Last Updated: Tuesday, 22 April 2014, 11:13 GMT

Kenya: Update to End July 1995

Publisher WRITENET
Author Richard Carver
Publication Date 1 August 1995
Cite as WRITENET, Kenya: Update to End July 1995, 1 August 1995, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6b78.html [accessed 23 April 2014]
DisclaimerThis is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since multi-party elections in December 1992 the Kenyan Government has taken few steps to remove the underlying causes of tension and political violence, which still have the potential to engulf the country in worse civil unrest. Although 1994 was a year of relative calm in the Rift Valley, which has been beset by political violence since late 1991, a spate of violent incidents in early 1995 indicated that the structural causes of conflict remained. Combined action by international agencies, local non-governmental groups and the Kenyan authorities has provided increased security for refugees, especially Somali refugee women who had been vulnerable to physical attacks and sexual abuse. However, government threats in early 1995 to expel the entire refugee population have only renewed fears for the long-term safety of refugees in Kenya.

2. VIOLENCE IN THE RIFT VALLEY

The year 1994 was one of relative calm in the provinces of the Rift Valley and Western Kenya, which had been hit by political violence continuously since late 1991. While the violence exploited long-standing grievances over access to land, a series of reports by parliamentary, church and human rights groups had made clear that conflict was being stimulated or exploited by the government for its own ends. Most of those displaced from their homes -- more than a quarter of a million -- were Kikuyus and Luhyas presumed to be supporters of opposition political parties. The aggressors in most cases were members of the Kalenjin or Maasai who supported the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU).[2] The decline in the number of violent incidents in 1994 was claimed by the government as a victory for its policy of imposing 'security zones', introduced in September 1994. This involved restricting movement to and from three of the worst affected areas: Molo, Londiani and Burnt Forest.[3] Human rights groups and journalists claimed that the main aim of the policy was to prevent a flow of accurate information about the violence.[4] In March 1995 the security zone restrictions were lifted.[5] In fact the security zone areas continued to be the epicentre of the violence, with some 25-30,000 people driven from their homes during 1994, despite the restrictions in force.[6]

Although 1994 was less violent than the three previous years, there were nevertheless a number of instances of conflict. In a number of these there were allegations of official support for the attackers. After an incident in which five people were killed in Mau Narok on 1 January, a Presbyterian Minister alleged that 60 Maasai warriors were escorted to the scene by police.[7] One of the most serious incidents occurred in Burnt Forest in late March in which 18 people died. Both the Daily Nation and the environmental campaigner Wangari Maathai alleged that Kalenjin warriors were airlifted into the area by helicopter. The claims were apparently derived from different sources and strongly suggest that the attackers had official backing.[8] The news editor of the Daily Nation, Mutegi Njau, was arrested and charged with subversion because of the paper's story. Charges were later dropped.[9]

Another apparent sign of the government's commitment to resolve the situation in the Rift Valley was its collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in a US$ 20 million programme to resettle those displaced by the violence. However, at the same time some senior officials were sending a clear message that they did not favour resettlement. The Minister for Local Government, William ole Ntimama, who is a prominent representative of the Maasai community, made it plain that some 11,000 people displaced from Enoosopukia in Narok District in October 1993 would not be returned to their homes.[10] The displaced were encamped at Maela in Nakuru District. In early 1994 it was reported that Maasai were taking over the farms of the Enoosopukia displaced.[11]

At the end of 1994 the Enoosopukia displaced were the focus of official actions which prompted a rapid degeneration in the security situation. On 23 December, police rounded up camp residents in Maela and forcibly transported 2,000 to Central Province (described by the government as the 'traditional' home of the Kikuyus). The residents were not told where they were being taken. Families were separated and initially not provided with shelter or food.

