Last Updated: Thursday, 17 April 2014, 13:11 GMT

Kwazulu-Natal - Continued Violence and Displacement

Publisher WRITENET
Author Richard Carver
Publication Date 1 July 1996
Cite as WRITENET, Kwazulu-Natal - Continued Violence and Displacement, 1 July 1996, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6bc4.html [accessed 17 April 2014]
DisclaimerThis is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

The April 1994 democratic elections in South Africa seemed to signal an end to the political violence which had plagued the country for a decade. However, close observers of the situation in KwaZulu-Natal considered that most of the factors leading to violence in the province remained in place. They concluded that the victory of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in flawed provincial elections would not lead to peace.

Violence has continued since April 1994, although at a reduced level. Sixteen hundred people were killed in political violence in 1994 and 837 in 1995. Some 500,000 have been displaced from their homes - about six per cent of the population of the province.

2. ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE

Evidence from commissions of inquiry, judicial proceedings, press investigations and human rights reports indicates that the outbreak of political violence in the mid-1980s was part of a calculated strategy by the National Party government and the state security apparatus to disorganize the opposition by means of a strategy of "informal repression".

In Natal the Inkatha cultural movement led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi benefited from its control of the KwaZulu homeland administration, particularly the police, whom it used in the struggle against the young "comrades" of the United Democratic Front. Inkatha also received extensive covert support, in the form of arms and military training, from military intelligence and secret police units.

3. CONTINUED VIOLENCE 1994-96

Continuing violence in the post-election period has generally been characterized by "political cleansing", mainly in rural areas. That is to say, it has been aimed at eliminating pockets of support for the minority party in any given area. As the local government elections approached in June 1996, the non-governmental Human Rights Committee identified 30 areas of the province where the ANC could not campaign and 22 which were corresponding "no-go areas" for the IFP. The Lower South Coast and the Mandini area have both been particular focuses of violence, as have parts of the Midlands, including Impendle and Bulwer.

4. THE RESPONSE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

4.1 The Monarchy and Chiefdoms

The main element of the political strategy of central government in dealing with the KwaZulu-Natal crisis has been to try to detach the IFP from its sources of legitimacy and support in the Zulu monarchy and the chiefly structures. For its part, the IFP has tried to use its continuing participation in central government (where Chief Buthelezi is Minister of Home Affairs) and in the constitutional process as a bargaining counter to advance its claims for a federal constitution which would increase provincial powers.

4.2 Security Measures

Because of the political bias in many of the provincial and local security structures, central government has used special police units to investigate political violence and "hit squad" activities. The result has been arrests of "warlords" and other perpetrators of violence, including former senior government officials and serving police officers. This appears to have been an important step in ending the culture of impunity.

5. UNDERLYING ISSUES

5.1 Federalism

In principle, the division of powers between central government and the provinces is now resolved, with the adoption of a largely unitary constitution. In practice, the KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution agreed in March 1996 (with ANC support) leaves a series of unanswered questions about the division of powers which are likely to remain a matter of continued negotiation and dispute.

5.2 Inkatha and the Far Right

The IFP's intransigence is partly related to its links with the far right, both internationally and in South Africa. During the 1980s the party cultivated relations not only with mainstream conservative forces, such as the governments in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Israel, but also with fringe far-right groups. Affiliates of these groups continue to act as important political advisers to the IFP leadership. Locally, IFP leaders have links with neo-fascist groups, which have trained party members in military skills.

5.3 Justice or Impunity

The deployment of special investigation units answerable to central government has been an effective tactic in dealing with some sources of the violence. However, it does not address the long-term question of making the police answerable and responsive to the local community.

5.4 "Traditional" and Modern Political Structures

The chiefs are an important base of support for the IFP. However, their previous executive powers are unacceptable for democrats and modernizers in the ANC. Central government's attempts to reduce chiefly powers have met with resistance not only from the IFP, but from ANC-supporting chiefs.

5.5 The Political Economy of "Warlordism"

The key explanation for continuing violence has been a system of warlords - local leaders in both urban and rural areas who are almost always aligned with the IFP. They depend upon local and provincial government for powers of patronage and assistance in imposing their will. In return they can "deliver" communities to the IFP. There are few ANC warlords because the party has thus far lacked the power of patronage in KwaZulu-Natal.

The warlord phenomenon has been particularly potent because the peculiarities of apartheid in the province led to massive informal settlements on the fringes of the major cities, which fell prey to the warlords. Similarly, the power of the chiefs has opened the way to predatory violent leaders.

5.6 Resettlement

Provision for the 500,000 displaced is made largely on an ad hoc basis. It is a problem which seems to rank low on central government's list of priorities. Yet the issue is not primarily one of welfare. The question of resettlement goes to the very roots of the conflict. People were driven from their homes because they were perceived as supporting the wrong political party. Land has been seized thereby to enrich the communities which remain and to skew electoral demography in favour of the majority party in each area.

6. CONCLUSION

The June 1996 local election campaign was conducted with much rhetoric from both main parties in favour of peace. A number of factors appear to make the situation more hopeful than for some time. The ANC's vote in the elections improved significantly, including gaining control of all major urban centres. This will reduce the IFP's powers of patronage. However, government at all levels will still need to tackle the political economy of the warlords if there is to be lasting peace.

1. INTRODUCTION

South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994 seemed likely to signal an end to the political violence which had plagued the country for a decade - at least, that was the view of many international commentators. By contrast, close observers of the situation in KwaZulu-Natal[1] considered that most of the factors leading to violence in the province remained in place.[2] They concluded that the victory of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in flawed provincial elections would not lead to peace. According to Mary de Haas of the University of Natal:

The violence will certainly flare, and if it does it will be the responsibility of those who took this decision which is based on fraud on a huge scale.[3]

ARTICLE 19 commented that the IFP would now feel that it "can rig the next elections with equal impunity". It continued:

On the one hand, local ANC supporters will feel frustrated and disenfranchised. On the other, Chief Buthelezi and the IFP have a green light to continue the repressive style of government that has characterized the KwaZulu homeland for the past two decades.[4]

This pessimistic view has proved correct. In contrast to the situation in Gauteng province - the former Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region - where political violence has almost entirely subsided, KwaZulu-Natal is still wracked with conflict. In 1994, 1,600 deaths were recorded in political violence in the province. The following year the figure was 837 in 891 incidents.[5] Thus there was a decline in the number of violent deaths, but the pattern was still marked by massacres such as the Christmas Day 1995 attack at Shobashobane on the KwaZulu-Natal South Coast in which 19 died. An estimated 500,000 - some six per cent of the population of the province - have been displaced from their homes.[6]

There are clearly multiple causes of the violence: socio-economic deprivation, urban-rural tensions, conflict between traditional and modern forms of governance, as well as political rivalry between the IFP and the African National Congress (ANC). A crucial factor was state backing, both overt and covert, for the IFP before 1994. The IFP's control of the provincial government has allowed it to continue a degree of state sponsorship for its armed activities. The ANC-dominated central government has attempted to counter this by deploying security forces - both military and police - from outside the province. This tactic has had a degree of success.

However, violence has continued, with the effect that local government elections originally scheduled for November 1995 were twice postponed and were only finally held in late June 1996. One aim of the continuing violence was clearly to secure local advantages in these elections.

The importance of who controls provincial government is apparent if KwaZulu-Natal is compared to Gauteng, which was equally plagued by violence until the April 1994 elections. The ANC provincial government in Gauteng rapidly succeeded in defusing political tensions. Pledges of economic development in the worst affected areas, such as the East Rand, clearly helped.[7] Yet KwaZulu-Natal, especially Durban as the country's major port, has also been a major beneficiary of post-April 1994 investment.[8] The IFP generally points to socio-economic factors as the underlying causes of violence,[9] yet there is ample evidence of the party's own complicity in the continued destabilization of the province it governs.[10]

By June 1996 there were serious efforts under way to promote peace, with warlords from the two parties embracing on public platforms and declaring themselves "peacelords". Yet this did not prevent the recurrence of violent incidents in early June, prompting central government to send substantial reinforcements of riot police to the province. Some observers compared the possibility of a rapprochement between the ANC and the IFP with the agreement between the ANC and the National Party in 1991-92. The crucial difference, however, is that the ANC and the IFP are competing for the same constituency of support. SouthScan cited a "well-placed observer" - presumably a senior ANC official - who argued: "There is no political solution to KwaZulu-Natal. There is only a security solution."[11]

2. ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE

There is now abundant evidence from commissions of inquiry, judicial proceedings, press investigations and human rights reports to indicate that the outbreak of political violence in the mid-1980s was part of a calculated strategy by the National Party government and the state security apparatus to disorganize the opposition by means of a strategy of "informal repression".[12]

