Last Updated: Monday, 14 July 2014, 13:12 GMT

Danish Immigration Service: Report on roving attaché mission to Kosovo (11 to 15 December 2000)

Publisher Danish Immigration Service
Publication Date 1 November 2001
Cite as Danish Immigration Service, Danish Immigration Service: Report on roving attaché mission to Kosovo (11 to 15 December 2000) , 1 November 2001, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3cac59374.html [accessed 14 July 2014]
DisclaimerThis is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

1. Introduction

In December 2000 the Danish Immigration Service carried out a roving attaché mission to Kosovo, with the following terms of reference:

the delegation is to carry out a roving attaché mission, collecting information from the relevant authorities, international and national human rights organisations etc. in order to clarify the following:

the general situation of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), including its strength and role following the elections in Kosovo;

The situation regarding documents issued or purporting to be issuedby the KLA:

- the validity of such documents;

- the KLA's authority to issue such documents;

- the penalties for not responding to call-up notices issued by the KLA;

- the possibility of obtaining protection from the authorities;

the situation regarding the registration of Kosovo Albanians resident in Kosovo and of Kosovo Albanians resident abroad;

the situation regarding the issue of personal documents, including national passports, to Kosovo Albanians resident inside and outside Kosovo.

The delegation held meetings with representatives of international organisations and local human rights organisations etc. in Pristina and Prizren. A list of sources is given in section 5. The list includes a description of some sources.

No interpreter was used for any of the meetings.

Sources were selected, amongst other criteria, to be representative and for their experience and knowledge of the subject under investigation. An effort was made to consult a range of sources, so that both independent international organisations and local organisations etc. were involved. Organisations with legal experience were consulted on questions of a legal nature. Background information about the sources was also gathered from relevant organisations and partners at home and abroad, including in Denmark. The number of sources consulted on each issue depended on its complexity and on the time available to the delegation.

Several sources asked not to be quoted on their response to questions about the current strength and role of the former KLA in Kosovo, inasmuch as this was linked with the security situation.

Some sources also expressed reservations about being quoted regarding documents purporting to be issued by the KLA.

No sources were reluctant to be quoted on registration and the issue of documents.

2. General situation of the former KLA

Under regulation No 1999/8 of 20 September 1999, as agreed between UNMIK, KFOR and the KLA leadership, the KLA was officially dissolved and, as it in its weapons, restructured as a civilian organisation, namely the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) . Former members of the KLA are also now active in politics and, according to several sources, in criminal organisations.

An international source which wished to be anonymous felt that, despite these steps to dissolve the KLA, UNMIK has not succeeded in dismantling the KLA's parallel structure set up during and after the war.

One international source, requesting anonymity, found it unclear whether the KLA's parallel police force still exists. It is possible that it does so, but consisting of those who have not been taken on by the Kosovo Protection Corps. It is also unclear what has happened to members of the KLA's military police; they might have been absorbed into the Kosovo Protection Corps, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) or criminal organisations, or they might simply have disappeared. The source had not heard of the ZKZ, the KLA's secret service, in the preceding four or five months, but it was quite possible that it had gone underground.

2.1 Kosovo Protection Corps

The agreement between UNMIK, KFOR and the KLA leadership involved the inclusion of about 5 000 former members of the KLA in the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and by the end of 2000 approximately 2 300 people were employed in various projects with the Corps. The Kosovo Protection Corps is led by the former KLA chief of staff, Lieutenant General Agim Çeku. The Corps is divided into six regional groups, namely Drenica, Prizren, Pec, Mitrovica, Pristina and Gnjilane. The Corps is not empowered to carry out police duties, such as maintaining law and order, but is an emergency service which is brought in to deal with disasters and undertakes other humanitarian duties. For example, the Kosovo Protection Corps has been involved in the reconstruction of schools and houses, the repair of roads and bridges etc. KFOR supervises the Kosovo Protection Corps under general guidelines drawn up by UNMIK's leadership.

Following individual selection and after education and training, a number of former members of the KLA are now employed by the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) under UNMIK.

