Chad/Sudan: Sowing the seeds of Darfur: Ethnic targeting in Chad by Janjawid militias from Sudan
|Publication Date||28 June 2006|
|Citation / Document Symbol||AFR 20/006/2006|
|Cite as||Amnesty International, Chad/Sudan: Sowing the seeds of Darfur: Ethnic targeting in Chad by Janjawid militias from Sudan, 28 June 2006, AFR 20/006/2006, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/44c5e77f4.html [accessed 29 August 2014]|
|Disclaimer||This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.|
A new human rights tragedy is unfolding today in the eastern part of Chad. It is a direct product of the long-running crisis in Sudan's neighbouring Darfur region, where the Janjawid, funded by the Sudanese government, have been attacking and systematically displacing those ethnic groups associated with Sudanese armed groups opposed to the Sudanese government. In Darfur, the Janjawid, often assisted by the Sudanese air force, caused the forcible displacement of some 2 million people and many thousands of deaths. These ruthless, mobile fighters have now extended their activities into eastern Chad. There, they have targeted a diverse range of ethnic groups who identify themselves and are identified by others as "African" rather than "Arab." The Janjawid have stolen the cattle that are their main source of wealth, driven them from their homes and villages, and killed or dispersed their inhabitants.
All along Chad's eastern border with Sudan, Janjawid incursions have been clearing the land of members of communities such as the Dajo, Mobeh, Masalit, Kajaksa and other groups. Although such incursions have occurred at least since 2003, they have become far more intensive, serious and abusive since the last months of 2005 as relations between the Sudan and Chad governments have deteriorated. The Janjawid attacks are also divisive. Certain Chadian communities have been singled out for attack, apparently on account of their wealth and for ethnic and other reasons, while others have been exempted or have become active participants with the Janjawid in attacking their neighbours.
The Sudanese government has taken no action to stop the attacks or to control and disarm the Janjawid, despite the commitments it has made to do so, or to bring to justice those leaders and members of the Janjawid who have committed gross human rights abuses. On the contrary, the Sudanese forces do not effectively patrol the country's border or make any efforts either to intercept or pursue the Janjawid or to protect the civilian populations on which they prey. They continue to support the Janjawid, whose fighters wear uniforms similar to those of the Sudanese army and have been found to be carrying identity cards showing them to be members of Sudanese paramilitary forces. Their raids often coincide with the attacks made against the government of Chad by Chadian armed groups based in Sudan, when the Janjawid take advantage of the absence of Chadian government troops to attack defenceless civilians.
In face of this threat, the government of Chad has preferred to deploy its troops to defend against the armed opposition groups rather than to protect the civilian population from Janjawid attacks. The government has failed to station troops so as to secure the country's eastern border, and the communities living within it, against Janjawid incursions. When concerned about possible new attacks by armed opposition groups, it has withdrawn any troops deployed in rural locations, so exposing the local inhabitants to Janjawid attack.
Since September 2005, Janjawid attacks into eastern Chad have caused the forcible displacement of between 50,000 and 75,000 people. Many of these people remain in Chad as internally displaced, but at least 15,000, cut off from safer means of escape, have fled into Darfur, despite the continuing conflict and disruption there. Those displaced have virtually no access to humanitarian assistance and, in Chad at least, people who have been internally displaced have congregated in informal camps where often they remain exposed to the threat of further attack.
Unsurprisingly, some Chadian communities are now seeking to acquire modern weapons with which to defend themselves, opening the prospect of widening violence. Others, including children, are being recruited into the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), an armed group fighting the Sudan government.
Urgent action is required by the UN, the African Union (AU) and particularly the two governments involved if this new, emerging crisis is to be forestalled in eastern Chad. Each of these bodies must take all possible action to secure three key objectives: protection from attacks for civilians; ensuring the provision of humanitarian assistance and access for humanitarian agencies and human rights monitors; and ending impunity for human rights abuses in both Chad and Sudan.
1. Patterns of attack and displacement
In June 2006, Amnesty International researchers who visited areas of Chad along the country's eastern border with Sudan found the civilian population in great disarray, disrupted and dispersed by recurrent cross-border attacks by Sudanese Janjawid from Darfur. The pattern and intensity of these attacks differed according to when and where they occurred and the ease with which the Janjawid were able to carry out their attacks unhindered. However, there was a marked escalation in late 2005 and the first months of 2006 as relations worsened between the governments of Chad and Sudan.
At the same time, Chadian armed groups based inside Sudan prepared to strike against the Chad government. They carried out a number of attacks, including on Ade and Borota on 16 December 2005 and a large-scale but failed assault on Adre on 18 December. In late December, a number of armed groups formed the United Front for Democratic Change (Front Unique pour le Changement Démocratique, FUCD). On 12 April 2006 there was an abortive attempt to capture Chad's capital, N'Djamena.
Faced with such threat, the government of Chad withdrew its armed forces to defend the strategic entry points from western Sudan, effectively denuding some areas along the eastern border of troops and leaving the civilian population to fend for themselves. These areas were then subjected to larger and more prolonged Janjawid attacks, causing thousands of civilians to flee their homes and become internally displaced. In some cases, civilians crossed into war-torn Darfur in search of safety and respite from attack.
Currently, conditions in the southernmost areas along the Chad-Sudan border are causing greatest concern. These areas have been abandoned by the Chad government and its armed forces, and the Janjawid now operate there without opposition and with impunity. Their activities have made it difficult for local people to escape northwards to areas where there is some Chadian government military presence, with the result that thousands have fled across the border into Sudan.
Types of attacks
When considering the patterns of attack and the different ethnic groups that have been targeted in eastern Chad, the 600-kilometre border area stretching from Adre in the north to Tissi in the south essentially can be considered to comprise three parts. The first, from Adre southwards to Ade, falls mostly within Dar Masalit, the traditional homeland of the Masalit people. The central sector, from Ade to the Wadi Azum, and the southernmost sector, from Wadi Azum to Tissi, close to the borders with both Sudan and the Central African Republic, are within Dar Silah, the homeland of the Dajo people. The Wadi Azum is a major watercourse which becomes an impassable barrier during the rainy season.
