2009 Country Reports on Terrorism - Madagascar
|Publisher||United States Department of State|
|Publication Date||5 August 2010|
|Cite as||United States Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism - Madagascar, 5 August 2010, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c63b636b.html [accessed 29 November 2015]|
Despite several steps taken in 2008 to counter terrorism, progress stalled in 2009 due to a political crisis that weakened government operations. Following an unconstitutional change of government in March, the United States had limited engagement with the de facto authorities, who did demonstrate a willingness to cooperate in law enforcement matters, however. The government budget suffered due to a suspension of foreign aid programs, negatively affecting public investment throughout the island.
To combat terrorist threats, the government previously created the Central Counterterrorism Service within the Ministry of Interior to work with INTERPOL and to provide information within the framework of regional and international cooperation. It also created a special counterterrorism branch within the Central Intelligence Service. These entities continued to function during the year, but did not fulfill their full roles.
The Financial Intelligence Unit (SAMIFIN) launched in June 2008 to combat money laundering, including terrorist finance, remained nominally operational, but its work was seriously limited by budget constraints.
Although the Malagasy government took steps to create a coast guard to improve maritime security and border control in 2008, no further progress was made in 2009, and the coast guard was not yet operational. Parliament was disbanded after the March coup, so no action was taken on a draft 2008 bill that would have implemented the provisions of several universal counterterrorism instruments, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373.
Political unrest and limited resources severely constrained Madagascar's ability to confront a potential terrorist threat. The Malagasy authorities lacked the capacity to effectively monitor suspect organizations, control suspicious financial transactions, identify terrorist suspects, and control the movement of people and goods across its borders.