The camp at Maela was razed to the ground, although many displaced people remained there. Those who remained were beaten and harassed by the authorities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Medecins sans Frontières (Spain) were denied access.[12] Police went to Kirigiti Stadium, one of three locations the displaced had been moved to, and questioned residents about their ethnic and family background.[13]

Meanwhile, local authorities in other areas were beginning to insist on displaced people dispersing. For example, on 28 December the District Officer of Uasin Gishu ordered 118 families at the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) community centre in Eldoret to disperse by 4 January.[14]

On 4 January police dispersed 700 of the people moved from Maela Camp out of the three holding centres in Central Province: Ol Kalau, Ndaragwa and Kirigiti. At Kirigiti Stadium the camp was razed. The UNDP, the government's supposed partner in the programme to resettle displaced people, had apparently not been informed of the government action.[15]

The significance of the Maela removals was twofold. First, there has been a constant call from senior officials for the expulsion of members of certain ethnic groups from the Rift Valley.[16] This appeared to be a first step in that direction. Secondly, it made it publicly apparent that the joint government-UNDP resettlement programme was in serious trouble. The UNDP regional representative, David Whaley, had created an uproar among local relief organizations when he claimed that one third of the displaced had been resettled on their own land. He later said that he had been misquoted. However, while UNDP estimated that 160,000 people remained displaced, local organizations put the figure at 240,000.[17]

The Maela removals were the signal for a renewal of violence. On 6 January 1995, some 650 displaced people at Thessalia mission were victims of a night attack by men armed with bows and arrows. Some accounts described the displaced as having been dispersed from Maela. However, there has been a long-standing displaced community at Thessalia which the government refuses to include in the resettlement programme, on the grounds that they are squatters, not victims of the 'clashes'.[18]

Two days later, in a speech at Naivasha, President Moi accused the opposition of planning 'guerrilla warfare' against the government and of being behind recent Rift Valley violence.[19] On 10 January, 10 Kikuyus, including two children, died in attacks by 60 Maasai moran (warriors) at Kagecha, near Mai Mahiu in Naivasha. Some reports alleged that the attack was prompted by the earlier killing of two Maasai in Mau Narok.[20]

In February 1995 arsonists destroyed 22 houses in Burnt Forest and in March four people in the same area were killed and some 800 families displaced in attacks by Kalenjins.[21]

3. ATTACKS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Many of the continuing restrictions on political activity and other forms of freedom of expression are related to the continuing political violence. The government is particularly sensitive to critical press reporting of events in the Rift Valley - hence the charges against journalists from the Nation and the Standard - and to attempts by the opposition to hold the government responsible. In the aftermath of the violence in January 1995, three opposition members of parliament (MPs) and several other political officials were arrested and charged with incitement to violence after attending a church service for those who died in Kagecha.[22] Charges were later withdrawn, yet this conformed to a pattern whereby opposition officials were under constant legal threat. ARTICLE 19 reported that when it visited the country in May 1994 26 opposition MPs - about a third of the total - faced charges relating to illegal meetings.[23] ARTICLE 19, Human Rights Watch and a group of MPs themselves have documented many cases where opposition politicians have been prevented from holding meetings.[24] In one of the worst incidents, in January 1995, police opened fire at a peaceful rally commemorating the anniversary of the death of opposition leader Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Several of those present were seriously injured.[25]

However, official reluctance to entertain critical comment goes far beyond the issue of the Rift Valley violence. In December 1994, both President Moi and Information Minister Johnstone Makau made public attacks on the Nation group of newspapers, including a threat to ban the Daily Nation. The following month two Nation reporters were summarily dismissed in circumstances which suggested to some observers that the company was responding to official pressure. One of the reporters had written about a government minister's alleged property deals, while the other had reported lawyers making critical comments about the Attorney-General.[26]

President Moi also made public threats against a judge hearing an application against the government over its responsibilities under broadcasting law. More than 50 applications for private commercial broadcasting licences were outstanding. The case involved a complaint by one such applicant against the Minister of Information for his delay in determining the application. Only days after the President's public criticism of the judge, the complainant withdrew his application, again suggesting to observers that some undue pressure had been brought to bear.[27]

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also suffered from an increasingly restrictive approach on the part of the authorities. In January 1995 the Mwangaza Trust, a think tank on constitutional, human rights and political issues had its registration withdrawn. It had been set up less than a year earlier. The trust's newspaper was banned and vendors were threatened with arrest if they sold it.[28] The following month the Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) was banned, shortly after it had published a report on official corruption in Kenya. CLARION was an academic research NGO based at Nairobi University.[29]

4. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JUDICIARY

In April 1995 two retired judges accused the government of interfering in judicial decisions. In a paper delivered to a seminar of the International Commission of Jurists in Nairobi, Benna Lutta and William Mbaya wrote: 'Many times judges and magistrates seek the opinion of the executive on matters that are still before the court which even a first-year law student and a layman will tell you is wrong. This amounts to interference in the judiciary.'[30]

This issue had become a matter of public controversy the previous year, when the People newspaper reported lawyer G.M. Kariuki saying that an Appeal Court decision 'reeked of state interference'. The lawyer, editor and reporter were convicted of contempt of court. The two journalists served several months in prison because they refused to pay their fines.[31] Some opposition activists and human rights critics also accused the executive of political interference in judicial affairs over the failure to renew the contracts of two High Court judges, Edward Torgbor and J.A. Couldrey.[32]

Human rights groups claim that the case of Koigi wa Wamwere illustrates the government's readiness to use judicial processes to stifle dissent. A former member of parliament and founder of a human rights group, Koigi wa Wamwere and three others are on trial before a Nakuru magistrates court on charges of attempted armed robbery. They face a mandatory death sentence if convicted. Human rights groups including Amnesty International and ARTICLE 19, which have sent observers to the trial, believe that the charges have been fabricated because the accused had campaigned against official involvement in the Rift Valley violence. ARTICLE 19 criticised the partiality of the presiding magistrate who 'has shown an extraordinary lack of familiarity with the rules of evidence and procedure and has frequently intervened to assist prosecution witnesses and ask leading questions without restraint'.[33] Amnesty International concluded:

The abusive use of criminal charges to detain political prisoners undermines the Kenya Government's claim to be abiding by the rule of law. Many human rights activists and others in Kenya see this trial as a test case. If these four men are found guilty and sentenced to death it will have serious implications for freedom of expression in Kenya.[34]

5. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Kenyan politics at all points on the spectrum have been characterised by growing division. The most remarked development has been the launch of a new opposition party, Safina (the Swahili word for ark) in June 1995. However, of equal short-term importance is the deteriorating health of President Moi and the question of who will succeed him.

All three main opposition parties have been marked by internal dissension. This has been most apparent in the case of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-Kenya). Since the death of its founder leader, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, in January 1994, there has been open feuding between factions headed by his successor, Michael Kijana Wamalwa, and his son, Raila Odinga. This has culminated in the suspension of Raila Odinga from membership of the party. Also, several prominent members of the new Safina party are defectors from FORD-Kenya, including Paul Muite and Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, who were both elected as FORD-Kenya MPs in 1992. However, Safina has also attracted dissidents from FORD-Asili, where dissatisfaction with the leader, Kenneth Matiba, is growing, and the Democratic Party.[35]

Both the international press and the Kenyan government have commented repeatedly on the fact that a white Kenyan, Richard Leakey, is secretary-general of Safina. It has been less remarked that the new party, in common with FORD-Asili and the Democratic Party, has a strong Kikuyu element in its leadership, with close personal links to the former Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, a key Kikuyu leader of the 1960s and 1970s. The new party's leaders are, for the most part, young and able but it is still unclear whether they will be able to transcend the narrow nature of their origin. However, it is clear that the government, which is launching vituperative personal attacks on Richard Leakey, fears his capacity to act as a unifying force. At the time of writing the government had delayed registering Safina as a political party.

Ordinarily, the increased fracturing of the opposition would be a source of encouragement to the government. However, KANU itself is affected by internal divisions which are being exacerbated by President Moi's ill-health and indecision over who should succeed him. Vice-President George Saitoti has come under increasing criticism from within the party. The defection of his fellow-Maasai John Keen from the Democratic Party in early 1995 appeared to represent a challenge to Vice-President Saitoti, although it is one which he has so far succeeded in fending off.[36]

6. MUSLIM POLITICS AND THE COAST

The politics of Coast Province continue to be dominated by the grievances of the indigenous population over concessions of land to outsiders and the refusal of the government to allow the registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) as a vehicle for the aspirations of people on the Coast. For example, in November 1994 more than 20 people were injured in riots in Mombasa, when market traders burned vehicles in protest at a decision to demolish over 4,000 stalls at an open-air market. The owner of the land from which the hawkers were evicted was Shariff Nassir, KANU chairman in Mombasa.[37]

