Last Updated: Friday, 26 December 2014, 13:50 GMT

Haiti: Prospects for Democracy

Publisher WRITENET
Author Patrick Costello
Publication Date 1 September 1995
Cite as WRITENET, Haiti: Prospects for Democracy, 1 September 1995, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c30.html [accessed 27 December 2014]
DisclaimerThis is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

1. INTRODUCTION

Under the name "Operation Uphold Democracy", a 21,000 strong U.S. military force occupied Haiti on 19 September 1994. It was the last chapter in a three-year history of international efforts to remove the de facto régime which took power through a military coup d'état on 29 September 1991. Unlike previous efforts, it succeeded. The leaders of the régime left the country and the President-in-exile, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was able to return to the National Palace on 15 October 1994. The withdrawal of U.S. troops began almost immediately.[1]

The return of the President could not resolve Haiti's problems overnight and he faced the daunting tasks of the restoration of democracy and economic reconstruction of the country. The last three years of military rule had impoverished what was already the region's poorest country and largely destroyed the fragile civil society which had paved the way for democratic elections in December 1990. A U.S. Strategic Studies Institute/U.S. Army War College paper expresses the difficulties:

How does one 'restore' a prosperity that has never existed? And how does one teach Haitian soldiers, reared in an authoritarian, corrupt and violent culture, the virtues of human rights, democracy, tolerance and the rule of law? ... the problem is less one of 'rebuilding' or 'restoring' than of starting from scratch.[2]

Haiti's recent history illustrates this point. With the exception of the nine months after President Aristide's election, there have been few democratic institutions, a non-existent rule of law and little economic development in the country since François Duvalier took power in October 1957. The "Duvalier era", during which François (Papa Doc) Duvalier and then his son Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier ruled as dictators, was characterized by the systematic destruction of all social and political opposition and the creation of a repressive apparatus to maintain power. This apparatus centred on a new militia, the Volontaires de Sécurité Nationale (Tontons Macoutes) formed by armed peasants loyal to the Duvaliers. Internationally, the Duvaliers were tolerated, mainly because of a strong anti-communist stance which was considered helpful in preventing the spread of communism in the Caribbean after the Cuban revolution of 1959. The period lasted until 1985 when a popular uprising culminated in Jean-Claude Duvalier leaving the country on a U.S. Air Force jet in February 1986.[3]

The post-Duvalier era has been characterized by armed sabotage against attempts to install democracy and continuing repression. The balance of power shifted to the military whose power had been held in check by the Tontons Macoutes under the Duvaliers. The uprooting of the Tontons Macoutes system by the popular uprising allowed the army to consolidate national control over the country. The army command, however, was not averse to using the Tontons Macoutes when it suited their purposes. The first attempt at elections, in November 1987, failed because Tontons Macoutes, with the collaboration of the army, were allowed to attack voters. In one incident, 14 people were killed when armed men opened fire on a queue of 1,100 waiting voters. Former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White, who was an electoral observer, said: "The army totally abandoned its responsibility ... It turned the streets over to the Macoutes."[4]

A second attempt at elections, in December 1990, succeeded, with Father Aristide winning over 67 per cent of the vote.[5] However, with only seven and a half months in power, he was unable to do more than begin the process of democratization and demilitarization anticipated by the 1987 constitution before he was ousted by the September 1991 coup d'état and the process was reversed.

2. REPRESSION AND THE FAILURE OF THE RULE OF LAW

Haiti's 1987 Constitution, in many ways the product of post-Duvalier euphoria, contains the usual guarantees of human rights associated with a modern state.[6] The rights to life (Article 19), freedom of expression (Article 28), freedom of association and assembly (Article 31) are all guaranteed and, in addition, Article 276.2 provides that all international treaties ratified by Haiti are incorporated into Haitian law. For example, the American Convention on Human Rights, ratified in 1977 by Jean-Claude Duvalier, is thus part of Haitian law. The court system is based on the Napoleonic Code, with the Code of Criminal Procedure, originally enacted in 1835, still constituting the theoretical framework of Haiti's criminal justice system today.[7]

This system of justice, however, has not functioned well. In 1989, UN Special Rapporteur on Haiti, Philippe Texier, concluded that:

The ordinary system of justice ... did not play its role .... The independence of the judicial authorities is not safeguarded and their powers are very restricted .... They have been unable to clear up any of the numerous crimes committed during the past few years.[8]

Almost exactly the same point was made by the UN Special Rapporteur on Haiti, Dr. Bruni Celli, in his report to the UN General Assembly in 1994.[9] Among the many reasons for this failure, inadequate education and training of judges and the low salaries leading to corruption are overshadowed by the almost complete lack of independence of the judiciary and the police from the Haitian armed forces. A nominally separate police force only exists in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, the two major cities, and in these police forces, both the commanders and agents are members of the armed forces. There is no police academy in the country.

In rural areas, divided up into 515 communal sections, the section chief, at the lowest level of the army hierarchy, is given the responsibility of maintaining order and public peace by Haitian army regulations. These section chiefs are the key to understanding the army's control over Haitian society since the Duvaliers. They are also crucial to the analysis of human rights violations in the A section chief has life and death power over the residents of his section. He often serves as de facto executive, legislature and judiciary for the areas under his command. Section chiefs do not refer cases to the judicial system; rather, they make arrests, detain prisoners, conduct trials and settle disputes.[10]

Often, the position was bought through bribes and in order to recoup the initial investment, the chief employed a number of assistants, known as attachés. The attachés paid the section chief for the chance of working for him and so profiting from the position of power it afforded. Extortion networks, receiving payments for the release of people detained and the levying of arbitrary fines became commonplace ways of raising money for the attachés and the section chief.[11]

During his brief period in power, President Aristide was able to decree the end of the system of section chiefs. It was to be replaced by a system of rural police under the control of the Ministry of Justice. However, the coup d'état removed him before the law instituting the new arrangement was approved by parliament. By November 1991, the de facto régime had reinstalled the section chiefs.[12] Subsequently, the section chiefs began to systematically extend their role. In many cases, it was the attachés who were responsible for the murders, disappearances, rapes and other human rights violations that characterized Haiti after the coup d'état.[13]

It is estimated that tens of thousands of attachés, often ex-Tontons Macoutes, joined the 7,000 members of the armed forces after the coup d'état.[14] While the Macoutes and the army were balanced against each other under the Duvaliers to ensure the personal power of the dictator, during the last three years, these two forces in effect became a single apparatus of repression with nothing to counterbalance it once the constitution had been suspended. In effect, they had been united by a common enemy, the supporters of President Aristide.

During the last year of the de facto régime, a political arm of the repression was created. The Front for Advancement and Progress in Haiti (Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès d'Haiti - FRAPH), ostensibly an independent political organization, was founded by Emmanuel Constant, son of an army commander under François Duvalier and Jodel Chamblain, a former soldier and Tonton Macoute said to have taken part in the election massacre of November 1987. FRAPH openly identifies with François Duvalier and "its activities, including public demonstrations, violent thuggery, and assassinations, are tolerated, and even encouraged by the army".[15] While small parties supporting the de facto régime were tolerated, the suppression of political opposition, most notably supporters of President Aristide, gave FRAPH an unchallenged platform on the streets and in the countryside. Many members are attachés and former Tontons Macoutes, but the presence of FRAPH in every communal section in the country also meant that many people joined FRAPH as a form of protection from the paramilitaries.[16]

2.1 The Consequences for Human Rights

Detailed figures for the number of victims of gross human rights violations during the period of the military régime are unavailable. The evacuation of the UN/OAS International Civilian Mission (ICM) in October 1993 curtailed a period which had seen the production of authoritative country-

wide reports on the human rights situation. Although the Mission was able to return in January 1994, it was in a limited capacity with a reduced staff that was able to gain a clear picture of the situation only in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The expulsion of the Mission by the Haitian military authorities in July 1994 resulted in another vacuum for detailed reporting of violations. The repression itself impeded the work of Haitian human rights organizations.[17]

Some idea of the chronology and scale of the human rights crisis after the coup d'état can however be deduced. Hundreds of people were killed in the immediate aftermath and these killings continued during 1992. Haitian human rights groups estimated some 3,000 deaths before the arrival of the ICM in April 1993, and, according to Ian Martin, Human Rights Director of the Mission, "this is probably not an exaggeration".[18] Most of the targets of the repression were supporters of Father Aristide's loosely organized Lavalas movement (meaning "flood" in Creole). Following the deployment of the Mission, there was an initial reduction in the scale of violations but, as it became clear that the international will was lacking to remove the military government, the violations became more flagrant and their political character more evident. The attaché attack on supporters present at the investiture of Port-au-Prince mayor Evans Paul and the army's public execution of businessman and supporter of President Aristide, Antoine Izméry, were paralleled by increased provision of arms to attachés outside Port-au-Prince and the emergence of the FRAPH. The evacuation of the ICM took place the day after President Aristide's Minister of Justice, Guy Malary, was shot to death in his car. The security of the Mission itself was felt to be in danger.[19]

In addition to the killings, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions and torture were the most persistent human rights abuses during this period. The ICM recorded more than 300 cases of arbitrary arrest between June and August 1993 alone.[20] Many of these violations were linked to the attempts of victims to exercise their right to freedom of expression: distribution of pamphlets, putting up posters or attempting to organize and participate in pro-Aristide demonstrations. Those arrested were routinely beaten and often suffered worse forms of torture.[21]

By the time the ICM returned to Haiti in January 1994, they found the situation to be worse than at any time during its presence in 1993. Between 31 January and 31 May, 296 killings were reported to the ICM, of which 254 took place in Port-au-Prince alone. Ninety-one cases of enforced disappearance and 66 rapes were reported.[22] Bearing in mind the relatively limited presence of international observers during this period, this would appear to represent a significant increase in the scale of the repression.