Janjawid attacks on communities within this eastern border area of Chad have tended to take two forms. The first type, beginning in 2003, consisted of continual small-scale raids intended primarily to steal cattle, which were generally kept at some distance from the villages. Those guarding the cattle would be killed if they resisted the better-armed Janjawid, but the villages themselves were not attacked.
However, as their incursions became more frequent, the Janjawid began directly to attack villages, sometimes repeatedly on successive days or over periods of months, until most of the inhabitants had been killed or forced to flee and the villages had been totally looted. In the area from Adre to Ade, and parts of the area from Wadi Azum to Tissi, this was the last stage in the evolution of attacks before populations, exhausted of possessions, were finally displaced.
In the area between Ade and Wadi Azum, and in some cases in the Wadi Azum to Tissi area, as the number and intensity of the first type of attacks increased, some groups of villages began to concentrate their cattle in a central area for greater protection. This, in turn, led the Janjawid to turn their attention to these concentrations of livestock and to attack surrounding villages when their inhabitants sought to mount a defence, causing many casualties.
In order to carry out larger-scale attacks, the Janjawid need to assemble in greater numbers and to have relative freedom of movement, so they have tended to launch these when the Chad government and its army are in no position to respond. Consequently, such attacks have occurred when the Chad government has been preoccupied with the threat posed by the FUCD, and has withdrawn its forces from rural bases to guard against or oppose its attacks.
When mounting their more concerted attacks, the Janjawid usually divide their forces. One part targets the local inhabitants' livestock. Another encircles the village or villages that are the object of the attack, to enable the first group to make off with the cattle, and then directly attacks that village or villages. Local men are killed but women and children apparently are spared – often they have already fled. All the villagers' possessions are taken. Sometimes repeat raids over several days ensure that there is nothing and no one left.
The overall result of these attacks is mass displacement. Two major attacks carried out by Janjawid, on 26 September 2005 in Koloy canton and on 3 March 2006 in Wadi Kadjo canton, in particular appear to have been intended to drive local inhabitants from the area, not only to steal their cattle. Both attacks were followed by assaults on the central villages to which those displaced in the earlier attacks had moved in search of refuge. Faced with this further harassment and violence, those displaced were forced to trek further inland and away from the border to the relative safety of Goz Beida.
According to local people, these attacks also have racist overtones, similar to those which have been recorded in Darfur, with the Janjawid proclaiming "Death to the Nuba" and comparable threats or claiming "This land is ours." This may help explain why Janjawid raids have resulted in villages being totally destroyed and their inhabitants killed or forced to take flight. The pattern suggests that the attacks are intended not only to bring material gain but, more especially, to break the resistance of local people and to force them permanently from their homes.
Of the tens of thousands of Chadian civilians who have been forced to flee their homes, some have fled after direct attacks, others in fear of imminent attack. The large-scale attacks have been the most obvious catalyst of displacement, but unremitting pressure from smaller-scale raids has had the effect of bleeding local communities of the resources they need to survive. The persistent insecurity and fear of further attacks are gradually changing the region's demography. The targeted population has been pushed further inland, away from the border, or driven to cluster elsewhere with other displaced people.
Between Adre and Ade: the northernmost sector
Most of the major displacement of the civilian population of this most northerly area occurred between December 2005 and March 2006. Most of those displaced were from places such as Gabina, Tandour, Gofota, Nahkulota, Birkenji and Sissi. They fled away from the border to the areas further west around Gongor, Tuer, Al Asha, Borota and Layana, some of them southward to Koloy. After March 2006, the incidence of Janjawid attacks in this northernmost sector seems to have diminished. This was possibly because increased cooperation between the Group of 19, a faction of the SLA, and the Chad government was perceived to present a possible threat to Janjawid activities. Alternatively, it may have been because the previous months' raids meant that the Janjawid had already effectively looted all the livestock and other wealth that the local people had owned.
In an incident characteristic of the pattern in this region, the Janjawid attacked a cluster of predominantly Masalit and Wadai villages on 16 December 2005, reportedly only a few hours after the FUCD attacked Ade and Borota. The Janjawid first attacked the northernmost village, Nahkulota, where they reportedly killed six people, then Bir Kedouas. Other villagers escaped to the west while the Janjawid were still establishing a cordon around them. Villagers told Amnesty International in June 2006 that they had escaped "with only the clothes on our backs". Next day, the Janjawid turned their attention to three villages further south, Birkenji, Sissi, and Kateliti, but the inhabitants fled their approach and escaped without casulties.
Two of the survivors of the Bir Kedouas attack described the killings there of 70-year-old Abdelkarim Abdulaye, the local imam, and Husna Juma, a girl aged three:
"People were in the village when the Janjawid arrived at 10am. They were more than 300 and they were divided in three columns which were heading in different directions. They were ululating and shouting 'We come to kill the black slaves.' They came in the houses and ran after those who were trying to flee. I was running away next to the imam who was very old. He was shot four times in the back and in the leg. They then burned the village. Only 10 out of 100 houses remained intact. The villagers fled to the village of Muruske."
AA, resident of Bir Kedouas
BB, the father of the three-year-old girl who was killed, recounted:
"When the Janjawid arrived, I took my daughter in my arms and ran away but I was shot in the leg and had to slow down. That is when my daughter Husna was shot."
Local people who had been displaced told Amnesty International that, while they were targeted, the Janjawid had refrained from attacking the nomadic, cattle-herding Baggara Arab communities and the Mimi communities, who have a presence on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border. Local people also alleged that members of these communities who live within Sudan participated in Janjawid attacks in late 2005 wearing Sudanese military fatigues. They alleged too that Baggara and Mimi living on the Chad side of the border, and also members of the Tama community, had assisted the Janjawid, providing information about locations of livestock and the best times and routes to use to attack.
Between Ade and Wadi Azum: the central sector
This central region, including the Koloy and Wadi Kadjo cantons, also experienced an increase in Janjawid attacks in 2003. Local people were killed and injured, and cattle were stolen and taken back into Sudan by the Janjawid. As these attacks increased in intensity and frequency, people in the affected villages tried to protect their remaining livestock by gathering them together in a central area. This concentration of wealth, however, served only to attract larger, more coordinated attacks. Such attacks were apparently mounted not only with the purpose of plundering the entirety of the cattle but also of breaking any resistance in the area and driving all the targeted communities from the region.
