopted by the Council of Ministers. However, a special committee of representatives of all recognized political parties failed to reach consensus on the text of a draft decree on the Commission. While parties of the presidential majority proposed the continuation of the system whereby the Minister of Interior would preside over the Commission, the opposition insisted on the appointment of a neutral and independent candidate.

14. Upon his arrival in Bangui, my Special Representative undertook intensive consultations aimed at finding a solution to this impasse. On 22 May 1998, President Patassé appointed Mr. Michel Adama-Tamboux, a retired ambassador and the first Speaker of the National Assembly after independence in 1960, as Chairman of the Commission. On 28 May, the decree creating the Electoral Commission was promulgated, conferring on President Patassé the power to appoint the Chairman.

15. The opposition objected strongly to the lack of due consultations on the appointment of Mr. Adama-Tamboux and the ex post facto promulgation of the relevant decree. My Special Representative made significant efforts to mediate between the parties, and convened the Monitoring and Arbitration Committee to discuss those issues. It is widely believed among international observers in Bangui that Mr. Adama-Tamboux is generally qualified for the position. However, some opposition parties remain very sceptical.

16. In a further effort to bridge divisions and promote trust among the parties, my Special Representative, in keeping with the basic law on political parties, appealed to the President to permit all registered political parties to be represented on the Electoral Commission (the initial decree had restricted representation to only the 15 parties represented in the National Assembly). President Patassé followed this recommendation and amended the decree on 5 June. Consequently, the Commission will have all 35 registered political parties represented, as well as representatives of the 16 prefectures and observers from civil society. The Electoral Commission has now been legally established, but it has not yet met, as a significant number of opposition parties, namely the Group of 11 and five other parties, have not yet agreed to join the Commission. My Special Representative will continue his efforts to reconcile the positions of the parties.

17. The three electoral experts of MINURCA have begun working with the appropriate bodies of the Central African Republic on an operational plan and draft budget and to sensitize potential donors, while the Government has also initiated some preparations for the elections. However, the difficulties affecting the Electoral Commission have prevented it from beginning its work. It is also clear that potential donors would consider contributing to the electoral exercise only after the Electoral Commission had developed a detailed operational plan and a realistic timetable for implementation.

18. On 8 June, the Minister of Interior announced President Patassé's decision to hold legislative elections on 16 and 30 August. That announcement created further complications, as the decree establishing the Electoral Commission states that it has to be installed at least three months before the elections are to take place. Furthermore, the proposed time-frame would not allow the United Nations and other international organizations to make arrangements for the provision of the necessary assistance for the elections.

Public information

19. Shortly after its establishment, MINURCA commenced public information activities in order to disseminate information about its mandate and its activities. The press in the Central African Republic has few resources and remains weak. The dissemination of accurate, objective information must therefore be treated as a priority if reconciliation and peace are to take hold in the country. Since May, my Special Representative, assisted by the Force Commander and the Director of my Special Representative's office (the UNDP Resident Representative), has given weekly press conferences. Furthermore, the Mission still intends to launch a United Nations radio programme (see para. 38 below).

IV. MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES

Activities of United Nations troops

20. Since its establishment, MINURCA has assisted in maintaining the secure and stable environment established in Bangui by MISAB. Although full deployment of the military component of MINURCA has been delayed because of the last-minute withdrawal of a troop contributor, almost all military tasks laid down by resolution 1159 (1998) are being fulfilled.

21. MINURCA has made concerted efforts to increase mechanized and foot patrols in the city, particularly in troublesome areas of Bangui. Those patrols are conducted 24 hours a day. MINURCA also participates in joint patrols with elements of the Central African armed forces and security forces, thus encouraging them to take a more active part in maintaining law and order. To ensure effective coordination, MINURCA created a Joint Security Commission for Bangui comprising the United Nations Force Commander and the commanders of the Central African armed forces, the National Police and the Gendarmerie, as well as the Special Force for the Defence of Republican Institutions, which is the successor to the dissolved Presidential Guard. The United Nations troops also serve an important humanitarian role in providing emergency medical assistance to the civilian population in Bangui.

22. However, the situation in the interior of the country remains precarious, with continued reports of banditry and other serious criminal acts. Almost all Central African parties, as well as United Nations programmes and agencies operating in the Central African Republic, have repeatedly urged MINURCA to expand its area of operations beyond Bangui and its immediate vicinity. Currently, United Nations partners are paying special fees for the provision of escorts by the Central African armed forces and the Gendarmerie for missions outside the capital.