2.2 The Consequences for Civil Society

A major target of the military led repression was the diverse and thriving civil society which had emerged in Haiti after Jean-Claude Duvalier's flight in 1986.

In contrast to many other countries emerging from dictatorial rule, political parties in Haiti were among the least developed parts of civil society. Rather, the strength of Haitian civil society lay in its breadth and diversity outside the narrow realms of electoral politics.[23]

It is one of the many paradoxes of recent Haitian history that it was this collection of farming cooperatives, grassroots church organizations, community groups, independent media, trade unions, student and women's groups which enabled the army to come to power in the mid-1980s by removing the monopoly of the Tontons Macoutes. However, having mobilized support for Father Aristide in the 1990 elections as the major force behind the Lavalas movement, they became the object of repression by that same army.

On the first day of the coup d'état, 10 radio stations were destroyed or shut down. Two months later, a Port-au-Prince police press release announced that the organizers of any assembly had to identify themselves to the police 48 hours in advance of the proposed gathering. This effectively constituted a ban on all meetings. The enforcement of the ban was left to the section chiefs and provided the excuse for a systematic attack on any social organization and its leaders. Members of these groups were reportedly arrested, beaten and killed by the army and attachés.[24]

The emergence of the FRAPH was a further attack on what remained of civil society. As the only social/political organization allowed by the military, it had free reign to fill the vacuum of a disarticulated civil society while at the same time acting as a spy network and counterbalance within pro-Aristide communities to any expression of dissent from the régime. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that U.S. Intelligence, working through Emmanuel Constant just after the coup d'état, encouraged the formation of the FRAPH as a front "that could balance the Aristide movement" and engage in "intelligence" work against it.[25]

2.3 The Consequences for Asylum Seekers from Haiti

The first boat people from Haiti began arriving in Miami in 1972. Initially, the exodus was tacitly encouraged by the régime and the Macoutes and section chiefs profited by accepting bribes to allow people to flee.[26] The exodus was curtailed in 1981 when the government was pressured to sign an agreement with the U.S. administration allowing the U.S. to prevent the arrival of further immigrants. This was a consequence of the 1980 U.S. Refugee Act which created a distinction between economic migrants and political refugees. The Haitian boat people were judged to be economic migrants and therefore ineligible for asylum. While a full analysis of this decision is beyond the scope of this paper, several points are worth noting. First, the dramatic drop in the number of boat people during President Aristide's tenure followed by a massive rise again after the coup d'état suggests that this risky form of flight had much more to do with political repression than economic poverty.[27] Second, the extortion, corruption and bribes which extended to the smallest village in the country were both part of the apparatus of repression and a cause of economic impoverishment. The distinction between economic migrants and political refugees would appear to lose much of its meaning in such circumstances.[28]

The U.S.-Haitian interdiction agreement authorized the U.S. Coast Guard to stop and board vessels on the high seas, determine if their passengers were undocumented aliens bound for the U.S. and, if so, return them to Haiti. Between 1981 and 1991, 22,716 Haitians were intercepted in this way and returned to Haiti.[29] In the aftermath of the 1991 coup d'état, the practice was legally challenged and refugee status determination began at the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo. Those who failed to fulfil U.S. asylum criteria were forcibly returned. Human Rights advocates were concerned about the continued detention at the Guantanamo base of HIV positive refugees who had passed asylum criteria.

The situation deteriorated dramatically for Haitians seeking asylum in May 1992, when President Bush issued the Kennebunkport Order under which all Haitian boats would be interdicted and the passengers returned to Haiti without prior screening for asylum seekers. As an alternative, the U.S. in-country processing programme (ICP) in Port-au-Prince became the only recourse for Haitian asylum seekers. Those who applied to the ICP programme were vulnerable during the process of application and often subject to repression after their applications were rejected:

A number of the victims of political killing, arbitrary arrest and torture whose cases have been investigated and reported by the ICM are people whose in-country applications had previously been rejected .... The possibility that asylum-seekers who have left Haiti by boat and been returned will be targeted ... has increased following the threat by the illegitimate President Jonaissant that anyone fleeing Haiti illegally will be punished under a 1980 Duvalier decree.[30]

The Kennebunkport Order was widely criticized by U.S. non-governmental organizations for violating Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which states:

No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened ...[31]

In the two years following the coup d'état, 53,735 refugees were interdicted and returned to Haiti.[32] Following the Kennebunkport Order, some passengers on virtually every boat interdicted by the U.S. Coastguard were arrested on their return to Haiti and taken to the Immigration and Identification Police headquarters. All returnees were interrogated by Haitian police on the dock. After February 1994, the Haitian authorities prevented U.S. and ICM officials from meeting detained returnees to check on their conditions.[33]

2.4 The Consequences for Internal Displacement

The boat people and those applying for in-country processing were only the tip of the iceberg. The Haitian Association of Voluntary Agencies estimates that 300,000 people of a population of 7.5 million were forced into hiding after the coup d'état.[34] Internal displacement is known as marronage in Haiti, a reference to the marrons, escaped slaves who fled the plantations in the 18th century to hide and organize in the hills. After the coup d'état, marronage was a response to the fear of repression. It is a complex phenomenon, with individuals sleeping in a different house in Port-au-Prince each night, and entire groups fleeing repression in one part of the countryside to live with relatives in others. It involved rural to urban and urban to rural displacement. It was also common for people in marronage to be continually on the move, not staying in one place for too long for fear of discovery by the local section chiefs, FRAPH members or attachés.

Those in hiding included many officials of President Aristide's government, activists and members of social organizations, people who were detained by the military and released on condition that they left the area. The emergence of FRAPH intensified the problem of marronage. The increased coverage of FRAPH networks enabled new kinds of operation including attacks on the families of people in marronage and localized waves of repression which caused significant new displacement. Examples of the latter include the shanty town of Raboteau in the town of Gonaïves and the rural area of Le Borgne in the Northern Province.[35] Marronage has been a powerful contributory factor to the destruction of civil society since it has scattered the members of organizations all over the country to places where they are completely unable to do any work.

3. EVENTS LEADING TO PRESIDENT ARISTIDE'S RETURN

While the coup d'état in Haiti provoked immediate international condemnation and an economic embargo on the part of the Organization of American States (OAS), it is worth comparing it to the reaction to the coup d'état in Guatemala in May 1993. In that case, constitutional rule was returned within a week, due in part to the diplomatic intervention of the OAS together with strong pressure from the U.S. Government. In the case of Haiti, it was three years before international intervention achieved the restoration of the elected president. In both cases, powerful nationalist military and economic interests had backed the coups d'état, yet in Guatemala, the leaders of the coup d'état proved susceptible to what on the surface seemed to be the same level of international pressure.

In large part, this seems to have been due to the ambivalence of the U.S. position through the period leading up to the military intervention in September 1994. While the U.S. administration had stated a broad commitment to the maintenance of democracy in the region, President Aristide was no friend of the Bush administration. In particular, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pentagon were highly critical of President Aristide. In addition to U.S. involvement in setting up the FRAPH, the leaders of the coup d'état were themselves U.S. trained.[36] Immediately after the coup d'état, U.S. criticism focused on the human rights record of the Aristide government in spite of the fact that the human rights situation afterwards was demonstrably worse.[37] The U.S. administration was also reluctant to accept the scale of the post-coup d'état human rights crisis and the embassy has been accused of mis-stating assessments of the human rights situation by members of the International Civilian Mission.[38] CIA criticism, backed up by several Republican senators, later shifted to President Aristide himself, with arguments that he was mentally unstable and, in an account later discredited, that he had spent time in a psychiatric hospital in Canada in 1980.[39]

In addition and, possibly, as a reflection of U.S. Government ambivalence, the embargo was leaky, particularly through the land border with the Dominican Republic. Six versions of the embargo were decreed between the day after the coup d'état and 22 May 1994, when the UN Security Council reinforced it again in Resolution 917. And yet it could be shown that:

Trade between the United States and Haiti has been flourishing during this period, even after the October 1993 'severe sanctions' that included petrol and weapons. The United States has even increased its exports. In January-February 1994 they reached $31 million compared to $26 million within the same period in 1992.[40]

In fact, the embargo seems to have done little to affect the Haitian military who controlled the black market and were able to profit from the high prices of petrol and other goods. Those who suffered the consequences of the embargo were the same people who suffered from the coup d'état, the Haitian poor.[41]

The first signs of change in the U.S. Government's position can be traced to a domestic concern over the refugee issue and the impact of the presidential elections which brought a change in the administration. Haiti's refugees and the Kennebunkport order became an electoral issue: with the aim of winning the votes of the black community and members of humanitarian associations and churches, Bill Clinton, when presidential candidate, promised to abandon the government's policy on refugees. However, after his election and in the face of a potentially huge wave of refugees reaching Miami if the Kennebunkport Order was lifted, the new administration changed its position with a blockade of the island that made flight by boat from Haiti even more difficult, effectively imprisoning Haitians on their island.[42] In recognition of this policy shift, President Clinton pledged to restore President Aristide to power and increased the provisions for in-country processing of asylum applications.