UNMIK Police in Pristina (Station 1) believed that both Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the liberal Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and former shadow president, and Hashim Thaci, the former leader of the KLA who now leads the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), have faithful supporters in both the Kosovo Protection Corps and the Kosovo Police Service.

An international source which asked to be anonymous observed that the Kosovo Protection Corps is now more prepared to admit to being a military organisation than when it was first founded and that, unlike the former KLA, the Corps is well-organised.

2.2 Parties

Politically, the former KLA is active in the following parties: the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), led by Hashim Thaci, previously leader of the KLA; the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), founded by the former KLA officer Ramush Haradinaj, amongst others, and led by Bardyl Mahmuti; and the Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo (PQLK), founded by the former KLA officer Naim Maloku. All the parties stood in the municipal elections held on 28 October 2000. The election was won, with 58% of the votes, by Ibrahim Rugova's liberal party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK); the Democratic Party of Kosovo, with 27% of the vote, was only the second largest party. However, it won majorities in the municipalities of Glogovac, Kacanik, Novo Brdo, Stimjle and Srebica. The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, with 7,7% of the vote, came third, and was the second largest party in the municipalities of Decani, Pec and Djakovica. The Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo came fifth, with 0,8%, with one seat in Gnjilane and two in Suva Reka.

The Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom (CDHRF) saw the LDK's electoral victory as an important political step in the right direction and thought that the international community welcomed the moderate approach indicated by that victory. The CDHRF believed that the political problems in Kosovo would continue until an international solution was found and that attempts to reunite Kosovo with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would lead to a return to violence and war.

The Danish Refugee Council believed that the election results were an indication that Kosovo Albanians generally were tired of conflict. The political situation following the municipal elections had become more tense, which was probably a reflection of the fact that the former KLA forces would not accept that they had lost power.

An international source, requesting anonymity, saw the electoral victory of Ibrahim Rugova's liberal LDK as an indication that people were tired of conflict, of the Democratic Party of Kosovo and of the KLA. Except for those areas where the Democratic Party of Kosovo won a majority, it was difficult to see the extent of the population's support for the former KLA, as the party only won a majority in the areas where the conflict began in 1998, namely around Drenica. The source thought it was symptomatic that the Democratic Party of Kosovo lost the election in low-income areas. The Kosovo Albanians have not forgotten that the KLA was originally a military organisation without any political leadership and that it was clan-based and initially had no clear leadership structure. The KLA is still divided into clans and this is reflected in the new political structure, where it takes the form of different parties which cannot cooperate. The elections gave the Kosovo Albanians their first opportunity to show that they were in favour of the LDK and a moderate approach, not the Democratic Party of Kosovo and the KLA's militant line. This came as a great surprise to the Democratic Party of Kosovo.

UNMIK Police in Pristina (Station 1) felt that the election showed that the majority did not agree with the Democratic Party of Kosovo's policies and tactics and that the party was surprised how little support it had amongst Kosovo Albanians.

An international source which wished to be anonymous on this subject added that in the elections the Kosovo Albanians had an opportunity to show their opinion of the KLA. In the eyes of the population, the KLA had been in training camps in Macedonia while the international community won the war. People therefore do not feel that they have anything to thank the KLA for. The source said that more violence had been expected in connection with the elections.

The Editor in Chief of the Koha Ditore newspaper, Veton Surroi, believed that the Kosovo Albanians generally were tired of talking about politics, that the individuals who had joined the political parties had behaved responsibly and democratically and that the election campaign had been conducted fairly and without hatred between those involved.

A local source which asked to remain anonymous felt that, although Rugova had won the election, he would remain politically isolated, because Thaci ran the black market and therefore also the economy in Kosovo.

Several sources said that, although the situation before and during the election had been peaceful, political violence had flared up following the election and several political murders had been committed.