The origins of the current political violence are to be found in the "township revolt" of the early to mid-1980s and the sharp political division between the young "comrades", usually claiming allegiance to the pro-ANC United Democratic Front (UDF), and "vigilantes". Sometimes the "vigilantes" were simply older and more conservative township residents. Also, in the PWV townships especially, there were violent territorial conflicts between the youth of the UDF and the black consciousness Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO). However, the crucial development, for example in the townships of Port Elizabeth and the squatter settlements of Cape Town, was the recruitment of local right-wing elements into informal state-sponsored militias. The state encouraged the development of vigilante organizations, often recruiting conservative blacks as police reservists or kitskonstabels (literally "instant constables").[13] In the mid-1980s there was a sharp decline in township deaths as a result of direct police action after the controversial massacres at Langa (March 1985) and Mamelodi (November 1985). But this was matched by a corresponding increase in deaths at the hands of pro-government black organizations. The victims of violence were still largely supporters of the UDF and its affiliates.[14]

In Natal, the conservative forces found a political expression in Inkatha, a Zulu cultural movement dating from the 1920s, which was resurrected by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi in the 1970s. Violence in Natal took hold in the mid-1980s and has continued unremittingly. In Durban the violence began with a student boycott organized in protest at the murder of human rights lawyer Victoria Mxenge. The protesters rioted and were in turn harassed and attacked by Inkatha members. In the provincial capital, Pietermaritzburg, the violence originated in a recognition struggle by UDF-aligned trade unions which were similarly harassed by Inkatha. The violence continued through the 1980s, stoked by local warlords, many of whom occupied positions in the KwaZulu homeland administration.[15]

In 1990, following the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation movements, Inkatha announced its transformation from a cultural movement into a national political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Shortly afterwards, in July 1990, violence suddenly erupted between ANC and IFP supporters in the Transvaal townships. The ANC accused the IFP and the government of replicating the Natal violence in order to weaken the newly legalized opposition. The violence began to assume an ethnic dimension, since most IFP supporters in the Transvaal were Zulus - often migrant workers in the single men's hostels.[16]

The growth of "black-on-black" violence was portrayed by the government as evidence of the volatility of the black community, its inherent tribalism and its unfitness to rule. Yet the epicentre of the violence has always been KwaZulu-Natal, where both parties to the conflict - supporters of the IFP and the ANC - are Zulus. The official portrayal of the violence also assumed an equivalence between the warring parties. Yet Inkatha was the ruling party in one of the self-governing apartheid "homelands". Chief Buthelezi chose not to agree to nominal independence for the KwaZulu homeland - unlike his counterparts of Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophutatswana - because this would have been political suicide. His success in building the IFP as the largest, although not the majority, party in KwaZulu-Natal is testimony to the effectiveness of these tactics.[17]

The role of Inkatha within the apartheid state is of continuing importance in light of its control over the structures of the provincial state in KwaZulu-Natal. Many security officials from the time when Chief Buthelezi was Chief Minister (and Minister of Police) in KwaZulu remain in place. They remain largely ineffective in ensuring accountability and impartial policing - when they are not actively engaged in promoting violence.[18]

From the early 1990s a series of press reports indicated the extent of covert state support for violent actions by Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha. These reports were confirmed in subsequent investigations by the commission of inquiry under Judge Richard Goldstone, established under the 1991 multi-party national peace agreement. The Goldstone Commission found that the IFP had been the recipient of covert funding and training from the police and military intelligence. A December 1993 report condemned the involvement of the KwaZulu police in hit-squad assassinations.[19] In a report in March 1994, the Commission named senior police officers who it said had provided weapons and other assistance to the IFP in "a horrible network of criminal activity". The allegations contained in the report included: gun-running to hit squad members, the illegal manufacture of weapons, the issuing of false documents and the orchestration of violence. It was alleged that a police unit based at Vlakplaas in the Transvaal was involved in organizing hostel and train violence. The Vlakplaas police unit recruited IFP officials, including the party's Transvaal leader, Themba Khoza, who distributed weapons.[20]

Documents submitted by the prosecution in the current murder case against former Defence Minister General Magnus Malan and 19 others also refer to the fact that two hundred Inkatha members received military training at a camp in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia in the mid-1980s. The prosecution in the Malan trial is seeking to prove that some of the Caprivi trainees went on to take part in the massacre of ANC supporters in the KwaMakutha township in 1987.[21] Transvaal leaders of the IFP, including Themba Khoza and Humphrey Ndlovu, are also facing weapons charges.[22]

A military intelligence document dated December 1985 gave a detailed analysis of the need to build up a paramilitary capacity for Chief Buthelezi and Bishop Lekganyane of the Zionist Christian Church (ZCC):

Inkatha and the ZCC's willingness to actively resist revolutionary elements provides a golden opportunity for the State to pull a meaningful and influential section of the black population into a counter-insurgency and mobilisation programme...[23]

The document describes in detail how Inkatha could be given a covert military capacity but emphasizes that this collaboration should be kept secret so that Chief Buthelezi's anti-apartheid image would not be tarnished:

Open SADF [South African Defence Force] support to Chief Minister Buthelezi and Bishop Lekganyane will clearly have a negative impact on their power base and must not be overlooked. Any support must be clandestine or covert. Not one of the leaders must, as a result of SADF support, be branded as marionettes of the South African government by the enemy.[24]

Until about 1980 Inkatha had maintained good relations with the ANC, functioning in effect as a legal internal wing of the exiled movement within Natal. However, since its original incarnation in the 1920s, Inkatha had been a conservative movement drawing its main support from the traditional chiefly structures in the province - which were the colonial structures of local government - and from African traders and land-owning petty bourgeois. In its capacity as the KwaZulu governing party, Inkatha was closely aligned with large business interests in the province in such spheres as education.[25] In the late 1970s and early 1980s the anti-apartheid struggle in Natal focused particularly on the student movement - placing Inkatha, as the authority responsible for education, in opposition to radical students. In Pietermaritzburg, which became the early focus for the UDF/Inkatha conflict, ANC loyalties were not especially strong, but labour militancy played an important part in awakening political allegiances. As a pro-business party, Inkatha opposed the 1986 May Day strike called by the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a UDF affiliate.[26]

There is no doubt that political violence in KwaZulu-Natal has fed upon mass poverty. Durban is one of the fastest urbanizing cities in the world, surrounded by sprawling squatter settlements.[27] Social and economic deprivation is the factor most often cited by Inkatha itself to explain the violence. Gavin Woods of the Inkatha Institute has argued "that reasonably contented communities have a negligible propensity for violence" and "politics is in itself not enough to have caused the levels of violence experienced".[28] But equally, poor communities do not erupt spontaneously into political violence. There is ample evidence that the proximate causes of violence lie in the political sphere. However, socio-economic factors may be useful in explaining the nature of some of the political allegiances.

Both the urban shanty-towns and the rural areas have fallen prey to groups of warlords who operate protection rackets and control taxi routes. As elsewhere in South Africa, notably the Western Cape, access to lucrative transport concessions has been a major source of conflict. Some of the warlords, such as Sifiso Nkabinde, are aligned with the ANC. But most have thrown in their lot with the IFP by virtue of its control first of the KwaZulu homeland administration and now of the provincial government. They include Thomas Shabalala in the Lindelani squatter settlement outside Durban, David Ntombela in the Midlands, Gideon Zulu in Eshowe, Winnington Sabelo in Umlazi, and James Zulu and Sipho Ngcobo on the lower South Coast. Most of these figures occupy no position within the traditional Zulu hierarchy as chiefs (amakhosi) or headmen (indunas), although Gideon Zulu is a member of the royal family and James Zulu claims to be. Thomas Shabalala, David Ntombela, Winnington Sabelo and Gideon Zulu are all IFP members of parliament.

It is difficult to determine the social profile of support for the different parties, since the tendency is for entire communities to be identified with one or the other. Nevertheless, it is apparent that many chiefs and conservative rural communities support the IFP. In the 1994 election the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) calculated that most areas controlled by KwaZulu tribal authorities supported Inkatha. Similarly, in the June 1996 local elections there was a striking contrast between the large rural vote for the IFP and the ANC's dominance in all the main towns.[29] Urban support for the IFP appears to derive mainly from the most marginal sections, such as squatter camps. Support for the UDF/ANC has been far more mixed, partly comprising marginalized urban youth but also including large sections of the mainstream urban working class.[30]

The security forces under the old order took advantage of the appeal of the IFP to marginalized youth to promote anti-ANC gangs such as the Black Cats in Ermelo, the A-Team in Chesterville, the Eagles in Harrismith and the AmaSinyora in KwaMashu.[31]

The weeks leading up to South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994 saw a crescendo of violence in KwaZulu-Natal. Belatedly the IFP reversed its decision to boycott the election, which took place in an atmosphere of relative calm. The impact of the preceding violence and intimidation is incalculable, although a number of specific incidents in the run-up to the election can be identified, most of them attributable to the IFP. The murder of three ANC members campaigning in the KwaZulu homeland capital of Ulundi was symbolic. The IFP's control over the homeland administration gave it enormous advantages in the organization of the election. Whatever the impact of earlier violence, the result of the election - a narrow majority for the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal - undoubtedly owed something to malpractice, including the use of unregistered polling stations stuffing of ballot boxes. In some IFP-supporting areas the turnout was impossibly high, rising to 855 per cent in Eshowe.[32]

The IFP's late entry into the election meant that the Independent Electoral Commission was seriously understaffed with only about 20 per cent of its complement for the province.[33] Similarly, there were few international observers in the rural areas. Nevertheless, international observers were aware of the abuses which were being perpetrated, choosing for reasons of political expediency to suppress their findings.[34]

The IEC, for essentially political reasons, agreed with the national ANC leadership to let the KwaZulu-Natal result stand, handing control of the province to the IFP in exchange for the latter's continued participation in the political process. The IFP won a narrow majority of 50.3 per cent according to the official result. (By contrast it won 44.5 per cent in the 1996 local government elections.[35]34) An unpublished report by European Union monitors concluded that it was likely that the final election result had been negotiated between the parties.[36] The outcome outraged many supporters of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, which filed a legal challenge to the results. However, this challenge was later dropped.[37] Commentators were divided between those on the one hand who argued that an imperfect election result rewarded the spoiling tactics of the IFP and thus condemned the province to further violence, and those on the other hand who argued that retaining the IFP within the political process was the only route to peace.[38] Developments in the two years since April 1994 have provided evidence for both contentions. Violence has continued, but at a reduced level. Impartial administration of justice has been extended in the province, although the security structures still retain close links with the IFP.