23. MINURCA has recently been conducting very limited one-day reconnaissance missions to key locations in the interior of the country to assess the situation outside Bangui in order to facilitate preparations for the elections and to formulate recommendations on a future role for the United Nations in the electoral process, as requested by the Security Council.

Restructuring of the Central African armed forces

24. As indicated in my previous report (S/1998/148), on 29 January 1998 the Commission on the Restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces, working under the overall supervision of General Touré, had recommended to President Patassé the dissolution of the security services and major downsizing and restructuring of the Presidential Guard. On 4 March, the President issued decrees implementing those recommendations. At the same time, two new entities were created: the Special Force for the Defence of Republican Institutions and the Directorate-General for State Documentation. While those steps were widely welcomed, the President's decisions to include in the new national security entity a judiciary police branch and to deploy the Special Force in the countryside were strongly criticized in the Central African Republic.

25. At the same time, no progress has been made in implementing the recommendations of the Commission concerning the creation of a national, republican and multi-ethnic army, whose size and activities would be in line with national budgetary capacity. The collapse of the chain of command and discipline and the outstanding salary arrears make the Central African armed forces, whose current strength is estimated at 3,500 personnel, a potentially destabilizing factor in the Central African Republic. The President, the Minister of Defence and his Deputy in charge of the restructuring of the armed forces, as well as some diplomatic representatives in Bangui have urged MINURCA to play a more active role in assisting in the restructuring of the Central African armed forces. It is clear that lasting stability and security in the country will depend on the transformation of the Central African defence and security forces into a professional corps dedicated to respect for the rule of law.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

26. As was indicated in my previous report, almost 93 per cent of heavy weapons and nearly 58 per cent of light weapons were retrieved during the disarmament exercise carried out by MISAB together with the Central African authorities. By resolution 1159 (1998), it was decided that MINURCA should supervise, control the storage of and monitor the final disposition of those weapons. Accordingly, weapons, munitions and explosives recovered by MISAB are now being stored and guarded by MINURCA at two locations. MINURCA has also been destroying hazardous munitions collected.

27. It is expected that any new arms recovered by the authorities will be handed over to MINURCA, pending their final disposition. While the mandate of MINURCA does not foresee active participation in the disarmament exercise, the Mission responds to reports of arms caches. In that context, on 4 and 5 May MINURCA recovered a limited quantity of ammunition. There is also considerable concern over the flow of arms within the country, particularly in view of the porous nature of the borders and the weakness of the defence and security forces.

28. The Project on Demobilization and Reintegration, funded by UNDP/United Nations Office for Project Services, envisages the demobilization of 1,000 military personnel in the context of the general restructuring of the armed forces. A project strategy document was finalized in April by UNDP, in collaboration with the Deputy Minister for Defence in charge of the restructuring of the armed forces. UNDP has created a technical committee on demobilization and reintegration. MINURCA participates in its work in order to ensure that the demobilization efforts are linked to the process of restructuring the Central African armed forces. MINURCA has recently been requested to provide security for the registration of Central African armed forces personnel and those personnel to be demobilized throughout the country.

Civilian police

29. Paragraph 10 (e) of Security Council resolution 1159 (1998) mandated MINURCA to assist in a short-term police trainers programme and in other capacity-building efforts for the National Police. The MINURCA Police Commissioner arrived in Bangui on 21 April, but the Mission has not yet achieved full operational capacity, as indicated in paragraph 5 above. In the meantime, facilities for the training programmes of the National Police trainers have been identified and work has begun on their rehabilitation. In consultation with the Government, MINURCA has also developed a plan of action, identifying key training areas and equipment needs, as well as infrastructural needs. Preliminary contacts have been initiated with donors, whose assistance in professionalizing the security forces would be indispensable.

V. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

30. The economy of the Central African Republic, which was severely damaged during the mutinies and looting of 1996, has not yet recovered. According to UNDP, despite significant natural resources, 64.4 per cent of the population live below the poverty line, with 35.5 per cent living in acute poverty. Economic and social problems are among the root causes of the crisis and should be urgently addressed by the Central African authorities in close coordination with international financial institutions and other partners. In that connection, my Special Representative has cooperated closely with all relevant entities working towards lasting reconstruction and development in the country.