An international source, requesting anonymity on this subject, added that the flare-up of political violence after the election could be a sign that the Democratic Party of Kosovo was trying to take political power by other means, following its election defeat. There could also be a connection between the loss of the election and the unrest in the Albanian-dominated areas of Serbia, in which the aim was to destabilise the general situation and destroy the international community's relationship with the new government in Belgrade. There was also increasing nationalism to be seen amongst Kosovo Albanians. It was difficult to distinguish political violence from organised crime and hence to establish responsibility. Rugova's second-in-command, who was murdered in October 2000, had for example begun to crack down on the illegal and unauthorised building which was defacing Kosovo and it was therefore highly likely that the Kosovo Albanian mafia were behind the murder.

An international source which wanted to be anonymous on this subject pointed out that political intimidation and violence mostly occur in those areas where the Democratic Party of Kosovo lost the election. The violence occurs particularly when members of the LDK take over the municipal political posts which they have won. Many local LDK leaders fear for their lives, often with good reason. In some areas the Democratic Party of Kosovo has also attempted to prevent the LDK's newspapers being published. Since just about everyone over the age of 24 was previously a member of the LDK and since everyone knows and watches everyone else, many people are threatened because of their pasts.

An international source, requesting anonymity in this respect, observed that many myths were current amongst Kosovo Albanians about who lay behind the political murders of LDK members. Some believed that it was the Serbian intelligence service, others the Democratic Party of Kosovo, since the party lost the election to the LDK; others believed that it was a group from the Drenica area which had not come to terms with the new political system and had expected to increase its power after the war. There was also speculation that it might be powerful clans or criminal organisations from outside, such as the Albanian mafia. The source did not personally believe that the Serbs lay behind the murders, as they did not have the resources and were strictly supervised by KFOR and the international community.

A local source which asked to be anonymous pointed out that Kosovo Albanians generally had a good knowledge of the background to the current political radicalisation and were afraid that Albanian conditions would develop in Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians liked to talk about politics, but not in connection with security questions and certainly not in public or with outsiders.

A local source, requesting anonymity, explained that the radicalisation was inspired by people who were stuck in the past. Ordinary Kosovo Albanians had no interest in it, as they now had other problems in their daily lives.

Veton Surroi, Editor in Chief of the Koha Ditore newspaper, deplored the political violence which had arisen and the political murders which had been committed since the election. Surroi believed that a small militant group which opposed the modernisation process lay behind them. He wanted to see more dynamic political leadership and increased cooperation between the parties, which he believed would be able to stop the political violence. He did not want to go into politics himself, since it was important to have political forces outside party politics.

The Danish Refugee Council explained that people generally were afraid because they were being pressurised to show that they were patriots. For example, they were obliged to take part in pro-Albanian demonstrations just to show their patriotism. People did not generally talk about the situation and were careful not to ask questions or answer them unless they knew one another personally.

The Danish Refugee Council reported that its interpreters had received death threats and that Albanian bus drivers were threatened if they carried Serbs on their weekly trips to buy food and medicines etc.

An international source, which asked to be anonymous on this question, observed that no-one knew whether only local Albanians were involved in the unrest in Albanian-dominated areas of Serbia, or whether former KLA members from elsewhere were also involved.

The Danish Refugee Council had heard rumours that the KLA in Pec was calling people up for military service and this was now being investigated by KFOR.

2.3 Criminal organisations

The widespread crime in Kosovo includes trafficking in and smuggling of arms, drugs and women sold into prostitution.

The Danish Refugee Council reported that many people in Kosovo carry weapons.

UNMIK Police in Pristina (Station 1) pointed out that it has not officially been confirmed that the KLA is behind the crime. However, it is generally known that both Albanians and Serbs run organised crime involving prostitution and trafficking in human beings and that they cooperate.

An international source which wished to be anonymous on this subject did not doubt that the financial mafia was connected to the KLA.

The Danish Refugee Council explained that many people pay protection money to former members of the KLA and that those who complain or object may risk losing their businesses. However, the payment of protection money has gone on for 10 years and is not necessarily only KLA-related.

A local source, requesting anonymity, reported that a form of crime which affects many citizens involves property ownership, with properties being illegally occupied or confiscated, and unlawful construction of buildings.

