Nations in Transit - Kosovo [Serbia and Montenegro] (2004)

  • Author: Arben Qirezi
  • Document source:
  • Date:
    24 May 2004

Capital: Pristina
Population: 10,700,000
Status: Partly Free
PPP: $930
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 73
Religious Groups: Muslim (majority), Serbian Orthodox, other
Ethnic Groups: Albanian (90 percent), Serb, Muslim, Montenegrin, Turk, Croat, Roma (10 percent)

NIT Ratings2004
Electoral Process5.25
Civil Society4.25
Independent Media5.50
Governance6.00
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework6.00
Corruption6.00
Democracy RatingN/A

Executive Summary

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Constitution of 1974 provided Kosovo with dual status as an autonomous territory of Serbia and a constituent part of the federation with largely the same rights as full-fledged republics. Soon after the forceful abolition of Kosovo's autonomy by the Parliament of Serbia in March 1989, an apartheid system was established in which Belgrade extended privileges to Kosovar Serbs but excluded Kosovar Albanians from the public sector and systematically repressed them. In response, on July 2,1990, Kosovo's Parliament proclaimed the territory's independence. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), a popular movement seeking independence through peaceful means, created a government in exile and established a parallel system of education and health supported by an unofficial 3 percent tax system. The two systems coexisted in relative peace through a status quo that lasted for nearly a decade.

However, as early as 1993, a group of political activists opposing the LDK's pacifist philosophy established the first cells of the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Serbian military attacks against civilians in February and March 1998 helped the KLA grow from a 300-man insurgency into a 20,000- or 30,000-guerrilla force. Despite efforts by the international community to establish a negotiation process, Belgrade intensified its military campaign in the towns and villages where the KLA had taken shelter.

Alarmed by the execution of more than 40 unarmed civilians in the village of Racak in January 1999, the so-called Contact Group, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, and Italy, organized talks in Rambouillet and arbitrated a deal in which international military forces would safeguard Kosovo's autonomy within Yugoslavia during an interim period, until a permanent solution on the territory's status could be negotiated. When Belgrade rejected the deal and continued its attacks against civilians in Kosovo, NATO launched an air campaign against Serbian forces on March 24,1999. However, during NATO's 76-day air campaign, Serbian forces continued their violence against Kosovar Albanians, killing 12,000[1], abducting close to 2,600[2], and forcing nearly 1 million out of the region.

On June 10,1999, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1244, establishing the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Headed by the special representative of the secretary-general, UNMIK was tasked with creating substantial autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia until the territory's status could be resolved. Yugoslav armed forces were ordered to withdraw from Kosovo, and a NATO-led peacekeeping coalition known as the Kosovo Force, or KFOR, stepped in.

Before UNMIK's deployment was completed, the Kosovo provisional government, led by former KLA political leader Hashim Thaci, established itself at central and municipal levels and filled a vacuum left by the withdrawing Serbian administration. Through intense international pressure, the KLA was eventually transformed into a civilian emergency organization named the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).

During this period, thousands of Kosovar Serbs fled Kosovo, fearing retaliation from returning Kosovar Albanians. Those Serbs who remained in Kosovo were subject to systematic attacks and intimidation, which eventually forced them to leave the territory or to concentrate in Serb-dominated enclaves protected by KFOR. According to the International Red Cross Committee, more than 900 Serbs, Roma, and other minorities are reported to have been killed or gone missing in the period between January 1999 and April 2001.

In early 2000, UNMIK invited all Kosovar political factions to participate in the Joint Interim Administration Structure (JIAS), a quasi-governmental body tasked with administering Kosovo's internal affairs until the election of a Parliament. For its part, the work of UNMIK was divided into four pillars covering civil administration, humanitarian emergency response, institution building and elections, and economic reconstruction and development. The Constitutional Framework for the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) provided Kosovo substantial autonomy and delineated the powers to be exercised by UNMIK and Kosovar institutions.

The international community has spent more than US$1 billion in reconstruction, economic development, and institution building since 1999. As a result, Kosovo today has a government, a banking system, local police, a judiciary, and other institutions found in democratic societies. Nevertheless, tremendous obstacles remain. These include ensuring minority and human rights, the free movement of ethnic Serbs, and the return of displaced persons; resolving residential property issues; tackling high unemployment; privatizing state enterprises; and combating organized crime, corruption, and political violence. In these areas, Kosovo has seen little progress, if any. The international community has postponed resolving the final status issue, yet the need to address this question looms owing to an increasingly unsustainable status quo. Also looming is the difficult task of transferring remaining competencies from UNMIK to Kosovo's own governmental institutions.

