State of the World's Minorities 2006 - China

Minorities in China, including the territories of Hong Kong, Macau and Tibet, constitute an extremely diverse and substantial grouping in what is still the world's most populous state. Ethnic minorities, known as 'nationalities', are officially 55 in number (not including the majority Han Chinese). In addition to this, more than 120 nationalities are said to exist, and even this number does not necessarily include all religious minorities such as the Falun Gong, or 'newer' minorities. The human rights record of China is often criticized as being very poor, both by some Western governments and in various international reports, but the particular plight of most minorities in the 'Middle Kingdom' remain largely overlooked in the flood of attention to this record.

Overall, their lot during 2004–5 has not improved significantly: on the contrary, the international 'War on Terrorism' and slogan of 'national security' have been a godsend for Chinese authorities intent on crushing separatist and autonomist movements in restive parts of the country, particularly in the northwestern province of Xinjiang (Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region) where the Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uighur minority are concentrated (according to the official 2000 census, approximately 45 per cent of the 19 million people in Xinjiang are Uighurs), and to a lesser extent, Tibet. As reported by Amnesty International, the view that human rights could be curtailed under the 'War on Terrorism' umbrella was particularly apparent in China in the last few years (Amnesty International, Regional Overview 2004: Asia and the Pacific). Under the guise of cracking down on terrorists and other extremists, arrests, detentions and even torture and other violations of the rights of minorities have been conducted without evoking a huge amount of criticism from the outside world. Another general noteworthy and worrying trend in China is the growing identification of the country with an increasingly blatant Han Chinese form of nationalism as the country appears to move away from the traditional doctrines of communism. Officially, and in conformity with what could be described as Marxist doctrine, the Chinese Communist Party still opposes forced assimilation and allows autonomy to the minority nationalities, so that they can retain their own characteristics. It is under this policy that the government has set up numerous autonomous areas throughout China, many of which are identified with specific nationalities, as did the former Soviet Union in the past.

The practice and reality in 2004–5 is not so benevolent for most minorities, especially those in Tibet and Xinjiang, but also in most parts of the country. Huge infrastructure developments continued in 2004–5, and their disastrous effects on minorities are now beginning to appear, though with hardly any reaction from the international community. Two new major rail-lines, one to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, and the other to the Xinjiang city of Kashgar, are being finished, and billions of dollars more are being invested to build highways, some with the financial backing of international agencies such as the World Bank. Ostensibly to assist in the economic development of these regions and to improve their transportation infrastructure, these projects however are connected to government policies that are clearly discriminatory and favour almost exclusively individuals of Han Chinese background.

The World Bank and much of the international community have remained largely silent and even complicit in what is in effect a surreptitious ethnic 'transmigration programme': recruitment for the thousands upon thousands of road- and rail-building jobs are mainly targeting Han Chinese in other parts of the country, and some estimates admit that, for Tibet alone, the new rail-line will open the door for some 900,000 Han Chinese annually to move into the ancient 'Land of the Snow', attracted by various employment opportunities and even financial incentives from the Chinese central authorities. In other words, government policies are clearly discriminatory as they favour and support overwhelmingly the Han Chinese, and are leading to the Uighurs, Tibetans and other minorities being swamped and rendered increasingly powerless in the face of a mammoth influx and settlement of people of Han Chinese background.

Employment practices by public authorities in Tibet, Xinjiang and other parts of China have seemed to be increasingly discriminatory, partially fuelled by the growing numbers of Han Chinese settling in these provinces, and often resulting in the effective exclusion of minorities from various jobs because of language requirements. Though officially supportive of minority languages, reports continue to indicate that even where minorities represent a very high percentage or even a majority in a region, civil service offices refuse or are unwilling to use local languages in their activities (Article 121 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China states that: 'In performing their functions, the organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas employ the spoken and written language or languages in common use in the locality'). Recruitment of civil servants is often based on fluency in Chinese, with no consideration of knowledge of local languages, with the result that minorities are clearly and unreasonably disadvantaged by this Chinese-language bias and find that they will be passed over for employment opportunities in favour of ethnic Hans.

The discriminatory position attributed to the Chinese language as the almost exclusive language of employment opportunities for government and government-supported initiatives in regions where there are substantial minorities thus has augmented the complete dominance of Han Chinese in almost all areas of political and economic significance. While minorities generally do have access to school instruction in their own language, they are still relegated in practice to the lower echelons of society with few job opportunities unless their language is also used as a language of work, particularly in those regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang and others with very large and territorially concentrated populations:

'In many areas with a significant population of minorities, there were two-track school systems which used either standard Chinese or the local minority language. Students could choose to attend schools in either system. However, graduates of minority language schools typically needed one year or more of intensive Chinese before they could handle course work at a Chinese-language university. Despite the government's efforts to provide schooling in minority languages, the dominant position of standard Chinese in government, commerce, and academia put graduates of minority schools who lacked standard Chinese proficiency at a disadvantage. The vast majority of Uighur children in Xinjiang attended Uighur-language schools and generally received an hour's Chinese language instruction per day. Tuition at Chinese-language schools in Xinjiang was generally more costly, and thus, most Uighur children living in rural areas were unable to afford them.' (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004: China)

