Last Updated: Friday, 25 July 2014, 12:52 GMT

Crisis and Transition, Catastrophe and Progress. Update to 'Indonesia: Economic, Social and Political Dimensions of the Current Crisis'

Publisher WRITENET
Author Julie M. Peteet
Publication Date 1 July 1998
Cite as WRITENET, Crisis and Transition, Catastrophe and Progress. Update to 'Indonesia: Economic, Social and Political Dimensions of the Current Crisis', 1 July 1998, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6b810.html [accessed 26 July 2014]
Comments This issue paper update was prepared by WRITENET on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. All sources are cited. This paper is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not necessarily those of UNHCR. WRITENET is a network of researchers and writers on human rights, forced migration, ethnic and political conflict. WRITENET is a subsidiary of Practical Management (UK)
DisclaimerThis is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

1.    INTRODUCTION

Since late April of this year, political change in Indonesia has been dramatic and, apparently, decisive. In mid-May, violent rioting rocked Jakarta and several other main cities, causing considerable damage, dislocations, and deaths. Combined with mounting student protests and broadening public opposition to the Government, these riots prompted a withdrawal of military support from President Suharto, who resigned on 21 May, with his newly selected Vice-President, B.J. Habibie, assuming the presidency.

Beyond this sudden change in national leadership (and subsequent reshuffles of the Cabinet and the officer corps), it soon became clear that a change in the very nature of the regime in Indonesia had been set in motion. The system of highly centralized and autocratic one-man rule established under Suharto has been replaced by a transitional government run by rival power centres - the Palace, the military leadership, and the Parliament. Facing widespread popular mobilization and strong pressures for change, President Habibie has loosened some of the most authoritarian restrictions on freedom of expression and of association, and this move towards political liberalization has facilitated a climate of ongoing, lively political debate and activity. "Demokrasi" and "Reformasi", the watchwords of the popular protest movement over the past few months, are now the standards which the current government is avowedly attempting to meet.

The pace of political change has been breathtaking, and the months ahead are filled with uncertainty and danger. Nonetheless, the broad contours of the transition process currently under way are already discernible, and it is possible at least to sketch the parameters of the possible in Indonesia today, bearing in mind the risk of recurring - or escalating - riots and the prospect of further violence and displacement of large numbers of people.

This report re-evaluates the course of events which transpired in May against the backdrop of the previous report's predictions, traces the trajectories of political change already under way in late June, and concludes with reference to the months ahead. As in the previous report, this author remains cautiously optimistic and self-consciously anti-alarmist, but the tragic episodes of mid-May 1998, the deepening economic crisis, and the current political configuration under the Habibie presidency underline the continuing danger of violence against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and the concomitant possibility of displacement of large numbers of people in the coming months.

2.    BACKDROP: LATE APRIL 1998

In several key respects, the course of events that transpired in Jakarta in mid-May of this year represented a culmination of trends identified in the previous report. Most significantly, the report chronicled a set of developments internal to the Suharto regime which left the President particularly poorly equipped to deal with the economic crisis that began to affect the country in the last months of 1997.

Since the late 1980s, President Suharto had grown increasingly wary of (and at times openly at odds with) certain elements in the Armed Forces, and correspondingly dependent upon a narrow circle of close cronies and family members. Fearful of incipient alliance-building between disaffected military officers and popular figures in Indonesian society, Suharto had since 1994 initiated a harsh crackdown on dissent in anticipation of the 1997 elections, and promoted his children and cronies to even greater heights of influence and wealth. As the elections approached, Suharto's nepotistic tendencies were increasingly visible in major economic decisions, in the selection of the Government's political party (Golkar) leadership, in the composition of the , and even in promotions in the uppermost echelons of the Armed Forces.

In the context of the economic crisis which hit Indonesia in late 1997, the discernible consequences of this political pattern were threefold. First of all, Suharto's personnel and policy decisions were more and more dictated by considerations of personal loyalty and favour, and less and less sensitive to market forces, institutional interests, and public opinion. Suharto's attack on "speculators and hoarders", flirtation with a currency board system, and choice of his controversial associate B.J. Habibie as Vice-President thus did little to assuage increasing concerns about Indonesia's future, enhance the regime's flagging popularity and credibility, or solve the country's mounting economic problems.

Secondly, the combination of this inauspicious political climate and a major economic crisis also worked to deepen cleavages and weaken loyalties within the broader set of civilian and military networks which had long underpinned the Suharto regime. In March 1998, a set of military rotations transferred command of Kostrad, the main Jakarta garrison, to the Presiden's son-in-law, Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, and left the Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Greater Jakarta Regional Command in the hands of his close allies. As detailed in the previous report, these promotions emboldened the notoriously adventurist Prabowo and embittered avowedly more "professional" officers, who rallied around the new Armed Forces Commander and Defence Minister, General Wiranto. At the same time, the appointment of President Suharto's longstanding associate B.J. Habibie as Vice-President, the selection of a that was noteworthy only for its nepotistic composition, and the impending takeover of Golkar by Suharto's favourite daughter, Mbak Tutut, left many previous regime loyalists deeply disappointed.

Thirdly, the confluence of these trends with a deepening economic crisis and growing foreign media and government attention created a strong sense of "a historical moment", thus triggering a broad wave of popular protest. In late January and February 1998, worsening economic conditions and various government figures' machinations had encouraged a series of anti-Chinese riots in several small cities in Java and scattered elsewhere around the archipelago, generating considerable international press coverage as well as anticipation of further "unrest".

Against the backdrop of these riots and the 11 March appointment by the People's Consultative Assembly of Suharto and Habibie as President and Vice-President, respectively, university campuses in many parts of the country saw a series of student protests which started in early March, persisted and grew in April, and began to spill into the streets in early May. With growing numbers of prominent civic figures joining or voicing support for the students, and some elements of the Armed Forces proving more and more receptive to their calls for "Reformasi", the protests had developed considerable momentum, popularity, and potency.[1][1]

As noted in the previous report, these protests also represented the culmination of trends in Indonesian society which had already begun to take shape in the mid-1990s. Two decades of rapid industrialization and urbanization under Suharto had swelled the ranks of the urban working and middle classes, whose grievances against the Suharto regime and aspirations for democratization gained expression through an emerging network of labour unions, human rights bodies, student groups, and civic and religious associations. Given its problematic minority and "foreign" status, the largely ethnic-Chinese (and Christian) business class was inclined towards quiescence rather than participation in opposition politics. Thus the movement for "Demokrasi" and "Reformasi" that emerged in March 1998 on university campuses in various Indonesian cities was led not by prominent businessmen but by loosely linked student groups, prominent intellectuals, and religious leaders such as Amien Rais, head of the modernist Islamic association Muhammadiyah.