[1] Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, Pristina, Kosovo. [2] "Missing Persons in Kosovo," 2nd Edition, International Red Cross Committee.

Electoral Process (Score: 5.25)

Kosovo receives a rating of 5.25 for electoral process. Elections have been generally free and fair but are still administered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rather than domestic institutions. The sustainability of such elections once authority is transferred to domestic authorities remains a key area of concern owing to a lack of political will exhibited by UNMIK, the OSCE, and Kosovar institutions to reform the electoral system. In addition, members of Kosovo's Central Assembly lack accountability to their constituencies, and citizens are largely disenchanted with political parties.

The OSCE is responsible for organizing elections in Kosovo. Since 2000, two municipal elections and one election to the Central Assembly have been held. Although the OSCE's involvement provides for fair and advanced electoral processes, the ability of Kosovo's own institutions and leaders to sustain them in the long run is unclear. UNMIK and the OSCE have indicated that decision-making authority over elections to the Central Assembly will not be transferred to domestic institutions until at least 2008.

Elections are currently managed by the OSCE's Department of Elections according to regulations set by the OSCE and UNMIK. These regulations define the electoral system, outline procedures for certifying political parties, and provide a code of conduct for campaign periods, among other provisions. They are approved by the Central Election Commission, a body comprising Kosovars and led by the head of the OSCE's mission in Kosovo. All decisions are made by consensus. However, if consensus cannot be reached, the final decision lies with the OSCE.

In the municipal elections of 2000 and 2002, a proportional voting system governing 30 electoral units was applied. While the mandate of the first elected municipal councils was limited to two years, the councils chosen in 2002 received a four-year mandate. A simple, single-district, proportional electoral system with closed lists was in place for the Central Assembly elections in 2001. Political parties competed for 100 out of a total of 120 seats; the remaining 20 seats were reserved for minority communities (10 for representatives of the Serb community and 10 for other non-Serb minorities). This system of set-aside seats was designed to motivate the participation of the ethnic Serb community, which had boycotted the first municipal elections.

Although the OSCE has indicated that no significant reform of the electoral system will be undertaken before the 2004 Central Assembly elections, a debate was stirred in 2003 over several aspects of Kosovo's electoral system. These included concern about weak accountability of assembly members to their constituencies owing to the proportional voting provision, a lack of geographic representation in the body, and overrepresentation of minorities due to the 20-seat set-aside for minority groups. To address these and other concerns – including complaints by some observers that the OSCE and UNMIK have failed to engage civil society in a transparent discussion on the future of Kosovo's electoral system – the OSCE established the Elections Working Group (EWG) and involved key Kosovar political parties and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). During the group's deliberations, the LDK argued that the current system of single-district proportional representation did not reflect genuine voter preferences. The party called instead for voting in multiple districts according to a mixed-majoritarian system. Some local and international civil society groups supported the LDK's proposal, adding other recommendations such as increasing the number of assembly seats from 120 to 140 and replacing the closed-list system with an open-list approach. Other EWG members, such as the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Serb Coalition "Return" (KP), preferred maintaining the current system. No decisions on the future of the system had been made by year's end.

Postwar elections in Kosovo have indicated overwhelming support for the LDK, in spite of the apparent social and political domination of the KLA's two successor political parties, the PDK and the AAK. In both the 2000 and 2002 municipal elections, for example, the LDK won a majority of votes (see table).

Showing of the Top Three Parties in the 2000 Municipal Elections

PartyNo. of VotesPercent of VotesNo. of Seats
LDK398,87258.0504
PDK187,82127.3267
AAK53,0747.771

Source: OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Results of voting for 27 out of 30 constituencies.