It is widely believed that a series of arson attacks on the Nairobi offices of the Legal Advice Centre in early 1995 were connected with a sensitive land case from the Coast, in which the centre was engaged in litigation against powerful interests.[38]

In 1994 and 1995 the situation on the Coast was somewhat quieter than in the two previous years, although the peace was intermittently broken. In July 1994 the Mombasa offices of the Standard daily newspaper were fire-bombed after the publication of a letter critical of Muslims and Islam.[39] In November 1994 about 20 Muslim protesters were injured when police used batons and rifle butts to disperse a demonstration after Friday prayers in Mombasa. The protesters were demanding that the authorities produce Mohamed Wakesa, a leading IPK member who had disappeared in police custody.[40]

In December 1994 the government refused to renew the passport of Sheikh Khalid Balala, the outspoken Muslim preacher, arguing that he was of Yemeni origin. Opposition members of parliament argued that, as a Kenyan by birth, Sheikh Balala could not be deprived of his citizenship.[41]

7. THE GUERRILLA THREAT

Since early 1995 government representatives have repeatedly warned of the threat of guerrilla attacks by the Uganda-based February the Eighteenth Revolutionary Army (FERA), the military wing of the February the Eighteenth Popular Movement. The government alleged that FERA was linked to the legal opposition parties in Kenya. Opposition politicians initially dismissed FERA as a figment of the government's imagination. However, in March 1995, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni acknowledged FERA's existence and the presence of its leader, Brigadier John Odongo in Uganda.[42]

In the months that followed, there were a series of reports of arrests and trials of alleged FERA activists and of attacks on official targets such as police posts in border areas.[43] There had been no previous accounts of FERA attacks. Some observers noted similarities between the trials of alleged FERA members and those of alleged supporters of another underground movement, Mwakenya, in the mid-1980s. The Mwakenya trials were condemned by Amnesty International as unfair.[44]

8. TREATMENT OF REFUGEES

The presence in Uganda of Brigadier Odongo was probably the trigger for a threat in March 1995 to expel all refugees in Kenya, estimated at about 240,000. President Moi was angered by the UNHCR's decision to resettle Brigadier Odongo from Uganda to outside East Africa. The president referred to allegations that refugees in Kenya were engaged in criminal or subversive activities: 'Kenya cannot continue harbouring refugees who have no respect for its laws. Let the Commissioner get them shelter in another country.'[45]

Some months earlier, in November 1994, President Moi had accused Ugandans of being responsible for growing crime in Nairobi. This followed the arrest of three Ugandans for murder. According to Ugandan diplomats, the authorities were harassing their nationals. Ugandans were often being picked up by police and held until they had paid a bribe.[46]

However, in another important respect the security of refugees improved significantly. The authorities tackled the problem of attacks on Somali women in the north-eastern camps by fencing the settlements and increasing the police presence, including helicopter patrols. The UNHCR contracted a Kenyan NGO, the International Federation of Women Lawyers, to help refugee women seek legal redress. The effect of these measures was a fall in the average monthly number of rapes from more than 30 in 1993 to fewer than 10 in 1994.[47]

9. INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS

Between 1991 and 1994 the Kenyan government was under intense pressure from international aid donors for what was seen as its failings in the areas of economic management, transparency in governance and respect for human rights. Non-humanitarian aid was suspended, prompting political and economic reforms. By the time the Consultative Group of donors to Kenya met in Paris in December 1994, there was a widespread perception that the government had done all that had been asked of it, although human rights groups warned that insufficient steps had been taken to introduce institutional reform and address the structural causes of abuse. The Paris meeting saw new aid pledges totalling some US$ 800 million.[48]