Chinese authorities tend, however, to emphasize that nationalities enjoy equality through the system for regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, and that they have the right to receive instruction in their own language, and that this is in fact more respectful of the identity of minorities than what is in place in many Western states. (This autonomy is unfortunately in most cases more illusory than real, with real positions of power usually kept in the hands of Han Communist Party cadres, and Han Chinese generally being employed in most senior positions. For example, out of 25 new appointees to various parts of the judiciary at local and Tibetan Autonomous Region levels, only four were Tibetan, according to the Free Tibet Campaign, August 2005.) Additionally, Chinese authorities will refer to new measures such as increasing investment and improving education and the legal system, and poverty alleviation for (only) 22 ethnic minorities in the government's 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–5).

The government published in February 2005 a White Paper on 'Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China' which emphasizes that China's policy of Regional National Autonomy is 'critical to enhancing the relationship of equality, unity, mutual assistance among different ethnic groups, to uphold national unification, and to accelerate the development of places where regional autonomy is practiced and promoting their progress'.

While this White Paper and other developments show that authorities are discussing the situation of minorities, international outside reports have continued to be more critical of the reality in the field of respecting the rights of minorities. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education concluded that in effect there was discrimination in the implementation of the country's minority education policy in relation to minorities, and especially in relation to the imposition of the Chinese language in detrimental ways:

'Education imposed upon minorities, enforcing their children's obligation to receive compulsory education, violates human rights when it denies their religious or linguistic identity.' (Special Rappoteur Katarina Tomasfievski, The Right to Education Report, Addendum, Mission to China, November 2003)

Indeed, even relatively recent regulations hailed as emphasizing the equality of minorities are in fact double-edged. Regulations approved on 22 May 2002 by the 15th session of the 7th Tibetan Autonomous Region People's Congress were described by the China Daily as 'the first government regulation[s] ever passed in China on preserving an ethnic language'. They permit the use of either Tibetan or Chinese in the region, but since authorities are not obliged to use Tibetan with the local population, but can use Chinese, this will increasingly lead to the marginalizing of the Tibetan language with the increased influx of Han Chinese, and the de facto bias and discriminatory disadvantaging of the Tibetan-speaking population.

The overall evolution in the treatment of religious minorities is also one of mixed messages. Officially, as the Chinese authorities often indicate, there is no restriction on the religious beliefs of individuals in private. Authorities however have often cracked down, often brutally, against unsanctioned religious activities, especially those of groups that are deemed a threat to the authority of the Communist Party or to be linked with 'separatist' or 'terrorist' threats. There are also new regulations adopted in 2004 and in force since 1 March 2005 which are likely to increase the state's overview and control over all religious activities, as well as to ban those of unrecognized religious groups. (On the potential significance of these regulations see HRIC Special Report, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Human Rights Watch, April 2005.)

The US State Department reports that the 'freedom to participate in officially sanctioned religious activity increased in many areas of the country, but crackdowns against unregistered groups, including underground Protestant and Catholic groups, Muslim Uighurs, and Tibetan Buddhists continued and worsened in some locations' in 2004 (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004: China).

There does not seem to have been let-up in the targeting and harsh treatment of practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, with Amnesty International reporting that more than 1,000 are alleged to have died during or soon after their detention and ill-treatment, even torture (Amnesty International Report 2005: China). During 2004, it seems that the same criminal laws that had been used to incarcerate and suppress the activities of the Falun Gong were being used against newer religious minorities, especially evangelical Protestant groups that refuse to refuse to register officially (Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005).

It has perhaps even become worse for the Muslim Uighurs (see in particular HRIC Special Report, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Human Rights Watch, April 2005). Armed with the 26 August 2002 support of the US that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) should be recognized as an international terrorist organization, Chinese authorities have cracked down heavily and unrelentingly on some Islamic religious practices, and even on use of the Uighur language in 2004 and 2005, whether these are connected to ETIM or not. This includes a prohibition against those under 18 receiving Quran instruction at home and a prohibition of private madrasas and mosques. The government published in December 2003 a 'terrorist list' of organizations, such as the World Uighur Youth Congress, that it viewed as terrorist entities. However, there is no clear evidence that most of these advocate violence. Many Uighurs continued to receive long prison terms and to be executed for separatist or terrorist activities.

Even cultural or religious popular events may fall foul of the 'War on Terrorism' in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang Party Secretary issued instructions to all local authorities from February 2002 to crack down on 'separatist techniques', one of which was 'using popular cultural activities to make the masses receptive to reactionary propaganda encouraging opposition', permitting the intimidation, arrest and detention of Uighur cultural and human rights activists, and even poets writing about a blue pigeon, as occurred in 2005.

On a more positive side, it must be emphasized that the Chinese government does recognize that minorities have rights, and seems to make efforts to demonstrate that their rights in relation to language, religion and culture are respected. The practice, however, seems to be still quite removed from the rhetoric.