The 2001 Central Assembly elections produced similar results, though the KP pushed the AAK into fourth place. The LDK enjoyed a victory with 46 percent of the vote but was unable to form a majority government (see table). When the LDK failed to mobilize the support even of minority parties, an all-inclusive coalition cabinet was formed. The cabinet included the three main Albanian parties (LDK, PDK, and AAK), the Serb KP, and the coalition of non-Serb minorities. In exchange for the post of president of Kosovo, the LDK gave up the prime minister's seat to the PDK. Cabinet posts were divided among the LDK, the PDK, and the AAK; one cabinet slot each was reserved for representatives of the KP and non-Serb minorities.

Results of the 2001 Central Assembly Elections

PartyNo. of VotesPercent of VotesNo. of Seats
LDK359,85145.6547
PDK202,62225.7026
KP (Serb)89,38811.3422 (12 contested, 10 set-aside seats)
AAK61,6887.838
VATAN (Bosniak)9,0301.154 (3 set-aside seats)
KDTP (Turkish)7,8791.003 (2 set-aside seats)
IRDK (Roma)3,9760.502 (2 set-aside seats)
PDASHK (Ashkali)3,4110.432 (2 set-aside seats)
LKCK8,7251.111
PSHDK7,7010.981
PD4,5040.571
LPK4,4040.561
BSDAK (Bosniak)2,9060.371 (set-aside seat)
PREBK (Egyptian)2,7170.341 (set-aside seat)
PLK3,6000.460
BK2,8810.370
PQLK2,4030.300
PGJK2,3250.290
PSDK1,7850.230
XHEVDET REXHAJ1,3300.170
LATIF KRYEZIU1,1990.150
XUN CETTA1,2100.150
PRK6430.080
PNDSH10660.140
IQK6310.080
PLSH4280.050

Source: OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

Civil Society (Score: 4.25)

Kosovo receives a rating of 4.25 for civil society. Although the number of civil society groups has grown substantially since 1999, the capacity of groups is weak and their work is largely unsustainable absent international donor support. In addition, corruption appears to be a serious problem in higher education. It will be years before the civil society scene in Kosovo stabilizes.

Kosovo has experienced significant growth in the number of NGOs since the end of the conflict. Since June 1999, more than 1,000 NGOs have been registered at the UNMIK Office for the Registration of Nongovernmental Organizations. The procedures for the registration of NGOs are not overly bureaucratic and, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development's 2002 NGO Sustainability Index, there is a "very favorable NGO registration law that allows NGOs to register easily, either with or without public benefit status and the associated benefits."

The civil society sector in Kosovo remains entirely dependent on international aid, and most civil society groups do not have sufficient financial and organizational capacity to sustain their activities in the long term. Indeed, the future of many NGOs is already at stake owing to reductions in international funding. Despite these challenges, the vibrancy of civic life is growing in Kosovo, with more NGO coalitions and pressure groups increasingly advocating their interests on issues such as education reform, the fight against corruption, economic and fiscal policies, election reform, and gender equality.

The majority (90 percent) of Kosovo's population is Muslim, followed by the Christian Orthodox community (7-8 percent) and Catholics (2-3 percent). The Muslim Community of Kosovo functions as an official representative of this religious group. In addition, since 1999 Arab humanitarian organizations have been involved in establishing the Wahhabi sect of Islam within Kosovo. The Catholic community plays a prominent role in humanitarian activities through groups such as the Mother Theresa Society. While the Albanian religious communities are not generally politically active, the Orthodox Church is. This is a reflection of the links between Serbian nationalism and the church.

Various independent and informal student organizations have grown more active in addressing reform in higher education in general and corruption in the University of Prishtina in particular. The most active group in this regard is For a Different University, which managed to attract public attention and sympathy in 2003. The group's Web site, www.tjeterqysh.com, is often quoted in media articles about corruption within the university. Other organizations have tried to address the problems in the university through clandestine methods. For example, various professors have received anonymous, threatening letters from the group Levizja 2004 demanding their resignation. Many of these anonymous allegations of corruption have been unsubstantiated.

Also playing a role in Kosovo's civil society are the KLA War Veterans Association and the KLA War Invalids Association, as well as the official Independent Union of the Students of the University of Prishtina. Serving more as vigilante networks than as genuine interest groups, these organizations focus mainly on the mobilization of public support in defense of former KLA personalities who have been accused of war crimes and currently are standing trial. The verbal attacks by these associations against their opponents highlight a clear political agenda.