31. The precipitous decline in private sector activities, which paralysed commercial life in the aftermath of the mutinies of 1996, is being reversed only gradually. It is obvious that restoration of long-term security and stability will also be crucial for the return of foreign investors. At the same time, the Government must continue to implement the necessary reform measures, which it has committed itself to undertaking, in a timely and effective manner. Those measures include increased revenue collection through greater efficiency, enhanced transparency and accountability and anti-corruption measures; regular payment of salaries of public employees and the earliest clearance of the accumulated arrears of unpaid salaries; and fulfilment of the conditions agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

32. So far, the efforts of the Government have resulted in modest macro-financial progress. Government-collected revenues have risen from 2.1 billion CFA francs per month in the first quarter of 1997 to CFAF 3.8 billion per month in the first quarter of 1998. By April 1998, the collected revenues had reached the level of CFAF 4.4 billion. However, that achievement is still far from the target of CFAF 5.5 billion to be attained by June 1998. Improved revenue collection has permitted regular monthly payment of salaries from March 1998 onwards and a modest reduction, to 10 months, in the accumulated arrears of unpaid salaries. The schedule of repayments to IMF has been kept up to date, and a revised budget was adopted by the National Assembly on 3 June.

33. In March, the IMF and World Bank reached an understanding with the Government on a medium-term programme for the 1998-2000 period that could be supported by resources from the Fund (under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility) and the Bank (under an economic recovery credit). A letter of intent and a memorandum on economic and financial policies for 1998 were also negotiated by the Fund, in support of the authorities' request for the first annual structural adjustment arrangement. Further discussions were held in Washington D.C., in April on structural reform issues. The policy framework paper for 1998-2000 was prepared by IMF and the World Bank on 1 June. The authorities of the Central African Republic believe that they have met all the preconditions except in the area of privatization. They are also optimistic about the outcome of a meeting with donors, which took place in Washington, D.C., on 15 June.

34. While some progress has been made, much remains to be done in terms of reviewing the law on finance with a view to focusing on vital development sectors and public services in education and health; eradicating all non-orthodox procedures of public finance management; introducing sound and transparent management in the diamond sector to attract foreign investors and thus increase government revenues; and privatizing public enterprises. In the context of this last issue, which is an important element for the conclusion of an accord with IMF, negotiations for the privatization of the oil sector were resumed in Bangui in May with three major international oil companies. Those negotiations are continuing, and the authorities hope to reach a satisfactory understanding on the issues over the next few weeks.

35. An issue with serious humanitarian and security ramifications is the situation of the approximately 1,200 Rwandan asylum seekers, who are mostly settled in the northern parts of the country. Following violent incidents between them and the local population in March, the Government insisted that the asylum seekers be resettled in third countries and requested assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in that regard. Denmark, Norway and Sweden agreed to receive some asylum seekers. So far, only 64 have left the Central African Republic, while 200 other Rwandans are awaiting possible resettlement in third countries in Africa.

VI. ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS

36. The rapid establishment of the new Mission, as described in paragraph 5 above, was due to a number of factors, including the provision by France of voluntary in-kind contributions consisting of air transportation of contingents and partial waiver of the reimbursement costs for military equipment and medical services rendered to MINURCA. The UNDP office in Bangui also provided invaluable assistance enabling MINURCA to meet urgent requirements during the initial phase of the operation. The status-of-forces agreement between the Government of the Central African Republic and the United Nations was concluded on 8 May. Cooperation between the Central African authorities and MINURCA has also been facilitated by the creation of a special high-level committee, of senior Government officials (Comité interlocuteur de la MINURCA). At the same time, the Government gave critical support to MINURCA by providing Camp Béal and parts of Camp M'Poko free of charge. However, owing to lack of many essential facilities in Bangui, logistical aspects of the Mission remain a very challenging task, and much remains to be done to ensure the provision of the necessary support to all contingents.

37. On 1 June, I wrote to the Foreign Ministers of Cameroon and Gabon to request that certain immunities, privileges and facilities be granted to MINURCA, which is using those countries as important points of transit and as logistics and supply bases.

38. A trust fund for the support of the activities of MINURCA was established on 20 April pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 1159 (1998), in order to enable Member States to make voluntary contributions to support the activities of MINURCA. So far, no contributions to the fund have been received. At the same time, the Government of Denmark has indicated its willingness to make a voluntary contribution by providing to MINURCA frequency modulation (FM) and short-wave transmitters to enhance the Mission's public information capacity, which would be very important for United Nations efforts in the country. Following the conclusion of the MINURCA mandate, the broadcasting equipment could be used in other United Nations missions.