The first major Janjawid attack took place on 26 September 2005, aimed at the greater Koumou village area. The Janjawid killed 55 and provoked the first mass displacement from the border villages surrounding the town of Koloy, the canton's main village (Chef lieu de canton). This attack was mounted despite the presence of Chadian government troops at Ade, some 60km away, and a smaller force at Modaina, 20km away. The Janjawid appear to have been emboldened to attack because the Chad government forces had failed to respond to previous smaller-scale raids.
After Chadian armed opposition groups attacked Ade, Borota and Adre on 16 and 18 December 2005, the Chad government withdrew all its forces from smaller rural locations, including Ade and Modaina in the central area and Borota in the north (although some government troops returned to Ade in March 2006). Following this, the Janjawid carried out further attacks on villages in the Koloy and Wadi Kadjo cantons in the following months, killing and looting and causing new, but smaller-scale displacements of civilians.
"The village was attacked over three consecutive days on 5, 6 and 7 of February 2006. In the first attack which took place at the cattle camp, five persons were killed: Abaker Suleiman, Hassan Ahmat, Dehie Ibrahim, Abaker Mahamat and Hassan Abdulaye. The two following attacks took place in the village itself. When they attacked, they shouted at the Dajo, 'Get out of the house, you slaves, this is not your land.' The villagers fled immediately to Koloy and, after Koloy was attacked, they fled again on 30 March. Koloy was attacked three times between 30 March and 5 April."
CC, chief of the village of Torora
The Janjawid launched a second, large-scale attack on 3 March 2006 near N'Djamena village, a few kilometres from Modaina, in which 72 people were killed. The displaced from this attack fled to Koloy village, over the border into Sudan, or further south to Dog Dore.
"On 3 March 2006, at about 5am, the Janjawid attacked the cattle camp [one kilometre from the village centre]. After the previous looting we decided to store our cattle together between the three villages: N'Djamena, Modaina, and Moukchacha. When other neighbouring villagers heard the fighting they came running to the cattle camp. But the Janjawid had set up ambushes between the camp and the villages. Many of us were killed and we had to let the cattle go and return to our villages. When we came back though, we heard shooting now near the villages we had come running from. While we were gone the Janjawid had encircled our villages and, when we tried to get back in, they shot at us. Inside the villages they killed all the men they could. Over the next days they came back over and over again, each time taking more things till we had nothing worth taking anymore. "
DD, leader of Modaina village
The people who fled to Koloy to seek shelter from the 3 March 2006 attack then came under further attack in Koloy itself. They were forced to flee again, travelling by foot and donkey to Goz Beida. Following this, the cantons of Wadi Kadjo and Koloy were virtually emptied of their original population.
"After we fled N'Djamena we settled with what we had left under trees on the outskirts of Koloy. When we went to the nearby wadi [Wadi Kadjo, a seasonal watercourse], the Janjawid found us and attacked us, killing three, and stealing the few cattle we had with us. This kept happening every day until the end. In the end, after nearly 10 days of this, the Janjawid came right to where we were staying inside Koloy and took all the small things we had left: bed sheets, beds, cooking pots and more. That was all we could take – we decided then we had to leave for Goz Beida. Those who still had donkeys rode them, those who did not went by foot. It took the slowest of us four days to make it to Goz Beida."
EE, from Koloy village
Many displaced people from communities in the central region continue to cluster near the border in Dog Dore, where they remain vulnerable to further attack. In mid-June 2006, Amnesty International was told of a new attack by Janjawid on a village named Kadamo, in Sinyar canton, some 25km north of Daguessa, which was linked to a nearby incursion into Chad by the FUCD. More than 20 civilians were reportedly killed in the attack on the village.
The Janjawid attacks in March 2006, on people who had previously been displaced to Koloy, and the recent attack in mid-June on Kadamo demonstrate how vulnerable these more recently displaced people may be to further attack. There are a few Chadian government troops in Daguessa, some 15km east of Dog Dore, and a smaller contingent sometimes passes through Dog Dore, where some SLA forces are also occasionally present. In the Tiero region, where displaced people from the southernmost region are clustering, there are no government troops at all. Members of all these displaced communities interviewed by Amnesty International requested protection and security above all else.
Between Wadi Azum and Tissi: the southernmost sector
This area was also subject to the first type of attack – primarily cattle raids – although here the Chad government reinforced its military presence for a time and proactively pursued Janjawid attackers, which dissuaded them from further attacks. This occurred after Janjawid attacked Ghadar in Fongoro canton in January 2004, killing three people. The Chad government sent reinforcements (30 military vehicles) to Tissi in order to strengthen the army's capacity to conduct mobile patrols and pursue Janjawid raiders back towards Sudan. This brought a measure of stability and security in the area until the FUCD attack on N'Djamena, Chad's capital, in April 2006.
Following the attack on N'Djamena, the Chad government remained engaged in skirmishes with FUCD forces before withdrawing all military forces and officials from the region by the end of May. This withdrawal left the area and its inhabitants vulnerable to new and more intensive Janjawid attacks, which soon followed. Villagers fleeing north from Eid al-Ghanam, Barungo and Hadjer in the greater Harraza area told Amnesty International in June 2006 that the Janjawid had repeatedly stolen livestock from them and had threatened to kill anyone who resisted.
A cluster of villages around Maguila, some 20km west of Harraza, was reportedly subjected to repeated attacks, including one on 27 April in which 11 people were killed and 17 injured. These attacks were examples of the second type of attack – targeting the villages themselves – and similar to those in Koumou and N'Djamena village in the central border area:
"On 12 April 2006 at 7.30am, a group of the Chadian rebels, led by Dr Hassan al Jinedi [a leading member of the FUCD], attacked the Tissi garrison.... After several hours of fighting, the government forces withdrew from Tissi. The rebels occupied the town during the day and left. At 2pm, the Janjawid came to loot the barracks and took arms, ammunition, blankets and everything else they could take. During the night, the armed group reoccupied the barracks and left the following morning. Some villagers decided to leave Tissi for Bolong [an area comprising five villages]. After the armed group left and the government forces withdrew, the Janjawid came back several times to loot houses, shops and cattle camps. They did the same in the surrounding villages: in Birnahal on 17 April, in Harraza on 18 April, in Maguila on 27 April, in Eid al-Ghanam on 18 April, in Gozamimi, in Amsisi. Eleven days after the big attack on Tissi, the Chadian soldiers came back and stayed for 10 days. From there they launched attacks against three Sudanese villages [perceived as sympathetic to the FUCD]: Abarjaradil, Gantur and Garai. They exchanged fire with the Janjawid, killed three of them and detained 20 others. Just before the presidential elections [May 2006] the army left again and the Janjawid came back to loot the neighbouring villages again. The village of Maguila was attacked and 17 people were killed there."
