Human Rights in Iran: Update on Selected Issues

 

MAP

See original

GLOSSARY

Basiji      Voluntary paramilitary forces: "mobilization of the oppressed"

Farsi       Persian

fatwa  Religious edict issued by a Mojtahed

FMI        Freedom Movement of Iran (Liberation Movement of Iran)

hezbollahi         Vigilante groups: "party of the children of god"

hijab   Islamic dress code based on Sharia

hudud                Islamic law of retribution as defined by Sharia

KDPI      Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran

Komaleh                Kurdish section of the Communist Party of Iran

Komiteh Islamic Revolutionary Committees

LEF         Law Enforcement Forces

Majles    Legislative Assembly

MCA      Militant Clergy Association

Mojtahed          High-ranking clerical jurist

Pasdaran                Revolutionary Guards

PMOI     People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran

Sharia     Islamic religious law

Ta'zirat               Punishments that are not defined by law and are left to a judge's discretion

velayat-e-faqih Rule of the Supreme Jurisprudent or Wali Faqih as representative of the 12th Imam on earth

Wali Faqih             Supreme Spiritual Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, public dissatisfaction with the government and the role of the clergy in the Islamic Republic of Iran has deepened and discord has become more open (HRW Mar. 1996, 5; The Economist 9 Dec. 1995, 44; MEI 12 May 1995, 20; Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996). Despite President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's attempts to liberalize the economy and rebuild Iran following the devastation of the Iran-Iraq war, the country's mixed economy continued to suffer (The Irish Times 8 Feb. 1995; Middle East Report Nov.-Dec. 1994c, 20). Inflation soared, averaging 37 per cent in 1994 (Europa 1995 1995, 1542) and reported to be as high as 58.8 per cent in June 1995 (Keesing's July 1995, 40620). In 1994, an estimated two-thirds of the country's 60 million people lived below the poverty line of 150,000 rials or $100 US a year (The Salt Lake Tribune 21 Jan. 1994); the government had to reschedule debt payments and devalue its currency (Keesing's Apr. 1994, 39934; ibid. May 1994, 40031). Buying power was severely reduced and the government brought in price controls which led to shortages of food and essential commodities (ibid. Feb. 1995, 40431; Time 26 June 1995). Unemployment was about 30 per cent in 1995 (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1152).

Factionalism increased following the death of the Republic's founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989 (ODR Sept. 1993), pitting economic liberals backing President Rafsanjani against Islamic conservatives backing Majles Speaker Akbar Nateq-Nuri, a key figure in Iran's parliament, and Wali Faqih Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, the supreme spiritual leader of Iran (MEI 15 Mar. 1996, 12; The Economist 9 Mar. 1996, 36; Le Devoir 11 Oct. 1995; The Middle East May 1996). According to one report, this factionalism has created "room for dissent" (MEI 12 May 1995, 20) and a "lively but controlled press" has become an "integral part of the political process," with a blossoming of publications reflecting various political positions (ibid. 16 Feb. 1996, 19; La Lettre de Reporters sans frontières Nov. 1995, 16).

The 8 March 1996 Majles election — which seemingly confirmed the conservatives' control over the Majles (Reuters 20 Apr. 1996; Libération 19 Mar. 1996; ibid. 23 Apr. 1996; The Middle East May 1996) — generated "substantive debate" over the future of the Republic (MEI 15 Mar. 1996, 12; Rahnema 3 May 1996). Some persons, such as intellectual Abdul Karim Souroush and Freedom Movement of Iran leader Ebrahim Yazdi advocate a secular Islamic government (The Middle East May 1996; MEI 12 May 1995, 20). Professor Saeed Rahnema of Queen's University describes "the decision making process [in Iran] at the top level [as being] in a state of anarchy" (3 May 1996), and Professor Houshang Hassanyari of Royal Military College says that Iran is a country where the government and religious leaders vie for control (4 Mar. 1996). Other observers suggest that this atmosphere of debate indicates an openness on the part of the leaders of the Islamic Republic (MEI 16 Feb. 1996, 18; The Economist 9 Dec. 1995, 44). In December 1995 and January 1996, for the first time in five years, the government allowed UN special rapporteurs on freedom of expression, on all forms of intolerance, and on human rights to research their reports from inside the country (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 3; AFP 29 Mar. 1996). Maurice Copithorne, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, notes in his report that although the notion of human rights is not generally accepted in Iran, the current open debate could lead to "significant changes" (ibid.).

This report will focus on selected issues concerning human rights in Iran from August 1993 to March 1996 which will update previous DIRB publications: Iran: Chronology of Events August 1994-February 1995 (April 1995); Iran: Chronology of Events June 1989-July 1994 (January 1995); Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran (June 1994); and Iran: Political Opposition (August 1993).

2. STATE SECURITY FORCES

Iran's state security forces are composed of the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), the military forces (including the regular armed forces and the Pasdaran or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), the judicial police and the secret intelligence service, SAVAMA[1]1. The LEF includes the national police, gendarmerie, and Komitehs, or Revolutionary Committees. The Pasdaran includes the Basiji — literally, the Mobilization of the Oppressed — a volunteer paramilitary force. All branches are under direction of the Supreme National Security Council, which is, in turn, guided by President Rafsanjani and the Wali Faqih Ayatollah Khamenei.

Under the Public Military Service Act of 1984, every male over 18 must complete military service for at least a two-year "exigency" period, after which he may be called up during times of national emergency (Iran 21 Oct. 1984, 2-3). The armed forces and the LEF receive conscripts under a quota system based on each force's needs, the specific skills of the conscript and the specific manpower needs of a particular unit (ibid.; see also the DIRB's Responses to Information Requests IRN20340.E of 12 April 1995 and IRN22706 of 28 December 1995). Exemption from military service in peacetime can be purchased under certain conditions (See Appendix 2).

2.1 Law Enforcement Forces

"In theory" the LEF is in charge of protecting peace and security, the well-being of the public and the achievements of the revolution (ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 11). Working with various government ministries, its tasks include: combatting threats to internal security, collecting information, controlling passports and exit visas, conducting certain interrogations and investigations and executing certain judgements by tribunals (ibid.). In practice, according to the Federal Office of Refugees (Office Fédéral des Réfugiés) in Switzerland, the LEF is unified in uniform only (ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 10; LCHR May 1993, 36). "The Minister of Interior acts as a kind of umbrella administration" of the forces that make up the LEF, says Professor Rahnema, "but they all run independently still" (3 May 1996).

The principal responsibility of the Komiteh, which numbered about 16,000 in 1994, is enforcing respect for Sharia (ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 4, 6; Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; Time 26 June 1995; LCHR May 1993, 37-38 ). The Komiteh act as a morality police, ranging from small "semi-official" groups of men and women based at police stations, mosques or factories to official forces which patrol larger cities in vehicles and arrest and detain women for hijab infractions or couples for demonstrating "unIslamic" behaviour in public, or other violations of religious law or Sharia (ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 6; Rahnema 3 May 1996; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; The Economist 23 July 1994). They collect information for the Ministry of Information and are active in the war against drugs (Rahnema 3 May 1996; LCHR May 1993, 37-38) — although Hormoz Hekmat, managing editor of Iran Nameh at the Foundation of Iranian Studies in Bethesda, Maryland, indicates that certain elements in the Komiteh also participate in the illegal drug trade (7 Mar. 1996).

The Komiteh do not have sole responsibility for enforcing Islamic morality, however: vigilante groups of religious zealots known as hezbollahi as well as the Pasdaran and Basiji also enforce Sharia (Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; Rejali 5 May 1996; Time 26 June 1995).

2.2 Armed Forces: The Regular Armed Forces and the Pasdaran

Although they have both been under the single Ministry of Defence and Logistics since 1989, the regular armed forces and the Pasdaran co-exist virtually autonomously with their own chains of command (ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 16, 18; Katzman 1993, 66). The regular armed forces consist of approximately 300,000 troops divided among ground, air and sea forces (Chubin 1994, 32). They are chiefly responsible for defending Iran from external threat, although they do co-operate with other forces to restore internal order during times of extreme unrest (Katzman 1993, 83).

The Pasdaran took on military responsibilities during the Iran-Iraq war and created parallel ground, air and sea forces, but, since its creation in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini, its primary responsibility has been to maintain internal security to "consolidate the revolution's hold on power" (Katzman 1993, 80; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 12). The Pasdaran's activities include the recruitment, training and command of the Basiji, maintaining an elite anti-riot brigade created in 1992, operating its own intelligence unit, and enforcing Islamic dress and moral codes (ibid.; Katzman 1993, 85-96; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996). It also supports Islamic groups abroad through Hezbollah (ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 13).

Kenneth Katzman writes in his 1993 study of the Pasdaran that although it was originally a force of mostly "lower middle class urban guerillas," the rank and file now includes "opportunists" looking for monetary or career gains, as well as conscripts (61-63; Chubin 1994, 32). Pasdaran members are paid more than members of the regular armed forces and sources report that some of them have been given homes and land confiscated from those who fled the revolution (Katzman 1993, 62; Time 26 June 1995). Influential Friday Prayer leaders are reported to have "contacts" within the Pasdaran and the Basiji whose loyalty they command by distributing money and favours (Mideast Mirror 10 Aug. 1995, 10). However, professor of political science Houshang Hassanyari at the Royal Military College in Kingston believes that "the vast majority of the Pasdaran have remained committed to the Revolution and the regime" (4 Mar. 1996).

According to media reports, in August 1995 Ayatollah Khamenei ordered the Pasdaran forces reorganized and cut from approximately 300,000 to 167,000 men (Al-Sharq al-Awsat 8 Aug. 1995; Mideast Mirror 8 Aug. 1995, 15). Conscripts formerly destined for the Pasdaran, reports the Mideast Mirror, are now to go to the Basiji and the Pasdaran's naval and air forces are to merge with those of the regular armed forces, leaving the Pasdaran as "an entirely professional" rapid deployment force (ibid.). According to the report, the Pasdaran was to turn over all of its internal security duties to the Basiji, although Pasdaran commander Brigadier General Mohsen Reza'i is quoted as saying it would intervene "in any situation threatening the security and survival of the Islamic Republic" (ibid.).

It is unclear whether this reorganization will actually happen (Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996). The Pasdaran is renowned for its independence, "revolutionary zeal," (Katzman 1993, 165; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996) and links to conservative clerical leaders (ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 14; Chubin 1994, 70). Hassanyari contends the Basiji are still under the Pasdaran's command as a reserve force (4 Mar. 1996).

The Basiji are composed mostly of reserves of rural, teenaged boys, many of them illiterate and unemployed, who sign up for three-month tours of service or work a few hours each week during the school year and during the summer break (Katzman 1993, 67-8; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; Rahnema 3 May 1996). There are also female Basiji corps (IRNA 13 Jan. 96; Time 26 June 1995; AFP 17 July 1995), as well as Basiji who are elderly, or high school or university students, factory workers, government bureaucrats or technical specialists (Katzman 1993, 67; IRIB 25 Jan. 1996). Basiji duties include supporting the Pasdaran and the regular armed forces in maintaining internal or, in times of outside threat, external security, enforcing Islamic dress and moral codes, promoting Islamic cultural activities, assisting in national vaccination campaigns and, reportedly, advising the judiciary (Katzman 1993, 67-8; LCHR May 1993, 38; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 21 Nov. 1993; see also the DIRB's Response to Information Request IRN22706.E of 28 December 1995).

Reports of the Basijis' size range from 300,000 to 500,000 to 3.5 million (Mideast Mirror 10 Aug. 1995; IRIB 25 Jan. 1996; AP 1 Nov. 1994; see also the DIRB's Response to Information Request IRN22706.E of 28 December 1995). According to the official IRIB television network, as of January 1996 the Basiji were organized into 741 Ashura Brigades, 134 al-Zahra battalions, several local reserve battalions and reconnaissance and advance guards (25 Jan. 1996).

2.3 SAVAMA

Little public information is available on SAVAMA, the secret intelligence service which was integrated into the Ministry of Information in 1984 (APS Diplomat Recorder 11 July 1994; Intelligence Newsletter 24 Mar. 1994). According to a 1993 report in the Intelligence Newsletter, SAVAMA lost its independence following a 1992 reorganization of intelligence services, and was "integrated into the intelligence ministry which has become a vast and strongly structured institution with networks and hubs in all major Iranian cities as well as abroad" (ibid. 4 Feb. 1993). Sources indicate that the Ministries of Information and of the Interior collect information about Iranians in Iran,[2]2 operating a network of informers, tapping telephones and reading mail (Freedom in the World 1994-1995 1995, 304; ODR 13 Jan. 1995, 11; The Irish Times 8 Feb. 1995; The Economist 23 July 1994).