Independent Media (Score: 5.50)

Kosovo's rating for independent media is 5.50. Freedom of speech and editorial independence are weakened through intimidation and pressure by political groups and criminal organizations. Fear from coercion also accounts for the weak development of investigative journalism. Most media outlets, both electronic and print, are not self-sustaining and depend on international donors or moneys from parent companies to survive. Political bias is evident in all forms of media.

Freedom of speech and editorial independence in Kosovo are threatened by intimidation, political pressure, and other threats against journalists. The main sources of these threats are powerful political groups and criminal organizations. Although investigative journalists enjoyed some breakthroughs in 2003 in highlighting the problem of corruption in Kosovo, this field remains underdeveloped and vulnerable.

The legal framework governing the media in Kosovo consists of UNMIK Regulation 2000/37, On the Conduct of the Print Media in Kosovo, its associated code of conduct, and UNMIK Regulation 2000/4, On the Prohibition Against Inciting to National, Racial, Religious, or Ethnic Hatred, Disorder, or Intolerance. This body of regulations has often created tensions between journalists and the Kosovo Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC), which has oversight of and supervisory responsibilities over the media.

Regulation 2000/37 and Regulation 2000/4 were introduced in 2000 owing to concerns about the role of the media in inciting political violence. Although the regulations were introduced in response to a specific incident – the murder of Miroslav Topoljski, an UNMIK interpreter who the Prishtina daily Dita alleged had taken part in war crimes against Albanians – local journalists feel the provisions limit their freedom of speech. Journalists also vocally oppose the rulings of the TMC, which has the right to impose financial or moral sanctions for violations of the regulations. However, numerous complaints from individuals received by the TMC suggests the persistence of a genuine problem involving unsubstantiated allegations by party-aligned media outlets against their political opponents and the resultant political violence.

Kosovo has both public and private media outlets. The television broadcasters reaching national audiences include Kosovo Public TV (RTK) and two private outlets, Koha Vision and RTV 21. Print media in Kosovo are all privately owned.

The television broadcasters in Kosovo are mired in a debate over the distribution of advertising revenues between public and private outlets. Ultimately at issue is the financial sustainability of these broadcasters. Some parties have argued for open competition for advertising dollars between public and private outlets. Others believe that this provides RTK with undue advantages since it already benefits from the collection of a monthly 3.5-euro fee from citizens as well as yearly government funding in the amount of 2 million euros. The issue remained unresolved by the close of 2003.

The majority of Kosovo's print media outlets are unsustainable and depend on foreign donations or infusions of funding from parent companies to keep their doors open. However, two leading newspapers, Koha Ditore and Bota Sot (the latter being a pro-LDK paper), are exceptions to this rule. The paper Zeri also claims to have had success in achieving market-based sustainability. Kosova Sot continues to be subsidized by the Interpress company, to which it belongs. Foreign editions of Kosovo-based newspapers that target Kosovar Albanian diaspora communities account for a sizable part of some media outlets' incomes. The average circulation of Kosovo's main newspapers ranges from 5,000 to 15,000 copies in Kosovo and up to 10,000 each in Western Europe for Koha Ditore, Bota Sot, and Zeri.

Newspapers in minority languages are limited mainly to community-based publications. The Turkish paper Tan and the Bosniak paper Alem both have readerships among their respective communities in Kosovo. Belgrade newspapers in Serbian provide the main source of information for Kosovo's Serb minority, while the main sources of information for non-Serb minorities are RTK, in Bosniak and Turkish, and other Albanian-language media. The majority of newspapers appear in Albanian.

Owing to efforts by the OSCE, there has been a proliferation of broadcast media in minority languages. On Kosovo's 92 radio and 26 television stations, most broadcasts are in Albanian. This is followed, in order, by broadcasts in Serbian, Bosniak, Turkish, and Gorani (the language of an ethnic group living in the Gora region south of Prizren). Several broadcasters provide multilingual programming (see table).

Linguistic Representation of Licensed Broadcasters in Kosovo

Albanian-Language MediaSerbian-Language MediaBosniak-Language MediaTurkish-Language MediaGorani-Language MediaMixed-Language Media
RadioTelevisionRadioTelevisionRadioTelevisionRadioTelevisionRadioTelevisionRadioTelevision
50172073None2None1None162
Total: 67 stationsTotal: 27 stationsTotal: 3 stationsTotal: 2 stationsTotal: 1 stationTotal: 18 stations

Source: Kosovo Temporary Media Commissioner, Annual Report 2002.