3.1 The Governor's Island Accord (January to October 1993)

A series of diplomatic initiatives by the OAS and the UN resulted in agreement on the establishment of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti in February 1993. The purpose of the Mission was to "help ensure respect for human rights, thereby creating a suitable climate in which a political solution for the restoration of democratic constitutional government in Haiti could be achieved".[43] This was a major step forward and was followed by political negotiations which led to the signing by President Aristide and Commander-in-Chief of the army, Raoul Cédras, of the Governor's Island Agreement in New York. The agreement provided an agenda which would ultimately lead to the return of President Aristide to Haiti on 30 October 1993. This agenda included provisions for the appointment of a new Prime Minister by President Aristide; the promulgation of an amnesty; the suspension of the embargo; the retirement of General Cédras and the separation of the armed forces and the police through a law creating a new police force.

General Cédras returned to Haiti after signing the agreement to jubilation from his supporters, hardly the response to an agreement which would have removed the de facto régime. A U.S. Army War College paper points out the difficulties:

The July 1993 Governor's Island Agreement to restore Aristide was inherently unworkable. By providing for the lifting of sanctions before Aristide returned and at a time when General Cédras, Colonel François and their allies still occupied key positions of power, the accord enabled the latter to obtain short-term relief while they restocked supplies and protected foreign financial holdings .... Nor was there any provision for purging the Haitian military and police of corrupt or abusive elements ... the signals that were sent were interpreted to mean that the international community was not serious and that the accord could be sabotaged with minimum risk or cost.[44]

On 11 October 1993, four days before General Cédras was due to resign, the USS Harlan County carrying 193 U.S. and 25 Canadian troops arrived at Port-au-Prince harbour. The troops were an advance force for a UN military and police mission which was intended to train the Haitian police and army, as agreed on Governor's Island.[45] As the ship approached the docks, it was met by a chanting crowd of about a hundred supporters of FRAPH. Some small boats blocked the dock and the car of the U.S. chargé d'affaires was surrounded and hit by the chanting crowd. The diplomats fled and the following day, the ship was ordered by the Pentagon to leave Haitian waters without any consultation with the UN. A day later, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to reimpose the oil and arms embargo and on 15 October, after President Aristide's Justice Minister, Guy Malary, was shot dead in his car, the International Civilian Mission was evacuated to the Dominican Republic. The international strategy for President Aristide's return had failed: the Haitian military régime had tested the resolve of the international community and found it wanting.

3.2 From Embargo to Occupation (October 1993 to August 1994)

The failure of the Governor's Island agreement was followed by a period of recriminations and failed negotiations. Attempts by UN/OAS Special Envoy Dante Caputo to advance the negotiations were met with hardline responses from the military and rejection by President Aristide. In the process, President Aristide publicly fell out with his Prime Minister, Robert Malval, and stripped him of his powers. The negotiation strategy remained within the framework of the provisions of Governor's Island. Mr. Caputo attempted to secure an agreement with President Aristide to form a power-sharing government including members of the opposition and, possibly, members of FRAPH. The so-called "Parliamentarians' plan" which was made public in February 1994 was rejected by President Aristide and finally had to be abandoned in April.[46] Among the problems with the plan was that it set no date for the return of the President.[47]

The turning point in the resolution to the crisis came after the U.S. Special Envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, resigned on 26 April 1994.[48] His replacement, William Gray III, was a former Congressman and President of the United Negro College Fund. The administration reiterated its resolve to unseat the military régime through better enforcement of economic sanctions. On 6 May, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 917 which broadened the sanctions imposed on Haiti. This was implemented on 21 May 1994. Most commercial flights were suspended on 21 June and the only exception, Air France, suspended flights on 1 August. During this period, the U.S. Government blocked all financial transactions with Haitians living in Haiti.

The change in U.S. policy following the resignation of Mr. Pezzullo was also apparent in U.S. policy towards asylum seekers. At the end of April, it was announced that two new refugee processing stations were to be set up in Haiti to process asylum applications.[49] In early May, a more significant change of policy gave Haitian boat people the opportunity to present asylum claims aboard U.S. vessels in the Caribbean or in the territory of third countries in the region. The shift involved an overt recognition that the Kennebunkport Order was not sustainable given the level of violence in Haiti. Even though the acceptance rate of refugees was expected to remain at a level of five per cent, this change of policy was welcomed by President Aristide. UNHCR, in welcoming the new policy, offered to help U.S. officials process Haitian boat people by persuading other Caribbean countries to allow the U.S. boats to come ashore, training U.S. Immigration officials and providing a team of monitors to the region. The result of the policy shift was an immediate increase in the numbers of boat people. Between 13 and 18 May, the number of people picked up by the U.S. Coastguard approached the total numbers for the first four months of the year.[50] This dramatic rise provided a further impetus for the U.S. to resolve the crisis in Haiti since it appeared that the return of President Aristide was the only available means to end the refugee crisis and its domestic political implications.

A clear indication to outside observers that this time the international community was serious was the reaction of the Haitian military authorities. On 11 May, following the strengthening of sanctions, the military named former Supreme Court Judge Emile Jonaissant as provisional president. His administration began to prepare for elections in November for a new president who could have claimed international legitimacy. However, the new régime was immediately condemned as illegitimate by the UN Security Council. Following the ban on commercial flights, it seems as though the military attempted once more to test the international community's resolve. On 5 July, the authorities demanded the removal of the International Civilian Mission which was again evacuated to the Dominican Republic.

The stage was set for confrontation. The Pentagon's selection of a commander for the invasion and military exercises organized by U.S. marines and paratroopers in the Bahamas and the U.S. were further public demonstrations of resolve.[51] The legal framework for a U.S. led invasion was created on 31 July by UN Security Council Resolution 940 which authorized

Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership ... the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authority of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement.[52]

The question was whether the apparent change in U.S. government policy would waver in the face of the need for an invasion, the only option remaining that would remove the leaders of the coup d'état. Opinion polls in the U.S. showed a majority against a military invasion: a growing isolationism in U.S. domestic opinion was bolstered by much talk in the U.S. media about the last time the U.S. military intervened in Haiti which had resulted in a 15 year occupation from 1919-

1934. In addition, most of the Latin American countries expressed reservations about such an operation which they regarded as a breach of the principles of self-determination and sovereignty. France and Canada, while supporting resolution 940, stated that they would not take part in the military invasion phase of the operation.[53]

3.3 The Carter-Jonaissant Agreement and the Occupation (September to October 1994)

While an invasion did take place, it is important to note that it was not according to the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution but on the basis of a last minute agreement negotiated between a U.S. delegation led by former U.S. President Carter and the military authorities in Port-

au-Prince. The terms of the agreement were worked out without any consultation with the Security Council, the UN/OAS Special Envoy or President Aristide.[54] In a televised speech on 15 September, President Clinton declared that General Cédras had to leave Haiti and that all diplomacy was exhausted. Two hours later he contacted former President Carter to ask him to launch a final diplomatic peace mission.[55] The two-day mission, composed of Mr. Carter, General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn, negotiated for two days over the weekend of 17-18 September. Unknown to Mr. Carter, a U.S. invasion was planned for midnight on 18 September and the agreement was achieved as 61 planes carrying paratroopers were flying to Haiti. The planes were recalled as the Carter-Jonaissant agreement was accepted by the Clinton administration.[56] Following the agreement, the military operation was renamed Operation Uphold Democracy (from Operation Restore Democracy) and on 19 September, 21,000 U.S. troops arrived in Haiti without a shot being fired.

The Carter-Jonaissant agreement provided for the cooperation of the Haitian military with the U.S. occupation force, retirement of Haitian military officers, lifting of economic sanctions and the allowing of free and fair legislative elections. However, it was a highly controversial document. Its very status was in doubt since it was signed by a former U.S. President and an internationally unrecognized Haitian President. It made no reference to the restoration of democracy, to the legitimate constitutional government or to the names of military officers due to step down by 15 October under the agreement. More seriously, it provided for a general amnesty to be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament. While the Governor's Island agreement provided for a political amnesty under the terms of the Haitian Constitution, a general amnesty would take impunity much further, pardoning members of the military for the thousands of atrocities committed since the coup d'état.[57]

Initially, while the troops were welcomed in the streets, it was unclear whether there would be a repetition of the disaster of the previous year. President Aristide was due to return to Haiti on 15 October, the very same day when on the previous year General Cédras had been due to resign under the terms of Governor's Island. The troops on the ground in Haiti seemed to be reluctant to intervene in any conflict or act to put an end to any violence. The turning point came on 30 September. A huge march in Port-au-Prince by supporters of President Aristide to commemorate the third anniversary of the coup d'état was attacked by attachés and members of the FRAPH. An estimated five people were killed and scores were wounded. The biggest part of the U.S. force of troops and tanks were kept away from the demonstration and those troops present did not intervene.[58] It was clear that a decision had to be made: if the invasion force continued to refuse to intervene then there was little doubt that the FRAPH and the leaders of the coup d'état would have been able to exploit the lack of resolve of the international community as they had the previous year.