There are media reports suggesting SAVAMA is principally interested in assassinations abroad (Intelligence Newsletter 24 Mar. 1994). In November 1993, a UN Human Rights Commission report accused the intelligence agency of responsibility for the killing of political opponents outside Iran (APS Diplomat Recorder 11 July 1994). On 15 March 1996, German authorities issued an arrest warrant for Information Minister Ali Fallahian for his alleged role in the bombing of a Berlin cafe which killed four exiled Kurdish leaders in 1992 (Le Monde 18 Mar. 1996; Reuters 26 Jan. 1996).

According to Darius Rejali's 1994 study of torture in Iran, SAVAMA was formed to replace the Shah's much-feared secret police SAVAK (1994, 131; see also APS Diplomat Recorder 11 July 1994). Rejali concludes that "there is little ‘hard evidence' that SAVAMA exists or that if it does, it is of any importance" (ibid.). He quotes former President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr as saying SAVAMA is mostly staffed by old SAVAK officials and engaged only in external espionage (ibid., 131-32). Iran Nameh editor Hormoz Hekmat maintains, however, that the Iranian government's intelligence service is "very ruthless, very effective, very widespread and very powerful" (7 Mar. 1996).

3. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ([3]3)

In August 1994 the government implemented changes to the court system, one of which provided for revolutionary court judges to act as both investigator and judge in the same case (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 10 Aug. 1994; Country Reports 1994 1995, 1079). It is a change that Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs concludes is "increasing the authoritarian nature of the system" (Jan. 1996, 1).

On 1 November 1994, following several riots, strikes and bombings, the Majles approved a bill granting the security forces, the Basiji and the armed forces the power to "use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed rallies, and at the time of unrest and armed revolt" (Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran 1 Nov. 1994; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 6; Voice of Iranian Kordestan 13 Jan. 1995). Under the law, officers who "resort to using firearms ... will not face criminal charges" (Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran 1 Nov. 1994). The law also allows security forces to shoot at fleeing vehicles suspected of carrying "fugitives, stolen goods, contraband or narcotics" (UN 16 Jan. 1995, 6).

In November 1995, the Majles adopted a new Islamic Penal Code which, according to Agence France Presse, legalizes Sharia penalties such as death by stoning for adultery and flagellation for hijab violations (29 Nov. 1995). The new code, which must be approved by the Guardian Council, forbids security forces from detaining suspects without an arrest warrant issued by a judge, but does not fix a time limit for the detention of suspects caught in the act of committing a crime (ibid.).

According to several sources, the government uses the judicial system to silence political and religious opponents through arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, torture and, in some cases, execution (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1154; AI May 1995, 1; LCHR July 1994, 175). The judiciary is not independent as judges can be "arbitrarily dismissed" and the lawyers' association is run by state authorities (UN 2 Feb. 1994, 46; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1154).

3.1 Political Prisoners

Country Reports 1995 alleges that the Iranian government arrests persons on "trumped up criminal charges when their actual 'offenses' are political" (1996, 1154). However, in January 1996, Seyyed Asadollah Lajevardi, director general of prisons, denied the existence of political prisoners, saying that of the 100,000 prisoners in Iran 70 per cent were serving sentences for drug smuggling, addiction or theft (IRNA 3 Jan. 1996) although, in 1994, he had admitted to foreign journalists that Iran held "a few" political prisoners (AFP 22 Apr. 1994; Middle East Times 8 May 1994). Amnesty International reported that "thousands" of political prisoners were held in Iran in 1994 (1995, 163). The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture expressed concerns in October 1995 that political prisoners were reported to be "often held incommunicado" without trial or access to lawyers; "most such detainees had allegedly been tortured and a number had been denied access to medical care" (UN 16 Jan. 1996, 67).

Sources report that in January 1996 the government released Abbas Amir Entezam, former deputy minister in the transitional liberal government of Mehdi Bazargan, from house arrest; he had been held since the end of 1979 on charges of espionage (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1154; Reuters 17 Jan. 1996; HRW Mar. 1996, 13n26; Sobh' 22 Mar. 1996). Although Le Monde printed a correction stating that Entezam had only been released temporarily to visit family and doctors before returning to house arrest (22 Jan. 1996), other sources indicate that he was still free in March 1996 (HRW Mar. 1996, 13n26; Sobh' 22 Mar. 1996).

In January 1996, according to an unconfirmed report on clandestine Kurdish radio, security forces arrested five followers of Ayatollah Sheybani, who is said to be a critic of the government; the report added that 88 of Sheybani's followers had been arrested in late 1995 (Voice of Iranian Kordestan 25 Jan. 1996).

According to media reports, on 17 July 1995 the Pasdaran and "the information ministry's special units" raided dissident cleric Grand Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani's home in Qom and arrested his son, Hojatleslam Javad Rohani (MEI 25 Aug. 1995, 13-14; Keyhan 27 July 1995). In July, August and November several of his followers were detained without charges (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1154; HRW Mar. 1996, 13). In January and June 1995, Grand Ayatollah Rohani, who has been under house arrest for 10 years (Keyhan 6 July 1995), and some of his followers sent open letters to President Rafsanjani criticizing the government for allowing hezbollahi to act with impunity (see section 4.1.3) and security forces to arbitrarily arrest, detain, and extrajudicially execute citizens (HRW Mar. 1996, 13).

Retired General Azizollah Amir Rahimi and son Mehrdad Amir Rahimi were arrested in November 1994 after Azizollah publicly called on President Rafsanjani to step down and hold free elections (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1080; AI 1995, 164). In March 1995, the charges against General Rahimi were reduced from attempting to overthrow the government to illegal possession of firearms, and his son Mehrdad was released (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 7 Mar. 1995). On 13 March 1995, General Rahimi was released from prison (AFP 13 Mar. 1995).

In November 1994 Ali Akbar Saidi Sirjani, a well-known dissident writer, died from what officials labelled a "heart attack," after eight months incommunicado detention (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1077; Libération 24 Mar. 1994; AI 1995, 164; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 23). He had been arrested with another writer, Said Niazi Kermani, on charges of drug smuggling and espionage in March 1994 following the publication of an open letter denouncing censorship (AI 1995, 164). Article 19, a non-governmental group based in London which advocates freedom of expression, believes his arrest was "solely the result of his open criticism of the government's policy of suppressing dissent" (n.d., 8). His family denied he had a history of heart problems (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1077; AI 1995, 164; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 23).

3.2 Capital and Corporal Punishment

Amnesty International maintains that Iran carried out at least 139 executions in 1994, some of which were of prisoners of conscience (May 1995, 2) while the UNCHR estimates there were 63 (16 Jan. 1995, 17). There are no figures for 1995 in the sources consulted by the DIRB. Both Amnesty International and the UNCHR note that the Iranian media do not report most executions (ibid.; AI May 1995, 2). Several offences carry the death penalty in Iran: murder, rape, adultery, armed robbery, drug trafficking and possession of certain amounts of drugs (LCHR July 1994, 175), counter-revolutionary activities, disturbing public security (AFP 29 Nov. 1995), production or sale of pornographic videos after a third conviction (The New York Times 21 Dec. 1993; LCHR July 1994, 175), apostasy (The Economist 23 July 1994), homosexuality (AI Feb. 1994, 33) and, as of 15 October 1994, profiteering (Xinhua 16 Oct. 1994; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 18; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 9 Mar. 1995). According to Agence France Presse, with the adoption of the new Islamic Penal Code in November 1995, those found guilty of "offending" either Ayatollah Khomeini or Khamenei could also face the death sentence (29 Nov. 1995). Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs reports that summary executions of alleged drug smugglers are said to be "common" (Jan. 1996, 2).

Iran continued to execute political opponents in 1995 (La Lettre de la FIDH 9 Nov. 1995; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1152-53). Assadollah Akhavan, a member of a marxist group, Fedayeen, was reportedly executed on 7 September 1995 at Langrud (La Lettre de la FIDH 9 Nov. 1995; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1153). Between seven and ten others were also executed in 1995 for "unspecified political activity" (ibid., 1152; Reuters 3 Oct. 1995). Country Reports 1995 states that, according to the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the executed men were KDPI members (1996, 1153). Amnesty International reports that on 10 April 1996 two members of Komaleh (Kurdish section of the Communist Party of Iran), Salim Saberniah and Mustafa Ghaderi, were executed at Orumiyeh prison (30 Apr. 1996). The two had been arrested in 1990 while trying to enter Turkey and were convicted in an Islamic Revolutionary Court of "opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran" (ibid.).

Human rights monitors also allege that security forces were behind several extrajudicial killings, including the highly publicized murders of three Christian ministers inside Iran (see Section 5.3) (AI 1995, 165; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1153). Haji Mohammad Ziaie, a Sunni leader and government critic from Bandar Abbas, who, according to Amnesty International, had been previously arrested and tortured, was found dead beside his car on 20 July 1994, five days after having been interrogated at security forces headquarters in Laar, Fars province (1995, 165; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1153). Officials attributed his death to a car accident, but eye witness reports indicate his body had been mutilated and beheaded (AI May 1995, 12; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1153).

Amnesty International also suggests that the government may have ordered the murder of several KDPI members abroad, including Taha Kermanj on 4 January 1994 and Mohammad Ghaderi and Bahram Azadifar in August 1993 in Turkey, and four senior KDPI members in Berlin on 17 September 1992 (May 1995, 13).

According to Agence France Presse, the new Islamic Penal Code makes a number of violations punishable by flagellation, including some cases of adultery and "illegitimate relations" short of sexual intercourse, prostitution and pimping and violations of the hijab or Islamic dress code (29 Nov. 1995). Darius Rejali in his 1994 study of torture in Iran, writes that the most "common form of public punishment," flagellation, was used to punish a wide range of offences not covered in the Penal Code, including hijab infractions, kissing in public, driving without a license, accepting a bribe or "any deviation from a disciplinary norm" (125). In May 1996, Rejali said that the regime has changed the way it flogs those who violate Sharia because officials realized that corporal punishment can also engender sympathy in observers (5 May 1996). Now, floggings are "semi-public," held in front of other offenders, with only a few actually singled out for physical punishment (ibid.).

In May 1994, United States citizen Mary Jones was given 80 whiplashes as her sentence when she was found guilty of "promoting corruption" after allegedly having been drunk in public (AFP 8 May 1994; AI 1995, 165). In March 1994, two men each had four fingers amputated at Qom prison after being convicted of theft (ibid.). Other sources suggest, however, that bribery is often used in Tehran to evade corporal punishment for offences such as dancing and drinking alcohol (Time 26 June 1995; Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; The Economist 23 July 1994).

3.3 Torture

Article 38 of the Iranian Constitution specifically forbids "all forms of torture for the purpose of extracting confession or acquiring information" (Flanz Dec. 1992, 30). Although there is little verifiable information on torture in Iran, sources continue to report incidents of torture in Iranian prisons (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1153; AI 1995, 164; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 20-21). According to Rejali, torture is carried out by special units of the Revolutionary Guard, rather than by ordinary prison guards; the main centres are in Tehran, Tabriz and Mashhad (5 May 1996). In 1994, sources reported that prisoners may have been tortured both before and after their trials, and beatings may or may not have been intended to elicit information (Parliamentary Human Rights Group Nov. 1994, 10; Rejali 1994, 114).

Country Reports 1995 states that 24 Kurds arrested in August and September 1995 were reportedly tortured, and that a "credible eyewitness" described seeing emaciated prisoners with "swollen and bloodied faces" (1996, 1153). Helmut Szimkus, a German citizen convicted of spying who served five years in Evin prison in Tehran, claimed in an interview with a German newspaper on 3 August 1994 that guards beat the soles of his feet with copper cable and that he was "tortured without a stop from the moment he was arrested" (UN 16 Jan. 1995, 20; Reuters 10 July 1994). He further claimed that the Iranian "secret service" run a special "section 209" of Evin prison where they torture prisoners, including children (ibid.). Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, head of the judiciary, denied Szikmus' allegations of torture (ibid. 7 Sept. 1994). According to human rights monitors, the most commonly reported methods of torture were beatings on the back or on the soles of feet with sticks and cables, or being hung by wrists or ankles for long periods (AI 1995, 164; Country Reports 1994 1995, 1078; Reuters 10 July 1994).