The Danish Refugee Council confirmed this and explained that over 3 000 illegal buildings have been constructed in Pristina alone. Only large buildings are authorised by UNMIK, not the smaller ones. Houses are demolished at night and new construction work begins the next day. Nobody dares ask whether building permits have been obtained. Abandoned Serb homes are occupied or confiscated without lawful authority (UNMIK has opened a property claims office, where Serbs in Serbia can make claims for property they have left behind). The KLA also sometimes unlawfully demands rent payments, or e.g. "glass insurance" money.

An international source which asked to be anonymous on this subject reported that the Kosovo Protection Corps has behaved very assertively in the many cases of irregular property ownership and has confiscated much public housing together with the tenants' rights . There are serious suspicions that the Kosovo Protection Corps is holding on to the property or controlling the allocation of housing. Confiscated homes are given to those who are regarded as patriots or to relatives and friends. Nobody knows the exact extent, although this does not only apply to flats but also to whole buildings and blocks.

The Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom (CDHRF) confirmed that there were major problems with the ownership of homes and stressed that no-one should be able to claim ownership of housing without having documents confirming it.

2.4 Law enforcement

Veton Surroi, Editor in Chief of the Koha Ditore newspaper, did not believe that there was currently sufficient law enforcement or law and order. No-one who was threatened in any way was able to obtain protection.

The Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom (CDHRF) reported that there was institutional chaos, that the police had no real power and that the judicial system was not working. The current system was not independent. Conditions were therefore easy for organised crime, individuals were free to threaten others and murders were committed without anyone being held responsible. It was impossible for people to find protection if their security was threatened.

The UNHCR observed that there were problems in relation to law and order and particularly the police protection of individuals giving evidence against the KLA. This meant that it was difficult to get witnesses to help clear up crimes, etc. Nor could the police offer protection to those who had problems with the KLA. The UNHCR also referred to its 2000 position paper and indicated that a new position paper would be published in 2001, perhaps in March.

UNMIK Police in Pristina (Station 1) explained that those who were being persecuted or threatened by the KLA, or those related to them, would be able to get protection from UNMIK, but the level of protection which could be provided would probably not be regarded as sufficient by those involved.

The Danish Refugee Council reported that there were plans to set up local complaints bodies and that one had already been established in Giljan. However, it did not know the details of the complaints procedure, or whether the body was operating.

3. Documents issued or purporting to be issued by the KLA

During the processing of their asylum cases, several Kosovo Albanian asylum applicants have presented documents issued by the KLA. These include:

- summonses for interviews with the KLA's secret service (Ushtrija, Clirimtare E Kosoves-Sherbimi Sekret) concerning cooperation with the Serbs, issued in August 1999 and in March and April 2000;

- an order to a deserter to hand in his uniform and weapon and report in person, issued by the KLA operative zone in December 1999;

- a finding, issued in February 2000, requring a former soldier to hand in his weapons. The document has UNMIK's letterhead and a KLA stamp;

- a final warning, issued in February 2000, requiring a former soldier to report in person and hand in his uniform and weapon. This document has a KLA letterhead at the top and an UNMIK letterhead at the foot;

- mobilisation notices, i.e. personal call-up notices, issued by the KLA in February 1999, including one issued by the KLA's general staff;

- confirmation and certificates, issued in January and July 2000, concerning the performance of military duties and membership of the KLA.

The documents were shown to a number of sources, with the names removed.

An international organisation which wished to be anonymous confirmed that it had previously seen summonses for interviews with the KLA, but not on the grounds of "cooperation with the Serbs". For example, summonses had been sent to those who had been employed in the Serbian public administration, such as school teachers, and to LDK members and others, who had been required to account for their "behaviour during the war". The KLA regarded all those who did not actively fight as collaborators and all those who continued working in the Serb administration subsequently had major problems with the Albanians. The source personally knew several people who had been summoned by the KLA, but could not say what had happened when they presented themselves or what the consequences were if they did not. In one case, a person employed as an official in a Serbian public institution who was summoned in July 1999 subsequently disappeared without trace and, in another case, where the person in question did not present himself, nothing happened. The source believed that accusations of having been a collaborator were serious, but this also depended on how close cooperation with the Serbs had been and what form it had taken. A group calling itself "Eye of an Eagle", officially a breakaway group from the KLA, had interrogated, convicted and executed people for collaboration with the Serbs. The group was active in June 2000, when it published an article with a warning to collaborators, but the source did not know whether it was still active.