A change of military strategy became immediately apparent. The day after the massacre, troops moved to arrest members of paramilitary militias. On 3 October, over 100 U.S. troops forcibly entered the offices of the FRAPH in Port-au-Prince and removed all weapons, documents and people found inside.[59] The building was looted and destroyed after the troops left. A day later, Emmanuel Constant, leader of the FRAPH, announced that the FRAPH would accept President Aristide's return with order and discipline and called on members of the group to lay down their arms.[60]

Although the violence did not come to an end and there were a number of incidents outside Port-

au-Prince, where there was little U.S. presence, the resolve of the occupation force had been demonstrated and the provisions of the Carter-Jonaissant agreement fell into place in the two weeks leading to Aristide's return. On 4 October, Colonel François, the chief of police, fled to the Dominican Republic. On 6 October, Haitian senators approved an amnesty for the military leaders. On 10 October, General Cédras resigned and two days later President Jonaissant resigned. On 13 October, General Cédras left Haiti for Panama and, as scheduled, President Aristide returned to the presidential palace on 15 October 1994.[61]

The executive and legislative branches of a democratic government were rapidly installed following President Aristide's return. The new Prime Minister, Smarck Michel, although not President Aristide's first choice, chose a broad cabinet which, as requested by UN negotiators in 1994, included ministers who supported the coup d'état. Marc Henri Rousseau François, for example, the Minister of Public Works, was the minister of the first de facto government following the coup d'état.[62] While this promoted a certain stability between the President and the economic elite, it had the potential to threaten his relations with the social movements which began to emerge again after the repression.

4. PROSPECTS FOR THE RETURNED GOVERNMENT: A SECOND CHANCE?

As President Aristide approaches the end of his first year back in the presidential palace, it is now possible to assess both the impact of the U.S. intervention and the prospects for Haiti's stability in the future. Long term stability can be assessed by looking at the ability of the restored government and the international forces to create the conditions for democratic institutions to replace the rule of force. However, the work to create this environment has only just begun. While President Aristide is back in office, the range of political, military and economic forces which removed him in 1991 is still largely intact. The departure of the leaders of the coup d'état still leaves tens of thousands of armed paramilitaries and many more thousands of FRAPH members which could potentially be mobilized to remove him again. A major difference this time is that he enjoys the full support of the U.S. Government, although this is likely to be subject to U.S. economic interests. In turn, this is dependent on the encouragement of external investment in the country, likely to invest in the only resource in which the country is abundant - cheap labour.

4.1 The Continuing Power of the Paramilitaries

While in the first few days after the return of the President there were a few cases of mob violence against attachés, the message being preached by President Aristide of reconciliation and justice but no violence soon took root and these attacks rapidly ceased.[63] A more long-term problem has been the continuing violence and abuse of power exercised by attachés, members of the FRAPH and section chiefs. Most of these abuses took place in the rural areas of the country outside the high-profile capital and the second city, Cap Haitien, where most of the international troops were based. Although the section chief system was outlawed by the Haitian military on 30 October 1994,[64] the means of enforcement are limited. International military presence outside the core areas has been restricted to 1,100 members of U.S. Special Forces who have worked largely with their military counterparts.[65] In addition, U.S. practice was to detain suspected attachés, but in most cases, the prisoners were subsequently handed over to the Haitian police and quickly released since the police were as implicated in the violence as the attachés themselves.[66] By 2 December 1994, of 90 people detained by U.S. troops in September and October, only 20 were still in custody and, on one occasion, troops had to return to the homes of a released suspect to protect him from an angry mob.[67] The role of U.S. troops in siding with the Haitian military and attachés in situations of conflict was criticized in December 1994 by a U.S. delegation led by former U.S. Attorney General Ramsay Clark.[68]

Two months after the invasion, the situation around the country was extremely varied. In some areas, the U.S. troops were welcomed and the attachés fled into surrounding hills in the belief that otherwise they would be arrested or killed by the soldiers.[69] Political repression has largely ceased in these areas. In other areas, the section chiefs remained in power and there was little change, particularly in remote parts of the Artibonite and the Central Plateau where the U.S. troops rarely patrolled.[70] Even where the attachés fled, many people fear that they will return after the multinational forces leave and there is considerable scepticism about the retraining of Haitian soldiers organized by U.S. Special Forces. In some areas (Hinche, Les Cayes), attachés have reportedly returned to the towns after initially fleeing the U.S. occupation.[71] On 3 November, Colin Granderson, the Director of the International Civilian Mission, noted that the attachés linked to the military junta "have gone to ground, but they are still there".[72]

Perhaps the most serious of the reported violations was the ambush of Cadet Damzal, the Deputy Mayor of Mirebalais, who had come out of hiding after the U.S. occupation. U.S. Special Forces found his headless body in a river on 5 November 1994. As troops had been stationed in the town since early October, the killing sent a message all over the country that even U.S. Special Forces could not guarantee security in rural communities to those returning out of forced displacement or exile.[73]

The continuing power of the attachés in many areas and the large number of weapons believed to have been hidden away by private individuals was a contentious issue between the U.S. administration and the UN who were due to take over the operation under the terms of Security Council Resolution 940. The discovery of a large cache of weapons on 29 October hidden in an underground tunnel in Port-au-Prince illustrated the problem.[74] Security Council Resolution 940 determined one of the roles of the invasion force as "to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment".[75] For the UN, the spectre of Somalia where the withdrawal of U.S. troops had left the UN force vulnerable to paramilitary attacks, meant that they wanted the U.S. to adequately disarm the paramilitaries in Haiti before they were prepared to take over the operation. On 20 October, unnamed UN officials warned that the U.S. force must thoroughly disarm paramilitaries before the UN takeover and declared that disarmament efforts were inadequate.[76] U.S. officials acknowledged the concern though Defense Secretary William Perry rejected a call by President Aristide for the U.S. to disarm opponents of his government, comparing the difficulties to those that would be involved in disarming the state of Maryland.[77]

One consequence of the lack of disarmament has been the political violence surrounding the legislative and local elections. In March 1995, two political figures were assassinated. Mr. Eric Lamothe, a former member of the Chamber of Deputies intending to run in the elections for the North-East Department, was found murdered in Port-au-Prince on 3 March. Mireille Durocher Bertin, former chief of staff to the de facto president, Emile Jonaissaint, and founder of a new opposition political party, was assassinated in Port-au-Prince on 28 March. In the latter case, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became involved in the investigation and one person was arrested in connection with the killing.[78] On 26 May, a mayoral candidate was shot and wounded.[79] In addition, there were a number of incidents of intimidation, arson and sabotage around the days of the election.[80]

The failure to disarm the paramilitaries in Haiti can also be seen as a reason for the rise in common crime in the country over the last year. On 17 January 1995, the UN Special Rapporteur, Marco Tulio Bruni Celli, noted the population's concern at the presence of armed bands which have still not turned in their weapons.[81] In the capital, murders are reported daily and criminal groups are setting up roadblocks to stop vehicles and rob passengers, while in the countryside there are reports of violence by bands of former attachés:

There is no evidence so far that these criminal acts are politically motivated. However, they are often committed by gangs armed with high-calibre firearms, including automatic weapons, which indicates a probable link to former paramilitary networks.[82]

The presence of so many weapons seems to have been responsible for the first U.S. casualty of the intervention. On 12 January, U.S. Special Forces were observing the operation of a toll booth in Gonaïves when they were shot at from a car whose driver refused to pay the toll. One soldier died in the incident which U.S. officials denied had any political motivation.[83]

Despite the limited levels of disarmament, the UN took over the multinational operation. As part of the new UN mission, the International Civilian Mission returned to Haiti as early as 22 October 1994. By 5 December, with U.S. forces down to less than 10,000 troops and scheduled to drop to 6,000 by the New Year, U.S. and UN officials began to discuss the transfer operation.[84] On 31 March 1995, in a ceremony presided over by President Clinton and the UN Secretary-General, the formal handing over of authority took place.[85] The mission, with its 7,000 peacekeepers, of whom 2,500 are U.S. soldiers, is expected to remain in Haiti at least until March 1996.[86] Some U.S. military observers are expecting the need for some kind of international military presence to remain beyond that date as a guarantee of security.[87]

4.2 Fragile Democratic Institutions

Criminal violence has continued to be a problem since the transfer of authority. However, the UN has no mandate to investigate common crime which is the responsibility of the criminal justice system.[88] Three years of military rule have left Haiti's democratic institutions in tatters. An urgent task for the new government was the construction of an effective criminal justice system to enable President Aristide's call for "justice yes, violence no" to be fulfilled before people took justice into their own hands as they did after the fall of François Duvalier. In addition, many believed that there was a need for a Truth Commission to investigate the violence during the years following the coup d'état as part of the necessary purging of the security forces and creation of an atmosphere of reconciliation.[89]

Initially, efforts focused on the police force. President Aristide pledged to separate the police and army, with the creation of a new civilian police force around 4,000 strong and the paring down of Haiti's army from 7,500 to 1,500 troops. The separation of police and army was approved by the Senate on 30 November and the first steps towards the reduction of the military were made by assigning a number of the military officers who were expected to oppose it to overseas diplomatic postings.[90] More radical steps were taken in December with the demobilization of troops. This happened so suddenly that it provoked a demonstration on 26 December in which three soldiers died and six others were wounded while protesting against their dismissal.[91] This appeared to strengthen the resolve of the government. The army was made part of the interim police force and put under the control of the Ministry of Justice.[92] Subsequently, the commission named to consider the future of the Haitian military effectively dismissed the bulk of the army, and in a series of announcements President Aristide removed all of Haiti's military officer corps above the rank of major. By 20 February 1995, Major Toussaint was Haiti's highest ranking military officer.[93]

The creation of a police force has been a more fraught process, in part because the rapid abolition of the army left a security void. The retraining of members of Haitian security forces began at a new police academy on 24 October. After week-long courses given by international trainers, they returned to the streets to patrol with international police monitors.[94] This created a 3,000 strong interim police force which was supplemented in early December by over 900 recruits from the refugee camps at Guantanamo naval base, also trained by the international police monitors.[95] The long term goal is to replace this interim force with a new police force from recruits who will receive longer training.