Reports indicate that Faizullah Makhubat, a 78-year-old Jew executed on 25 February 1994 for espionage, had been tortured before his death (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1077; AI May 1995, 7; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 21; AFP 3 Mar. 1994). According to the 1995 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Galindo Pohl, Makhubat's body "bore signs of severe torture, including a disfigured face, bruises probably caused by blows, broken teeth and contusions on various parts of the body" (16 Jan. 1995, 21; AI May 1995, 7; Country Reports 1994 1995, 1077). Country Reports 1994 and Amnesty International report that his eyes had been gouged out (1995, 1077; AI May 1995, 7). The Special Rapporteur concludes that "it has been some time since the evidence received [regarding Makhubat and Szikmus] has been as direct and convincing" and it is "sufficient to support the conclusion that torture is used to extract confessions, at least in politically sensitive cases" (UN 16 Jan. 1995, 26).

Iranian government documents annexed to the 1994 UNHCR report, indicate that Seyed Hashem Sadr, director of Sari rehabilitation centre, and Alireza Yusefi Pour, prison guard at Shahid Kachonei, were fired from their jobs and placed under investigation on charges of "beating" prisoners as were other staff members for "creating inconveniences for prisoners' families" (UN 2 Feb. 1994, 61).

There have been reports that prison guards draw lots to form "temporary marriages" with virgin female political prisoners slated for execution and then rape them (The Times 31 Mar. 1995; Parliamentary Human Rights Group Nov. 1994, 11; Rejali 1994, 129). The practice of raping female prisoners is allegedly based on the belief that Islamic law does not permit the execution of virgins (Parliamentary Human Rights Group Nov. 1994, 11; Rhoodie 1989, 379).

3.4 Bribery

Amnesty International reports that although it has "little confirmed information about bribery in the judicial system," it has received reports from relatives of prisoners who say "they paid sums of money to officials to get information about them or to try to secure their release, with mixed results" (5 Mar. 1996). Human Rights Watch quotes the first prime minister of the Republic and liberal critic, Mehdi Bazargan, as saying there is "widespread corruption into the very heart of the judiciary" (Dec. 1995, 276). Other sources report that bribery is practised throughout Iran to avoid arrest, to limit detention, to reduce sentences, to skirt Sharia, to buy exit visas and to pass borders (Time 26 June 1995; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; Freedom in the World 1994-1995 1995, 304; The Economist 23 July 1994; Middle East Watch 16 May 1994). Time reports that

the Revolutionary Guards who run the morality-enforcing komitehs can be bought. When parties are busted for playing loud music or serving alcohol guests are still taken to local komiteh headquarters. So are women who show too much hair under their scarves, and unmarried couples caught in public together. But in Tehran such cases now rarely end up in revolutionary courts. Once they are paid off, the Revolutionary Guards let the offenders go (26 June 1995).

Iran Nameh editor Hormoz Hekmat supports this, saying that "in Tehran you can do anything in the privacy of your own home, having access to the most recent pornographic movies, alcohol, having a totally western life, by having bribed the local komitehs" (7 Mar. 1996). There are rumours, says Hekmat, that the komitehs run a network that supplies drugs and alcohol to certain people for a monthly charge (ibid.).

Corruption and bribery are reported to be pervasive in government (Time 26 June 1995; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; The Economist 4 Feb. 1995, 40). In August 1995 eight employees of the state-owned Bank Saderat were convicted of embezzlement; one was sentenced to death (Keesing's Aug. 1995, 40702; IRNA 23 Nov. 1995). Also in August 1995, according to a media report, a former district mayor of Tehran was detained on charges of embezzlement and was implicated in a bribery and embezzlement scheme involving other municipal leaders and the head of district security (Xinhua 17 Aug. 1995). In February 1995, a cleric and member of the Majles was convicted of bribery and sentenced to flogging (Keesing's Feb. 1995, 40431). "The level of corruption and of bribery in the government — in all levels of government from the lowest level to the highest — is, in fact, unprecedented in Iranian modern history," says Hekmat (7 Mar. 1996). Inflation and dropping salaries, especially for government employees, mean "they have no way of earning anything without bribery" (ibid.).

4. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, OPINION AND EXPRESSION

4.1 Freedom of Association

4.1.1 The 1996 Elections

On 8 March 1996, in the first round of the Majles elections, the conservative Militant Clergy Association (MCA) and supporters won over 100 of the 270 Majles seats, while those who ran under the banner "Servants of Construction"[4]4 or "G-6" and backed President Rafsanjani's policy of a freer market economy and mild political liberalization won 39 seats (Libération 19 Mar. 1996; MEI 15 Mar. 1996, 12; AFP 5 Mar. 1996). At least one person died and several were injured as a result of violence (AFP 26 Feb. 1996), and about 100 people were arrested for violations of election law (Xinhua 6 Mar. 1996).

Although the constitution and the 1988 Law on Political Parties allow for political parties, and although President Rafsanjani has spoken favourably of having the presence of "powerful political parties" (Foreign Report 14 Dec. 1995, 3; APS Diplomat Recorder 25 Mar. 1996; HRW Mar. 1996, 14), the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI), the Iran Nation Party and the National Front were not licensed as parties for the Majles elections (ibid., 12). According to a Human Rights Watch study on the 1996 election — the first study conducted from inside Iran by a non-governmental organization in four years — 1995 amendments to the Law on Elections legalized the Guardian Council's veto power and spelled out procedures to review candidates applying to run in an election, but did not compel the Council to give reasons for denying an applicant's candidacy nor allow its decisions to be appealed (ibid., 7). The Commission on Political Parties also has the power to arbitrarily deny a party a license and its decisions cannot be appealed (ibid.). Without a license a political party can still be active, but it cannot qualify for media coverage by government-controlled media outlets and it can be prevented from holding meetings in public places (ibid., 12).

Sources report that in the run-up to the March election, the Guardian Council used its absolute power to screen candidates for election to disqualify 44 per cent of more than 5,000 people who applied (HRW Mar. 1996, 9; AFP 5 Mar. 1996; Mideast Mirror 29 Feb. 1996; AFP 29 Feb. 1996). The council disqualified candidates by questioning their "practical adherence to Islam" or their support for the concept of velayat-e faqih[5]5 (HRW Mar. 1996, 2; IRNA 18 Jan. 1996; Article 19 n.d., 6). Once approved, candidates had only one week to campaign, although the two main contending parties, the MCA and the Servants of Construction, had been campaigning for "several months through the media" (AFP 5 Mar. 1996).

"The ruling clerics effectively control the electoral process," concludes Country Reports 1995, "thereby denying the people the right to change their government" (1996, 1152). Agence France Presse also reports allegations that the Guardian Council selection of candidates was ‘biased' in favour of hardline conservatives" (5 Mar. 1996).

 The FMI, described by The Economist as "the closest the country comes to an opposition party" (9 Mar. 1996, 36) backed 15 applicants to run in the Majles election (HRW Mar. 1996, 8; Mideast Mirror 29 Feb. 1996). Four candidates were approved although three were later disqualified (ibid.; HRW Mar. 1996, 8). Four days before the vote, the FMI withdrew from the election after the Minister of the Interior barred the group from campaigning and "raided the group's offices" (The Economist 9 Mar. 1996, 36; La Presse 4 Mar. 1996).

On 31 January 1996 police broke up press conferences called by the Seekers for a Free Election, a liberal umbrella group with FMI and National Front members, stating the group "was unauthorized and so the conference was illegal" (Reuters 31 Jan. 1996; HRW Mar. 1996, 10; Article 19 n.d., 6). Sources report that a previous press conference in early January was stopped by police because police said they could not guarantee "the security of the event" (ibid.; HRW Mar. 1996, 10). Human Rights Watch quotes National Front leader, Darioush Foruhar, as saying before the vote that it was "impossible to hold free elections. We are not allowed to circulate our newspaper and we cannot hold a public rally without it being attacked by a mob" (ibid., 13).

4.1.2 Radical Opposition: The PMOI, KDPI and Komaleh

Outside the electoral process are radical armed opposition groups,[6]6 chiefly, the People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran (PMOI) (also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq) and Kurdish nationalist groups such as the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and Komaleh (Political Handbook of the World 1994 1994, 406).

The PMOI were blamed for the December 1995 bombing of an oil pipeline near the Iran-Iraq border (AFP 31 Dec. 1995), the bombing at Mashhad in June 1994, and the July 1994 murder of Christian ministers (Xinhua 26 June 1994; AFP 18 July 1994; Xinhua 7 July 1994). In a televised "show" trial in March 1995, three women accused of being PMOI members confessed to killing the two evangelical Christian pastors who died in mysterious circumstances in 1994, and of attempting to plant a bomb in the shrine to Ayatollah Khomeini in Qom city (IRNA 15 Mar. 1995; IRIB 15 Mar. 1995; HRW 1995, 279). Human Rights Watch described the public trial with court-appointed lawyers and foreign observers as "unusual" and likely politically motivated as the government "sought to place responsibility on the violent opposition group," the PMOI (Dec. 1995, 279). The PMOI denied any connection to the two women (AFP 18 June 1995).

On 20 June 1994 in Mashhad a bomb destroyed the tomb of Imam Reza, one of the holiest Shia pilgrimage sites, killing 26 and leaving 170 injured (UN 16 Jan. 1995, 20; Reuters 13 Aug. 1994). The government arrested two alleged PMOI members, Bahran Abbas-Zadeh and Mehdi Nahvi in connection with the bombing (Reuters 13 Aug. 1994; Xinhua 30 June 1994). Nahvi was shot during his arrest and died later of wounds (ibid.; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 20); Abbas-Zadeh, who confessed during his trial that the bombing was a PMOI attempt to "create Sunni-Shiite strife," was hanged in public (Reuters 13 Aug. 1994). But, according to Middle East Report, "in the opinion of most independent observers" the bombing was an "act of retaliation against the razing of a Sunni mosque by local authorities in the same city earlier in the summer" (Nov.-Dec. 1994a, 6).

In May 1995, the PMOI accused security forces agents of killing two unarmed female PMOI officials near their base in Baghdad and wounding a third (AFP 17 May 1995). In November 1994, Iranian troops bombed PMOI bases in Iraq (MEI 18 Nov. 1994).

The KDPI claims to have killed 15 government troops in western Iran in mid-November 1995 (Reuters 4 Dec. 1995) while the government continued to target KDPI and Komaleh members for arrests and executions in 1994 and 1995 (AI May 1995; Country Reports 1996 1995, 1153; US Office of Asylum Dec. 1994, 12). Aside from the unconfirmed KDPI information reporting some ten KDPI members executed in 1995 (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1152), Amnesty International reports that four KDPI members were executed in Kermanshah Prison in February 1994 after being tortured during two years in custody, and that two Komaleh members were sentenced to death in March 1993 (May 1995, 7-8). In May 1995, Amnesty International did not know if the sentences had been carried out (ibid.). Human rights monitors allege that Iranian security forces have summarily executed several KDPI members in exile in recent years, including the murders in Turkey[7]7 of KDPI members Taha Kermanj in January 1994 and Mohammad Ghaderi and Bahram Azadifar in August 1993 (ibid., 9, 13; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1153).

4.1.3 Demonstrations

Amnesty International reports that in February 1994 in Zahedan, a Sunni city in Sistan-Baluchistan, police "attacked" demonstrators who had defaced public buildings and occupied the Makki Mosque to protest the destruction of a Sunni Mosque in Mashhad (1995, 163; Libération 3 Feb. 1994; Documentation-Réfugiés 15-28 Mar. 1994, 3). At least two people were reported killed and Amnesty International says "scores" were arrested, including the Imam Moulavi Abdolhamid of the Makki Mosque (1995, 163; Libération 3 Feb. 1994). Ministry of Interior officials attributed the uprising to the work of "counter-revolutionaries" (Documentation-Réfugiés 15-28 Mar. 1994, 3).

On 4 August 1994, the Basiji killed at least four people during riots sparked by the Majles' rejection of a bill to make the Farsi-dominated city of Qazvin a separate province (UN 16 Jan. 1995, 9; Reuters 7 Aug. 1994; AFP 5 Aug. 1994; APS Diplomat Recorder 6 Aug. 1994; The Daily Telegraph 5 Aug. 1994; Country Reports 1994 1995, 1078). One source reports that the Basiji used tanks, military helicopters and armoured personnel carriers to restore order (The Mideast Mirror 10 Aug. 1995, 9) as an estimated 100,000 rioters took to the streets (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1078). Amnesty International reports that at least 13 persons were killed and 80 wounded (1995, 163) while other reports say that about 30 were killed and 400 wounded (HRW Dec. 1994, 271; MEI 9 Sept. 1994; Middle East Report Nov.-Dec. 1994b, 11). Human Rights Watch reports that about 1,000 demonstrators were arrested (Dec. 1994, 271) while Country Reports 1994 puts the number at 3,000 (1995, 1079). The Majles agreed to compromise and transfer Qazvin to the province of Tehran (Reuters 7 Aug. 1994).