Meanwhile, the 1990s had also witnessed the rising frequency and intensity of urban riots which targeted ethnic Chinese business establishments, houses of worship, and residences. These riots in part represented popular protest against a pattern of economic development that benefited corrupt local government authorities and a business class widely perceived to be predatory and "foreign". In addition, these riots occurred against the backdrop of new state policies which began to encourage the self-conscious Islamization of the public sphere and to embolden Moslem leaders and groups to assert a more prominent role in public life. Finally, by many accounts these riots were facilitated, if not triggered, by rivalries and intrigues within the increasingly factionalized Suharto regime and among rival Islamic groups in society. Thus a cluster of government figures (most notably Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto) and Moslem leaders were identified in the previous report as responsible for encouraging the anti-Chinese riots in late January and February of this year.

In short, by late April 1998, a set of trends within the Suharto regime and in Indonesian society at large had set the stage for dramatic political change. Suharto's increasing reliance on a small circle of family members, close cronies, and most trusted lieutenants had narrowed the base - and diluted the strength - of the support and loyalty which he could command in the face of uncertainty and crisis. Suharto's personnel and policy decisions, moreover, created an atmosphere of intrigue and uncertainty that only deepened the economic crisis and further alienated critical elements of the civilian and military establishment.

By late April 1998, these trends had combined with the economic crisis to mobilize Indonesian society towards popular protests. Rallies on university campuses in support of "Demokrasi" and "Reformasi" had only gathered greater strength, courage, moral legitimacy, and popularity in the course of March and April, to the extent that some ministers and high ranking military officers had begun to voice cautious support for the students' goals and to engage in private and public dialogue with campus activists. Meanwhile, the economic crisis which had first hit Indonesia in late 1997 only deepened over the first four months of the new year, with inflation and unemployment soaring and hardship for millions of Indonesians ever more palpable. It was against this backdrop that April 1998 drew to a close and the month of May ushered in a dramatic series of political developments.

3.    MAY 1998: CATACLYSM AND CAPITULATION

Although the trends noted above - deepening economic crisis, declining regime legitimacy and solidity, and mounting popular mobilization - were already visible in late April 1998, the events of May transpired with far greater speed, drama, violence, and consequence than hitherto imaginable. That month saw the most devastating riots ever to hit Jakarta, the resignation of President Suharto, and the inauguration of a new, albeit transitional, regime under President B.J. Habibie.

3.1     The Riots

The intensity of the crisis - and the scale of protest against the Suharto regime - escalated dramatically in the wake of the Government's drastic reduction of fuel price subsidies announced on 4 May.[2][2] Doubtlessly designed (and perfectly timed) to force IMF approval and disbursement of funds despite misgivings about the pace and extent of reform implementation since the signing of the 10 April accord, this move led to an increase in petrol prices by 70 per cent, diesel oil by 60 per cent, and kerosene by 25 per cent literally overnight.[3][3] Alongside the obvious economic hardship induced, the political fall-out was also immediate: student protests swelled and spilled into the streets in several cities, and the Sumatran metropolis of Medan erupted in rioting.[4][4]With President Suharto in Egypt for an international conference, and rumours circulating of a reshuffle on his return, the pace of events in Jakarta soon accelerated. Student protest continued to grow, and confrontations with police and military authorities became more frequent and more heated. In the late afternoon of 12 May, after hours of protest actions in and around Jakarta's élite Trisakti University, security forces opened fire and shot dead six students, wounding many more.[5][5] These killings, suspected by many analysts to be the premeditated handiwork of certain adventurist elements in the Armed Forces, generated widespread outrage.[6][6] On 13 May, thousands of Jakartans joined a burial ceremony for the victims. Scattered rioting ensued in a number of locations in Jakarta and elsewhere, continuing and spreading on 14 May, and finally petering out two days later.[7][7]

Subsequent reports estimated that more than one thousand people had lost their lives in the riots, many others had suffered beatings, rapes, and other indignities, and countless shops, homes, and other forms of private property had been lost to burning, looting and wanton wreckage.[8][8] Unsurprisingly, the victims were overwhelmingly Indonesians of Chinese ancestry, who, as noted in the previous report, have in recent years been the targets of increasingly frequent urban disturbances. The rioting in Jakarta led some 150,000 residents - mostly ethnic Chinese and Western expatriates - to flee the country, mostly by air to nearby Singapore or Hong Kong.[9][9] Together with simultaneous disturbances in Solo and several other Indonesian cities, the Jakarta riots constituted the single worst episode of anti-Chinese violence in the country since the so-called "Malari" incident in January 1974.

3.2     The Transition

Meanwhile, on 15 May, Suharto returned home early from Cairo, setting in motion a week of frenzied political activity and change. Despite the reassertion of "law and order" on the streets of Jakarta, the restoration of fuel price subsidies to previous levels, and the announcement of an imminent Cabinet reshuffle, Suharto proved unable to reassert his authority.[10][10] The leaders of the various factions of the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - People's Representative Assembly), including Golkar chief and DPR speaker Harmoko and Armed Forces faction leader Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid, publicly called on the President to resign.[11][11] With students joining legislators in an occupation of the Parliament and with a nation-wide rally scheduled for 20 May, Suharto proposed to hold new presidential elections, in which he would not be a candidate. Opposition leaders, under heavy military pressure, agreed to call off the 20 May rally but rejected Suharto's offer.

By 20 May, with an estimated 30,000 student protesters still occupying the Parliament grounds, Suharto's authority had reached an all-time low. Led by economic coordinating minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita, the entire Cabinet resigned. Meanwhile, a series of meetings among the military leadership had reportedly led to an emerging consensus that Suharto would have to resign, with the President's son-in-law Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto one of the few remaining avowed defenders of the regime. How Defence Minister and Armed Forces chief General Wiranto conveyed this news to Suharto remains unclear, but by the evening of 20 May the President had agreed to the removal of Lieutenant General Prabowo from the command of the Army's major Jakarta garrison (Kostrad), by some accounts as punishment for his adventurism in recent months, and on the morning of 21 May Suharto announced his own resignation, ceding power to his Vice-President and long-time associate, B.J. Habibie.[12][12]