FF, local official from Tissi
2. Communities under attack and their assailants
The area of eastern Chad affected by the Janjawid incursions, like Darfur, is home to an intricate mix of different ethnic communities, some of whom identify themselves and are identified by others as "African" and others as "Arab." These delineations are not absolute and are subject to evolution and change. Indeed, a group perceived as "African" in eastern Chad may have very recently taken on an "Arab" identity in Darfur under the complex pressures of the conflict. In this context, it is "African" groups, mostly the largest and wealthiest in terms of livestock, which have been the targets of the Janjawid. However, some smaller ethnic groups perceived locally to be "African" have effectively forged alliances with the Janjawid. These alliances exempt them from attack and, in some cases, lead them to participate in Janjawid attacks on other local communities. They are not comprehensive, however, and change according to each of the three regions. One group allied to the Janjawid in one region may be targeted by them in another.
The largest and wealthiest "African" groups targeted vary according to region:
- From Adre to Ade: the Masalit and Wadai
- From Ade to Wadi Azum: the Dajo, and smaller numbers of Zaghawa and Mobeh
- From Wadi Azum to Tissi: the Masalit, Wadai, Fur, Dajo and some smaller communities such as the Kajaksa and Kebet
The "African" communities that have formed alliances with the Janjawid are the Mimi and Tama in the region from Adre to Ade; the Mimi and Wadai in the area between Ade and Wadi Azum; and the Tama, Gimr and Fellata in the south towards Tissi (the alliances in the southern border area are less clear-cut than in the other two areas). Like local "Arab" groups, these communities have escaped attack by the Janjawid and have assisted them, apparently by providing people, information or places for the Janjawid to stay overnight while undertaking their raids.
"Our village was attacked twice on 12 April 2006. It was a Wednesday; they came in the morning then came back around 3pm. I was there. The Janjawid were supported by the Mimis and the Wadai; these are our neighbours, and they have been living with us for a long time."
GG, chief of the Agogo village
As the incidence and scale of attacks increased, many groups exempted from attack began actively participating in armed raids on neighbouring villages. Targeted villagers sometimes recognized individuals among their attackers. Not all Chadian Arabs – or all African ethnic groups exempted from attack by the Janjawid – have joined in the attacks on the larger African communities. However, with the increasing violence, a polarization of identity has evolved in the border areas. Displaced people interviewed by Amnesty International readily labelled entire ethnic groups as Janjawid, even though African groups linked to the Janjawid in one region were targeted in another. In some areas groups who are exempted from attack, but have not participated in attacks themselves, fear reprisals should the targeted communities organize themselves and obtain arms.
"The first attack on the village happened on 20 September 2005 at about 7am. They came back the same morning at 10am. During the attack, many people were killed. The Janjawid were many, maybe 50, in military uniforms. They were supported by the Arabs of the [neighbouring] cattle camp. The night before the attack, the Janjawid spent the night with them at the cattle camp.... The Janjawid got information from children.... They asked them questions about cattle owners. When children refused to answer their questions, they were beaten up and had hot mud put on their head."
HH, a woman from Koloy
Motivations and strategy: the Janjawid, their allies and Sudan
Although Janjawid attacks have clearly been motivated to a great extent by a desire to steal cattle and enrich themselves at the cost of the sedentary communities of eastern Chad, they have also had an ethnic element and a relationship to larger political events, notably the worsening relationship between the governments of Chad and Sudan. In this last scenario, the Janjawid, as a force armed and supported by the Sudanese government, has acted effectively as a proxy for that government in creating instability in eastern Chad, thereby weakening the position of President Idriss Deby's government in N'Djamena. The human cost, however, of the Janjawid's actions has been incalculable and threatens to become still graver.
It is possible that the current accommodations between the Janjawid and groups such as the Wadai and Mimi in the central border region will prove to be no more than temporary and opportunistic. These groups may have been spurred by fears that they could be attacked by the Janjawid or may see Janjawid raids as offering an opportunity for their own aggrandizement. As recent newcomers to the area following the major famine of 1984, they lack the same land and administrative rights as the longer established Dajo and are still seen as "guests" on Dajo land.
Other factors may also help to explain why certain areas and communities have been attacked. As in Darfur, the quest for land may be a contributing factor for "Arab" groups and for the Wadai and the Mimi in Dar Silah. Following the large-scale displacement of populations in Darfur, groups allied to the Janjawid have begun to take advantage of the recently cleared land in areas from Adre to Tawila in north Darfur and southwards. The region targeted in Chad is a direct extension of that line moving south along the border. Land here is fertile and has ample water supply – elements both lacking in the desert areas further north of Adre and in north Darfur. In June 2006, Amnesty International interviewed many displaced inhabitants from the area between Ade and Wadi Azum who had returned briefly to their homes to find people they termed Janjawid moving freely about their area, eating their crops and grazing their cattle in their villages. Others reported seeing Wadai and Mimi markings on trees in their land, denoting a change in ownership.
The ethnic links of the targeted communities with the Chadian government are another factor. North of Adre, there are concentrations of Zaghawa with close ties to members of the Chadian government. The SLA and another Darfuri armed group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), are active in the area, draw recruits from it and use it for transit. The homelands of the Tama and other smaller groups, which comprise the majority of the FUCD forces, are also north of Adre. If large-scale attacks by the Janjawid took place in this region, any of these groups would have recourse to a robust response. However, areas such as Dar Silah and parts of Dar Masalit are wealthy but the protection of civilians in these regions is not a priority. The area south of Wadi Azum is of less strategic importance to the Chadian government, as the FUCD is more likely to make inroads to the capital, N'Djamena, from further north along the border only during the rainy season. For the SLA and JEM these areas are also of less importance than those further to the north of Adre. Finally, they have little importance for the FUCD as relatively few of its cadres are drawn from the region.