Ten days after the Qazvin riots, another riot erupted in Tabriz, Iran's third largest city, when Basiji reportedly attacked a group of young women who had mixed with young men after a soccer match (MEI 9 Sept. 1994; Middle East Report Nov.-Dec. 1994b, 11). Again, rioters attacked government buildings, burned cars and fought against security forces (ibid.).

On 4 April 1995 in the Tehran suburb of Islamshahr and surrounding areas, several people were reportedly killed when security forces were brought in to restore order after protests over price increases of bus fares and the quality of water turned into a wider protest against poverty that left cars burned and shop windows smashed (AI 7 Apr. 1995; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1156; Mideast Mirror 6 Apr. 1995, 14; AFP 5 Apr. 1995; Voice of Mojahed 5 Apr. 1995). Amnesty International reports that "up to 10 people may have been shot dead by members of the Revolutionary Guards" and that police helicopters fired tear gas at demonstrators (7 Apr. 1995; see also AFP 5 Apr. 1995). Government officials reported one dead, opposition officials reported "more than 140," and a media report quoted an Asian diplomat as saying "up to 50" were killed (The Mideast Mirror 6 Apr. 1995, 14). Voice of Mojahed clandestine radio reported "dozens" killed by the Pasdaran and other security forces who "fired at the defenceless and unarmed people" (5 Apr. 1995). It also reported the involvement of the outlawed PMOI in leading some of the demonstrations (ibid.). Human Rights Watch reports that "hundreds" of protesters arrested after the Islamshahr riot in April 1995 "remain in detention without charges almost a year after their arrest by the Revolutionary Guard" (Mar. 1996, 10). In March 1996, Amnesty International had received no reports of official investigations, discipline or prosecution of any security force officers[8]8 (5 Mar. 1996).

4.1.4 Hezbollahi

According to Human Rights Watch, religious zealots who call themselves the "partisans of God," or hezbollahi, and are loyal to various factions in the ruling political and religious leadership, were increasingly active in 1994 and 1995 (Mar. 1996, 10). They harassed government critics, intellectuals and "free-thinkers of all kinds," firebombed bookstores and disrupted gatherings (ibid.).

Some high-ranking officials have publicly supported the hezbollahi, particularily Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, secretary of the Guardian Council (HRW Mar. 1996, 10; Tehran Times 23 Dec. 1995; Libération 26-27 Aug. 1995, 7; Reuters 25 Aug. 1995). In August 1995, after a hezbollahi group firebombed a Tehran bookshop for having published a novel it considered insulting to Islam, Ayatollah Jannati praised the hezbollahi's actions, "saying they had only done what authorities should have done" (HRW Mar. 1996, 10). In a Friday sermon broadcast on Tehran radio, Jannati reportedly said: "I recommend that officials not reprimand young Hizbollah members when ... they carry out their duty" (Reuters 25 Aug. 1995). He also reportedly said that [translation] "Neither the police, nor the courts — nor any authority — has the right to oppose them [the hezbollahi]" (Libération 26-27 Aug. 1995; AFP 14 Sept. 1995a). "The impunity with which these groups operate undermines the rule of law," concludes Human Rights Watch (Mar. 1996, 2).

Researcher Elahé Hicks of Human Rights Watch reports that a memorial service for Mehdi Bazargan, first prime minister of the Republic and a liberal critic of the government, in Tehran on 19 January 1996 was called to a halt by police after a vigilante group interrupted proceedings (Mar. 1996, 10).

The Freedom Movement of Iran or FMI, an unauthorized, moderate liberal opposition group, and its leader Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, has been targeted by hezbollahi (ibid., 11). According to Dr. Yazdi, there was no action on the part of authorities when a mob set fire to his house in 1994 (ibid.). The National Front, another banned liberal opposition group which is, however, largely tolerated by the government, has also been the target of hezbollahi attacks according to Human Rights Watch (ibid., 12). In July 1995, authorities stood by when a memorial service for Karim Sanjabi, National Front leader and a former member of Bazargan's transitional government, was "attacked" by a mob (ibid.).

Hezbollahi groups have harassed the prominent academic Abdul Karim Soroush (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1155; HRW Mar. 1996, 17-18). In July and October 1995 vigilante mobs prevented Soroush from speaking at Isfahan and Tehran universities (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1155; HRW Mar. 1996, 17-18). According to a report in La Presse, as members of the vigilante group Ansar-Hezbollah prevented Dr. Soroush from speaking by throwing chairs at the podium and uttering death threats [translation] "the police, although in place, refused to intervene" (18 Nov. 1995; Xinhua 1 Nov. 1995). A few days after the October events about 7,000 students at Tehran University staged a demonstration, organized by the Association of Islamic Students, to protest the actions of the hezbollahi (AFP 22 Oct. 1995).

4.2 Freedom of Opinion and Expression

Articles 24 and 175 of the constitution provide for freedom of expression and freedom of the media so long as that freedom is in keeping with "Islamic principles" and not contrary to the public interest (Flanz Dec. 1992, 26, 88). In practice, according to some sources, the clerical leadership defines what constitutes Islamic principles and the public's interest (HRW Mar. 1996, 3; Article 19 n.d., 6). Human Rights Watch believes that as debate over the legitimacy of the government gains strength "the scope for freedom of expression is narrowing" (Mar. 1996, 16), although Middle East International believes the debate has created "room for dissent" (12 May 1995, 20). Human rights monitors indicate that the government continued to censor, ban, imprison, beat and allegedly kill critics throughout 1993, 1994 and 1995 (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1152; HRW Mar. 1996, 2; UN 2 Feb. 1994, 47; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 22-23; Article 19 n.d., 6).

4.2.1. The Press

The 1985 Press Law requires newspapers to "enjoin the good and forbid the evil" (HRW Mar. 1996, 3) and guarantees that press offences will be "investigated by a competent court in the presence of a jury" (Article 19 n.d., 6; HRW Mar. 1996, 15). In June 1995, the Majles introduced amendments to the Press Law that would require journalists as well as publications to be licensed by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and would allow the Supervisory Council to freeze or cancel a publication's permit without applying to the courts, thereby legalizing powers which the council already exercises de facto (Hamshahri 4 May 1995; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1155; HRW Mar. 1996, 15). In order to get a permit, journalists and editors would have to demonstrate their belief, explained the deputy minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance in a newspaper interview, in "the constitution and in the system" (Hamshahri 4 May 1995). Human Rights Watch reports that the Majles withdrew the proposed legislation in October 1995 but suggests it may be reintroduced (Mar. 1996, 15).

In practice, daily newspapers are controlled and funded by the government or different factions of the clerical leadership (HRW Mar. 1996, 14). Although there has been a blossoming of publications in recent years (Le Devoir 13 Oct. 1995) and although some magazines and newspapers — notably Salam and Hamshahri — publish critical views, none of the tolerated opposition groups, such as the FMI and National Front, are able to publish their own newspapers (ibid.; The Economist 9 Dec. 1995, 43-44). Arbitrariness reigns, reports Le Devoir, and newspaper editors live in constant fear their paper will be closed if they publish views critical of the regime (13 Oct. 1995). Some newspapers, according to information received by Human Rights Watch, continue to operate because they have "strong connections" in government or clerical circles (Mar. 1996, 15). The government controls those that do publish critical views by limiting their access to subsidized newsprint and, contrary to the Press Laws, through unilateral closures, arbitrary arrest and detention of journalists, and sanctioning harassment (ibid.; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1152, 1155; Article 19 n.d., 9-10).

Human Rights Watch reports that in 1995, the Ministry of Islamic Culture closed seven publications (Mar. 1996, 15). In January 1996, the literary monthly Gardoon was closed (ibid.; Reuters 27 Jan. 1996; AFP 30 Jan. 1996). Its editor, Abbas Maroufi, was convicted of "publishing lies" and insulting Ayatollah Khamenei and sentenced, in a trial that Human Rights Watch reports was full of inconsistences, to 35 lashes and 6 months in prison, as well as being banned from working as a journalist (Mar. 1996, 15; AFP 30 Jan. 1996; Reuters 27 Jan. 1996). He is reported to have compared Khamenei with the Shah and to have published a survey suggesting depression was the dominant mood among Iranians (ibid.; HRW Mar. 1996, 15). In January 1996, Abolghassem Golbaf, publisher of the monthly Gouzarish, was convicted of defaming a state-run fertilizer company and sentenced to three months in prison (HRW Mar. 1996, 15; Reuters 27 Jan. 1996). The charge was brought to court by the Minister of Agriculture, contrary to the Press Law which permits only the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to initiate charges (ibid.; HRW Mar. 1996, 15).

In November 1995, Mohammed Sadq Javadi Hessari, editor of the magazine Tous, was sentenced to 20 lashes and 6 months in prison after he criticized the government for arbitrarily suspending publication of Tous in October 1995 (HRW Mar. 1996, 16; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1155; AFP 29 Oct. 1995). He was convicted of slander and "divulging secrets" but, according to Country Reports 1995, was released on bail (1996, 1155). In February 1995, the government closed the daily newspaper Jahan-e Eslam, a radical Islamic left-wing paper run by Ayatollah Khamenei's brother, after it published an interview with former Interior Minister Ali Akhbar Mohtashami that was critical of Rafsanjani's economic reforms (AFP 12 Feb. 1995; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1155). On 31 July 1995, the government closed Peyam-e Daneshju, a left-wing Islamist student weekly known for its open criticism of Rafsanjani (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1155; Middle East Times 6-12 Aug. 1995, 4; AFP 6 Aug. 1995). Hundreds of students rallied to protest the closure (ibid.).

The death in prison in November 1994 of banned satirical writer Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani "had a chilling effect on independent writers" throughout Iran, reports Human Rights Watch (Mar. 1996, 16; Article 19 n.d., 8). "All of the writers and journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 1996 asked not be identified for fear of retribution from the authorities" (Mar. 1996, 16). Following Saidi-Sirjani's arrest, 134 writers and intellectuals published an open letter to President Rafsanjani in the cultural magazine Takakpou protesting his detention and government censorship (Le Devoir 27 Oct. 1994; Le Monde 14 Nov. 1994; HRW Mar. 1996, 16). The Supervisory Council closed Takakpou in March 1995 for "publishing vulgar poems" (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1155) and, according to Human Rights Watch, "all" the writers have since received anonymous death threats; one, Ahmad Mir-Allai, died on 24 October 1995 in "disputed circumstances" (Mar. 1996, 16-17; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1153).

4.2.2 Electronic Media

The government owns all radio and television broadcasting facilities with the exception of clandestine rebel radio stations such as those run by the PMOI and KDPI, and permits only that programming which fits government-defined Islamic criteria (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1156; ODR Sept. 1993, 9). On 20 December 1993, the government made the possession and sale of pornographic videos a capital offence, although first offenders face only a maximum sentence of five years and a US$100,000 fine (The New York Times 21 Dec. 1993). On 21 April 1995, a bill banning the use of satellite dishes came into effect (AFP 14 Sept. 1995b; Article 19 n.d., 11; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1156). Those convicted of illegal use of the dishes could face a $1,000 fine or seizure of the equipment (Reuters 8 Jan. 1996). Because of a 18 May 1994 fatwa issued by the Grand Ayatollah Araki who called the dishes "sacrilegious," Iranians are forbidden to own satellite dishes, thereby protecting Islamic society from "decadent foreign cultures" (Article 19 n.d., 11). According to AFP, "tens of thousands" of middle class urban Iranians owned satellite dishes when the ban came into effect and about two million people received foreign programming (14 Sept. 1995b). Reuters estimates that by the end of 1995, about 250,000 people had reinstalled their satellite dishes, disguising them as air conditioners or similar machinery (8 Jan. 1996).

According to a media report, in January 1996 the Ministry of Justice established a special judicial body called the "Martyr Qoddusi Complex" in Tehran to enforce the ban on satellite dishes and video pornography (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 23 Jan. 1996). Agents, who must wear identity cards, have the power under judicial warrant to inspect houses (ibid.). Some 2,000 obscene computer diskettes packaged as education material had been seized and 88 people had been arrested (ibid.).