The final weeks of May then saw the rapid demobilization of forces which had assembled in Jakarta for the last days of the Suharto regime. While rejecting the transfer of power to Habibie as an insufficient response to popular calls for "Demokrasi" and "Reformasi", the student groups who had occupied the Parliament mostly dispersed, encouraged by opposition leaders like Amien Rais as well as new groups of pro-Habibie demonstrators. Meanwhile, the first week of the Habibie presidency also brought the downfall of Lieutenant General Prabowo, who was transferred from the command of the powerful Kostrad to head an army college in the West Java city of Bandung. As noted in the previous report, Lieutenant General Prabowo had emerged in January and February as a supporter of Habibie's vice-presidential bid and a new ally of certain pro-Habibie Islamic groups, and in late May he allegedly demanded as compensation for his efforts promotion to the position of Army Chief of Staff. Together with his close ally Major General Muchdi, who had likewise been summarily dismissed from his post as new commander of Special Forces (Kopassus), Prabowo reportedly made rather menacing overtures to President Habibie, and for several days after Habibie's inauguration the stance of Kostrad and Kopassus troops and the whereabouts of Prabowo and Muchdi were the focus of much speculation and anxiety. In the end, however, Prabowo and Muchdi accepted their dismissals and new postings, and officers reputed to be close allies of Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto assumed command of the key Kostrad and Kopassus posts.[13][13]

In short, May 1998 witnessed the most dramatic and decisive series of political developments and changes since the violent removal of Soekarno and the subsequent anti-communist pogroms in late 1965. Against the backdrop of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, trends within the Suharto regime and in Indonesian society at large manifested themselves in popular protest, mass rioting, and a rapid transfer of power. By the end of the month, some of the immediate consequences of these events and the medium and long term implications for Indonesian politics and society were already discernible.

4.    LATE JUNE 1998: AFTERMATH AND ANTICIPATIONS

4.1     The New Habibie?

The ascent of B.J. Habibie to the presidency in late May 1998 understandably met with considerable skepticism, cynicism, and dismay from many political figures and commentators. As noted in the previous report, Habibie was well known as an intimate associate and protégé of former President Suharto, as long-time Minister of Research and Technology and master of a set of high-tech "strategic industries" that had yet to turn a profit, and as patron of the controversial Association of Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals (ICMI - Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia), seen variously by observers as a vehicle for Habibie's political ambitions, a mechanism for the cooptation and control of Islamic groups, and a sectarian body promoting Islamization at the expense of multi-faith tolerance.[14][14]The notoriously "eccentric" and "mercurial" Habibie had been a highly controversial (and in some quarters utterly unacceptable) vice-presidential choice in March 1998, and his assumption of presidential duties disappointed many. Some student activists and opposition figures saw Habibie as a thin veneer for continued rule by Suharto; businessmen and financial institutions (domestic and international) typically viewed him as overly "nationalistic" and insensitive to market realities. Military officers allegedly resented his intrusions into realms of the economy previously reserved for the Armed Forces, and Islamic and Christian leaders alike viewed his sponsorship of the ICMI as likely to exacerbate already worsening religious tensions in the country.

This focus on Habibie's personality and activities under the Suharto regime ignored both the considerable constraints on his presidency imposed by the economic crisis and the underlying change of regime which his ascendancy had signified. Indeed, Habibie's all too evident "weakness" soon showed itself to be a refreshing strength: responsible economic ministers and policy choices were announced, and steps to investigate the riots and reassure Indonesia's minority "Chinese" and Christian populations were soon undertaken. Political prisoners were freed, press censorship was eased, and promises of political reform, measures against "cronyism, corruption, and nepotism", and elections were extended. Even the hitherto non-negotiable issue of East Timor, it was hinted, was open for reconsideration.[15][15]Under conditions of severe economic crisis and widespread popular mobilization and pressure, Habibie has thus seemed eager to please even his harshest critics. News reports of a spontaneous Habibie visit to the home of Gus Dur, head of the 30-million strong Islamic association Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and a long-time opponent of ICMI, noted the surprising sound of jovial laughter coming from the room where they were meeting. Meanwhile, contact (and friendship) between Habibie and Suharto reportedly came to an abrupt halt with the transfer of power in May.[16][16]

4.2     A New Regime?

More important than these newsworthy snapshots of an ebullient Habibie singlehandedly introducing "Demokrasi" and "Reformasi" with a wave of his magic wand was the markedly decentralized configuration of state power that had emerged in the wake of Suharto's resignation. The Cabinet, while filled with familiar faces, soon proved to be far less deferential to the President than its Suharto-era predecessors, as reported difficulties in the recruitment of new ministers and threats of resignation soon made clear. With the Habibie administration widely seen as transitional, many Cabinet ministers, most notably Coordination Minister for Economic Affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita, now appear as responsive to public opinion and their own medium-term political prospects as they are to the orders of the President.

Meanwhile, the resignation of President Suharto has also suggested that major changes in the political role and orientation of the Armed Forces are under way. For more than thirty years, Suharto had controlled - and manipulated - all promotions and assignments to top military posts, and the Armed Forces' withdrawal of support for his regime demonstrated the hitherto unproven capacity of the military leadership to achieve internal consensus and assert political power independently of - and against - the chief executive. The unceremonious relegation of Prabowo and Muchdi in late May, and the late June removal of Prabowo's close ally, Major General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, from his post as Jakarta Regional Commander, led some observers to conclude that Defence Minister and Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto has emerged as the undisputed master of the military, or at least as primus inter pares in a fairly united Army leadership.[17][17]Nonetheless, the autonomy, internal solidity, and orientation of the Armed Forces remain unproven. For example, some reports have noted Wiranto's occasional visits to Suharto's residence and speculated that the former President still enjoys influence over his former adjutant. Indeed, it was reportedly General Wiranto who persuaded President Habibie to install an active Armed Forces officer as replacement for the new Attorney General who, in his short three-week tenure, had shown considerable zeal in pursuing a legal investigation of the Suharto family's business activities.[18][18]