3. Legal framework
Since 2003 the conflict in Darfur has been characterized by widespread and systematic violations of human rights including unlawful killings; mass forced displacement; and torture, including rape and other sexual violence particularly targeting women. As many as 200,000 people have died or been killed as a result of the violence, and those who have been driven from their homes and displaced number approximately 2 million. This pattern of violations, the makings of a similar human catastrophe, is now being repeated in Chad.
All parties to the conflict in both Darfur and Chad – the armed forces of the governments of Sudan and Chad, the Janjawid and other militia or paramilitary forces, and Sudanese and Chadian armed opposition groups – are bound by applicable rules of international humanitarian law, which seek to ensure the maximum possible protection for civilians at risk from the conflict. All these parties must at all times respect the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law.
Sudan and Chad are both High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Chad is also a party to the Geneva Conventions' Additional Protocol I (relating to international armed conflict) and Additional Protocol II (relating to non-international armed conflict). The minimum rules governing all conflict, including "armed conflict not of an international character," are laid out in Article 3, which is common to all four Geneva Conventions, so underscoring their fundamental importance. This Article provides for the protection of persons taking no active part in the hostilities, civilians but also fighters who have laid down their arms or who are otherwise hors de combat. It prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds" and the carrying out of executions without certain judicial guarantees. The destruction and looting of civilian property and means of livelihoods are also forbidden by the Geneva Conventions.
As the Janjawid are armed and, to a great extent, controlled by the Sudanese government, their cross-border attacks into Chad arguably qualify what is occurring as an international armed conflict, not simply an internal conflict. In this case, such attacks by the Janjawid in Chad are subject to the full range of (conventional and customary) rules on the conduct of hostilities in international armed conflict. Sudanese military commanders and Sudanese government officials responsible for their actions, as well as members of the militia directly involved, may therefore be held liable for grave breaches and other serious violations of international humanitarian law that the Janjawid commits in Chad.
4. Sudan's responsibility for violations in Chad
The government of Sudan bears a heavy responsibility for continuing abuses by the Janjawid, who would be unable to function without its support, including the guarantee of a safe haven inside Sudan. The Sudanese government may not exercise total control over all Janjawid forces but the close nexus between them is evidenced, among other things, by the government's incorporation of large numbers of Janjawid into various divisions of its armed forces, such as the Popular Defence Force (PDF), the Border Intelligence Guard and the Reserve Police. And it has done so, apparently, without taking any steps to ensure that Janjawid responsible for perpetrating human rights violations are excluded.
Moreover, the Sudan government has failed to take any concerted steps to prevent the Janjawid from crossing from Sudan into eastern Chad and attacking civilians resident there. The government has signally failed to deploy its armed forces to patrol the border and to intercept and disarm Janjawid raiders. Equally, it has failed to honour its commitments under international agreements to disarm the Janjawid as a whole, and has failed to bring to justice those responsible for committing grave human rights abuses.
Amnesty International has received no information to suggest that the Janjawid receive direct assistance from the regular armed forces of Sudan, including the air force, when carrying out attacks in Chad. However, local people in eastern Chad interviewed by Amnesty International in June 2006 described the Janjawid as invariably dressed in Sudanese military fatigues. Amnesty International's researchers were also given copies of identity cards, left behind or retrieved from the bodies of Janjawid who had been killed during attacks, indicating that they were or had been members of Sudan's PDF militia and Border Intelligence Guards. In Darfur, from 2003 the Janjawid militia were largely recruited and paid as PDF members to attack and displace the civilian population.
Local witnesses whom Amnesty International interviewed in eastern Chad in June 2006 were able to name some of the Sudanese Janjawid leaders involved in the current attacks in Chad. The names were almost exactly the same as those given to Amnesty International in 2004 by victims from Darfur. At that time, Amnesty International researchers were at the Goz Beida and Goz Amer refugee camps in Chad, interviewing Sudanese refugees driven by the Janjawid from their homes in Darfur by repeated attacks, killings, widespread rape and systematic pillage.
The Sudan government also supports and provides an operations base for the Chadian armed group, the FUCD, which is opposed to the government of President Deby. The armed activities of the FUCD effectively facilitate the Janjawid's attacks into Chad in two ways.
First, when the Chad government receives intelligence about the massing of FUCD forces or other information indicating the possibility of an impending attack, it deploys its own armed forces to protect against such attack. This leaves other areas and concentrations of Chadian civilians exposed and vulnerable to the Janjawid. In this way, villages that formerly derived a degree of security from the proximity of Chadian armed forces are effectively sacrificed through the process of military redeployment. The Janjawid then attack, taking advantage of the increased vulnerability of these civilians. It is clear from the pattern of attacks in the Koloy area that the Janjawid have been able to obtain information about redeployments of Chadian government troops and to take advantage by mounting attacks against the communities left exposed.
Second, in a pattern that has been repeated throughout Chad's eastern border region, the Janjawid carry out attacks on civilians at times which coincide with major assaults launched by the FUCD against the Chadian government. Thus, the Janjawid mounted large scale attacks on exposed civilian communities in Chad in late December 2005, when the FUCD mounted a major assault on Adre; at the time of the FUCD's strike against the Chad capital, N'Djamena, on 12 April 2006; and at various times of lesser FUCD incursions into Chad in-between and since. With the Chadian army preoccupied with fending off FUCD attacks, the Janjawid are able to enter Chad in greater numbers and to carry out larger and more sustained attacks than in their more usual, shorter raids. It is often during these more sustained incursions that entire village clusters are decimated.
For example, the Janjawid attack on the Djawara area, which reportedly killed 118 people, was carried out on 13 and 14 April 2006 amid the disruption arising from the FUCD's attack on N'Djamena the previous day. According to residents of Djawara present at the time of the Janjawid attack, a force 1,500-strong crossed the border into Chad and attacked in strength because they knew the Chadian army would be unable to respond. The Janjawid, it appears, can quickly become aware of FUCD activities by noting the massing of their forces, significant vehicle movements and the like, and exploit this information for their own purposes in launching attacks into Chad. Despite this coincidence of armed activity, however, the FUCD reportedly does not itself support or necessarily approve of the Janjawid incursions into Chad.
