R v. Yabu Hurerali Naillie; R v. Rajaratnam Kanesarajah

R v Yabu Hurerali Naillie; R v Rajaratnam Kanesarajah

Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

[1993] 1 All ER 75, [1992] 1 WLR 1099, [1992] Imm AR 395, 96 Cr App Rep 161

Hearing Date: 14 April 1992

14 April 1992

Index Terms:

Illegal entry -- political asylum -- arrival in United Kingdom with forged documents or no valid passport -- deception in country of departure -- claim for asylum made immediately on disembarkation and before passing through immigration control -- whether applicants for asylum were illegal entrants -- whether those who assisted in the acquisition of the false documents abroad committed an offence under the 1971 Act -- whether a person not within the categories set out in s 25(5) of the 1971 Act could commit abroad an offence under s 25(1) of the Act. Immigration Act 1971 (as amended) ss 3, 4, 11, 25, 33, sch 2 paras 2, 4; HC 251 paras 7, 21, 25, 140, 161, 173.

Held:

Two appeals heard together as raising the same point of law: whether in the events which had happened those whom the defendants had assisted in coming to the United Kingdom were illegal entrants as defined in the 1971 Act, so as to render the defendants guilty of criminal offences under section 25 of the Act. Each defendant has assisted in the production of false documents on the basis of which airline tickets were purchased. The details are set out in the judgments. When the passengers concerned arrived in the United Kingdom they claimed political asylum immediately and before they had passed through immigration control. The defendants were charged with and convicted of an offence under section 25(1) of the 1971 Act, of "knowingly being concerned in making or carrying out arrangements of securing or facilitating the entry into the United Kingdom of . . . an illegal entrant". On appeal it was argued that the persons assisted by the defendants had not secured entry into the United Kingdom through the use of the forged documents and in the circumstances were not illegal entrants as defined in the 1971 Act. It was further argued on behalf of Naillie that being a Kenyan citizen, he was excluded from the provisions of section 25(1) by section 25(5). Held 1. Under the 1971 Act entry was not to be equated with disembarkation. Those who disembarked without a right of entry were not automatically illegal entrants. 2. An asylum seeker who claimed asylum while still within the designated area was not an illegal entrant, albeit he might have forged documents or no documents at all. 3. On the facts, none of those whose arrival in the United Kingdom was assisted by the defendants, was an illegal entrant. 4. The convictions were therefore quashed. 5. The court did not decide whether a person not within the categories set out in section 25(5) could in the circumstances, be guilty of an offence under section 25(1), albeit it was inclined to agree with counsel for the Crown that he could be.

Cases referred to in the Judgment:

Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1984] AC 74: [1982] Imm AR 139. Nadarajah Vilvarajah and anr v Secretary of State for the Home Department (CA of 26 October 1987) [1990] Imm AR 457. Kwong Fai Chan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1992] Imm AR 233.

Counsel:

A Scrivener QC and M Massih for Naillie; Miss F Webber for Kanesarajah; M Griffith for the Crown in the case of Naillie; T Spencer for the Crown in the case of Kanesarajah

PANEL: Watkins LJ, Swinton Thomas, Garland JJ

WATKINS LJ:

We heard these appeals together by consent of the appellants because they raise similar issues as to the meaning of the phrase "illegal entrant" in section 25(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, the status of persons entering the United Kingdom without permission who claim to be asylum seekers or political refugees and the offence committed by anyone who assists an illegal entrant to enter. On 7 August 1991 Yabu Naillie, then 41 years of age, at the Crown Court at Isleworth before His Honour Judge Simon Evans was convicted of facilitating illegal entry into the United Kingdom contrary to section 25(1). He was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment. He appeals on a point of law against conviction and applies for leave to appeal against sentence. On 18 November 1991 Rajaratnam Kanesarajah at the Crown Court at Croydon before His Honour Judge Sir David Hughes-Morgan was convicted of facilitating illegal entry contrary to section 25(1). He was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment. He appeals against conviction by leave of the single judge. An application with regard to sentence has been referred to this court. The facts in Naillie's case are that on 3 March 1991 two Somali women, Mrs Ahmadi and Mrs Said, who are half-sisters, together with six children landed at Gatwick Airport in a Gulf Air aeroplane which had come from Nairobi, Kenya. The appellant was on the same aeroplane. The women had with them during the flight forged Tanzanian passports. They had left their homes in Somalia and travelled to Nairobi, where they purchased forged passports. There was no evidence, certainly no direct evidence, that Naillie had been involved in that but at some time or other he must have met the two women or someone concerned with them because he purchased their air tickets, and either had the Tanzanian passports in his possession then or knew the women possessed them. He is himself of Somali parentage but is a Kenyan national and has a valid Kenyan passport. On Saturday 2 March 1991 Naillie went into the offices of Haidery Tours in Nairobi. He purchased nine tickets for a flight from Nairobi to London for himself, the two women and the six children, saying that three children belonged to each woman. In fact one of the women was the mother of all the children. He told the salesman that he had a Kenyan passport and the women had Tanzanian passports. It was essential that onward tickets to London should be booked because otherwise the women would be treated as Tanzanians seeking entry to Kenya. Naillie paid for the tickets and described himself as the group leader. They travelled on the Gulf Air aeroplane which left Nairobi on 2 March. On the first leg of the journey, to Muscat, Naillie sat with the women and the children. On the second leg to Gatwick he did not. The Crown alleged that he deliberately distanced himself from them. In the course of that journey the crew on the aeroplane took possession of the women's passports because they became aware from what the women said that they were asylum seekers. When the aeroplane arrived at Gatwick the women and the children on the one hand, and Naillie on the other, disembarked separately and stayed apart. The women and the children were directed to the transit lounge where they were interviewed by immigration officers who were in possession of the women's passports by then. Had they been Tanzanians on a visit to this country they would have presented their passports at the usual place on their way out of the airport. As a result of the interview the women, and the children, were given temporary admittance to the United Kingdom as asylum seekers pending an enquiry and decision by the Home Secretary as to whether they were or were not genuine political refugees and whether they should be allowed to remain in this country or be deported. It was part of Naillie's case at the trial, and on this appeal, that whilst the forged passports had been used to deceive the Kenyan authorities before departure from Nairobi, they had not been used to gain entry into the United Kingdom and the women had made it clear it was never their intention that they would be. In any event, so it was contended, the acts complained of were committed outside the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. The Crown's case against Naillie was that he bought the tickets in Nairobi having the forged passports in his possession. He travelled with the two women and then deliberately distanced himself from them. He was acting as the group leader throughout. There was a plan to deceive the United Kingdom immigration service and Naillie was a party to that plan. After his arrest for having contravened section 25(1) he told a number of lies to the immigration officers. At the outset of his trial which commenced on 29 July and at the close of the Crown's case, counsel for Naillie submitted that no case to answer had been made out, inter alia because it had not been established that the two women were illegal entrants as defined by the 1971 Act. Counsel for the Crown contended that the women were illegal entrants when they disembarked at Gatwick Airport and it was irrelevant for the purposes of section 25(1) that they did not thereafter attempt to go through immigration control using the forged passports. The judge rejected the submission of no case to answer. He also rejected Mr Spencer's submission for the Crown as to the meaning of the words "illegal entrant" in section 25(1). He said that he would direct the jury as follows:

(1)The Crown must prove that there was a plan that the false passports be used to allow Mrs Ahmadi and Mrs Said to enter the United Kingdom;

(2)Naillie knew or had reasonable cause to believe the passports were to be used to secure their entry and

(3)Naillie took part in carrying out those arrangements by travelling to the United Kingdom with them.

In summing-up the judge said:

"The main question of fact for you to decide -- and there are a number of questions of fact really which I will come to in a moment -- before reaching a verdict is: are we sure that that was part of a plan to deceive the United Kingdom Immigration Service? If you are sure it was part of a plan, then you may and probably will -- but it will be a matter for you as all matters of fact are -- find the defendant guilty, if you have found the other ingredients which I will come to in a moment."

He summarised those ingredients as follows:

"(1)was there a plan that false passports be used to allow the ladies to enter the United Kingdom? If 'yes' to (1),

(2)are we sure that Naillie knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the false passports were to be used to secure their entry? If 'yes' to that . . .