Meanwhile, although General Wiranto has succeeded in installing close associates as commanders of Kostrad, Kopassus, and the Greater Jakarta Regional Command, his original choice for the Kostrad post, Major General Johnny Lumintang, one of the Army's few Christian generals, was within a few hours inexplicably withdrawn and replaced by another (Moslem) Wiranto loyalist, former West Java Regional Commander Major General Djamari Chaniago. Accounts of this strange turn of events cited opposition to the Lumintang appointment as coming variously from out-going Kostrad commander Lieutenant General Prabowo, lower-level Kostrad officers, and Moslem activists close to Habibie.[19][19]sIf the internal dynamics and ultimate source of authority within the Armed Forces remain clouded in mystery, so do military plans for a post-Suharto era. Some reports suggest there are elements in the Armed Forces who envisage a reduction (or elimination) of military representation in the DPR, withdrawal of military backing for a government political party (i.e. Golkar), and the removal of the police from military authority to the Ministry of Home Affairs.[20][20] Yet such liberal views have yet to receive official endorsement from General Wiranto or other high-ranking Armed Forces spokesmen, and recent military moves against an activist Attorney General and against workers' demonstrations in Jakarta reveal far more familiarly conservative tendencies.[21][21]Finally, questions about the political authority and orientation of Habibie, the Armed Forces, and former President Suharto have focused attention on the future of the legislature (DPR) and of Golkar, the former regime's electoral machine and ruling party. The residual influence of Suharto and his children in Golkar is considerable and is reportedly being mustered for an imminent meeting to remove current Golkar chief and DPR Speaker Harmoko, who is understandably resented by the former first family for his role in the events of last May. Replacements for Harmoko are rumoured to include former Vice-President Try Sutrisno and former Defence Minister Edy Sudrajat, both retired military officers who enjoy residual support within the Armed Forces and reputations for independence from Suharto (and Habibie, for that matter).[22][22]Thus a "Suhartoist" comeback attempt is currently envisaged in which the former President reasserts his claim to Golkar, ousts Harmoko, and regains control over the DPR. According to this scheme, the Parliament could then call for an extraordinary session of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat - People's Consultative Assembly), the supra-parliamentary body - also stacked with Suharto appointees - which is empowered to "elect" a President and Vice-President, and the appointment of a new chief executive to replace Habibie. The choice of Try Sutrisno or Edy Sudrajat as new Golkar chief and/or presidential candidate would presumably facilitate Armed Forces involvement in this scenario, via their faction in the DPR, military influence in Golkar, and military facilitation of the meetings necessary to oust Harmoko, reconvene the MPR, and appoint a new President.[23][23] With Harmoko and the DPR remaining largely supportive of President Habibie and reluctant to assert parliamentary authority, the national legislature has yet to play a role as a rival power centre to the Palace and the Armed Forces. Hence the considerable interest and speculation regarding former President Suharto's choice of major Armed Forces mosques for his Friday prayers and the announcement that a special meeting of the Golkar leadership will be held in the Armed Forces headquarters.[24][24]The scenario sketched above appears somewhat unlikely in the current climate, given Habibie's growing legitimacy, the Armed Forces' claims of opposition to a Suhartoist retrenchment, and the likely public response to such a development. Yet fears of a Suharto comeback are very real in Indonesia today, contributing to an atmosphere of considerable intrigue, uncertainty, and insecurity.

4.3     The Promise of New Politics?

Meanwhile, if the resignation of Suharto has left the Indonesian state somewhat hollow at the centre and in disarray, a variety of forces in Indonesian society have responded quite positively to the rise of Habibie to the presidency, the tentative political liberalization of recent weeks, and the promise of elections by 1999. Newspapers and magazines have grown much bolder in their coverage of political issues, and several banned publications are already resurfacing. Demands for the investigation - and prosecution - of the 12 May Trisakti shooting incident and the abductions of numerous anti-government activists in preceding months have pushed government and military authorities into judicial proceedings and inspired other groups to pursue cases of human rights violations dating as far back as 1984.[25][25]A lively reevaluation of the Suharto regime's historical origins and legacies is already under way in the mass media and on university campuses. The riots and the problems of the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia are the focus of open concern and debate among prominent intellectuals and civic figures. The ongoing process and direction of democratization and the format of a post-Suharto democracy are matters of freewheeling public discussion.

Meanwhile, political liberalization has also focused renewed attention on long-standing questions about the future form of the Indonesian nation-state. For example, President Habibie appears to have adopted a relatively receptive stance towards demands - domestic and international - for autonomy, or even independence, for the occupied territory of East Timor, which was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 and subsequently annexed as a province. Habibie has offered "special status" for East Timor, there are rumours that the long-imprisoned resistance leader Xanana Gusmao will soon be released, and the Indonesian military is reportedly engaged in a high-level debate over the future of the territory.[26][26] These developments have combined with a flurry of diplomatic activity and negotiations to suggest the possibility of more concessions by Jakarta, whether in the form of autonomy or even a UN-supervised referendum such as the resistance movement has long demanded. Against this backdrop, the past weeks have seen popular demonstrations in Dili, the capital of East Timor, as well as well-publicized actions and discussions in Jakarta on the future of the long-occupied territory.[27][27]

Meanwhile, the Habibie administration's relatively conciliatory stance on the issue of East Timor has emboldened disaffected groups in several regions of Indonesia proper to push for autonomy or even independence. In far-flung Jayapura and Biak for example, activists demonstrated and unfurled flags representing demands for the independence of Irian Jaya, the western half of New Guinea which was incorporated into Indonesia in the 1960s.[28][28] A small number of students from the eastern Indonesian province of Maluku likewise revived demands dating back to the 1950s for special autonomy or the formation of a republic independent of Jakarta.[29][29] While opposition to autonomy or independence for East Timor remains strong in the Indonesian Government, and regional independence movements in Indonesia proper have very limited prospects, deeply held local grievances against the central government in Jakarta are allowed greater voice in the public domain. Regional parliaments, long overshadowed and emasculated by an extremely centralized form of rule under Suharto, are being pushed to assume a greater role in overseeing provincial affairs and asserting local aims vis-a-vis Jakarta.

At the national level and in much of the country, Indonesians mobilizing for political gains in the present and manoeuvring for electoral goals in the near future have drawn on the rich organizational legacies of the past, which remained largely submerged during the authoritarian Suharto era but are still available for reactivation today. Thus, for example, the popular Amien Rais can draw upon the reportedly 28-million strong Islamic modernist association Muhammadiyah as the basis for rallies today and an election campaign next year. Founded in 1912 as a network of modern Western-style schools (madrasah) and charitable groups, Muhammadiyah later formed the backbone of Masjumi, one of the four most popular political parties during the brief period of constitutional democracy in the 1950s. While Masjumi was banned by Soekarno in 1960, Muhammadiyah survived - and prospered - as an association and network of schools which grew in number, constituency, and significance in three decades of urbanization, industrialization, and upward social mobility for Moslems under the Suharto regime.[30][30]

Today Rais could try to resurrect Masjumi in tandem with some of the more militant Islamic activists (e.g. from Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia) who can also lay claim to the Masjumi party title, perhaps with the blessing of Habibie and his protégés in ICMI.[31][31] Alternatively, Rais could renew the 1950s-era coalition between Masjumi and the more technocratic, liberal, and secular Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), whose heirs include former Cabinet minister Emil Salim and other prominent figures deemed more acceptable to the Armed Forces, the business community, and Western donor governments.