There have been a number of problems with the interim police force. Firstly, due to the difficulties of vetting, a number of members of the security forces suspected of human rights violations were allowed into the force. The wholesale entry of the remaining members of the Haitian military into the force compounded this problem. The patrolling of these people on the streets has not done much to improve peoples' confidence in the new police.[96] In addition, following the transfer from the U.S. to the UN international mission, responsibility for disarmament of the paramilitaries was handed to the interim force. The involvement of former attachés in the force makes it "difficult to believe the interim police will be able effectively to take on their former associates ... who remain armed and dangerous".[97] A further problem is that the training has been conducted by the International Criminal Investigation, Training and Assistance Programme (ICITAP), a U.S. body founded by the F.B.I. and administered by the Justice and State Departments. The Haitian Government opposes the U.S. monopoly on police training, a disagreement dating back to 1991 when President Aristide called in Swiss police to train a new palace guard.[98] The problems with the interim police were graphically illustrated on 31 October when around 100 prisoners escaped from the penitentiary in Port-au-Prince. It is believed that the prison guards played a role in allowing the prisoners to escape.[99]

A new national police academy was inaugurated in early February 1995 in order to train the national police force which will ultimately replace the interim force. Four month training sessions began for the first two classes of 375 recruits each. The plan is for the new police to replace the interim force by stages until a new national force of 6,000 to 7,000 officers is formed. Some of the interim force will be allowed to apply to join the permanent force, although the Haitian and U.S. Governments do not plan for more than 9 per cent of the new force to be composed of former soldiers.[100] The first 408 cadets graduated on 4 June in a ceremony attended by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, underlining the U.S. role in funding and partially staffing the academy.[101] However, the deployment of the new officers in the Northern Department provoked the desertion of dozens of interim police officers in what government officials said was a misunderstanding. [102]

While the civilian police force is at least on the way to being formed, the judiciary remains in a state of collapse. At the highest level, a new 11 member Supreme Court was appointed on 2 December 1994 with a new Chief Justice, Clauzel Debrosse, a justice during the coup d'état years who had opposed the military.[103] The problems are at the lower levels of the legal system. Soon after his appointment, Ernst Mallebranche, the Minister of Justice, issued a notice to judges across the country urging them to hold court from 9am to 2pm. He was unsure where to send it because he did not know how many judges the country had.[104] An added problem is the need to replace over 500 discredited magistrates loyal to the former military government.[105] The refusal of FRAPH leader Emmanuel Constant to appear in court to hear charges of attempted murder and torture on the grounds that his security could not be guaranteed is an ironic testimony to the state of Haiti's judiciary.[106]

On 24 January 1995, Ernst Mallebranche resigned as Justice Minister following mounting protest against the slow pace of judicial reform.[107] However, the new appointee, Jean Joseph Exume, has made little difference to the continuing inertia. The first trial for crimes committed during the coup d'état years took place eight months after the return of the President. Lieutenant Jean Emery Piram was sentenced on 29 June 1995 for killing political activist Jean-Claude Museau in December 1992.[108] By 1 September, only four people had been convicted.[109] On 16 August, Colin Granderson, the Director of the International Civilian Mission, criticized repeated violations by the Haitian judiciary despite the return to civilian rule, citing violations of legal and constitutional guarantees against arbitrary arrest and detention without trial.[110]

Some of the problems associated with the police force and the judiciary could be resolved by an effective Truth Commission which would identify the perpetrators of human rights violations during the coup d'état and its aftermath. The people identified could then be removed from the criminal justice system. A decree forming a seven member commission was signed on 20 December 1994. It has a six month mandate to gather information and make a report. However, a series of delays in putting together a technical team and raising the funds necessary to begin its work have led to accusations that the government lacks the political will to pursue the investigation. This does not bode well for the depth and rigour of the investigation which is now expected to be completed towards the end of this year.[111]

4.3 What Hope For the Economy?

                  Democracy is not only about values and ideas. Nothing has been done to provide clean water, electricity, transportation, health care or education - Dr. Marco Tulio Bruni Celli, 1 March 1995.[112]

The more intractable problem is the state of Haiti's economy. Even before the coup d'état, Haiti had the lowest per capita income (US$ 360), and life expectancy (48 years), the highest infant mortality (124 per 1,000) and illiteracy (63-90 per cent depending on criteria) in the Western Hemisphere.[113] Overpopulation and the consequent deforestation have devastated Haitian agriculture and huge amounts of topsoil have been swept off deforested hills by rains. The state of the country was vividly demonstrated by the effect of Tropical Storm Gordon on the country. While in neighbouring Cuba, the storm caused a good deal of material damage, in Haiti, over 500 people died from landslides and the destruction of poor housing.[114] Three years of military rule, economic sanctions and the consequent unemployment and internal displacement have ensured further decline of an already weak economy, although the full scale is not yet known.

The reconstruction plan was agreed to before the U.S. invasion in a meeting between President Aristide's advisors and international donors held on 22 August in the World Bank offices in Paris. Under the plan, Haiti agreed to eliminate the jobs of half of its civil servants, privatize public services, reduce tariffs and import restrictions and massively promote the export economy. In return for implementing what is a structural adjustment programme likely to have deleterious social consequences, the government was promised US$ 550 million of aid over the remaining months of President Aristide's tenure.[115]

The quantity of aid was increased after Aristide's return with the 20 November announcement by a delegation of international donors of US$ 600 million to be made available for the remaining months of President Aristide's tenure and a further US$ 400 million promised for the subsequent four years. Half of the money will promote institution-building, humanitarian assistance and balance of payments support. The other half will go towards around 180 individual projects, including the construction of roads and sewerage systems. The plan, known as the Emergency Economic Recovery Programme, was agreed by donors at a special meeting in Paris in January 1995.[116] The promise of over US$ 1 billion in international aid, while a significant sum, is considered by some as "but a drop in the bucket when compared to the magnitude of the problems faced".[117] Bureaucratic delays in the disbursement of aid led the UN to make an emergency appeal in December for US$ 77 million to provide urgent aid for the following six months.[118]

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration has announced a package of measures designed to stimulate investment in Haiti. The creation of a Joint Business Development Council, the sending of a presidential Trade Mission and, most importantly, the provision through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of US$ 400 million in financing and political risk insurance should help to make Haiti a more attractive proposition for U.S. investors.[119] Unfortunately for the majority of Haitians, the investment is likely to be in the assembly and handicraft sectors which will do little to raise the standard of living of workers and is more likely to enrich the same businessmen who supported the coup d'état in 1991.[120] In response to rising criticism of the government by social movements protesting against the cost of living (lavi chè in Creole), the government raised the official minimum wage to 36 gourdes per day (around US$ 2.40). However, the level of underemployment is believed to be over 50 per cent and the cost of living has risen over the last three years by between 65 and 85 per cent.[121] It is estimated that 10,000 jobs have been created since President Aristide's return. However, it is also estimated that over 50,000 were lost after the coup d'état.[122]

4.4 Refugees and Internal Displacement

The flows of refugees from, and sent back to, Haiti have offered a clear indicator of the levels of stability and repression within Haiti. The high hopes following the return of President Aristide initially led to a rapid and voluntary repatriation of Haiti's refugees. By 25 November 1994, 15,199 Haitians had been voluntarily repatriated to Haiti from the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo.[123] Most of the internally displaced had also returned to their homes by the end of the year.[124] However, following the completion of voluntary repatriations, there remained over 4,400 refugees at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo.[125] Refugee advocates cited the continuing lack of security within Haiti and consequent fear of persecution as reasons for the asylum claims.[126]

The remaining refugees at Guantanamo were offered a US$ 80 cash incentive and job opportunities in Haiti if they accepted voluntary repatriation before 5 January 1995.[127] However, only 677 accepted the offer and U.S. soldiers were deployed on 6 January in order to forcibly repatriate the remaining refugees. According to the refugees, hundreds were handcuffed during the operation.[128] The speed and the nature of the forced repatriation drew a great deal of criticism, most notably from UNHCR. Rene van Rooyen, the UNHCR Representative in the Washington Office, told members of the U.S. State Department that forced repatriation "significantly violates international and U.S. laws on refugees".[129]