A third view is to say that the 1994 results were more or less accurate anyway - a position that is perhaps less tenable in light of the 1996 local election results. Thus the experienced commentator R.W. Johnson concluded:

we accordingly decided that we had no reason to treat the result as other than crudely correct, if not in the precise numbers of votes cast, at least in the order and general magnitude of the party positions.[39]

The problem with such a conclusion is that ignores the crucial question of legitimacy. Roughly half of the electorate who did not vote for the IFP question its authority to govern because it is clear that intimidation and fraud accounted for at least some of the party's percentage vote. A flawed result is ultimately no result at all.

3. CONTINUED VIOLENCE 1994-96

Continuing violence in the post-election period has generally been characterized by "political cleansing", mainly in rural areas. That is to say, it has been aimed at eliminating pockets of support for the minority party in any given area. As the local government elections approached in June 1996, the non-governmental Human Rights Committee identified 30 areas of the province where the ANC could not campaign and 22 which were corresponding "no-go areas" for the IFP.[40] The 25 December 1995 massacre at Shobashobane on the lower South Coast was typical of this pattern, involving an IFP attack on an ANC enclave within territory regarded as exclusively pro-IFP.

The declining death toll in the post-election period may reflect the fact that killings have been more targeted. Massacres - defined by the Human Rights Committee as killings of 10 or more - have been the exception, with only two in 1995, at Shobashobane and at Sundumbili near Mandini on the North Coast in May. The Lower South Coast and the Mandini area have both been particular focuses of violence, as have parts of the Midlands, including Impendle and Bulwer.[41]

Monitors claim that IFP killings are carried out by hit squads - including those trained in the Caprivi Strip - at the invitation of local party leaders. The Network of Independent Monitors has reported that IFP Self Protection Units continue to receive training in remote camps in reserves run by the KwaZulu Department of Nature Conservation.[42] Chief Buthelezi denied a later press report of 18 secret military training camps for IFP members.[43]

A growing concern has been an increase in attacks on moderate IFP leaders who favour peace initiatives with the ANC. The Human Rights Committee identified this as an issue in early 1995.[44] In October 1995, Chief David Molefe was killed with his sister and three other party supporters at Impendle.[45] It appears that he was killed by IFP hardliners because of his moderate political stance, as well as the fact that he was a Sotho, not a Zulu. In January 1996, Director Herbert "Bushie" Engelbrecht, head of a special police team investigating killings on the Lower South Coast over the Christmas period, angered the IFP by reopening investigations into an earlier killing of IFP members at Mvutshini in KwaXolo. Local police had assumed that these were the work of ANC supporters, but Director Engelbrecht's team, acting on information from human rights monitors, arrested and charged IFP hardliners in connection with the killings.[46]

4. THE RESPONSE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

4.1 The Monarchy and Chiefdoms

The main element of the political strategy of central government in dealing with the KwaZulu-Natal crisis has been to try to detach the IFP from its sources of legitimacy and support in the Zulu monarchy and the chiefly structures. For its part, the IFP has tried to use its continuing participation in central government (where Chief Buthelezi is Minister of Home Affairs) and in the constitutional process as a bargaining counter to advance its claims for a federal constitution which would increase provincial powers.

Under the interim constitution which came into force in April 1994, King Zwelithini's bodyguard and finances were provided by central rather than provincial government, giving him an independence which he did not enjoy when he was closely linked to the KwaZulu homeland administration. He exercised this independence symbolically in September 1994 when he invited President Nelson Mandela to the annual Shaka Day celebrations - commemorating the founder of the Zulu nation. Chief Buthelezi objected to the invitation and stone-throwing IFP supporters attacked the royal palace. King Zwelithini then cancelled the official ceremony, although an IFP Shaka Day rally in the Durban township of KwaMashu attracted 10,000 people.[47]

At the same time, King Zwelithini made a more practical demonstration of his independence by removing Chief Buthelezi from his self-appointed position as "traditional prime minister" and replacing him with Prince Mcwayizeni, an ANC member of parliament.[48] Since the 1970s Chief Buthelezi had exploited the Zulu monarchy to establish the traditional roots of his own political authority. However, in doing so he deployed the somewhat untraditional notion of a "constitutional monarchy" in which the king played no active political role. Chief Buthelezi was clearly angered at being outflanked by the King and the ANC and came near to resigning from the government of national unity. The KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature established a House of Traditional Leaders which downgraded the King to the status of an ordinary member and restored Chief Buthelezi to his position of "traditional prime minister". The provincial government also increased the stipend paid to chiefs.[49]

The climax of this crisis came when Chief Buthelezi and his bodyguards burst into a television studio to interrupt a live interview with one of the King's advisers, Prince Sifiso Zulu. The IFP leader later offered an "unconditional apology" for his conduct and remained in the government.[50] However, Patrick Hlongwane, a former police agent who had infiltrated the ANC in exile and later joined the IFP, issued a statement calling on "all ANC dissidents, their 'military allies', and 'far rightists within the police force and army', to assist in 'removing Sifiso Zulu from society'". Amnesty International stated that it had received reports that Patrick Hlongwane had stored arms in the Nakandla area, where Prince Sifiso and his family live.[51] Fears grew of armed conflict between supporters of chiefs who backed Chief Buthelezi and those loyal to the King. Troops were deployed to protect the royal palace.[52]

The most serious attack on the royal family occurred in April 1996, when attackers at the Mbelebeleni royal house in KwaMashu killed Princess Nonhlanhla Zulu and seriously injured Queen Buhle Mamathe Zulu and Princess Sibusile Zulu. Since the attack the King has apparently taken refuge in Swaziland.[53]

The relationship between the ANC and traditional chiefly structures has been tense. The colonial system of indirect rule - associated in Natal with the person of the British Secretary for Native Affairs, Theophilus Shepstone - froze the structure of chiefdoms in order to make the amakhosi the keystone of local government.[54] The KwaZulu AmaKhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 was based on the Native Administration Act of 1927 and vested the executive authority of each tribe in its chief or inkosi, who drew a government salary. The provincial government had the power to appoint or dismiss any person. It could also unilaterally define tribes, amalgamate them or redefine territorial boundaries between them (somewhat at odds with the idea that this was a "traditional" form of administration). Any person living within the territory of a particular tribe was subject to the authority of the inkosi, whatever his or her ethnic origin.[55] Chief Buthelezi, in his previous capacity as Chief Minister of KwaZulu, frequently used these powers to ensure that the "traditional" chiefs functioned in practice as servants of the IFP. Amakhosi had extensive power to ban gatherings and limit political activity within their jurisdiction.[56]

When a new national constitution was adopted in May 1996, traditional leaders in KwaZulu-Natal were highly critical of its failure to entrench indigenous and customary law or to entitle chiefs to be ex officio members of local government bodies. They said that it turned the Zulu kingdom "into a mere implementor of decisions adopted by the central government and a passive puppet in the hands of Pretoria and Cape Town." In this they had the support of the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa.[57]

4.2 Security Measures

The central government has shown from the outset its readiness to employ tough security measures in conjunction with its strategy of undermining the IFP's use of the Zulu monarchy. The April 1994 election was conducted under a state of emergency declared by the Transitional Executive Council. The new government of national unity deployed additional troops in the province in 1995 as the security situation declined. The troops were well received by many observers. Their use of foot patrols made them a more effective presence on the ground than the Internal Security Units of the police who patrolled in armoured vehicles.[58]

However, the most important security measure has been the creation of the Investigation Task Unit (ITU) and other special investigation units. The ITU is answerable to the national commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS), George Fivaz, and the Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi. Until June 1996 it was headed by Senior Superintendent Frank Dutton, who had led the investigation in the 1988 Trust Feed murders - a police massacre carried out at the behest of Inkatha - and had been chief investigator for the Goldstone Commission. The ITU consists of officers hand-picked from around South Africa for their skills and integrity. Its principal investigation has been into the 1987 KwaMakutha massacre - a case in which former Defence Minister Malan is the most prominent defendant, along with several other senior security and IFP officials. However, the ITU has also launched prosecutions of members of an ANC Self Defence Unit for killings at Richmond in the Midlands.[59]