Internet services in Kosovo are easily accessible. The number of wireless and dial-up providers is growing. Since 2000, Internet cafes have mushroomed in all urban areas of Kosovo, creating easy access to the Internet for those who have no such service at work or at home. There is no Internet access in rural areas.

Governance (Score: 6.00)

Kosovo's rating for governance is 6.00. Although the administrative capacity of the Kosovo government is improving gradually, the territory's dual system of governance has produced systematic problems in addressing the basic needs of Kosovo's citizens. In addition, despite the positive introduction of the standards for Kosovo and the opening of the official Dialogue with Serbia, significant challenges and obstacles still stand in the way of fulfilling the conditions that will lead to the opening of talks on the resolution of Kosovo's status. Finally, nepotism and political considerations are the most important factors in filling posts for senior civil servants, while the Central Assembly does not have the resources it needs to fulfill its legislative and investigative responsibilities.

At the central level, Kosovo has a dual system of governance, with executive powers divided between UNMIK and the PISG according to Chapter 8 and Chapter 5 of the Constitutional Framework, respectively. The PISG is responsible for education, health, social welfare, agriculture, the environment, and public services and administration. UNMIK is responsible for the justice system, foreign relations (including trade), fiscal policy, the administration and privatization of public utilities, elections, the protection of minority rights and returns, transport, and telecommunications. There is some overlap in executive powers in the areas of privatization, fiscal policy, minority returns, transport, telecommunications, and spatial planning.

The transfer of powers from UNMIK to the PISG, including to municipalities, continued in 2003. However, the process has not been without tension – often resulting in a lack of communication between UNMIK and the PISG. This was true in 2003 with regard to privatization.

In June 2003, the European Union (EU), which is in charge of Kosovo's privatization policies, launched a process for selling off Kosovo's socially owned enterprises (SOEs) and created a special chamber within Kosovo's Supreme Court to address complaints and claims by third parties. The process came to a halt when, at UN headquarters in New York City, Belgrade claimed ownership over the SOEs. When the EU pillar of UNMIK responded to Belgrade by adding a provision to the process for confirming the status of each SOE up for sale, the PISG protested, claiming that all Kosovar SOEs were integrated illegally into the Serbian economy following the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy. The situation resulted in a deadlock, and the PISG withdrew from the board of the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), the executive body in charge of implementing privatization. Both sides continue to stand firmly in their positions, although there is wide recognition that public and social property issues will continue to pose a problem until the resolution of Kosovo's status.

In 2002, UNMIK introduced eight standards, or conditions that must be met before talks can begin on the resolution of Kosovo's status. The standards offer a vision for a democratic Kosovo marked by a stable political system and a sustainable market economy. The standards include the creation of functioning democratic institutions in Kosovo; the disciplining of the KPC as a civilian emergency organization; the introduction of conditions for the return of minority displaced persons and their reintegration into Kosovar society through improved freedom of movement and the resolution of residential property disputes; the launching of a privatization process; a reduction in crime; the creation of a fully independent judiciary; and the initiation of a dialogue with Serbia on practical issues of mutual concern.

When UNMIK first introduced the standards, Kosovar Albanians complained that the plan lacked tangible steps and a clear time frame for the resolution of Kosovo's status. They specifically disapproved of UNMIK's "standards before status" approach and perceived the plan as a means of postponing Kosovo's independence indefinitely. Although Belgrade and Kosovar Serbs, for their part, supported the plan, the Contact Group on November 5,2003, added a target date of mid-2005 for assessing Kosovo's progress in implementing the standards and, based on the results, for deciding whether or not to open talks on Kosovo's final status.

The addition of the target date has boosted cooperation between UNMIK and the PISG, through the Joint Working Groups on the Implementation of Standards, on designing a road map for achieving the standards. According to some government officials, the last quarter of 2003 marked the most intensive period of cooperation between Kosovars and UNMIK since June 1999. The prospect of accelerating Kosovo's final status talks also motivated Kosovar Albanians to approach the standards process more seriously. On the other side, however, Belgrade and the Kosovar Serbs have boycotted the standards process, arguing that the new approach on standards paves the way for Kosovo's independence.

