Hammond Kwaku Larbie v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 25073;94, Council of Europe: European Commission on Human Rights, 28 February 1996, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,COECOMMHR,3ae6b61b20.html [accessed 24 February 2017]
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Application of Hammond Kwaku Larbie against the United Kingdom
European Commission of Human Rights First Chamber Decision AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF The European commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 28 February 1996, the following members being present:
C. L. ROZAKIS, President
A. S. GOYUBUZUK
M. P. PELLONPAA
M. F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the application introduced on 17 June 1994 by Hammond Kwaku LARBIE against the United Kingdom and registered on 2 September 1994 under file No. 25073/94; Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Having deliberated; Decides as follows: I have had Mrs Larbie's case considered fully and carefully in the light of all these circumstances, including the fact that Mrs Larbie id now expecting a second child, but I am not prepared to revoke the deportation order against her. Her removal from the United Kingdom will be enforced as soon as the necessary arrangements are made. If her husband wishes to do so, he may accompany her on her deportation, if her husband wishes to do so, he may accompany her on her deportation, if necessary at public expense. Her child's fare will also be met at public expense if necessary." An official of the Immigration service wrote to the F's Solicitors on 7 April 1994. He repeated the substance of the under Secretary's letter of 26 November 1993, and declined to defer the removal directions which had been set for 8 April 1994. In July 1994 F applied, out of time, for judicial review of the letters of 26 November 1993 and 7 April 1994. The application for leave was refused on 27 July 1994, Mr justice Ognall holding that the Secretary of State had not failed to take into account all relevant considerations. In particular, he noted that the Secretary of State had borne in mind the difficulties the applicant would face if he had to choose between returning to Ghana with F or continuing to run his business in London. F's renewed application for leave was refused b the Court of Appeal on 8 September 1994. The Court of appeal took note of the letter of 27 October 1993 from F's MP to the Secretary of State in which reference was made to the applicant's business. F's removal, which had been suspended pending the judicial review proceedings, was set for 11 September 1994, ad she and the bady (born on 31 December 1993) returned to Ghana on 10 September 1994. The applicant paid for her ticket. The elder child stayed in the United Kingdom with the applicant. On 15 September 1994 the applicant's representative requested the Secretary of Sate to revoke the deportation order an to allow F to re-enter the united Kingdom. The applicant's representative states that the Secretary of State refused to revoke the deportation order on 14 November 1994, and that an appeal has been entered. No copy of the decision of 14 November 1994 or any subsequent appeal has been submitted.
The applicant alleges violation of articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. Under Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complains that the Secretary of State might have misunderstood the position of F's former boyfriend: he had in fact been accused of involvement in a plot to kill the chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council, rather than being on the same side as the Council. The applicant requested the application of Rule 36 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. Under Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant considers that the removal of F interferes disproportionately with his family life. He underlines that he has indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom, and that both children hold British passports. He accepts that he was aware of F's immigration status when they met and married, member from a Contracting state is compatible with the requirements of Article 8 will depend on a number of factors-the extent to which family life is effectively ruptured, whether there are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of one or more of them, whether there are factors of immigration control or considerations of public order weighing in favour of exclusion (see Sorabjee V. the united Kingdom, No. 23938/94, Dec. 23. 10. 95, with further references). The Commission notes the applicant was aware of F's immigration history and the pending deportation order when they married, and he must have been aware that her continued stay in the United Kingdom was precarious. As to the children, who hold British passports, the Commission notes that the elder child remained in the United Kingdom when F left. If the applicant chooses to stay in the United Kingdom when F left. If the applicant chooses to stay in the United Kingdom, the younger child will be able to join him if and when her parents decide. The Commission does not under-estimate the problems for the applicant-and for his business and its employees in particular-if he wishes to join F and their younger child in Ghana, but in the view of the Commission those problems cannot be regarded as the direct responsibility of the United Kingdom under the Convention. The applicant was able to raise this matter before the domestic authorities: the matter was raised on judicial review, and the Divisional Court found that the Secretary of State had considered it. The Commission is unable to accept that the applicant's business interests, and those of his employees, should have prevailed over the interests of immigration control or that the authorities failed to give adequete weight to this aspect. Moreover, it remains the case that the applicant is a Ghanaian national, and has not submitted that-apart from the business aspects-life would be particularly difficult for him there. The Commission concludes that F's having to leave the United Kingdom does not disclose a lack of respect for the applicant's right to respect for his family life as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,