The IFP initially welcomed the government's decision to assign the investigation of the 1995 Christmas massacres on the Lower South Coast to a newly-created unit rather than to the ITU, although there were grumblings about an alleged lack of consultation with the provincial government. However, good will between the IFP and the South Coast unit, headed by Director Engelbrecht, evaporated when it embarked on arrests of IFP members, including warlord James Zulu. The IFP launched protests over the appearance of six suspects in court in Margate. Director Engelbrecht received death threats.[60]

The South Coast unit later arrested more than 50 suspects in connection with the Shobashobane massacre, including warlord Sipho Ngcobo and police officers from Izingolweni. At the same time the KwaZulu-Natal police reporting officer, Advocate Neville Melville, submitted to the provincial Attorney General culpable homicide dockets against members of the police management in Port Shepstone because of their failure to heed intelligence warnings of the Shobashobane massacre.[61]

This flurry of activity underlined the importance of the local police structures in preserving the impunity of IFP warlords. The introduction of impartial police units has begun to challenge that impunity, as well as flushing out security officials who have been negligent or culpable. This has created local optimism about the prospects for peace and led to Director Engelbrecht's promotion to head a national structure coordinating these special investigation units, to be known as the National Investigation Task Unit.[62]

However, special units are not an unmixed blessing. A unit operating in Mandini has been accused of torturing an IFP suspect, Ngiyane Mhlongo, who died in custody in April 1996.[63] The IFP chairperson in Nzinga ward, Impendle, Protash Nash Ngubane, was shot in an execution-style killing in September 1995. It is alleged that Nash Ngubane had been arrested by members of the Unrest and Violent Crimes Investigation Unit, although there are also claims that this was also an internal IFP killing.[64]

5. UNDERLYING ISSUES

5.1 Federalism

One of the underlying political issues dividing the ANC and the IFP is the relative powers to be assigned to national and provincial government. When the IFP was persuaded to participate in the April 1994 elections, one of the terms of the agreement was that the parties would invoke international mediation to help resolve the disagreements over this issue. However, the ANC has failed to honour its commitment to international mediation, which has been a major grievance on the IFP side.[65]

Each side clearly has a material interest in the choice between a federal and unitary state. On the one hand the IFP's sole political base is in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. On the other hand, the ANC has a secure hold on national government, with nearly two-thirds of the popular vote. However, there are also underlying issues of principle which carry considerable emotional weight. The ideology of apartheid was a rejection of the notion of a unitary South Africa, resting as it did on the notion that the country was to be subdivided into "ethnic" political entities. Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha were a product of that system, while the ANC has consistently stood for non-racialism and a unitary state. Before the conclusion of agreement on an interim constitution by multi-party negotiations, a right-wing Concerned South Africans Group, later known as the Freedom Alliance, rejected the reincorporation of the homelands into South Africa and supported a federal solution. It was this position which led the IFP to boycott the April 1994 elections until the last moment.[66]

Ideological and practical considerations coincide, for example, in the case of the KwaZulu police. The former homeland police force was notorious for running "hit squads" and functioning as a barely concealed IFP militia. Thus it became an urgent priority for central government to accelerate the process of integration of the KwaZulu police into the South African Police Service in order to ensure a degree of central control.[67]

The IFP boycotted the constitutional assembly which produced the final constitution enacted in May 1996. This was in protest at the ANC's refusal to invoke international mediation. The IFP's own draft constitution, drawn up by Chief Buthelezi's US adviser, Mario Ambrosini, was a hard-line federalist document.[68] Some more moderate IFP leaders are increasingly concerned that the party's hard-line stance and its refusal to involve itself in constitutional talks has left it sidelined on this issue.[69]

In principle, the division of powers between central government and the provinces is now resolved, with the adoption of a largely unitary constitution. In practice, the KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution agreed in March 1996 (with ANC support) leaves a series of unanswered questions about the division of powers which are likely to remain a matter of continued negotiation and dispute.[70]

5.2 Inkatha and the Far Right

The IFP's intransigence over the constitutional negotiations appears to be linked to its connections with the far right wing in international politics. Throughout the 1980s Chief Buthelezi maintained warm connections with conservative governments internationally, notably the Republican administration of Ronald Reagan in the United States, the Christian Democratic government of Helmut Kohl in Germany and the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. The Conservative link apparently continues, since advisers of Margaret Thatcher were consultants to the IFP campaign in the June 1996 local elections.[71] Inkatha members received military training in Israel.[72]

However, Inkatha also cultivated relations with groups further to the right, especially in the United States. Its chief constitutional adviser was Albert Blaustein, a well-known right-wing lawyer. Mario Ambrosini, the current constitutional adviser, was an associate of Blaustein's. The IFP has also retained relations with US right-wing organizations such as the Heritage Foundation, the Leadership Institute, the Jefferson Education Foundation and the World Preservatist Movement (formerly the World Apartheid Movement).[73] The International Freedom Foundation (IFF), another right-wing body, was also an important supporter of the IFP until it was dissolved after being shown to have received extensive South African government funds.[74] However, the former director of the British branch of the IFF, Marc Gordon, remains an important adviser to the IFP. Gordon is a former leader of the Federation of Conservative Students, which was dissolved by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party because of its links with the neo-fascist right wing.[75]

The significance of these right-wing links to the IFP is that Chief Buthelezi's international backers are pursuing the most uncompromising political line for essentially ideological reasons. It is no coincidence that many of the most extreme of Chief Buthelezi's political advisers are not Zulus at all, but whites such as Mario Ambrosini and Walter Felgate. Waiting in the wings are eccentric "white Zulus" such as the British zoo-owner John Aspinall.[76] Whereas the serious political leadership of the IFP - such as secretary-general Ziba Jiyane and provincial premier Frank Mdlalose - recognizes that it will have to live with the consequences of its own actions, international right-wingers can pursue unrealistic options such as total secession for KwaZulu-Natal as a means of destabilizing President Mandela's government.

The same applies to the local far right, which also has long-standing links with the IFP. The neo-fascist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB - Afrikaner Resistance Movement) is alleged to have provided military support to the IFP, while Inkatha members have received training on white-owned farms in the South Coast area. The South Coast AWB commander, Morton Christie, is alleged to have been involved in training IFP Self Protection Units before the elections.[77] Another far-right paramilitary group, the Orde Boerevolk, also trained IFP cadres in the months before the election.[78]

In October 1994, Riaan van Rensburg, a former "security adviser" to the Freedom Alliance, claimed that he had been instructed by Chief Buthelezi's adviser Walter Felgate to train 60 Inkatha members, including former Caprivi trainees and members of Patrick Hlongwane's Returned Exiles Committee. The training took place at a base in the northern Transvaal. Van Rensburg alleged that he had been asked to arrange the "removal from society" of several ANC leaders, including provincial leader Jacob Zuma and Midlands hardliner Harry Gwala. Walter Felgate admitted to hiring van Rensburg but said that the training had been for purely defensive purposes.[79]

An anonymous telephone caller from the "Natal Liberation Army" claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sey Shells restaurant in Port Shepstone in February 1994 and the killing of George Mbele, chairperson of the South Coast branch of the ANC. The previously unknown army was said to consist of members of the IFP and the white right-wing Conservative Party.[80]

When police raided the house of South Coast warlord James Zulu in search of arms in April 1994, Morton Christie was found to be present. Both men were later among those arrested (and released on bail) in connection with an attack on the police station in Flagstaff in the former Transkei in March 1994. Sipho Ngcobo, the IFP chairman from Izingolweni, was arrested in connection with the same attack. Morton Christie and other AWB members were also charged in connection with the Sey Shells bombing.[81] The picture which emerges is of a close entanglement between the white fascist paramilitaries and sections of the IFP leadership.

5.3 Justice or Impunity

The IFP's entanglement with the far right is intimately related to its connections with the security apparatus in the province. The involvement of the KwaZulu Police (KZP) in running "hit squads" was established by an investigative unit established by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) prior to the April 1994 elections.[82] It was also admitted by the last commissioner of the KZP, General Roy During.[83] However, elements of the former South African Police have also supported "third force" activities.[84]

The conduct of the police in the Lower South Coast over the Shobashobane massacre is indicative of continued problems in this regard. A number of police officers at the local police station, Izingolweni, have been charged with active participation in the massacre.[85] Certainly there was a marked failure of the police to intervene in a massacre which was taking place barely two kilometres away in the valley below. A patrol of the police Internal Security Unit (ISU) left the area just 15 minutes before the massacres because of alleged vehicle problems. The replacement ISU shift did not arrive in time because its vehicle was also said to be faulty.[86] The local police management in Port Shepstone apparently ignored intelligence warnings of the impending attack. They too may face criminal charges as a result.[87]

The behaviour of the Lower South Coast police over Shobashobane indicates the persistent problem of lack of police impartiality in the ANC-IFP conflict. However, the measures taken against those responsible indicate the changes since April 1994. The deployment of special investigation units, such as the ITU and the special South Coast unit, has challenged the existing culture of impunity. Such measures cannot be taken in isolation from the political context, yet they are an important measure in rebuilding community confidence in the police.