UNMIK Police in Pristina (Station 1) had never seen such documents before. Nor had they heard directly of a KLA secret service, although they had heard indirectly that there were KLA parallel structures. The source was not aware of any cases of people being threatened or persecuted by the KLA just because they had not taken part in its military activities. However, the source added that, because they feared the KLA, people would not dare to bring complaints to the UNMIK police. It emphasised that the KLA did not have any means of exerting pressure, since it did not have its own courts, prosecutors or prisons.

UNMIK Police Headquarters explained that all UNMIK documents were computer-generated and not typewritten, as was clearly the case for the documents with UNMIK's letterhead. The source was not aware of UNMIK sending documents to individuals, telling them to hand in their weapons.

KFOR Military Police said that they had not previously seen such documents, but had heard that they existed. Regarding the existence of call-up lists, KFOR did have relevant information, but it was classified. However, KFOR did say that e.g. Kosovo Albanians resident in the USA had returned voluntarily to Kosovo to join the KLA.

KFOR Military Police possess lists/databases of former members of the KLA and are thus able to search their databases for those who claim or are claimed to have served in the KLA. However, KFOR Military Police pointed out that the last people to be recruited to the KLA before the organisation was dissolved were never officially registered.

The UNHCR had not seen such documents before but thought that, although the KLA was not empowered to issue them in 2000, it might still have done so and the documents could therefore be authentic.

The Norwegian Refugee Council, which provides legal assistance in Pristina and has Kosovo Albanian lawyers on its staff, had not previously seen such documents; it believed that the documents with UNMIK's letterhead were forgeries and that the language used was not UNMIK's usual style. However, the organisation would not dismiss the possibility that the KLA might have issued the documents in 1999, although this would not have happened in 2000. The organisation had never had a case in which people had experienced problems with the KLA and it thought that those who had a quarrel with the KLA would not be in Kosovo. One of the Kosovo Albanian lawyers employed there said that he himself had been abroad during the war and he had not had problems with the KLA after his return. He believed that any problems with the KLA were for other reasons, e.g. collaboration with the Serbs. The organisation was not aware that call-up lists for military service with the KLA had been in circulation, including in Scandinavia.

The Danish Refugee Council believed that, although it had not previously seen such documents, they should be taken seriously.

The Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom had never seen such documents or anything similar before and doubted their authenticity. It added that the KLA had openly thanked Kosovo Albanians in the newspapers for their financial support, but had not issued confirmation that individuals had been members. The Council had never heard of people being persecuted by the KLA just because they had not taken part in the fighting. It believed that personal conflicts might lie behind the documents. The Council also thought that anyone presented with such documents should be suspicious.

A local source, requesting anonymity, was not aware of the existence of call-up lists with the names of Kosovo Albanians resident abroad, although there were rumours that such lists had circulated in Switzerland. The source had not heard of relatives of such people being visited by the KLA. Nor was the source aware of young Kosovo Albanians abroad having problems with the KLA because they had been away or had not taken part in KLA activities, although the possibility could not be ruled out, since in such cases Kosovo Albanians would not turn to the organisation for help.

4. Registration and issue of documents

4.1 Registration

A requirement for participation in the municipal elections on 28 October 2000 was that voters should be registered. This registration was also the basis for the issue of identity cards in Kosovo. According to Gerard Fischer, the Deputy to the DSRSG for UNMIK Civil Administration, registration was extremely difficult in practice. A total of 915 000 Kosovo Albanians were registered, but only 35 000 of the registrations could be described as error-free. Some 300 000 registrations were marred by minor errors. For example, there were many mistakes in names, since registration was carried out by Indians who had great difficulty spelling Albanian names. The remainder of the registrations involve such major errors that they will have to be done again.