Counterposed against the urban middle-class Moslem and Outer Island bases of the old Masjumi and PSI are a set of more rural and populist forces. With a strong base in its network of Islamic pesantren (boarding schools) scattered in towns throughout Java and beyond, the 30-million strong Islamic association Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has long been at odds with Muhammadiyah on theological and political grounds. During the long Suharto years, moreover, Muhammadiyah's more urban, western-educated, and middle-class constituents succeeded in entering the ranks of the power élite, typically recruited via the group's university student wing HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) and in the 1990s through cooptation into ICMI networks of power and influence. By contrast, NU's more rural, pesantren-educated members typically graduated only to positions of local prominence during the same period.[32][32]Thus while Muhammadiyah members - most prominently Amien Rais - have worked with ICMI and developed linkages with Habibie since 1990, NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) remained aloof and pioneered a public strategy of embracing multi-faith tolerance against what he described as dangerous Islamic sectarianism. In alliance first with the (Catholic) former Armed Forces chief Benny Murdani, then with Partai Demokrasi Indonesia leader Megawati Soekarnoputri, and finally with Suharto's daughter Mbak Tutut (Habibie's main rival for influence within Golkar and the Cabinet in 1997-1998), Gus Dur consistently aligned NU with various powerful and avowedly secular forces opposed to Habibie and his ICMI (and/or Muhammadiyah) based allies.[33][33]

Against this backdrop, the recent ascendancy of Habibie to the presidency has mobilized Nahdlatul Ulama into political action. In its stronghold of East Java, for example, thousands of NU members rallied in a massive show of strength in early June in Surabaya, the region's capital and the second largest city in Indonesia, and a planned visit by Amien Rais to Pasuruan, an NU bailiwick, was eventually cancelled on security grounds.[34][34] Some high-ranking NU leaders have announced plans to reconstitute the association as a political party for parliamentary elections scheduled for 1999, and the ailing and wheelchair-bound Gus Dur, who long voiced opposition to the formation of an Islamic party, has yet to quash the initiative.[35][35]As with Amien Rais's efforts to establish a popular, electoral base beyond Muhammadiyah and urban middle-class Moslems, so is Gus Dur's Nahdlatul Ulama similarly inclined towards alliance-building, in this case with the popular Megawati Soekarnoputri. As detailed in the previous report, Megawati, the daughter of the first Indonesian President Soekarno, had emerged in the early 1990s as the head of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), the Suharto regime's forced fusion of the Soekarno-era Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI) with a set of smaller Christian and secular parties. By 1996, however, once Megawati's evident mass popularity and her closeness with Gus Dur threatened a serious electoral challenge to Golkar in the upcoming elections, Suharto and the military engineered her removal from the PDI leadership and, in July of that year, violently forced her and her followers from the PDI headquarters in Jakarta, triggering two days of rioting and signalling a harsh regime crackdown on all forms of dissent.[36][36]

Although since mid-1996 Megawati has refrained from active participation in political protests, she remains a very popular figure who holds great potential in the elections planned for next year. Besides name recognition and residual respect for her late father, Megawati appears likely to regain control over the PDI with the current government's blessing. The PDI, one of only two parties allowed to challenge Golkar during the Suharto era, has a nation-wide machine in place and one which, unlike the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP or United Development Party), has enjoyed "oppositional" status in Christian areas in the Outer Islands (and other non-Moslem locales such as Hindu Bali).

Thus Megawati could reemerge as a unifying figure, one capable of outshining the divisive Amien Rais and of supplanting Moslem arriviste triumphalism with a more all-encompassing "nationalist" populist appeal. It is in this context that Gus Dur and NU may ally with a Megawati-led PDI or revived Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, and thus, reassuring conservative skeptics in the military and the business community, counter-balance the influence of Megawati's urban poor and working-class base.[37][37]

In short, the month following Suharto's resignation has seen the resurgence of pluralist political activity in Indonesian society in a climate of rapid liberalization and in anticipation of freer electoral competition. The press and a network of civic figures and organized groups have rapidly expanded the realm of public discussion and debate, and political parties have begun to prepare for a new era of constitutional democracy in Indonesia.

5.    CONCLUSION: NEW RIOTS, NEW REFUGEES?

In this context, there is some basis for hopes that violent riots targeting Indonesia's ethnic-Chinese minority will not recur in the months and years ahead. After all, "anti-Chinese riots" did not take place during the period of constitutional democracy in the 1950s and occurred only on extremely few occasions during the latter (i.e. authoritarian) part of the Soekarno era. Insofar as the trend towards more frequent and violent anti-Chinese rioting in the 1990s has reflected popular grievances left unredressed, manipulated, or re-channelled by the authoritarian Suharto regime, a freer and more democratic environment will hopefully encourage more peaceful forms of social mobilization. Indeed, the past month has witnessed an enormous upsurge in demonstrations over local land and labour issues in various parts of the country involving thousands of urban poor and workers but leading to little in the way of violence or damage to property.[38][38]

Moreover, insofar as the anti-Chinese riots of the Suharto era reflected an authoritarian regime's policies of discrimination against a "pariah entrepreneur" minority, today's atmosphere of lively public debate may well create a climate conducive to greater inter-ethnic and inter-faith tolerance. Indeed, the new government, the press, and a number of civic groups have done much to focus attention on the violent May riots in ways which stress both state and societal responsibility for the safety and welfare of the country's vulnerable ethnic-Chinese population. Numerous public figures have raised demands for the replacement of the Suharto-era's derogatory designation "Cina" and a return to the more neutral (but long officially abolished) "Tionghoa", and voiced doubts about the dubious term pribumi (indigenous). Some have also called for an end to the ban on the use of the Chinese language and script, Chinese cultural activities and Chinese schools and to the state's (unofficial) discriminatory policies in universities, the civil service, and the military. Some ethnic-Chinese activists have even established a Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia.[39][39]Nonetheless, a number of less salutary signals and circumstances suggest that continued, if not heightened, caution with regard to the prospect of recurring anti-Chinese riots remains warranted in the months ahead. First, the sheer scale and brutality of the riots in Jakarta remain fresh and poignant testimony to the possibilities for violent social mobilization against the ethnic-Chinese population. Even if, as some credible accounts suggest, the Jakarta riots were instigated and many of the atrocities were committed by "organized groups", it is far from clear that all Indonesians recall these events with shame and dismay.[40][40]Those harbouring the most virulently (or ambitiously) anti-Chinese sentiments may well relish - and find inspiration in - memories of ethnic-Chinese Indonesians fleeing Jakarta by the thousand for Singapore and Hong Kong in May. Other, perhaps more narrowly opportunistic, elements have reportedly exploited the current climate of fear to harass and extort protection money from ethnic Chinese in various towns and cities. Small-scale attacks on Chinese shops and places of worship have occurred in several towns on Java and elsewhere in the course of June.[41][41]Overall, the vivid media coverage of sustained rioting, looting, and violence in the national capital (and of massive flight overseas) in May both exemplified and expanded the realm of imaginable attacks against a much resented minority. The damage is irreparable; an atmosphere of heightened fear and uncertainty is still in the air.[42][42] Many of the ethnic-Chinese Indonesians who fled the country in May returned promptly after the restoration of order in Jakarta, but some are now planning speedy departures if rioting erupts anew.[43][43]

Secondly, the ongoing transition to a post-Suharto Indonesia has not eliminated - and may well have exacerbated - precisely those conditions identified in the previous report as conducive to riots against the country's ethnic-Chinese minority. Decades of discriminatory state policies and sharpening ethno-religious identities and cleavages will not disappear - or be reversed - overnight. Adventurist military elements suspected of involvement in inciting or instigating riots have been purged from key posts in the Armed Forces, but the current appearance of consensus and unity in the military leadership may soon give way to familiar patterns of internal factionalism and intrigue. At the very least, the ongoing investigation into the Trisakti shootings and the riots in Jakarta has left regional military commanders all the more reluctant to suppress disturbances with state violence.