The period immediately after the December 1994 meeting saw a sharp decline in the human rights situation, with a resurgence in violence in the Rift Valley, the forcible resettlement of the Maela camp displaced, an escalation in arrests of opposition politicians, the deregistering of non-governmental organizations and physical attacks on the press and human rights activists. Some donor governments were highly disquieted by these developments, notably Germany, which substantially cut its aid, and Denmark, where a parliamentary committee blocked a substantial grant because of concerns over human rights abuse.[49] In April 1995, the World Bank convened an extraordinary donors' meeting to be held in Paris in July 1995. While in Kenya both the government and its critics saw the meeting as bringing the country's human rights record under renewed scrutiny, it may in practice have been a move by those donors who did not favour sanctions against Kenya to bring governments like the German and Danish into a more unified position.[50] In the event the final statement of the July meeting was low-key in its criticism of human rights developments, confining itself to calling for both government and opposition to work to improve the political environment.[51] It is as yet unclear what the impact of the donor meeting will be, but the likelihood is that, as in December 1994, the Kenyan government will have come away from Paris feeling that it has international backing for its approach.

10. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Africa Watch.

Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. New York, November 1993

Amnesty International.

Kenya: Torture, Political Detention and Unfair Trials. London, July 1987 (AI Index: AFR 32/17/87)

___,

Kenya: Abusive Use of the law: Koigi wa Wamwere and Three Other Prisoners of Conscience on Trial for their Lives. London, November 1994 (AI Index: AFR 32/15/94)

___,

Women in Kenya: Repression and Resistance. London, July 1995 (AI Index: AFR 32/06/95)

ARTICLE 19.

Kenya: Shooting the Messenger. London, October 1993

___,

Censorship in Kenya. London, March 1995

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.

7 November 1994, quoting Kenya Television Network, 4 November 1994

___,

25 November 1994, quoting Kenya Television Network, 23 November 1994

___,

'Internal refugee families ordered to leave Eldoret'. 30 December 1994, quoting Kenya News Agency

___,

'Moi speaks on attempts to disrupt the peace; broadcast licensing court case'. 11 January 1995, quoting Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, 8 January 1995

___,

'Security measures intensified after 10 killed in ethnic violence in Rift Valley'. 13 January 1995, quoting Kenya Television Network, 11 January 1995

___,

'Three FORD-Asili MPs arrested for "incitement to violence" after Nakuru deaths'. 17 January 1995, quoting Kenya Television Network, 15 January 1995

___,

'Attorney-general deregisters Paul Muite's opposition Mwangaza Trust'. 20 January 1995, quoting Kenya Television Network, 18 January 1995

___,

'Official defends police action at Odinga commemoration'. 25 January 1995, quoting Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, 23 January 1995

Daily Nation [Nairobi].

18 March 1994 and 4 April 1994

___,

'Muite's group now struck off'. 20 January 1995.

___,

'Twenty villagers arrested over curfew'. 24 February 1995

___,

'Moi wants refugees out'. 6 March 1995

___,

'Refugees: Moi meets UN officials'. 7 March 1995

Economic Review [Nairobi],

'The worst Christmas'. 2 January 1995

___,

'Thessalia, Maela and Elsewhere'. 16 January 1995

___,

'Guerrilla warfare'. 16 January 1995

Financial Times [London],

'Concerned donors call Kenya talks'. 3 May 1995

Human Rights Watch/Africa.

Kenya: Old Habits Die Hard. New York, July 1995

Independent [London],

'Corruption claim'. 21 February 1995

___,

'Leakey forms protest party'. 8 May 1995

International Freedom of Expression Exchange [Greennet].

12 and 13 April 1994

Inter Press Service [Greennet],

'Kenya-Uganda: Relations sour'. 29 November 1994

___,

'Kenya-Rights: Critical report released ahead of donor meeting'. 24 July 1995

___,

'Kenya-Uganda: Refugees face threat of repatriation'. 7 March 1995

___,

'Kenya-Human-Rights: Government slammed for manipulating judiciary'. 6 April 1995

. Kenya Gazette.

Kenya. 'The Preservation of Public Security (Molo, Burnt Forest and Londiani areas) Regulations'Suppl. 60, 17 September 1993

___,

National Assembly. Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya. Nairobi: The Assembly, September 1992

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

African Exodus: Refugee Crisis, Human Rights and the 1969 OAU Convention. New York, June 1995

National Christian Council of Kenya.