(3)did he take part, that is 'become concerned' as you can see there, in that plan and the carrying out of that plan by travelling to the United Kingdom?"

In Kanesarajah's case there was little, if any, dispute of the following facts. On 9 March 1991 Kanesarajah, born in Sri Lanka but a British national, travelled to Sri Lanka. He took his wife's passport with him. It was endorsed with particulars of their three children. Whilst he was there his wife's passport was altered, with his knowledge, by removing the photograph of his wife and inserting the photograph of another woman and her child. On 25 April four airline tickets were purchased in the name of Kanesarajah, to be used by him, the woman and child and two others who were strangers to him. The forged passport belonging to Kanesarajah's wife was used to deceive the immigration authorities in Sri Lanka to allow all except Kanesarajah, who possessed his own passport, to leave that country and to obtain access to a flight between Colombo and London via Dubai. In the course of the journey Kanesarajah retrieved his wife's passport. Accordingly, on arrival, the woman and the others had no passports of any description in their possession and no other documents. On disembarkation at Gatwick and before going through immigration the woman and the strangers sought asylum and said they were political refugees. Kanesarajah was arrested. He had in his possession the forged passport and documents relating to the woman and the two strangers. They were given temporary admittance as asylum seekers to await the decision of the Home Secretary. Kanesarajah was unquestionably a party to deceiving the authorities in Sri Lanka. That fact by itself does not, of course, make him guilty of any offence in this country. At the close of the Crown's case counsel for Kanesarajah submitted that there was no case to answer because it had not been shown that the woman was an illegal entrant. The judge rejected that submission. After reciting the brief facts, he said in his summing-up:

"Here was this lady and she was going to come into the United Kingdom with this passport. I have used what I hope is going to be a neutral expression 'come into the United Kingdom' because . . . what Miss Joseph has been saying to you is that the passport was only used to get out of Sri Lanka and that on arrival in the United Kingdom the passport was not used. That seems to be the position from what we have heard. I was reminded when Miss Joseph was talking about using the passport only to get out and not into England of the old contemplation that is suggested ought to be carried out by Zen Buddhists, namely you sit for five or six years concentrating upon the sound of one hand clapping. That occurred to me because I am wondering whether there is not a danger that Miss Joseph has been concentrating in her submissions to you upon a door with only one side, a side labelled exit. However, that door not only has one side it has two sides. You go through the door to get out of Sri Lanka and when you are through the door you enter into the United Kingdom. It is a matter for you to decide."

He said later:

". . . the evidence is all one way here that the lady did not have a valid passport. She apparently demanded entry on the basis that she was a political refugee. She sought political asylum. We have further been told that there is nothing in the law: insofar as I am the judge of the law I have to tell you there is nothing in the law which says that anybody can demand entry, legal entry, by claiming political asylum. You remain an illegal entrant if you satisfy this definition in other words if you have not got a passport or some other proper document."

The two main questions which arise on these appeals are:

(1)Was it established that the persons in both cases (we shall call them henceforward as they claimed to be asylum seekers) upon arriving in the United Kingdom were illegal entrants.

(2)If not what was their status when actually claiming to seek asylum in relation to an alleged offence by another under section 25(1)?

The relevant legislation under the Act and the immigration rules, including, in particular, references to the Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, is as follows:

The 1971 Act

"Section 3

(1)Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, where a person is not [a British citizen] --

(a)he shall not enter the United Kingdom unless given leave to do so in accordance with this act."

Section 4

(1)The power under this Act to give or refuse leave to enter the United Kingdom shall be exercised by immigration officers, and the power to give leave to remain in the United Kingdom, or to vary any leave under section 3(3)(a) . . .".

Section 11

(1)A person arriving in the United Kingdom by ship or aircraft shall for purposes of this Act be deemed not to enter the United Kingdom unless and until he disembarks, and on disembarkation at a port shall further be deemed not to enter the United Kingdom so long as he remains in such area (if any) at the port as may be approved for this purpose by an immigration officer; and a person who has not otherwise entered the United Kingdom shall be deemed not to do so as long as he is detained, or temporarily admitted or released while liable to detention, under the powers conferred by Schedule 2 to this Act.