The EU launched the so-called Dialogue with Serbia in June 2003 at its Thessaloniki Summit. The dialogue involves discussions between Kosovo and Serbia on missing persons, returns of displaced persons, energy, transport, and telecommunications. Initially, Kosovo's coalition government was divided over this issue. While the president of Kosovo and the assembly Speaker (both representing the LDK) took part in the official launching of the dialogue in Vienna in October 2003, the prime minister of Kosovo (representing the PDK) declined to participate in response to pressure from within his party ranks in the Central Assembly. This initial hesitation to endorse the dialogue was overcome with the introduction of clearer provisions in the standards for Kosovo.

The dialogue, which is seen as a confidence-building measure between Prishtina and Belgrade, is expected to address some basic issues that stand between the two sides and to open the lines of communication before the beginning of the final status process. The first meetings of the dialogue's expert working groups are expected in early 2004. However, substantial improvements in relations between Prishtina and Belgrade will be difficult to achieve and could prove unattainable. First, although the most senior officials from Kosovo and Serbia participated in the dialogue's Vienna launch, they did not actually meet with one another. Second, the level of animosity between Kosovo and Serbia is palpable both at the grassroots level and at the highest levels of government.

Owing to the absence of a working majority in the Central Assembly, Kosovo has an all-inclusive coalition government, with rival parties participating in the same cabinet (the LDK, the PDK, the AAK, the PK, and the "other minorities" caucus). The coalition is based on a limited role for the prime minister, with cabinet members responsible to their political parties rather than the head of government. The pursuit of party agendas has prevented the development of cohesive governmental policies. Although joint governance has proved to be a positive exercise in providing interparty dialogue and easing relations among political rivals, disagreements over major policy initiatives persist.

The capacity of ministers and other political appointees to perform their jobs has shown some improvement, yet nepotism and political considerations continue to be the main criteria for the appointment of senior civil servants, at both central and municipal levels. Likewise, public administrations in both the PISG and at the municipal government level are highly politicized and lack the capacity to accomplish their objectives. There are reports, for example, that only one-third of the legislation passed by the Kosovo Central Assembly and UNMIK is being implemented. The Council of Europe has presented a strategy for boosting the number of municipalities from 30 to 180 units; however, the lack of administrative capacity and financial resources, among other factors, will make this reform plan difficult to implement.

The Central Assembly does not have the resources to fulfill its legislative and investigative responsibilities. In addition, violations of the rules of procedure have often stalled the assembly's work, and frequent initiatives beyond the competencies of the PISG have led to numerous interventions from UNMIK. Several such interventions were made at the request of the KP caucus with regard to violations of the rights and interests of the Serb community. The Non-Serb Communities Caucus has also used the special procedure on the protection of the rights and interests of minority communities. As such, minority groups can raise objections to policies or laws, and their concerns are then referred to a special panel for consideration. At the same time, though, the work of the assembly has shown some improvement, including holding several public hearings and making important contributions to the process of amending legislation presented by the prime minister and cabinet.

The inclusion of the PISG in the returns process for displaced persons has had positive effects in terms of the acceptance of returnees by local Albanian communities, as well as Serb perceptions of the PISG. According to the Serbian Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, around 234,000 minority displaced persons from Kosovo are settled in Serbia and Montenegro. An estimated 160,000 to 170,000 are Serbs, and the rest are Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, and Bosniaks. Currently, an estimated 85,000 Serbs remain in Kosovo, with the highest concentration in the northernmost part of the territory. Out of 32 million euros allocated for returns, 7 million euros were granted by the Kosovo government.

While at the central level the role of the PISG and the Albanian political parties is aimed at creating a positive political climate, the key players in the returns process are the municipal authorities and local communities. Although there is still resistance toward returns on the part of local communities, especially in areas that suffered the highest human and materiel costs during the 1998-1999 conflict, the involvement of municipal authorities in the process has shown improvement both in budgetary spending and in their engagement in the community and returns committees (two bodies tasked with devising concrete projects that will improve the quality of life for minorities).

