Assessment for Susu in Guinea
|Publisher||Minorities at Risk Project|
|Publication Date||31 December 2003|
|Cite as||Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Susu in Guinea, 31 December 2003, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f3a8a19.html [accessed 1 August 2014]|
|Disclaimer||This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.|
In light of the current political situation in Guinea, the Soussou are unlikely to engage in future rebellion or protest. As the advantaged group, they face no restrictions or repression, the government represents their interests, and it is in their best interests to maintain the status quo. Because Conte managed to change the constitution and is still in power, the Soussou are not about to lose their favored position in society. Guinea as a whole and the Soussou must also be concerned with the situation in Sierra Leone, and the effect that the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees will have on Guinean society. At present, the opposition groups appear committed to democratic reform, which hopefully will prevent ethnic violence, but the long term stability of the Soussouian state of affairs in Guinea is unknown, especially with Conte's deteriorating health.
The Soussou are found in the coastal areas of Guinea (REGIONAL = 1), and the majority have not ventured far (GROUPCON = 3) beyond their traditional homelands (TRADITN = 1). Beyond a different language (LANG = 1), the Soussou are very similar to the other large ethnic groups in Guinea the Malinke and the Fulani (CUSTOM, BELIEF, and RACE = 0). Since the group holds an advantaged position in society due to the ethnicity of the president, the Soussou are organized around their ethnicity and are cohesive (COHESX9 = 4).
Guinea gained independence from France on 2 October 1958 after rejecting the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which would have resulted in the colony becoming a self-governing entity within the French Community. At independence, labor leader and Malinke Ahmed Sekou Touré, head of the Guinean Democratic Party-African Democratic Assembly (PDG-RDA), became president. During almost 30 years in power, Touré pursued a socialist agenda that resulted in harsh repression of all opposition to his rule. Nearly two million Guineans were thought to have left the country by 1983 to escape the government's repressive activities. France cut all aid to the country on its withdrawal, and Touré developed ties to the Soviet bloc until the early 1980s.
After decolonization, the Malinke occupied a position of special status in Guinea due to the common ethnicity of Sekou Touré. Resentment between the Malinke and other ethnic groups grew, but Touré, though faced with several coup attempts, managed to keep ethnic violence in check during his tenure as president. Touré died in 1984. Before a permanent successor could be chosen by the ruling party, the armed forces seized power in a bloodless coup, and Col. Lasana Conte, a Soussou, was appointed head of the government by the Military Committee of National Reformation. The PDG-RDA and the legislature were dissolved, and the Constitution suspended. With the rise of Conte, the special status held by the Malinke was transferred to the Soussou. The Soussou have maintained this status to the present day.
In October 1985, Conte, like many African heads of state, began restructuring the economy in line with World Bank and IMF prescriptions. Towards the late 1980s, internal and external pressure on the government led to political reforms. In late 1988, Conte proposed the creation of a new Constitution, and a year later he proposed a transitional government. In November 1990, Conte appealed to exiled Guinean political leaders to return to the country. Many returned, including Alpha Conde, a Malinke and head of the Rally for the Guinean People. The transition to multiparty rule was marred by violence in Guinea. For example, as many as 60 of Conde's supporters were arrested after they protested his summons to a police station in Conakry for possessing "subversive materials." In another incident in 1993, anti-government protesters were fired upon, resulting in as many as 18 deaths. Presidential elections were finally held in December 1993. The main contenders included President Conte, Alpha Conde (RPG), Mamadou Boye Ba, a Fulani and head of the Union for a New Republic (UNR) and Siradiou Diallo, also a Fulani and head of the Party for Renewal and Progress (PRP). The polls resulted in the election of Conte with 52% of the vote. However, the opposition claimed the elections were unfair, and relations between the government and opposition parties were strained. Legislative elections took place in June 1985, and the opposition again complained of harassment and irregularities. The opposition then joined forces in the Coordination of the Democratic Opposition. Incidents over the next few years substantiated the opposition's allegations that the government harassed its members. For example, the RPG's headquarters in Conakry were ransacked and damaged by fire in November 1996, and opposition leaders were periodically arrested.
Conte's Unity and Progress Party (PUP) is seen as dominated by Soussou while the RPG is seen as a Malinke party. The PRP and UNR, Fulani parties, merged to form the Union for Progress and Renewal in 2000. Elections in December 1998 were marred by violence and opposition allegations that they were unfair. The opposition claimed the government used troops to break up their party rallies, and foreign election monitors were refused permission to oversee the election process. Official results indicated that President Conte (PUP) had won with 56% of the vote, while Ba (UNR) came in second with 25%, and Conde (RPG) came in third with 17%. Aside from the political transition process, Guinea is also challenged by its role as host to 700,000 (as of 1998) of the region's war refugees.
Very little information from Guinea reaches the western media, and therefore not much information is available on the current status of the Soussou. It appears that the group does not face any demographic disadvantages (DEMSTR03 = 0), other than the fact that Soussou lands are near the Sierra Leone border, which hundreds of thousands of refugees have crossed in order to escape the civil war in Sierra Leone. As the dominant group in Guinea, it is no surprise that the Soussou are not confronted with political disadvantages (POLDIS03 = 0). In fact, the Soussou predominantly compose the higher positions inside the Guinean government, civil service and military (POLDIFXX = -2). The group also is free from economic or cultural restrictions or discrimination (ECDIS03 = 0). Once again, almost 20 years of being the advantaged group has removed any historical discrimination. Not surprisingly, there have been no reports of government repression against the group, and there have not been any reports of communal conflict between the Soussou and other ethnic groups (COMCON03 = 0). Again, it is unknown if attacks have occurred and not been reported by the western media, or if the country has been truly free of ethnic conflict.
As noted earlier, the Unity and Progress Party has managed to remain in power to the present day, and the Soussou retain their privileged position. Thus, the group has voiced very few demands of the government. A central Soussou request is protection from the other Guinean ethnic groups. There is a lack of trust between the opposition parties and the government, and as a result, there are tensions between the Soussou and other ethnic groups in Guinea who are less advantaged. Therefore, the potential for conflict is great, and the Soussou want the government to protect them. There are also tensions within the Soussou in power as suspicion is highly common between them (INTRACN03 = 1).
Before the coup which brought Conte to power, there were scant reports of Soussou political protest (PROT75X = 1 being the exception), and this has not changed during his time in office (PROT03 = 0). There also appears to have been no militant activity by the group (REB03 = 0).
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