(2)In this Act 'disembark' means disembark from a ship or aircraft and 'embark' means embark in a ship or aircraft; and, except in subsection (1) above . . .'.

Section 25

"(1)Any person knowingly concerned in making or carrying out arrangements for securing or facilitating the entry into the United Kingdom of anyone whom he knows or has reasonable cause for believing to be an illegal entrant shall be guilty of an offence . . .

(5)Subsection (1) above shall apply to things done outside as well as to things done in the United Kingdom where they are done --

(a)by a British citizen, a British Dependent Territories citizen, or a British Overseas citizen;

(b)by a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 is a British subject; or

(c)by a British protected person (within the meaning of that Act)

Section 33

'Entrant' means a person entering or seeking to enter the United Kingdom, and 'illegal entrant' means a person unlawfully entering or seeking to enter in breach of a deportation order or of the immigration laws, and includes also a person who has so entered."

Schedule 2

(This deals with, inter alia, the powers and duties of immigration officers. Section 26 makes it an offence for someone without reasonable excuse to fail to comply with a number of its provisions). paragraph 2

(1)An immigration officer may examine any persons who have arrived in the United Kingdom by ship or aircraft (including transit passengers, members of the crew and others not seeking to enter the United Kingdom) for the purpose of determining --

(a)whether any of them is or is not [a British citizen]; and

(b)whether, if he is not, he may or may not enter the United Kingdom without leave; and . . .

paragraph 4

"(1)It shall be the duty of any person examined under paragraph 2 or 3 above to furnish to the person carrying out the examination all such information in his possession as that person may require for the purpose of his functions under that paragraph.

(2)A person on his examination under paragraph 2 or above by an immigration officer shall, if so required by the immigration officer --

(a)produce either a valid passport with photograph or some other document satisfactorily establishing his identity and nationality or citizenship.'

. . .

The immigration rules

Rule 7 "A person must, on arrival in the United Kingdom, produce on request by the immigration officer a valid national passport or other document satisfactorily establishing his identity and nationality. Everyone arriving in the United Kingdom is liable to be examined and must furnish the immigration officer with such information as may be required for the purpose of deciding whether he requires leave to enter and, if so, whether and on what terms leave should be given." Rule 21 "Where a person is a refugee full account is to be taken of the provisions of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Cmnd 9171 and Cmnd 3096). Nothing in these rules is to be construed as requiring action contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under these instruments." Rule 75 "Special considerations apply where a person seeking entry claims asylum in the United Kingdom, or where it appears to the immigration officer as a result of information given by that person that he may be eligible for asylum in the United Kingdom. Every such case is to be referred by the immigration officer to the Home Office for decision regardless of any grounds set out in any provision of these rules which may appear to justify refusal of leave to enter. The Home Office will then consider the case in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Asylum will not be refused if the only country to which the person could be removed is one to which he is unwilling to go owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion . . .". Rule 140 "A person may apply for asylum in the United Kingdom on the ground that, if he were required to leave, he would have to go to a country to which he is unwilling to go owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Any such claim is to be carefully considered in the light of all the relevant circumstances." Rule 161 "Where a person is a refugee full account is to be taken of the provisions of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Nothing in these rules is to be construed as requiring action contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under these instruments." Rule 173 "In accordance with the provisions of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, a deportation order will not be made against a person if the only country to which he can be removed is one to which he is unwilling to go owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." We have heard submissions for the Crown by Mr Griffith and Mr Spencer, who appeared separately in the two trials -- we shall regard their submissions as having been made more or less jointly -- and from Mr Scrivener QC for Naillie and Miss Webber for Kanesarajah, neither of whom appeared in the trials. The Crown submitted that the asylum seekers upon arriving in the United Kingdom from Kenya and Sri Lanka were seeking to enter in breach of the immigration laws. In R v Home Secretary ex part Khawaja [1984] 1 AC 74 it was held that the expression "illegal entrant" in section 33(1) included any person who had obtained leave to enter the United Kingdom by practising fraud or deception in contravention of the Act and was not limited to persons who had entered the country clandestinely. Khawaja was considered by this court in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Kwong Fai Chan (20 December 1991, unreported). The appellant had entered the United Kingdom from Hong Kong with a forged work permit, but the fact that it was a forgery was unknown to him. Neill LJ quoted a passage at the conclusion of the speech of Lord Bridge of Harwich in Khawaja, page 118D, and said:

". . . it seems to me to be clear that he [Lord Bridge] did not intend at that stage to extend the categories of illegal entrants beyond those who had entered clandestinely or who had obtained leave to enter by themselves practising fraud or deception in contravention of section 26(1)(c)" of the 1971 Act.