4.3 Sexual Orientation

Under Sharia, sodomy is punishable by death if both parties are considered to be adults of sound mind and free will (Kia 1983, 32). Sodomy must be proven by either four confessions from the accused, the testimony of four righteous men who witnessed the act or through the knowledge of a Sharia judge "derived through customary methods" (ibid., 32-33). If the accused repents before the witnesses testify, the penalty "will be quashed" (ibid., 34). Lesbianism, defined under the law as genital contact between women, is punishable by 100 lashes each and by death on the fourth offence (ibid., 35).

In November 1995, Reuters reported that Mehdi Barazandeh, described as a Dervish mystic, was stoned to death in Hamadam, 180 miles west of Tehran, on charges of repeated acts of "adultery and sodomy" (14 Nov. 1995). In October 1995, a man identified only as Mohsen was sentenced to 20 lashes after being caught on a Tehran bus dressed as a woman (International News 9 Nov. 1995; San Francisco Examiner 30 Oct. 1995).

5. KURDS AND OTHER ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

About 89 to 90 per cent of Iranians are Shia Muslims of whom about 50 per cent speak Farsi; approximately 27 per cent of Shia are Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis (Europa 1995 1995, 1538; UN 9 Feb. 1996, 8). Approximately 10 per cent are Sunni Muslims, including Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans, and Baluchis, and about one per cent are non-Muslim (ibid.; Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992, 869; Documentation-Réfugiés 15-28 Mar. 1994). Article 12 of the constitution recognizes as "immutable" that "the official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'afari school"[9]9 (Flanz Dec. 1992, 21). Other Islamic schools, including Sunni, are to be "accorded full respect" and, under article 13, Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are recognized religious minorities (ibid., 21-22). Each constitutionally recognized religion has seats reserved in the Majles: one seat each for Jewish and Zoroastrian representatives, one joint seat for Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, and one seat each for Armenian Christians in the north and in the south of Iran (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 5; Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992, 871). Article 14 adds that the government and all Muslims are "duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights" so long as they "refrain from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran" (Flanz Dec. 1992, 22).

The UN Special Rapporteur on All Forms of Intolerance, Abdelfattah Amor, concluded after his February 1996 mission to Iran that "except for some serious problems in specific fields ... the situation of the recognized Muslim and non-Muslim minorities appears to be fairly satisfactory" (9 Feb. 1996, 22). The Special Rapporteur expressed concern about the constitutional requirement that members of the judiciary, military and civil service prove faith in Islam and the Islamic Revolution, because he said this discriminates against non-Muslim minorities (ibid., 11). He also expressed concern over reports that lower-level courts often decided against minorities and that the Ministry of Education insists that only Muslims may administer minority schools (ibid.).

The Special Rapporteur, "while recognizing and welcoming the recent first indications of improvements in some fields," expressed concern over the situation of Baha'is and Protestants in Iran (ibid., 23). According to Country Reports 1995, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and Sunnis face "officially sanctioned discrimination" (1996, 1159).

5.1 Kurds

There are approximately four to five million Kurds in Iran, making them the third largest ethnic group in the country after Persians and Azerbaijanis (Documentation-Réfugiés 15-28 Mar. 1994, 3; US Office of Asylum Dec. 1994, 11). Ethnic Kurdistan comprises not just the province of Kurdistan but also part of West Azerbaijan and Kermanshah provinces (Chaliand 1994, 81). Once a nomadic people, Kurds are rapidly moving to cities and Kurdish areas have twice the population growth of the rest of Iran (ibid., 81-82). Kurdish areas remain underdeveloped (ibid.).

Although the government acts harshly against Kurds thought to be members of the KDPI or Komaleh, the US Office of Asylum reported in 1994 that it was "aware of no pattern of action by the regime against Iranians simply because they are Kurds" (Dec. 1994, 12). According to KDPI information received by Country Reports 1995, security forces arrested 26 Kurdish civilians from Orumiyeh and Salmas in August and September 1995 and charged them with membership in the KDPI; they were reportedly tortured and face the death penalty (1996, 1154). In an unconfirmed media report, KDPI sources reported that Rashid Abubakri, a villager arrested on suspicion of cooperating with KDPI, was hanged on 21 September 1995 in prison in Orumiyeh (Reuters 3 Oct. 1995).

In November 1995, President Rafsanjani and several ministers visited Kurdistan province to announce 2,000 new projects "to end deprivation in Kordistan province" (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 16 Nov. 1995; IRNA 16 Nov. 1995; ibid. 18 Nov. 1995; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 18 Nov. 1995). Rafsanjani stressed the unity of Shia and Sunni Muslims, that Kurdistan was inseparable from Iran, and promised to pay special attention to Kurdistan province to "help remove the dust of deprivation from the region" (IRNA 16 Nov. 1995; Resalat 20 Nov. 1995). Kurdish nationalists, by contrast, accuse the state of discriminating against Kurds by denying them access to government positions as well as opposing the exercise of their religion and culture; they also accuse the government of forcibly evacuating villagers and of destroying historic monuments (Voice of Iranian Kordestan 19 Feb. 1995). According to Gerard Chaliand, "schooling in the Kurdish language is banned" (1994, 82).

5.2 Baha'is

There are approximately 350,000 Baha'is in Iran (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 13; Documentation-Réfugiés 15-28 Mar. 1994, 2; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157; Reuters 11 Feb. 1996). According to Country Reports 1995, the Iranian government views Baha'ism as a "misguided sect" and continued to "persecute" believers in 1995, albeit "unevenly" (1996, 1157, 1159; see also UN 16 Jan. 1995, 26; ibid. 9 Feb. 1996, 13). Government officials who met with Special Rapporteur Amor described Baha'ism not as a religion but "a political organization which was associated with the Shah's regime, is against the Iranian Revolution and engages in espionage activities" (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 6). The Baha'is organization was banned in 1983 (ibid., 14).

On 2 January 1996, the Islamic Revolutionary Court sentenced to death Dhabihu'llah Mahrami, a Baha'i from Yazd, after convicting him of apostasy (La Lettre de la FIDH 22 Feb. 1996, 2; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157; Reuters 11 Feb. 1996). The court also ordered the confiscation of his property because, as his wife and children are also Baha'is, he does not have any Muslim heirs (ibid.). Mahrami appealed the verdict and the case was sent back to the general, rather than the revolutionary, court (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157).

According to the Special Rapporteur's report, seven Baha'is were in prison in early 1996 (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 16). Two of them, Bihnam Mithaqi and Kayvan Khalajabadi, had been sentenced to death "because of their religion" on 8 December 1993 after having been arrested in 1989; as of January 1996 they had not yet received the right to appeal and the Special Rapporteur was denied the right to meet with them (ibid.). However, the representatives of the Baha'i community "emphasized [to the Special Rapporteur] that, during the last six years, the number of Baha'is arrested because of their religious faith had declined and the executions had apparently been halted" (ibid.).

Under a law passed in October 1993, only members of one of the "divine religions" — a phrase that Country Reports 1995 says is used to discriminate against Baha'is — can work for the government (1996, 15). According to Baha'i and representatives of non-governmental organizations who met with the Special Rapporteur, the government continues to pursue a "policy of repression" (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 13). Baha'is who have been fired do not receive any financial assistance or pension and some must return salaries or pensions they received while working (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1159; UN 9 Feb. 1996, 15; ibid. 16 Jan. 1996, 12; Documentation-Réfugiés 15-28 Mar. 1994, 2; Baha'i Community of Canada Jan. 1996). The government reportedly does not recognize the Baha'is right to marry, divorce or inherit according to Baha'i traditions; it blocks their access to higher education and has confiscated cemeteries and other Baha'i property (ibid.), although Country Reports 1995 writes that the government has returned some of the property previously confiscated (1996, 1159). According to Gerald Filson, secretary of the Baha'i Community of Canada, many Baha'is in Iran do not apply to university or register their marriages in order to avoid making their religion public and encountering difficulties (7 May 1996). Although Baha'is may conceal their identity from government officials to avoid difficulties, their religion urges honesty (Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996). The US Office of Asylum reported in 1994 that Baha'is identity can usually be confirmed through the international Baha'i Spiritual Centre in Wilmette, Illinois which issues membership cards to recognized followers (14 Dec. 1994, 10).

5.3 Christians

According to information provided by the Iranian government, there are approximately 117,000 Christians in Iran: 17,000 Assyro-Chaldeans and 100,000 Armenians (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 7). The religious organizations themselves report higher numbers — between 200,000 and 250,000 — but, according to the Special Rapporteur, they use numbers from before the 1979 Revolution and many Christians have since left Iran (ibid.).

The Special Rapporteur reports that Protestant associations with an "ethnic component and name (Armenian or Assyrian), are legally recognized" while those without an ethnic focus "sometimes face difficulties in obtaining legal recognition of their existence" (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 17). Protestant representatives told the Special Rapporteur that their activities were "subject to restrictions," citing, for example, the government's seizure of 20,000 New Testaments which had been translated into Farsi, the closure of six temples since 1988, and pressure to stop conducting services in Farsi and allowing Muslim converts to participate (ibid.). The government appears to be tolerant of groups such as Armenian Christians because they conduct their services in Armenian and thus are not proselytizing Muslims; it has, however, targeted evangelical Christians whose services are conducted in Farsi, closing their churches and arresting converts (ibid., 18; Country Reports 1996 1995, 1157).

Reverend Khosrow Khodadadi, pastor of the closed Pentecostal Assyrian Church in Hamadan and a convert from Islam, was arrested in April 1995, held incommunicado, reportedly "mistreated" and released in June, according to Country Reports 1995 (1996, 1157). Khodadadi and his family had left Iran for Turkey in 1994 after being harassed by the Iranian government but he was extradited back in November 1994 and told to move from Hamadan to Tehran (ibid.). According to Country Reports 1995, the government will not permit him to leave Iran (ibid.).

In 1994, three Christian ministers known to be critical of the government were murdered under such suspicious circumstances that Amnesty International suggested the deaths may have been "extrajudicial executions" (May 1995, 9) although two of the murders were officially attributed to PMOI members (AFP 4 Oct. 1995; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157). Bishop Haik Hovespian-Mehr, superintendent of the Assembly of God Churches and chairman of the Council of Protestant Ministers in Iran, went missing on 19 January 1994 (AFP 6 July 1994; Reuters 26 Jan. 1994). He had campaigned for the release of accused apostate pastor Mehdi Dibaj and had refused to sign a document issued by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance stating that Iranian Christians enjoyed full rights (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1078; AI May 1995, 10). Eleven days later, Amnesty International reports, his family was informed of his death and was shown only a photograph to identify his body (ibid.; AFP 31 Jan. 1994).

Mehdi Dibaj, pastor of the Assemblies of God Church, was found dead on 5 July 1994 in a wood near Tehran after having been missing for two weeks (AFP 6 July 1994; AI May 1995, 10-11). Dibaj, a convert from Islam 45 years earlier, spent several years in Sari Prison and had been sentenced to death for apostasy in December 1993 (ibid., 10; Country Reports 1994 1995, 1077). He was released on 16 January 1994 following international pressure but the charges remained (The Times 14 Jan. 1994; AI May 1995, 10-11). Reverend Tatavous Michaelian, pastor of the Evangelical Church in Tehran, who took over the chairmanship of the Council of Protestant Ministries, was found dead from shots to the head and throat on 2 July 1994 (AI May 1995, 10; AFP 6 July 1994; Country Reports 1994 1995, 1078).

Three women said to be members of the PMOI confessed on 15 March 1995 to the murders of Dibaj and Michaelian in the first ever public trial in an Islamic Revolutionary Court (AFP 4 Oct. 1995; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157). One woman was sentenced to 30 years, the other two to 20 years each (AFP 4 Oct. 1995). The government is still investigating the murder of Hovespian (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157). Amnesty International reports that government authorities pressured church leaders to state publicly that the PMOI was responsible for the murders (May 1995, 11).

According to the Special Rapporteur, Protestant representatives reported that following the murders, government authorities lifted travel restrictions on several Protestant pastors (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 18).

