Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 - Indonesia
|Publisher||United States Department of State|
|Author||Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism|
|Publication Date||29 April 2004|
|Cite as||United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 - Indonesia, 29 April 2004, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/468107c322.html [accessed 12 February 2016]|
In the wake of the Bali bombing on 12 October, the Indonesian Government stepped up internal investigations against international terrorist groups, although it had provided limited support for the global Coalition against terrorism before this event. Indonesia participated in a number of regional and international fora focused on terrorism and supported declarations on joint action against terrorism, including the declarations issued at the US-sponsored Southeast Asian Counter-Terrorism Conference, the ASEAN Summit, and a regional conference on combating terrorist financing. Internal administrative and legal weaknesses, however, hampered indigenous counterterrorism efforts.
Jakarta's response to the 12 October terrorist attacks in Bali represented a major and multifaceted counterterrorism effort. Jakarta undertook a number of significant actions, including the quick adoption of antiterrorism decrees (PERPU), the introduction into the legislature of a counterterrorism bill, and an aggressive investigation into the Bali attacks in particular. Jakarta, with international assistance, has taken action against Jemaah Islamiya (JI), an organization now designated by the United States pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list of organizations and individuals, whose assets UN member states are required to freeze. Indonesia supported this designation. Authorities detained JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir and arrested members of the JI cell believed responsible for the Bali bombings, including JI leaders Imam Samudra and Ali Ghufron, a.k.a. Mukhlas.
The 12 October Bali terrorist bombings, which killed some 200 persons and maimed hundreds more, has been clearly attributed to the al-Qaida-linked terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya. The attack in Bali's crowded Kuta tourist district was initiated with a possible suicide bombing inside a tourist bar that funneled panicking victims into the street, exposing the crowd to the full blast of a large car bomb parked next to a neighboring club.
A smaller, nearly simultaneous bombing occurred about 300 yards from the US Consular office in Bali. Those arrested have indicated that the consular agency was the target. Hours before the Bali bombings, a small explosion had occurred at the Philippine Consulate in Sulawesi, which damaged the compound gates and blew out several windows. No casualties were reported in either bombing. Other bombings in 2002 in Indonesia included a botched grenade attack on a US diplomatic residence in Jakarta in September and the bombing on 4 December of a US-based/owned fast-food franchise and a car dealership in Makassar.
In 2002, Indonesia did not discover or freeze any terrorist assets. Indonesia's weak rule of law and poorly regulated financial system have produced roadblocks in uncovering terrorist assets, notwithstanding its willingness to freeze terrorist assets, consistent with the requirements of UNSCR 1373, as well as UNSCRs 1267, 1390, and 1455.
Indonesia is a party to four of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.