Neill LJ then posed the question as to whether there are any categories of illegal entrants other than those specifically recognised in Khawaja. He answered that question by saying that if, as in that case, leave to enter the United Kingdom was obtained by a materially false document then that person was not given leave to enter in accordance with the 1971 Act and that accordingly he entered in breach of the immigration laws and was an illegal entrant. Thus illegal entrants are those who (a) enter clandestinely or (b) obtain leave to enter by themselves practising fraud or deceit by the use of a materially false document. Therefore, unless it can be said that the asylum seekers in these cases actually entered the United Kingdom when they disembarked from the aeroplane, they clearly could not have offended in any of those ways. Mr Griffiths and Mr Spencer in submitting that the asylum seekers upon arrival in the United Kingdom had sought to enter in breach of the immigration laws said that they should be regarded as having entered the United Kingdom when they disembarked from the aircraft. Seeing that they had no passports then they were inevitably illegal entrants. We cannot agree with that. A person is required under the immigration rules to produce a passport to an immigration officer before, or at, or after immigration control if so required by that officer. The asylum seekers arriving in the United Kingdom in these cases had not been so required. None of them at any time produced a forged passport within this country or attempted to go through immigration control using a false passport or any other false document. The submission that the asylum seekers were illegal entrants when they disembarked from their aircraft involved the proposition that they left the country of embarkation with forged passports and thus could not be legal entrants to this country. Accordingly it followed that because they were not legal entrants they were illegal entrants. Leaving on one side their claimed status of asylum seekers, that submission makes the assumption that on disembarkation a person must either be a legal entrant or an illegal entrant. It leaves out of the calculation the vital question as to whether such a person is an illegal entrant as defined in the Act. Quite clearly, in our view, these asylum seekers on the facts were not persons who had sought to enter in breach of the immigration laws and had not so entered. They were not people who had entered clandestinely or by practising fraud or deception by means of materially false documents or otherwise. Entry cannot, we think, be equated with disembarkation. The distinction between entry into the United Kingdom and disembarkation from a ship or aircraft is quite clearly recognised in section 11 where disembarkation and entry are contrasted, and specific provision is made for the area which exists at the airport between the two where persons are deemed not to enter the United Kingdom. The side-note to that section reads: "Construction of references to entry and other phrases relating to travel." the section in terms recognises that there is an area at the airport where people wait before making entry into the United Kingdom as defined in the Act. It cannot be the law, in our view, on any proper construction of the relevant sections of the Act that disembarkation is to be equated with entry, or that persons who disembark without a right of entry are automatically illegal entrants. Lord Donaldson MR's observations in Nadarajah Vilvarajah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1990] Imm AR 457 are in that respect very much in point, page 459. He said:

". . . those who are or claim to be refugees and who arrive in this country seeking asylum may well have to arrive armed with false documents and false passports. It may be that there is no other way in which they can leave the country from which they have come and come to this country. That is quite understandable, and if the Secretary of State had relied in any way upon that fact he would in my judgment have been wrong. That is one thing. A refugee arrives with a forged passport and says to the immigration officer, 'I am a refugee. I claim to be a refugee. I have arrived with forged documents because there was no other way of my coming here. Here are the documents. They are forged.' Nobody could hold that against him. It is quite a different matter where a refugee or somebody claiming to be a refugee arrives with forged documents and proffers them to the immigration authorities as being genuine. That is entirely different."