A small group of unaccompanied children remained at Guantanamo. Small numbers were allowed into the U.S. after they were found to have parents there and 103 were returned to Haiti for the same reason. However, following pressure from refugee advocates, a decision was taken to allow the remaining 183 children to be granted permanent resettlement with foster parents in the U.S. provided that they had no family in Haiti.[130] By 30 June 1995, 165 Haitians remained on the base, and the Haitian population there was declared to be an irreducible minimum.[131]

In the Bahamas, according to the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, the 60,000 Haitian refugees registered by a census in 1993 were never allowed to apply for political refugee status. While 3,000 Haitians had agreed to go home in a voluntary registration exercise in November 1994, many of those registered went into hiding again in the new year. There are reports that they are frustrated at the lack of change in Haiti since the return of President Aristide. Under an agreement between the two governments in January 1995, 800 were expected to be repatriated monthly with a US$ 100 allowance provided by the Bahamian Government. However, it seems that this has not been enough to convince the Haitians to return.[132] Nevertheless, around 3,000 undocumented Haitian nationals have been returned to Haiti from the Bahamas since the January agreement.[133]

A further reflection of the lack of stability within Haiti, beyond the reluctance of refugees to return, has been the new outflow of refugees. By January 1995, less than three months after President Aristide's return, there were reports of makeshift boats leaving the island for Florida and of bodies being sighted in Haitian territorial waters.[134] Before long the U.S. Coastguard cutters were once again intercepting Haitian refugees in boats near Florida, and repatriating them to Haiti. The most serious incident occurred on 20 August when Bahamian authorities and the U.S. Coast Guard removed 450 Haitians from an overcrowded freighter. Around 50 to 100 people died during the four day voyage and survivors said that people starved, suffocated or jumped overboard after going mad in cramped quarters. One victim drowned after jumping from the Bahamian freighter taking the Haitians ashore. The survivors were flown back to Haiti.[135]

While frustration with the lack of changes since the President's return may be one reason for the new outflow of boat people, another factor has been the failure to provide any programmes for returning refugees. Funding appeals for refugee reintegration programmes which were made by UNHCR in November 1994 have not yet resulted in any contributions.[136] An August demonstration by former refugees in front of the presidential palace during which police had to be called to ease the tension, reflected this frustration.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The recent elections pointed to the problems that lie ahead for Haitian democracy. Parliamentary and local elections, held on 25 June, could have been a celebration of a democracy restored by international intervention. However, the process was characterized by considerable technical flaws. International observers reported cases of ballot burning, ballot box stuffing, threats against electoral officials and a rise in political violence.[137] In addition, the electoral campaign was low key, reflecting a lack of interest amongst voters. The estimated 25-50 per cent turnout for the first round was considerably lower than the over 80 per cent who voted in the 1990 presidential elections.[138]

Irregularities in the process also resulted in a second round boycott by the leadership of a number of political parties despite attempts by the U.S. Department of State to prevent it.[139] Cabinet ministers linked to parties other than President Aristide's Organisation Politique Lavalas (OPL - Lavalas Political Organization) have resigned in protest at the handling of the elections. While it is probably fair to say that the result, a landslide victory for the OPL, reflects what a majority of Haitians wanted, it is hard to see the process as effectively legitimizing the return to constitutional rule.

The President has to mediate between the demands of the people for justice and an end to poverty on the one hand and demands for prosperity and fear of retribution of the economic elite who backed the coup d'état on the other. In addition, he theoretically has only three months remaining of his presidential tenure and the search for a successor who can implement the requirements of structural adjustment programmes without losing the backing of the majority of the people is already well under way. Some commentators believe that President Aristide will be encouraged to promote a constitutional amendment which would allow him to stand for president again at the end of the year.[140] His presence in the National Palace may be the only guarantee of stability following the departure of the international peacekeeping force.

It is too early to predict the outcome of the democratization and reconstruction process in Haiti. At this stage, all that can be said is to point to the magnitude of the problems and the efforts being made to resolve them. There does seem to be a fundamental problem, however. The half year of democracy before the 1991 coup d'état was made possible by a thriving civil society that had developed in the aftermath of the Duvalier era. This civil society was largely destroyed by the coup d'état and yet none of the reconstruction plans or the democratic institution-building seem to contribute significantly to rebuilding it. Unlike in his previous government, President Aristide does not have a single popular movement representative in his cabinet. The economic reconstruction plan is targeted largely at governmental and infrastructural projects. It is a rather sad reflection on the impact of the international intervention that the first anniversary of the U.S. intervention was marked by a protest against the presence of foreign troops in Haiti and the government's privatization plans.[141] It is civil society which has proved its ability to breathe life into weak democratic institutions and give them force. Ignoring this fact may ultimately play into the hands of the paramilitaries who may not need much encouragement to try and rule the country again.

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___, Ives Marie Chanel. "Welcome Mat no Longer Out for Haitians". 26 January 1995.

___, Deby Nash. "Bahamas-Haiti: Refugees Go Underground to Avoid Repatriation". 26 January 1995.

___, Ives Marie Chanel. "Haiti-Economy: Refugees Take to Sea Again, Others are Forced Back". 1 February 1995.

___, Dan Coughlin. "Haiti-Refugees: Life Still Hard After Aristide's Second Coming". 22 August 1995.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Paper Laws Steel Bayonets: The Breakdown of the Rule of Law in Haiti. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. November 1990.

___, Haiti: A Human Rights Nightmare. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 1992

Martin, Ian. "Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism". Foreign Policy, No. 95 (Summer 1994).

___, "The Human Rights Situation in Haiti and its Implications", (Testimony of Ian Martin before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee). Washington. 28 June 1994.

Nairn, Allan. "Aristide Banks on Austerity". Multinational Monitor. July/August 1994.

___, "The Eagle is Landing". The Nation. 3 October 1994.

___, "Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries". The Nation. 24 October 1994.

National Labor Committee Education Fund Delegation. Haiti After the Coup: Sweatshop or Real Development. New York: National Labor Committee. April 1993.

Newsweek [New York]. "Getting Ready". 25 July 1994.

___, "Haiti: Running into Trouble". 3 October 1994.

The New York Times. "U.S. Expects UN to Toughen Haiti Embargo". 29 April 1994.

New York Times News Service. Richard D. Lyons. "UN Envoy Pessimistic about Holding Orderly Election in Haiti". 4 November 1994.

___, Larry Rohter. "Legal Vacuum in Haiti is Testing U.S. Policy". 4 November 1994.

Organization of American States. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc.9 rev. Washington: Organization of American States. 11 February 1994.

Reuters. "Rise in Haitian Repatriations Prompts Exodus Fears". 19 May 1994.

___, "Text of Resolution Authorizing Haiti Invasion". 31 July 1994.

___, "U.S. Admits Concern about Haiti Arms Problem". 20 October 1994.

___, "U.S. Hopes to Cut Troops in Haiti in Early 1995". 23 October 1994.

___, David Lawsky. "Temporary Police Start Training in Haiti". 23 October 1994.

___, Andrew Downie. "Dozens at Large After Haiti Jailbreak". 31 October 1994.

___, Andrew Downie. "International Donors Promise Haiti $600 Million". 20 November 1994.

___, "Haiti Government Sends Delegation to Refugee Camp". 25 November 1994.

___, Andrew Downie. "Hundreds Protest against Release of Alleged Gunman". 2 December 1994.

___, "UN to Appeal Urgently for $77 million for Haiti". 2 December 1994.

___, Carol Giacomo. "U.S., UN Map Haiti Transition Plans". 5 December 1994.

___, Randall Mikkelsen. "Haiti Orders Military Cutbacks, Moves on Elections". 13 December 1994.

___, Patricia Zengerle. "Haitians Forcibly Repatriated from U.S. Camps". 6 January 1995.

___, "Haitian Children at Guantanamo to be Moved Out". 22 May 1995.

___, Sandra Marquez. "Fear Hampers Haiti"s Drive Against Rights Violators". 1 September 1995.

Review of Current Events: Latin America and the Caribbean. WriteNet. 1-15 October 1994 (UNHCR/CDR RefWorld Databases).

___, WriteNet. 1-30 June 1995 (UNHCR/CDR RefWorld Databases).

Schulz, Donald E. and Marcella, Gabriel. Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. 1994.

Texier, Philippe. Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights, E/CN.4/1989/40. Geneva: United Nations. 6 February 1990.

This Week in Haiti [New York]. "Cosmetic Actions Disguise Support for Death Squads". 5-11 October 1994.

___, "Guantanamo Refugees Forced Back to Haiti in Handcuffs". 11-17 January 1995.

___, "Mallebranche Forced to Resign". 1-7 February 1995.

___, "U.S. Occupation Forces Want to Stay in Haiti Indefinitely". 12-18 April 1995.

___, "New 'School of the Americas' for Haiti's Police". 5-11 July 1995.

U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993 - Haiti. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1994.

United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. (UNHCR/CDR RefWorld Databases).

UN General Assembly. The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti. A/49/926. New York: United Nations. 29 June 1995.

UN Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti. S/1995/46. New York: United Nations. 17 January 1995.

United Press International. 8 September 1995 (Compuserve).