More importantly, perhaps, the ascendancy of ICMI chief Habibie to the presidency (and other ICMI activists to the Cabinet) may well have emboldened, if not empowered, some Islamic groups who have been vocal opponents of perceived Chinese and Christian predominance in the economy and various spheres of Indonesian life. In addition, with Habibie as President and elections scheduled for 1999, long-standing friction and rivalry between Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, by some accounts crucial for the outbreak of riots in the mid-1990s, are already becoming increasingly visible. Meanwhile, those figures left sidelined by the course of events in late May - most notably former President Suharto himself and Lieutenant General Prabowo - might reemerge as spoilers of the new regime, amply capable of intrigue, riot instigation, and other "dirty tricks".

Thirdly and finally, the combination of political liberalization and deepening economic crisis portends a season of frequent and perhaps mounting popular mobilization. Already the easing of restrictions on political expression and activity has encouraged a wave of local demonstrations in various towns and cities around the country, from mass strikes to NU rallies to protests against corrupt government officials. With popular calls for "Demokrasi" and "Reformasi" accorded broad legitimacy, the 1999 elections looming on the horizon, and the central government in Jakarta decentred and in disarray, local civilian and security officials alike are more sensitive to such displays of "the people's will", and competing political groups are freer and more anxious than ever to harness it to their own ends.

In some parts of the archipelago, moreover, rising pressures for regional autonomy or independence have contributed to an atmosphere of considerable tension and uncertainty. In East Timor, for example, recent popular demonstrations for independence and rumours of impending changes in the central government's policy have driven tens of thousands of non-Timorese "transmigrants" from various Indonesian provinces to flee the territory over the past few weeks.[44][44] In predominantly Christian provinces like Irian Jaya and Maluku, moreover, demands for regional autonomy or independence reflect deep-seated local suspicions concerning the allegedly more Islamic orientation and policies of the Habibie administration.[45][45] In such provinces, tensions between the Christian population and local Moslem minority groups may combine with heightened Moslem-Christian friction within the Armed Forces and increasing economic hardship to produce local episodes of "communal violence" such as the Madurese-Dayak conflict of December 1996-January 1997 in East Kalimantan.

Meanwhile, the economic crisis which first struck Indonesia in late 1997 is taking a dramatic toll on business activity, living standards, and social conditions in the country. Although the Habibie government has signed new agreements with foreign creditors and the IMF and made promising strides towards reform, the economy is expected to contract by at least 10 per cent in 1998, inflation is estimated at upwards of 80 per cent, and unemployment is soaring. The cost of food, medicine, and other basic daily needs has risen beyond the reach of millions of Indonesians. A food crisis and a health crisis are well under way. Insofar as these increasing hardships sharpen existing inequalities and exacerbate long-standing resentments against the relatively wealthy ethnic-Chinese minority, the months ahead will only be more conducive to outbursts of rioting and violence.[46][46]

Against the backdrop of these dramatic political developments and evolving social trends, it is perhaps prudent to conclude that the prospects for recurring riots against Indonesia's ethnic-Chinese minority remain considerable in the months to come. The unprecedented scale and brutality of the riots and looting in Jakarta in mid-May was only possible in the context of the historic breakdown of the Suharto regime and the unmatched anonymity afforded by the nation's capital and principal city. Such a major cataclysm is thus unlikely to take place again in the foreseeable future. Yet the first month of the Habibie presidency has already seen scattered, small-scale anti-Chinese rioting in several towns and indications of more to come.

That said, the possibility that recurring riots could generate displacement of large numbers of ethnic-Chinese Indonesians or a "boat people" crisis of 1970s-Vietnam proportions still remains rather remote. The thousands who fled Jakarta in May departed by air for Singapore or Hong Kong, many on open-return tickets purchased a few months in advance in anticipation of such a contingency. Others left for Australia or destinations further afield, and still others sought refuge in locations within Indonesia, ranging from rural Java to Bali and North Sulawesi. Yet the vast majority of those who did flee the country returned home shortly thereafter, and despite continued nervousness and vigilance among ethnic-Chinese Indonesians, no mass exodus is on the horizon.

In short, the months ahead may well see a pattern of recurring riots that target ethnic-Chinese Indonesians or at least their businesses, residences, and houses of worship. That said, such disturbances are likely to be smaller in scale, more local and episodic, and less brutal than the violent rioting and looting seen in the national capital and elsewhere in mid-May. In this context, thousands of ethnic Chinese will remain understandably nervous over the upcoming months, and some of those who can afford to leave the country will doubtless do so.

Yet no mass refugee crisis is in the making. Indonesia's ethnic-Chinese minority has survived and indeed prospered in the face of discrimination, hardship, and the threat of violence in the past. It will continue to do so in the years to come. Indeed, if the past month's lively public debate on Indonesia's future is any guide, the vast majority of ethnic-Chinese Indonesians will continue to strive towards accommodation to new realities and assertion of new rights rather than flee the country that is their home.

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[1][1] See, for example, D&R [Jakarta], "Prof. Dr. Selo Sumardjan: 'Sekonyong-konyong, Mahasiswa Meledak...'", 9 May 1998

[2][2] D&R [Jakarta], "Sudah Jatuh, Tertimpa Tangga Pula", 9 May 1998

[3][3] International Monetary Fund News Brief [Washington DC], "IMF Executive Board Completes First Review of Indonesia's Economic Program", 4 May 1998; International Monetary Fund, "Press Briefing on First Review of Indonesia's Economic Program by Stanley Fischer and Hubert Neiss", Washington DC, 4 May 1998

[4][4] See Forum Keadilan [Jakarta], "Percik Bara Seantero Nusantara", 1 June 1998

[5][5] Forum Keadilan [Jakarta], "Di Ujung Aksi Damai", 1 June 1998

[6][6] See, for example, Gatra [Jakarta], "Misteri, Keanehan, Campur Aduk Dalam Trisakti Berdarah". 13 June 1998; Forum Keadilan [Jakarta], "Danpomdam Jaya, Kolonel Hendardji: 'Ada Pihak Yang Mau Menututup-nutupi Kasus Ini'", 16 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Sidang Penembakan Mahasiswa Trisakti: Keberadaan Pasukan Lain Dipertanyakan", 16 June 1998; Kompas, "Sidang Penembakan Mahasiswa Trisakti: Perintah Tembak Hanya Ada Pada Pangdam", 17 June 1998; Kompas, "Sidang Kasus Trisakti: Ada Tembakan Dari Arah Citraland", 25 June 1998