In these two cases the asylum seekers upon arrival in the United Kingdom immediately claimed refuge and did not proffer any forged documents to immigration officers as being genuine. If the contention put forward by the Crown is correct almost all asylum seekers or political refugees would inevitably be illegal entrants from the moment they disembarked from ship or aircraft. Such a construction has never, so far as we know, previously been suggested and there is no authority to support it. In our judgment it cannot be a correct construction of the relevant sections of the Act. Mr Spencer contended, with regard to section 11(1) that the phrase "a person who has not otherwise entered the United Kingdom shall be deemed not to do so as long as he is detained or temporarily admitted or released while liable to detention" means that the asylum seekers upon arrival in the United Kingdom had not otherwise entered the United Kingdom and so were accordingly not deemed not to do so. It is clear, in our judgment, that the part of section 11 to which we have referred relates to those who have not disembarked as set out in the first part of the section, for example persons who have arrived clandestinely and were then detained or temporarily admitted or released while liable to detention. That part of section 11 cannot turn persons, such as these asylum seekers, who are in a designated area in a transit lounge, for example, approved by the immigration officer, into illegal entrants. Accordingly in both these cases it was not shown on the Crown's evidence that the asylum seekers who arrived in the United Kingdom were illegal entrants for the purposes of the offence created by section 25(1) of the Act. We turn to the second issue with the observation that signing the Convention has undoubtedly caused serious problems for immigration control and the Home Secretary. Ever since then those who claim asylum pursuant to the Convention and Protocol form a special and different category of persons when arriving in the United Kingdom. Once the claim has been made, the Home Secretary will investigate the claim and either allow the claimant to remain or deport him. It was not suggested by the Crown that any of the claims put forward by these asylum seekers were other than, apparently anyway, genuine. It does not follow, of course, that the Home Secretary will so regard them, after investigation, and allow the asylum seekers to remain in the United Kingdom. It is, therefore, clear, so it seems to us, that special considerations apply to persons seeking asylum and a valid passport is not a prerequisite. As Lord Donaldson pointed out in the passage which we have quoted from Vilvarajah it is unlikely that the asylum seeker will have a valid passport. Nevertheless it was submitted on behalf of the Crown that despite the provisions of the rules relating to the Protocol, a refugee, unless he has valid documentation on arrival in the United Kingdom, is an illegal entrant. We do not agree. In the light of the authorities which we have quoted and the relevant sections of the Act and the rules, so long as a person leaving an aircraft is an asylum seeker and does not attempt otherwise to seek entry or to obtain entry by fraud such as by the use of false documents or without any documentation at all, but remains within a designated area when he claims asylum, he is not, in our view, an illegal entrant. He does not fall within section 33(1). For those reasons we are driven to hold, being only too conscious of the awful problems a flood of asylum seekers would create for the immigration authorities and the Home Secretary, that the asylum seekers in the present cases were not illegal entrants. Therefore an essential ingredient of the offences laid under section 25(1) was not made out against either appellant. It follows that the submissions made by counsel on behalf of each of the appellants at the close of the Crown's case at trial should have been allowed. Mr Scrivener made a further submission on behalf of Naillie. It was to the effect that Naillie had not committed any act within the United Kingdom which was in any sense of relevance. All such acts as he had committed were performed outside the jurisdiction. Accordingly, seeing that he is a Kenyan he does not come within any of the categories of persons in section 25(5) and is not, therefore, caught by the words "subsection (1) shall apply to things done outside as well as things done in the United Kingdom." The Crown disagreed with this proposition and, inter alia, contended that there need be no overt act committed in this country to establish an offence under section 25(1). The subsection is aimed at any plan or conspiracy no matter where formed to secure or facilitate the entry and so forth of anyone known or believed to be an illegal entrant. Having regard to the reasons we have provided for allowing, as we do, these appeals and quashing the convictions, we do not have to resolve the central issues arising from the arguments of counsel in this interesting context. Suffice it to say that our tentative opinion is that the Crown's contention is probably sound. Whether that be so or not it seems to us that if the two Somali women had somehow got past immigration control and become illegal entrants the jury on the whole of the facts would have been entitled to convict Naillie on the basis that he was their shepherd so to speak in a strange land, guiding them through a barrier they had no right to penetrate.

DISPOSITION:

Convictions quashed

SOLICITORS:

Crown Prosecution Service, Acton and Sussex