Wargny, Christophe. "Véritable objectif de Washington en Haïti: L'élimination programmée du Président Aristide". Le Monde Diplomatique. April 1994.

Washington Office on Haiti. Text and Talking Points of the September 18 Agreement signed by Jimmy Carter and Emile Jonaissant. September 1994.

The Washington Post. Todd Robberson. "Haiti's Old Police Still Daunt U.S. Effort at Building New Force". 3 November 1994.

___, Edward Cody. "Haitians, Starved for Justice, Try to Repair Rusted System". 22 November 1994.

___, Douglas Farah. "GIs in Haiti Avoid Mediating Local Feuds, but Regional Bosses Make it Hard". 29 November 1994.

 

The views expressed in the papers are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of UNHCR.

 



[1]. There were only 16,000 troops in Haiti by 23 October 1994. On 7 November 1994, Colonel Barry Willey announced that a further 9,000 troops would return home by Christmas. Reuters, 23 October 1994; Associated Press, 7 November 1994.

[2]. Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994) p. 3.

[3]. For a good history of the "Duvalier era", see James Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

[4]. Americas Watch/National Coalition for Haitian Refugees/Caribbean Rights, The More Things Change ... Human Rights in Haiti, (New York: Americas Watch, February 1989), p. 17.

[5]. Haitian Information Bureau, "Chronology" in James Ridgeway (ed.), The Haiti Files, (Washington D.C.: Essential Books, 1994), p. 205.

[6]. Constitution de la République d'Haiti, (Port-au-Prince: Deschamps, 29 March 1987).

[7]. For further details, see Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Paper Laws, Steel Bayonets: The Breakdown of the Rule of Law in Haiti, (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, November 1990), pp 21-3.

[8]. Philippe Texier, Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights, E/CN.4/1989/40, (Geneva: United Nations, 6 February 1990), para. 89 and 48.

[9]. Marco Tulio Bruni Celli, Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, A/49/513, (New York: United Nations, 14 October 1994), Annex para. 24.

[10]. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Paper Laws, Steel Bayonets, p. 35.

[11]. ibid., pp. 38-43.

[12]. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Haiti: A Human Rights Nightmare, 1992, pp 3-4 & 7.

[13]. Amnesty International, Haiti, on the Horns of a Dilemma: Military Repression or Foreign Invasion?, [AMR 36/33/94], (London: Amnesty International, August 1994), pp 2-3.

[14]. J. Ferguson, Researcher, Latin America Bureau, London. Personal Interview, 21 September 1995.

[15]. Human Rights Watch/Americas and National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Terror Prevails in Haiti: Human Rights Violations and Failed Diplomacy, (New York: Human Rights Watch/Americas, April 1994), p. 11.

[16]. J. Ferguson, Researcher, Latin America Bureau, London. Personal Interview, 21 September 1995.

[17]. For instance the attack on the Ecumenical Centre for Human Rights on 5 October 1993 referred to in Organization of American States, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc.9 rev., (Washington: Organization of American States, 11 February 1994), para. 238.

[18]. Ian Martin, "Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism", Foreign Policy, No. 95 (Summer 1994), p. 82.

[19]. See "The Human Rights Situation in Haiti and its Implications", (Testimony of Ian Martin before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee), (Washington, 28 June 1994), pp. 3-4. However, there is some suspicion that the ICM was evacuated because its condemnation of military and police officers impeded the political negotiations which were based on a broad amnesty for the coup leaders. See F. Andreu, "The International Community in Haiti: Evidence of the New World Order", in Institute of Latin American Studies, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the United States, Occasional Papers No. 6, (London: ILAS, 1994), p. 27.

[20]. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993 - Haiti, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p 4.

[21]. International Civilian Mission, "Report" in UN General Assembly, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, A/48/532, (New York, United Nations, 25 October 1993), para. 32-38.

[22]. Ian Martin, "The Human Rights Situation", pp. 4-5.

[23]. Americas Watch/National Coalition For Haitian Refugees, Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti, (New York: Americas Watch, February 1993), pp. 3-4.

[24]. Americas Watch/National Coalition For Haitian Refugees, Silencing a People, pp. 8-10.

[25]. Emmanuel Constant quoted in Allan Nairn, "Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries", The Nation, 24 October 1994, p. 18.

[26]. Ferguson, pp. 63-5.

[27]. Ian Guest, Repression in Haiti: A Challenge for Multilateralism, (Washington D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 22 October 1993), p. 20.

[28]. A strong case for the exodus as the only form of protest against the régime that was possible is made by Laënnec Hurbon in Chapter 2 of Comprendre Haïti: Essai sur l'Etat, la nation, la culture, (Paris: Karthala, 1987), pp. 25-38.

[29]. Americas Watch/National Coalition For Haitian Refugees/Jesuit Refugee Service USA, No Port in a Storm: The Misguided Use of In-Country Refugee Processing in Haiti, (New York: Americas Watch, September 1993), p. 6.

[30]. Ian Martin, "The Human Rights Situation", p. 10.

[31]. United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 33(1) (UNHCR/CDR Refworld Databases)

[32]. Americas Watch/National Coalition For Haitian Refugees/Jesuit Refugee Service USA, No Port in a Storm, p. 7.

[33]. See Anne Fuller: "Persecution of Haitian Refugees Forcibly Returned to Haiti", Memorandum, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, 21 April 1994.

[34]. Human Rights Watch/Americas, Jesuit Refugee Service USA, National Coalition For Haitian Refugees, Fugitives from Injustice: The Crisis of Internal Displacement in Haiti, (New York: Human Rights Watch/Americas, August 1994), p. 2.

[35]. International Civilian Mission, "Report" in UN General Assembly, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, A/48/532/Add. 3 & Corr. 1, (New York: United Nations, 27 July 1994), para. 69.

[36]. Allan Nairn, "The Eagle is Landing", The Nation, 3 October 1994, p. 346.

[37]. See Mark Danner, "The Fall of the Prophet", The New York Review of Books, 2 December 1993, p. 52.

[38]. See Ian Martin, "The Human Rights Situation", pp. 7-8.

[39]. Mark Danner, "The Fall of the Prophet", p. 44 note 6.

[40]. A. Corten, "The Dominican Republic Elections and the United Nations Embargo against Haiti" in Institute of Latin American Studies, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the United States, Occasional Papers No. 6, (London: ILAS, 1994), p. 6.

[41]. See Christophe Wargny, "Véritable objectif de Washington en Haïti: L'élimination programmée du président Aristide", Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1994, p. 20. He argues forcefully that the aim of the embargo and other elements of Washington policy were to "empêcher le retour au pouvoir d'un dirigeant porteur des espérances d'un peuple humilié".

[42]. Christophe Wargny, "Véritable objectif de Washington", p 20.

[43]. Organization of American States, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, para. 155.

[44]. Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, pp. 1-2

[45]. The military/police mission was intended to subsume the International Civilian Mission under a unified administration.

[46]. Bruni Celli, Interim Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, para. 111-117.

[47]. See Christophe Wargny, "Véritable objectif de Washington", p. 20.

[48]. Human Rights Watch/Americas, Jesuit Refugee Service USA, National Coalition For Haitian Refugees, Fugitives From Injustice, p. 4.

[49]. The New York Times, "U.S. Expects UN to Toughen Haiti Embargo", 29 April 1994.

[50]. Reuters, "Rise in Haitian Repatriations Prompts Exodus Fears", 19 May 1994.

[51]. Newsweek [New York], "Getting Ready", 25 July 1994.

[52]. Quoted in Bruni Celli, Interim Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, para. 132.

[53]. Bruni Celli, Interim Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, para. 136.

[54]. Bruni Celli, Interim Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, para. 146.

[55]. Newsweek [New York], "Haiti: Running into Trouble", 3 October 1994, p. 11.

[56]. Newsweek [New York], "Haiti: Running into Trouble", 3 October 1994, pp. 12-13.

[57]. See Washington Office on Haiti, Text and Talking Points of the September 18 Agreement signed by Jimmy Carter and Emile Jonaissant, (Washington: Washington office on Haiti, September 1994) and Amnesty International USA, Haiti: Human Rights Ignored in Haiti Agreement, News Release, New York, 20 September 1994.

[58]. This Week in Haiti [New York], "Cosmetic Actions Disguise Support for Death Squads", 5-11 October 1994.

[59]. The Guardian [London], Maggie O'Kane, "Haiti's Hard Men Give Up Quietly", 4 October 1994.

[60]. InterPress Service, "Haiti: Extreme Right-Wing Group Accepts Aristide's Return", 5 October 1994.

[61]. Chronology from Review of Current Events: Latin America and the Caribbean [UNHCR/CDR RefWorld Databases], 1-15 October 1994.

[62]. Haiti Info [Florida], "A Government to Please the U.S. Administration and the Bourgeoisie", 19 November 1994. Aristide's first choice for prime minister, Claudette Werleigh, is now Foreign Minister.

[63]. Most of these attacks were on property belonging to army officers or attachés. See for instance Associated Press, "Mob Burns Down 15 Houses, Including Family Home of Army Chief", 18 October 1994.

[64]. Haiti Info [Florida], "Section Chiefs Abolished", 5 November 1994.

[65]. Associated Press, "Downing: U.S. Can't be Haiti's Police Force", 18 October 1994.

