Assessment for Berbers in Algeria
|Publisher||Minorities at Risk Project|
|Publication Date||31 December 2003|
|Cite as||Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Berbers in Algeria, 31 December 2003, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f3a531c.html [accessed 18 December 2014]|
|Disclaimer||This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.|
Algerian Berbers possess several risk factors for rebellion. These include persistent protest in the past decade, territorial concentration and high levels of group organization and cohesion. While Berbers have not been subject to harsh government repression, many Berbers hold the government responsible for not protecting them from attacks by Muslim fundamentalist militants. Despite these risks, Berber rebellion seems unlikely in the near future. Berber political organization is overwhelmingly conventional, with Berber political parties and cultural organizations focusing their energies on nonviolent protests, electoral politics, and national and international public awareness campaigns. Continued democratization of Algerian politics will also alleviate the risk of Berber rebellion.
Berber protest will probably continue so long as Berbers remain underrepresented in national politics and Tamazight remains unrecognized by the Algerian central government. Berbers encounter significant cultural restrictions, particularly linguistic restrictions. Algeria's new and unstable democracy also provides ample opportunities for protest. The issue of the Berber language is not going away and is driving a wedge between the Berbers and the secular government. This estrangement leaves the Berbers in a very difficult situation. If the Islamic fundamentalists come to power the Berbers are sure to suffer greatly but on the other hand the more the government tries to play the Arabic national card the more the Berbers are going to suffer. For the situation to improve real movement towards democracy in the country is needed. Moves towards an electoral representation alone may result in the language issue becoming even more potent as an issue around which to garner votes.
Although Berber protest since independence has been primarily nonviolent, recent events also demonstrate that violence results from certain catalysts. The assassination of Berber entertainer/nationalist Matoub Lounes in 1998 sparked riots, and annual protests (with limited instances of violence) have been held each year since. The death of a Berber youth being held in police custody in spring 2001 also sparked three months of riots, in which several dozen Berbers were killed by security forces. The incident and its aftermath mobilized several hundred thousand Berbers to take to the streets. These violent outbursts highlight the tension underlying Berber-Arab tensions in Algeria and are a potent warning of the possibilities for Berber rebellion if their grievances are not addressed in a meaningful way.
Although Islamic fundamentalism has been forced into a retreat, it remains a threat to Berber lives, identity, language and culture. The Islamic fundamentalists consider the Berbers secular, at best, and some go so far as to call them heretics. Should the Islamic fundamentalists gain power, their campaign to Islamicize the Berbers is likely to be bloody. Given Berbers' continued identification with secular culture in Algeria, the Berbers continue to be important targets for the Islamic fundamentalist movement.
Clashes between Berber demonstrators and security forces and a massacre by Islamic fundamentalists that marred legislative elections in Algeria in 2002 show the tremendous tensions present in the country. However, the government officially recognized the Berber language, Tamazight, and adopted a compensation plan for the families of victims who died in clashes with security forces.
Berbers (Amazigh) are the descendants of the original indigenous inhabitants of North Africa, going back at least to the fifth century B.C. (TRADITN = 1). Punic settlement was the first challenge to Berber culture. Roman, Vandal, Byzantine and Arab rule followed. The Arab invasion of the seventh century brought about the Arabization of several cities and most of the coastal area, but most of Algeria's countryside remained Tamazight-speaking well into the 12th century. The Arabization of the countryside accelerated during the invasion of Arab nomads from Egypt in the late 11th century and by the late 18th century Berber speakers were limited to the least accessible parts of the country high mountains, distant oases and desert plateaus, and mountain areas where the vast majority of Berbers live today. These areas include: Kabylia (Djurdia Mountains) southeast of Algiers, the Aures Mountains southeast of Constantine and Ouarseni Massiv, southwest of Algiers.
Berbers have a long history of resisting Arab rule, despite being converted to Islam in the 8th century. They were periodically able to maintain independent kingdoms and empires from shortly after the time of the Arab invasion until the 16th century (AUTON = 1). They resisted the rule of the Ottoman Turks. They also opposed French colonial rule despite a policy of preferential treatment by the French. This included a yearlong rebellion in 1871 and strong participation in the Algerian war of independence (REBEL45X = 1, REBEL55X = 7, REBEL60X = 6).
The majority of Algerians have at least some Berber heritage, and many are descendents of Arabized Berbers. Thus, the primary distinguishing characteristic of Berbers is linguistic, although some cultural traits are also relevant. Linguistic distinctions, along with territorial concentration (GROUPCON = 3), have resulted in a strong identity forming among Berbers (COHESX9 = 5).
The ruling Arab majority decided to Arabize Algeria following independence in 1963 to counter the French colonial influence on their state. This included making Arabic the only official language of Algeria. While the Berbers were not the direct target of this policy, they suffered from it. Linguistic discrimination became the driving force behind the formation of Berber political parties. In 1963, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) split off from the National Liberation Front (FLN), which has been Algeria's dominant political party both during the revolution and for most of Algeria's history. The FFS, which continues to be a Berber-dominated party, consistently calls for official status for Tamazight (the Berber language) and for a secular, pluralist polity. The FFS also calls for greater autonomy for Berber-dominated regions and more Berber input into central policy decisions. The FLN, which has controlled Algeria's government since independence, has virtually excluded Berbers from high-ranking positions within the party. This policy has effectively excluded Berbers from high ranking positions in Algeria's government.
In 1989, the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) was formed as a Berber political party, focusing on Berber cultural rights as well as broader democratization issues. The RCD and the FFS have also jointly formed the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) as an umbrella organization under which the two parties undertake joint action. In 1999, RCD joined the coalition government, marking the first time since independence a Berber-dominated party has been part of a ruling coalition. While this is an important signal of increased Berber inclusion, the RCD has not been successful in pushing Berber linguistic issues.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the challenge to the Algerian government by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other Islamic parties constituted a new challenge for the Berbers. These parties call for the Islamization of Algeria which includes the mandatory use of Arabic in schools and government. This has resulted in both governmental concessions in that area and sporadic direct confrontations between the secular Berber parties and Islamic fundamentalists (COMCO98X = 3). While the fundamentalists were forced into a tactical retreat by the late 1990s, they still constitute a major threat to Berber populations and aspirations for several reasons. First, their appeal is strong among the Algerian population. Second, several fundamentalist militants retreated into the Berber-dominated Kabylia region, one of the more inaccessible regions to security forces and also one of the most staunchly secular regions. Sporadic attacks, which have resulted in the deaths of several Berbers, have continued up to 2003.
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