5.4 Sunni Muslims and Other Religious Minorities

The majority of Sunnis, numbering between two and five million, live in the southern provinces of Sistan-Baluchistan and Khorassan and include a number of Kurds (Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992, 869; The Middle East Sept. 1994; UN 9 Feb. 1996, 11). According to the UN Special Rapporteur, "the situation of the Sunni Muslim minority does not seem to give rise to problems of a religious nature, except in respect of places of worship" (ibid., 22). Sunni representatives did not report any restrictions on their political, cultural, educational or professional activities (ibid., 12) although Country Reports 1995 says Sunni face "religious discrimination on the local level" (1996, 1159).

Reports (discussed in Section 4.1.2) suggest there were clashes between security forces and Sunnis in 1994 in Zahedan over the destruction of a Sunni mosque in Mashhad (Documentation-Réfugiés 15-28 Mar. 1994, 3; Country Reports 1994 1995, 1078). The Middle East reported in 1994 that "tension [had] been rising for some time between Sunnis and Shia in eastern Iran," and that the 20 June 1994 Mashhad bombing may have been the work of a Sunni organization with links in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Sept. 1994). Sunni Muslims reportedly resented the "powerful and very wealthy" Imam Reza Foundation which was building Shia mosques in Sistan and Baluchistan (ibid.). In his February 1996 report, the Special Rapporteur was told by government and Sunni officials that they had, in discussions, determined that the building destroyed in Mashhad in 1994 was not, in fact, a mosque, although there had been plans to build one; the government has offered the Sunni community land on which to build their mosque (UN 9 Feb. 1996, 12).

There are 20,00 to 30,000 Jews in Iran (AFP 3 Mar. 1994; International Herald Tribune 2 Aug. 1994; UN 9 Feb. 1996, 7). The government permits Jews, as a constitutionally recognized minority, to follow their religion; like other non-Muslims, however, they are subject to the general ban on non-Muslims in government posts (ibid., 21). In both 1994 and 1995, Country Reports reported that although the government issued passports to Jews, it "often" did not issue the multiple exit visas and "does not normally" permit entire families to travel abroad together (1995, 1081; 1996, 1157).

The Special Rapporteur found that the situation of Zoroastrians (who number around 33,000) and other non-Muslim minorities is "apparently satisfactory except in respect of some specific problems" such as discrimination in employment, education and housing and restrictions on freedom of expression (UN 9 Feb. 7, 21; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1158).

6. WOMEN ([10]10)

Most observers agree that women in Iran still face systemic discrimination on the basis of gender: Country Reports 1995 asserts that discrimination has increased since the revolution (1996, 1158); the Parliamentary Human Rights Group claims that equality "is systematically denied" and that women are "third class citizens" (Nov. 1994, 1); and Human Rights Watch reports that women "continued to be hounded to comply with petty restrictions" from authorities enforcing Islamic dress and moral codes (1995, 278).

6.1 Hudud Punishments

Under the new Islamic Penal Code, adopted by the Majles in November 1995, those found guilty of adultery, witnessed by at least three others, are subject to execution by stoning (AFP 29 Nov. 1995). If a husband discovers his wife in an adulterous act he may kill her and her partner without legal consequences; a wife who discovers her husband with another woman does not have the same right (ibid.).

Several executions for adultery have been reported in recent years. In December 1994, a couple were stoned to death in Ramhormoz for murder and adultery (UN 16 Jan. 1995, 5; Reuters 7 Dec. 1994). In November 1994, a woman was stoned to death near Sari (UN 16 Jan. 1995, 4; AFP 16 Nov. 1994). In May 1994, a woman was hanged for adultery (LCHR July 1994, 175). A woman was stoned to death in Qom for adultery in March 1994 (Reuters 3 Mar. 1994; UN 16 Jan. 1995, 17; AFP 16 Nov. 1994) and in January 1994 a woman was stoned in Evin prison (UN 16 Jan. 1995, 17; Parliamentary Human Rights Group Nov. 1994, 11).

6.2 The Islamic Dress Code

The new Islamic Penal Code of November 1995 states that women caught in violation of the Islamic dress code could be sentenced to between 10 days and 10 months in prison or 74 lashes (AFP 29 Nov. 1995). Government security forces continued to enforce the hijab (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1158; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996) and the public segregation of women and men unrelated by blood or marriage (Le Devoir 12 Oct. 1995; The Ottawa Citizen 23 Aug. 1994). Sources describe enforcement as "inconsistent and unpredictable" (HRW 1995, 278; Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; Rejali 5 May 1996). They report that enforcement is taken on by various branches of the LEF including the Komiteh (Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; The Economist 23 July 1994, 39), the Basiji (Rejali 5 May 1996; Documentation-Réfugiés 15-28 Mar. 1994, 2; Parliamentary Human Rights Group Nov. 1994, 9), and the Pasdaran (Time 26 June 1995; Parliamentary Human Rights Group Nov. 1994, 9). According to some reports, women continue to be flogged for hijab violations (AI 1995, 165; Rejali 5 May 1996), although others say women are more likely to be fined for infractions (Time 26 June 1995; The Economist 23 July 1994, 39). Sources report that some women in Tehran stretch the limits of the law by wearing colourful scarves, manteaux and running shoes (Time 26 June 1995; Hassanyari 4 Mar. 1996; Le Devoir 12 Oct. 1995). Shahrzad Mojab, assistant professor in Concordia University's Applied Social Science department, points out that now, with inflation and unemployment so high, "the hijab is not on the top of people's agenda to talk about or to complain about ... [Iranians] are more concerned about the government's violation of overall human rights" (6 Mar. 1996).

6.3 Access to Employment

On 24 April 1994, the Majles passed a bill allowing women with a judicial background to work as advisors and in low-level judicial positions (Voice of the Islamic Republic 24 Apr. 1994; HRW 1994, 270-71). Country Reports 1995 questions the "practical effect" of the law as the government does not "permit female judges to preside over legal hearings" (1996, 1158). On 10 October 1995, President Rafsanjani appointed Ashrafossadat Sanei as deputy health minister, the first woman to hold a ministerial post since the 1979 Revolution (IRNA 10 Oct. 1995; Keesing's Oct. 1995, 40798).

7. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

7.1 Legal Exit Requirements

Iranians enjoy freedom of movement within Iran (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157). Leaving Iran, however, can be difficult for certain Iranians, particularly women, Baha'is, Jews (in some cases), certain government opponents and those thought to be members of the PMOI, the KDPI, Komaleh or other radical opposition groups (Rahnema 3 May 1996; Bakhash 30 Apr. 1996; US Office of Asylum Dec. 1994). In January 1995, the Ministry of Higher Education announced that Iranian men wishing to study for masters degrees or doctorates abroad may do so, without having to perform their military service, if they pay their own expenses (Keyhan 12 Jan. 1995). Sources note, however, that it is difficult to predict which persons will be allowed by government authorities to leave Iran (Hekmat 7 Mar. 1996; Rahnema 3 May 1996).

All Iranians may apply to the passport office within the Ministry of the Interior for passports and exit visas after paying the appropriate fees and submitting birth certificates and other documents recording civil status, such as a military completion card or a marriage certificate (Issues Related to Iranian Asylum Seekers Oct. 1993, 23-25). According to Shaul Bakhash, a professor of history at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, any outstanding business with government, such as unpaid taxes, would have to be settled before the government would issue travel documents (30 Apr. 1996). Men must submit proof that they have either completed their military service or have an exemption, either government-granted, purchased or medically certified (Issues Related to Iranian Asylum Seekers Oct. 1993, 23; Bakhash 30 Apr. 1996; Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157). Government employees may need a letter of permission (Issues Related to Iranian Asylum Seekers Oct. 1993, 22) or to post a bond to travel abroad (Country Reports 1995 1996, 1157).

Women must have written, notarized permission from either their father, husband or legal guardian (ibid.; Issues Related to Iranian Asylum Seekers Oct. 1993, 22; CIC 6 Nov. 1995). An official with the Iranian Embassy in Ottawa reports that women over the age of 18 may travel on their own without permission and a divorced woman with a divorce certificate would only need her ex-husband's permission if she wanted to travel with her children and he was the custodial parent (14 Mar. 1996). A widowed woman over 18 would be free to travel with her children, without written permission, if she had both legal custody and her husband's death certificate (ibid.). No one under the age of 18 is issued a passport, except under special circumstances when the minor is travelling without a parent or a guardian (Issues Related to Iranian Asylum Seekers Oct. 1993, 20).

According to a 1993 report, passports are checked at the airport by the LEF for criminal offences and against computerized lists by the Ministry of Intelligence for political, Sharia, narcotic, commercial or tax offences (ibid., 17). Having a passport and exit visa still does not guarantee exit through an airport, the report notes, because airport authorities "seem to be in possession of lists which are not the same as those kept at the passport office" (ibid.).

7.2 Illegal Exit Practices

Information about illegal exit is difficult to obtain as many who have left illegally or have helped others to do so will not speak publicly. The 1993 report on Issues Related to Iranian Asylum Seekers observes: "With so many checks by the authorities involved it would seem that without the correct documentation in hand, it would be difficult for passengers who are wanted by the Iranian authorities to pass the control system at Tehran's airport by means of bribery or false documentation" (Oct. 1993, 19). The report concludes that the use of false documents in Iran is uncommon: "Counterfeits [passports] and look alikes are rarely seen in Iran" and those that are seen are usually passports that have been altered through the substitution of photographs; most are bought by Jews and draft-dodgers (ibid., 24). According to Alexander Neve, a lawyer and former legal programs coordinator at the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University, illegal exit through an airport with false documents is "probably the second most common" way out of Iran (4 Mar. 1996). Professor Hekmat says that high inflation and low government salaries have made bribery endemic in the civil service (7 Mar. 1996).

Those seeking to leave Iran illegally are most likely to try to leave overland, reports Neve (4 Mar. 1996). The most popular route is through the border with Turkey near Bazargan, one of Iran's busiest borders (Rahnema 3 May 1996). Iranians do not need a visa to enter Turkey and are allowed a three-month stay (Embassy of Iran 23 Nov. 1995). Some leave through Baluchistan into Pakistan (Rahnema 3 May 1996) or through the port of Bandar Abbas across the Persian Gulf in small boats at night to the United Arab Emirates (Neve 4 Mar. 1996).

7.3 Return to Iran

Shaul Bakhash says that in recent years "travel is not really restricted, it is really quite free" and that recently there has been "a lot of coming and going" (30 Apr. 1996). According to a 1993 media report, the government has even allowed former PMOI members who had "repented" to return to Iran (AFP 22 Dec. 1993). Others comment that there is no predicting who can safely return to Iran (Rahnema 3 May 1996). According to Saeed Rahnema, there are "all sorts of authorities that decide" what might happen to a person on return, because, although the central government creates policy, local authorities, such as the Friday Prayer leaders appointed by Wali Faqih Khamenei to each mosque and each Komiteh, vary in their interpretation of policy (3 May 1996). Rahnema concludes by saying that what happens to an Iranian national on return "depends on which Komiteh, which Mullah, who is judge, which local authorities" (ibid.).

NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES

Article 19

Article 19 is an independent human rights organization that campaigns on behalf of the right to freedom of expression worldwide. Founded in 1986, Article 19, or the International Centre Against Censorship, is based in the United Kingdom. Article 19 has been active in fighting censorship and in protests against the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. The draft briefing notes referred to in this document were written by Jan Bauer, UN Representative for Article 19, Thornhill, Ontario, and from the most recent visit to Iran by UN Special Rapporteurs.

Bakhash, Shaul

Shaul Bakhash is a professor of history at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. He has published articles and reviews in the New York Times Book Review, New York Review of Books, Anthropological Quarterly, Iran: A Country Study, The World Today, The Middle East Journal, and World Politics. Mr. Bakhash is also the author of The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (1984), The Politics of Oil and Revolution in Iran (1982) and Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform Under the Qajars: 1858-1896 (1978).

Hassanyari, Houshang

Houshang Hassanyari is a professor of political science, focusing on Iranian foreign policy, at the Royal Military College in Kingston. He travelled in Iran in June 1995 and May 1996.

Hekmat, Hormoz

Hormoz Hekmat is the managing editor of Iran Nameh and a professor of political science with the Foundation for Iranian Studies in Bethesda, Maryland. He left Iran in 1982.

Mojab, Shahrzad

Shahrzad Mojab is an assistant professor in the Department of Applied Social Sciences at Concordia University in Montréal and has taught at Windsor University in Ontario. Shahrzad Mojab has published articles and reviews in The Middle East Journal and Resources for Feminist Research/Documentation sur la recherche feministe. Shahrzad Mojab was also a contributor to the 1995 publication Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State.