However, there is still a long way to go. Central government has tackled the security dimension of the KwaZulu-Natal crisis by deploying units under its own direct command. This brings it into dispute with the provincial government over the proper division of powers in security matters. It also fails to address one of the underlying problems, namely how to improve the responsiveness and efficiency of local police structures. In the past specialized units - such as the ISU and the Murder and Robbery Units - have been seen as part of the problem. The solution is to make the police more receptive to community needs. Elsewhere in the country this is being attempted through Community Police Forums, but these have so far been largely ineffective in KwaZulu-Natal, precisely because of the continuing conflict. The ITU has been unique because its management is a combination of police and civilian officials - the latter mainly composed of individuals with a background in non-governmental human rights work. However, this dimension has not been incorporated into subsequent special investigation units, such as those on the Lower South Coast and in Mandini.

5.4 "Traditional" and Modern Political Structures

The tension between "traditional" political structures - the chiefly system of indirect rule and the Zulu monarchy - and the modernizing democratic approach of the ANC has been one of the underlying differences between the parties in KwaZulu-Natal. It is probably incorrect to describe it as a "cause" of a conflict which has been deliberately engineered. However, it is clearly an issue which will have to be addressed if the conflict is to be resolved.

The issue has not been confined to KwaZulu-Natal. In the Eastern Cape, the ANC provincial government and its allies in the urban civic associations have found themselves in conflict with the chiefs.[88] The ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) has made common cause with IFP-supporting Zulu chiefs to oppose the new constitution, which does not enshrine the chief's role in local government. In practice all these issues still remain to be decided. The IFP is likely to mount a legal challenge to the new constitution on the grounds that it interferes with provincial powers. At the same time, a number of issues relating to traditional powers in the KwaZulu-Natal constitution will probably also have to be resolved by litigation. The provincial constitution has not yet been certified by the Constitutional Court - which is necessary before it comes into effect. At hearings in late June 1996 it seemed unlikely that this would occur. The court's president, Judge Arthur Chaskalson, said that the provincial constitution could cause "total chaos" and that it had been written as though KwaZulu-Natal were a sovereign state. Judge John Didcott said that the draft was "plainly intended to legitimize armed secession".[89] If the court refuses to certify the constitution, this could undermine the ANC's attempted compromise with the IFP. The former had agreed not to oppose the draft in the provincial legislature in March 1996 in return for concessions.[90]

This is one of series of disputes between central and provincial government which are likely to be litigated. One, which was resolved in an out of court settlement, was over who had responsibility for amending the controversial Ingonyama Trust Act, which is concerned with control over about a third of the land in KwaZulu-Natal. The Act was passed secretly two days before the multi-party elections in April 1994, giving the Zulu king sole control of all land previously owned by the KwaZulu homeland government. The intention was to increase the powers of the IFP, although the refusal of King Zwelithini to continue his overtly political role somewhat blunted its effect.[91] The Act has nevertheless caused havoc with land ownership and housing subsidies in the province. In May 1996, the provincial government agreed that the central government had the power to amend the Act, although previously it had tried to reenact the legislation at the provincial level.[92]

Provincial legislation preventing KwaZulu-Natal chiefs from being paid by anyone other than the provincial government is also in dispute before the Constitutional Court. It was passed narrowly in advance of national legislation allowing central government to pay the chiefs. According to one of the judges: "The whole debate is clearly about who pays the piper."[93]

5.5 The Political Economy of "Warlordism"

In both academic and activist circles there are a number of competing explanations of the continuing violence: political competition, ethnic mobilization, underlying social and economic deprivation and covert state backing for one of the warring parties. Some commentators attempt to advance an alternative multi-causal explanation for the violence.[94] However, all such attempts miss the central point: there is a single explanation for the violence, but it has various different dimensions. It can be summed up in a single phrase: the political economy of "warlordism".

An experienced observer of the KwaZulu-Natal violence, John Aitchison of the University of Natal, offers a popular definition of the warlord phenomenon:

Warlords are powerful local leaders who rely on the force of arms to maintain their power. They tend to gather a group of professional strong-arm men around them and they pay for their services by screwing the local populace. Now to that extent, you could say that they are no more and no less than gang leaders, but the key difference is that they are not motivated exclusively by the acquisition of persona wealth and power, but in addition they owe allegiance to a central power, namely Inkatha. You could say the difference lies in the form of extortion: gang leaders fight for money and territory, whereas warlords are also crusaders for a political cause. There's one other reason for calling these people warlords, and that's the hype that surrounds them, I don't just mean in the media, I mean among their own communities. Their exploits become the stuff of modern-day legends, like fairy-tale villains, attributed with special powers, personal invulnerability.[95]

This definition captures the intimate link between organized crime and politics. What it leaves out is that affiliation to the prevalent political authority is a necessary part of the warlord's modus operandi. He is allowed to operate without interference from the police because he has, in essence, received a concession from the local or provincial government to control a given territory. This is why "warlordism" is overwhelmingly an Inkatha phenomenon. There have undoubtedly been criminal elements, comtsotsis, who have exploited the political struggle on the UDF/ANC side, just as there have been uncompromising or brutal ANC leaders such as Harry Gwala and Sifiso Nkabinde. What the ANC has largely lacked in KwaZulu-Natal, both before and since the April 1994 election, has been the power of patronage enjoyed by the IFP.

Minnaar identifies four different categories of warlord, three of whom are the essentially Inkatha type of warlord relying upon official position or government patronage:

•           the rural induna type, who uses the inherited Shepstonian structures of indirect chiefly rule as a means of exerting patronage and protection. The imposition of new "traditional" customs and dues is a means of extracting tribute from the local population.

•           the urban/town councillor type, who uses his position in the local administration to monopolize the structures of power and patronage, granting privileges such as building land and trading licences in return for payment.

•           the squatter-lord, who controls informal urban settlements with vigilante gangs, extracting "rent" or "taxation" from the local population to pay for this protection and guaranteeing his own access to lucrative business opportunities.

•           the "hired gun", who uses violence and intimidation to operate protection rackets.[96]

Of these four, only the fourth is common to both the IFP and ANC, because it is not dependent on patronage - it is simply gangsterism which takes advantage of the general break-down of law and order, especially in the large cities.

In the mid-1980s, violence in KwaZulu-Natal was a largely urban phenomenon. Durban is one of the fastest growing cities in the world. In the 1980s, 100,000 people a year were migrating into the city. The Durban Functional Region, which numbered less than a million in 1970 had grown to more than three million 20 years later.[97] By 1989 more than half the population of KwaZulu-Natal lived in urban centres. Of these, 2.8 million people - out of a provincial population of about 8 million - lived in dense informal settlements.[98]

These extensive squatter settlements, which are far greater than anything to be found in Johannesburg or Cape Town, are largely the result of a peculiarity of apartheid in Natal. Uniquely, the KwaZulu homeland extended to the fringes of the major cities, so that some of the most important black areas were under the administration not of the white Natal provincial government, but of the Inkatha-controlled homeland. Thus, whereas influx control had theoretically denied blacks residence in South Africa's other major cities, the fringes of Durban were part of the Zulu "homeland" and therefore the "proper" place for Zulus to be.[99] However, the KwaZulu administration had neither the inclination nor the funds to provide adequate housing, sanitation, education, health or other social infrastructure in the peri-urban settlements. Instead they were abandoned to the mercy of the warlords.[100]

The Lindelani settlement, on the northern fringes of Durban, offers a useful case study. It first sprang up around 1982 and by 1986 had 120,000 inhabitants. From the beginning it fell under the control of Inkatha warlord Thomas Shabalala. In 1990 Shabalala annexed new land for the settlement which he claimed now numbered 350,000. Extension of territory was often by violent means. In 1989 an attack was launched from Lindelani into neighbouring Ntuzuma, driving people from their homes and burning them down to acquire new land for settlement.[101] In the early 1980s, one of the causes of conflict was an attempt by the KwaZulu administration to bring a number of the formal settlements in "white" Natal under homeland control. The residents of townships such as Chesterville and Lamontville strongly resisted incorporation.[102]

Lindelani residents in 1991 had to pay 20 rand for the privilege of "living under the protection of Thomas Shabalala". Additional payments have to be made in order to do business; for example in 1986, 400 rand was required to open a shop. The effect has been to bring most business in the settlement under Shabalala's personal control. By 1988 he owned the only butchery and bottle store in Lindelani, as well as a development company and a fleet of taxis.[103]

However, Shabalala is not a mere gangster. In order to maintain his authority in Lindelani he depends upon the compliance of the provincial government, formerly the homeland administration. In return he delivers the settlement to the IFP. The party dues he collects by strong-arm methods are financially useful and the votes politically valuable.[104] Needless to say, the ANC cannot function effectively in Lindelani. Shabalala is a provincial member of parliament and was at one stage a member of the party's national executive. The IFP kept some distance from him in the late 1980s when he was on trial for murder (he was acquitted, but two of his bodyguards convicted) but now he is back in the fold.[105] Equally, Shabalala retains good relations with the security forces. His IFP impis could be seen armed with police issue rifles and transported in KwaZulu Police vehicles.[106]

The example of Lindelani shows clearly how the multiple causes of violence are bound together: political rivalry, state complicity, social deprivation, rural-urban migration and crime. The political economy of the warlord system depends upon sympathetic control of local or provincial government structures, as well as the local security apparatus, in order for the shacklords or indunas to operate their systems of patronage and "protection". This, fundamentally, was why the decision in April 1994 to concede control of the provincial administration to the IFP was certain to lead to continued violence. It is also why questions such as control of the Ingonyama land and whether central or provincial government will pay chiefs' salaries are of crucial importance.