The Cursed Arrow: Organized Violence Against Democracy in Kenya. Nairobi, April 1992

___,

'Kolongolo flare up: 800 evicted', The Clashes Update [Nairobi]. 31 March 1995

New Kenya Network [Greennet],

'Kenya: sixth attack on centre'. 16 March 1995

Reuters,

'UN worried about plight of displaced people'. 27 December 1994

___,

'Kenyan police disperse more than 700 displaced'. 4 January 1995

Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights.

Failing the Democratic Challenge: Freedom of Expression in Multi-Party Kenya. Washington, February 1994.

Sunday Nation [Nairobi].

2 January 1994

Weekly Review [Nairobi].

15 April 1994

___,

'A noisy parting of the ways'. 10 June 1994

___,

'"An Act of War"'. 15 July 1994

___,

'The Sheikh is shut out'. 16 December 1994

___,

'Unexpectedly good results'. 23 December 1994

___,

'Mess in Maela'. 13 January 1995

___,

'Slow but steady resettlement'. 13 January 1995

___,

'Tribal fighting erupts again'. 20 January 1995

___,

'Under pressure'. 10 February 1995

___,

'Struck off the list'. 24 February 1995

___,

'Towards peaceful co-existence'. 10 March 1995

___,

'Guerrillas on the rampage'. 17 March 1995

___,

'Museveni comes clean'. 24 March 1995

___,

'Taking the plunge'. 12 May 1995

___,

'The determined arsonists'. 24 March 1995

World Bank,

'Informal donor meeting on Kenya', (press release). 24 July 1995

 

The views expressed in the papers are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of UNHCR.

 



[2]. Kenya. National Assembly, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya, (Nairobi: The Assembly, September 1992); National Christian Council of Kenya, The Cursed Arrow: Organized Violence Against Democracy in Kenya, (Nairobi, April 1992); Africa Watch, Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya, (New York, November 1993).

[3]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Towards peaceful co-existence', 10 March 1995; Kenya, 'The Preservation of Public Security (Molo, Burnt Forest and Londiani areas) Regulations, Kenya Gazette, Suppl. 60, 17 September 1993.

[4]. ARTICLE 19, Kenya: Shooting the Messenger, (London: October 1993); Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, Failing the Democratic Challenge: Freedom of Expression in Multi-Party Kenya, (Washington, February 1994).

[5]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Towards peaceful co-existence', 10 March 1995

[6]. Human Rights Watch/Africa, Kenya: Old Habits Die Hard, (New York, July 1995)

[7]. Sunday Nation [Nairobi], 2 January 1994

[8]. Weekly Review [Nairobi] , 15 April 1994; Daily Nation [Nairobi], 4 April 1994

[9]. International Freedom of Expression Exchange [Greennet], 12 and 13 April 1994; ARTICLE 19, Censorship in Kenya, (London: March 1995)

[10]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], '"An Act of War"', 15 July 1994

[11]. Daily Nation [Nairobi], 18 March 1994

[12]. Reuters, 'UN worried about plight of displaced people', 27 December 1994; Economic Review [Nairobi], 'The worst Christmas', 2 January 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Mess in Maela', 13 January 1995

[13]. Reuters, 'Kenyan police disperse more than 700 displaced', 4 January 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Mess in Maela', 13 January 1995

[14]. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'Internal refugee families ordered to leave Eldoret', 30 December 1994, quoting Kenya News Agency.

[15]. Reuters, 'Kenyan police disperse more than 700 displaced', 4 January 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Mess in Maela', 13 January 1995

[16]. Human Rights Watch/Africa, Kenya: Old Habits Die Hard, (New York, July 1995).

[17]. Human Rights Watch/Africa, Kenya: Old Habits Die Hard, (New York, July 1995).

[18]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Slow but steady resettlement', 13 January 1995; Economic Review, 'Thessalia, Maela and Elsewhere', 16 January 1995.

[19]. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'Moi speaks on attempts to disrupt the peace; broadcast licensing court case', 11 January 1995, quoting Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, 8 January 1995.

[20]. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'Security measures intensified after 10 killed in ethnic violence in Rift Valley', 13 January 1995, quoting Kenya Television Network, 11 January 1995; Economic Review [Nairobi], 'Guerrilla warfare', 16 January 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Tribal fighting erupts again', 20 January 1995.