[7][7] Kompas [Jakarta], "Jakarta Dilanda Kerusuhan Massa", 14 May 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Perusuh Menjarah", 15 May 1998; Surabaya Post, "Yogya Rusuh, Bandung 6 Diringkus, Semarang Lumpuh", 14 May 1998; Pikiran Rakyat [Bandung], "Massa Mengamuk Di Cicadas", 14 May 1998; Pos Kota [Jakarta], "Kerusuhan Makin Hebat: 7 Tewas, Ratusan Mobil Dibakar, Toko2 Hancur", 15 May 1998

[8][8] Kompas [Jakarta], "Kerusuhan Di Jakarta: Kerugian Fisik Rp 2,5 Trilyun", 18 May 1998; Republika [Jakarta], "Mitra Perempuan: Pernyataan Terbuka", 13 June 1998; Tempo Interaktif [Jakarta], "Mereka Ditelanjangi, Diperkosa Dan Dibunuh", 20 June 1998. For English-language summary accounts, see International Herald Tribune [Paris], S. Mydans, "Death Toll in Jakarta Put at 1,188", 4 June 1998; International Herald Tribune [Paris], S. Mydans, "Jakarta Groups Document Mass Rapes of Chinese", 11 June 1998

[9][9] Jakarta Post, "Over 150,000 Flee Abroad During Riots: Ministry", 9 June 1998

[10][10] See, for example, Kompas [Jakarta], "Menhamkam/Pangab: Situasi Jakarta Sudah Normal", 17 May 1998; Kompas, "Presiden Segera 'Reshuffle' Kabinet", 17 May 1998; Forum Keadilan [Jakarta], "Merevisi Dua Keppres Berumur Sebelas Hari", 1 June 1998

[11][11] Kompas [Jakarta], "Pimpinan DPR: Sebaiknya Pak Harto Mundur", 19 May 1998; Republika [Jakarta], "Pimpinan DPR: Demi Persatuan, Presiden Sebaiknya Mundur", 19 May 1998; Media Indonesia [Jakarta], "Presiden Diminta Mundur", 19 May 1998

[12][12] On this series of events, see Forum Keadilan [Jakarta], "Detik-detik Menjelang Pak Harto Berhenti", 17 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Detik-detik Soeharto Berhenti Versi Habibie", 7 June 1998; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], J. McBeth and M. Vatikiotis, "Endgame", 28 May 1998; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], M. Vatikiotis and A. Schwarz, "A Nation Awakes", 4 June 1998

[13][13]  SiaR [Jakarta], "Kostrad Pimpin Penyerbuan Mahasiswa Di DPR, Isu Kudeta Merebak Di Ibukota", 23 May 1998; SiaR [Jakarta], "Pangab Gelar Apel Siaga Untuk Redam Manuver Prabowo", 26 May 1998; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], J. McBeth, "Soldiering On", 4 June 1998

[14][14] On Dr B.J. Habibie, see Takashi Shiraishi, "Rewiring the Indonesian State", in Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey (eds.), Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1996), pp. 164-79. On ICMI, see Robert Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class", Indonesia, No. 56 (October 1993), pp. 1-37; R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 55, No. 3 (August 1996), pp. 613-34

[15][15] See Bernas [Semarang], "Habibie Angkat Tiga Penasihat Ekonomi", 2 June 1998; International Herald Tribune [Paris], S. Mydans, "15 Freed in East Timor amid Shift in Jakarta", 11 June 1998; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], J. McBeth, "Getting On with It", 25 June 1998

[16][16] See, for example, Gatra [Jakarta], "Bung Rudy Yang Egaliter", 20 June 1998

[17][17] Singapore Straits Times, "Wiranto in Full Control of Military", 24 May 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin Diganti Mayjen TNI Djadja Suparman", 26 June 1998; Republika [Jakarta], "Sjafrie Dan Kivlan Diganti, Ini Bukan Penggeseran 'Orang-orang' Prabowo", 26 June 1998

[18][18] Kompas [Jakarta], "Soal Pergantian Jaksa Agung: Tak Terkait Dengan Pengusutan Harta Soeharto", 17 June 1998

[19][19] See Kompas [Jakarta], "Jaga Kekompakan TNI AD: Johny Lumintang Pangkostrad 17 Jam", 24 May 1998; Forum Keadilan [Jakarta], "Kisah Mutasi Panglima Yang Unik", 25 May 1998; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], J. McBeth, "Balance of Power: Armed-forces Commander Wiranto Is Far From Omnipotent", 11 June 1998

[20][20] Antara [Jakarta], "Pernyataan Wakapolri Tentang Status Polri Di Luar ABRI", 18 June 1998; Singapore Straits Times, "Police Force's Wish to Quit Abri Strengthens", 19 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Bupati ABRI Tidak Boleh Dua Periode", 22 June 1998

[21][21] Kompas [Jakarta], "Batal, Rencana Ribuan Buruh Turn Ke Jalan", 25 June 1998; Asiaweek [Hong Kong], J. Tesoro, "A Matter of Force", 27 June 1998; Asiaweek [Hong Kong], J. Tesoro, "What Role for the Military?", 27 June 1998

[22][22] Kompas [Jakarta], "Terpilih, Trio Penyelenggara MLB Golkar", 16 June 1998; Kompas, "Try Sutrisno: Munaslub Golkar Harus Buat Kriteria Obyektif", 18 June 1998; Republika [Jakarta], "Kalangan FKP Minta Panitia Munaslub Golkar Diganti", 18 June 1998

[23][23] See Ummat [Jakarta], "Aliansi Politik Para Loyalis Soeharto" and "Mau Apa Lagi Kaum Suhartois?, June 1998; Ummat [Jakarta], "Trio Penyelenggara Munas Luar Biasa" and "Indra Bambang Utoyo: Mbak Tutut Atau Bambang Tri Jangan", July 1998; Gatra [Jakarta], "Bangkitnya Pendukung Soeharto", 27 June 1998

[24][24] See Jawa Pos [Surabaya], "Tak Ada Konsesi Politik ABRI-Soeharto", 26 June 1998; Jawa Pos [Surabaya], "Hubungan ABRI-Soeharto Bukan Politis; Giliran Lakukan Salat Jumat Di Masjid Mabes AD", 27 June 1998; Republika [Jakarta], "Rakor Golkar Digelar Di Mabes ABRI", 27 June 1998