Despite these positive trends, the scale of returns is below the intended rate. There are several reasons for this, including the highly unstable security situation, the persistence of problems associated with the return of residential properties, a lack of access to objective information in Serbia about the situation in Kosovo, and insufficient cooperation until recently from the Serbian government. In addition, Kosovo's unclear status has affected the return of Kosovar Serbs.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework (Score: 6.00)

Kosovo's rating in this category is 6.00. Although the PISG's Constitutional Framework provides for legislative, executive, and judicial institutions and powers – and they exist in practice – UNMIK still remains the final authority on constitutional and legal matters. International judges and prosecutors are appointed by UNMIK owing to ongoing concerns about bias and the lack of impartiality among local judges and prosecutors, particularly with respect to war crimes trials. Witness protection is weak, as is the safeguarding of human rights, especially of Kosovar Serbs. Despite some signs of improvement, for example, the freedom of movement of Kosovar Serbs remains limited and access to jobs, health care, and education is impeded.

Kosovo is governed by a complex set of international, national, and subnational legislation. On June 10,1999, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1244, which established UNMIK and effectively suspended the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's sovereignty in Kosovo. Resolution 1244 gives UNMIK both legislative and executive powers. To prevent the creation of a legal vacuum following the collapse of the Serbian administration in Kosovo, UNMIK also established a legal system based on Kosovo and Yugoslav laws passed before March 28,1989, nondiscrimination laws approved after 1989, UNMIK regulations, and international human rights conventions.

On May 15,2001, UNMIK promulgated the Constitutional Framework for the PISG, which gave the Central Assembly of Kosovo legislative powers and created the Supreme Court of Kosovo, a body vested with powers to rule on the constitutionality of legislation. However, the Kosovo secretary-general (SRSG) remains the final ruling authority on constitutional and legal matters and is the main evaluator of the PISG's performance. UNMIK enjoys legal immunity and is responsible only to the UN.

Kosovo's Constitutional Framework provides effective mechanisms for the protection of minority rights and interests, with the SRSG as the main guarantor of these rights. In cases in which a minority community believes that legislation passed by the assembly violates its rights, the group can also file a complaint with UNMIK. To date, the SRSG has returned a number of laws to the assembly with recommendations for amendments that address the rights in question of the minority community. If the assembly fails to comply with the recommendation, the SRSG may promulgate the law with its own provisions that ensure the protection of the rights and interests of the minority community. For example, in 2003 former SRSG Michael Steiner amended and promulgated the Law on Higher Education following the refusal of the assembly to recognize the University in Slavic Languages of Northern Kosovo.

The protection of religious freedoms is another delicate issue, with recent debates on the rights and freedoms of certain Islamic sects highlighting the tension between building a secular, democratic society and showing tolerance toward public displays of religious traditions and symbols. The issue was first raised in 2003 when a group of PISG officials refused to accept an interpreter on a trip to Germany because she was covered according to the Muslim tradition. The officials were supported by their respective ministries on the grounds that dressing according to religious strictures threatens the secular nature of public institutions. Although no judicial action was initiated in this case, the issue of religious freedoms versus the secularity of public institutions will eventually have to be taken up by the courts.

Owing to concerns about a lack of impartiality within the judiciary, particularly with respect to cases of war crimes and crimes involving minorities, Kosovo has UNMIK-appointed international judges and prosecutors in addition to local judges and prosecutors. Although the system is not perfect, particularly regarding cases of extended and illegal pretrial detentions of war crimes suspects, Kosovo's justice system would not be able to function impartially without the presence of these international judges and prosecutors. The year 2003 was marked by the opening of the first war crimes trial involving three former KLA members, the arrest of five former KLA members on the suspicion of war crimes, and the legal proclamation of the Albanian National Army (ANA) as a terrorist organization. Two former KLA strongholds, the War Veterans Association and the War Invalids Association, have attracted attention with demonstrations against these arrests, but owing to their failure to mobilize the general public's support, the effects of these protests faded away rather quickly. Witness protection also remains a key obstacle to fair and effective judicial processes in Kosovo. Threats, intimidation, and even murder of witnesses is not uncommon.

While the year 2003 saw a decrease overall in criminal activity in Kosovo, a campaign between May and September to kill ethnic Serbs drew wide attention. The murder of the ethnic Serb Stolic family in Obiliq, near Prishtina, and the killing of two Serb children swimming in a river just outside the Serb enclave of Gorazdevac have shaken the sense of security among Kosovar Serbs. These events have also undermined achievements such as the promulgation of new criminal and criminal procedures codes that provide better mechanisms for the prosecution of serious crimes and for witness protection. As with the majority of other brutal crimes against Serbs since June 1999, both murders were committed during high-level international visits – the former during the visit of Javier Solana, the EU's high foreign policy and security representative, and the latter on the first working day of SRSG Harri Holkeri. Although the investigation of these assassinations continued at the close of the year, their timing and brutality indicate that they were politically motivated.