[66]. The Guardian [London], Jonathan Freedland, "Sergeant Steve wants his US 'heroes' out of Haiti", 22 October 1994.

[67]. Reuters, Andrew Downie, "Hundreds Protest Against Release of Alleged Gunman", 2 December 1994.

[68]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Disturbance Breaks Out when Multinational Soldiers Free Pro-Coup Gunman", 3 December 1994.

[69]. E.g. Les Cayes. See Associated Press, "80 Year Old Mayor Tries to Hold Haitian Town Together (Les Cayes)", 21 November 1994.

[70]. E.g. Terre-nette: The Washington Post, Douglas Farah, "GIs in Haiti Avoid Mediating Local Feuds, but Regional Bosses Make it Hard", 29 November 1994.

[71]. Haiti Support Group [London], "Report on Trip to Haiti, 11 October - 7 November 1994 by Charles Arthur", 15 November 1994.

[72]. New York Times News Service, Richard D. Lyons, "UN Envoy Pessimistic about Holding Orderly Election in Haiti", 4 November 1994.

[73]. Associated Press, "Brutal Political Murder Seeks to Intimidate Haiti's Democratic Forces", 13 November 1994.

[74]. Associated Press, "Monitors Find Weapons in Capital: UN Envoy Wraps Up Visit", 29 October 1994.

[75]. Reuters, "Text of Resolution Authorizing Haiti Invasion", 31 July 1994.

[76]. Reuters, "U.S. Admits Concern about Haiti Arms Problem", 20 October 1994.

[77]. Associated Press, Ron Fournier, "Clinton Administration is Cool to Aristide's Disarmament Proposal", 27 November 1994.

[78]. UN General Assembly, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, A/49/926, (New York: United Nations, 29 June 1995), para. 9.

[79]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Mayoral Candidate Shot and Wounded", 29 May 1995.

[80]. See Review of Current Events: Latin America and the Caribbean [UNHCR/CDR RefWorld Databases], 1-30 June 1995.

[81]. InterPress Service, Ives Marie Chanel, "Gains in Human Rights Face New Threats", 17 January 1995.

[82]. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti, S/1995/46, (New York: United Nations, 17 January 1995), para. 16-18.

[83]. InterPress Service, "Haiti-U.S.: Pentagon Announces First Killing of U.S. Soldier", 12 January 1995.

[84]. Reuters, Carol Giacomo, "U.S., UN Map Haiti Transition Plans", 5 December 1994.,

[85]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "U.S. Secretary-General Arrives in Haiti", 31 March 1995.

[86]. Associated Press, Louis Meixler, "Boutros-Ghali Warns Against Unrealistic Expectations", 28 March 1995 and Associated Press, 31 March 1995.

[87]. This Week in Haiti [New York], "U.S. Occupation Forces Want to Stay in Haiti Indefinitely", 12-18 April 1995.

[88]. UN General Assembly, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, para. 8.

[89]. The Montreal-based International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development has produced a draft proposal for a Truth Commission after a request from President Aristide in January 1994. See Associated Press, Lisa Hamm, "Aristide Honors Political Victims as Thoughts Turn to Justice", 2 November 1994.

[90]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Armed Forces Reform Law Passed, New Supreme Court Appointed", 2 December 1994.

[91]. InterPress Service, Ives Marie Chanel and Variot Serant, "Haiti: Generals Without an Army", 10 January 1995.

[92]. InterPress Service, 10 January 1995.

[93]. Human Rights Watch/Americas, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Haiti, Security Compromised: Recycled Haitian Soldiers on the Police Front Line, (New York: Human Rights Watch/Americas, March 1995), pp 22-3.

[94]. Reuters, David Lawsky, "Temporary Police Start Training in Haiti", 23 October 1994.

[95]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Haitian Boat People Return as Interim Police", 10 December 1994.

[96]. The Washington Post, Todd Robberson, "Haiti's Old Police Still Daunt U.S. Effort at Building New Force", 3 November 1994.

[97]. Human Rights Watch/Americas, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Security Compromised, p. 4.

[98]. Haiti Info [Fort Lauderdale], "Power Struggle: U.S. Wants to Control New Police", 22 October 1994.

[99]. Reuters, Andrew Downie, "Dozens at Large After Haiti Jailbreak", 31 October 1994.

[100]. Human Rights Watch/Americas, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Security Compromised, p. 3.

[101]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Core of Haiti's New Police Force Graduates", 5 June 1995.

[102]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Dozens of Interim Policemen Desert as New Police Begin Foot Patrols", 13 June 1995.

[103]. Associated Press, "Armed Forces Reform Law Passed, New Supreme Court Appointed", 2 December 1994.

[104]. The Washington Post, Edward Cody, "Haitians, Starved for Justice, Try to Repair Rusted System", 22 November 1994.

[105]. New York Times News Service, Larry Rohter, "Legal Vacuum in Haiti is Testing U.S. Policy", 4 November 1994.

[106]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "FRAPH Leader Refuses to Appear in Court, Aristide Flies to Miami", 9 December 1994.

[107]. This Week in Haiti [New York], "Mallebranche Forced to Resign", 1-7 February 1995.

[108]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Army Officer Sentenced in First Judgement for Crimes Committed During Coup", 1 July 1995.

[109]. Reuters, Sandra Marquez, "Fear Hampers Haiti's Drive Against Righs Violators", 1 September 1995.

[110]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "UN Mission Denounces Human Rights Abuses in Haiti's Judicial System", 16 August 1995.

[111]. For a more detailed discussion, see P. Golberger, J-C Jean, M. Maesschalk, Questions et perspectives pour un véritable debat autour de la conjoncture politique, (Port-au-Prince: Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque, May 1995), pp. 8-11.

[112]. Associated Press, Alexander G. Higgins, "Rights Investigator Urges World to Help Government Start Working", 1 March 1995.

[113]. Schultz and Marcella, p. 3.

[114]. Associated Press, Chris Torchia, "Death Toll from Gordon Reaches 531 in Haiti", 17 November 1994.

[115]. Allan Nairn, "Aristide Banks on Austerity", in Multinational Monitor, July/August 1994.

[116]. Reuters, Andrew Downie, "International Donors Promise Haiti $600 Million", 20 November 1994 and Haiti Info [Fort Lauderdale], "'SAP': The Outcome of a Policy of Capitulation", 11 February 1995.

[117]. Schultz and Marcella, p. 5.

[118]. Reuters, "UN to Appeal Urgently for $77 million for Haiti", 2 December 1994.

[119]. Associated Press, "U.S. to Provide Support for Investment in Haiti", 14 December 1994.

[120]. For an insight into the impact of U.S. assembly industries in Haiti, see: National Labor Committee Education Fund Delegation, Haiti After the Coup: Sweatshop or Real Development, (New York: National Labor Committee, April 1993).

[121]. Haiti Info [Fort Lauderdale], "Behind 'Lavi Chè' (High Cost of Living)", 17 June 1995.

[122]. United Press International, 8 September 1995, (Compuserve).

[123]. Reuters, "Haiti Government Sends Delegation to Refugee Camp", 25 November 1994.

[124]. John Bevan, Former International Civilian Mission Base Coordinator, Personal Interview, 1 September 1995.

[125]. Associated Press, George Gedda, "U.S. Induces Haitians at Guantanamo to Go Home", 14 December 1994.

[126]. Associated Press, Tracy Fields, "Marines in Riot Gear Round Up Haitians for Forced Return", 6 January 1995.

[127]. Associated Press, 14 December 1994.

[128]. Reuters, Patricia Zengerle, "Haitians Forcibly Repatriated from U.S. Camps", 6 January 1995 and This Week in Haiti [New York], "Guantanamo Refugees Forced Back to Haiti in Handcuffs", 11-17 January 1995.

[129]. InterPress Service, "UN Organization Against Forced Repatriation", 10 January 1995.

[130]. Reuters, "Haitian Children at Guantanamo to be Moved Out", 22 May 1995.

[131]. Associated Press, George Gedda, "Charter Flight Ends Era at Guantanamo", 30 June 1995.

[132]. InterPress Service, Ives Marie Chanel, "Welcome Mat no Longer Out for Haitians", 26 January 1995 and InterPress Service, Deby Nash, "Bahamas-Haiti: Refugees Go Underground to Avoid Repatriation", 26 January 1995.

[133]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, 6 September 1995 (Compuserve).

[134]. InterPress Service, Ives Marie Chanel, "Haiti-Economy: Refugees Take to Sea Again, Others are Forced Back", 1 February 1995.

[135]. Associated Press, 6 September 1995, (Compuserve).

[136]. InterPress Service, Dan Coughlin, "Haiti-Refugees: Life Still Hard After Aristide's Second Coming", 22 August 1995.

[137]. Charles Arthur, "Fractured State", Index on Censorship, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July/August 1995), pp 12-14.

[138]. This Week in Haiti [New York], "New "School of the Americas" for Haiti's Police", 5-11 July 1995.

[139]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Strobe Talbott Tries to End Parties' Boycott of Electoral Process", 17 August 1995.

[140]. Charles Arthur, "Fractured State", Index on Censorship, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July/August 1995), pp 12-14.

[141]. Associated Press, Michael Norton, "Haitians Protest Presence of Foreign Troops, Privatization Plans", 19 September 1995.

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