Neve, Alexander

Alexander Neve has worked with Amnesty International's International Secretariat in London, U.K., as Refugee Officer with the Great Lakes Crisis Team. Alexander Neve, a lawyer, was formerly the Legal Programmes Coordinator at York University's Centre for Refugee Studies in Toronto, as well as the Acting Refugee Coordinator of the Canadian Section of Amnesty International. The information offered by Alexander Neve in this paper is based on information he acquired while working with Amnesty International and in representing Iranian refugee claimants.

Rahnema, Saeed

Dr. Rahnema teaches policy studies at Queen's University, Kingston, and war and peace in the Middle East at York University, Toronto. He was the Director of the Canadian Branch of the U.S.-based Center for Iranian Research and Analysis, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Middle East Economic Association and the editor of the MEEA Newsletter. He is the author of several books and articles in English and Persian, including articles published in Economic and Industrial Democracy, Journal of Developing Areas, International Journal, Conflict Quarterly, Cesmandaz, Mehregan, and Mihan. He is also the author of Rebirth of Social Democracy in Iran (1996), co-author and co-editor of Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State (1995, 1996), and Organization Structure: A Systemic Approach (1992). Dr. Rahnema was formerly a director and senior analyst in the Industrial Management Institute in Tehran, and a senior programme officer with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). He was last in Iran in 1984.

Rejali, Darius

Darius Rejali teaches political philosophy and comparative politics as an associate professor of political science at Reed College in Portland, Oregon. Darius Rejali is the author of Torture and Modernity: Self, Society and State in Modern Iran (1994), "Rape as a Political Weapon in War: The Case of Bosnian Women" (1994). Darius Rejali has also published an article in Political Science and Politics.

APPENDIX ONE: SELECTED CONDITIONS FOR PERMANENT MILITARY EXEMPTIONS

CONDITIONS FOR EXEMPTION              COST

1. Men with PhDs in certain fields, born US$ 16,600, with differences
between 1949 and 1958 who left Iran                based on education and profession
before March 1990

2. Men with BAs, born between 1955               US$16,600
and 1964 who left Iran before
March 1990

3. Men with PhDs born 1949 or earlier              None

4. Men with BAs born 1955 or earlier               None

5. Men who left Iran after 1990          Between US$1,000-3,000, depending
                on education and profession

6. Continuing graduate studies abroad            Education expenses

7. Permanent physical or mental disability       None

8. Sole guardian and support of family
members or only son           None

INELIGIBLE FOR EXEMPTION

Men born after 1958 who have degrees in medicine, pharmacy, dentistry or other fields deemed essential by the state.

SOURCES: Embassy of Iran 14 Mar. 1996; Iran 21 Oct. 1984; Keyhan, 12 Jan. 1995.

Note: According to a report in Keyhan in January 1995, men who are continuing graduate studies abroad who pay their own expenses will be granted a full exemption. There are no age limitations and those who qualify are able to return to Iran periodically throughout their studies (12 Jan. 1995).

APPENDIX TWO: PENALTIES FOR THOSE WITHOUT PROOF OF EXEMPTION OR COMPLETION OF SERVICE

CONVICTION                PENALTY

1. Peacetime draft avoidance with             Extra 6 months-2 years service
no exemptions

2. Wartime draft avoidance with no  Up to 10 years extra service or
exemptions            punishment to be decided at
                discretion of convicting judge

3. Lying or falsifying documents to  Punished "in accordance with the
avoid service        laws of Ta'zirat for each instance"

SOURCE: Iran 21 Oct. 1984, 24-26.

APPENDIX THREE: PUNISHMENTS FOR EXIT VIOLATIONS

These punishments apply to those who do not have a political or criminal record.[11]11

CRIME           SENTENCE

1. Leaving the country on illegal or          1-2 years imprisonment or fine
falsified document               of up to 500,000 rials

2. Attempting to cross a border         1 month-1 year imprisonment
without official documents or fine of up to 300,000 rials

3. Attempting to cross an unauthorized           6 months or fine of up to 300,000 rials
border with official documents

4. Attempting to leave from "unauthorized     2 months-1 year imprisonment
entrances"             and/or fines of 100,000-500,000 rials

5. Falsifying passports or visas or similar        Up to 3 years imprisonment and
documents            fines of up to 3,000,000 rials.

SOURCES: Issues Related to Asylum Seekers Oct. 1993, 33-34; UNHCR 21 Mar. 1995.

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Intelligence Newsletter[Paris]. 4 February 1993. "Iran: Networks in Turkey and Germany." (NEXIS)

International Herald Tribune[Paris]. 2 August 1994. Chris Hedges. "Persecution of Christians Mounts in Iran." (NEXIS)

International News[San Francisco]. 9 November 1995. Rex Wockner. "Iranian Crossdresser Lashed."

Iran. 21 October 1984. Executive Regulation of the Military Service Act.

IRIB[Tehran, in Persian]. 25 January 1996. "Commander Says One Million Recruited Into Iranian Basij Force." (FBIS-NES-96-018 26 Jan. 1996, pp. 52)

IRIB[Tehran, in Persian]. 15 March 1995. "First Session Begins." (FBIS-NES-95-051 16 Mar. 1995, pp. 55-56)

The Irish Times[Dublin]. 8 February 1995. Michael Jansen. "Islam On The March: Iran." (NEXIS)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 18 January 1996. "Iran Majlis Speaker Calls for Massive Elections Turnout." (FBIS-NES-96-013 19 Jan. 1996, p. 82)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 13 January 1996. "Iran's Basij Forces Concludes Civil Maneuver in Kerman Province." (FBIS-NES-96-013 19 Jan. 1996, p. 81)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 3 January 1996. "Iran: Prison Head Lajevardi Says Iran Has No Political Prisoners." (BBC Summary 5 Jan. 1996/NEXIS)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 23 November 1995. "Death Sentence in Bank Saderat Case Shows Iran's 'Economic Health and Security.'" (BBC Summary 24 Nov. 1995/NEXIS)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 18 November 1995. "Inaugurates Cement Works, Gives Speech." (FBIS-NES-95-224 21 Nov. 1995, p. 75)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 16 November 1995. "Further on Visit to Kordestan." (FBIS-NES-95-222 17 Nov. 1995, p. 42)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 10 October 1995. "First Woman Deputy Minister Appointed Since 1979 Revolution." (BBC Summary 12 Oct. 1995/NEXIS)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 5 April 1995. "Islamshar Residents Protest Rioters' Actions." (FBIS-NES-95-066 6 Apr. 1995, p. 59)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 15 March 1995. "Trial of MKO Members Opens in Tehran." (FBIS-NES-95-051 16 Mar. 1995, p. 55)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 13 March 1995. "Former General Granted 3-Day Leave From Jail." (FBIS-NES-95-049 14 Mar. 1995, p. 68)

Issues Related To Iranian Asylum Seekers And Refugee Applications Abroad[Tehran]. October 1993. A Joint Report By The Embassies of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 4th revised edition.

Jomhuri-ye Eslami[Tehran, in Farsi]. 8 April 1995a. "Paper Details 'Spectacular' Protests in Islamshahr." (FBIS-NES-95-072 14 Apr. 1995, p. 40)

Jomhuri-ye Eslami[Tehran, in Farsi]. 8 April 1995b. "Friday Imam Cited on Unrest in Islamshahr, Akbarabad." (FBIS-NES-95-075 19 Apr. 1995, p. 65)

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies[Villanova, PA]. Fall 1995. Vol. 19, No. 1. Robert Olson. "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: From The Gulf War to The Incursion Into Iraq."

Katzman, Kenneth. 1993. The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.

Keesing's Record of World Events[Cambridge]. October 1995. Vol. 41, No. 10. "Appointment of First Woman Deputy Minister."

Keesing's Record of World Events[Cambridge]. August 1995. Vol. 41, No. 7/8. "Sentencing in Bank Corruption Trial."

Keesing's Record of World Events[Cambridge]. July 1995. Vol. 41, No. 7/8. "Record Rise in Inflation."

Keesing's Record of World Events[Cambridge]. February 1995. Vol. 41, No. 2. "Renewed Campaign Against Corruption."

Keesing's Record of World Events[Cambridge]. May 1994. Vol. 40, No. 5. "Currency Devaluation — Establishment of Private Savings and Loans Associations."

Keesing's Record of World Events[Cambridge]. April 1994. Vol. 40. No. 4. "Debt Rescheduling Agreements."

Keyhan[London, in Persian]. 27 July 1995. "Rowhani's Home In Qom Attacked." (FBIS-NES-95-177 13 Sept. 1995, p. 75)

Keyhan[London, in Persian]. 6 July 1995. "Ayatollah Rowhani Accuses Rafsanjani of Violations." (FBIS-NES-95-177 13 Sept. 1995, p. 74)

Keyhan[London, in Persian]. 12 January 1995. "Law Relaxed on Continuing Studies Abroad." (FBIS-NES-95-057 24 Mar. 1995, p. 55)

Kia, Masouduzzafar Samimi. 1983. Law of Hudoud and Qasas (Punishment and Retribution) and Provisions Thereof. Tehran: Pars Associates.

La Lettre de la Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH)[Paris]. 22 February 1996. "Iran: Un Bahá'i condamné à mort pour apostasie. La communauté bahá'ie communique."

La Lettre de la Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH)[Paris]. 9 November 1995. "Ligue pour la Défense des droits de l'homme en Iran: Communiqué de presse, 23 octobre 1995."

La Lettre de Reporters sans frontières[Paris]. November 1995. Siavosh Ghazi and Djallal Malti. "La presse à l'ordre des mosquées."

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). July 1994. Critique: Review of the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993. New York: LCHR.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). May 1993. The Justice System of the Islamic Republic of Iran. New York: LCHR.

Libération[Paris]. 23 April 1996. Jean-Pierre Perrin. "À Téhéran, la droite religieuse renforce son emprise."

Libération[Paris]. 19 March 1996. Jean-Pierre Perrin. "L'ultradroite truste les urnes en Iran."

Libération[Paris]. 26-27 August 1995. "Les 'hezbollahi' au-dessus des lois en Iran."

Libération[Paris]. 24 March 1994. "Un intellectuel proche du président iranien arrêté."

Libération[Paris]. 3 February 1994. "Violente manifestation de sunnites iraniens."

The Middle East[London]. May 1996. Kathy Evans. "Will The Mullahs Move On?"

The Middle East[London]. September 1994. "Iran's Peeling Veneer."

Middle East International(MEI) [London]. 15 March 1996. Saeed Barzin. "Election Results."

Middle East International(MEI) [London]. 16 February 1996. Karen Dabrowska. "Iran Balances Dogma With Pragmatism."

Middle East International(MEI) [London]. 12 May 1995. Lamis Andoni. "Winds of Change in Iran."

Middle East International(MEI) [London]. 25 August 1995. Safa Haeri. "Clerical Split."

Middle East International(MEI) [London]. 18 November 1994. No. 488. Gerald Butt. "Green Light For Tehran."

Middle East International(MEI) [London]. 9 September 1994. No. 483. Safa Haeri."The Generals' Warning."

Middle East International(MEI) [London]. 13 May 1994. No. 475. Safa Haeri. "Mutual Extradition."

Middle East Report[Washington, DC]. November-December 1994a. Ali Banuazizi. "Iran's Revolutionary Impasse: Political Factionalism and Societal Resistance."

Middle East Report[Washington, DC]. November-December 1994b. Asef Bayat. "Squatters and The State: Back Street Politics In The Islamic Republic."

Middle East Report[Washington, DC]. November-December 1994c. Kaveh Ehsani. "'Tilt But Don't Spill': Iran's Development and Reconstruction Dilemma."

Middle East Times[Cairo]. 6-12 August 1995. "Tehran Closes Radical Weekly."

Middle East Times[Cairo]. 8 May 1994. "Iran Denies Prison Abuses."

Middle East Watch, New York. 7 March 1995. Telephone interview with representative.

Middle East Watch, New York. 16 May 1994. Telephone interview with representative.

Mideast Mirror[London]. 29 February 1996. Vol. 10, No. 43. "3,232 Candidates Qualify to Run For Next Week's Parliamentary Elections in Iran." (NEXIS)

Mideast Mirror[London]. 10 August 1995. Vol. 9, No. 153. Amir Taheri. "Iran: Who Is Preparing For Civil War?"

Mideast Mirror[London]. 8 August 1995. Vol. 9, No. 151. "Reorganization of Iran's Armed Forces Starts With Revolutionary Guard."