[25][25] See, for example, Gatra [Jakarta], "Tragedi Tanjung Priok: Tuntutan Mereka Itu Bergaung Makin Keras", 20 June 1998

[26][26] See, for example, International Herald Tribune [Paris], S. Mydans, "15 Freed in East Timor amid Shift in Jakarta", 11 June 1998; Washington Post, C. Shiner, "Independence Drive Revives in East Timor", 10 July 1998

[27][27] See, for example, Antara [Jakarta], "Belo Akan Berdialog Dengan Gus Dur dan Megawati", 14 July 1998; Antara [Jakarta], "Xanana Dimungkinkan Dapat  Remisi Pada 17 Agustus", 14 July 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Laporan dari Timtim (1): Menuju Revolusi Bunga II", 14 July 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Laporan dari Timtim (2): Memperebutkan Xanana", 15 July 1998

[28][28] SiaR [Jakarta], "Rakyat Irian Ingin Memisakhkan Diri Dari Indonesia", 8 July 1998; SiaR [Jakarta], "Laporan Situasi Di Irian Jaya (1)", 8 July 1998; SiaR [Jakarta], "Laporan Situasi Di Irian Jaya (2)", 9 July 1998; Media Indonesia [Jakarta], "Warga Irian Ancam Pisah Dari RI Juga Menuntut Nama 'Irian' Diganti 'Papua'", 10 July 1998; SiaR [Jakarta], "Di Biak Tujuh Demonstran Dilaporkan Tewas", 10 July 1998

[29][29] SiaR [Jakarta], "Demo Di DPR Tuntut Otonomi Khusus Bagi Maluku", 8 July 1998

[30][30] See: M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1991)

[31][31] On relations between such contending forces within the modernist Islamic community, see Robert W. Hefner, "Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian Muslims", Indonesia No. 64 (October 1997), pp. 77-103

[32][32] Andrée Feillard, Islam et Armée dans l'Indonésie contemporaine (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995)

[33][33] Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds.), Nahdlatul Ulama,  Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996)

[34][34] Gatra [Jakarta], "Amien Rais Ditolak Di Pasuruan", 27 June 1998; Tempo Interaktif [Jakarta], "Siapa Menjegal Amien Di Pasuruan?", 20 June 1998

[35][35] Kompas [Jakarta], "PB NU Bentuk Tim Khusus Pembentukan Partai", 26 June 1998

[36][36] See Irawan Saptono and Lukas Luwarso, Megawati Soekarnoputri: Pantang Surut Langkah (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1996); Gibran Ajidarma and Irawan Saptono, Peristiwa 27 Juli (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1997)

[37][37] Kompas [Jakarta], "Berdirinya Partai Nasionalis: Gus Dur Mendukung", 28 June 1998

[38][38] National and local newspapers are filled with stories of such activities. For two exemplary English-language accounts, see Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], M. Cohen, "Tackling a Bitter Legacy", 2 July 1998; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], J. McBeth, "On Course for Reform", 2 July 1998

[39][39] See Tempo Interaktif [Jakarta], "Wawancara Harry Tjan Silalahi: 'Nasib Etnis Cina Di Indonesia Seperti Nasib Isteri Kedua'", 20 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "SARA Dan Reformasi", 23 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Diskusi Refleksi Agenda Reformasi: Memperbesar Kue Pribumi Tanpa Memusuhi Nonpri", 26 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Warga Keturunan Cina Menuntut Pemakaian Istilah Suku Tionghoa", 27 June 1998

[40][40] See Kompas [Jakarta], "Komnas HAM: Kerusuhan 13-14 Mei Dipicu Kelompok Terorganisir", 3 June 1998; SiaR [Jakarta], "Tim Relawan Imbau Komnas Ham Bongkar Aksi Kerusuhan Mei 1998", 6 June 1998; Antara [Jakarta], "Amien Rais Optimis Abri Dapat Ungkap Kelompok Provokator", 13 June 1998; Kompas, "Pemuka Agama Dan Masyarakat: Bongkar Dan Adili Jaringan Pengobar Kerusuhan", 18 June 1998; Tempo Interaktif [Jakarta], "Wawancara Clementino Dos Reis Amaral: 'Kami Punya Bukti, Pelakunya Jelas Kelompok Terorganisasi'"; "Wawancara Chairul: 'Perkosaan dan Pembakaran Itu Tidak Dilakukan Oleh Warga Biasa'"; "Wawancara Sri Palupi: 'Kerusuhan Dilakukan Oleh Kelompok Terorganisir Rapi'"; "Wawancara Ita F. Nadia: 'Para Pemerkosa Itu Dikomando'", 20 June 1998

[41][41] Kompas [Jakarta], "Tiga Kota Di Jawa Dilanda Kerusuhan", 16 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Pernjarahan Masih Berlangsung Di Solo", 18 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Massa Mengamuk Di Purworejo", 27 June 1998

[42][42] Kompas [Jakarta], "Setelah Kios Habis Terbakar: Mereka Ingin Aman Berdagang", 4 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Jajakat Pendapat Litbang Kompas: Sembako, Kerusuhan, Dan Perpecahan, Paling Dikhawatirkan", 22 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Belum Sirna, Trauma Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei", 23 June 1998

[43][43] See Jawa Pos [Surabaya], "Meningkat, Pemohon Paspor WNI Cina", 19 June 1998

[44][44] SiaR [Jakarta], "Ada Provokasi Di Balik Eksodus Timtim", 13 July 1998; SiaR [Jakarta], "Situasi Terakhir Timtim", 13 July 1998; Jawa Pos [Surabaya], "50 Ribu Pengungsi Tinggalkan Timtim", 14 July 1998; Antara [Jakarta], "Gubernur Abiliio Minta Warga Tidak Tergesa Ngungsi", 14 July 1998

[45][45] Antara [Jakarta], "Ada Pihak Luar Yang Mensponsori Aksi Unjuk Rasa", 13 July 1998; Antara [Jakarta], "Tokoh Adat Jayapura Larang Kegiatan Berbau Separatis", 13 July 1998

[46][46] International Monetary Fund, "Indonesia - Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies" (Jakarta, 24 June 1998 - unpublished document); Kompas [Jakarta], "Inflasi 1998 Bisa 80 Persen",  2 June 1998. See also Forum Keadilan [Jakarta], "Drama Politik Berujung Tragedi Ekonomi", 25 May 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Harga Beras Terus Melambung Di Berbagai Daerah", 16 June 1998; Indonesian Observer [Jakarta], "WB: RI Contraction May Be 15%", 19 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Harga Kebutuhan Pokok Belum Stabil", 22 June 1998; Kompas [Jakarta], "Harga Minyak Goreng Terus Naik", 26 June 1998

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