Kosovo Albanians who have lost all their personal documents have to travel to the municipality of their birth and produce evidence of their identity, e.g. receipts for payment of telephone bills or rent. After the war, all the old Serbian population records were recovered and UNMIK has access to them. There are also complete copies, for example in Nis, of the Kosovo population records.

4.2 UNMIK travel documents

Gerard Fischer, the Deputy to the DSRSG for UNMIK Civil Administration, explained that the reason for the issue of the special UNMIK travel documents to Kosovo Albanians was to provide them with non-Yugoslav documents and thus a non-Slav identity. But this has created an unfortunate precedent, since all Kosovo Albanians want UNMIK documents and it is impossible to turn people away merely because they do not want to apply to the Yugoslav authorities. The Yugoslav authorities are not well-disposed to the issue of the UNMIK documents, but Gerard Fischer thought this might lead to the Yugoslav authorities being more willing in future to issue documents to Kosovo Albanians than has hitherto been the case. The political change in Belgrade may well also contribute to developments in a more positive direction. It is questionable, in addition, whether it will continue to be appropriate to issue UNMIK travel documents and whether there is a political will to carry on with the process.

Before the documents can achieve international validity, they will have to be recognised abroad with the same rights as the Yugoslav passport, i.e. visa requirements should be the same for citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and for Kosovo Albanians. Currently, UNMIK's travel documents have only been recognised by 14 countries, mainly EU countries, including Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom, as well as Australia and Canada. Fischer said that the process of achieving recognition had been a long and difficult one and had not yet been completed.

For an UNMIK travel document to be issued, applicants must produce an identity card.

The travel document issuing system is very sophisticated and, since the travel document contains fingerprints, the system can reveal if a person has applied for travel documents several times with different identities .

Gerard Fischer thought it was unlikely that it would become possible for UNMIK travel documents to be issued abroad to Kosovo Albanians. Kosovo Albanians abroad who had lost their travel documents or whose documents had expired could either apply for new documents from the relevant representation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or travel to Kosovo on the expired passport (entry to Kosovo on an expired passport is accepted) and apply for an UNMIK travel document. Issue takes four weeks and the applicant has to be registered in Kosovo and obtain an identity card.

Besides these UNMIK travel documents, "pre-cleared" UNMIK travel documents are also issued, for a single journey, to Kosovo Albanians who have to go abroad for a particular reason, for example in connection with the death of a close relative; the authorities in the country in question are informed in advance and give permission for entry.

4.3 Travel documents issued by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The Serbian authorities, which have an office in the Peace and Tolerance building in Pristina, issue Yugoslav national passports to both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians . Applications must be made in person and an identity card and/or expired passport be produced. Officially, passport issue costs DEM 30 and takes a couple of months. Unofficially, issue costs DEM 200, which helps reduce the processing time. About 20 000 Kosovo Albanians have had Yugoslav documents issued to them in this way. However, it is generally regarded as inappropriate to apply for a Yugoslav travel document and Gerard Fischer reported that those queuing at the office were often harassed. Members of the LDK party who needed travel documents to take part in political conferences abroad, for instance, were worried about being recognised there.

Apart from in Pristina, Kosovo Albanians may also obtain Yugoslav travel documents in Belgrade and at representations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia abroad.

Peter Sander of the UNMIK Border Police reported that there are many false Yugoslav passports in circulation, both where the holder knows they are false and where the holder believes them to be genuine. Many German visas have also proved to be false, frequently showing spelling mistakes and errors in the logo. During the war a significant number of blank passports were stolen; these were subsequently completed and are now in circulation. The owners of these passports often do not know that they are false (see the annexed UNMIK list of serial numbers of stolen blank passports). Peter Sandner reported that a number of criminal cases involving the issue of false passports were currently under way; the punishment was three to four months in prison.

5. List of persons consulted

Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom, Pristina: Behxhet Sh. Shala, Secretary.