In both academic and popular commentaries there is a tendency to portray violence in Africa as essentially irrational - a breakdown of systems of government and of civilization itself. The key text is an article by Robert Kaplan entitled "The Coming Anarchy":

You have a lot of people in London and Washington who fly all over the world, who stay in luxury hotels, who think that English is dominating every place, but yet they have no idea what is out there. Out there is that thin membrane of luxury hotels, of things that work, of civil order, which is proportionately getting thinner and thinner.[107]

The arguments of Kaplan and similar thinkers chime with the rather longer standing views of many white South Africans: the notion that blacks are unfit for government and that the violence in KwaZulu-Natal is the inevitable result of handing over power. The KwaZulu-Natal violence cannot be understood outside its historical context, which indeed includes a long history of intra-Zulu "faction-fighting".[108] Yet a concrete analysis shows that the violence results from a number of choices made by (primarily white) politicians and serves the rational self-interest of a class of warlords. The violence is not chaotic and irrational, but an essential function of a certain political and economic system. As David Keen has remarked in a critique of Kaplan's article:

Faced with international analysts' depiction of "mindless violence" in troublespots around the globe, we need to ask whether it is the violence that is mindless or the analysis.[109]

If the government at either central or provincial level is to resolve the conflict, then it will need to eschew mindless analysis and address the causes of violence in their full political and economic dimensions.

5.6 Resettlement

An estimated 500,000 people - some 6 per cent of the population of the province - have been displaced by the violence. Provision for the displaced is made on an ad hoc basis by local social welfare departments, non-governmental organizations and churches. In many cases the displaced receive no assistance at all and join the ranks of those sleeping in black dustbin liners on the Durban seafront.[110]

Despite the scale of the displacement, the problem is one which seems to rank low on the Pretoria government's list of priorities. Central government is primarily concerned about KwaZulu-Natal's potential for national destabilization. Displaced people are an internal problem which is seen as belonging to the provincial government.[111]

Commentators on internal displacement in KwaZulu-Natal note the lack of a coherent government policy to address the problem. The displaced appear to be a "vanished population" of whom "little is known".[112] According to one academic observer:

The amazing thing is where all these people find homes. Very few come to the attention of relief agencies. They end up sharing other people's homes, squat, or live in backyard shacks.[113]

Most likely, the displaced simply drift into the massive informal peri-urban settlements, falling under the authority of a different warlord.

Those displaced by the Shobashobane attack in December 1995 were not entirely typical in the way they responded to their plight. They probably also received greater assistance from outside because of the publicity surrounding the massacre. By the time of the attack the Shobashobane community had already dwindled from 2,000 to about 500 people, all of whom fled on Christmas Day. Some ended up at St Katherine's Anglican church in Port Shepstone, which had housed many displaced in the past. Emergency relief was supplied by a local church body, Practical Ministries. Unlike most of their predecessors, the Shobashobane people wished to return to their homes quickly. However, most of their homes had been destroyed and they are housed in tents, supplied by the army, at Shobashobane. They are receiving assistance to rebuild their homes, as well as therapy for the traumatized.[114]

Yet the issue is not primarily one of welfare. As with larger scale and better known situations in Bosnia-Herzogovina or Rwanda, the question of resettlement goes to the very roots of the conflict. People were driven from their homes because they were perceived as supporting the wrong political party. Land has been seized thereby to enrich the communities which remain and to skew electoral demography in favour of the majority party in each area. Thus a political solution which acknowledges the validity of pluralism and individual choice is often a precondition for resettlement. This may often be difficult to achieve with the retention of chiefly structures, since these tend to reinforce the inference that all people in a given area support the political preferences of the chief. But this may not necessarily be so. In 1994, a moderate IFP chief, Everson Xolo, was driven from his area, KwaXolo, on the Lower South Coast. Chief Xolo was the victim of a nearly fatal attack, apparently by IFP hardliners who resented his allowing the ANC Youth to organize in his area. KwaXolo fell under the effective control of "warlord" Sgoloza Xolo.[115] However, in early 1996 Sgoloza Xolo was arrested on murder charges, creating the possibility that Chief Xolo and those displaced with him might return from their refuge in a tented village in Margate.[116] Thus effective security measures raised the possibility of lasting resettlement.

6. CONCLUSION

The campaigning message from all sides in the local elections of June 1996 was that more than a decade of civil war was finally over. The pre-election period was marked by negotiations between the ANC and IFP, as well as the appearance of some of the more incendiary leaders from each side - men like Sifiso Nkabinde and Thomas Shabalala - on joint platforms. This was not accompanied by a significant reduction in violence, despite claims to that effect by Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi. The Human Rights Committee said that a number of "near disastrous situations" had only been averted by the presence of security forces - with some 20,000 additional police deployed in the province.[117]

Scepticism is clearly in order, but there are some indications that the prospects for peace are better than for many years. Central government's new policing policy has improved the situation in some areas, such as the Lower South Coast, by removing violent leaders from circulation. At the political level, the National Party's decision in May 1996 to withdraw from the Government of National Unity has had the effect of drawing the ANC and IFP closer together. Chief Buthelezi has felt his status enhanced - an impression which ANC members of parliament have been anxious to underline.[118]

However, the National Party's withdrawal has had little direct effect within KwaZulu-Natal. The party has been historically weak in the province because its natural support base - Afrikaans speakers - are thin on the ground. Conservative English-speaking whites gravitated towards the IFP in the April 1994 election, although they appear to have moved towards the National Party and the Democratic Party in the June 1996 local elections.[119] The large Durban Indian community has historic links with the ANC, is generally hostile to the IFP and in recent years has offered a large measure of support to the National Party, although a local party, the Minority Front, gained ground in June 1996.[120] The other peculiarity of KwaZulu-Natal in South African politics is that it is the only area where the ANC faces serious political competition within the African community[121] (the nearest parallel being its competition with the National Party for support within the "Coloured" community in the Western Cape). It is this which makes KwaZulu-Natal a particularly important test of the maturity of South African democracy.

The conclusion of the national constitutional talks has seen the departure from the political scene of the ANC's secretary general, Cyril Ramaphosa. A former trade union leader, Cyril Ramaphosa is generally disliked and distrusted in IFP circles, not least because of his skill in detaching the National Party from its former IFP allies in multi-party negotiations. Ramaphosa's rival within the ANC, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, who is a politician much more to the IFP's liking, has played an important role in getting the recent peace talks moving. The ANC's provincial leader in KwaZulu-Natal, Jacob Zuma, also has good relations with IFP politicians like Frank Mdlalose.[122]

However, the success of the peace initiative will depend more upon the alignment of forces within the IFP. If moderate politicians like secretary general Ziba Jiyane and provincial premier Frank Mdlalose are in the ascendancy the chances for peace are clearly better than if the leading faction is a combination of warlords and extreme right-wing ideologues. In February Ziba Jiyane gave Lindelani warlord Thomas Shabalala a public dressing down for inciting violence, but appeared not to receive backing from Chief Buthelezi.[123] Ultimately the inclinations of the enigmatic Inkatha leader will be decisive. He alone has the authority to turn the party away from the far right and the warlords. But it is far from clear if he is yet ready to exercise that power for peaceful ends.

The results of the June 1996 local elections also throw up some interesting possibilities. They confirmed existing impressions of a significant rural-urban split between the IFP and the ANC. The ANC gained control of all the significant urban areas: Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Ladysmith, Newcastle and Richards Bay. In the Durban Metro region the ANC won 47 per cent, compared with only 17.2 per cent for the IFP. On the other hand, the IFP won crushing victories in the two local government regions in the north of the province, as well as a substantial victory in the lower South Coast.[124] One important consequence is that, in the urban areas at least, sources of patronage controlled by local government should no longer be available to IFP warlords. In other words, these elections give the ANC a larger stake in the day-to-day governance of KwaZulu-Natal than it had previously enjoyed. This too may improve the prospects for peace.

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"Business is Booming amid the Violence". 10 May 1996.

Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg].

"Special Team Brings Hopes of South Coast Peace". 10 May 1996.

Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg].

"KwaZulu's Supercop Taken Off the Case". 17 May 1996.

Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg].

"IFP Takes Up the Case of an ANC Suspect". 24 May 1996.

Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg].

"Ingonyama Land is Relinquished". 24 May 1996.

Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg].

"Province That's One Big No-Go Area". 14 June 1996.

Malan, Rian.

My Traitor's Heart. London, Bodley Head, 1990.

Maré, Gerhard.

Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa. London: Zed Books, 1993.

Marks, Shula.

"Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness" in Leroy Vail (ed.). The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. London and Berkeley: James Currey and California University Press, 1989.

Minnaar, Anthony.

Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu: Historical Perspectives. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1991.

Minnaar, Anthony.

"Patterns of Violence: An Overview of Conflict in Natal During the 1980s and 1990s" in Anthony Minnaar (ed.). Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992, pp. 1-25.

Minnaar, Anthony.

"'Undisputed Kings': Warlordism in Natal" in Anthony Minnaar (ed.). Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992, pp. 61-93.

Minnaar, Anthony.

Squatters, Violence and the Future of the Informal Settlements in the Greater Durban Region. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992.

Naidoo, Kumi.

"The Politics of Youth Resistance in the 1980s: The Dilemmas of a Differentiated Durban". Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol 18, No 1 (March 1991), pp. 143-165.

Natal Mercury [Pietermaritzburg].

"Massacre Arrests 'Surprise' Soon". 25 January 1996.

Observer [London].

"Terrorist Supporters Woo Tories". 9 October 1988.

Observer [London].

"Inkatha Stages Boycott". 9 April 1995.

Observer [London].

"How Apartheid Conned the West". 16 July 1995.

Practical Ministries.

Shobashobane - Police Complicity. Port Shepstone, n.d.

Practical Ministries.

Shobashobane. Port Shepstone, February 1996.

Sitas, Ari.

"The Making of the 'Comrades' Movement in Natal, 1985-91". Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol 18, No 1 (March 1991), pp. 629-641.

Smith, Charlene and Fred Khumalo.

"'Suffer the Children: Refugees and Disrupted Schooling in Natal" in Anthony Minnaar (ed.). Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992, pp. 259-264

South Africa.

KwaZulu AmaKhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act 1990.

South Africa,

High Court, Durban and Coast Local Division. "The State v Peter Msane and 19 Others: Indictment" [November 1995].

South Coast Herald [Port Shepstone].

"Investigators Face Death Threats". 24 January 1996.

SouthScan [London].

"Right-Wingers Train over 1,000 Inkatha Volunteers in Natal". 18 March 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Goldstone Puts Official Seal on Third Force Claims". 25 March 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"KwaZulu Natal Violence on the Increase Despite NC Reconciliation Stance". 10 June 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Ceasefire Agreed in East Rand Townships". 22 July 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Outgoing KwaZulu Police Chief Now Admits to Existence of Hit-Squads". 29 July 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Buthelezi Faces New Threat to Traditional Influence in King's Court". 9 September 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Buthelezi Prepares to Knit Alliance with Chiefs Against Zulu King". 16 September 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Fears Mount that Split with King May End in Division Between 'Zulus' and 'Buthelezis'". 23 September 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Mandela Holds Cabinet Together after Buthelezi's SABC Debacle". 30 September 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Clash with Traditional Leaders Heralds Deeper Splits". 9 December 1994.

SouthScan [London].

"Peace-Seeking IFP Leaders Killed". 27 January 1995.

SouthScan [London].

"Police Chief Seeks to Dilute KZP". 17 February 1995.

SouthScan [London].

"Inkatha Begins Hardline Strategy to Challenge NC for Control of Province". 26 May 1995.

SouthScan [London].

"Inkatha Hardliners Fail to Secure Federal Plan Support". 25 August 1995.

SouthScan [London].

"ANC Backs Off over IFP Vlakplaas Court Revelations". 20 October 1995.

SouthScan [London].

"IFP Lashes Out as Police Team Clamps Down". 9 February 1996.

SouthScan [London].

"Top IFP Figure Seeks to Push Out the Warlords". 16 February 1996.

SouthScan [London].

"IFP Knuckles Under for Deal on Provincial Constitution". 22 March 1996.

SouthScan [London].

"Tensions Rise after Zulu Royal Family Attacked". 3 May 1996.

SouthScan [London].

"Chiefs Find Powers Diminished". 17 May 1996.

SouthScan [London].

"Bloody Weekend Threatens Tentative Peace Moves". 7 June 1996.

SouthScan [London].

"Secret IFP Training Camps Discounted". 14 June 1996.

SouthScan [London].

"Tensions Remain Say Monitors". 21 June 1996.

Sparks, Allister.

The Mind of South Africa. London: Heinemann, 1990.

The Star [Johannesburg].

"KwaZulu Natal's Constitution May Go Back to Drawing Board". 26 June 1996.

Sunday Times [Johannesburg].

"Inkatha's Costly Poll Flop". 30 June 1996.

Sunday Times [Johannesburg].

"Judges Slam Plan to Secede". 30 June 1996.

Sunday Times [Johannesburg].

"ANC Wins the Economic Hub of Kwazulu". 30 June 1996.

Tilton, Doug.

"Creating an 'Educated Workforce': Inkatha, Big Business, and Educational Reform in KwaZulu". Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol 18, No 1 (March 1991), pp. 166-189.

Webster, David and Maggie Friedman.

Repression and the State of Emergency, June 1987-March 1989. New York: Africa Watch, June 1989 (reprint).

Weekly Mail [Johannesburg].

"Inkatha Confirms Israeli Training". 19 March 1993.

Woods, Gavin.

"Natal Violence: A Contemporary Analysis of Underlying Dynamics" in Anthony Minnaar (ed.). Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992, pp. 37-48.

 

The views expressed in the papers are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of UNHCR.

 



[1] Since April 1994 the province has been known as KwaZulu-Natal. For the purposes of this paper the full name is used, even for events prior to April 1994. However, the previous provincial name, Natal, is also used on occasion to refer to earlier events. Mention of KwaZulu can be taken to refer specifically to the territory designated as the self-governing Zulu "homeland" prior to 1994.

[2] Richard Carver, South Africa after the Elections (WRITENET for UNHCR/CDR, June 1994)

[3] The Independent [London], 6 May 1994.

[4] ARTICLE 19, "Statement on Elections in South Africa", London, 9 May 1994 (press release)

[5] Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Review 1995 (Johannesburg, [1996), p. 28

[6] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Pretoria Fiddles while KwaZulu-Natal Burns", 22 September 1995

[7] SouthScan [London], "Ceasefire Agreed in East Rand Townships", 22 July 1994

[8] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Business is Booming amid the Violence", 10 May 1996

[9] For example, Gavin Woods, "Natal Violence: A Contemporary Analysis of Underlying Dynamics" in Anthony Minnaar (ed.), Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992)

[10] See, for example, Human Rights Watch/Africa, South Africa: Threats to a New Democracy (New York, 1995).

[11] SouthScan [London], "Bloody Weekend Threatens Tentative Peace Moves", 7 June 1996

[12] For summaries of this evidence, see Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card" (New York, 1995), and Carver.

[13] Allister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa (London: Heinemann, 1990), pp. 339-41 and 356-8; Africa Watch, The Killings in South Africa (New York, 24 January 1991), p. 13

[14] David Webster and Maggie Friedman, Repression and the State of Emergency, June 1987-March 1989 (New York: Africa Watch, June 1989) (reprint)

[15] Shula Marks, "Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness" in Leroy Vail (ed.), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London and Berkeley: James Currey and California University Press, 1989), p. 215; Anthony Minnaar, "Patterns of Violence: An Overview of Conflict in Natal During the 1980s and 1990s" in Minnaar (ed.), Patterns of Violence, pp. 2-7

[16] Africa Watch, The Killings in South Africa, pp. 43-5.

[17] Gerhard Maré, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 57

[18] Human Rights Watch/Africa, South Africa: Threats to a New Democracy

[19] Summarized in Independent Board of Inquiry, Report for December 1993/January 1994 (Johannesburg, January 1994)

[20] Summarized in Independent Board of Inquiry, Report for February/March 1994 (Johannesburg, 1994)

[21] South Africa, High Court, Durban and Coast Local Division, "The State v Peter Msane and 19 Others: Indictment" [November 1995]

[22] SouthScan [London], "ANC Backs Off over IFP Vlakplaas Court Revelations", 20 October 1995

[23] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Pulling the Strings on the Buthelezi Marionette", 8 March 1996

[24] Ibid.