5. Chad's failure to protect its civilians
The government of Chad is failing in its duty to protect the civilian population on its eastern borderlands from attack by the Janjawid and those assisting them. It contends that it lacks the capacity to do so because its military and other resources have to be utilized at strategic points to guard against FUCD attacks from Sudan, leaving the civilian population exposed to attacks mounted by the Janjawid.
Amnesty International recognizes that the government of Chad is facing a real threat of attack by the FUCD but the existence of this threat does not absolve the government of its fundamental duty to protect the civilian population. Despite the difficulties caused by defections from the Chadian armed forces, weak infrastructure and poor communications, the Chadian armed forces should do more to safeguard the civilian population. In this connection, it is notable that the Janjawid to date have refrained from venturing into areas where Chadian army troops are stationed and attacking civilians in those areas. Equally notably, villages including Koumou, Harraza and Tissi were made the subject of attacks by the Janjawid once the Chad government had pulled its troops away from them.
Amnesty International researchers who visited eastern Chad in June 2006 heard dozens of complaints from displaced people and parliamentary representatives in the region about the failure of the Chadian government and armed forces to afford them protection:
"On the day of the attack on Djawara I went to the sub-prefecture [administrative unit] of Daguessa with a military commander from the area. I left an hour before the attack and took three hours to get to the sub-prefecture. I asked the sub-prefect for help. He answered that he had not received any orders from the high military command. I said that he had to do it and that he did not have to wait for an order."
II, a resident of Tiero village
6. The lack of humanitarian assistance
To a large extent, the government of Chad has also abdicated responsibility for providing assistance to civilians who have become internally displaced, although the primary duty to do so rests with the national authority. As one observer told Amnesty International, the Chad government has effectively elected to treat the issue of the internally displaced in the same way that it has treated the problem of refugees from Darfur: as a matter outside its area of responsibility and one which it is for the international community to resolve. Officially, the government takes the view that the problem of the internally displaced is a temporary one, and will resolve itself soon when the displaced communities return to their places of origin.
The government has preferred not to provide assistance on the grounds that this could attract more people to congregate at locations where internally displaced civilians are already taking shelter. The government also believes that such assistance could deter displaced people from returning to their places of origin if and when the situation in their home area improves. It has looked to the international community to take the lead, especially to deal with the technical aspects of aid provision.
The UN has no direct mandate or funding to address the needs of Chadian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and the funding needs required to support the 180,000 refugees from Darfur in Chad have yet to be met, despite appeals to donor governments. Moreover, the number of such refugees continues to grow as new attacks are mounted against civilians in Darfur. The Gaga refugee camp, which was opened formally in May and is the only one open to receive new refugees, then accommodated some 25,000 Sudanese refugees, including thousands who had newly arrived after being forced to flee from Darfur. Hundreds of Sudanese refugees who had camped along the border in the hope of being able to return to Darfur are now moving westwards into Chad in search of safety. Sudanese civilians who had remained in IDP camps in Darfur feel so insecure that increasingly they are leaving these camps and fleeing into Chad. More than 100 refugees are believed to cross the border into Chad every day.
Despite this, there is concern that the UN could, and should, be more active in seeking means by which to ensure the flow of international humanitarian assistance to the thousands of civilians who have now become internally displaced in eastern Chad.
The little humanitarian assistance that is provided to internally displaced people in Chad has come largely from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has been active in the border area, and some non-governmental organizations. The UN World Food Programme plans to distribute seeds and farming tools to allow some of those displaced people to cultivate crops in the areas where they are temporarily settled.
The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is involved with a scheme to resettle some IDPs locally. It carries out limited protection activities in two of the longer established IDP sites, Goz Beida and Goz Amer, which received people from the Koloy area, mostly in early March 2006. However, it does not provide any humanitarian aid to these groups.
There is particular concern for the situation of Chadians who are internally displaced and still arriving in areas generally closer to the border that are very insecure and where there are no recognized sites or UN presence. With so much disruption continuing, there remain areas in which no assessments of IDP needs have yet been made and where no aid at all is being provided. Tiero, where some of those displaced from the greater Djawara area fled, and Daguessa, located a few kilometres only from the Sudan border, are two such areas, while the vast southern border area remains completely without assessment.
Speaking to Amnesty International researchers in June 2006, JJ, a representative of the chief of the Moukchacha village in Chad, 15km from the border with Sudan, described the suffering to which he and other villagers had been exposed by repeated stages of displacement and their sense of hopelessness:
"My village was attacked on 3 March 2006 by the Janjawid. It was about 7am. They attacked the village from three different places and took 500 cattle after killing people, including Abdelkerim Issaq, 65, imam of the mosque. The Janjawid were wearing green camouflage military uniforms [a different colour from those worn by the Chadian army] ... They took our cattle and food stocks. We could not bury all our dead and went two days later to the village of Koloy. Two weeks after we arrived there, this village was attacked. Some people were killed in the mosque. From Koloy we went to Goz Beida.... We stayed not far from the warehouse of the World Food Programme, and the sultan found this place in Gurkurun for us. After all this we have come here and no one gives us anything. We can see the refugee camp just over there [there is a camp for Darfuri Refugees only a few kilometres away]. We are running from the Janjawid just like them. Why do they get help and we do not? We are told it is because they come from another country, but we are Chadians, in our own country, and no one helps us? We also came here with nothing, and we also cannot return home because we will be attacked again. How are we supposed to survive?"
7. Fears for the future
There is now a serious risk that the human rights and humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad will deepen further in the coming weeks, especially in the area south of the Wadi Azum, where there is now a growing political and protection vacuum. The Chad government and armed forces have effectively abandoned the area and its civilian population since April 2006, and neither the UN nor any international non-governmental agencies have a presence there. The FUCD, however, have established a sizeable presence in the Um Dukhun area of Sudan, directly across the border from Tissi, and exercise a degree of control over an area stretching southwards along the border between Sudan and the Central African Republic. The Janjawid are able to operate without hindrance against what is now an entirely unprotected civilian population in south-eastern Chad.
Civilians in the area have already been acutely affected, as evidenced by the fact that there are refugee movements from Chad into Darfur. In May and June alone, more than 10,000 Chadian refugees crossed over into Sudan at Tissi. Already there are 7,000 Chadian refugees living in makeshift camps inside Sudan. Another 2,000-3,000 have sought shelter with relatives in Um Dukhun town, whose population has swelled from 6,000 to 13,000 owing to the influx of refugees and displaced people. UNHCR is moving some refugees to Mukjar, away from the border and deeper into Sudan.