39. As I indicated in my report of 11 May 1998 on the financing of MINURCA (A/52/895), pending consideration by the Security Council of the present report, my proposed budget for the establishment and maintenance of MINURCA covers the period from 27 March to 30 November 1998.

40. Subject to the extension of the Mission's mandate by the Security Council beyond 15 July 1998, the budget for this period amounts to $49.6 million gross, inclusive of the estimated voluntary contribution in kind of $2.1 million from the Government of France, and provides for 1,350 military contingent personnel and 24 civilian police supported by 179 civilian staff (106 international and 73 local). A review of my budgetary proposals has been completed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee, and I expect the General Assembly to adopt the financing resolution shortly. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Mission as recommended below, the cost of maintaining MINURCA during the extension period would be within my proposed budget.

41. As at 15 June 1998, the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to US$ 1,530.8 million.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

42. Since the transfer of authority from MISAB to MINURCA on 15 April, MINURCA has succeeded in maintaining security and stability in Bangui, and my Special Representative has been actively promoting the reforms necessary to achieve lasting national reconciliation, peace, reconstruction and development in the Central African Republic. All Central African parties, as well as countries in the region, have welcomed the deployment of MINURCA, as they believe that without a credible external force, violence could return to Bangui. It is also widely acknowledged that the establishment of the United Nations Mission has contributed to maintaining international peace and security in the region.

43. During the reporting period, some progress has been made in implementing major reforms outlined in my previous report to the Security Council (S/1998/148). However, much more remains to be done, since the political climate in the Central African Republic remains permeated by division and distrust. National reconciliation and the security situation are still fragile. If lasting peace is to be achieved, urgent action is needed in the following priority areas: the credible restructuring of the defence and security forces, the organization of free and fair legislative elections and economic and social recovery.

44. The main responsibility for the implementation of those essential tasks lies with the Central African Government and the political parties. At the same time, it is clear that the Government and people of the Central African Republic need external assistance. In that connection, I call upon not only traditional donors, but also upon all Member States and regional organizations to provide the required assistance. Without decisive domestic efforts and external support, the country may well return to instability and serious violence.

45. It is indispensable that the Government make all possible efforts to conclude agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions to address the pressing economic and social difficulties facing the country. Particular attention must be given to meeting unpaid salary arrears as soon as possible. The donors' meeting on 15 June in Washington, D.C., was an important first step in generating the necessary external support enabling the Central African Republic to meet the goals set by the international financial institutions.

46. Equally, I call upon the Government and all other members of Central African civil society to implement in a timely manner the plans developed by the Commission on the Restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces, which were based on the recommendations developed by the General Meeting on National Defence held in September 1996 in Bangui. I wish to encourage the international community to lend its support to this important endeavour through bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes. My Special Representative would be ready to monitor and coordinate, as appropriate, such international support and to provide technical advice to donors on the restructuring needs.

47. I also strongly urge all Central African parties to reconcile their differences to allow for the urgent installation of the Electoral Commission and the development of a detailed operational plan for the elections, including a realistic implementation timetable and the allocation of funds. Only when these minimum requirements are met would I be in a position to formulate recommendations on a future role of the United Nations in the legislative elections process. In the meantime, MINURCA, working in close collaboration with UNDP, will continue to provide advice and technical assistance to all relevant electoral bodies.

48. The electoral unit of MINURCA estimates that a minimum of 90 to 100 days would be required to prepare credible elections once the Electoral Commission has been installed and critical funding has been obtained, including from the donor community. As indicated in my previous report, MINURCA could, in due course, recruit electoral observers to establish a presence throughout the country and coordinate the international assistance necessary for the successful conduct of free and fair elections. In that connection, it is clear that concerted action would be required to ensure security throughout the country for the safe conduct of the elections. In addition to the Government's measures, I could envisage the possibility of recommending the deployment of United Nations troops in some key locations outside Bangui to protect electoral observers. I will continue to review the security requirements and will revert to the issue when appropriate.

49. In the meantime, in view of the need for MINURCA to continue to assess, for electoral purposes, the situation outside of Bangui and in order to provide support to United Nations humanitarian activities throughout the country, I would recommend that the military component of MINURCA conduct reconnaissance missions and to provide security escorts of short duration outside the capital.

50. In view of the current situation in the Central African Republic as described in the present report, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINURCA by two months, until 15 September 1998. However, should the necessary electoral preparations be made by the Central African parties before the expiration of the mandated period, I would be prepared to submit to the Council detailed recommendations on possible United Nations involvement in the electoral process.

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