[25] Doug Tilton, "Creating an 'Educated Workforce': Inkatha, Big Business, and Educational Reform in KwaZulu", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 18, No 1 (March 1991)

[26] Nkosinathi Gwala, "Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietermaritzburg", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 15, No 3 (April 1989)

[27] Bill Berkeley, "The Warlords of Natal", The Atlantic Monthly (March 1994)

[28] Woods, "Natal Violence", p. 38

[29] The Citizen [Johannesburg], "ANC Hammered in Rural KZ/Natal", 2 July 1996

[30] Ari Sitas, "The Making of the 'Comrades' Movement in Natal, 1985-91", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 18, No 1, (March 1991); Kumi Naidoo, "The Politics of Youth Resistance in the 1980s: The Dilemmas of a Differentiated Durban", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 18, No 1 (March 1991)

[31] Ziondile Gwala, "Natal Conflict under the Microscope: A Case Study Approach" in Simon Bekker (ed.), Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986-1992 (Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1992); Africa Watch, South Africa: "Traditional" Dictatorship (New York, September 1993), p. 10

[32] Human Rights Watch/Africa, South Africa: Threats to a New Democracy, p. 11

[33] Ibid., p. 9. See also R.W. Johnson, "The Election, the Count and the Drama in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)" in R.W. Johnson and Lawrence Schlemmer (eds.), Launching Democracy in South Africa (New York: Yale University Press, 1996).

[34] The Independent [London], "Report on SA Poll-Fixing is Suppressed", 20 March 1995

[35] The Citizen [Johannesburg], "IFP Wins Most Votes in KZ/N", 3 July 1996

[36] The Independent [London], 20 March 1995

[37] SouthScan [London], "KwaZulu Natal Violence on the Increase Despite NC Reconciliation Stance", 10 June 1994

[38] See Carver

[39] R.W. Johnson, "Through a Glass Darkly: The 1996 Contest in the Light of '94", KwaZulu-Natal Briefing (May 1996)

[40] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Province That's One Big No-Go Area", 14 June 1996

[41] Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Review 1995

[42] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Inkatha's Training Grounds in the Game Reserves", 22 September 1996

[43] SouthScan [London], "Secret IFP Training Camps Discounted", 14 June 1996

[44] SouthScan [London], "Peace-Seeking IFP Leaders Killed", 27 January 1995

[45] BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, "Inkatha Leader, Four Supporters Killed in KwaZulu/Natal", 4 October 1995, quoting South African Press Agency, 2 October 1995

[46] Natal Mercury [Pietermaritzburg], "Massacre Arrests 'Surprise' Soon", 25 January 1996

[47] SouthScan [London], "Buthelezi Faces New Threat to Traditional Influence in King's Court", 9 September 1994; "Fears Mount that Split with King May End in Division Between 'Zulus' and 'Buthelezis'", 23 September 1994; "Mandela Holds Cabinet Together after Buthelezi's SABC Debacle", 30 September 1994

[48] SouthScan [London], "Buthelezi Prepares to Knit Alliance with Chiefs Against Zulu King", 16 September 1994

[49] BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, "Buthelezi Elected as Chairman of KwaZulu/Natal House of Traditional Leaders", 11 January 1995, quoting South African Press Agency, 9 January 1995

[50] SouthScan [London], 30 September 1994

[51] Amnesty International "Urgent Action", 15 December 1994 (AI Index: AFR 53/39/94) (electronic format)

[52] SouthScan [London], 23 September 1994

[53] SouthScan [London], "Tensions Rise after Zulu Royal Family Attacked", 3 May 1996

[54] Anthony Minnaar, Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu: Historical Perspectives (Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 1991)

[55] South Africa, KwaZulu AmaKhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act 1990

[56] Africa Watch, South Africa: "Traditional" Dictatorship, p. 17

[57] SouthScan [London], "Chiefs Find Powers Diminished", 17 May 1996

[58] Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Review 1995, p. 29

[59] Ibid., pp. 32-3

[60] South Coast Herald [Port Shepstone], "Investigators Face Death Threats", 24 January 1996; SouthScan [London], "IFP Lashes Out as Police Team Clamps Down", 9 February 1996

[61] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Special Team Brings Hopes of South Coast Peace", 10 May 1996

[62] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "KwaZulu's Supercop Taken Off the Case", 17 May 1996

[63] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "IFP Takes Up the Case of an ANC Suspect", 24 May 1996

[64] Human Rights Committee, Monthly Report (Johannesburg, September 1995)

[65] Observer [London], "Inkatha Stages Boycott", 9 April 1995

[66] Human Rights Watch/Africa, South Africa: Threats to a New Democracy, p. 3

[67] SouthScan [London], "Police Chief Seeks to Dilute KZP", 17 February 1995

[68] SouthScan [London], "Inkatha Begins Hardline Strategy to Challenge NC for Control of Province", 26 May 1995

[69] SouthScan [London], "Inkatha Hardliners Fail to Secure Federal Plan Support", 25 August 1995

[70] The Star [Johannesburg], "KwaZulu Natal's Constitution May Go Back to Drawing Board", 26 June 1996

[71] Sunday Times [Johannesburg], "Inkatha's Costly Poll Flop", 30 June 1996

[72] Weekly Mail [Johannesburg], "Inkatha Confirms Israeli Training", 19 March 1993

[73] Africa Watch, South Africa: "Traditional" Dictatorship, p. 42

[74] The Observer [London], "How Apartheid Conned the West", 16 July 1995

[75] The Observer, "Terrorist Supporters Woo Tories", 9 October 1988

[76] Africa Watch, South Africa: "Traditional" Dictatorship, p. 42

[77] Human Rights Watch/Africa, South Africa: Threats to a New Democracy, p. 25

[78] SouthScan [London], "Right-Wingers Train over 1,000 Inkatha Volunteers in Natal", 18 March 1994

[79] Human Rights Watch/Africa, South Africa: Threats to a New Democracy, pp. 30-1

[80] Ibid., p. 24

[81] Ibid., p. 24

[82] Ibid., p. 26

[83] SouthScan [London], "Outgoing KwaZulu Police Chief Now Admits to Existence of Hit-Squads", 29 July 1994

[84] Amnesty International, South Africa: State of Fear (London, June 1992) (AI Index: AFR 53/09/92)

[85] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Special Team ...", 10 May 1996

[86] Practical Ministries, Shobashobane - Police Complicity (Port Shepstone, n.d.)

[87] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Special Team ...", 10 May 1996

[88] SouthScan [London], "Clash with Traditional Leaders Heralds Deeper Splits", 9 December 1994

[89] Sunday Times [Johannesburg], "Judges Slam Plan to Secede", 30 June 1996

[90] SouthScan [London], "IFP Knuckles Under for Deal on Provincial Constitution", 22 March 1996

[91] Human Rights Watch/Africa, South Africa: Threats to a New Democracy, p. 14

[92] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Ingonyama Land is Relinquished", 24 May 1996

[93] Ibid.

[94] Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, "Political Violence, 'Tribalism', and Inkatha", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 30, No 3 (1992)

[95] Quoted in Anthony Minnaar, "'Undisputed Kings': Warlordism in Natal" in Minnaar (ed.), Patterns of Violence, p. 61

[96] Ibid., pp. 61-5

[97] Anthony Minnaar, Squatters, Violence and the Future of the Informal Settlements in the Greater Durban Region (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992)

[98] Antoinette Louw and Simon Bekker, "Conflict in the Natal Region: A Database Approach" in Simon Bekker (ed.), Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986-1992 (Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1992)

[99] Alexander Johnston, "The Political World of KwaZulu-Natal" in R.W. Johnson and Lawrence Schlemmer (eds.), Launching Democracy in South Africa (New York: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 169

[100] Minnaar, "'Undisputed Kings'...", p. 67

[101] Ibid., pp. 71-82

[102] Anthony Minnaar, "'Patterns of Violence': An Overview of Conflict in Natal During the 1980s and 1990s" in Minnaar (ed.), Patterns of Violence

[103] Minnaar, "'Undisputed Kings'...", pp. 71-72

[104] Ibid., p. 82

[105] Berkeley

[106] Author's observation, Lindelani, August 1992

[107] Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", The Atlantic Monthly (February 1994)

[108] Minnaar, Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu; see also, Rian Malan, My Traitor's Heart (London: Bodley Head, 1990), pp. 354-60.

[109] David Keen, "Organised Chaos: Not the New World We Ordered", The World Today (January 1996)

[110] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Pretoria Fiddles while KwaZulu-Natal Burns", 22 September 1995

[111] Ibid.

[112] Charlene Smith and Fred Khumalo, "'Suffer the Children: Refugees and Disrupted Schooling in Natal" in Minnaar (ed.), Patterns of Violence, p. 259

[113] Ibid. citing Mary de Haas of the University of Natal

[114] Practical Ministries, Shobashobane (Port Shepstone, February 1996)

[115] Human Rights Watch/Africa, South Africa: Threats to a New Democracy, pp. 22-4

[116] Mail and Guardian [Johannesburg], "Special Team ...", 10 May 1996

[117] SouthScan [London], "Tensions Remain Say Monitors", 21 June 1996

[118] Africa Confidential [London], "South Africa: Inside or Outside?", 24 May 1996

[119] Sunday Times [Johannesburg], "ANC Wins the Economic Hub of Kwazulu", 30 June 1996

[120] Ibid.

[121] Johnston, pp. 168-9

[122] Johnston, p. 182

[123] SouthScan [London], "Top IFP Figure Seeks to Push Out the Warlords", 16 February 1996

[124] The Citizen [Johannesburg], "ANC Hammered in Rural KZ/Natal", 2 July 1996

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