Others displaced from their homes in the southern border area have remained within Chad, fleeing north across the Wadi Azum to Dog Dore and Daguessa in search of protection and safety. Survivors interviewed by Amnesty International in June 2006 described a hauntingly familiar pattern of attacks, looting and destruction by the Janjawid:
"The Janjawid came on Saturday at 4 pm, to my village Barungo [5.5km north of Harraza]. They had already stolen most of our cattle from us in past raids. This time they took what was remaining: the sheep and goats. We did not resist and only one person was killed. The same day the Janjawid kept moving north and raided the villages of Hadjer and Eid al-Ghanam too. On Sunday some of us decided it was too much; it was time to leave. By Thursday most of the people in the villages had left, either to here [Daguessa] or to Sudan."
KK, a man from Barungo, near Harraza
There is a risk that the conflict spreading from Darfur could widen and become more entrenched in eastern Chad. Abandoned by their own government and under constant attack or threat of attack by the Janjawid, some Chadian communities are now reported to be trying to obtain more powerful weapons with which to arm themselves, raising the prospect of communal violence between newly armed Chadian communities. Some are turning to the SLA for this and some may cross over to Sudan where weapons are amply available.
In certain areas of eastern Chad, the Group of 19 faction of the SLA has afforded a degree of protection to local Chadian civilians, notably in Dog Dore and south of Adre. This faction of the SLA has established a presence in these areas, and has been apparently welcomed by local people as offering some deterrent against Janjawid attacks. For the time being it may have provided some respite in that the Janjawid have avoided attacking areas in which the SLA are present, which may explain why the region between Adre and Ade has witnessed a decrease in the rate of civilian displacement. However, in the longer term, if communities are seen to align with the SLA and the SLA establishes a greater presence in Chad, they may become targets not just of the Janjawid, as they are now, but also military targets of the Sudanese government which has to date not attacked Chad.
Throughout eastern Chad, displaced civilians have become a potential recruitment pool of new fighters for the SLA. Some children are already reported to have been recruited, raising the spectre of greater involvement of child soldiers in the continuing conflict in Darfur to which the various factions of the SLA are party.
Many local leaders told Amnesty International in June 2006 that they were desperate to acquire arms. If they do so, there is a real risk that this will result in even greater bloodshed as communities increasingly turn against one another. To date, the Janjawid have refrained from attacking certain communities whom they perceive as sharing their ethnicity or with whom they have made temporary alliances, exacerbating already existing lines of ethnic division in eastern Chad. Should the communities that have suffered at the hands of the Janjawid be successful in their efforts to gain access to modern weaponry, a dramatic widening of the conflict may ensue, as Chadian communities increasingly turn against one another.
As this report shows, a grave new human rights crisis is unfolding by the day in the eastern regions of Chad, a crisis whose origins are linked intrinsically to the long ongoing, human-made tragedy in the neighbouring Darfur region of Sudan. Indeed, today the inhabitants of eastern Chad are being exposed to a pattern of attacks and abuse that are not only reminiscent of those which occurred in Darfur but, in many cases, are being carried out by the same perpetrators – Sudan's notorious Janjawid. These ruthless armed groups continue to operate with impunity, despite repeated international demands that the Sudan government rein them in, and are turning their attention and carrying their depredations into eastern Chad. As in Darfur, they target virtually defenceless communities: stealing their cattle, their main source of wealth; driving them from their homes and villages; killing and sometimes raping; and impoverishing those who survive.
That the Janjawid are able to continue in this fashion is the result of several factors.
First, to date, the Sudan government has reneged on its promises to bring the Janjawid under control and has not held them accountable for the devastation they have wrought in Darfur.
Second, the government of Chad, faced with a challenge to its own survival, has virtually abdicated responsibility for protecting the civilian population in the eastern areas bordering Sudan. Its troops are deployed to protect military and other strategic installations and areas and to defend against insurgent attacks, whereas civilians in the eastern borderlands are left unprotected and vulnerable to attack from the Janjawid militia and to exploitation from the Sudanese armed groups present in eastern Chad.
Third, there is a pattern of effective coordination between the Janjawid and Chadian armed groups opposed to the Chad government, who have their bases in Darfur. As the latter mount attacks on the Chadian government, the Janjawid move in against the undefended civilian population, targeting certain communities but not others and keeping clear of those areas where the Chadian armed groups seek to draw support.
Fourth, the international community has struggled over several years to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur, where gross abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, continue with impunity. Initially, there was hope that the decision to deploy the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) would signal to the perpetrators that they could not continue to commit human rights abuses with impunity. Under-resourced and with too limited a mandate, AMIS could not address these needs, with the result that it lost credibility and failed to inspire confidence among the people of Darfur, who were intended to benefit from its deployment.
In March 2006, at the recommendation of the AU's Peace and Security Council, it was decided that AMIS, whose mandate expires on 30 September 2006, should be replaced by an international force under the authority of the UN Security Council. On 24 March 2006 the Security Council, in Resolution 1663 (2006), decided to "expedite the necessary, preparatory planning for transition of AMIS to a United Nations operation". The Sudan government has so far opposed the deployment of this UN peacekeeping mission.
In the meantime, renewed internationally inspired efforts to bring an end to the conflict in Darfur resulted in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. This was signed by the Sudan government but by only one faction of the SLA armed opposition group. The agreement contains a commitment and a timeline for disarming the Janjawid, a commitment that the Sudan government has made in previous contexts but not carried out.
What is occurring now in eastern Chad is one consequence of the failure to address the situation in Darfur. It is vital, therefore, that the situation in Chad should not be neglected as the UN and the international community at large seeks to develop solutions for Darfur. The adjoining conflicts should not be seen as separate and addressed in isolation. They are directly linked and must be addressed in tandem. It would be yet another tragedy if the cost of achieving improvements in Darfur had to be borne by the people of eastern Chad because they were not considered a priority. Were this to happen, it would be a further stain on the international community and the intergovernmental institutions whose duty it is to resolve conflict and preserve human rights.