The freedom of movement of Serbs in Kosovo has improved somewhat, and in response, KFOR has started the withdrawal of its guards from Orthodox churches and Serbian enclaves. Nevertheless, substantial regional variations and severe limitations remain, particularly affecting access for Serbs to health care, jobs, markets, and education. To further increase freedom of movement, UNMIK has offered Kosovo license plates to Serbs. Belgrade has opposed the campaign, encouraging Serbs to continue using Serbian license plates.

Corruption (Score: 6.00)

Kosovo receives a 6.00 for corruption, owing to the pervasiveness of the problem and its negative impact on Kosovo's overall democratic development. Despite better efforts in 2003 to address the problem and some recent successes in exposing and dealing with corruption practices, anticorruption initiatives as a whole have produced limited positive effects to date. Corruption appears to be greatest within public utilities, customs, public procurement, and local government. Allegations of corruption within UNMIK and the PISG are also growing.

Democratic institution building and economic development in Kosovo are negatively impacted by pervasive corruption. Factors contributing to the problem include the legacy of a state-controlled economy, the long-standing acceptance of corruption by citizens and political leaders alike, and the lack of proper mechanisms to hold public officials accountable. Sizable flows in international funding with urgent spending priorities also contribute to the prevalence of corruptive practices in Kosovo. Four areas appear to be most affected: public utilities, customs, public procurement, and local government. The health and pharmaceutical sectors are influenced as well.

Although a number of steps were taken in 2003 to improve the institutional mechanisms for fighting corruption, the record of UNMIK and the PISG in this arena has been mixed. In 2003, the Central Assembly of Kosovo approved three key laws aimed at improving transparency and accountability: the Law on Management of Public Finances and Responsibilities, the Law on Access to Official Documents, and the Law on Public Procurement.

Also in 2003, the Investigative Task Force (ITF) was formed, comprising the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, the European Anti-Fraud Office, and UNMIK's Financial Investigation Unit. This agency has been given powers to investigate both Kosovar and international public officials suspected of wrongdoing. By year's end, UNMIK had announced that the ITF was investigating reports of corruption within the Kosovo Trust Agency, which is responsible for privatization and the administration of public utilities, and launching probes into other bodies within UNMIK and the PISG. The code of conduct of civil service was approved in 2002.

UNMIK's anticorruption initiatives have produced mixed results and have highlighted shortcomings that can be attributed to a lack of coordination and transparency among different UNMIK agencies, as well as weak political will within the PISG. For example, the results of several audits of public companies, including Post-Telecomm and the Kosovo Energy Corporation, were never revealed to the public and have not been followed up with concrete actions. The Office of the Auditor-General, responsible for financial control and oversight of the PISG, is provided for in the Constitutional Framework in 2001 but had not been established as of the close of 2003. In addition, the absence of a whistle-blower charter prevents protection of individuals who publicly expose corrupt practices. Corrupt practices within municipal administrations are the most difficult to investigate. These include, among others, the falsifying of cadastre documents and illegal appropriations of municipal land in Prishtina, irregularities in awarding government and municipal contracts, and the selling of sensitive business and property information by municipal officials.

Despite these problems and limitations, some important breakthroughs have been made in dealing with corruption. Five customs officials were arrested between 2002 and 2003 for involvement in the smuggling of fuel. Some 200 police officers have been dismissed for corrupt practices such as falsifying documents or abuse of their official position. An international official working for the EU has been sentenced to four years in prison in Germany for stealing 4.5 million euros from the public energy corporation. Connections of political figures with organized crime are frequently reported, although there is insufficient political will to take action. Furthermore, the role of the media in reporting corruptive practices was on the rise in 2003, with some reports leading directly to the suspension or arrest of corrupt officials. In addition, several arrests of municipal officials were made owing to citizen cooperation.

Author

Arben Qirezi, a political analyst based in Kosovo, has contributed to numerous international and local magazines and has served as a consultant to several international organizations and nongovernmental groups in the region.

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