The Council was founded in 1989 by a group of Albanian intellectuals. As soon as it was founded, the Council forged contacts with international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, the International Helsinki Federation and Human Rights Watch. In 1991 Adem Demaci, who had been released after 28 years in prison for political activities, became director. In the same year Demaci received the European Parliament's Sakharov prize. Demaci left his post in 1997 and in 1998 he became spokesman for the KLA. The Council was particularly active before and during the Kosovo conflict. Through its 27 subcommittees and 2 000 voluntary informants, the Council has reported on persecution and human rights violations in all areas of Kosovo and has issued detailed daily, monthly and annual reports. The Council is now involved in an NGO network project under the leadership of the Danish Centre for Human Rights. However, doubts are now being raised about its ability to report objectively and many workers have resigned from their posts, so that the Council's activities have been significantly scaled down.

Danish Refugee Council: Jette Toft, Representative.

The Danish Refugee Council is active in a number of municipalities in Kosovo, with projects in reconstruction, social services, transport, including personal transport, and logistics.

Human Rights Centre, Prishtina University: Enver Hasani, Director, Enver Hoxhaj, Ph.D., Lecturer, Department of History, Enver Buqaj, Project Assistant.

The Centre was founded in November 2000 on the initiative of and in cooperation with the Finnish Human Rights Project, Åbo Academy University in Finland and World University Service (WUS Austria), amongst others. The Centre is supported by the Council of Europe. The aim is to promote human rights at university level and to function as a resource centre for research, teaching, counselling and networking, etc. The Director was appointed at the beginning of December 2000.

KFOR MAIN: Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hampton, Military Police USAR, Kosovo Protection Corps, Chief, KPC Establishment and Compliance.

KFOR: Major Steven R. Shappell, United States Army, KFOR Spokesman.

Koha Ditore: Veton Surroi, Editor in Chief.

Koha Ditore is and has been one of the most respected Kosovo Albanian newspapers because of its objectivity. The Editor in Chief, Veton Surroi, took part in the Rambouillet negotiations in 1999 as a politically independent representative of the Kosovo Albanians. Contrary to the international community's expectations, Surroi has chosen not to take on any political position in Kosovo.

Norwegian Refugee Council: Harals Kloevjan, Head of Office, CRP, Pristina.

The Refugee Council's Pristina branch provides free legal assistance and has several Kosovo Albanian lawyers on its staff.

International organisation: human rights/legal adviser and human rights officer.

UNHCR: Betsy Greve, Deputy Head of Protection.

UNMIK Civil Administration: Gerard A. Fischer, Deputy to the DSRSG (Deputy Special Representative of Secretary-General) for Civil Administration, and Tania Mechlenborg, Political Adviser to the DSRSG for Civil Administration.

UNMIK Police:

- Derek Chappell, Chief, Press and Public Information, UNMIK Police.

- Charles Johnson, UNMIK Police Media Relations Coordinator.

UNMIK Border Police: Peter Sandner, Deputy Head of the Border Police Section.

6. Bibliography

International Crisis Group: What happened to the KLA? March 2000.

International Crisis Group: Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom? November 1999.

International Crisis Group: The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo. August 1999.

Bundesamt für Flüchtlinge: Faktenblatt: Die verschiedenen Polizeikorps im Kosovo. Internationale Polizei, KPS und PU. [Swiss Federal Office for Refugees: Fact Sheet: The various police forces in Kosovo. International police, KPS (Kosovo Police Service) and PU (KLA military police).] Bern-Wabern, August 2000.

Bundesamt für Flüchtlinge: Faktenblatt: Nachfolgeorganisationen der UÇK. Die TMK. [Swiss Federal Office for Refugees: Fact Sheet: UÇK (KLA) successor organisations. The TMK (KPC).] Bern-Wabern, September 2000.

OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Municipal Elections 2000. Final Results. November 2000.

UN Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (S/2000/1196). December 2000.

7. List of annexes

Annex 1: Administrative map of Kosovo.

Annex 2: List of numbers of stolen passports.

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