There are key issues that must urgently be addressed in order to end the spiralling abuses in eastern Chad, including ensuring protection from attacks for civilians; ensuring the provision of humanitarian assistance and access for humanitarian agencies and human rights monitors; and ending impunity for human rights abuses in both Chad and Sudan.
Because the roots of the problem lie in the failure to end the conflict in Darfur, it is important to take a holistic approach to resolving the human rights and humanitarian crisis on both sides of the border. However, the people of eastern Chad need urgent help, and must not be held hostage to the pace of negotiations regarding Darfur. The government of Chad must address the situation in eastern Chad immediately. The international community must assist the government of Chad and exert pressure on the government of Sudan in order to address both the human rights abuses in Darfur and their direct consequences in Chad.
Ensuring protection of civilians
All parties to the conflict:
- The governments of Chad and Sudan, as well as all the armed groups operating in their territories, must respect their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, in particular those relating to the protection of civilians.
The government of Chad must:
- Take all effective measures to protect civilians, including refugees and the internally displaced living in areas adjoining the border with Sudan and vulnerable to attack by Janjawid or other forces. It should deploy military forces wherever necessary to safeguard civilians, giving particular attention to the situation in south-eastern Chad.
- Seek assistance as may be necessary from the international community, including the UN, the AU and the European Union, in order to enhance its protection capacity, for example through the deployment in areas along the border with Sudan of an international force as may be necessary for the protection of civilians, including refugees and the internally displaced.
- Take all feasible measures to prevent the recruitment of refugees for military purposes and of child soldiers by armed groups operating in Chad, including armed groups opposed to the government of Sudan.
The government of Sudan must:
- Take all effective measures to prevent further cross-border incursions into Chad by the Janjawid, and to disarm them in accordance with the obligations it has already entered into under the Darfur Peace Agreement.
- Cooperate fully with the peacekeeping forces of AMIS, including the strengthening of its mandate to protect civilians in Darfur and prevent attacks on civilians across the border in Chad.
- Agree without further delay to the early deployment of UN peacekeepers in Darfur, in accordance with the decisions of the AU and the UN Security Council, with a robust mandate to ensure the protection of civilians, including displaced persons.
The African Union must:
- Impress upon the government of Sudan its primary responsibility to protect civilians in Sudan, including all displaced persons, to prevent cross-border attacks against civilians in Chad by the Janjawid, and to disarm the Janjawid in accordance with the Darfur Peace Agreement.
- Urge the government of Sudan to accept without further delay the transfer from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation with a strengthened mandate to protect civilians. AU member states can make a key contribution to the new UN force. The AU and individual AU members have a critical role to play to persuade the government of Sudan to cooperate fully with the UN and to facilitate the rapid deployment of such UN peacekeepers.
- Ensure that, until the handover to the UN takes place, AMIS is provided with all necessary political, financial and other support, and that it acts proactively to fulfil all aspects of its mandate, including "the protection of civilian population in danger" as recommended by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare, on 1 June 2006.
- Adopt a clear programme and timetable for action to address the current human rights crises affecting Darfur and eastern Chad. Measures should include considering the imposition of sanctions on Sudan – in accordance with Article 23 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which provides for such measures against any member state that "fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union" – and revisiting the agreement by the AU Assembly in January 2006 to give Sudan the Chairmanship of the AU for 2007.
- Consider measures to support the government of Chad to discharge its responsibility to protect civilians in eastern Chad, including by expanding the presence of AMIS along the Sudanese border to prevent cross-border incursions by the Janjawid.
The UN Security Council must:
- Recognize the protection vacuum in eastern Chad which has made refugees, displaced persons and other civilians vulnerable to human rights abuses. Consider measures to assist the government of Chad to discharge its responsibility to protect, for example through the deployment in areas along the border with Sudan of an international force as may be necessary for the protection of civilians, including refugees and the internally displaced.
- Ensure that a fully-resourced UN peacekeeping force is deployed in Darfur on or before the expiry of the AMIS mandate on 30 September 2006. The peacekeepers should be authorized to use all necessary means to protect civilians in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in full compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law. The UN force should also ensure that no cross-border attacks take place against the civilian population in Chad.
- Apply further targeted sanctions on Sudanese government officials if they obstruct the deployment of the UN force and otherwise contribute to abuses of civilians.
- Support the AU's efforts to ensure full operational capacity for AMIS and encourage AMIS to robustly interpret its mandate to protect civilians until the transition to the UN peacekeeping mission.
- Take all necessary measures to enforce the UN arms embargo relating to the conflict in Darfur in order to prevent the flow of weapons into Darfur and the areas of eastern Chad affected by the Darfur conflict. The permanent member states of the UN Security Council have a particular responsibility in this regard, given their global role in the arms trade.
Ensuring the provision of humanitarian assistance and access for humanitarian agencies and human rights monitors
The government of Chad must:
- Provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in eastern Chad, especially the refugees and the internally displaced, and seek assistance from the UN and other humanitarian organizations to enhance its capacity and resources to do so as necessary.
The UN must:
- Ensure the provision of international humanitarian assistance to civilians in eastern Chad, including the internally displaced.
- Ensure that the Office of the UNHCR has the support and funds to enable it to strengthen protection and assistance to refugees and internally displaced people in Chad.
The government of Sudan must:
- Ensure full and free access to humanitarian organizations and facilitate their operations to assist those in need, particularly the displaced people in Darfur and refugees who have crossed over from eastern Chad.
- Allow full and free access to human rights monitors, including by granting permission to visit the country to Amnesty International and other human rights organizations
Ending impunity for human rights violations in Chad and Sudan
The UN Security Council must:
- Establish an independent commission of inquiry into the attacks against civilians in eastern Chad, to identify the crimes being committed and to recommend measures for deterring them and bringing to justice those responsible. UN and AU human rights experts – such as the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, and the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights – should be invited to assist this commission. Its findings and recommendations should be made public.
- Extend the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to cover all crimes under international law committed in eastern Chad since 1 July 2002.
- Clarify categorically that its referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court includes crimes under international law that commenced in Darfur but were completed in another state, as warranted by the close interconnection between human rights abuses perpetrated in Darfur with those perpetrated in eastern Chad.
The government of Sudan must:
- Cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court to ensure that those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur and eastern Chad are brought to justice, victims receive reparation and witnesses are protected.