Mideast Mirror[London]. 6 April 1995. Vol. 9, No. 67. "Iran's Rulers Advised to 'Go Back to Their Mosques' Following Price Riots Near Tehran."

Mojab, Shahrzad. 6 March 1996. Assistant Professor of Applied Social Sciences, Concordia University, Montréal. Telephone interview.

Le Monde[Paris]. 18 March 1996. Delattre Lucus. "L'Allemagne lance un mandat d'arrêt contre un ministre iranien pour incitation au terrorisme; La décision de justice embarrasse le premier partenaire commercial de la République islamique." (NEXIS)

Le Monde[Paris]. 22 January 1996. "Iran: le plus ancien prisonnier politique d'Iran, Abbas Amir Entezam, a eu droit seulement a une liberte provisoire de quelques jours." (NEXIS)

Le Monde[Paris].14 November 1994. Niam Mouna. "Iran contre-attaque des censeurs." (NEXIS)

Neve, Alexander. 4 March 1996. Legal Programs Coordinator, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Toronto. Telephone interview.

The New York Times. 21 December 1993. "Iranians Approve Death Penalty for Makers of Video Pornography." (NEXIS)

ODR Bulletin d'information[Berne]. 13 January 1995. "Les Forces de securité en Iran."

ODR Bulletin d'information[Berne]. September 1993. "Iran."

The Ottawa Citizen. 8 December 1994. "Terror Governs Iranian Women."

The Ottawa Citizen. 23 August 1994. Bizhan Torabi. "Iranian 'Gender Apartheid' Policy Meant to Protect Women." (NEXIS)

Parliamentary Human Rights Group. November 1994. Iran: The Subjection of Women.

La Presse[Montréal]. 4 March 1996. "Élections-retrait."

La Presse[Montréal]. 18 November 1995. Fred A. Reed. "Un vent de fronde souffle sur l'Iran."

La Presse[Montréal]. 4 August 1995. "Kurdes extradés en Turquie."

Political Handbook of the World: 1994. 1994. Edited by Arthur S. Banks. Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications.

Professor, Department of Political and Economic Science, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, and Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal. 12 December 1995. Text sent to the DIRB.

Rahnema, Saeed. Professor of Political Science, Queen's University, and visiting professor, York University. 3 May 1996. Telephone interview.

Rejali, Darius M. Associate Professor of Political Science, Reed College, Portland, Oregon. 5 May 1996. Telephone interview.

Rejali, Darius M. 1994. Torture and Modernity: Self, Society, and State in Modern Iran. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Resalat[Tehran, in Persian]. 20 November 1995. "Editorial Hails Rafsanjani's Visit to Kordestan." (FBIS-NES-95-230 30 Nov. 1995, p. 73)

Reuters. 20 April 1996. BC Cycle. William Maclean. "Iran's Election Results Start Trickling In." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 11 February 1996. BC Cycle. "Bahai Gets Death Sentence in Iran: French Report." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 31 January 1996. BC Cycle. "Iran Police Bans Opposition News Conference." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 27 January 1996. BC Cycle. "Iran: Iranian Editor Condemned to Lashes and Jail." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 26 January 1996. BC Cycle. Fiona Fleck. "Germany: German Prosecutors Investigate Iranian Spy Chief." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 17 January 1996. BC Cycle. "Iran Frees Longest-held Political Prisoner — Lawyer." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 8 January 1996. BC Cycle. "Iran Police Raid 110 Homes, Seize Banned TV Dishes." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 4 December 1995. BC Cycle. "Kurdish Rebels Say They Killed 15 Iranian Troops." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 14 November 1995. "An Iranian Mystic Was Stoned to Death After a Court Found Him Guilty of Adultery and a Homosexual Act."

Reuters. 3 October 1995. BC Cycle. "Kurdish Rebels Say Iran Executed Supporter." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 25 August 1995. BC Cycle. "Senior Iran Cleric Backs Publishing House Attack." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 7 December 1994. BC Cycle. "Iranian Man, Woman Stoned to Death on Court Order." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 7 September 1994. BC Cycle. "Iran Denies Torturing German Spy." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 13 August 1994. BC Cycle. "Iran Hangs Man in Public for Bomb Plot." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 7 August 1994. BC Cycle. "Qazvin Riots Raise Questions About Iran's Mullahs." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 10 July 1994. BC Cycle. "German Ex-prisoner Says Iran Tortures Children." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 3 March 1994. BC Cycle. "Iranian Woman Stoned to Death for Adultery Paper." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 26 January 1994. BC Cycle. "Iranian Bishop Disappears in Tehran Rights Group." (NEXIS)

Rhoodie, Eschel M. 1989. Discrimination Against Women: A Global Survey. London: Macfarland and Company.

The Salt Lake Tribune. 21 January 1994. USA Today. "Iran." (NEXIS)

San Francisco Examiner. 30 October 1995. "Going Out In Drag Costs Man in Iran."

Sobh'[Tehran, in Persian]. 22 March 1996. "Reactions to President's Speech: Weekly Ridicules Former Deputy PM Amir Entezam's Call to Observe Defiant Silence." (BBC Summary 24 Mar. 1996/NEXIS)

Tehran Times[Tehran, in English]. 23 December 1995. "Jannati Says Hezbollah Safeguards Islamic Values." (FBIS-NES-96-004 5 Jan. 1996, p. 69)

Time[New York]. 26 June 1995. Lara Marlowe. "Revolutionary Disintegration; The New US Embargo May Hurt, but the Greatest Danger to the Mullahs is From Their Own People." (NEXIS)

The Times[London]. 31 March 1995. Eve-Ann Prentice. "Iranians 'Raped on Death Row.'" (NEXIS)

The Times[London]. 14 January 1994. Michael Binyon. "Iranian to be Executed for Giving up Islam." (NEXIS)

United Nations (UN). Economic and Social Council. 9 February 1996. (E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2). "Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Report Submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/23."

United Nations (UN). 16 January 1996. (E/CN.4/1996/35./Add.1). "Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/37."

United Nations (UN). 16 January 1995. (E/CN.4/1995/55). "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran Prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/73 and Economic and Social Council Decision 1994/263."

United Nations (UN). 2 February 1994. (E/CN.4/1994/50). "Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran Prepared By the Special Representative of the Commission, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1993/62 of 10 March 1993 and Economic and Social Council Decision 1993/273."

United Nations High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR), Ottawa. 21 March 1995. Facsimile sent to the IRB.

United States (US) Office of Asylum. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. December 1994. Iran: Profile of Asylum Claims And Country Conditions.

Voice of Iranian Kordestan[Clandestine, in Persian]. 25 January 1996. "Iran: 5 More Ayatollah Sheybani Followers Said Arrested." (FBIS-NES-96-018 26 Jan. 1996, p. 40)

Voice of Iranian Kordestan[Clandestine, in Persian]. 19 February 1995. "Rebel Radio Commentary on Kurdish Struggles." (FBIS-NES-95-034 21 Feb. 1995, pp. 90-91)

Voice of Iranian Kordestan[Clandestine, in Persian]. 13 January 1995. "Rebel Radio on Regime's Ban on Protests." (FBIS-NES-95-012 19 Jan. 1995, p. 63)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 23 January 1996. "'Offensive' Videos Seized by a Newly Formed Judicial Body." (Article 19, 25 Jan. 1996)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 18 November 1995. "President Rafsanjani Visits Kordestan Province." (FBIS-NES-95-224 21 Nov. 1995, p. 74)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 16 November 1995. "Significance of President's Kordestan Trip Noted." (FBIS-NES-95-221 16 Nov. 1995, p. 49)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 9 March 1995. "Call for Increased Punishment for Overcharging." (FBIS-NES-95-047 10 Mar. 1995, p. 54)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 1 November 1994. "Majles Passes Bill on Using Arms to Restore Order." (FBIS-NES-94-212 2 Nov. 1994, p. 56)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 18 August 1994. "Basijis to Participate in Nationwide Maneuvers." (FBIS-NES-94-160 18 Aug. 1994, p. 52)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 10 August 1994. "Justice Minister on New Law on Public Courts." (FBIS-NES-94-154 10 Aug. 1994, pp. 65-66)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 24 April 1994. "Women Allowed to be Advisers at Courts." (FBIS-NES-94-080 26 Apr. 1994, p. 57)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran[Tehran, in Persian]. 21 November 1993. "Basijis to Begin Judicial Activities." (FBIS-NES-93-223 22 Nov. 1993, p. 56)

Voice of Mojahed[Clandestine, in Persian]. 5 April 1995. "Clandestine Radio on Islamshahr Riots." (FBIS-NES-066 6 Apr. 1995, p. 58)

The Xinhua News Agency. 6 March 1996. "Some 100 Arrested for Violating Election Law in Iran." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua News Agency. 1 November 1995. "Khamenei Gives Warning to Anti-Clerical Trends." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua News Agency. 17 August 1995. "Iran's District Mayor Detained for Embezzlement." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua News Agency. 16 October 1994. "First Iranian Official Arrested for Profiteering." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua News Agency. 7 July 1994. "MKO Member Confesses Killing Two Priests in Iran." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua News Agency. 30 June 1994. "MKO Member Confesses Terrorist Activities in Iran." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua News Agency. 26 June 1994. "Eight Gunmen Killed in Clash in Western Iran." (NEXIS)

---

[1]1.           For detailed information about the organization of Iranian security forces, see Responses to Information Requests IRN22706.E, IRN20785.E and IRN20340.E, available at the IRB Regional Documentation Centres.

[2]2.           Country Reports 1995 states that security forces "enter homes and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without court authorization," and they use the ban on satellite dishes as a "pretext for entering private homes" (1996, 1154).

[3]3.           More detailed information on the Iranian justice system may be found in the information package on Legislation in Iran (January 1996) which is available at Regional Documentation Centres.

[4]4.           In December 1995, officials close to President Rafsanjani announced the creation of the Mardom-e Party to represent the moderate forces in the Majles, but Human Rights Watch reports that it "provoked vehement opposition" and did not run candidates (Mar. 1996, 14). In January 1996, however, Rafsanjani and his backers decided to run under the separate Servants of Construction banner after the MCA refused to back some of their more moderate candidates (AFP 5 Mar. 1996).

[5]5.           Rule of the Supreme Jurisprudent or Wali Faqih as representative of the 12th Imam on earth.

[6]6.           For background information on these parties please refer to the DIRB publication, Iran: Political Opposition (August 1993) which is available at Regional Documentation Centres.

[7]7.           On 30 November 1993, Turkey and Iran signed a joint security protocol to "take action against terrorism" and in early 1994 the two countries signed a mutual extradition treaty to hand back their political opponents (Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Fall 1995, 9; MEI 13 May 1994, 15). In May 1994, according to a media report, Iran returned 28 members of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (or PKK) — ten of whom were allegedly dead — to Turkey, and got back an undisclosed number of opponents (ibid.). In June 1994, Iran gave Turkey permission to bomb PKK locations in Iran and, in return, Ankara announced that it would "move ‘against' " the PMOI in Turkey (Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Fall 1995, 9). Iranian security forces unilaterally bombed KDPI "counter-revolutionary" bases inside Iraq in late 1994 (MEI 18 Nov 1994) and were reportedly amassing Pasdaran units in al-Sulaymaniyah province in preparation for possible "lightning strikes" against KDPI forces in northern Iraq (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 24 Mar. 1995). La Presse reported that Iran had arrested 34 Kurdish rebels from Turkey near the Iran-Turkey border in 1995 and extradited them (4 Aug. 1995).

[8]8.           On 5 April 1995, a counter demonstration was organized by the pro-government Association of Muslim Students, including Basiji and local clerics, to denounce the rioters and to reassert their support for the Islamic Republic (IRNA 5 Apr. 1995; Mideast Mirror 6 Apr. 1995, 15). According to a media report, in his Friday Prayer after the Islamshahr riots, Hojatelsam Nowruzi, an Islamshahr cleric, thanked "the selfless personnel of the regional law enforcement forces" and praised "the hezbollahi people of Islamshahr" for their participation in the counter demonstration following the riot (Jomhuri-ye Eslami 8 Apr. 1995b).

[9]9.           For a description of the Twelfth School, see: IRBDC Cultural Profile Lebanon: The Shi'a and Sunni (July 1991), available at Regional Documentation Centres.

[10]10.        For further information on this subject, please refer to the DIRB publication Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran (June 1994) which is available at Regional Documentation Centres.

[11]11.        Actual treatment of alleged offenders reportedly depends heavily on the specifics of the case (Middle East Watch 27 Mar. 1995).