[21]. Daily Nation [Nairobi], 'Twenty villagers arrested over curfew', 24 February 1995; National Christian Council of Kenya, 'Kolongolo flare up: 800 evicted', The Clashes Update, 31 March 1995.

[22]. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'Three FORD-Asili MPs arrested for "incitement to violence" after Nakuru deaths', 17 January 1995, quoting Kenya Television Network, 15 January 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Tribal fighting erupts again', 20 January 1995.

[23]. ARTICLE 19, Censorship in Kenya, (London, March 1995)

[24]. ARTICLE 19, Censorship in Kenya, (London, March 1995); Human Rights Watch/Africa, Kenya: Old Habits Die Hard, (New York, July 1995); Daily Nation [Nairobi], 22 March 1994

[25]. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'Official defends police action at Odinga commemoration', 25 January 1995, quoting Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, 23 January 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Mayhem at Jaramogi Ceremony', 27 January 1995.

[26]. ARTICLE 19, Censorship in Kenya, (London, March 1995).

[27]. ARTICLE 19, Censorship in Kenya, (London, March 1995).

[28]. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'Attorney-general deregisters Paul Muite's opposition Mwangaza Trust', 20 January 1995, quoting Kenya Television Network, 18 January 1995; Daily Nation [Nairobi], 'Muite's group now struck off', 20 January 1995.

[29]. Independent [London], 'Corruption claim', 21 February 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Struck off the list', 24 February 1995.

[30]. Inter Press Service, [Greennet], 'Kenya-Human-Rights: Government slammed for manipulating judiciary', 6 April 1995.

[31]. ARTICLE 19, Censorship in Kenya, (London, March 1995).

[32]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'A noisy parting of the ways', 10 June 1994.

[33]. ARTICLE 19, Censorship in Kenya, (London, March 19950.

[34]. Amnesty International, Kenya: Abusive Use of the Law, (London, November 1994), (AI Index: AFR 32/15/94).

[35]. Independent [London], 'Leakey forms protest party', 8 May 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Taking the plunge', 12 May 1995.

[36]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Under pressure', 10 February 1995.

[37]. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 November 1994, quoting Kenya Television Network, 23 November 1994.

[38]. New Kenya Network [Greennet], 'Kenya: sixth attack on centre', 16 March 1995; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'The determined arsonists', 24 March 1995.

[39]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Paying a very high price', 5 August 1994.

[40]. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 November 1994, quoting Kenya Television Network, 4 November 1994; Inter Press Service [Greennet], 5 November 1994.

[41]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'The Sheikh is shut out', 16 December 1994.

[42]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Museveni comes clean', 24 March 1995.

[43]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Guerrillas on the rampage', 17 March 1995.

[44]. Amnesty International, Kenya: Torture, Political Detention and Unfair Trials, (London, July 1987), (AI Index: AFR 32/17/87).

[45]. Daily Nation [Nairobi], 'Moi wants refugees out', 6 March 1995, and 'Refugees: Moi meets UN officials', 7 March 1995; Inter Press Service [Greennet], 'Kenya-Uganda: Refugees face threat of repatriation', 7 March 1995.

[46]. Inter Press Service [Greennet], 29 November 1994; Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Imaginary crackdown', 2 December 1994.

[47]. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, African Exodus: Refugee Crisis, Human Rights and the 1969 OAU Convention, (Washington, June 1995), p. 70.

[48]. Weekly Review [Nairobi], 'Unexpectedly good results', 23 December 1994; Financial Times [London], 'Concerned donors call Kenya talks', 3 May 1995.

[49]. Financial Times [London], 'Concerned donors call Kenya talks', 3 May 1995.

[50]. Inter Press Service [Greennet], 'Kenya-Rights: Critical report released ahead of donor meeting', 24 July 1995.

[51]. World Bank, 'Informal Donor Meeting on Kenya', (press release), 24 July 1995.

[1] This paper provides a second update to the author's Kenya Since the Elections (July 1993, updated January 1994). (WRITENET Issue Paper, UNHCR RefWorld Databases, electronic format)

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